Order Code RS20871
Updated November 15, 2007January 23, 2008
The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA)
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
No firms have been sanctioned under the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA). Set to expire
in August 2006, legislation in the 109th Congress (the “Iran Freedom Support Act, P.L.
109-293) extended it, although the
GAO reported in December 2007 said that the effects on Iran’s economy of ISA and
of other US sanctions are “difficult to determine.” Legislation in the 109th Congress
(P.L. 109-293) extended ISA until December 31, 2011, terminated application to Libya, and
added provisions, although with Administration flexibility in implementation.
Proposed ISA-related legislation
and added provisions. Legislation in the 110th Congress, such as H.R. 1400 (passed by
the House on September 25, 2007), would remove some flexibilityadd still more provisions. See CRS Report
RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.
Background and Original Passage
The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), originally called the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA),
is one among many U.S. sanctions in place against Iran. It was enacted in a context of
tightening U.S. sanctions on Iran during the Clinton
Administration. In, in response to Iran’s stepped up nuclear program and
its support to
terrorist organizations such as Hizbollah, Hamas, and Palestine Islamic Jihad, President
Clinton issued
Jihad. The year before enactment, an Executive Order, 12959 (of May 6, 1995), banning , banned
U.S. trade with and
investment in Iran. The rationale was that these sanctions would curb
the strategic threat
from Iran by hindering its attempts to modernize its petroleum sector,
which generates
about 20% of Iran’s GDP. Iran’s onshore oil fields, as well as its oil industry
industry infrastructure, are aging and need substantial investment, and its large natural gas
gas resources (940 trillion cubic feet, exceeded only by Russia) were undeveloped when ISA
ISA was first considered.
U.S. allies refused to join the U.S. sanction, and the Clinton Administration and
Iran has 136.3 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the third
largest after Saudi Arabia and Canada (according to Oil and Gas Journal, January 2007).
In 1995 and 1996, U.S. allies refused to impose sanctions on Iran, and the Clinton
Administration and Congress believed that it might be necessary for the United States to
try to deter their
investment in Iran. The opportunity to do so came in November 1995,
when Iran first
opened its energy sector to foreign investment. To accommodate Iran’s philosophy to
retainits
philosophy of retaining control of its national resources, Iran developed a “buy-back”
investment program
in which foreign firms recoup their investments from the proceeds
of oil and gas
discoveries but do not receive equity stakes.
CRS-2
With input from the Clinton Administration, some in Congress developed legislation
to to
sanction such investment. On September 8, 1995, Senator Alfonse D’Amato
introduced introduced
the “Iran Foreign Oil Sanctions Act” to sanction foreign firms’ exports to Iran
of energy
technology. The bill passed the Senate on December 18, 1995 (voice vote) but,
acknowledging the difficulty of monitoring all trade with Iran, this
version instead sanctioned foreign
investment in Iran’s energy sector. On December 20, 1995,
the Senate passed a version
applying the legislation to Libya as well, which was refusing
to yield for trial the two
Libyan intelligence agents suspected in the December 21, 1988,
bombing of Pan Am 103.
The House passed its version of the bill, H.R. 3107, on June
19, 1996 (415-0), and then
concurred on a slightly different Senate version adopted on
July 16, 1996 (unanimous
consent). It was signed on August 5, 1996 (P.L. 104-172).
Key Provisions. ISA requires the President to impose at least two out of a
menu of seven sanctions on foreign companies (entities, persons) that make an
“investment” of more than $20 million in one year in Iran’s energy sector.1 The sanctions
sanctions menu (Section 6) includes (1) denial of Export-Import Bank loans, credits, or credit
credit guarantees for U.S. exports to the sanctioned entity; (2) denial of licenses for the
U.S.
export of military or militarily-useful technology to the entity; (3) denial of U.S. bank
bank loans exceeding $10 million in one year to the entity; (4) if the entity is a financial
institution, a prohibition on its service as a primary dealer in U.S. government bonds;
and/or a prohibition on its serving as a repository for U.S. government funds (each counts
as one sanction); (5) prohibition on U.S. government procurement from the entity; and (6)
restriction on imports from the entity, in accordance with the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. 1701). In the original law, the President may
waive the sanctions on Iran if the parent country of the violating firm agrees to impose
economic sanctions on Iran (Section 4(c)), or if he certifies that doing so is important to
the U.S. national interest (Section 9(c)). It terminates application to Iran if Iran ceases
its efforts to acquire WMD and is removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of
terrorism. Its applicationApplication to Libya terminated when the President determined on April 23,
2004, that Libya had fulfilled the requirements of all U.N. resolutions on Pan Am 103.
Traditionally skeptical of imposing economic sanctions, European Union states
opposed ISA as an extraterritorial application of U.S. law and threatened counter-action
in the World Trade Organization (WTO). In April 1997, the United
States and the EU
agreed to avoid a trade confrontation in the World Trade Organization
(WTO) over it and a separate Cuba sanctions law, P.L. 104114104-114). The agreement
contributed to a May 18, 1998, decision by the Clinton
Administration to waive ILSA ISA
sanctions (“national interest” grounds — Section 9(c)) on
the first project determined to
be in violation: a $2 billion2 contract, signed in September
1997, (September 1997) for Total SA of France and its
partners, Gazprom of Russia and Petronas of
Malaysia to develop phases 2 and 3 of the 25-phase South Pars gas field. The EU pledged
to increase cooperation with the United States on non-proliferation and counter-terrorism,
1
1
The definition of “investment” in ISA (Section 14 (9)) includes not only equity and royalty
arrangements (including additions to existing investment, as added by P.L. 107-24) but also any
contract that includes “responsibility for the development of petroleum resources” of Iran. The
definition excludes sales of technology, goods, or services for such projects, and excludes
financing of such purchases. For Libya, the threshold was $40 million, and sanctionable activity
included exportation to
Libya of a broad range of technology of which the export to Libya wasexport to Libya of technology banned by Pan Am 103related103-related Security Council
Resolutions 748 (March 31, 1992) and 883 (November 11, 1993).
2
Dollar figures for energy investment contracts with Iran represent public estimates of the
amounts investing firms are expected to spend during the life of the project, which might in some
cases be several decades.
CRS-3
and the Administration indicated no penalties would be imposed on future similar
investments by EU firms in Iran25-phase South Pars gas field. The EU pledged to increase cooperation with the United
States on non-proliferation and counter-terrorism, and the Administration indicated future
investments by EU firms in Iran would not be penalized.
ISA was to sunset on August 5, 2001, in the context of somewhat improved U.S.
relations with both Iran and Libya. During 1999 and 2000, the Clinton Administration
had eased the trade ban on Iran somewhat to try to engage the relatively moderate Iranian
President Mohammad Khatemi. In 1999, Libya yielded for trial the Pan Am 103
suspects. However, proponents of renewal maintained that both countries would view
its expiration as a concession, and renewal legislation was enacted in the 107th Congress
(P.L. 107-24, August 3, 2001); it changed the definition of investment to treat any
additions to pre-existing investment as new investment, and. This law required an Administration
report on ISA’s
effectiveness within 24 to 30 months of enactment. That; that report was
submitted to Congress
in January 2004 and did not recommend that ISA be repealed.
Modifications in the 109th Congress. During the 109th Congress, withWith U.S.
concern about Iran’s nuclear
program increasing, ISA was again to sunset on August 5,
2006. Some Members, concerned that
foreign companies had begun to openly ignore
ignore ISA, introduced the “Iran Freedom and Support
Act” (H.R. 282, S. 333) to extend ISA
indefinitely, close some perceived loopholes, and to authorize funding for pro-democracy
activists in Iran. These bills increased indefinitely, to increase the requirements to justify
waiving sanctions on
violators and, most notably, would have, to set a 90-day time limit for the Administration to
determine whether
an investment constitutesis a violation of ISA (there is no time limit in
the original law). H.R. 282 also, and to authorize
funding for pro-democracy activists in Iran. H.R. 282 (passed by the House on April
26,2006 by a vote of 397-21) would have cut U.S. foreign assistance to countries
whose companies have violated whose
companies violate ISA and applied the U.S. trade ban on Iran to foreign
subsidiaries of
U.S. companies. H.R. 282 was passed by the House on April 26, 397-21.
To prevent ISA To prevent expiration while these bills were being considered, there was
a temporary
extension until September 29, 2006 (P.L. 109-267, signed August 4, 2006).
Toward the end of the 109th Congress, H.R. 6198 (a modification of H.R. 282), was
introduced to address Administration concerns that H.R. 282 and S. 333 did not allow
sufficient Administration flexibility. As did H.R. 282, it made sanctionable sales of
WMD-useful technology or ). The version that
ultimately was passed was H.R. 6198, which addressed Administration demands for
flexibility; H.R. 6198 recommended, but did not require, a 180-day time limit for a
determination of violation. It made sanctionable sales of WMD-useful technology or
“destabilizing numbers and types of” advanced conventional
weapons, and added a required
determination that Iran “poses no significant threat” in
order to terminate application to Iran. Unlike H.R. 282, it recommended, but did not
require, a 180-day time limit for a determination of violation and ,
changed the multi-lateral
sanctions waiver provision (“4(c) waiver,” see above) to a
national security interest
waiver. The law also waiver, and recommended against U.S. nuclear agreements with
countries that
have supplied supply nuclear technology to Iran,. It extended ISA until December 31, 2011, dropped
Libya from ISA, and
2011, formally dropped Libya, contained a provision to try to preventcurb money-laundering by criminal
criminal groups, terrorists, or proliferators. It, and formally changed the name of the law to
the Iran Sanctions Act. H.R. 6198 was passed by the House and Senate by voice vote
and and
unanimous consent, respectively, and was signed on September 30, 2006 (P.L. 109293). It changed the name of ILSA to the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA).
Effectiveness and Ongoing Challenges
Some believe ISA has slowed Iran’s energy development, but, as shown by the
projects agreed to below, its deterrent effect has been relatively limited. The projects
listed in the table, all drawn from mainstream press reports, are said to be under review
for ISA sanctions by the State Department (Bureau of Economic Affairs), but no
determinations of violation have been announced. State Department reports to Congress
CRS-4
on ISA, required every six months, state that U.S. diplomats raise U.S. policy concerns
about Iran with both investing companies and their parent countries. Most of the projects
agreed before 2004 are now producing gas or oil. Some experts believe that what
investment has been deterred has been caused more by Iran’s aggressive negotiating style
than by ISA. The investment has not boosted Iran’s sustainable oil production
significantly — it is still about 4 million barrels per day (mbd)3 — and an analysis
published by the National Academy of Sciences says that Iranian oil exports are declining
to the point where Iran might have negligible exports of oil by 2015.4 Others maintain
that Iran’s gas sector, virtually non-existent in 1998, is becoming an increasingly
important factor in Iran’s energy future because of foreign investment.
ISA’s definition of “investment” does not provide for sanctions on oil or gas
purchases from Iran. However, the Clinton and Bush Administration interpretations have
been that the construction of energy routes to or through Iran would constitute
sanctionable activity because, as stated in the ISA definition of “investment” (Section 14
(9)(A)), such routes would help Iran develop its petroleum resources. The Clinton
Administration used that argument to deter energy routes involving Iran and thereby
successfully promote an alternate route from Azerbaijan (Baku) to Turkey (Ceyhan); this
route became operational in 2005. However, neither Administration imposed sanctions
on a 1997 project viewed as beneficial to U.S. ally Turkey: a natural gas pipeline from
Iran to Turkey (each country constructing the pipeline on its side of their border). The
State Department said that the project did not violate ISA because Turkey would be
importing gas from Turkmenistan, not Iran, and would therefore not benefit Iran’s energy
sector directly. However, direct Iranian gas exports to Turkey began in 2001, in apparent
contravention of Turkey’s pledges 109-293).
Effectiveness and Ongoing Challenges
Successive Administrations have argued that ISA has slowed Iran’s energy
development, but, as shown by the projects agreed to below and as discussed in a
December 2007 report by the GAO, its effect on Iran is difficult to determine. The GAO
report (Iran Sanctions: Impact in Furthering U.S. Objectives in Unclear and Should be
Reviewed. GAO-08-58, December 2007) contains a chart of post 2003 investments in
Iran’s energy sector, totaling over $20 billion in investment, but the GAO table includes
petrochemical and refinery projects, as well as projects that might not exceed the $20
million/one year investment threshold. The table below lists oil and gas exploration and
development investments only. The projects listed in the table and in the GAO report are
said to be under review for ISA sanctions by the State Department (Bureau of Economic
CRS-4
Affairs), but no determinations of violation have been announced. State Department
reports to Congress on ISA, required every six months, state that U.S. diplomats raise
U.S. policy concerns about Iran with both investing companies and their parent countries.
Many of the projects agreed before 2004 are now producing gas or oil. Some experts
believe that what investment has been deterred has been caused more by Iran’s aggressive
negotiating style than by ISA. The investment has not boosted Iran’s sustainable oil
production significantly — it is still about 4.1 million barrels per day (mbd) — and
analyses, including by the National Academy of Sciences, say that, partly because of
growing domestic consumption, Iranian oil exports are declining to the point where Iran
might have negligible exports of oil by 2015.3 Others maintain that Iran’s gas sector,
virtually non-existent in 1998, is becoming an increasingly important factor in Iran’s
energy future because of foreign investment.
ISA’s definition of “investment” does not include oil or gas purchases from Iran, but
does include construction of energy routes to or through Iran because such routes help
Iran develop its petroleum resources. The Clinton Administration used that argument to
deter energy routes involving Iran and thereby successfully promoted an alternate route
from Azerbaijan (Baku) to Turkey (Ceyhan), which became operational in 2005.
However, no sanctions have been imposed on a 1997 project viewed as beneficial to U.S.
ally Turkey: a natural gas pipeline from Iran to Turkey (each country constructing the
pipeline on its side of their border). The State Department said that the project did not
violate ISA because Turkey would be importing gas from Turkmenistan, not Iran, and
would therefore not benefit Iran’s energy sector directly. However, direct Iranian gas
exports to Turkey began in 2001, and, as shown in the table, in July 2007 a preliminary
agreement between Iran and Turkey would expand that arrangement to transshipment of
Iranian gas to Europe, via the Iran-Turkey pipeline. Construction of oil refineries or
petrochemical plants in Iran would appear – included in the referenced GAO report – would also appear
to constitute projects that develop Iran’s
petroleum resources. petroleum resources. Iran has plans to build or
expand — possibly involving new foreign investment — at least eight refineries in an
effort to ease gasoline imports that have totaled as much as 30% of Iran’s needs in early
2007. However, it is not clear whether or not Iranian investments in
energy projects in
other countries, such as reputed Iranian investment to help build five
oil refineries in Asia
(China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore) and in Syria, reported
in June 2007, would
constitute sanctionable investment under ISA.
Further major tests loom, and some of the large, long-term (preliminary) deals
between Iran and Indian, Chinese, and Malaysian firms, listed below, have the potential
todeals between Iran and
several Asian countries, listed below, could significantly enhance Iran’s energy export
prospects. Most of the value of these
agreements includes long-term contracts to
purchase Iranian oil and gas, and the exact
investment amounts for the exploration and
production phases of these projects are not
known. A related deal, particularly those
involving several Indian firms,5 is the construction of
3
Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Anna Borg before the House International
Relations Committee, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia. June 17, 2003.
4 is the construction of a gas pipeline from Iran to India,
through Pakistan, with a possible extension to China.4 The three governments appeared
3
Stern, Roger. “The Iranian Petroleum Crisis and United States National Security,” Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. December 26, 2006.
5
Some of the Indian companies that reportedly might take part in the pipeline project are ONGC
4
The Indian companies reportedly include ONGC Corp.; GAIL Ltd.; Indian Oil Corp.; and
Bharat Petroleum Corp. Some large European
companies have also expressed interest. See
Solomon, Jay and Neil King. “U.S. Tries to
Balance Encouraging India-Pakistan Rapprochement With Isolating Tehran.” Wall Street
(continued...)
CRS-5
a gas pipeline from Iran to India, through Pakistan, with a possible extension to China.
All three governments have appeared
(continued...)
CRS-5
committed to the $4 billion to $7 billion project,
which will take about three years to
complete after work begins. Press reports say India
, but India did not sign a reported “finalization” of a deal on
the project, signed by Iran and Pakistan
on November 11, 2007. The two countries
reportedly are requiring that India decide
within a few months whether or not it will join
the project; previously, the three countries
had difficulty agreeing on such issues as a
pricing formula, pipeline routing,
transportation tariffs, pipeline security, and the Indian
and Pakistani split of the gas
supplies. U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Rice,
have on several occasions
“expressed U.S. concern” about the pipeline deal or have called
it “unacceptable,” but
no U.S. official has stated outright that it would be sanctioned.
ISA is not the only mechanism available toone of many mechanisms the United States is using to try to squeeze Iran’s
economy to try to limit
investment in Iran. U.S. officials are having some success persuading European
governments to
limit new export credits guarantees to Iran, and to persuade European
banks not to
provide letters of credit for exports to Iran or to process dollar transactions
for Iranian banks. This result is due not only to U.S. diplomacy but also to U.S.
presentations of the financial risk posed by providing credit to Iran. The restrictions on
financing are, according to Iranian and outside observers, making it more difficult to fund
energy industry and other projects in Iran. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown said on
November 12, 2007 that Britain might propose, as part of a new U.N. Security Council
Resolution addressing Iran’s nuclear program, a worldwide ban on financing of energy
projects in Iran – the equivalent of a worldwide adoption of the principles of ISA – and
possibly a
banks. Forty banks worldwide have thus far agreed to end their business in Iran,
according to the Administration, by many accounts making it more difficult to fund
energy industry and other projects in Iran and causing potential investors in the energy
sector to hesitate on finalizing pending projects. In addition, prior to the December 3,
2007 release of a U.S. intelligence estimate on Iran’s nuclear program that dampened the
international threat perception of Iran, there were reports that a new U.N. Security Council
Resolution might include a worldwide ban on financing of energy projects in Iran and a
ban on all financial dealings with Iran’s banks. Some have speculated that the
U.N.
Security Council — or a coalition of countries acting outside the Council — might
impose at some point a worldwide ban on gasoline sales to Iran, although industry experts say that there
are so many gasoline suppliers near Iran that any such embargo could be skirted. On
. On October 25, 2007,
several major Iranian banks (Saderat, Melli, Mellat, and related banks)
were designated
by the Bush Administration, along with Revolutionary Guard and Guard
business entities,
as ineligible to deal with U.S. persons (or banks) under Executive order
13224 (terrorism
supporting entities) and Executive order 13382 (proliferation entities).
Proposed Further Amendments in the 110th Congress
In the 110th Congress, H.R. 1400 contains numerous provisions, some of which
pertain to ISA, others of which do not. The billIt passed the House on September 25, 2007
by a
vote of 397-16. Among ISA-related provisions, H.R. 1400It would remove the
Administration’s ability to waive application of
sanctions under ISA under Section 9(c),
national interest grounds. However, the bill, but it would not
impose on the Administration a
time limit to determine whether a project is sanctionable.
Both it and other bills, its
its Senate counterpart S. 970, and another House bill, H.R. 957 (the latter
passed the House
on July 31, 2007) would expand the definitions of sanctionable entities
to official credit
guarantee agencies, such as France’s COFACE and Germany’s Hermes,
and apply ISA
sanctions to investment to develop a liquified natural gas (LNG) sector in
Iran, which
currently has no LNG export terminals. H.R. 1400 also would require the
President to
impose the ban on U.S. procurement from any entity sanctioned under ISA,
and impose
one other of the menu of sanctions. H.R. 2880 would apply ISA sanctions to sales to Iran
5
(...continued)
Journal, June 24, 2005, p. A4.
CRS-6
sales to Iran of refined petroleum resources after December 31, 2007. Another bill, H.R.
2347, which
passed the House on July 31, 2007, would protect from shareholder lawsuits fund
4
(...continued)
With Isolating Tehran.” Wall Street Journal, June 24, 2005, p. A4.
CRS-6
fund managers that divest from firms that have made ISA-sanctionable investments. (For all
all the major provisions of H.R. 1400, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and
Policy Responsesreferenced above.)
Post-1999 Foreign Investment in Iran’s Energy Sector
Major Investments in Iran’s Energy Sector
(Oil and gas fields only; pure infrastructure projects such refineries, petrochemical plants, not
included.)
Date
Field
Feb. 1999 Doroud (oil)
Apr. 1999 Balal (oil)
Nov. 1999 Soroush and Nowruz (oil)
Apr. 2000 Anaran (oil)
Company(ies)
Totalfina Elf (France)/ENI
(Italy)
Totalfina Elf/ Bow Valley
(Canada)/ENI
Royal Dutch Shell
Norsk Hydro
(Norway)/Lukoil (Russia)
July 2000 Phase 4 and 5, South Pars (gas) ENI
Mar. 2001
June 2001
May 2002
Sep. 2002
Oct. 2002
Caspian Sea oil exploration
June 2001 Darkhovin (oil)
May 2002 Masjid-e-Soleyman (oil)
Phase 9 and+ 10, South Pars
Sep. 2002
(gas) (gas)
Phase 6, 7, 8, South Pars (gas)
Jan. 2004 Azadegan (oil)
Yadavaran (oil). Finalized
December 9, 2007
June 2006 Gamsar block (oil)
Oct. 2004
GVA Consultants (Sweden)
ENI
Sheer Energy (Canada)
LG (South Korea)
Oct. 2002 Phase 6, 7, 8, South Pars (gas) Statoil (Norway)
Value
Output
Statoil (Norway)
Inpex (Japan) 10% stake
Output/Goal
$1 billion
205,000 bpd
$300 million
40,000 bpd
$800 million
$225 million
$1 billion
$80 million
190,000 bpd
?
2 billion
cu.ft./day
?
160,000 bpd
25,000 bpd
$1.6 billion
?
$2.65 billion
3 billion
cu.ft./day
$1.9 billion
$200 million Japan
stake
$70 billion (value
Yadavaran (oil); deal includes Sinopec (China) and ONGC
of exploration not
Oct. 2004
gas purchases for 30 years
(India)
known)
June 2006 Gamsar block (oil)
Sinopec (China)
$50 million
Feb. 2004 Azadegan (oil)
Inpex (Japan) 10% stake
Pending Deals/Preliminary Agreements
Golshan and Ferdows (offshore gas,
SKS Ventures (Malaysia)
includes downstream development)
Phase 13 and 14 - South Pars (gas);
includes building a liquified natural gas
(LNG) terminal
Phase 22, 23, 24 - South Pars (gas), plus
agreement to transport Iranian gas to
Europe (signed July 13, 2007)
Construction of a petrochemicals plant in
Iran, near South Pars gas field. Might
produce rubber, plastics, other petroleumderived products. (Announced Sept. 2007)
Construction of oil refinery in Iran.
Announced October 2007, just after Essar
deal to acquire Minnesota Steel LLC
300,000 bpd
?
Oil: 1.2 million
bpd
$80 billion+
Gas: 5 billion
cu.ft/day+
Totals
North Pars Gas Field (offshore gas)
260,000 bpd
China National Offshore
Oil Co.
Royal Dutch Shell and
Repsol (Spain)
Turkish Petroleum
Company (TPAO)
GAIL-India, Jaipan
Industries Ltd. (India)
Essar Steel (India)
$20 billion
100 million
cu.ft/day
$16 billion
(includes gas
purchases
3.6 billion
cu.ft/day
$10 billion
?
$3 - $4 billion
2 billion cu.
ft/day
$2.3 billion
$8 billion
300,000 bpd
refined190,000 bpd
$100 million 100,000 (by 2010)
$1.9 billion
$225 million
$1 billion
$80 million
$1.6 billion
$2.65 billion
$200 million
(Inpex stake)
2 billion cu.ft./day
(cfd)
?
160,000 bpd
25,000 bpd
2 billion cfd
3 billion cfd
260,000 bpd
Sinopec (China)
$2 billion
Sinopec (China)
$20 million
185,000 bpd (by
2011)
?
$49 million
?
$16 billion
3.4 billion cfd
Sept. 2006 Khorramabad block (oil)
Norsk Hydro (Norway)
Golshan and Ferdows onshore
Dec. 2007
SKS Ventures (Malaysia)
and offshore gas fields
Oil: 1.085 million
$27.9 billion bpd Gas: 10.4
billion cfd
Totals
Pending Deals/Preliminary Agreements
Kharg and Bahregansar fields (gas)
IRASCO (Italy)
Salkh and Southern Gashku fields (gas).
LNG Ltd. (Australia)
Includes LNG plant (Nov. 2006)
North Pars Gas Field (offshore gas)
(Dec. 2006)
China National Offshore
Oil Co.
Phase 13, 14 - South Pars (gas);(Feb.
2007). Deadline to finalize: June 2008.
Royal Dutch Shell, Repsol
(Spain)
Phase 12 - South Pars (gas). Includes
building LNG terminal (May 2007)
Phase 22, 23, 24 - South Pars (gas), plus
agreement to transport Iranian gas to
Europe (July 13, 2007)
Value
OMV (Austria)
Turkish Petroleum
Company (TPAO)
$1.6 billion
?
?
?
$16 billion
(includes gas
purchases
3.6 billion
cu.ft/day
$4.3 billion
?
?
?
$3 - $4 billion
2 billion cfd