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Iran Sanctions

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Order Code RS20871 Updated January 23June 27, 2008 The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Summary No firms have been sanctioned under the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), although the GAO reportedand a GAO study in December 2007 said that the effects on Iran’s economy of ISA and of other US sanctions are “difficult to determine.” Legislation in the 109th Congress (P.L. 109-293) extended ISA until December 31, 2011, terminated application to Libya, and added provisions. Legislation in the 110th Congress, such as H.R. 1400 (passed by the House on September 25, 2007), would add still more provisions. See CRS Report RL32048, Iran: other U.S. sanctions on Iran’s economy are “difficult to determine.” Some foreign firms, particularly in Asia, continue to finalize investment deals with Iran, while European firms seem hesitant. In the 110th Congress, H.R. 1400 (passed by the House on September 25, 2007), S. 970, and a similar Senate bill would add ISA provisions. See CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman. Background and Original Passage The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), originally called the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), is one among many U.S. sanctions in place against Iran. It was enacted in a context of tightening U.S. sanctions on Iran, in response to Iran’s stepped up nuclear program and its support to terrorist organizations such as Hizbollah, Hamas, and Palestine Islamic Jihad. The year before enactment, anFor example, Executive Order, 12959 of May 6, 1995, banned U.S. trade with and investment in Iran. The rationale was that these sanctions would curb sanctions were intended to curb the strategic threat from Iran by hindering its attempts to modernize its petroleum sector, which generates about 20% of Iran’s GDP. Iran’s onshore oil fields, as well as its oil industry infrastructure, are aging and need substantial investment, and its large natural gas resources (940 trillion cubic feet, exceeded only by Russia) were undeveloped when ISA was first considered. Iran has 136.3 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the third largest after Saudi Arabia and Canada (according to Oil and Gas Journal, January 2007). In 1995 and 1996, U.S. allies refused to impose sanctions on Iran, and the Clinton Administration and Congress believed that it might be necessary for the United States to try to deter their investment in Iran. The opportunity to do so came in November 1995, when Iran first opened its energy sector to foreign investment. To accommodate its philosophy of retaining control of its national resources, Iran developed a “buy-back” investment program in which foreign firms recoup their investments from the proceeds of oil and gas discoveries but do not receive equity stakes. CRS-2 With input from the Administration, some in Congress developed legislation to sanction such investment. On With input from the CRS-2 Administration, on September 8, 1995, Senator Alfonse D’Amato introduced the “Iran Foreign Oil Sanctions Act” to sanction foreign firms’ exports to Iran of energy technology. The bill passed the Senate on December 18, 1995 (voice vote), but instead but, this version instead sanctioned investment in Iran’s energy sector. On December 20, 1995, the Senate passed a version applying the legislation to Libya as well, which was refusing to yield for trial the two Libyan intelligence agents suspected in the December 21, 1988, bombing of Pan Am 103. The House passed its version of the bill, H.R. 3107, on June 19, 1996 (415-0), and then concurred on a slightly different Senate version adopted on July 16, 1996 (unanimous consent). It was signed on August 5, 1996 (P.L. 104-172). Key Provisions. ISA requires the President to impose at least two out of a menu menu of seven sanctions on foreign companies (entities, persons) that make an “investment” of more than $20 million in one year in Iran’s energy sector.1 The sanctions menu (Section 6) includes include (1) denial of Export-Import Bank loans, credits, or credit guarantees for U.S. exports to the sanctioned entity; (2) denial of licenses for the U.S. export of military or militarily-useful technology to the entity; (3) denial of U.S. bank loans exceeding $10 million in one year to the entity; (4) if the entity is a financial institution, a prohibition on its service as a primary dealer in U.S. government bonds; and/or a prohibition on its serving as a repository for U.S. government funds (each counts as one sanction); (5) prohibition on U.S. government procurement from the entity; and (6) restriction on imports from the entity, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. 1701). In the original law, the President may waive the sanctions on Iran if the parent country of the violating firm agrees to impose economic economic sanctions on Iran (Section 4(c)), or if he certifies that doing so is important to the U.S. national interest (Section 9(c)). It terminates applicationApplication to Iran terminates if Iran ceases its efforts to acquire WMD and is removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. Application to Libya terminated when the President determined on April 23, 2004, that Libya had fulfilled the requirements of all U.N. resolutions on Pan Am 103. Traditionally skeptical of imposing economic sanctions, European Union states opposed ISA as an extraterritorial application of U.S. law. In April 1997, the United States and the EU agreed to avoid a trade confrontation in the World Trade Organization (WTO) over it and a separate Cuba sanctions law, P.L. 104-114). The agreement contributed to a May 18, 1998, decision by the Clinton Administration to waive ISA sanctions (“national interest” grounds — Section 9(c)) on the first project determined to be in violation: a $2 billion2 contract (September 1997) for Total SA of France and its partners, Gazprom of Russia and Petronas of Malaysia to develop phases 2 and 3 of the 25-phase South Pars gas field. The EU pledged to increase cooperation with the United 1 The definition of “investment” in ISA (Section 14 (9)) includes not only equity and royalty arrangements (including additions to existing investment, as added by P.L. 107-24) but also any contract that includes “responsibility for the development of petroleum resources” of Iran, interpreted to include pipelines to or through Iran. The . The definition excludes sales of technology, goods, or services for such projects, and excludes financing of such purchases. For Libya, the threshold was $40 million, and sanctionable activity included export to Libya of technology banned by Pan Am 103-related Security Council Resolutions 748 (March 31, 1992) and 883 (November 11, 1993). 2 Dollar figures for energy investment contracts withinvestments in Iran represent public estimates of the amounts investing firms are expected to spend duringover the life of thea project, which might in some cases be several decades. CRS-3 25-phase South Pars gas field. The EU pledged to increase cooperation with the United States on non-proliferation and counter-terrorism, and the Administration indicated future investments by EU firms in Iran would not be penalized. ISA was to sunset on August 5, 2001, in the context of somewhat improved U.S. relations with both Iran and Libya. During 1999 and 2000, the Clinton Administration had eased the trade ban on Iran somewhat to try to engage the relatively moderate Iranian President Mohammad Khatemi. In 1999, Libya yielded for trial the Pan Am 103 suspects. However, proponents of renewal maintained that both countries would view its expiration as a concession, and renewal legislation was enacted in the 107th Congress (P.L. 107-24, August 3, 2001). This law required an Administration report on ISA’s effectiveness within 24 to 30 months of enactment; that report was submitted to Congress in January 2004 and did not recommend that ISA be repealed. Modifications in the 109th CongressIran Freedom and Support Act Modifications. With U.S. concern about Iran’s nuclear program increasing, ISA was to sunset on August 5, 2006. Members, concerned that foreign companies had begun to ignore ISA, introduced the “Iran Freedom and Support Act” (H.R. 282, S. 333) to extend ISA indefinitely, to increase the requirements to justify waiving sanctions, to set a 90-day time limit for the Administration to determine whether an investment is a violation (there is no time limit in the original law), and to authorize funding for pro-democracy activists in Iran. H.R. 282 (passed by the House on April 26, 2006 by a vote of 397-21) would also have cut U.S. foreign assistance to countries whose companies violate ISA and applied the U.S. trade ban on Iran to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies. To prevent expiration while these bills were being considered, there was a temporary extension until September 29, 2006 (P.L. 109-267). The version that ultimately wasIran Freedom and Support Act version that ultimately passed was H.R. 6198, which addressed Administration demands for flexibility; H.R. 6198 recommended, but did 6198, providing the flexibility demanded by the Administration; it recommends, but does not require, a 180-day time limit for a determination of violation. It made violation determination. It makes sanctionable sales of WMD-useful technology or “destabilizing numbers and types of” advanced conventional weapons, addedadds a required determination that Iran “poses no significant threat” to terminate application to Iran, changed changes the multi-lateral sanctions waiver provision (“4(c) waiver,” see above) to a national security interest waiver, and recommended recommends against U.S. nuclear agreements with countries that supply nuclear technology to Iran. It extendedextends ISA until December 31, 2011, formally dropped Libya, contained a provision to curb money-laundering by criminal groups, terrorists, or proliferators, and formally changed the name of the law to the Iran Sanctions Act 2011, formally dropped Libya (changing the name to the Iran Sanctions Act), and contained a provision to curb moneylaundering. H.R. 6198 was passed by the House and Senate by voice vote and unanimous unanimous consent, respectively, and was signed on September 30, 2006 (P.L. 109-293). Effectiveness and Ongoing Challenges Successive Administrations have argued that ISA has slowed Iran’s energy development, but, as shown by the projects agreed to below and as discussed in a December 2007 report by the GAO, its effect on Iran is difficult to determine. The GAO report (Iran Sanctions: Impact in Furthering U.S. Objectives in Unclear and Should be Reviewed. GAO-08-58, December 2007) contains a chart of post 2003 investments in Iran’s energy sector, totaling over $20 billion in investment, but the GAO table includes petrochemical and refinery projects, as well as projects that mightdo not exceed the $20 million/one year investment threshold. The table below lists oil and gas exploration and development investments only. The projects listed in the table below and in the GAO report are said to be under review for ISA sanctions by the State Department (Bureau of Economic CRS-4 Affairs), but no Affairs), but no publication of such deals has been placed in the Federal Register (Section 5e of ISA), and no determinations of violation have been announced. State Department CRS-4 reports to Congress on ISA, required every six months, state that U.S. diplomats raise U.S. policy concerns about Iran with both investing companies and their parent countries. Many of the projects agreed before 2004 are now producing gas or oil. Some experts believe that what investment has been deterred has been caused more by Iran’s aggressive negotiating style than by ISA. The investment has not boosted Iran’s sustainable oil production significantly — it is still about 4.1 million barrels per day (mbd) — and analyses, including by the National Academy of Sciences, say that, partly because of growing domestic consumption, Iranian oil exports are declining to the point where Iran might have negligible exports of oil by 2015.3 Others maintain that Iran’s gas sector, virtually non-existent in 1998, is becoming an increasingly important factor in Iran’s energy future because of foreign investment can more than compensate for declining oil exports, although, because investment in the gas sector has been slow and because Iran uses gas to reinject into its oil fields, Iran remains a relatively minor gas exporter. It exports about 3.6 trillion cubic feet of gas, primarily to Turkey. ISA’s definition of “investment” does not include oil or gas purchases from Iran, but does, as interpreted by successive Administrations, include construction of energy routes to or through Iran because such routes help Iran develop its petroleum resources. The Clinton Administration used that argument to the threat of ISA sanctions to deter energy routes involving Iran and thereby successfully promoted an alternate route from Azerbaijan (Baku) to Turkey (Ceyhan), which became operational in 2005. However, no sanctions have been were imposed on a 1997 project viewed as beneficial to U.S. ally Turkey: a natural gas pipeline from Iran to Turkey, in which (each country constructing the constructed the pipeline on its side of their border). The State Department saidhad maintained that the project did not violate ISA because Turkey would be importing gas fromoriginating in Turkmenistan, not Iran, and would therefore not benefit Iran’s energy sector directly. However, . However, direct Iranian gas exports to Turkey began in 2001, and, as shown in the table, in July 2007 a preliminary agreement between Iran and Turkey would expand that arrangement to transshipment of to trans-shipment of Iranian gas to Europe, via the Iran-Turkey pipeline. Construction of oil refineries or petrochemical plants in Iran included in the referenced GAO report – would also appear to constitute projects that develop Iran’s petroleum resources— might also constitute sanctionable projects. Iran has plans to build or expand — possibly involving new foreign investment — at least eight refineries in an effort to ease gasoline imports that have totaled as much as 30% of Iran’s needs in early early 2007. However, it is not clear whether or not Iranian investments in energy projects in in other countries, such as reputed Iranian investment to help build five oil refineries in Asia Asia (China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore) and in Syria, reported in June 2007, would would constitute sanctionable investment under ISA. Further major tests loom, and some of the large, long-term dealsprojects between Iran and several Asian countries, listed below, could significantly enhance Iran’s energy export prospects. Most of the value of these agreements includes long-term contracts to purchase purchase Iranian oil and gas, and the exact investment amounts for theexact proportions of exploration and production phases ofin these projects are not always known. A related deal, particularly those involving several Indian firms, is the construction of a gas pipeline from Iran to India, through Pakistan, with a possible extension to China.4 The three governments appeared 3 Stern, Roger. “The Iranian Petroleum Crisis and United States National Security,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. December 26, 2006. 4 The Indian companies reportedly include ONGC Corp.; GAIL Ltd.; Indian Oil Corp.; and Bharat Petroleum Corp. Some large European companies have also expressed interest. See Solomon, Jay and Neil King. “U.S. Tries to Balance Encouraging India-Pakistan Rapprochement (continued...) CRS-5 committed to the $4 billion to $7 billion project, which will take about three years to complete after work begins, but India did not sign a reported “finalization” of a deal on the project, signed by Iran and Pakistan on November 11, 2007. The two countries reportedly are requiring that India decide within a few months whether or not it will join the project; previously, the three countries had difficulty agreeing on such issues as a pricing formula, pipeline routing, transportation tariffs, pipeline security, and the Indian and Pakistani split of the gas supplies. U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Rice, have on several occasions “expressed U.S. concern” about the pipeline deal or have called it “unacceptable,” but no U.S. official has stated outright that it would be sanctioned. ISA is one of many mechanisms the United States is using to try to squeeze Iran’s economy. U.S. officials are having some success persuading European governments to limit new export credits guarantees to Iran, and to persuade European banks not to provide letters of credit for exports to Iran or to process dollar transactions for Iranian banks. Forty banks worldwide have thus far agreed to end their business in Iran, according to the Administration, by many accounts making it more difficult to fund energy industry and other projects in Iran and causing potential investors in the energy sector to hesitate on finalizing pending projects. In addition, prior to the December 3, 2007 release of a U.S. intelligence estimate on Iran’s nuclear program that dampened the international threat perception of Iran, there were reports that a new U.N. Security Council Resolution might include a worldwide ban on financing of energy projects in Iran and a ban on all financial dealings with Iran’s banks. Some have speculated that the U.N. Security Council — or a coalition of countries acting outside the Council — might impose a worldwide ban on gasoline sales to Iran, although industry experts say that there are so many gasoline suppliers near Iran that any such embargo could be skirted. On October 25, 2007, several major Iranian banks (Saderat, Melli, Mellat, and related banks) were designated by the Bush Administration, along with Revolutionary Guard and Guard business entities, as ineligible to deal with U.S. persons (or banks) under Executive order 13224 (terrorism supporting entities) and Executive order 13382 (proliferation entities). Proposed Further Amendments in the 110th Congress In the 110th Congress, H.R. 1400 contains numerous provisions, some of which pertain to ISA, others of which do not. It passed the House on September 25, 2007 by a vote of 397-16. It would remove the Administration’s ability to waive application of sanctions under ISA under Section 9(c), national interest grounds, but it would not impose on the Administration a time limit to determine whether a project is sanctionable. Both it and its Senate counterpart S. 970, and another House bill, H.R. 957 (the latter passed the House on July 31, 2007) would expand the definitions of sanctionable entities to official credit guarantee agencies, such as France’s COFACE and Germany’s Hermes, and apply ISA sanctions to investment to develop a liquified natural gas (LNG) sector in Iran, which currently has no LNG export terminals. H.R. 1400 also would require the President to impose the ban on U.S. procurement from any entity sanctioned under ISA, and impose one other of the menu of sanctions. H.R. 2880 would apply ISA sanctions to sales to Iran of refined petroleum resources after December 31, 2007. Another bill, H.R. 2347, which passed the House on July 31, 2007, would protect from shareholder lawsuits 4 (...continued) With Isolating Tehran.” Wall Street Journal, June 24, 2005, p. A4. CRS-6 fund managers that divest from firms that have made ISA-sanctionable investments. (For all the major provisions of H.R. 1400, see CRS Report RL32048, referenced above.) Post-1999 Major Investments in Iran’s Energy Sector (Oil and gas fields only; pure infrastructure projects such refineries, petrochemical plants, not through Pakistan (IPI pipeline). The three governments initially appeared committed to the $4 billion to $7 billion project, which would take about three years to complete after work begins, but India did not sign a reported “finalization” of a deal on the project, signed by Iran and Pakistan on 3 Stern, Roger. “The Iranian Petroleum Crisis and United States National Security,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. December 26, 2006. CRS-5 November 11, 2007. India has resumed discussions on the project following Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit to India in late April 2008, but India continues to raise concerns on security of the pipeline, the location at which the gas would be officially transferred to India, pricing of the gas, tariffs, and the source in Iran of the gas to be sold. U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Rice, have on several occasions “expressed U.S. concern” about the pipeline deal or have called it “unacceptable,” but no U.S. official has stated outright that it would be sanctioned. In a possibly related development, coinciding with the Ahmadinejad visit the Hinduja-ONGC Videsh group won preliminary Iranian approval to take a 45% stake in the large Azadegan oil field project and a 60% stake in South Pars gas field Phase 12. Another major energy deal with Iran is considered a blow to European solidarity. In March 2008, Switzerland’s EGL utility agreed to buy 194 trillion cubic feet per year of Iranian gas for 25 years, through a Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) to be built by 2010, a deal valued at at least $15 billion. The United States said it was launching a “legal review” of the deal and criticized it as sending the “wrong message” to Iran. However, the deal appears to involve only purchase of Iranian gas, not exploration, and so many would consider it unlikely to constitute a violation of ISA. ISA is one of many mechanisms the United States and its European partners are using to try to squeeze Iran’s economy. U.S. officials are having some success persuading European governments to limit new export credits guarantees to Iran, and to persuade European and other banks not to provide letters of credit for exports to Iran or to process dollar transactions for Iranian banks. Forty banks worldwide have thus far agreed to end their business in Iran, according to the Administration, by many accounts making it more difficult to fund energy industry and other projects in Iran and causing potential investors in the energy sector to hesitate on finalizing pending projects. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1803, adopted March 3, 2008, calls for, but does not require, countries to prohibit financial transactions with Iran’s Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, and the European Union voted in June 2008 to cease transactions with Bank Melli. On October 25, 2007, several major Iranian banks (Saderat, Melli, Mellat, and related banks) were designated by the Bush Administration, along with Revolutionary Guard and Guard business entities, as ineligible to deal with U.S. persons (or banks) under Executive order 13224 (terrorism supporting entities) and Executive order 13382 (proliferation entities). Proposed Further Amendments in the 110th Congress In the 110th Congress, H.R. 1400 contains numerous provisions, some of which pertain to ISA. It passed the House on September 25, 2007 by a vote of 397-16. It would remove the Administration’s ability to waive application of sanctions under ISA under Section 9(c), national interest grounds, but it would not impose on the Administration a time limit to determine whether a project is sanctionable. That bill, a Senate counterpart S. 970, and another House bill, H.R. 957 (the latter passed the House on July 31, 2007) would expand the definition of sanctionable entities to official credit guarantee agencies, such as France’s COFACE and Germany’s Hermes, and apply ISA sanctions to investment to develop a liquified natural gas (LNG) sector in Iran, which currently has no LNG export terminals, in part because the technology for such terminals is patented by U.S. firms and unavailable for sale to Iran. H.R. 1400 also would require the President to impose the ban on U.S. procurement from any entity sanctioned under ISA, and impose one other of the menu of sanctions. A Senate bill marked up by the Senate Finance CRS-6 Committee on June 19, 2008, would add financial institutions and insurers to the definition of sanctionable entities. H.R. 2880 would apply ISA sanctions to sales to Iran of refined petroleum resources after December 31, 2007. Another bill, H.R. 2347, which passed the House on July 31, 2007, would protect from shareholder lawsuits fund managers that divest from firms that have made ISA-sanctionable investments. Post-1999 Major Investments in Iran’s Energy Sector ($20 million + investments in oil and gas fields only; infrastructure projects such refineries, petrochemical plants, not included.) Date Field Feb. 1999 Doroud (oil) Apr. 1999 Balal (oil) Nov. 1999 Soroush and Nowruz (oil) Apr. 2000 Anaran (oil) Company(ies) Totalfina Elf (France)/ENI (Italy) Totalfina Elf/ Bow Valley (Canada)/ENI Royal Dutch Shell Norsk Hydro (Norway)/Lukoil (Russia) July 2000 Phase 4 and 5, South Pars (gas) ENI Mar. 2001 June 2001 May 2002 Sep. 2002 Oct. 2002 Caspian Sea oil exploration Darkhovin (oil) Masjid-e-Soleyman (oil) Phase 9 + 10, South Pars (gas) Phase 6, 7, 8, South Pars (gas) Jan. 2004 Azadegan (oil) Yadavaran (oil). Finalized December 9, 2007 June 2006 Gamsar block (oil) Oct. 2004 GVA Consultants (Sweden) ENI Sheer Energy (Canada) LG (South Korea) Statoil (Norway) Inpex (Japan) 10% stakeGVA Consultants (Sweden) ENI Sheer Energy (Canada) LG (South Korea) Statoil (Norway) Jan. 2004 Azadegan (oil) Inpex (Japan) 10% stake Aug. 2004 Tusan Block Yadavaran (oil). Finalized Oct. 2004 December 9, 2007 June 2006 Gamsar block (oil) Petrobras (Brazil) Value Output/Goal $1 billion 205,000 bpd $300 million 40,000 bpd $800 million 190,000 bpd $100 million 100,000 (by 2010) $1.9 billion $225 million $1 billion $80 million $1.6 billion $2.65 billion $200 million (Inpex stake) $34 million 2 billion cu.ft./day (cfd) ? 160,000 bpd 25,000 bpd 2 billion cfd 3 billion cfd 260,000 bpd Sinopec (China) $2 billion Sinopec (China) $20 million ? 185,000 bpd (by 2011) ? $49 million ? $16 billion 3.4 billion cfd Sept. 2006 Khorramabad block (oil) Norsk Hydro (Norway) Golshan and Ferdows onshore Dec. 2007 SKS Ventures (Malaysia) and offshore gas fields $27.9 billion investment Oil: 1.085 million $27.9 billion bpd Gas: 10.4 billion cfd Totals Pending Deals/Preliminary Agreements Kharg and Bahregansar fields (gas) IRASCO (Italy) $1.6 billion ? Salkh and Southern Gashku fields (gas). LNG Ltd. (Australia) ? ? Includes LNG plant (Nov. 2006) $16 billion 3.6 billion North Pars Gas Field (offshore gas) China National Offshore (includes gas cu.ft/day (Dec. 2006) Oil Co. purchases (Dec. 2006) China National Offshore Oil Co. Phase 13, 14 - South Pars (gas);(Feb. Royal Dutch Shell, Repsol $4.3 billion ? 2007). Deadline to finalize: June 2008. Royal Dutch Shell, Repsol (Spain) (Spain) $30 billion (inc. Phase 12 - South Pars (gas). Includes OMV (Austria) gas purchases ? building LNG terminal (May 2007) over 25 years Phase 22, 23, 24 - South Pars (gas), plus Turkish Petroleum $3 - $4 billion 2 billion cfd agreement to transport Iranian gas to Company (TPAO) Europe (July 13, 2007) Totals crsphpgwEurope (July 13, 2007) Value OMV (Austria) Turkish Petroleum Company (TPAO) $1.6 billion ? ? ? $16 billion (includes gas purchases 3.6 billion cu.ft/day $4.3 billion ? ? ? $3 - $4 billion 2 billion cfd