Order Code 95-1013
Updated November 29, 2007October 17, 2008
Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
After instability during the late 1990s, Bahrain undertook substantial political
reforms, but tensions between ruling Sunni Muslims and the Shiite majority re-emerged
in November 2006 parliamentary elections, fueled by Sunni-Shiite conflict in Iraq.
Bahrain’s the Shiite majority continues to simmer over the Sunni-led government’s
perceived manipulation of laws and regulations to maintain its grip on power. Bahrain’s
stability has long been a key U.S. interest; it has hosted U.S. naval
headquarters for the
Gulf for nearly 60 years. In September 2004, the United States and
Bahrain signed a free
trade agreement (FTA); legislation implementing it was signed
January 11, 2006 (H.R. 4340, P.L. P.L.
109-169). This report will be updated. See also CRS
Report RS21846, U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement.
The Political Structure, Reform, and Human Rights1
The Al Khalifa family, which is Sunni Muslim, has ruled Bahrain since 1783, when
the family’s arrival ended a century of domination by Persian settlers. Bahrain became
independent from Britain in August 1971 after a 1970 U.N. referendumsurvey determined that
its its
inhabitants preferred independence to Iranian control. Political reform has been
institutedIt is led by King Hamad bin Isa Al
Khalifa (about 6061 years old), who succeeded his
father, Shaykh Isa bin Sulman Al
Khalifa, upon his death in March 1999. King Hamad,2
educatedEducated at Sandhurst Military Academy in
Britain, hadKing Hamad was previously been commander of
the Bahraini Defense Forces (BDF). He subsequently named his son, Salman, as Crown
Prince. Salman, who is about 40,
His son, Salman bin Hamad, about 40 years old, is Crown Prince. He is U.S.- and U.K.-educated and, as head of the
“Economic Development Board,” is considered a proponent
of rapid reform and
accommodation with Bahrain’s Shiite majority (about 6070% of the 480
430,000 person
citizenry). The King’s uncle (the brother of the late ruler), Prime Minister Khalifa bin
Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, along with hardliners in the royal court and several
ministries, are perceived as skeptical of reform and seeking to repress Shiite power.
1
Much of the information in this section is from State Department reports: 2007 Country Reports on
on Human Rights Practices - 2006 (March 6, 200711, 2008); Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The
U.S. Record 2006 (April 5, 2007); the International Religious Freedom Report for 20072008
(September 14, 200719, 2008); and the Trafficking in Persons Report for 20072008 (June 12, 2007).
2
Hamad changed his title to King, from Amir, just prior to the February 2002 referendum on the
new national charter.
CRS-2
Salman Al Khalifa, along with hardliners in the royal court and several ministries, seeks
to repress any Shiite power.4, 2008).
CRS-2
King Hamad and the Crown Prince have tried to channel Shiite unrest into peaceful
political competitionare trying to accommodate Shiite grievances but
without losing the regime’s grip. The minor political reforms under his father, namely the December
– the
December 1992 establishment of a 30-member appointed Consultative Council to
comment on
proposed laws and its June 1996 expansion to 40 members, – failed to satisfy
Shiite and
Sunni demands for the restoration of an elected national assembly, provided (provided
for under the
1973 constitution but abolished in August 1975). The unrest eventually took
on a more
Shiite sectarian character and produced daily anti-government violence during
1994-1998.
As Hamad’s first step, Bahrain held a referendum reform steps after taking over, he changed his title to
“King,” rather than “Amir” and implying more accountability, and held a referendum
(February 14, 2002) on a new
“national action charter (constitution).” Elections were held
in October 2002 for a 40-seat
“Council of Representatives” (COR). However, some mostly many Shiite
Shiite opposition “political
societies” (formal parties are banned), including Al Wifaq,
(the largest political society,
led by Shaykh Ali al-Salman), National Action, the Islamic Action Association, and the
Nationalist Assembly boycotted on the grounds thatboycotted the elections on the
grounds that the government set the appointed upper body (Shura
Council) is ofas the same
size and with powers nearly equal to the elected COR. The boycott
lowered turnout to about 52%(about
52%) and helped Sunni MuslimsSunnis win two-thirds of the seats. Of
the 170 total candidates, 6 were
women, but none was elected.
Together, the elected COR and the appointed Shura Council constitute an increasingly vibrant National
Assembly, and they have been gaining in scope of authoritya seemingly
vibrant National Assembly (parliament) that serves as a check on government
power. The
COR can propose (but not actually draft) legislation and question ministers,
although not
in public session. It can, by a two-thirds majority, vote no-confidence against
ministers ministers
and the Prime Minister and override the King’s veto of approved legislation,
although although
none of these actions has occurred since the COR was formed. The Shura
Council is
formally limited to amending draft legislation and, in concert with the COR,
reviewing reviewing
the annual budget, but these powers do provide the Shura Council with the
ability to block
action by the COR. The Shura Council contains generally more educated
and pro-Western
members.
InSunni-Shiite tensions escalated again in the run-up to the November 25, 2006,
parliamentary and municipal elections,
Sunni-Shiite tensions were aggravated by the Shiite perception that a once-repressed
Shiite majority is now, through elections, in power in Iraq. In the oncerepressed Shiite majority has come to power in Iraq through U.S.-backed elections. In the
fall of 2006, some Shiite
protests occurred in Bahrain, particularly after allegations —
some of which were publicly
corroborated by a government adviser (Salah al-Bandar) in
August 2006 in a report to an
outside human rights organization — that the government was adjusting election districts
as part of a plan to ensure that Shiites did not win a majority in parliament. Despite the
allegations, the major Shiite groupings decided to try to empower themselves through
what they still view as a flawed electoral process. Wifaq and the National Democratic
Action Association participated, raising voter turnout to 72%.
The opposition led by Wifaq won 18 seats, virtually all those it contested. Sunni
Islamists (Salafists and Muslim Brotherhood candidates) together won another 8 seats.
Only one woman won (she was unopposed) out of 16 female candidates (down from 31
female candidates in the 2002 elections). As evidence of continued friction, Wifaq
subsequently boycotted the speakership contest, and incumbent COR Speaker Khalifa alDhahrani was re-elected Speaker. A new Shura Council was appointed by the King, with
20 Sunnis, 18 Shiites, one Jew and one Christian (both women). Ten women were
appointed to the body. In a nod to the increased Shiite strength, the government appointed
CRS-3
a Shiite as deputy prime minister and another (who is close to Wifaq) as a Minister of
State for Foreign Affairs. In the cabinet, there are now four Shiites and one female
ministers – a Shiite woman, Health Minister Nada Haffadh, resigned in October 2007
following allegations of corruption in her ministry by COR conservatives who are
believed to oppose women occupying high positions in Bahrain. Two other women,
including the president of the University of Bahrain, have ministerial rank. In June 2006,
a female judge was named to the Higher Civil Court.
Although its reforms and human rights progress remain uneven, as noted in State
Department reports, Bahrain allows freedom of worship for Christians, Jews, Hindus, and
Baha’is, although the constitution declares Islam the official religion. The government
requires licenses for churches to operate, and in November 2007 it threatened to shutter
seven un-licensed churches serving the Indian expatriate community. About half of the
approximately 235,000 expatriates living in Bahrain are non-Muslim. On labor issues,
even before the U.S.-Bahrain free trade agreement, Bahrain was credited with significant
labor reforms, including a 2002 law granting workers, including non-citizens, the right
to form and join unions. There are now 47 trade unions in Bahrain, and workers are
permitted to conduct work stoppages. On human trafficking, Bahrain was dropped in the
2007 Trafficking in Persons report to “Tier 3” (worst level) because it is “not making
significant efforts” to “fully comply with the minimum standards for elimination of
trafficking.” In July 2006, King Hamad ratified a law passed by the National Assembly
to restrict the right of public association and to provide for jail terms for organizers of
was adjusting election districts so as to favor Sunni candidates. It has also been alleged
that the government, facing a population increase of approximately 41%, is issuing
passports to Sunnis in an attempt to shift the demographic balance to the Sunnis’
advantage. In March 2008, an political row in the COR resumed over calls by Shiite MPs
to question the Minister for Cabinet Affairs Sheikh Ahmad bin Atiyatullah Al-Khalifa
about allegations that the government was illegally naturalizing Sunni foreign residents.
In the November 2006 elections, Wifaq and the National Democratic Action
Association participated, raising voter turnout to 72%. The opposition led by Wifaq won
18 seats, virtually all those it contested. Sunni Islamists (Salafists and Muslim
Brotherhood candidates) together won another 8 seats. Only one woman won (she was
unopposed) out of 18 female candidates (down from 31 female candidates in the 2002
elections). As evidence of continued friction, Wifaq subsequently boycotted the
speakership contest, and incumbent COR Speaker Khalifa al-Dhahrani was re-elected
Speaker. A new Shura Council was appointed by the King, with 17 Sunnis, 18 Shiites,
CRS-3
one Jew and one Christian (both women). Ten women were appointed to the body. In a
nod to the increased Shiite strength, the government appointed a Shiite as deputy prime
minister and another (who is close to Wifaq) as a Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.
In the cabinet, there are six Shiites and one female minister (Minister of Social Affairs).
A Shiite woman, Health Minister Nada Haffadh, resigned in October 2007 following
allegations of corruption in her ministry by conservatives who oppose women occupying
high ranking positions. Two other women, including the president of the University of
Bahrain, have ministerial rank. In April 2008, Huda Azar Nunu, a female attorney and the
only Jew in the Shura Council, was named ambassador to the United States.
Beyond the politically-motivated discrimination against Shiites, which includes
basing Islamic studies curricula in schools on Sunni jurisprudence and excluding Shiite
teachings, State Department reports note problems for non-Muslims and for opponents of
the government. (About half of the approximately 235,000 expatriates living in Bahrain
are non-Muslim.) Bahrain allows freedom of worship for Christians, Jews, and Hindus
although the constitution declares Islam the official religion. A Baha’i congregation has
repeatedly requested and been denied an official license, although the Baha’i community
continues to gather and operate openly. The government requires licenses for churches to
operate, and in November 2007 it threatened to shutter un-licensed churches serving
Indian expatriates. In February 2008, it arrested (but later released) the head of the Bahrain
Center for Human Rights, which documents religious freedom concerns. On labor issues,
Bahrain has been credited with significant labor reforms, including a 2002 law granting
workers, including non-citizens, the right to form and join unions. There are about 50 trade
unions in Bahrain, and workers are permitted to conduct work stoppages. On human
trafficking, Bahrain was elevated in the 2008 Trafficking in Persons report to “Tier 2
Watch List,” from Tier 3 in the 2007 report, because it is “ making significant efforts” to
comply with the minimum standards for elimination of trafficking, but has not shown
results, to date. In July 2006, King Hamad ratified a National Assembly law to provide for
jail terms for organizers of unauthorized protests.
According to the State Department, the United States seeks to accelerate political
reform in Bahrain and empower its political societies through several programs, including
the “Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI).” Economic Support Funds (ESF) are
requested forwere
provided in FY2008 to help build an independent judiciary and strengthen the COR.
Other Other
U.S.-funded programs focus on women’s empowerment, journalist training, and
civic education for Ministry of Education officials and teachers. Some MEPI funds have
media training, educational
opportunities, and civil society legal reform. MEPI funds have been used to fund AFL-CIO
projects with Bahraini labor organizations, and to help
Bahrain implement its commitments under the U.S.-Bahrain FTA. During 2006, the U.S.
embassy added a position to focus on outreach to NGOs and civil society groups.
Suggesting a still difficult climate for U.S. programs, inthe U.S.Bahrain FTA. In May 2006 Bahrain revoked the
visa for the resident program director of
the National Democratic Institute (NDI), an
implementor of some U.S. democracy programs. Bahrain resisted October 2006 entreaties
by NDI officials to allow the office to reopen.
Defense and Economic Relations3and has not allowed the office to reopen. Still,
NDI is conducting programs to enhance parliamentary capabilities through a local NGO.
Defense and Economic Relations2
Defense issues remain a key feature of U.S.-Bahrain relations. A U.S. Embassy in
Manama, Bahrain’s capital, opened in September 1971. In large part to keep powerful
neighbors in check, Bahrain has long linked its security to the United States, and U.S.
2
Information in this section obtained from a variety of press reports, and the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency (DSCA).
CRS-4
efforts to address threats from Iraq and Iran have benefitted from access to Bahraini
facilities. February 1998 marked the 50th anniversary of a U.S. naval command presence
in Bahrain; MIDEASTFOR (U.S. Middle East Force), its successor, NAVCENT (naval
3
Information in this section obtained from a variety of press reports, CRS interviews in Bahrain
and Washington, DC, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).
CRS-4
component of U.S. Central Command), and the Fifth Fleet (reconstituted in June 1995)
have been headquartered there. The Fifth Fleet headquarters is a command facility that
now covers over 100 acres. About 2,500, and about 1,000 U.S. personnel, mostly Navy (but from several
different commands) work there; fewer than half live on the compound, are assigned
there. Some smaller
U.S. ships (minesweepers) are docked there, but the port is being improved to handle
aircraft carriers. Fifth Fleet also
consists of a Carrier Battle Group, an Amphibious Ready Group, and various other ships.
The headquarters currently coordinates the operations of over 30 U.S.
20 warships performing
support missions for U.S. operations in Iraq war (securing Iraqi oil
platforms) andand allied naval operations related to the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, including interdicting the movement of Al Qaeda membersterrorists, arms, or weapons of
mass mass
destruction (WMD)-related technology and narcotics trafficking across the Arabian
Sea. These U.S. operations are in partnership with ships from nations contributing to the
Iraq war (Britain, Italy, Australia, Canada, and Singapore) and the U.S.-led stabilization
operations in Afghanistan (including ships from Germany, France, and Pakistan).
Bahrain participated in the allied coalition that ousted Iraq from Kuwait in 1991,
hosting 17,500 troops and 250 combat aircraft at Shaykh Isa Air Base. Bahraini pilots
flew strikes over Iraq during the war, and Iraq fired nine Scud missiles at Bahrain during
Sea. The latest
exercises (“Arabian Shark ”) under these operations were held April 15-17, 2008, and
Bahrain’s U.S.-supplied frigate participated. These operations are part of the ongoing
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan that ousted the Taliban after the
September 11 attacks; Bahrain hosted about 4,000 U.S. military personnel during major
combat of OEF, a major increase from the 1,300 U.S. military personnel hosted during the
1990s. In recognition of the relationship, in March 2002, President Bush (Presidential
Determination 2002-10) designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally (MNNA),” a
designation that facilitates U.S. arms sales.
On Iraq, Bahrain participated in the allied coalition that ousted Iraq from Kuwait in
1991, hosting 17,500 troops and 250 combat aircraft at Shaykh Isa Air Base. Bahraini
pilots flew strikes over Iraq during the war, and Iraq fired nine Scud missiles at Bahrain
during the conflict, of which three hit facilities there. After that war, the United States and
Bahrain signed a 10-year defense pact (October 28, 1991), renewed in October 2001. The
agreement reportedly provides U.S. access to Bahraini bases during a crisis, the prepositioning of strategic materiel (mostly U.S. Air Force munitions), consultations with
Bahrain if its security is threatened, and expanded exercises and U.S. training of Bahraini
forces.43 Bahrain hosted the regional headquarters for U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq
during 1991-1998, and the U.S.-led Multinational Interdiction Force (MIF) that enforced
a U.N. embargo on Iraq during 1991-2003.
Bahrain has provided extensive support to the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan
(support to Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) and Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraqi Freedom (OIF), despite
domestic domestic
opposition in Bahrain particularly to the war in Iraq. During major combat of
OEF, Bahrain hosted about 4,000 U.S. military personnel — a major increase from the
1,300 U.S. military personnel hosted during the 1990s to contain Iraq. U.S. force levels
thereto the Iraq war. U.S. force levels in Bahrain increased to about 4,500
for OIF (mostly additional U.S. Air Force personnel).
Bahrain allowed the United States
to fly combat missions from the base in both OEF and
OIF, and it was the only Gulf state
to deploy its own forces to provide aid to Afghanistan.
During OEF and OIF, Bahrain
publicly deployed its U.S.-supplied frigate warship (the
Subha) to help protect U.S. ships,
and it sent ground and air assets to Kuwait in support
of OIF. In recognition of the close defense relationship, in March 2002, President Bush
(Presidential Determination 2002-10) designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally
(MNNA),” a designation that facilitates U.S. arms sales of OIF. Because of its limited oil
income, Bahrain has not contributed funds to Iraq reconstruction, but it is attendingattends the
“Expanded Neighbors of Iraq” regional conference process that began in Baghdad on
March 10, 2007 and has continued with two regional meetings since (May 2007 in Egypt
and November 2007 in Turkey). It does not have a full embassy in Iraq.
U.S. Arms Transfers. Congress and successive Administrations, citing Bahrain’s
limited income, have supported military assistance to Bahrain’s small BDF of about
4which most recently met in
Kuwait on April 22, 2008. On October 16, 2008, Bahrain’s first post-Saddam Ambassador
to Iraq (Saleh Ali al-Maliki) presented his credentials in Baghdad, in line with King
Hamad’s pledge to President Bush in March 2008.
3
Details of the U.S.-Bahrain defense agreement are classified. Some provisions are discussed
in in
Sami Hajjar, U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects (U.S. Army War
College: Strategic Studies Institute), March 2002, p. 27.
CRS-5
U.S. Arms Transfers. Congress and successive Administrations, citing Bahrain’s
limited income, have supported military assistance to Bahrain’s small BDF of about
27.
CRS-5
11,000 personnel. It is eligible to receive grant “excess defense articles” (EDA). The
United States transferred the FFG-7 “Perry class” frigate Subha as EDA in July 1997. In
1996, the United States gave Bahrain a no-cost five-year lease on 60 M60A3 tanks; title
subsequently passed to Bahrain. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) was suspended for
Bahrain in FY1994 but restarted in appreciation of Bahrain’s support in OEF and OIF.
Recent FMF has been provided to help Bahrain maintain U.S.-origin weapons, to enhance
inter-operability with U.S. forces, to augment Bahrain’s air defenses, and to promote
international standards of human rights practices in the BDF.
U.S. Assistance to Bahrain
(in $ millions)
FY2007
FY2008
(Request)
FY2002
FY2003
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
FMF
28.5
90.0
24.6
18.847
15.593
15.0
4.3
IMET
0.395
0.448
0.600
0.649
0.651
0.614
0.650
1.489
2.761
.776
1.25
NADR
ESF
Est.
1.1
Note: IMET = International Military Education and Training Funds, used mainly to enhance BDF military
professionalism and promote U.S. values. NADR = Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism (ATA), De-Mining
and Related Programs, used to sustain Bahrain’s counterterrorism capabilities and interdict terrorists.
to support it’s F-16
fleet, and to improve counter-terrorism capabilities.
Despite limited funds, Bahrain has purchased some U.S. systems. In 1998, Bahrain
purchased 10 U.S.-made F-16Cs from new production. With spare engines and
armaments, the sale was, worth about $390 million. In late 1999, the Clinton
Administration, with congressional concurrence,
the United States sold Bahrain 26 Advanced MediumRangeMedium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles
(AMRAAM) to arm the F-16s. Some, although some Members were concerned
about the sale of AMRAAM’s to Gulf countries on the grounds that the sale might
that the
AMRAAM sale could promote an arms race in the Gulf. Section 581 of the FY1990
foreign operations
appropriation act (P.L. 101-167) made Bahrain the only Gulf state
eligible to receive the
STINGER shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile, and the United States
has sold Bahrain
about 70 Stingers since 1990. (This authorization has been repeated in subsequent
subsequent legislation.) To allay congressional concerns about possible U.S. promotion
of missile
proliferation in the region, an August 2000 sale of 30 Army Tactical Missile Systems
Systems (ATACMs, a system of short-range ballistic missiles fired from a multiple rocket
launcher) included an agreement for joint U.S.-Bahraini control of the weapon. Among
recent sales notified to Congress by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
are a sale, worth up to $42 million, of 180 “Javelin” anti-armor missiles and 60 launch
units; and a sale, worth up to $252 million, of nine UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters and
associated equipment and services; and a ; and a
sale, notified August 3, 2007, of six Bell search
and recovery helicopters and associated equipment and services, valued at about
$160
million. Under the State Department’s “Gulf Security Dialogue,” begun in 2006 to
counter Iran, a total of about $20 billion worth of U.S. weapons might be sold to the Gulf
monarchy states, although only a small portion is reportedly slated for Bahrain.
Economic Relations. Bahrain has the lowest oil and gas reserves of the Gulf
monarchy states, estimated respectively at 210 million barrels of oil and 5.3 trillion cubic
feet of gas, and the energy sector accounts for 16.5% of Bahrain’s gross domestic product
(GDP), and it is attempting to diversify its economy by emphasizing banking and services.
CRS-6
. Bahrain has diversified its economy by emphasizing banking and financial
services (about 25.5% of GDP). At current rates of production (3035,000 barrels per day of
crude oil), Bahrain’s onshore oil reserves will
be exhausted in 15 years. As of April 1996, the Saudi government has given Bahrain all
revenues from the 150, but Saudi Arabia
shares equally with Bahrain the 300,000 barrels per day produced from Saudi Arabia’sthe offshore Abu
Safa field. The United States buys virtually no oil from Bahrain; the major U.S. import
from it is aluminum. To encourage further reform and signal U.S. appreciation, the United
States and Bahrain signed an FTA on September 14, 2005. Implementing legislation was
signed January 11, 2006 (H.R. 4340, P.L. 109-169).
Other Regional Relations and Anti-Terrorism Cooperation
Bahrain’s concerns about Iran stem mostly from Iran’s perceived willingness and
ability perceives Iran as willing and able to support Shiite oppositionistsgroups against Bahrain’s
Sunni-dominated government
of Bahrain. The concern, a concern that has been heightened by the Shiite dominance of post-Saddam
Iraq and related -Sunni
sectarian violence therein Iraq. In December 1981, and then again in June 1996,
Bahrain Bahrain
publicly accused Iran of trying to organizingorganize a coup by pro-Iranian Bahraini
Shiites (the
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, IFLB). The government has
consistently blamed Iran for the internal unrest that took place in the late 1990s and
subsequently. Some Bahraini leaders suspect that Iran
eventually wants to overturn the
results of the 1970 U.N. referendum, discussed above; those concerns were aggravatedconcerns aggravated
CRS-6
by a July 2007 Iranian newspaper article reasserting the Iranian claim. However, that
article, along with the Bahraini Crown Prince’s November 3, 2007 comment that Iran is
developing a nuclear weapon (Iran claims it is building only developing only civilian nuclear power capabilities)),
did not mar the visit of Iranian President Ahmadinejad to Bahrain on November 17, 2007.
The visit produced an agreement for Bahrain to buy Iranian natural gas, which
resulted in a preliminary agreement for Bahrain to buy 1.2 billion cubic feet per day of
Iranian gas via an undersea pipeline to be built. In March 2008, the U.S. Department of
Justice sanctioned Future Bank, headquartered in Bahrain, because it is controlled and
partially owned by Iran’s Bank Melli. The sanctions, under Executive order 13382 (antiproliferation), prevent U.S. citizens from participating in transactions with Future Bank
and require the freezing of any U.S.-based bank assets.
Arab-Israeli Issues. On the Arab-Israeli dispute, Bahrain participated in the 19901996 multilateral Arab-Israeli talks, and it hosted a session on the environment (October
1994). However, Bahrain did not follow Oman and Qatar in exchanging trade offices with
Israel. In
September 1994, all the GulfGCC states ceased enforcing secondary and tertiary
boycotts of Israel, which black listed companies doing business with Israel, while
retaining the ban on direct trade (primary boycott) boycotts of Israel
while retaining the ban on direct trade (primary boycott). However, in conjunction with
the U.S.-Bahrain FTA, Bahrain dropped the primary boycott and closed boycott-related
offices in Bahrain. The Foreign Relations Authorization
Act for FY1994/1995 (P.L. 103-236103236, Section 564(1)) banned U.S. arms transfers to
countries that maintain the Arab
boycott of Israel, but successive administrations have
waived the ban for all the GCC states on national interest grounds. In conjunction with
the U.S.-Bahrain FTA, Bahrain has dropped the primary boycott and closed boycottrelated offices in Bahrain. However, Islamist hardliners in the COR have called on the
government to reopen the boycott office, to refrain from attending the November 27, 2007
summit on Middle East peace in Annapolis, and to explain why Bahrain’s foreign minister
met with the Israeli Foreign Minister during U.N. meetings in New York in September.
Anti-Terrorism Cooperation. The State Department’s report on international
terrorism for 2006 (released April 2007) credits Bahrain with enacting legislation to
combat terrorism and its financing, including laws criminalizing terrorism and the
undeclared transfer of money in support of terrorism. It continues to host the Middle East
and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENA/FATF) secretariat. However, the
report
states on national interest grounds. Islamist hardliners in Bahrain have accused the
government of trying to “normalize” relations with Israel, citing the government’s sending
a delegate to the November 27, 2007 summit on Middle East peace in Annapolis, the
Foreign Minister’s meeting with Israeli officials at U.N. meetings in September 2007, and
by proposing (in October 2008) a “regional organization” that would group Iran, Turkey,
Israel, and the Arab states.
Other Anti-Terrorism Cooperation. The State Department’s report on
international terrorism for 2007 (released April 2008) credits Bahrain for “actively
monitoring terrorism suspects” and for the arrests of a number of men on terrorism-related
charges in August 2007 (case still pending). Bahrain also continues to host the Middle
East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENA/FATF) secretariat. The report,
however, notes that Bahrain has not overcome legal constraints that have derailed
prosecutions and incarcerations of suspected terrorists, even some who have admitted to
traveling to Afghanistan to fight U.S.-led forces there.
U.S. Assistance to Bahrain
(in $ millions)
FY03
FY04
FMF
90.0
24.6
IMET
0.448
0.600
NADR
“Section 1206”
FY05
18.847
FY06
FY07
FY08
(Est.)
FY09
(Req.)
15.593
14.998
3.968
19.5
0.649
0.651
0.616
0.619
.650
1.489
2.761
.776
1.24
.800
5.3
24.54
Note: IMET = International Military Education and Training Funds, used mainly to enhance BDF military
professionalism and promote U.S. values. NADR = Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-Mining and
Related Programs, used to sustain Bahrain’s counterterrorism capabilities and interdict terrorists. Section
1206 are DoD funds used to train and equip Bahrain’s coastal patrol forces and develop its counter terrorism
assessment capabilities. (Named for a section of the FY2006 Defense Authorization Act).