Order Code RS21968
Updated January 31February 14, 2008
Iraq: Government Formation and Benchmarks
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The current government is the product of a U.S.-supported election process
designed to produce a democracy, although many now believe it produced a sectarian
government incapable of reconciling Iraq’s communities. This sentiment has grown to
the point where some believe that the United States should seek a decentralized Iraq
with substantial autonomy for each community. However, the Administration says that,
partly as a result of the U.S. “troop surge,” it is now seeing some concrete signs of
political accommodation, most notably at local levels. See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq:
Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.
Elections and Constitutional Referendum in 2005
After about one year of formal occupation, the United States handed sovereignty to
an appointed Iraqi government on June 28, 2004. A government and a constitution were
voted on thereafter, in line with a March 8, 2004, Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).
The first election (January 30, 2005) was for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly,
provincial assemblies in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces (41 seats each; 51 for Baghdad), and
a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). The election system was proportional
representation (closed list) — voters chose among “political entities” (a party, a coalition
of parties, or individuals). A female candidate occupied every third position on electoral
lists in order to ensure 25% female membership. A total of 111 entities were on the
national ballot, of which nine were multi-party coalitions.
In all 2005 votes, vehicle traffic was banned, Iraq’s borders were closed, and polling
centers were guarded primarily by Iraq’s security forces (ISF), with U.S. forces as backup.
Violence did not disrupt voting. As shown in the table at the end of this paper, the
January election was dominated by the Shiite Islamist “United Iraqi Alliance” (UIA),
consisting mainly of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),
which in May 2007changed its named to the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), and
the Da’wa Party, as well as the Kurds, and a few secular parties. The two main Kurdish
parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) offered a joint list. Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population), perceiving
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electoral defeat, mostly boycotted and won only 17 seats and very few provincial council
seats. Sunnis won only one seat on Baghdad province’s 51-seat council. The factions
formed an interim national government that U.S. officials said was not sufficiently
inclusive of Sunnis, although it had Sunnis as Assembly speaker, deputy president, deputy
prime minister, defense minister, and five other ministers. The presidency went to PUK
leader Jalal Talabani and Da’wa leader Ibrahim al-Jafari became Prime Minister.
Permanent Constitution and Referendum. The elected Assembly was to
draft a constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005,
subject to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any three provinces. On May 10,
2005, the Assembly appointed a 55-member drafting committee which included only two
Sunni Arabs, although 15 Sunnis were later added as full members and 10 more as
advisors. In August 2005, the talks produced a draft that set a December 31, 2007,
deadline to hold a referendum on whether Kirkuk will join the Kurdish region (Article
140); designated Islam “a main source” of legislation and said no law can contradict the
“established” provisions of Islam (Article 2);1 set a 25% electoral goal for women (Article
47); allowed families to choose which courts to use for family issues such as divorce and
inheritance (Article 41); made only primary education mandatory (Article 34); and said
that the federal supreme court would include Islamic law experts and civil law judges and
experts (Article 89). These provisions concerned many women who fear that too much
discretion was given to males of their families, and many women say the provision is
being misused by Islamic extremists in southern Iraq and elsewhere to impose, including
through killings, restrictions against women. Sunni Arabs (20% of the
overall population), perceiving electoral defeat, mostly boycotted and won only 17 seats
and very few provincial council seats. Sunnis won only one seat on Baghdad province’s
51-seat council. The faction of radical Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr also mostly
boycotted the provincial elections because he was opposing the U.S.-led political process;
his supporters did not win many seats on the provincial councils of the mostly Shiite
south. After the elections, an interim national government was formed that U.S. officials
said was not sufficiently inclusive of Sunnis, although it had Sunnis as Assembly speaker,
deputy president, deputy prime minister, defense minister, and five other ministers. The
presidency went to Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani and Da’wa
leader Ibrahim al-Jafari became Prime Minister.
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Permanent Constitution. The elected Assembly was to draft a constitution by
August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a twothirds majority of voters in any three provinces. On May 10, 2005, the Assembly
appointed a 55-member drafting committee which included only two Sunni Arabs,
although 15 Sunnis were later added as full members and 10 more as advisors. In August
2005, the talks produced a draft that set a December 31, 2007, deadline to hold a
referendum on whether Kirkuk will join the Kurdish region (Article 140); designated
Islam “a main source” of legislation and said no law can contradict the “established”
provisions of Islam (Article 2);1 set a 25% electoral goal for women (Article 47); allowed
families to choose which courts to use for family issues such as divorce and inheritance
(Article 41); made only primary education mandatory (Article 34); and said that the
federal supreme court would include Islamic law experts and civil law judges and experts
(Article 89). These provisions concerned many women who fear that too much discretion
was given to males of their families, and many women say the provision is being misused
by Islamic extremists in southern Iraq and elsewhere to impose, including through
killings, restrictions against women. Article 126 made all orders of the U.S.-led
occupation authority (Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA), applicable until amended.
The major disputes were — and continue to be — centered on the draft’s allowing
two or more provinces together to form new autonomous “regions” and to allocate oil
revenues. Article 117 allowed each “region” to organize internal security forces, which
would legitimize the fielding of militias, including the Kurds’ peshmerga (allowed by the
TAL). Article 109 required the central government to distribute oil and gas revenues from
“current fields” in proportion to population, and gave “regions” a role in allocating
revenues from new energy discoveries. Sunnis opposed the draft on these grounds; Sunnidominated areas of Iraq have few oil or gas deposits, although some oil fields might lie
in Anbar Province. Article 62 established a “Federation Council,” a second chamber
with its size and powers to be determined by subsequent law (not passed to date).
With contentious provisions unresolved, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%85%) to try to defeat it, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11) providing for
a panel to propose amendments within four months after a post-December 15 election
government took office (Article 137). The amendments would require a majority
Assembly vote of approval and, within another two months, would be put to a referendum
under the same rules as the October 15 referendum. However, in the referendum, the
Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively.
Mostly Sunni Nineveh province voted 55% “no,” which meant that the constitution was
adopted (only two provinces, not three, voted “no” by a two-thirds majority).
December 15, 2005 Elections. In the December 15, 2005, elections for a four
year government, a formula was adopted to attract Sunni participation; each province
1
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
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contributed a predetermined number of seats to a “Council of Representatives” (COR).
Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were allocated this way, with 45 “compensatory” seats
for entities that would have won additional seats had the constituency been the whole
nation. 361 political “entities” registered, of which 19 were multi-party coalitions. The
UIA slate formally included Sadr’s faction as well as other hard line Shiite parties
including Fadilah (Virtue). The major Sunni slate was a three-party “Iraq Consensus
Front” led by the Iraq Islamic Party (IIP), which had entered but then withdrew from the
January elections. Another major Sunni faction (National Iraqi Dialogue Front) ran
separately. The hardline Muslim Scholars Association (MSA) did not participate,
although it did not, as it had in January, call for a Sunni boycott. Violence was minor
because Sunni insurgents, supporting greater Sunni inclusion, facilitated voting. Still,
voters chose lists representing their sects and regions, and the UIA and the Kurds
dominated the new COR, with nearly two-thirds of seats.
The COR was inaugurated on March 16, but quickly began wrangling over posts.
Kurdish and As
shown in the table below, voters chose lists representing their sects and regions, and the
1
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
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UIA and the Kurds again dominated the elected COR, as they had in the January election.
The full term COR was inaugurated on March 16, but wrangling ensued and Kurdish and
other opposition caused the UIA to agree to Jafari’s Da’wa deputy, Nuri
Kamal al-Maliki,
as Prime Minister. On April 22, the COR approved Talabani to continue
as president,
and selected his two deputies — ISCI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) and
Consensus Front/IIP leader Tariq al-Hashimi. Anotherof the Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Tariq al-Hashimi, leader of the Consensus Front. Another
Consensus Front figure, the hardline
Mahmoud Mashhadani (National Dialogue Council
party), was chosen COR speaker.
Maliki won COR majority vote approval of a 37-member37member cabinet (including himself and
two deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006.
Three key slots (Defense, Interior, and
National Security) were not filled permanently
until June 8 because of infighting. Of the
37 posts, there were 9 Sunnis; 8 Kurds; 19
Shiites; and 1 Christian. Four are women.
Iraqi Performance on Benchmarks and Reconciliation
In August 2006, the Administration and the Iraqi government agreed on a series of
“benchmarks” that, if adopted and implemented, would presumably achieve political
reconciliation. Under Section 1314 of a FY2007 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 11028), “progress” on eighteen political and security-related benchmarks — as assessed in
Administration reports due by July 15 and September 15 — was required for the United
States to provide $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Iraq. The president
indicated intent to use the waiver provision to provide the aid. The law mandated a
separate assessment by
the GAO, by September 1, 2007, of the degree to which the
benchmarks have been actually
achieved, as well as an assessment of the Iraqi security
forces (ISF) by an outside
commission (headed by ret. Gen James Jones). Results of the
assessments, as well as
subsequent actionslegislative actions and implementation, are shown in the chart below.
Many experts
agree that there has not been substantial movement toward national political
reconciliation, but recent progress on some of the laws and on other issues – such as
November 2007 passage of a law to provide pensions to Saddam-era workers and the
January 2008 passage of the De-Baathification reform law – are cited by the
Administration as concrete signs of growing reconciliation. The COR also fulfilled a
related “benchmark” (not part of those named in P.L. 110-28 but cited by the Iraqi
themselves, by passing a law (January 22, 2008) adopting a new national flag, although
many Iraqi Arabs say the new flag was adopted only because of Kurdish pressure and
some factions refuse to fly it over buildings they control.
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Some question whether a strong, cohesive central government can ever be
established. Although U.S. support for decentralizing Iraq into autonomous regions
(expressed in a Senate amendment to H.R. 4986, P.L. 110-181. FY2008 defense
authorization act) appears to be increasing, Maliki is now widely assessed as having
stabilized politically, helped by a decrease in violence attributed to the U.S. “troop surge.”
Deputy President Hashimi continues to promote reconciliation, signing on to an August
26, 2007, “Unity Accord” — along with Maliki, Talabani, deputy President Adel Abd alMahdi (ISCI) and Kurdish regional president Masoud Barzani — to try to pass the deBaathification law, hold early provincial council elections, and release (mostly Sunni)
detainees. All blocs, including the Consensus Front, have ended their 2007 boycotts of
the COR. Still, the number of vacant cabinet posts is at least 12 out of 37 positions,
reflecting the April 2007 withdrawal of the Sadr faction, the Consensus Front, and the
Allawi bloc from the cabinet. Maliki filled two vacancies (agriculture and health
ministers) in October 2007 with independent Shiites, replacing resigned Sadrists, but
failed in November 2007 to win COR confirmation for new ministers of justice or
communications. The Iraqi Islamic Party, the main faction of the Consensus Front,
reportedly is considering rejoining the cabinet. A relatively positive development came
in December 2007 with agreement by the Kurds to delay the contentious, constitutionally
mandated referendum on Kirkuk until June 2008; it was to be held by December 31. On
the other hand, demonstrating that new alliances are forming across sectarian lines, 120
parliamentarians from Sadr’s faction, Allawi’s faction, and part of the Da’wa Party
members signed a statement on January 13, 2008, opposing Kurdish takeover of Kikuk
and energy deals signed by the Kurds.
Table 2. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Slate/Party
UIA (Shiite Islamist). Now 84 seats. ISCI- 29; Da’wa (two factions) - 25;
independents - 30. Sadr ( 29 seats) and Fadilah (15 seats) left bloc in 2007.
Kurdistan Alliance (PUK and KDP).
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added some mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote
(2 members left the bloc in September 2007, leaving it with 23 seats)
Iraq Consensus Front (Sunni). Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, Saleh al-Mutlak agree that Iraq’s major communities remain sharply divided over their
relative positions in the power structure, but the Administration sees signs of movement,
perhaps attributed to the success of the 2007 “troop surge” in reducing violence. The
February 13, 2008 passage (unanimously, with 206 members voting) of two significant
laws (amnesty law and provincial powers law, discussed below) and the 2008 national
budget, represented clear breakthroughs. The effect on reconciliation will depend on
implementation. The budget had been help up over Iraqi Arab assertions that the 17%
revenue allocation to the Kurdish region was too generous – a figure already agreed to
in previous budgets. The Kurds accepted a national census to determine long term
percentage allocations for the Kurds, and the budget apparently does not fund the Kurds’
peshmerga militia, who are now funded from the Kurds’ own regional funds. This
follows the January 12, 2008 passage of the De-Baathification reform law and the
January 22, 2008 adoption (not part of those named in P.L. 110-28 but cited by the Iraqi
themselves) of a law adopting a new national flag. Many Iraqi Arabs say the new flag was
adopted only because of Kurdish pressure and some factions refuse to fly it. These
recent steps, to some degree, represent achievement of the steps committed to by signed
by Hashimi, Maliki, Talabani, Abd al-Mahdi, and Kurdish regional president Masoud
Barzani in their August 26, 2007, “Unity Accord”.
Others signs point to a political stabilization of Prime Minister Maliki, who was
reeling in mid-2007 by the pullout of the cabinet of several major blocs, including the
Consensus Front, the Sadr faction, and the secular bloc of former Prime Minister Iyad alAllawi. Those withdrawals left the cabinet with about 16 vacant seats out of a 37 seat
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cabinet. As of late 2007, Maliki’s government has strengthened somewhat. Maliki
filled two vacancies (agriculture and health ministers) in October 2007 with independent
Shiites, replacing resigned Sadrists, although he failed in November 2007 to win COR
confirmation for new ministers of justice or communications. At the same time, Minister
of Planning Ali Baban broke with his Consensus Front bloc and rejoined the cabinet,
leaving the cabinet with 13 vacancies. As of February 2008, the Iraqi Islamic Party, the
main faction of the Consensus Front, reportedly is considering rejoining the cabinet. All
blocs, including the Consensus Front, have ended their 2007 boycotts of the COR.
Another positive development came in December 2007 with agreement by the Kurds to
delay the contentious, constitutionally mandated referendum on Kirkuk until June 2008;
it was to be held by December 31. On the other hand, demonstrating that new alliances
are forming across sectarian lines, 120 parliamentarians from Sadr’s faction, Allawi’s
faction, and part of the Da’wa Party members signed a statement on January 13, 2008,
opposing Kurdish takeover of Kirkuk and energy deals signed by the Kurds.
Table 2. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Bloc/Party
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, Shiite Islamist). Now 84 seats after departure
of Fadilah (15 seats) and Sadr faction (29 seats) in 2007. Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq of Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim has 29 seats; Da’wa Party (faction
of Nuri al-Maliki, and a competing faction - 25 seats; and independents - 30.
Sadr faction not formally in UIA for January 2005 election.
Kurdistan Alliance - joint list of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Kurdistan
Democratic Party.
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added some mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote
(2 members left the bloc in September 2007, leaving it with 23 seats)
Iraq Consensus Front. Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote. Consists of Iraqi
Islamic Party (IIP) of Tariq al-Hashimi; National Dialogue Council of
Khalaf Ulayyan; and General People’s Congress of Adnan al-Dulaymi.
Hardline Sunni group Muslim Scholars Association did not join slate but did
not call for election boycott, as it had in January vote.
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, led by former Baathist Saleh alMutlak) Not in Jan. vote
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) (votes with Kurdistan Alliance)
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) pro-Sadr
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Sunni, secular)
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
Seats
(Jan. 05)
Seats
(Dec. 05)
140
128
75
40
53
25
—
—
53
40
25
—
44
—
11
2
—
5
3
3
2
2
1
44
11
5
0
—
1
2
—
0
—
1
1
0
—
1
3
1
1
Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200; Eligible voters: 14 million in January election;
15 million in October referendum and December; Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66%
(10 million)/ December: 75% (12 million).
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Table 1. Assessments of the Benchmarks
Benchmark
July 12
Administration
Report
satisfactory
GAO
Report
unmet
Sept. 14
Administration
Report
satisfactory
unsatisfactory
unmet
satisfactory
3. Enacting and implementing oil laws that ensure
equitable distribution of resources
unsatisfactory
unmet
unsatisfactory
4. Enacting and implementing laws to form semiautonomous regions
5. Enacting and implementing: (a) a law to establish
a higher electoral commission, (b) provincial
elections law; (c) a law to specify authorities of
provincial bodies, and (d) set a date for provincial
elections
satisfactory
partially
met
overall
unmet; (a)
met
6. Enacting and implementing legislation
addressing amnesty for former insurgents
conditions do
not allow a
rating
unmet
conditions do not
allow a rating
7. Enacting and implementing laws on militia
disarmament
8. Establishing political, media, economic, and
services committee to support U.S. Baghdad
“surge”
conditions do
not allow rating
satisfactory
unmet
conditions do not
allow rating
met
1. Forming Constitutional Review Committee
(CRC) and and
completing review
2. Enacting and implementing laws on DeBaathification
satisfactory on
(a) and
unsatisfactory
on the others
met
satisfactory
satisfactory on (a)
and (c).
Subsequent Actions
no progressNo recent discernible progress. Deadlines for CRC
recommendations repeatedly extended, now to May 2008.
“Justice and Accountability Law” passed Jan. 12 unanimously by
143 in COR present. Effect on overall reconciliation depends on
implementation.
Allows about 30,000 lower ranking ex-Baathists
fourth ranking
Baathists to regain their jobs;, and 3,500 Baathists (in top three
party ranks) would
not, but would receive pensions instead. But, the law could allow
for could allow for
judicial prosecution of all ex-Baathists and to firing of about
7,000
ex-Baathists in post-Saddam security services, and bars exSaddam security personnel from regaining jobs.
no passage of oil laws, but revenue being distributed equitably
.
2008 budget adopted February 13, 2008 at least temporarily
maintains existing 17% revenue share for Kurdish region.
Regions law passed October 2006, but main blocs agreed to
moratorium on implementation until April 2008.
Draft law stipulating powers of provincial governments had two
readings but was sent back in December 2007 to the presidency
council for revisions. Several provincial governors pressing for
passage.
January 1, 2008, cabinet submitted to COR draft law to amnesty
5,000 “non-terrorist” detainees held by Iraq, would not affect
25,000 detainees held by U.S. Draft had first reading in COR
on January 21adopted
February 13, 2008, and COR agreed to hold provincial elections
by October 1, 2008. Election law will need to be adopted first.
Some of the nine Higher Election Commission (IHEC) members
to be replaced due to “non-transparent” selection process, despite
passage of IHEC law in May 2007.
Crucial to Sunnis who are the overwhelming majority of detainees
in Iraq, the law to amnesty 5,000 “non-terrorist” detainees held by
Iraq passed on February 13, 2008. However, would not affect
25,000 detainees held by U.S, and, depending on implementation,
might not lead to freedom for other approximately 20,000
detainees held by Iraq.
No progress on disarmament program or related laws
No change
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Benchmark
9. Providing three trained and ready brigades to
support U.S. surge
10. Providing Iraqi commanders with authorities to
make decisions, without political intervention, to
pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and
Shiite militias
July 12
Administration
Report
satisfactory
GAO
Report
Sept. 14
Administration
Report
satisfactory
unsatisfactory
partially
met
unmet
11. Ensuring Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) providing
even-handed enforcement of law
unsatisfactory
unmet
12. Ensuring that the surge plan in Baghdad will not
provide a safe haven for any outlaw, regardless of
sectarian affiliation
13. (a) Reducing sectarian violence and (b)
eliminating militia control of local security
satisfactory
partially
met
Overall mixed.
Satisfactory on
(a) but
unsatisfactory
on (b)
satisfactory
unsatisfactory
unmet
same as July 12
met
unmet
satisfactory
unsatisfactory
satisfactory
met
satisfactory
satisfactory
partially
met
satisfactory
unsatisfactory
unmet
unsatisfactory
14. Establishing Baghdad joint security stations
15. Increasing ISF units capable of operating
independently
16. Ensuring protection of rights of minority parties
in Iraqi parliament
17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in 2007
capital budget for reconstruction projects, on an
equitable basis
18. Ensuring that Iraqi authorities are not
undermining or making false accusations against
ISF members
Mixed: satisfactory
to pursue extremists,
but political
interference
continues
overall mixed.
Satisfactory on Iraqi
military,
unsatisfactory on
police
satisfactory
Subsequent Actions
No change
No significant change
No significant change.
No change. Mahdi Army at reduced level of activity due to
Sadr six month suspension and reported decline in Iranian
weapons shipments. Sadr might not extend suspensionend suspension in later Feb.
Sectarian violence continues to drop, but militias still operating.
7080,000 Sunni “Concerned Local Citizens” and 15,000 tribal
“Awakening” fighters combatting Al Qaeda, but still distrusted
by Maliki government as potential Sunni militia forces. Only
15% of these Sunni fightersCLC’s have been allowed to join ISF.
No change
Continuing but slow progress training ISF. U.S. officials say s
ISF likely unable to secure Iraq internally until 2012; and
against external threats not until 2018-2020.
No change
About 4.5% of the $10 billion spent by August 2007, according
to Iraqi figures. $13 billion more in 2008 Iraqi budget now
debatedadopted
on February 13, 2008.
No change