Order Code RL34074
The Palestinian Territories:
The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations
Updated October 12, 2007
Paul Morro
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
The Palestinian Territories: Background and U.S.
Relations
Summary
This report provides an overview of Palestinian society and current issues in
U.S.-Palestinian relations. It contains a brief historical review of modern Palestine,
an overview of Palestinian society and politics, and a look at the Palestinians’
relations with the international community.
U.S. policy toward the Palestinians since the advent of the Oslo process in the
early 1990s has been marked by efforts to establish a Palestinian state through a
negotiated two-state solution with Israel, counter Palestinian terrorist groups, and
establish norms of democracy, accountability, and good governance within the
Palestinian Authority (PA). President Bush made these goals explicit in his June 24,
2002 Rose Garden speech. Congressional views of the issue have reflected concern
that U.S. bilateral assistance not fall into the hands of Palestinian rejectionists who
advocate terrorism and violence against Israelis and, at times, against Americans.
Congress also has expressed concern that U.S. funds for Palestinian refugees
channeled through the United Nations have been mismanaged or found their way into
the wrong hands.
Among the current issues in U.S.-Palestinian relations is how to deal with the
political leadership of Palestinian society, which is divided between Fatah and its
rival, Hamas, a State Department designated Foreign Terrorist Organization.
Following Hamas’s victory in the 2006 legislative election and the formation of a
Hamas-led PA cabinet, the United States halted aid to the PA, but continued
humanitarian aid along with efforts to bolster Fatah leader and PA President
Mahmoud Abbas. In June 2007, Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip leading
Abbas to dissolve the government and appoint an emergency government based in
the West Bank that excludes Hamas. The Administration quickly announced plans
to resume aid to the new government, but questions remain over Fatah’s ability to
govern in the West Bank and a possible humanitarian crisis in Gaza.
Since the signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993, the U.S. government has
committed an estimated $1.9 billion in bilateral economic assistance to the
Palestinians. For FY2008, the Administration requested $63.5 million in Economic
Support Funds (ESF) for the West Bank and Gaza and an additional $10 million in
Child Survival and Health (CSH) funds. H.R. 2764, the FY2008 State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations bill (passed by the House on June
22, 2007), would provide the $63.5 million in ESF only if the administration certifies
that the PA recognizes Israel, renounces violence, and accepts previous agreements
with Israel. The Senate version of the bill (passed by the Senate on September 6,
2007) includes $75 million in aid for the West Bank and Gaza and does not include
the additional restrictions contained in the House version. Neither bill contains the
CSH funds. This report will be updated regularly.
Contents
Historical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Palestine Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The 1947 U.N. Partition Plan and the Creation of Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The 1967 War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The October War and Camp David . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The First Intifada (Uprising) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The Oslo Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Second Intifada and Israel’s Withdrawal From Gaza . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Palestinian Society and Political Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
National Identity and the Quest for Statehood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The Fatah-Hamas Rivalry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Other Rejectionist Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Palestinian Christians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Palestinian Refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
UNRWA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
UNRWA Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Congressional Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Palestinian Foreign Policy/Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Regional States and Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Syria and Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Iran and Hezbollah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
The European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
The United Nations Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Economic Profile and Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Fiscal Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Deepening Poverty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Current Issues in U.S.-Palestinian Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Hamas Takes Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
The First Hamas Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
The Unity Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Hamas Seizes Gaza; Unity Government Dissolved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Political, Economic, and Security Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Congressional Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
U.S. Foreign Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Current Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Recent Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Appendix A. Further Reading and Historical Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Appendix B. Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Appendix C. List of Current U.N. Bodies and Offices That Focus on
Palestinian or Arab-Israeli Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Appendix D. Links to Palestinian and Palestinian-American Organizations . . . 38
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of West Bank and Gaza Strip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Figure 2. Map of the Gaza Strip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
List of Tables
Table 1. Palestinian Population Worldwide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Table 2. Recent U.S. Contributions to UNRWA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Table 3. Arab States’ Pledges to UNRWA 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
The Palestinian Territories: Background and
U.S. Relations
Historical Background
The Palestine Mandate. Following World War I and the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire, the United Kingdom was given the mandate for Palestine, which
encompassed what is today Jordan, Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.1
Britain’s stewardship of Palestine was troubled from the beginning as it became
embroiled in the struggle between Jewish settlers seeking to establish their own state
and Arab inhabitants who were resisting these efforts. Because of uncertain data,
precise population figures for Palestine at this time are not available; the numbers
most frequently cited are from a 1922 British census, which put the figures at
660,000 Arabs, 84,000 Jews, and 7,600 others. By 1948, there were an estimated
1.35 million Arabs and 650,000 Jews.2 During the 1920s and 1930s, Jewish-Arab
relations in Palestine worsened and were marked by spasms of violence. Repeated
British efforts to find a formula that would satisfy all parties succeeded only in
further angering and alienating the two sides. As World War II wound down,
violence in Palestine escalated and Jewish underground groups began attacking
British installations and assassinating British officials. In February 1947, Britain told
the U.N. General Assembly that it wished to relinquish the mandate and asked the
new body to settle the issue.
The 1947 U.N. Partition Plan and the Creation of Israel. The U.N.
Special Commission on Palestine eventually recommended dividing Palestine into
a Jewish state (about 56% of the territory) and an Arab state (about 42% of the
territory) and placing Jerusalem (about 2% of the territory) under international
administration.3 The U.N. General Assembly adopted this plan on November 29,
1947 as U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181.4 Many observers believed the plan
was unworkable, not least because it left many Arabs living in the proposed Jewish
state. The Jews saw the U.N. decision as imperfect but accepted it as a step toward
creating the Jewish state for which they had worked so long. The Arabs felt that it
1
In 1922, Britain set up a separate administration for the land east of the Jordan River and
soon began transferring authority to the newly created Emirate of Transjordan, later
renamed Jordan.
2
MidEast Web, “The Population of Palestine Prior to 1948,” [http://www.mideastweb.org/
palpop.htm].
3
For a map of the 1947 U.N. Partition Plan, see [http://www.mideastweb.org/
unpartition.htm].
4
For the full text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181, see [http://www.state.gov/p/
nea/rls/22562.htm].
CRS-2
was unjust to ignore the rights of the majority of the population of Palestine and
rejected the partition plan. Both sides began organizing and arming themselves, and
groups on both sides carried out attacks on civilians. As violence mounted, many
Palestinian Arabs began fleeing to neighboring countries. On May 14, 1948, the
British withdrew from Palestine and the Jews proclaimed the independent State of
Israel. In the following days and weeks, neighboring Arab states invaded the newly
proclaimed state of Israel in Palestine.
When the fighting ended in 1949, Israel held territories beyond the boundaries
set by the U.N. plan — a total of 78% of the area west of the Jordan river. Jordan
held East Jerusalem and the West Bank and Egypt held the Gaza Strip. About
700,000 Palestinian Arabs fled or were driven out of Israel.5 Palestinians call their
defeat and exile in 1948 al-Nakba (the Catastrophe). Many Palestinian refugees
ended up in camps in the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip, the Jordanian-ruled West
Bank, Jordan proper, Syria, and Lebanon, where they and their descendants remain
today. The Arab countries resisted assimilating the refugees for both political and
economic reasons. Many Palestinians did not wish to assimilate, hoping to one day
return to their homes. Israel refused to readmit the refugees, seeing them as both a
physical and demographic threat to the new state.
The 1967 War. During the 1950s and 1960s, as the winds of Arab nationalism
blew across the region, radical Arab leaders in Egypt and Syria pressed for military
action against Israel. In May 1967, Egypt moved military units into the Sinai
Peninsula and concluded a military agreement with Jordan. On June 5, 1967, Israel,
assuming war was inevitable, launched preemptive air strikes against its Arab
neighbors.6 Its subsequent victory over Egypt, Jordan, and Syria took only six days.
Israel took control of the Sinai and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank and
East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. Almost 1 million
Arabs, mostly Palestinians, came under Israeli rule. In November 1967, the U.N.
Security Council passed Resolution 242, calling for Israeli withdrawal from
territories occupied during the war and the right of every state in the region to live in
peace within recognized borders.7 The defeated Arabs states refused to recognize or
negotiate with Israel. The Israeli government decided to keep the territories as
bargaining chips in future peace talks.
Many observers believe one consequence of the war was the emergence of a
stronger sense of Palestinian national identity. Palestinians began to more forcefully
advocate for a state of their own. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),
which had been established in 1964, became more militant and portrayed itself as a
movement struggling for national liberation. In time, the PLO became recognized
by the Palestinian people, the Arab states, and much of the international community
5
There is no reliable data for the precise number of Palestinian refugees who fled in 1948.
Most scholars place the figure between 600,000 and 750,000.
6
For a contrary view that asserts that Israel was motivated more by fear of being
disadvantaged diplomatically than by genuine military threat, see Roland Popp, “Stumbling
Decidedly Into the Six-Day War,” Middle East Journal, Spring 2006.
7
For the full text of UNSCR 242 see [http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1967/
scres67.htm].
CRS-3
as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Israel strongly opposed the
PLO because of terrorist attacks by its component groups and because its charter at
the time aimed to destroy the state of Israel.
The October War and Camp David. In 1973, the Arabs, led by Egypt and
Syria, launched a surprise attack on Israel in part to regain the lost territory. Catching
Israel off guard, the Arab armies made initial advances but eventually Israel drove the
Arab forces back to roughly the 1967 armistice lines. By 1977, with the pan-Arab
dream shattered, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat offered peace if Israel withdrew
from the occupied lands and agreed to a Palestinian state. In 1978, following
vigorous diplomatic efforts by President Carter, Egypt and Israel signed framework
agreements that led to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and Israel’s withdrawal from
the Sinai, and promised autonomy talks for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.
The autonomy talks, however, never materialized and other Arab states did not
accept the Camp David Accords. In the mid-1970s, Israeli nationalist-religious
groups accelerated their campaign to establish Jewish settlements in the occupied
territories. In 1977, when the right-wing Likud party came to power in Israel for the
first time, the government began backing the settlement enterprise more intensively.
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Figure 1. Map of West Bank and Gaza Strip
The First Intifada (Uprising). A growing sense of frustration set in among
Palestinians during the 1980s over the lack of progress in finding a durable resolution
of their nationalist claims. In December 1987, after four Gaza Palestinians were
killed by an Israel Defense Force (IDF) truck in a traffic accident, rioting broke out
and quickly spread through the territories. Initially Palestinian youth hurled stones
and Molotov cocktails at IDF soldiers, although in some later clashes hand grenades
and guns were used. The IDF struggled at first to contain the crowds and often
resorted to firing into them, killing hundreds of Palestinians. The protests also
featured acts of civil disobedience, including strikes, demonstrations, tax resistance,
and boycotts of Israeli products, all coordinated through locally based popular
CRS-5
committees. Over the next six years, over 1,100 Palestinians and 160 Israelis were
killed in the violence.8
The uprising put the Palestinian question back on the international agenda. In
July 1988, in response to the months of demonstrations by Palestinians in the West
Bank, Jordan ceded to the PLO all Jordanian claims to the territory. To try and fill
the political vacuum, in November 1988 the Palestine National Council (the PLO
legislature) declared the establishment of the State of Palestine, in accordance with
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181, the 1947 partition plan. Though symbolic,
the PLO’s declaration was seen by many as tacit recognition of Israel and acceptance
of a two-state solution. From the Palestinian perspective, by engaging the Israelis
directly, rather than relying on neighboring Arab states, the Palestinians reinforced
their identity as a separate nation worthy of self-determination. The impact on
Israelis was equally profound. Many observers have noted that the first intifada
demonstrated to many Israelis that something they had come to take for granted, the
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, could not continue indefinitely.
The Oslo Years. By the early 1990s, the intifada, the end of the Cold War,
and the changed international climate led Israel’s new Labor government and the
PLO to conduct secret negotiations in Oslo, Norway to settle the conflict. The
breakthrough came in 1993 and the resulting agreements, often called the Oslo
Accords, included letters of mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, the
establishment of a Palestinian interim self-governing authority in the West Bank and
Gaza, and a five-year window in which to conclude a final status deal. The new
Palestinian Authority (PA) had a directly elected president and a legislative council,
elected separately. The PA assumed full control of major West Bank cities and
limited control in other areas. However, Palestinian rejectionist violence and Israeli
settlement building in the territories undermined the process. Nonetheless, in July
2000, President Clinton invited Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PLO
Chairman Yasir Arafat to Camp David to press them to conclude a final status deal.
Barak’s offer went further than any previous Israeli offer but still fell short of
Palestinian demands. The summit collapsed and the two sides traded accusations
over who was to blame.
The Second Intifada and Israel’s Withdrawal From Gaza. In
September 2000, with tensions high, then opposition leader Ariel Sharon visited the
Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem’s Old City, a site holy to both Jews and
Muslims. The visit sparked Palestinian riots in Jerusalem, which quickly spread
through the territories, igniting the second or “Al-Aqsa” intifada.9 As Palestinian
crowds rioted, in some instances members of the Palestinian security forces opened
fire on Israeli forces. Israeli soldiers often responded with deadly force, killing more
than 100 Palestinians over the next few weeks. Palestinian militant groups responded
with a bombing campaign against Israeli civilian and military targets, killing scores
8
Figures according to B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the
Occupied Territories, [http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/First_Intifada_Tables.asp].
9
The name “Al-Aqsa” intifada is taken from the Al-Aqsa mosque, the third holiest site in
Islam, located on the Temple Mount, or Haram al-Sharif in Arabic, the scene of Sharon’s
visit.
CRS-6
of Israelis and several Americans. Amid the violence, Israeli and Palestinian
negotiators continued the peace talks begun at Camp David. Meeting in Taba, Egypt,
in January 2001, the two sides closed the gaps between them considerably and
agreement appeared near, based on a set of ideas presented by President Clinton.
However, talks were suspended for the Israeli election, in which Barak sought a vote
of confidence from the public. Sharon, who opposed the talks, won a decisive
victory and the talks were never resumed.
In 2002, to try and stem the bombings, the IDF reoccupied all major West Bank
cities and began building a separation barrier in the West Bank. At the end of 2003,
Prime Minister Sharon announced his intention to “disengage” from the Palestinians
by unilaterally withdrawing settlers and IDF forces from the Gaza Strip and a small
area of the West Bank. In September 2005, Israel completed its unilateral withdrawal
from Gaza but still controls the flow of people and goods in and out of the territories,
continues to occupy the West Bank, and has erected hundreds of checkpoints and
roadblocks to thwart terrorism. Just over 4,000 Palestinians and just over 1,000
Israelis have been killed since the second intifada began.10
Palestinian Society and Political Dynamics
Demographics. There are an estimated 3.8 million Palestinians living in the
West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem (2.4 million in the West Bank and East
Jerusalem, and 1.4 million in Gaza).11 In addition, some 425,000 Jewish settlers live
in the occupied territories (250,000 in the West Bank and 175,000 in East Jerusalem).
West Bank Palestinians generally are wealthier, better educated, and more secular
than their Gaza brethren. The Palestinian population has one of the highest growth
rates in the world and is disproportionately young. According to the Norwegian
Institute for Labor and Social Research, widely considered the most credible
authority on Palestinian demographics, 51% of the Palestinians in the territories are
20 years old or younger and 80% are less than 40 years old. The youth bulge ensures
that the population growth rate will remain high even as fertility rates decline.
Palestinians are well educated relative to other Arab countries with an adult literacy
rate of 92% and 92% of school-age children enrolled in school. (Jordan, by
comparison, has a 90% adult literacy rate and a 99% enrollment rate, while Egypt has
a 71% adult literacy rate and an 83% enrollment rate.12) The Palestinian population
is 98% Sunni Muslim; just under 2% are Christians of various denominations (see
Palestinian Christians section below for further discussion).
10
Figures according to B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the
Occupied Territories, [http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Casualties.asp].
11
The PA last conducted a census in 1997, in which it counted 2.9 million residents of the
Palestinian territories. The 3.8 million figure is not an actual count but a projection of the
1997 census, assuming an annual growth rate of between 4% and 5%. An additional 1.3
million Palestinians live inside Israel proper as Arab citizens of Israel.
12
UNICEF data, [http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/northafrica.html].
CRS-7
National Identity and the Quest for Statehood. Historians have noted
that the concept of Palestinian national identity is a relatively recent phenomenon and
in large part grew from the challenge posed by Zionism in the first half of the 20th
century.13 Palestinian identity first emerged during the British Mandate period,
began to crystalize with the 1947 partition plan, and grew stronger following Israel’s
conquest of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967. Although in 1947 the United
Nations intended to create two states in Palestine — one Jewish and one Arab —
only one came into being. The Arab state was stillborn, a victim of the military
triumph of the new Jewish state, the failure of the Palestinians, and, some allege, the
collusion of Arab and British leaders.14 Today, the Palestinian public’s desire to
establish a state of their own on at least some portion of historic Palestine is the
dominant political issue throughout the Palestinian territories. How that state should
be established and its nature, however, continue to divide Palestinian society. Fatah
and Hamas are the largest political movements and reflect the basic cleavage in
Palestinian society, namely, between those who support a negotiated two-state
solution with Israel and those who do not.
The Fatah-Hamas Rivalry
Fatah, a secular nationalist party and the largest faction within the PLO,
dominated Palestinian society and politics between 1969, when its leader Yasir
Arafat became PLO chairman, and his death in 2004. In its 1988 Declaration of
Independence and again in the Oslo Accords, the PLO renounced violence,
recognized Israel, and committed to negotiating a two-state solution to the conflict.
The first Palestinian elections were held January 20, 1996 in accordance with the
Oslo Accords. Arafat was elected president with 88% of the vote and Fatah won 55
of the then-88 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). When Arafat died,
Mahmoud Abbas, also known as Abu Mazen, succeeded him as leader of Fatah and
the PLO, and was elected PA president in January 2005. However, polling data
between 1996 and 2004 showed a significant drop in support for Fatah against a
backdrop of widespread political alienation. In a 2003 poll, for example, some 40%
of respondents said they favored none of the existing factions.15 Most observers
believe Fatah’s decline was due to the public’s perception that the PA was rife with
corruption, out of touch with the populace, and had failed to achieve progress toward
statehood or provide law and order.
Hamas, for many years the main opposition force in the Palestinian territories,
grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood, a religious and political organization founded
in Egypt in 1928 with branches throughout the Arab world. Hamas’s founder and
13
Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National
Consciousness, New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1997.
14
Khalidi, “Palestinian Identity”; the leading proponent of the collusion charge is Israeli
historian Avi Shlaim in his book Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist
Movement, and the Partition of Palestine, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.
15
Khalil Shikaki, “Sweeping Victory, Uncertain Mandate,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 17,
No. 3, July 2006.
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spiritual leader, the late Shaykh Ahmed Yassin,16 established Hamas as the Muslim
Brotherhood’s local political arm in December 1987, following the eruption of the
first intifada. Hamas combines Palestinian nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism.
Its founding charter commits the group to the destruction of Israel and the
establishment of an Islamic state in all of historic Palestine.17 Hamas rejected the
Oslo Accords, boycotted the 1996 elections, and has waged an intermittent terrorist
campaign to undermine the peace process. Its military wing, the Izz al-Din
al-Qassam Brigades,18 has carried out hundreds of terrorist attacks since 1993,
killing more than 500 Israelis. The U.S. State Department has designated Hamas as
a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Hamas owes much of its popularity to an
extensive social services network supported by donations from Palestinians, other
Arabs, and international charitable front groups. It funds schools, orphanages,
mosques, healthcare clinics, soup kitchens, and sports leagues in the West Bank and
Gaza.
Fatah’s political hegemony inside the occupied territories was undermined by
the inability of the PLO, and later the PA, to co-opt or incorporate Hamas, which
proved more resistant than its secular rivals to the PLO’s inducements. The
independence of this Islamic group has created a constant sense of ambivalence as
to where the center of gravity in Palestinian politics lies. Particularly between 2000
and 2004, the popularity of Hamas began to increase as Fatah’s fell. Hamas made
a strong showing in a series of municipal elections held between December 2004 and
December 2005. Still, most observers were surprised by the scale of Hamas’s victory
in the January 2006 legislative election. Hamas won 74 of the 132 seats in the PLC,19
Fatah won 45 seats, and smaller parties claimed the remainder. Hamas’s popular
vote victory was far narrower, 44% to Fatah’s 41%. Most observers believe that the
Hamas victory was a function of several factors including a complicated, mixed
electoral system that rewarded Hamas’s better organization and party discipline,
disaffection among younger, marginalized political activists, and a general
disenchantment with Fatah over its inability to deliver peace and good governance.20
Yet despite the electoral setback, observers point out that Fatah has done little to
purge its ranks of corrupt, discredited officials or adopt norms of honesty and
transparency in order to regain the public’s trust. One scholar noted that Fatah “party
leaders seem to be more intent on short-term maneuverings against Hamas and each
other than the long-term viability of the party.”21
16
Israel assassinated Yassin on March 22, 2004, using helicopter-fired missiles.
17
For the text of the Hamas charter see: [http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/
hamas.htm].
18
Izz al-Din al-Qassam was a Muslim Brotherhood member, preacher, and leader of an antiZionist and anti-British resistance movement during the Mandate period. He was killed by
British forces on November 19, 1935.
19
The PLC amended the Electoral Law in 2005, expanding the PLC from 88 to 132 seats.
20
For a fuller discussion of the implications of the 2006 PLC election, see Riad Malki,
“Beyond Hamas and Fatah,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 17, No. 3, July 2006.
21
Nathan J. Brown, “The Peace Process Has No Clothes The Decay of the Palestinian
Authority and the International Response,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
(continued...)
CRS-9
Hamas’s decision to participate in the PLC election may have intensified
internal strife and threatened the organization’s vaunted unity. There appears to be
a split between hard-liners such as Hamas political chief, Khalid Mish’al, who lives
in exile in Damascus, and Mahmoud al Zahhar, a Gazan considered close to Mish’al,
and more pragmatic figures such as current Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh.
Observers differ, however, on how far such a split may go. Those who believe
Hamas is wedded to its violent, anti-Israeli agenda point to its deeply held religious
views as expressed in its charter. Written in 1988, the charter is explicit about the
struggle for Palestine being a religious obligation. It describes the land as a “waqf,”
or religious endowment, saying that no one can “abandon it or part of it.” In the
charter, Hamas describes itself as “a distinct Palestinian Movement which owes its
loyalty to Allah” and that strives to “raise the banner of Allah over every inch of
Palestine.” It calls for the elimination of Israel and Jews from Islamic holy land and
portrays the Jews as evil, citing anti-Semitic texts. These observers also note that no
Hamas leader is on record as sanctioning a permanent recognition of Israel’s right to
exist side by side with an independent Palestinian state or as expressing a willingness
to disarm or to stop attacks on Israel and Israelis, or to make a distinction between
Israeli soldiers and civilians.22
Other observers see Hamas as a more pragmatic, evolving movement. They
note that Hamas has already moderated its positions by participating in the 2006 PLC
election (a body created by the Oslo Accords, which the group has long rejected) and
by expressing willingness to enter into a long-term cease-fire (or hudna) with Israel.
Most importantly, they say, Hamas signed the Mecca Accord in which it agreed to
share power with Fatah, “respect” previous agreements signed by the PLO, and allow
the PLO to negotiate with Israel and submit any agreement reached to the Palestinian
people. Finally, they note that the PLO, also once a terrorist group albeit a secular
one, altered some of its tenets in the late 1980s and early 1990s, under pressure from
the United States, and agreed to condemn terrorism, recognize Israel’s right to exist,
and negotiate for a two-state solution.
Other Rejectionist Groups
Several other small Palestinian groups continue to reject the PLO’s decision to
recognize Israel and negotiate a two-state solution. They remain active in the
territories and retain some ability to carry out terrorist attacks and other forms of
violence to undermine efforts at cooperation and conciliation. The largest of these
is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization
that, like Hamas, is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. The PIJ, estimated at
1,000 members, emerged in the 1980s in the Gaza Strip as a rival to Hamas. Inspired
by the Iranian revolution, it combined Palestinian nationalism, Sunni Islamic
fundamentalism, and Shiite revolutionary thought. The PIJ seeks liberation of all of
historical Palestine through armed revolt and the establishment of an Islamic state,
but unlike Hamas has not established a social services network, formed a political
21
(...continued)
June 2007.
22
Steven Erlanger, “Academics View Differences within Hamas,” New York Times, January
29, 2006.
CRS-10
party, or participated in elections. Mainly for these reasons, PIJ has never
approached the same level of support among Palestinians as Hamas. PIJ
headquarters is in Damascus, and Syria allows it to operate on its territory and, during
the Syrian occupation, in Lebanon. Iran, however, is the PIJ’s chief sponsor,
providing the group with almost its entire budget. Since 2000, the PIJ has conducted
nearly 1,000 attacks against Israel, killing scores of Israelis.23
The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades is a militant offshoot of Fatah that emerged in
the West Bank early in the second intifada. The group initially targeted only Israeli
soldiers and settlers, but in 2002 began a spate of attacks on civilians in Israeli cities
and in March 2002 was added to the State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist
Organizations. According to terrorism experts, the group switched tactics to restore
Fatah’s standing among Palestinians at a time when Palestinian casualties were
mounting, Hamas’s popularity was rising, and Fatah was tainted by its cooperation
with Israel during the Oslo years. Most of the Brigades’ members are believed to be
members of the Palestinian security forces.
The Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) is a loose alliance of armed
dissidents and militants that first appeared in the Gaza Strip in 2000. Its founder,
Jamal Abu Samhadana, a former member of Fatah, was killed in an Israeli air strike
in June 2006. The membership of the PRC encompasses both the secular and Islamic
fundamentalist Palestinian movements, including Fatah, Hamas, and the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Ex-members of the PA’s Preventive Security
Organization also are reported to be active in the PRC. The group also has been
implicated in the October 15th, 2003 attack that killed three U.S. diplomatic security
personnel in the Gaza Strip. The attack, a roadside bomb that destroyed the van the
men were traveling in, was claimed and then later denied by the PRC. In part to
avenge the death of their leader Samhadana, in June 2006 the PRC (along with
Hamas and a splinter group calling itself the Army of Islam) launched a raid on an
Israeli army post near the Gaza Strip, killing two Israeli soldiers and capturing a
third, Gilad Shalit.
Palestinian Christians
There are approximately 60,000 Palestinian Christians living in the West Bank,
Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, about 2% of the population. Palestinian Christians
once made up some 8-10% of Palestinian Arabs, but their numbers have been
shrinking for several decades as a disproportionate number of them have fled for
economic and security reasons. According to the State Department’s 2006
International Religious Freedom Report for the Occupied Territories, the PA does not
have a constitution, but the Basic Law provides for religious freedom, and the PA
generally respects this right in practice. Since Islam is the official religion of the PA,
Islamic institutions and places of worship receive preferential treatment. A majority
of Palestinian Christians are Greek Orthodox; the remainder consist of Roman
Catholic, Greek Catholic, Protestant, Syrian Orthodox, Armenian, Coptic, Maronite,
23
For a fuller discussion of the PIJ, see “Terrorist Group Profile: Palestinian Islamic Jihad,”
CENTRA Technology Inc., August 1, 2006.
CRS-11
and Ethiopian Orthodox denominations. Christians are concentrated primarily in the
areas of Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Bethlehem.
The 2006 Religious Freedom Report draws attention to several issues that have
negatively affected the Christian community and that have raised Congressional
concern. Since 2003, the Israeli government has confiscated land (with some
compensation generally offered but refused) belonging to three Catholic institutions
in Bethany for construction of the separation barrier. Israeli closure policies,
imposed by the government due to security concerns, prevented tens of thousands of
Palestinians from reaching places of worship in Jerusalem and the West Bank,
including during religious holidays such as Christmas and Easter. The PA failed to
halt several cases of seizures of Christian-owned land in the Bethlehem area by
criminal gangs. There have been credible reports in recent years that PA security
forces and judicial officials colluded with members of these gangs to seize land from
Christians.24 Press reports in early 2007 noted that while Christian leaders describe
a rise in attacks on Christians and their property in the past year, most blamed
mounting stresses on Palestinian society, including growing unemployment and
lawlessness, rather than the Hamas-led government for the increase.25
Palestinian Refugees
Of the some 700,000 Palestinians displaced during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war,
about one-third ended up in the West Bank, one-third in the Gaza Strip, and one-third
in neighboring Arab countries. They and their descendants now number 4.4 million,
many living in refugee camps in the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.26
Jordan offered Palestinian refugees citizenship, but the remainder are stateless and
therefore unable to travel. They receive little or no assistance from Arab host
governments and remain reliant on the United Nations for food, health care, and
education. For political and economic reasons, the Arab host governments have been
unwilling to allow the Palestinians to assimilate into their countries. Even if they
were able, many of the Palestinian refugees hold out hope of returning to the homes
they left behind or possibly to a future Palestinian state. According to many
observers, it is difficult to overstate the deep sense of dispossession and betrayal
these refugees feel over never having been allowed to return to their homes, land, and
property. Thus, their presence exerts significant pressure on both their host
governments and the Palestinian leadership in the territories to seek a solution to their
claims as part of any final status deal with Israel.
24
For the text of the 2006 International Religious Freedom Report for Israel and the
Occupied Territories, see [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71423.htm#occterr].
25
Isabel Kershner, “Palestinian Christians Look Back on a Year of Troubles,” New York
Times, March 11, 2007.
26
UNRWA website, accessed October 12, 2006, [http://www.un.org/unrwa/publications/
index.html].
CRS-12
Table 1. Palestinian Population Worldwide
Country or Region
Population
West Bank and Gaza Strip
3,800,000
Jordan
2,900,000
Israel
1,100,000
Other Arab states
1,600,000
Other States
Total
560,000
9,960,000
Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
UNRWA. In 1949, to ease the plight of Palestinian refugees resulting from the
1948 Arab-Israeli war, the U.N. General Assembly set up the U.N. Relief and Works
Agency (UNRWA) to shelter, feed, and clothe the refugees. Although seen at the
time as a temporary measure, in the absence of a comprehensive resolution of the
Palestine refugee problem, the General Assembly has repeatedly renewed UNRWA’s
mandate, most recently extending it to June 30, 2008. Over time, its operations have
evolved to meet changing needs and circumstances. UNRWA now provides both
basic humanitarian relief and human development services, including education,
vocational training, and micro-credit loans. UNRWA defines those eligible for its
services as “anyone whose normal place of residence was in Mandate Palestine
during the period from 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both home and
means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.” The descendants of the
original refugees also are eligible to register. As of 2006, UNRWA has registered 4.3
million Palestine refugees living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon,
and Syria.
UNRWA Funding. Ninety-five percent of the UNRWA budget is funded by
voluntary contributions from governments and the European Union. Most of these
funds are in cash; approximately 4% is made up of in-kind donations. UNRWA’s
budget for 2006 was $471 million. U.S. contributions to UNRWA come from the
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account managed by the State
Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), and also
through the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) account, which
is made available for refugee emergencies. The United States contributed $137
million to UNRWA in FY2006 in regular program budget and emergency appeal
funds. For FY2007, Congress appropriated $90 million for the regular program
budget and the United States contributed another $50 million to the emergency
appeal for the West Bank and Gaza.27 Until the 1990s, Arab governments did not
contribute to UNRWA’s budget in an effort to keep the Palestinian refugee issue on
the international agenda and to press Israel to accept responsibility for their plight.
27
Since October 2000, UNRWA has launched Emergency Appeals to the donor community
to fund the Agency’s Emergency Programs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
CRS-13
Since then, most Arab states have made relatively small annual contributions. The
following two charts show recent U.S. contributions to UNRWA and Arab states’
pledges in 2006.
Table 2. Recent U.S. Contributions to UNRWA
($ millions)
Account
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
Regular Program
Budget
$88
$84.15
$90
Emergency
Appeal
$20
$52.85
$40
$108
$137
$130
Total
Source: State Department
Table 3. Arab States’ Pledges to UNRWA 2006
Country
Regular Budget
Non-Regular
Budget
Total
Bahrain
$30,000
0
$30,000
Egypt
$10,000
0
$10,000
Jordan
$656,133
0
$656,133
Kuwait
$1,500,000
$999,958
$2,499,958
Lebanon
$17,700
0
$17,700
Morocco
$23,000
0
$23,000
Palestine
$853,772
0
$853,772
$1,200,000
0
$1,200,000
$85,293
0
$85,293
$9,302
0
$9,302
$500,000
0
$500,000
$4,885,200
$999,958
$5,885,158
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Tunisia
United Arab
Emirates
Total
Source: UNRWA website
Congressional Concerns. Some in Congress have questioned whether
UNRWA refugee rolls are inflated. There is also concern that no effort has been
made to settle the refugees permanently or extend the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees mandate to include Palestinian refugees. UNRWA’s
CRS-14
defenders point out that UNRWA periodically updates the rolls to try to eliminate
duplication and that its mandate covers relief and social services, but not
resettlement. At present, many observers consider UNRWA a unique organization
that is better left in place until a way forward on the peace process can be found.
For many years, Congress has raised concerns about how to ensure that
UNRWA funds are used for the programs it supports and not for anything
inappropriate, such as terrorist activities. Some in Congress have been concerned
that refugee camps have been used as military training grounds. The camps are not
controlled or policed by UNRWA, but by the host countries. Concerns also have
been expressed about the content of textbooks and educational materials used by
UNRWA, with claims that they promote anti-Semitism and exacerbate tensions
between Israelis and Palestinians. UNRWA responds that the host country, not
UNRWA, provides the textbooks and determines their content because students must
take exams in host country degree programs.
In the 109th Congress, in 2006, Congressman Mark Kirk introduced H.R. 5278,
the UNRWA Integrity Act, which would have required that U.S. contributions to
UNRWA be provided only if the President certified that UNRWA, among other
things, is subject to independent financial audits, does not knowingly provide aid to
any member of a Foreign Terrorist Organization, and does not promote
anti-Semitism. In 2005, an amendment to H.R. 2745, the Henry J. Hyde United
Nations Reform Act of 2005, would have prohibited the Secretary of State from
making contributions to UNRWA greater than the highest contribution by an Arab
country or exceeding 22% of the total UNRWA budget. Neither bill was enacted into
law.
Palestinian Foreign Policy/Relations
Israel
All aspects of Palestinian political and economic life are intimately connected
to Israel (for further discussion of the economic relationship, see the Economic
Profile and Issues section below). Political contacts, which were regular and wideranging during the Oslo years, culminated in intensive negotiations on a final status
agreement between July 2000 and January 2001. Since then political interaction has
been limited because of intifada violence, which broke out in September 2000, and
more recently the election of Hamas in 2006. However, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
has met several times with PA President Abbas since December 2006. These
meetings, encouraged by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice as a precursor to
resuming peace negotiations, initially focused on easing restrictions on Palestinian
movement and restoring law and order to the Palestinian territories. In October 2007,
Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams began meeting to discuss final status issues
in an effort to reach an agreement in principle prior to U.S.-sponsored peace talks
planned for November.
In the West Bank, IDF soldiers regularly mount arrest operations to apprehend
wanted Palestinians or foil terrorist plots. In Gaza, despite the fact that Israel
CRS-15
withdrew its settlers and soldiers in 2005, Palestinian militants sporadically fire
crude, homemade rockets, so-called Qassam rockets, at Israeli civilian targets. The
rockets are inaccurate but occasionally lethal: in 2006, over 800 rockets were
launched into Israel, killing two Israelis; in 2007, two more Israelis have been killed.
Since the withdrawal, most of the rockets have been fired by PIJ or PRC operatives,
but Hamas has claimed responsibility for some. Observers offer several explanations
for the rocket attacks: sometimes they appear to be designed as retaliation for IDF
operations in the West Bank, at others they seem intended to draw an Israeli response
in order to rally and unify warring Palestinian factions.
Since Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, Israel has closed all
border crossings, allowing only food and medical supplies to enter the territory. In
September, it declared the area a “hostile entity,” and authorized the disruption of
power and fuel supplies to the Strip in order to press Hamas to end the rocket fire.
Regional States and Actors
Jordan. West Bank Palestinians share a common bloodline, culture, and
history with Jordan. Palestinians, mostly refugees from the 1948 and 1967 ArabIsraeli wars, comprise an estimated 55% to 70% of Jordan’s population. Jordan
controlled the West Bank from 1949 until Israel seized it in 1967. In 1950, Jordan
annexed the West Bank but in 1988, in the midst of the first intifada and growing
Palestinian demands for self-determination, Jordan relinquished its claim to the
territory. However, the late King Hussein and his son and successor King Abdullah
II have remained deeply involved in championing the Palestinian cause and urging
a negotiated two-state solution with Israel. At a joint meeting of Congress in March
2007, King Abdullah called the need for a just and secure peace in Palestine “the core
issue” in the Middle East and urged a renewed U.S. commitment to this end. In May
2007, the King invited some 200 Palestinians, Israelis, and Jordanians to Aqaba to
discuss peace plans for the region.28 In June 2007, PA President Abbas reportedly
requested that Israel allow the Badr Brigade, a Palestinian force loyal to Fatah and
stationed in Jordan, to return to the West Bank to shore up his control following
Hamas’s takeover of Gaza.
Jordan’s relations with Hamas are strained and since the 2006 Hamas electoral
victory, the Jordanian government has been placed in a difficult position. Much of
its citizenry sympathizes with Hamas, and Jordan’s own Islamist party, the Islamic
Action Front, reportedly maintains close ties to Hamas. However, on April 20, 2006,
Jordan reportedly cancelled a planned visit by then Palestinian Foreign Minister
Mahmoud al Zahhar, who is also a high-level Hamas official, on the grounds that
Hamas had hidden a weapons cache in Jordan. Hamas denied the charge and claimed
that Jordan was using the allegation to justify cancelling the visit. Hamas had been
expelled from Jordan in 1999, shortly after King Abdullah’s ascension to the throne.
Egypt. President Hosni Mubarak has attempted to act as a broker, advisor,
messenger, and arbitrator between Palestinian factions in the hopes of galvanizing
28
Ilene Prusher, “A New/Old Idea for Palestinian Peace,” Christian Science Monitor, May
31, 2007.
CRS-16
them to take the necessary risks for peace. In addition, Egypt’s intelligence chief,
Omar Suleiman, has repeatedly met with Hamas and PA figures in order to secure
cease-fire arrangements with Israel. However, press reports in May 2007 suggest
Egypt is growing increasingly frustrated by the Palestinians’ inability to halt violence
and restore order in Gaza. Although Egypt has often tried to steer a neutral course
in dealing with the Palestinians, most observers believe that Hamas’s rise to
prominence poses a number of challenges for Egyptian diplomacy in the region, since
the Egyptian government has traditionally been at odds with its own domestic
Islamist groups. According to Israeli press reports, Egypt has begun barring senior
Hamas leaders from entering Egypt due to concerns over their contacts with the
Muslim Brotherhood.29
In December 2006 and again in June 2007, several news outlets reported that
Egypt, with the approval of the Israeli government, shipped AK-47 rifles and large
stockpiles of ammunition to Fatah-affiliated groups in the Gaza Strip.30 With
intra-Palestinian violence flaring in the Gaza Strip, U.S., Israeli, and Egyptian
officials sought to bolster forces loyal to PA President Abbas in an unsuccessful bid
to prevent Hamas from seizing control there. From Egypt’s standpoint, providing
military support to one Palestinian faction, while in its interest, could pose problems
for the Mubarak government. Egyptian public opinion may be somewhat
sympathetic to Hamas, making public disclosure of overt Egyptian support for
anti-Hamas groups an unwelcome development for the Mubarak government. On the
other hand, Egypt derives certain political benefits as one of the few outside powers
capable of acting as an intermediary between Israel, the United States, and the
Palestinians. Following Hamas’s takeover of Gaza, President Mubarak hosted Israeli
Prime Minister Olmert, PA President Abbas, and Jordanian King Abdullah in Sharm
el Shaykh on June 25, 2007, to show support for Abbas.
Syria and Lebanon. As noted, some exiled leaders of Hamas, PIJ, and other
Palestinian terrorist groups are based in Syria. According to the State Department’s
most recent annual report on global terrorism (Country Reports on Terrorism, 2006,
published on April 30, 2007) Syria continues to provide political and material
support for Palestinian groups that have committed terrorist acts, and allows them to
maintain offices in Damascus. Syria admits its support for Palestinians pursuing
armed struggle in Israeli occupied territories, but insists that these actions represent
legitimate resistance activity as distinguished from terrorism. Syria also is home to
some 400,000 Palestinians refugees, most of whom live in UNRWA-run refugee
camps.
Among Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee population are several militias, including
some rejectionist groups opposed to the Arab-Israeli peace process. In the past,
Palestinian militias in Lebanon were secular and in some cases Marxist in outlook,
with little affinity for Islamic fundamentalism. More recently, however, some
29
Barak Ravid, “Mubarak Says Hamas Will Never Sign a Peace Agreement With Israel,”
Ha’aretz, May 18, 2007.
30
“With Approval of Israeli Gov’t, Egypt Transfers Thousands of Rifles to Fatah,”
Ha’aretz, December 28, 2006; Ya’akov Katz, “Israel May Let Egypt Transfer Weapons To
Fatah Troops,” Jerusalem Post, June 7 2007.
CRS-17
Palestinians in Lebanon have moved closer to the type of hard-line Sunni
fundamentalism espoused by al Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and the late Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi. Some have joined the insurgency in Iraq, while others have
sought to turn Lebanon into a recruiting ground for terrorist activities.
A relatively obscure Palestinian-associated group known as Fatah al-Islam has
mounted the most serious challenge to the Lebanese government. Numbering
between 100 and 300, this group is variously described as having ties to Al Qaeda or
to Syrian intelligence; however, Syrian officials deny any links with it and maintain
that they have pursued Fatah al-Islam through Interpol and other channels.31
Observers also differ on its composition, some calling it a Palestinian organization
and others saying its membership includes Syrians, Saudis, Jordanians, and other
Arab and non-Arab nationals. The organization is particularly strong among
Palestinian refugees residing in the Nahr al-Bared camp located near the northern
Lebanese city of Tripoli.
In May 2007, Lebanese police conducted raids against suspected Fatah al-Islam
hideouts in Tripoli reportedly in pursuit of bank robbers. Fighting between Lebanese
army and police units, on one hand, and Fatah al-Islam militia, on the other, spread
to the nearby Nahr al-Bared refugee camp. Prohibited by a 1969 agreement from
entering Palestinian camps, the army besieged the camp and shelled militia positions
in an effort to force the militia out. The siege ended in early September after the army
killed or captured almost all of the militants and the remainder fled.
Saudi Arabia. Prior to the election of the current Hamas-led government,
Saudi support to the PA was estimated at $80 million to $180 million per year.32
Since Hamas came to power in 2006, Saudi support has been channeled through the
office of President Abbas. In the past, there have been reports of private Saudi
citizens and charities aiding Hamas. According to one 2003 press report, at one time,
Saudi benefactors contributed some $5 million to Hamas per year, or approximately
half of its pre-governing annual operating budget.33 Past reports indicated that Saudi
authorities tolerated fund raising for Hamas. For example, in May 2002, Israeli
officials, citing captured Palestinian documents, said the Saudi government had given
money to 13 charities, seven of which provided support to Hamas. Then Saudi
government spokesman Adel al Jubeir maintained that “no Saudi government money
goes to Hamas, directly or indirectly.”34
In 2007, Saudi Arabia has undertaken efforts to end the fighting between
Palestinian factions as well as the international aid boycott on the Hamas-led
government. In February 2007, King Abdullah invited Hamas and Fatah leaders to
Mecca where they reached the Mecca Accord, creating a unity government in which
31
Liz Sly, “Lebanon’s Stability Under Fire; Al Qaeda-linked Group Emerges as New
Threat,” Chicago Tribune, May 22, 2007.
32
Don Van Natta, Jr., with Timothy L. O’Brien, “Flow of Saudi Cash to Hamas Is Under
Scrutiny by U.S.,” New York Times, September 17, 2003.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
CRS-18
the two rivals agreed to share power. The Saudis continued their diplomatic push at
the Arab League summit in Riyadh in March. During a speech at the summit, Saudi
King Abdullah called for an end to the international boycott of the PA in light of the
agreement between Fatah and Hamas to form a unity government.
In addition, the summit communique relaunched the Arab Peace Initiative of
2002 (originally crafted by Abdullah himself) , which calls for full Israeli withdrawal
from the territories occupied in 1967, creation of an independent Palestinian state
with East Jerusalem as its capital, and a just, agreed upon solution to the refugee
problem. In exchange, all Arab states would enter into peace agreements and
establish normal relations with Israel. Analysts speculate that the Saudi diplomatic
drive had several purposes. First was to end the intra-Palestinian violence and
resume long-stalled peace negotiations with Israel. Second, by securing Arab and
perhaps international recognition of a government that included Hamas and then
relaunching peace talks with full Arab backing, the Saudis hoped to bring Hamas into
the Arab consensus, moderate its anti-Israeli ideology, and ultimately get it to accept
a two-state solution. Finally, by creating momentum toward peace, the Saudis were
seeking to undermine the regional influence of Iran and rejectionist groups like
Hezbollah.
Iran and Hezbollah. Since the early 1990s, Iran has supplied cash, arms, and
training to Hamas, but most observers say the relationship has been an uneasy one.
Iran has sought a foothold in the Palestinian territories, while Hamas jealousy guards
its political and operational independence. The relationship has been relatively
unaffected by the widening rift between some Sunni and Shiite groups, although
Hamas protested the December 2006 execution of Saddam Hussein by the Shiite-led
government of Iraq. Since the international aid boycott was enacted, Iran has
increased its assistance to Hamas. Hamas officials visiting Tehran in 2006 often
returned carrying large sums of cash, according to press reports. The International
Monetary Fund estimates that in 2006 some $70 million in cash was carried into the
territories, most of it thought to be from Iran. After a visit to Iran in December 2006,
then Palestinian Prime Minister Haniyeh said Iran had agreed to provide $120 million
in assistance in 2007 and up to $250 million in total. Israeli security officials have
warned of growing Iranian influence in Gaza. The head of the Israel Defense Force
Southern Command, Maj. Gen. Yoav Galant, said in April 2007 he believes a large
number of “Iranian terror and guerrilla experts” are operating in the Gaza Strip,
training Palestinian terrorists.35 Other observers contend that claims of Iranian
influence in Gaza are exaggerated, primarily in order to influence U.S.
policymakers.36
Although Hamas and the Lebanese militia Hezbollah are not organizationally
linked and represent different constituencies (Palestinian Sunni vs. Lebanese Shiite),
Hezbollah provides military training as well as financial and moral support to the
35
Amos Harel, “Senior IDF Commander Confirms Iran Training Militants in Gaza,”
Ha’aretz, April 22, 2007.
36
“CNN Interviews Nir Rosen on Middle East Tensions, U.S. Role,” New America
Foundation website, June 21, 2007, [http://www.newamerica.net/pressroom/2007/
cnn_interviews_nir_rosen_middle_east_tensions_u_s_role].
CRS-19
Palestinian group and has acted in some ways as a mentor or role model for Hamas,
which has sought to emulate the Lebanese group’s political and media success.
Moreover, the two groups share the goal of driving Israel from occupied territories
and ultimately eliminating it; both maintain close ties with Iran. On June 25, 2006,
Palestinian gunmen, including Hamas members, raided an IDF position near Gaza,
killing two Israeli soldiers and capturing a third. On July 12, under cover of massive
shelling of a town in northern Israel, Hezbollah forces crossed the international
border from Lebanon into northern Israel and attacked two Israeli vehicles, killing
three soldiers and kidnaping two. Hezbollah thereby opened a second front against
Israel ostensibly in support of Hamas. Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader,
suggested that the Hezbollah operation might provide a way out of the crisis in Gaza
because Israel had negotiated with Hezbollah indirectly in the past even though it
refuses to negotiate with Hamas now. He said that the only way the soldiers would
be returned would be through a prisoner exchange.37
The European Union
The European Union (EU) has been the largest donor to the PA since its creation
in the mid-1990s. The focus of EU aid had been on long-term institution building
and development assistance, but more recently has shifted to humanitarian assistance.
The EU joined the United States in banning direct assistance to the PA after the
election of the Hamas government in 2006. In July 2006, the EU established a
Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) to channel aid directly to Palestinians,
bypassing the Hamas-led government. Through a World Bank account, European
donations or “social allowances” are paid directly into the bank accounts of some
Palestinian public sector workers and other needy families. The TIM also provides
essential services in the Gaza Strip through fuel deliveries to hospitals and clinics as
well as by maintaining water and waste water treatment facilities.38
Following the establishment of the Palestinian unity government, EU officials
met with non-Hamas members of the PA government, but left in place the ban on
direct aid. The EU has had some success in forging consensus on its approach to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the last few years. The EU views resolving the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict as key to reshaping the Middle East and promoting
stability on Europe’s periphery. Moreover, EU member states are committed to
maintaining a common EU policy on this issue to boost the credibility of the Union’s
evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy. The EU joined the United States in
announcing a resumption of aid to the PA in June 2007 after Abbas dissolved the
Hamas-led unity government and set up an emergency government without Hamas.
37
“Lebanon: Hezbollah Leader Holds News Conference on Captured Israeli Soldiers,”
Al-Manar Television, July 12, 2006, Open Source Center Document, GMP20060712617001.
38
For more details of the TIM and the EU’s policy toward the Palestinians, see the EU
website [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/gaza/intro/index.htm].
CRS-20
The United Nations Context39
As events have unfolded in Israel and the Palestinian territories, two major U.N.
organs — the Security Council and the General Assembly — have worked to carry
out their Charter functions.40 Some observers have asserted that U.N. debate and
resolutions on these issues are intended only to criticize and target Israel. Others, on
the other hand, have viewed the United Nations as a necessary ingredient or factor
in any solution leading to lasting stability for the region.41 The Security Council, as
the organ with a primary responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and
security, has worked to bring an end to any immediate conflict and to set agreed-upon
long-range principles and goals. The General Assembly has passed resolutions to
reflect the views of a majority, but not necessarily all, of the international
community.
Since 1947, the U.N. General Assembly has annually passed at least one
resolution relating in some way to Arab-Israeli or Palestine issues. The numbers of
resolutions adopted each session slowly increased after the 1967 “Six-Day War” and
leading up to the 1973 “Yom Kippur War” when the Assembly passed resolutions
dealing with human rights and with conditions in the occupied territories.
Resolutions adopted after 1973 also focused on Palestine and on the PLO, with the
Assembly granting observer status to the PLO in 1974, declaring that Zionism is a
form of racism in 1975, and broadening PLO (Palestine) rights as “observer” in the
Assembly in 1998.42 The General Assembly held special sessions on Palestine in
1947 and in 1948. The remaining Assembly special sessions on these issues have
39
This section was written by Marjorie Ann Browne, Specialist in International Relations.
40
The 1945 U.N. Charter sets forth a number of legal principles to be followed by U.N.
member states. They include refraining “from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state” and settling “their international
disputes by peaceful means.” [Article 2, para. 4 and 3] At the same time, Article 51
recognizes “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a [U.N.] Member....”
41
The Security Council has 15 members, five of which are permanent and have the right to
veto adoption of a resolution. Some Council decisions commit all members to carry them
out. The General Assembly is made up of all 192 U.N. members. Its resolutions are
recommendatory, except in certain circumstances.
42
In 1988, the Assembly redesignated the PLO as Palestine and in 1991 repealed the
“Zionism equals racism” resolution. The Institute for Palestine Studies publishes a
comprehensive compilation of all related U.N. and U.N. system agency resolutions: United
Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Volumes I - V cover 1947
through 1998. The table of contents in these volumes is very detailed. The United Nations
provides links to the texts of related U.N. resolutions at its website, at
[http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/qpal ]. Resolutions of U.N. system agencies are not included.
CRS-21
been convened as emergency special sessions.43 Of the 10 emergency special
sessions held since 1956, six have related to Arab-Israeli or Palestine issues.
The U.N. Security Council adopted fewer numbers of resolutions on these
issues. In part, this was because the United States used its veto to prevent adoption
of resolutions it viewed as one-sided or unbalanced. The veto was used in the
Council in approximately 25 percent, or 53, of 210 cases, to prevent adoption of a
resolution on issues involving the Arab-Israeli disputes or Palestine.44
Over the years, U.N. organs have set up a number of bodies or offices, as well
as five U.N. peacekeeping operations which had mandates or functions directly
related to Palestine or the Arab-Israeli dispute. Appendix 3 of this report, List of
Current United Nations Bodies and Offices That Focus on Palestinian or Arab-Israeli
Issues, which is arranged by the establishing organ, provides the name, the year of
establishment and by what organ, and when possible a web address for the body. At
least three agencies have established programs of assistance to the Palestinian people.
In addition, Palestine is a full member of the U.N. Economic and Social Commission
for Western Asia.
Economic Profile and Issues
Overview
The combination of 40 years of Israeli occupation, political turmoil, and
corruption in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have produced a distorted economy that
is highly dependent on foreign assistance. The Palestinian public sector is bloated,
with patronage and cronyism contributing to an expanding PA payroll. The private
sector is characterized mainly by small, family-owned businesses. By the end of
2005, despite signs of a fragile recovery, the Palestinian economy was suffering from
a five-year-long crisis that began with the outbreak of the second intifada in
September 2000. In January 2006, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 10% lower
than in 1999; real per capita GDP was one-third lower than in 2000; unemployment
and poverty rates were 24% and 44%, respectively, more than twice their pre-intifada
levels; and the PA was in an unsustainable fiscal position, with an annual budget
deficit of $800 million, or 17% of GDP.45 The crisis continued even as the
international community doubled its external assistance from roughly $500 million
per year in the 1990s to around $1 billion annually by 2005. Most observers cite
43
The Assembly adopted the Uniting for Peace Resolution (A/RES/377 (V)) in 1950 to
enable Assembly consideration of an issue, then before the Security Council, in instances
when the Council, thwarted by use of the veto, was unable to act on that issue. For a list
of emergency special sessions, see
[http://lib-unique.un.org/lib/unique.nsf/Link/R03055].
44
See Subject of UN Security Council Vetoes, available at [http://www.globalpolicy.org/
security/membship/veto/vetosubj.htm]
45
Mohammed Samhouri, “Looking Beyond the Numbers: The Palestinian Socioeconomic
Crisis of 2006,” Brandeis University Crown Center for Middle East Studies, February 2007.
CRS-22
Israeli-Palestinian violence, political instability, and stringent Israeli restrictions on
Palestinian movement, both within the West Bank and Gaza and across borders, as
the main contributors to the 2000-2005 crisis.
Fiscal Crisis
In 2006, following the establishment of the Hamas-led PA government, Israel
and the international donor community took a series of measures that triggered a
drastic reduction in PA revenues and drove Palestinian society deeper into poverty
and crisis. Israel began withholding tax and customs revenues that it collects on
behalf of the PA and imposed more severe restrictions on the movement of
Palestinian people, labor, and goods on security grounds. Western donors suspended
direct financial support to the PA budget and began channeling humanitarian aid
through international and non-governmental organizations, and in some cases directly
to Palestinian families. As economic activities in the West Bank and Gaza declined
due to the crisis, domestic tax revenues dropped correspondingly. Finally, Arab and
international banks, fearing possible litigation under U.S. anti-terror law, refused to
provide lending facilities to the new PA government to help cover the shortfall. The
PA had to curtail spending; PA employees were estimated to have received 50-55%
of their normal salaries in 2006, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and World Bank.46
The Israeli government for security reasons has hindered the free movement of
Palestinian people, labor, and goods within and between the West Bank and Gaza,
as well as across borders, since the 1990s, employing checkpoints, roadblocks,
curfews, and border closures. These restrictions were intensified both in number and
complexity after the outbreak of the second intifada. They physically hindered the
flow of economic transactions, raised the cost of doing business, and often left
Palestinians unable to export goods for days or weeks at a time, including perishable
fruits and vegetables, a key Palestinian export. In 2006, Israel further tightened
restrictions on movement, especially after a June 25 attack in which Palestinian
gunmen killed two Israeli soldiers and captured a third. A U.S.-brokered Agreement
on Movement and Access, signed by Israel and the PA in November 2005, went
largely unfulfilled in 2006. During 2006, the Rafah border crossing, Gaza’s main
gateway to the world, was closed 86% of the time after June 25. The Karni crossing,
Gaza’s main commercial outlet, averaged 12 truckloads of goods per day, a small
fraction of the 400 truckload target set by the agreement.47 Although the flow of
goods improved slightly at Karni in the first quarter of 2007, the crossing has
remained closed since June, when Hamas fighters seized control of the Gaza Strip.
The suspension of Gaza trade will further exacerbate the PA’s fiscal crisis and could
collapse Gaza’s private sector, according to the World Bank.48
46
International Monetary Fund-World Bank, “West Bank and Gaza Economic
Developments in 2006 — A First Assessment,” March 2007.
47
48
Samhouri, “Looking Beyond the Numbers,” February 2007.
The World Bank, “Two Years After London: Restarting Palestinian Economic Recovery,”
September 24, 2007.
CRS-23
Deepening Poverty
The impact of the 2006 fiscal and access crisis on Palestinian living conditions
has been severe. According to the IMF and World Bank, the Palestinian economy
declined in 2006 with real GDP falling between 5 and 10%.49 An increase in official
and private aid flows cushioned the impact of the decline somewhat.
Unemployment is now estimated at 25% (19% in the West Bank and 35% in Gaza).
However, even those with jobs are often making due with substantially less. As
noted, the estimated 165,000 PA employees (in Gaza, the PA employs 73,000, or
40% of Gaza’s work force) received only about half of their salaries in 2006.
Teachers have been striking off and on since September 2006 to protest unpaid
salaries. Hospitals regularly run out of essential medical supplies and are often able
to provide no more than emergency treatment. Poverty levels, already 44% at the
beginning of 2006, have risen. Finance Minister Salam Fayyad in April 2007
estimated that nearly two-thirds of Gazans are living below the poverty level.50
According to a U.N. report, 34% of Palestinians are “food insecure,” with income
below $1.68 per day and/or showing decreasing food expenditures. An additional
12% of Palestinians are “vulnerable” to food insecurity.51
Current Issues in U.S.-Palestinian Relations
Hamas Takes Power
The First Hamas Government. After winning a majority of seats in the
January 2006 Palestinian legislative election, Hamas formed a government without
Fatah, which initially refused to join a Hamas-led coalition. On April 7, 2006, the
United States and the European Union announced they were halting direct aid to the
Hamas-led PA government but that humanitarian aid would continue to flow through
international and non-governmental organizations. Israel also began withholding
about $50 million in monthly tax and customs receipts that it collects for the PA. In
2005, international assistance and the Israeli-collected revenues together accounted
for nearly 75% of PA revenues. The resulting fiscal crisis left the Hamas-led
government unable to pay wages regularly and deepened poverty levels in the
Palestinian territories. By the end of 2006, tensions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
were rising as living conditions deteriorated and PA employees, including members
of the security forces, went unpaid for weeks or months. Armed supporters of Fatah
and Hamas clashed repeatedly in Gaza, trading accusations of blame, settling scores,
and drifting into lawlessness. More than 100 Palestinians were killed in the violence.
The Unity Government. After months of intermittent talks, on February 8,
2007, Fatah and Hamas signed an agreement to form a national unity government
49
IMF-World Bank report, March 2007.
50
Barry Schweid, “Rice, Palestinian Finance Minister Meet,” Associated Press, April 17,
2007.
51
World Food Program. “Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis West
Bank and Gaza Strip,” February 21, 2007.
CRS-24
aimed at ending both the spasm of violence between them and the international aid
embargo. The accord was signed by PA President Abbas and Hamas political leader
Khalid Mish’al in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, after two days of talks under the auspices
of Saudi King Abdullah. Under the agreement, Ismail Haniyeh of Hamas remained
prime minister. In the unity government, Hamas controlled nine ministries and Fatah
six, with independents and smaller parties heading the remainder. Among the
independents were Finance Minister Salam Fayyad, an internationally respected
economist, and Foreign Minister Ziad Abu Amr, a reformer and ally of President
Abbas. Demonstrating the differing priorities of Fatah and Hamas, the unity
government’s platform called for establishing a Palestinian state “on all the lands that
were occupied in 1967 with Jerusalem as its capital,” and at the same time affirmed
the Palestinians’ right to “resistance in all its forms” and to “defend themselves
against any ongoing Israeli aggression.” The government committed to “respect”
previous agreements signed by the PLO but did not explicitly renounce violence or
recognize Israel. The government platform stated that any peace agreement reached
would have been submitted for approval to either the Palestine National Council (the
PLO legislature) or directly to the Palestinian people in a referendum.
The Bush Administration expressed disappointment with the unity government
platform and said that Prime Minister Haniyeh of Hamas had “failed to step up to
international standards.”52 The Administration, however, met with non-Hamas
members of the new government. On March 20, 2007, U.S. Consul General in
Jerusalem Jacob Walles met with Palestinian Finance Minister Fayyad in Ramallah,
the first diplomatic contact between the United States and the Palestinians in a year.
On April 17, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice held a half-hour meeting with
Fayyad at the State Department. Fayyad separately controls an account held by the
PLO and, at his request, U.S. officials have given the green light to allowing donor
funds from Arab and European countries — but not from the United States — to flow
to this account. By early June, some $160 million had been deposited into this
account by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Norway.
The Administration also redirected some assistance to PA President Abbas. In
late 2006, the State Department notified Congress of the President’s intent to
reprogram up to $86 million in prior-year funding to support efforts to reform and
rehabilitate Palestinian civil security forces loyal to Abbas.53 However, the House
Appropriations Committee placed a hold on these funds, seeking more information
on where and why the money was to be spent. After the Palestinians reached
agreement on the Fatah-Hamas power sharing arrangement, other Members of
Congress reportedly expressed further doubts about where the money was going,
fearing it may end up with Hamas.54 In March 2007, Secretary Rice told a House
Appropriations subcommittee that the Administration was now seeking $59 million
for Abbas ($43 million for training and non-lethal assistance to the Palestinian
52
Isabel Kershner, “U.S. and Israel Differ on Contact With Palestinians,” New York Times,
March 19, 2007.
53
Cam Simpson, “Dangerous Territory: With Aid, U.S. Widens Role in Palestinian Crisis,”
Wall Street Journal, January 12, 2007.
54
Paul Richter, “Palestinian Aid Lands in Limbo,” Los Angeles Times, February 21, 2007.
CRS-25
Presidential Guard and $16 million for improvements at the Karni crossing, the main
terminal for goods moving in and out of Gaza).55 No holds were placed on this
request.
Hamas Seizes Gaza; Unity Government Dissolved. Factional fighting
broke out again in the Gaza Strip in June 2007. This time, however, Hamas gunmen,
better armed and trained than Fatah forces, pressed their advantage and resisted calls
for a cease-fire. Over five days and meeting little organized resistance, Hamas took
complete control of the Strip, capturing all remaining Fatah strongholds, including
the Preventive Security Headquarters and the presidential compound in Gaza City.
More than 160 people were killed in the fighting, mostly Fatah gunmen.56 President
Abbas, who remained in the West Bank, declared a state of emergency, dissolved the
government, and named Finance Minister Fayyad as the new prime minister.
Hamas has run a parallel administration in the strip since Abbas’s decree. Many
Fatah officials fled Gaza during the final days of fighting in June and those that
remain are keeping a low profile. According to press accounts, Hamas has restored
a measure of law and order in the Strip, although sometimes with a heavy hand. The
courts are not functioning because judges and prosecutors are refusing to work under
the Hamas regime. Hamas officials insist they are holding secret reconciliation talks
with Fatah, but Fatah officials deny this, saying such talks will only be possible if
Hamas surrenders control of Gaza.
The Hamas takeover exacerbated the growing split between the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip. For now, President Abbas and Fatah remain in power in the West
Bank, but have little authority in Gaza. On June 18, 2007, the United States and the
EU announced they were resuming aid to the PA in the West Bank, now that it is
back in the hands of Fatah.57
55
Ron Kampeas, “U.S. Details Security Aid for Abbas,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, May
30, 2007.
56
Palestine Center for Human Rights, “Black Pages in the Absence of Justice: Report on the
Bloody Fighting in the Gaza Strip from 7 to 14 June 2007,” October 2007.
57
“US, EU Lift Economic Embargo on New Palestinian Government,” Ha’aretz, June 18,
2007.
CRS-26
Figure 2. Map of the Gaza Strip
CRS-27
Terrorism
The United States faced a new situation when Hamas, a designated Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO), assumed control of the PA after its electoral victory
in January 2006. The Bush Administration suspended all direct assistance to the PA
and all contact with PA officials. When Hamas and Fatah formed a unity
government in March 2007, the Administration permitted meetings with non-Hamas
ministers on a case by case basis. Besides Hamas, six other Palestinian groups have
been designated FTOs (Abu Nidal Organization, Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Palestine
Liberation Front, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command).
More than 50 U.S. citizens have been killed by Palestinian terrorists since the Oslo
process began in 1993. Most were not specifically targeted as Americans but were
killed in attacks on Israeli civilians. In October 2003, three U.S. security guards were
killed in Gaza when their vehicle was destroyed by a roadside bomb in what appears
to have been a targeted attack. The Popular Resistance Committees, a shadowy
group of dissidents and militants operating in Gaza, claimed and then later denied
responsibility.
Political, Economic, and Security Reform58
Because of the late Palestinian President Yasir Arafat’s preference for cronyism,
duplicate lines of authority, and controlled chaos over order, calls for PA reform have
been heard from Palestinian activists since the late 1990s.59 Sustained international
efforts to press for PA reform emerged following President Bush’s June 2002 speech,
in which he explicitly tied movement toward Palestinian statehood with PA reform.
Within weeks of the President’s speech, key donors led by the United States formed
the Task Force on Palestinian Reform, which established a series of specific
benchmarks against which PA performance was evaluated. Emboldened Palestinian
legislators and civil society activists made the issues of reform and anti-corruption
a dominant theme in Palestinian political discourse. These internal and external
pressures led to the appointment of the well-respected former IMF official Salam
Fayyad as Minister of Finance in June 2002, the PLC rejection of Arafat’s proposed
cabinet (deemed insufficiently reform-minded) in September 2002, and the creation
of the post of Prime Minister, designed specifically to curb Arafat’s power, in March
2003. The first prime minister was Mahmoud Abbas, the current president. Abbas
quit the post after just four months because Arafat refused to yield key powers
envisioned for the prime minister. Now, as president, Abbas fired Prime Minister
Haniyeh over their power struggle in Gaza.
Elections, viewed by all as an integral component of the reform agenda, from
the outset created a conundrum for the international community as well as for
Palestinians. Despite rhetorical commitment to democratic processes, the Bush
58
Much of this section is drawn from Larry Garber, “Palestinian Reform and International
Assistance,” Arab Reform Bulletin, February 2005. For a fuller discussion, see Judy
Barsalou, “The Long Road to Palestinian Reform,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2003.
59
For further on Arafat’s leadership style, see David Samuels, “In a Ruined Country, How
Yasir Arafat Destroyed Palestine,” Atlantic Monthly, September 2005.
CRS-28
Administration was ambivalent about holding Palestinian presidential elections while
Arafat was alive. For their part, Arafat and his inner circle were reluctant to schedule
long-overdue legislative or local elections, which they feared might result in a
repudiation of their rule. The problem was only resolved by Arafat’s death in
November 2004. In accordance with the Palestinian Basic Law, a Presidential
election was held in January 2005, municipal elections followed later that year, and
a legislative election was held in January 2006.
Arafat’s penchant for establishing competing lines of authority and playing
rivals off against one another led to a proliferation of Palestinian security forces, as
many as 22 by one count.60 Reformers in the Palestinian territories and abroad have
called for a reduction in the number of security forces, the removal of leaders
notorious for the violation of human rights, and the creation of a hierarchical chain
of command. Although Arafat replaced some security-force leaders, neither he nor
his successor Abbas has shown the willingness to undertake the complete reform that
is needed. During the tenure of the Hamas-led government, the problem worsened
as Hamas established yet another force, the “Executive Force,” in Gaza.
In February 2005, the Bush Administration named Lieutenant General William
Ward as U.S. security coordinator for Gaza to help the Palestinians reform and
rehabilitate their security forces and support Israel’s forthcoming withdrawal from
the Gaza Strip. Following the pullout, the Administration provided $2.3 million in
non-lethal assistance to the Palestinian security services and police to facilitate their
assumption of security responsibilities in these areas. The equipment purchased
included vehicles, riot gear, and basic provisions. An additional $1.2 million in
USAID funds was used to set up a community policing initiative, but that program
was suspended when the Hamas government was established. Lt. Gen Keith Dayton
replaced Ward in November 2005. So far, neither Dayton nor the Administration has
commented on how the Hamas takeover of Gaza will affect his mission.
Congressional Responses
U.S. Foreign Assistance61
Most U.S. assistance to the Palestinians is provided through the U.S. Agency for
International Development’s (USAID) West Bank and Gaza program. U.S.
assistance also reaches Palestinians through contributions to the United Nations
Relief Works Agency (UNRWA), which provides humanitarian relief and basic
services to Palestinian refugees living in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Jordan, Syria,
and Lebanon. After Hamas won the January 2006 legislative election and took over
the PA in March 2006, the United States halted foreign aid to the PA, but continued
60
Barsalou, “Long Road to Palestinian Reform”; for a in-depth look at Palestinian security
forces history and structure, see Strategic Assessments Initiative, “Planning Considerations
for International Involvement in the Palestinian Security Sector,” July 2005.
61
For more information, see CRS Report RS22370, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians,
by Paul Morro.
CRS-29
providing humanitarian assistance and democracy promotion and private sector
support funds to the Palestinian people through international and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). The ban continued during the brief tenure of the Hamas-led
unity government in early 2007. In June 2007, after President Abbas dissolved the
unity government and established an emergency government in the West Bank, the
United States announced it was resuming assistance to the PA.
Current Restrictions.
Since FY2003, annual foreign operations
appropriations laws have contained several restrictions on assistance to the
Palestinians, including:
!
Limitation on Assistance to the PA, which bans direct assistance
to the PA unless the President submits a waiver to Congress citing
that such assistance is in the interest of national security.
!
Limitation on Assistance for the PLO, which bans aid to the PLO.
No U.S. aid has ever been provided to the PLO.
!
Restriction Concerning Jerusalem, which bans using U.S. funds
for a new office in Jerusalem for the purpose of conducting
diplomatic business with the “Palestinian Authority over Gaza and
Jericho.”
!
Restriction Concerning Palestinian Statehood, which bans U.S.
assistance to a future Palestinian state unless the Secretary of State
certifies, among other things, that the leadership of the new state has
been democratically elected, is committed to peaceful coexistence
with Israel, and is taking appropriate measure to combat terrorism.
The President can waive the certification if he determines that it is
important to U.S. national security interests.
!
Prohibition on Assistance to the Palestinian Broadcasting
Corporation (PBC), which bans U.S. assistance to the PBC. Israel
accuses the PBC of inciting violence against Israelis.
!
Auditing USAID’s West Bank and Gaza Program, which calls
for annual audits of all U.S. assistance to the West Bank and Gaza
Strip in order to ensure that funds are not being diverted to terrorist
groups.
Since FY2005, annual foreign operations appropriations have also contained a
prohibition on funds for any program that would recognize or otherwise honor
individuals who commit, or have committed, acts of terrorism.
Recent Legislation
Section 550 of P.L. 109-234, the FY2006 Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act, prohibits U.S. aid to the PA, but provides the President waiver
authority to grant some assistance to the Office of the President of the Palestinian
CRS-30
Authority (Mahmoud Abbas) provided, among other things, that such assistance will
not benefit or be re-transferred to Hamas and that the President consult Congress and
provide a written policy justification for use of the waiver. Upon signing P.L.
109-234 into law on June 15, 2006, President Bush asserted that since “the
President’s constitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive branch and take
care that the laws be faithfully executed cannot be made by law subject to a
requirement to consult with congressional committees or to involve them in
executive decision-making, the executive branch shall construe the references in the
provisions to consulting to require only notification.”62
On December 21, 2006, President Bush signed into law P.L. 109-446, the
Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006, which bars aid to the Hamas-led Palestinian
government unless, among other things, it acknowledges Israel’s right to exist and
adheres to all previous international agreements and understandings. It exempts
funds for humanitarian aid and democracy promotion. It also provides $20 million
to establish a fund promoting Palestinian democracy and Israeli-Palestinian peace.
The law limits the PA’s representation in the United States as well as U.S. contact
with Palestinian officials. In a signing statement, the President asserted that these
and several other of the bill’s provisions impinge on the executive branch’s
constitutional authority to conduct foreign policy and he therefore viewed them as
“advisory” rather than “mandatory.”63 The final bill reflected many of the provisions
of the Senate version of the bill. The original House version (H.R. 4681, passed on
June 23, 2006) was seen by many observers as more stringent as it would have made
the provision of U.S. aid to the PA more difficult even if Hamas relinquishes power.
In March 2007, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen introduced H.R. 1856, the
Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act Amendments of 2007, which would amend the
original Act to further restrict contact with and assistance to the PA.
H.R. 2764, the FY2008 Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related
Programs Appropriations bill (passed by the House on June 22, 2007), in addition to
the restrictions listed above, includes a provision prohibiting any funds, or previously
appropriated funds, being used for security assistance in the West Bank and Gaza
until the Secretary of State reports to the Appropriations Committees on the extent
of Palestinian compliance with benchmarks — including maintaining law and order,
fighting terrorism, and countering Qassam rocket launches — established for such
assistance. During floor debate, by a 390-30 vote, the House adopted an amendment
offered by Congressman Mike Pence that would prohibit the disbursement of $63.5
million in the bill for the Palestinian territories unless the administration certifies that
the PA recognizes Israel, renounces violence, and accepts previous agreements with
Israel. The Senate version of the bill (passed by the Senate on September 6, 2007)
includes $75 million in aid for the West Bank and Gaza and does not include the
additional restrictions contained in the House version.
62
For text of the signing statement, see [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/
20060615-14.html].
63
For text of the signing statement, see [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/12/
20061221-4.html].
CRS-31
Appendix A. Further Reading and Historical
Resources
Published Works
Abu-Amr, Ziad. “Hamas: A Historical and Political Background.” Journal of
Palestine Studies, XXII, No. 4 (1993): 5-19.
Abu-Amr, Ziad. Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1994.
Brown, Nathan J. Palestinian Politics After the Oslo Accord: Resuming Arab
Palestine. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003.
Hroub, Khaled. Hamas: Political Thought and Practice. Washington: Institute for
Palestine Studies, 2000.
Khalidi, Rashid. Palestinian Identity. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.
Khalidi, Rashid. The Iron Cage The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood.
Boston: Beacon Press, 2006.
Levitt, Matthew. Hamas Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.
Nusseibeh, Sari. Once Upon a Country. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007.
Oren, Michael B. Six Days of War June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle
East. New York: Random House, 2002.
Robinson, Glenn. Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.
Savir, Uri. The Process: 1,100 Days That Changed the Middle East. New York:
Random House, 1998.
Segev, Tom. 1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East.
New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007.
U.N. Resolutions
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (Partition Plan), November 29,
1947; [http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/res181.htm].
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (Palestinian refugees), December
11, 1948; [http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decad171.htm].
CRS-32
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, November 22, 1967;
[http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/un242.htm].
United Nations Security Council Resolution 338, October 22, 1973;
[http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/un338.htm].
Other Documents
The Palestinian National Charter: Resolutions of the Palestine National Council, July
1-17, 1968; [http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/plocov.htm].
The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), 18 August 1988;
[http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/hamas.htm].
Israel-PLO Recognition: Exchange of Letters Between Prime Minister Rabin and
Chairman Arafat, September 9, 1993; [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22579.htm].
Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles (Oslo I), September 13, 1993; [http://www.yale
.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/isrplo.htm].
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994;
[http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22676.htm].
The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Oslo
II), September 28, 1995; [http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/
Peace/interim.html].
Protocol on Redeployment in Hebron; January 15, 1997; [http://www.yale
.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/hebron.htm].
The Wye River Memorandum; October
.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/wyeriv.htm].
23,
1998;
[http://www.yale
The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, September 4, 1999; [http://www.state
.gov/p/nea/rls/22696.htm].
A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict; April 30, 2003; [http://www.yale
.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/roadmap.htm].
Agreement on Movement and Access, November 15, 2005; [http://www
.israel-mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Agreed+documents
+on+movement+and+access+from+and+to+Gaza+15-Nov-2005.htm].
Arab Peace Initiative, March, 2002, reaffirmed March 2007, [http://www
.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/peace02.htm].
CRS-33
Appendix B. Chronology
1918-1948
British Mandate period
November 29, 1947
United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 181 (Partition Plan)
May 14, 1948
State of Israel established
December 11, 1948
United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 194 (Palestinian refugees)
1964
Arab states establish Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO)
1965
Fatah conducts first terrorist attack inside
Israel, attempting to sabotage the national
water carrier
June 1967
Six-Day War; Israel conquers East
Jerusalem, West Bank, and Gaza Strip
March 1970-July 1971
Jordanian army clashes with Palestinian
militants; PLO expelled from Jordan,
moves to Lebanon
October 1973
October (Yom Kippur/Ramadan) War;
U.N. Security Council Resolution 338
1974
Arab League declares PLO sole
representative of Palestinian people; Arafat
addresses United Nations; United Nations
grants PLO observer status
1980
Israel annexes East Jerusalem
1982
Israeli invades Lebanon to halt PLO crossborder attacks; PLO evacuated from Beirut
to Tunisia
1987-1993
The first Palestinian intifada
1988
Jordan disengages from West Bank;
emergence of Hamas; PNC declares State
of Palestine; U.S. opens direct discussions
with PLO.
1993
Israel, PLO sign Declaration of Principles
(the “Oslo Accords”) on interim
self-government arrangements.
1994
Gaza-Jericho Agreement; Arafat
establishes PA headquarters in Gaza;
Israeli settler massacres Palestinians in
Hebron mosque; first Palestinian suicide
bombing inside Israel
CRS-34
1995
Oslo II Accords divide West Bank into
Area A, direct Palestinian control; Area B,
Palestinian civilian control and Israeli
security control; and Area C, Israeli control
1996
First Palestinian elections for president and
parliament result in victory for Arafat,
Fatah
2000-Present
The second Palestinian intifada
July 2000-January 2001
Camp David II summit and subsequent
Taba negotiations close gaps, end without
agreement
March 2002
Israel reoccupies nearly all Palestinian
areas evacuated during Oslo process,
begins construction of separation barrier in
West Bank; Arab League endorses plan to
recognize Israel in exchange for end of
occupation;
April 2003
Quartet proposes Roadmap to peace
November 2004
Yassir Arafat dies
2005
Mahmoud Abbas elected PA president;
Israel unilaterally evacuates all Israeli
settlements in Gaza and four in the
northern West Bank
2006
Hamas wins a majority in Palestinian
parliamentary election; United States, EU
halt aid to PA
2007
Arab League relaunches Arab Peace
Initiative; Hamas, Fatah briefly share
power; Hamas seizes control of Gaza,
Abbas dissolves unity government; United
States, EU resume aid to PA
CRS-35
Appendix C. List of Current U.N. Bodies and Offices
That Focus on Palestinian or Arab-Israeli Issues
Entity
When Created
Comments
U.N. Conciliation
Commission for Palestine
(UNCCP)
U.N. General Assembly
1948
Reports annually to the
Assembly. Most recent
report, A/61/172, was two
pages, to the effect that the
UNCCP had nothing to
report.
U.N. Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA)
U.N. General Assembly
1949
[http://www.un.org/unrwa/
english.html]
Special Committee to
Investigate Israeli
Practices Affecting the
Human Rights of the
Palestinian People and
Other Arabs of the
Occupied Territories
U.N. General Assembly
1968
[http://www.unhchr.ch/ht
ml/menu2/7/a/moatsc.htm]
Committee on the Exercise
of the Inalienable Rights
of the Palestinian People
(CEIRPP)
U.N. General Assembly
1975
[http://www.un.org/Depts/
dpa/qpalnew/committee.ht
m]
Division for Palestinian
Rights [Originally
established as the Special
Unit on Palestinian
Rights] Serves as the
Secretariat for the
CEIRPP)
U.N. General Assembly
1977 (as Special Unit)
[http://www.un.org/Depts/
dpa/qpalnew/dpr.htm]
U.N. Register of Damage
Caused by the
Construction of the Wall
in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory
U.N. General Assembly
2006
Three-member Board of
the Register has been
appointed, including a
U.S. expert.
U.N. Special Coordinator
for the Middle East Peace
Process (UNSCO) and
Personal Representative of
the Secretary-General to
the PLO and the
Palestinian Authority
U.N. Security Council,
1999
[http://www.un.org/unsco]
CRS-36
Entity
When Created
Comments
U.N. Peacekeeping Operations
U.N. Truce Supervision
Organization (UNTSO)
U.N. Security Council
1948
Current U.N.
peacekeeping operation
[http://www.un.org/Depts/
dpko/missions/undof/inde
x.html]
U.N. Disengagement
Observer Force (UNDOF)*
U.N. Security Council
1974
Current U.N.
peacekeeping operation
[http://www.un.org/Depts/
dpko/missions/undof/inde
x.html]
U.N. Interim Force in
Lebanon
(UNIFIL)
U.N. Security Council
1978
Current U.N.
peacekeeping operation
[http://www.un.org/Depts/
dpko/missions/unifil/index
.html]
U.N. Emergency Force
(UNEF I)*
1956-1967
U.N. peacekeeping
operation - ended
[http://www.un.org/Depts/
dpko/dpko/co_mission/une
fi.htm]
U.N. Emergency Force
(UNEF II)*
1973-1979
U.N. peacekeeping
operation - ended
[http://www.un.org/Depts/
dpko/dpko/co_mission/une
fii.htm]
Special Rapporteur on the
Situation of Human Rights
in the Palestinian
Territories occupied since
1967
U.N. Commission on
Human Rights
1993; continued under the
U.N. Human Rights
Council, 2006.
[http://www.ohchr.org/eng
lish/countries/ps/mandate/i
ndex.htm]
U.N. Conference on Trade
and Development
(UNCTAD) Program of
Assistance to the
Palestinian People
UNCTAD
1995-1997, based on
studies initiated in 1979
[http://r0.unctad.org/palest
ine]
U.N. Development
Program of Assistance to
the Palestinian People
(UNDP/PAPP)
U.N. General Assembly
1978
[http://www.undp.ps/en/ab
outundp/aboutpapp.html]
Programs of Assistance
CRS-37
Entity
When Created
U.N. Educational,
Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO)
Program of Assistance to
the Palestinian People
UNESCO, General
Conference
1995
U.N. Economic and Social
Commission for Western
Asia (ESCWA)
Comments
Palestine is a full member
[http://www.escwa.org.lb/
about/main.asp]
* These forces were established following military clashes between Israel and other Arab neighbors,
not between Israel and the Palestinians.
CRS-38
Appendix D. Links to Palestinian and PalestinianAmerican Organizations
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, the most respected polling
organization in the Palestinian territories, [http://www.pcpsr.org/about/about.html]
Near East Consulting, respected research and polling organization, [http://www
.neareastconsulting.com/]
Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, [http://www
.passia.org/]
Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, [http://www.jmcc.org/index.html]
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, [http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/]
The PLO Mission to the United States, [http://www.plomission.us/]
The American Task Force on Palestine, [http://www.americantaskforce.org/]
The Jerusalem Fund for Education and Community Development, [http://www
.thejerusalemfund.org/index.php]
The Institute for Palestine Studies, [http://www.palestine-studies.org/final/en/
index.html]
U.S. Relations
Jim Zanotti
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
January 8, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL34074
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations
Summary
This report provides an overview of current issues in U.S.-Palestinian relations and. It also
contains an overview of Palestinian society and politics and descriptions of key Palestinian
individuals and groups—chiefly the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Palestinian
Authority (PA), Fatah, Hamas, and the Palestinian refugee population. For more information, see
the following: CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti; CRS
Report R40664, U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority, by Jim Zanotti; CRS
Report R40092, Israel and the Palestinians: Prospects for a Two-State Solution, by Jim Zanotti,
Israel and the Palestinians: Prospects for a Two-State Solution, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report
RL33530, Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy, by Carol
Migdalovitz.
The “Palestinian question” is important not only to Palestinians, Israelis, and their Arab state
neighbors, but to many countries and non-state actors in the region and around the world—
including the United States—for a variety of religious, cultural, and political reasons. U.S. policy
toward the Palestinians since the advent of the Oslo process in the early-1990s has been marked
by efforts to establish a Palestinian state through a negotiated two-state solution to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, counter Palestinian terrorist groups, and establish norms of democracy,
accountability, and good governance within the PA. Congressional views of the issue have
reflected concern that U.S. bilateral assistance not detrimentally affect Israel’s security by falling
into the hands of Palestinian rejectionists who advocate terrorism and violence against Israelis.
Among the current issues in U.S.-Palestinian relations is how to deal with the political leadership
of Palestinian society, which is divided between the PA in parts of the West Bank and Hamas, a
State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, in the Gaza Strip. Following
Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in June 2007, the United States and the other members of the
international Quartet (the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia) have sought to bolster
the West Bank-based PA, led by President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. In
late 2009, however, Abbas endured a number of diplomatic setbacks that imperiled both his
political standing and the likelihood of resuming peace negotiations with Israel. In response,
analysts have raised fundamental questions about the future of Palestinian leadership and whether
U.S. policies serve Palestinian interests.
The Gaza situation also presents a dilemma. In the wake of the 2008-2009 Israel-Hamas conflict,
humanitarian and economic problems have worsened, but the United States, Israel, and other
international actors are reluctant to do more than provide basic humanitarian assistance because
of legal barriers to dealing with Hamas and/or potentially negative political and strategic
consequences that might follow from any such dealings. Egyptian-brokered efforts to effect a
power-sharing arrangement among Palestinian factions that would allow for presidential and
legislative elections and reunified PA rule over Gaza and parts of the West Bank have failed thus
far. Since the signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993, Congress has committed approximately $3.5
billion in bilateral assistance to the Palestinians, over half of it since mid-2007—including $650
million in direct budgetary assistance to the PA and nearly $400 million to strengthen and reform
PA security forces and the criminal justice system in the West Bank. Congress approved $500
million of this amount in December 2009 pursuant to P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations
Contents
Historical Background and Palestinian Identity ...........................................................................1
Demographic and Economic Statistics.........................................................................................3
Issues for Congress .....................................................................................................................5
Recent Developments and Key Issues .........................................................................................6
Israeli-Palestinian Relations and U.S. Involvement................................................................6
Future Leadership and Direction of the PLO and PA..............................................................8
Fatah-Hamas Rivalry and the Question of Power Sharing......................................................9
Gaza: Hamas and the Status Quo......................................................................................... 11
West Bank: U.S. and International Assistance...................................................................... 13
Terrorism and Militancy...................................................................................................... 15
The Regional Context ......................................................................................................... 17
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) ................................................................................... 18
Palestinian Authority (PA)......................................................................................................... 19
General Profile.................................................................................................................... 19
Prime Minister Salam Fayyad ............................................................................................. 21
West Bank Governance Under Israeli Occupation................................................................ 21
Fatah and Other PLO Factions .................................................................................................. 24
Fatah: General Profile ......................................................................................................... 24
Key Fatah Leaders .............................................................................................................. 27
Mahmoud Abbas (aka “Abu Mazen”) ............................................................................ 27
Marwan Barghouti ........................................................................................................ 28
Other Key Fatah Leaders............................................................................................... 28
Other PLO Factions and Leaders......................................................................................... 29
Hamas and Other Non-PLO Factions ........................................................................................ 29
Hamas: General Profile ....................................................................................................... 29
Origins and Emergence ................................................................................................. 29
Key Questions Regarding Hamas .................................................................................. 30
Hamas Rule in Gaza............................................................................................................ 32
Means of Control .......................................................................................................... 32
Influence Over Society: Congress and Al Aqsa Television ............................................. 34
Smuggling Tunnels ....................................................................................................... 36
Key Hamas Leaders ............................................................................................................ 36
Khaled Meshaal ............................................................................................................ 36
Ismail Haniyeh.............................................................................................................. 37
Other Key Hamas Leaders............................................................................................. 37
Other Rejectionist/Terrorist Groups..................................................................................... 38
Palestinian Refugees ................................................................................................................. 39
U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) ............. 39
Profile........................................................................................................................... 39
Congressional Concerns ................................................................................................ 40
Economic Issues and Trends...................................................................................................... 41
General Profile.............................................................................................................. 41
West Bank Economic Development............................................................................... 42
Congressional Research Service
The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Gaza Strip ...................................................................................................... 12
Figure 2. Map of West Bank...................................................................................................... 23
Tables
Table 1. Estimated Palestinian Population Worldwide..................................................................3
Table 2. Basic Facts for the West Bank and Gaza Strip ................................................................4
Table 3. U.S. Bilateral Assistance to the Palestinians, FY2004-FY2010 ..................................... 14
Appendixes
Appendix A. Historical Background .......................................................................................... 44
Appendix B. List of Current or Former U.N. Bodies and Offices That Focus on
Palestinian or Arab-Israeli Issues............................................................................................ 49
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 50
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 50
Congressional Research Service
The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations
Historical Background and Palestinian Identity
The Palestinians are Arabs who live in the geographical area that constitutes present-day Israel,
the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, or who have historical and/or cultural ties to that area.
Historians have noted that the concept of Palestinian national identity is a relatively recent
phenomenon and in large part grew from the challenge posed by increased Jewish migration to
the region during the eras of Ottoman and British control in the first half of the 20th century. 1
Palestinian identity emerged during the British Mandate period, began to crystallize with the 1947
United Nations partition plan, and grew stronger following Israel’s conquest of the West Bank
and Gaza Strip in 1967. Although in 1947 the United Nations intended to create two states in
Palestine—one Jewish and one Arab—only the Jewish state came into being. Varying
explanations for the failure to found an Arab state alongside a Jewish state in mandatory Palestine
place blame on the British, the Zionists, neighboring Arab states, the Palestinians themselves, or
some combination of these groups.
As the state of Israel won its independence in 1947-1949, roughly 700,000 Palestinians were
driven or fled from their homes, an occurrence Palestinians call the nakba (“catastrophe”). Many
from the diaspora ended up in neighboring states (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan) or in Gulf
states such as Kuwait. Palestinians remaining in Israel became Israeli citizens. Those who were in
the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza were subject to Jordanian and Egyptian
administration, respectively. With their population in disarray, and no clear hierarchical structure
or polity to govern their affairs, Palestinians’ interests were largely represented by Arab states
(during the high-water mark of pan-Arab, Nasserite sentiment) with conflicting internal and
external interests.
1967 was a watershed year for the Palestinians. In the June Six-Day War, Israel decisively
defeated the Arab states who had styled themselves as the Palestinians’ protectors, seizing East
Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip (as well as the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt and the
Golan Heights from Syria). Thus, Israel gained control over the entire area that constituted
Palestine under the British Mandate. Israel’s territorial gains provided buffer zones between
Israel’s main Jewish population centers and its traditional Arab state antagonists. These buffer
zones remain an important part of the Israeli strategic calculus to this day.
Although Israel ultimately annexed only East Jerusalem (as well as the Golan Heights), leaving
the West Bank and Gaza under military occupation, Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories
became increasingly economically interdependent, and Israel presided over the settlement of
thousands of Jewish civilians in both territories (although many more in the West Bank than
Gaza)—particularly when the Likud Party, with its vision of a “Greater Israel” extending from the
Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River, took power in 1977. This presented some economic and
cultural opportunities for Palestinians, but also new challenges to their identity, property rights,
civil liberties, morale, political cohesion, and territorial contiguity that persist to this day and have
since intensified.
With the Arab states’ humiliation in 1967, and Israeli rule and settlement of the West Bank and
Gaza, space was opened for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to emerge as the
1
See Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness, New York: Columbia
Univ. Press, 1997.
Congressional Research Service
1
The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations
representative of Palestinian national aspirations. Founded in 1964 as an umbrella organization of
Palestinian factions and militias in exile under the aegis of the League of Arab States, the PLO
asserted its own identity after the Six-Day War by waging a war of attrition against Israel from
Jordanian territory. Yasser Arafat and his Fatah movement gained leadership of the PLO in 1969,
and the PLO subsequently achieved international prominence on behalf of the Palestinian national
cause—representing both the refugees and those subjected to Israeli rule in occupied territories—
although often this prominence came infamously from Palestinian acts of terrorism and militancy.
Although Jordan forced the PLO to relocate to Lebanon in the early 1970s, and Israel forced it to
move from Lebanon to Tunisia in 1982, the organization and its cause survived. In 1987,
Palestinians inside the West Bank and Gaza rose up in opposition to Israeli occupation (the first
intifada, or uprising), leading to increased international attention and sympathy for the
Palestinians’ situation. In December 1988, as the intifada continued, Arafat initiated dialogue with
the United States by renouncing violence, promising to recognize Israel’s right to exist, and
accepting the “land-for-peace” principle embodied in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242.2
Many analysts believe that Arafat’s turn to diplomacy with the United States and Israel was at
least partly motivated by concerns that if the PLO’s leadership could not be repatriated from
exile, its legitimacy with Palestinians might be overtaken by local leaders of the intifada in the
West Bank and Gaza (which included Hamas). These concerns intensified when Arafat lost much
of his Arab state support following his support for Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait
(which was later reversed by a U.S.-led coalition in the 1991 Gulf War).
After direct secret diplomacy with Israel brokered by Norway, the PLO recognized Israel’s right
to exist in 1993, and through a succession of agreements (known as the “Oslo Accords”), gained
limited self-rule for Palestinians in Gaza and parts of the West Bank—complete with democratic
mechanisms; security forces; and executive, legislative, and judicial organs of governance. The
Oslo Accords were gradually and partially implemented during the 1990s, but the expectation that
they would lead to a final-status peace agreement establishing a Palestinian state has not been
realized. Many factors—including violence, leadership changes and shortcomings, rejectionist
movements with sizeable popular followings (particularly Hamas on the Palestinian side),
continued Israeli occupation or control, expanded Israeli settlement of the West Bank and East
Jerusalem, and international involvement—have contributed to the failure. The limited self-rule
regime of the Palestinian Authority (PA) was undermined by Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in 2007,
lending further confusion to questions regarding Palestinian leadership, territorial contiguity, and
prospects for statehood. Along with the Palestinians of Israel, the West Bank, Gaza, and East
Jerusalem (which include approximately 1.8 million refugees), approximately 2.8 million
Palestinian refugees outside these territories, in addition to a wider diaspora, await a permanent
resolution of their situation.
Today, the public’s desire to establish a state of its own on at least some portion of historic
Palestine is the dominant political issue among Palestinians. How that state should be established
and its nature, however, continue to divide Palestinian society. Fatah and Hamas are the largest
political movements and reflect the two basic cleavages in Palestinian society: (1) between those
2
UNSCR 242, adopted in 1967 shortly after the Six-Day War, calls for a “just and lasting peace in the Middle East”
based on (1) “Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the [1967 Six-Day War]” and (2)
“Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and
recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.” See text at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/
Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/UN%20Security%20Council%20Resolution%20242.
Congressional Research Service
2
The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations
who support a negotiated two-state solution with Israel and those who prefer other means to
establish a Palestinian state; and (2) between those who favor a secular model of governance and
those who seek a society governed more by Islamic norms.
The “Palestinian question” is important not only to Palestinians, Israelis, and their Arab state
neighbors, but to many countries and non-state actors in the region and around the world—
including the United States—for a variety of religious, cultural, and political reasons. Over the
past 60-plus years, the issue has been one of the most provocative in the international arena. Al
Qaeda, Iran, and others seeking to garner support for and/or mobilize Arab and Muslim sentiment
against the United States, Israel, and/or other Western nations routinely use the Palestinian cause
as a touchstone for their stances and grievances. Analysts often debate whether the Palestinian
question is truly central to the region’s and world’s problems, and whether it is more often than
not used by actors as a pretext to deflect attention from matters more central to their interests.
For more detailed historical background information, see Appendix A.
Demographic and Economic Statistics
There are an estimated 4 million Palestinians living in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East
Jerusalem (2.4 million in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and 1.6 million in Gaza).3 Of these,
approximately 1.8 million are refugees (in their own right or as descendants of the original
refugees) from the 1947-1949 Arab-Israeli war. (In addition, approximately 450,000 Jewish
settlers live in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.) Another some 2.8 million Palestinians live as
refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, in addition to non-refugees living in these states and
elsewhere around the world.
Table 1. Estimated Palestinian Population Worldwide
Country or Region
Population
West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem
4,000,000
Israel
1,300,000
Arab states
4,500,000
Other states
Total
560,000
10,360,000
Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Central Intelligence Agency.
West Bank Palestinians generally are wealthier, better educated, and more secular than their
Gazan counterparts. The Palestinian population in the territories has one of the highest growth
rates in the world and is disproportionately young. According to the Norwegian Institute for
Labor and Social Research, widely considered a respected authority on Palestinian demographics,
51% of the Palestinians in the territories are 20 years old or younger and 80% are less than 40
years old. The youth bulge ensures that the population growth rate will remain high even as
3
See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: “Israel,” “West Bank,” “Gaza Strip,” available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/. An additional 1.3 to 1.6 million Palestinians live inside
Israel proper as Arab citizens of Israel.
Congressional Research Service
3
The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations
fertility rates decline. Possible implications were summarized thusly in a March 2009 Brookings
Institution report:
If young people are engaged in productive roles, the Palestinian youth bulge can be a
positive factor in economic development. Human capital is the main comparative advantage
that Palestinian Territories have over naturally resource-rich countries in the Middle East.
Yet, as in any economy, a large cohort of young Palestinians will continue to exert pressure
on the education system and labor markets.4
Palestinians are well educated relative to other Arab countries with an adult literacy rate of 93%
and 76% of school-age children enrolled in school. (Jordan, by comparison, has a 93% adult
literacy rate and a 90% enrollment rate, while Egypt has a 72% adult literacy rate and an 96%
enrollment rate.)5 The Palestinian population is 98% Sunni Muslim; just under 2% are Christians
of various denominations.
Table 2. Basic Facts for the West Bank and Gaza Strip
Statistic
West Bank
Population
(July 2009 est.)
Gaza Strip
Combined
2,460,000
1,550,000
4,010,000
760,000
1,070,000
1,830,000
Median age (2009 est.)
20.5
17.4
-
Population growth rate
(2009 est.)
2.2%
3.3%
-
GDP growth rate
-
-
2.3%
GDP per capita
(purchasing power
parity)
-
-
$2,900
16.3%
41.3%
-
-
-
11.5%
46%
80%
-
$339 mil
$339 mil
-
olives, fruit, vegetables,
limestone
citrus, flowers, textiles
-
-
-
Israel 89.0%, Arab states
6.8%, Europe 3.5%
$1.3 bil
$2.8 bil
-
food, consumer goods,
construction materials
food, consumer goods,
construction materials
-
Refugees
(June 2009 est.)
Unemployment rate
Inflation rate
Population below
poverty line (2007 est.)
Exports (2006 est.)
Export commodities
Export partners
(2007 est.)
Imports (2006 est.)
Import commodities
4
Nawtej Dhillon, “Beyond Reconstruction: What Lies Ahead for Young Palestinians,” Brookings Institution, March
2009, available at http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0310_west_bank_gaza_dhillon.aspx.
5
UNICEF data, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/northafrica.html.
Congressional Research Service
4
The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations
Statistic
West Bank
Import partners
(2007 est.)
Gaza Strip
-
Combined
-
Israel 73.5%, Asia 12.8%,
Europe 7.2%
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Economist Intelligence Unit, UNRWA.
Notes: All figures are 2008 estimates unless otherwise indicated; figures exclude Israeli settlers.
Issues for Congress
Congress plays a significant role in U.S. policy toward the Palestinians. It has approved expanded
levels of aid (a total of nearly $2 billion) to the Palestinians since PA President Mahmoud Abbas
appointed the politically independent technocrat Salam Fayyad as PA prime minister and
dismissed Hamas from government shortly following its takeover of Gaza in 2007 (see Table 3
for a chart of FY2004-FY2010 U.S. aid). This increased U.S. assistance supports internationallysponsored programs of PA security and economic reform and development—mainly in the West
Bank—and humanitarian efforts in the Gaza Strip.
As uncertainty pervades prospects for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as well as the internal
Palestinian political landscape, congressionally-funded initiatives could become more influential
to developments in the region. This is particularly the case because PA Prime Minister Fayyad’s
two-year plan for readying Palestinian institutions and society for “de facto statehood”6—viewed
by many as the most realistic and relevant Palestinian political proposal extant in late 2009—
relies on an assumption of continued budgetary, security, and developmental assistance from the
United States and other countries. Thus, as Members and Committees of Congress closely and
continually monitor the direct outcomes of U.S. programs of assistance, they might also consider
analyzing the effects these programs are likely to have on developments related to the overall
political situation, such as the following:
•
Long-term prospects for a negotiated two-state solution and for possible
alternatives.
•
The desirability and probability of holding imminent PA presidential and
legislative elections, and the potential consequences of not holding them.
•
Prospects for Palestinian leadership and power-sharing among and within the
PLO, the PA, Fatah, Hamas, and other Palestinian factions.
•
Progress on security, governance, rule of law, and economic development in the
West Bank.
6
See Palestinian National Authority, Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State, Program of the
Thirteenth Government, August 2009, available at http://www.mideastweb.org/palestine_state_program.htm. A key
passage from the document reads: “Out of respect for our citizens, and in recognition of their desire to live free and
peaceful lives under national independence, we must answer their demand to see the fruits of the state-building project.
Against this background, the Palestinian government is struggling determinedly against a hostile occupation regime,
employing all of its energies and available resources, most especially the capacities of our people, to complete the
process of building institutions of the independent State of Palestine in order to establish a de facto state apparatus
within the next two years. It is time now for the illegal occupation to end and for the Palestinian people to enjoy
security, safety, freedom and independence.” Some PLO and Fatah leaders have taken offense at Fayyad’s injecting
himself into diplomatic matters because the Palestinian Authority has no formal authority in such matters.
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•
Mutual threats posed by Hamas, other Palestinian militants, the PLO/PA, and
Israel, along with options (military, political, economic) to address these threats.
•
The nature of the de facto Hamas regime and its relationship in Gaza to (1) the
population, (2) commerce, (3) performance of public functions, and (4) provision
of humanitarian services.
•
Palestinian public opinion and civil society activities (in the West Bank, the Gaza
Strip, and East Jerusalem, and among the Palestinian refugee population and
diaspora).
•
Political currents in the United States, the Middle East, and the international
community.
A more detailed discussion of issues such as (1) the role of Hamas and (2) factors to consider
when evaluating various programs of U.S. aid to the Palestinians is found throughout this report
and in CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti; CRS Report
R40664, U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report
R40092, Israel and the Palestinians: Prospects for a Two-State Solution, by Jim Zanotti.
Recent Developments and Key Issues
Israeli-Palestinian Relations and U.S. Involvement
Relations with Israel are central to Palestinian affairs because of the control Israel exerts over
Palestinian life, the proximity of the two peoples, and the difficult history they share. After the
Oslo peace process fell apart in 2000 with renewed Israeli-Palestinian fighting (known as the
second intifada), the United States and the international community sought new ways to chart a
path to a two-state solution (a Palestinian state existing side-by-side in peace with Israel). Israel
and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) agreed to abide by the Performance-Based
Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (the “Roadmap”),7
which was rolled out during 2002-2003 by the international Quartet (the United States, the
European Union, the United Nations, and Russia), but both parties continually put off the
Roadmap’s implementation. 8
7
The Roadmap outlines the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in three distinct phases: Phase 1 includes calls
for progress on security and governance in the Palestinian territories and for an Israeli freeze on settlement building
(including so-called “natural growth”). Phase 2 contemplates the establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional
borders and the continuation of progress on Phase 1 objectives. Phase 3 contemplates a comprehensive final-status
peace agreement between Israel and the PLO on all issues. The text of the published version of the Roadmap, dated
April 30, 2003, is available at http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/roadmap3.html. The Roadmap was based largely on a
2001 report prepared by the Sharm al Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee chaired by President Obama’s current Special
Envoy for Middle East Peace, former Senator George Mitchell (commonly known as the “Mitchell Report”). The text
of the Mitchell Report, dated April 30, 2001, is available at http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/mitchell.html.
8
In May 2003, Israel accepted the Roadmap but with 14 reservations. Among the reservations is an Israeli insistence
that the “first condition for progress will be the [Palestinians’] complete cessation of terror, violence and incitement.”
The text of the “primary themes” of Israel’s acceptance of the Roadmap with reservations is available at
http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/14reservations.html.
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In the subsequent four years, PLO Chairman/PA President Yasser Arafat died and was succeeded
by Mahmoud Abbas (who many in the international community saw as a better “partner for
peace” than Arafat), Israel withdrew from Gaza 9 and also began building a separation barrier
roughly tracking (with some major exceptions) the 1949-1967 armistice line demarcating Israel
proper from the West Bank (the “Green Line”), and the militant Islamist group Hamas (a State
Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization) won Palestinian Legislative Council
(PLC) elections in 2006 and seized Gaza by force in June 2007. With Hamas in control first of the
PLC and then of Gaza, expectations for a conflict-ending agreement were dampened. The
Quartet, led by the United States, refused dealings with the group unless it agreed to (1) renounce
violence, (2) recognize Israel’s right to exist, and (3) abide by previous Israeli-Palestinian
agreements.
Nevertheless, a new round of negotiations—formally launched at Annapolis in November 2007
through the offices of the Bush Administration—sought an Israel-PLO “shelf agreement” on the
core issues of borders, settlements, refugees, security, water, and Jerusalem, with the idea that the
shelf agreement would take effect upon the establishment of PLO/PA authority and security in
Gaza as well as the West Bank. These negotiations ended unsuccessfully with the anticipation of
new leadership in Israel and the United States and the outbreak of conflict in and around Gaza
between Israel and Hamas in December 2008.
Upon his inauguration in January 2009, President Barack Obama stated that Israeli-Palestinian
peace would be one of his priorities. However, the election of a new right-wing government in
Israel in early 2009, headed by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, complicated matters.
Obama’s calls for Israel to stop all settlement activity and for Arab states to take certain measures
to “gradually normalize” their relations with Israel did not have their intended effect. Subsequent
efforts by the United States to prioritize the resumption of Israeli-Palestinian final-status
negotiations over a full settlement freeze and over the Palestinian attempt to have various United
Nations bodies scrutinize Israel’s actions during the Gaza conflict (see further discussion of the
“Goldstone Report” below) have been perceived by many Palestinians to be signs of continued
pro-Israel bias and a lack of sensitivity to Mahmoud Abbas’s domestic standing, which suffered
in the final months of 2009 (see below).
In November 2009, Netanyahu announced a 10-month freeze on settlement construction in the
West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem. The Obama Administration welcomed this as a step in the
right direction while acknowledging that it fell short of the Administration’s ultimate expectations
of a more comprehensive freeze. The Administration and Israel continue to seek the resumption
of negotiations, and the Administration has voiced particular interest in having Israel and the PLO
negotiate the borders of a future Palestinian state as a possible way to defuse the settlement
issue.10 Although PLO leaders have resisted a “borders first” approach to negotiations, the
9
There is disagreement between Israel and much of the international community over the legal consequences of
Israel’s withdrawal of its forces and settlers in 2005. Israel contends that it has “disengaged” from Gaza and is no
longer legally responsible for its residents as an “Occupying Power” under the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 (text
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/380?OpenDocument). Many others believe that even though Israel no
longer handles the day-to-day administration of Gaza, the control it exercises over Gaza’s borders, airspace, territorial
waters, resources, and trade continues to rise to the level of the international legal definition of an occupying power.
The State Department continues to refer to the Gaza Strip, as well as the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) as
“Occupied Palestinian Territories.”
10
The “borders first” idea has inspired debate largely because its critics believe that borders cannot be drawn in any
meaningful sense without resolving Israeli-Palestinian disagreement on the borders and administration of Jerusalem
and its holy sites. For more information on this topic, see CRS Report R40092, Israel and the Palestinians: Prospects
(continued...)
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Administration met one of the demands the PLO had set for resuming talks when Secretary of
State Hillary Rodham Clinton stated her expectation in November 2009 that a Palestinian state
would be based on the borders demarcated by the Green Line. 11 Nevertheless, prospects for
negotiations in 2010 are unclear given, among other things, the uncertainty surrounding internal
Palestinian politics (see below).12 Many analysts focus their optimism on improved security and
economic performance in the PA-governed West Bank, enabled by Israeli measures—facilitated
by U.S. and international involvement—that have relaxed movement restrictions and have
otherwise encouraged greater Palestinian freedom of activity.
Future Leadership and Direction of the PLO and PA
In the final months of 2009, the future of Palestinian leadership in the West Bank was in question.
After emerging strengthened from the Fatah Sixth Congress in August, Palestinian Authority (PA)
President Mahmoud Abbas endured a number of diplomatic setbacks (described above) that
imperiled both his political standing and the likelihood of resuming peace negotiations with
Israel. In response, Abbas signaled that he did not intend to stand for reelection. Elections
scheduled for January were subsequently called off because of the inability to hold them in the
Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. Nevertheless, Abbas’s frustration has led some—including those
who view Abbas’s 2003 resignation as PA prime minister as indicative of his tendencies (see
“Mahmoud Abbas (aka “Abu Mazen”)” below)—to believe that he might resign. Others think that
Abbas’s announcement was calculated mainly to draw diplomatic concessions and political
support from Israel, the United States, and Arab states.
The possibility of a leadership crisis or even the complete dissolution of the PA if Abbas steps
down, combined with the lack of a clear successor, has led many to speculate about who or what
might replace him, and about the consequences for stability within the West Bank. The
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) reported in December 2009 that Abbas
confirmed that he would remain in office until a successor is elected. 13 Later in December, the
PLO’s Central Council extended Abbas’s term and that of the Palestinian Legislative Council
(...continued)
for a Two-State Solution, by Jim Zanotti.
11
See Daniel Levy, “Netanyahu’s Stubbornness on Settlements Produces American Call for 1967 Borders,” Huffington
Post, November 25, 2009. The PLO is considering seeking a U.N. Security Council resolution to formally demarcate
the Green Line as the border of a Palestinian state. See PLO Position Paper, Fatah Media & Culture Commission,
December 2009, Open Source Document GMP20091219745001 (translated from Arabic). The positions of the PLO
and Arab states on core issues are embodied in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API). The API was proposed by thenCrown Prince (now King) Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, adopted by the 22-member League of Arab States (which includes
the PLO), and later accepted by the 56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference at its 2005 Mecca summit. It
offers a comprehensive Arab peace with Israel if Israel were to (1) withdraw fully from the territories it occupied in
1967, (2) agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem, and (3) provide for the
“[a]chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with UN General Assembly
Resolution 194.” It was most recently reaffirmed by the Arab League at its Doha, Qatar summit in 2009, but King
Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and other Arab leaders have warned that the offer will not last indefinitely. The text of the
initiative is available at http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/summit.html. Hamas has insisted on the first two API
conditions, plus a right of return for Palestinian refugees, in return for a 10-year hudna (“truce”), but refuses to openly
consider a permanent peace arrangement or formal recognition of Israel and its right to exist.
12
See Ali al Salih and Nazir Mujalli, “Abu-Mazin: To My Knowledge, HAMAS Leaders in Gaza Want Reconciliation
Because They Are Suffering, But the Leaders in Damascus Do Not Want It,” Al Sharq al Awsat Online, December 20,
2009, Open Source Document GMP20091220001003 (translated from Arabic).
13
Palestinian Electoral Environment Update from International Foundation for Electoral Systems, December 7, 2009.
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(PLC) indefinitely until elections can be held, but Hamas and other non-PLO factions have
challenged the PLO’s authority to settle matters of PA law.
Having pursued a negotiated two-state solution and peace agreement with Israel for 20 years,
Abbas’s Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) faces a dilemma. The PLO gave up some of its
strategic advantages as an independent resistance movement in the mid-1990s with the Oslo
process—by bringing the bulk of its political and military assets to territories under Israeli
occupation—in return for limited self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza. The PLO hoped that
limited self-rule in the territories would transition into the end of Israeli control, but now
confronts a situation in which Israeli occupation persists in the West Bank and Hamas rules in a
Gaza Strip closed to general travel and commerce and faced with ongoing humanitarian
dilemmas.
There is active debate within the PLO and its dominant Fatah faction over whether devotion to
the Oslo model of seeking a negotiated solution with Israel still serves Palestinian interests. Each
time negotiations have lapsed, the United States and the international community have focused on
restarting them, but recurring violence, perceived failures spanning three U.S. presidential
administrations, changes in Israeli leadership, and the entrenched division between Abbas in the
West Bank and Hamas in Gaza have raised doubts. Lack of tangible progress in negotiations
despite raised expectations during President Barack Obama’s first year in office has led some
within the PLO to advocate different strategies—ranging from unilateral or self-directed efforts
toward autonomy or sovereignty in the West Bank and/or Gaza, to various forms of nonviolent or
violent resistance against Israeli occupation.
Fatah-Hamas Rivalry and the Question of Power Sharing
The uncertainty that stems from the continuation of Palestinian factional and geographical
divisions has led to political pressure from Palestinians, Arab states, and some other members of
the international community for a consensus or “unity” government that is acceptable to both
Fatah and Hamas. This is the case even though power-sharing could come at the expense of
negotiations and security cooperation with Israel, and at the expense of aid and diplomatic ties
with the United States and Europe, if the arrangement gives Hamas too prominent a role in the
PA. Egyptian efforts to facilitate an agreement to create a power-sharing government—which
continue intermittently—have been unsuccessful. Reportedly, negotiations have been complicated
by differing views on how to integrate PA and Hamas security operations, when and how to
conduct Palestinian presidential and legislative elections, and whom to appoint to government
positions.
It is possible that both factions are content to preserve the status quo, with each hoping that
developments will strengthen its legitimacy and popularity vis-à-vis the other. Polls in late 2009
seem to indicate an advantage for Abbas and Fatah,14 but most polls failed to forecast Hamas’s
victory in 2006. Abbas appears to hope that the Obama Administration and other international
actors will help him show progress to Palestinians on the PA’s West Bank reform, security, and
development goals and, perhaps more importantly, on finding a realistic, peaceful pathway to a
Palestinian state.
14
Major surveyors of Palestinian public opinion include the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research
(http://www.pcpsr.org/) and Arab World for Research and Development (http://www.awrad.org/).
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Hamas, on the other hand, might believe that time will show Palestinians that little is to be gained
through reliance on the West or through preserving the option for talks with Israel, particularly
under current Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. Hamas argues that Abbas’s peaceful
engagement plays into the hands of an Israel that seeks to weaken the Palestinians by sowing
division through the false hope of a future state. By making the case to Palestinians that it would
not be a pushover for Israel, while simultaneously encouraging the post-Gaza-conflict sentiment
among some in the West (Europe especially15) and Muslim-majority states that it might be an
indispensable and a rational actor,16 Hamas could argue that it should at least share (if not inherit)
the mantle of Palestinian leadership. Reportedly, its leaders covet the prospect of becoming a
member of and potentially supplanting Fatah as the dominant faction in the PLO.
It remains to be seen whether Hamas is willing to moderate its platform, decrease its militancy, or
give up its monopoly on Gaza in return for greater legitimacy and participation in Palestinian
institutions. The opportunity, through a power-sharing agreement, for Hamas to reestablish an
open presence in the West Bank, with the hope that it might one day gain control of the West
Bank through elections or by force, could be persuasive (given that recent PA actions have
focused on reducing Hamas’s military profile and charitable activities in the West Bank), as could
a possible pathway to PLO membership.
A September 2009 Egyptian proposal aiming to broker a Fatah-Hamas power-sharing
arrangement contemplated holding presidential and legislative elections in June 2010. Only Fatah
has signed the Egyptian proposal. Many believe that Hamas is seeking additional concessions
because it perceives that the Goldstone Report controversy (see below) increased its leverage.
Hamas has rejected Abbas’s election decree for January, insisting that “there will be no elections
without [factional] reconciliation.”17 As a result, the PA Central Elections Commission has
concluded that elections cannot be held. Although Fatah signed the Egyptian proposal, it does not
necessarily mean that Abbas supports either holding elections or sharing power with Hamas. Most
analysts believe that Abbas was confident that Hamas would react as it did, and therefore
accepted the Egyptian proposal largely in order to portray Hamas, not Fatah, as the obstructionist
party.
Reluctance by Abbas to share power with Hamas may be explained by regional trends signaling
the possible political ascendancy of nationalist movements featuring Islamist elements at the
expense of those featuring secular and/or pan-Arab elements. Some have theorized that these
trends are likely to lead to the decline of Abbas’s secular Fatah movement—and, along with it, the
official PLO position of peaceful engagement with Israel—and to the continuing rise of Hamas
and other Islamists. Some, including Khaled Meshaal (Hamas’s politburo chief), perceive secular
nationalism to be a passing phase nestled within a broader era of Islamist renewal—stating that
the historical narrative locating the rise of Palestinian nationalism within secular politics
overlooks that many of the first generation of self-consciously Palestinian leaders, including
Yasser Arafat, began their political careers within the Muslim Brotherhood.18 Others contest that
15
Legislators from various EU countries have met publicly with Hamas politburo chief Khaled Meshaal and other
Hamas leaders, and Hamas representatives claim that high-ranking European officials—including ambassadors—are
talking regularly to them. See Andrew Rettman, “EU Countries Practice ‘Secret’ Diplomacy, Hamas Says,”
euobserver.com, September 14, 2009.
16
See, e.g., Taghreed El-Khodary and Ethan Bronner, “Addressing U.S., Hamas Says It Grounded Rockets,” New York
Times, May 4, 2009.
17
Palestinian Electoral Environment Update from International Foundation for Electoral Systems, October 26, 2009.
18
Paul McGeough, Kill Khalid: Mossad’s Failed Hit ... and the Rise of Hamas, Crows Nest, Australia: Allen & Unwin,
(continued...)
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reference to such trends is too simplistic and does not sufficiently account for the many variables
(actors, events, ideas) that influence Palestinian politics. Lack of Fatah-Hamas accommodation
could fuel further cultural and political separation between Palestinians in the West Bank and in
Gaza.19
Gaza: Hamas and the Status Quo
Following the December 2008-January 2009 conflict in Gaza (code-named “Operation Cast
Lead” by Israel), very little reconstruction has taken place. For most of the time since Hamas’s
forcible takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007,20 most of Gaza’s border crossings—including
the Rafah border crossing with Egypt—have been closed to everything but a minimum of goods
deemed necessary to meet basic humanitarian needs. This is ostensibly to deny Hamas materials
to reconstitute its military capabilities, but it also prevents progress toward reinstituting pre-2007
living and working conditions—raising concerns for the future. In many respects, the U.N. Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and other international
organizations and non-governmental organizations take care of the day-to-day humanitarian
needs of many of Gaza’s 1.6 million residents.
The militant Islamist group Hamas emerged from the conflict very much in control of Gaza. It
has bypassed the border closure regime to some extent by encouraging and facilitating the
expansion of a network of smuggling tunnels leading into Gaza from Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula.
Since the conflict’s end, Hamas has generally adhered to and enforced a de facto cease-fire with
Israel. The quiet has allowed Hamas to rearm through Gaza’s smuggling network—with much of
its money, weapons, and other supplies reportedly originating in Iran.21 Israeli officials are
concerned that Hamas’s rockets might be increasing in range to where they endanger the outskirts
of Tel Aviv and other major Israeli population centers.22
(...continued)
2009, p. 53, quoting Meshaal as saying, “We’re the root; Fatah is a mere branch.”
19
This separation may be partially explained by the lack of a territorial link between the two Palestinian territories, and
partially explained by geography and recent history linking the Gaza Strip with Egypt and the West Bank with Jordan.
For further information on the Gaza/West Bank divide and on the territories’ respective ties with Egypt and Jordan, see
CRS Report R40092, Israel and the Palestinians: Prospects for a Two-State Solution, by Jim Zanotti.
20
In November 2005, Israel and the PA signed an Agreement on Movement and Access, featuring U.S. and EU
participation in the travel and commerce regime that was suppose to emerge post-Gaza disengagement, but this
agreement was never fully implemented. In September 2007, three months after Hamas’s takeover of Gaza, the closure
regime was further formalized when Israel declared Gaza to be a “hostile entity.”
21
See CRS Report R40849, Iran: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, coordinated by Casey L. Addis.
22
Mark Weiss, “Hamas rocket range extends to Tel Aviv region, claims Israel,” irishtimes.com, November 4, 2009;
Jeffrey White, “Hamas and Its Long-Range Rockets: Military and Political Implications,” Washington Institute for
Near East Policy PolicyWatch #1603, November 17, 2009, available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
templateC05.php?CID=3143.
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Figure 1. Map of Gaza Strip
Source: U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and UNOSAT, with additional data from
UNRWA; adapted by CRS.
Hamas’s control of Gaza presents a conundrum for the PA, Israel, and the international
community. No one has figured out how to assist Gaza’s population without bolstering Hamas,
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and thus aside from humanitarian assistance, the issue has been largely ignored, despite
aspirational pledges otherwise.23 Breaking the political deadlock on Gaza could include one or
more of the following: (1) reuniting Gaza with the West Bank under a Palestinian factional
power-sharing arrangement, (2) a general opening of Gaza’s borders, (3) a formal Hamas-Israel
cease-fire, and (4) a prisoner exchange deal involving captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. There
are concerns that if the status quo holds, the massive unemployment and dispiriting living
conditions that have worsened since Israel’s withdrawal in 2005 could contribute to further
radicalization of the population, decreasing prospects for peace with Israel and for Palestinian
unity and increasing the potential for future violence.
The Report of the U.N. Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (commonly known as the
“Goldstone Report,” after South African judge Richard Goldstone, the mission’s leader), which
was endorsed by the U.N. Human Rights Council and the U.N. General Assembly in fall 2009,
has generated controversy because of what many U.S. officials and analysts have deemed its
disproportionate and hyperbolic condemnation of Israeli strategy and actions during the conflict. 24
Most critics of the report believe that it did not sufficiently investigate or criticize Hamas for
endangering Gaza’s civilian population (including its allegedly intentional use of hospitals,
schools, mosques, and residential neighborhoods as command and operations centers or as
weapons caches). On November 3, 2009, the House of Representatives passed H.Res. 867
(“Calling on the President and the Secretary of State to oppose unequivocally any endorsement or
further consideration of the ‘Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza
Conflict’ in multilateral fora”) by a vote of 344-36 (with 22 voting “present”).
See “Hamas Rule in Gaza” below for more details. For additional information on Israel’s and
Hamas’s respective actions during the Gaza conflict, see CRS Report R40101, Israel and Hamas:
Conflict in Gaza (2008-2009) , coordinated by Jim Zanotti.
West Bank: U.S. and International Assistance
The PA’s dependence on foreign assistance is acute—largely a result of the distortion of the West
Bank/Gaza economy in the 40 years since Israeli occupation began and of the bloat of the PA’s
payroll since its inception 15 years ago. Facing a regular annual budget deficit of over $1 billion,
PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad spends much of his time seeking aid from the United States and
other international sources. Absent major structural changes in revenue and expenses, which do
not appear likely in the near term despite robust economic growth projections, this dependence
will likely continue.
Since the installation of Salam Fayyad as prime minister in mid-2007, the PA has committed itself
to reforming PA institutions across the board. The United States has appropriated or
reprogrammed nearly $2 billion since 2007 in support of these programs, including $650 million
for direct budgetary assistance to the PA and nearly $400 million (toward training, non-lethal
equipment, facilities, strategic planning, and administration) for strengthening and reforming PA
security forces and criminal justice systems in the West Bank. The remainder is for USAID23
See, e.g., Failing Gaza: No rebuilding, no recovery, no more excuses (A report one year after Operation Cast Lead),
Amnesty International UK, et al., December 2009, available at http://www.amnesty.org.uk/uploads/documents/
doc_20012.pdf.
24
The Goldstone Report, dated September 25, 2009, is available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/
specialsession/9/FactFindingMission.htm.
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administered programs implemented by non-governmental organizations in humanitarian
assistance, economic development, democratic reform, improving water access and other
infrastructure, health care, education, and vocational training. In December 2009, Congress
approved $500 million in total assistance pursuant to P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2010.
Table 3. U.S. Bilateral Assistance to the Palestinians, FY2004-FY2010
(regular and supplemental appropriations; current year $ in millions)
Account
FY2004
Economic Support Fund
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
74.5
224.4
148.5
50.0
389.5
776.0
400.4
P.L. 480 Title II
(Food Aid)
-
6.0
4.4
19.488
-
-
-
INCLEa
-
-
-
-
25.0
184.0
100.0
Transition Aid
-
-
0.343
-
-
-
-
74.5
230.4
153.243
69.488
414.5
960.0
500.4
Total
Sources: U.S. Department of State, USAID.
Notes: All amounts are approximate; for purposes of this table and this report, “bilateral assistance” does not
include U.S. contributions to UNRWA or other international organizations from the Migration and Refugee
Assistance (MRA) or Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) accounts, regardless of how the term
is defined in legislation.
a.
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account.
b.
Does not include $86.362 million reprogrammed into the INCLE account by President Bush in January
2007.
Security and criminal justice assistance and reform receive a great deal of political attention, both
because of their linkage with prospects for diplomatic progress, and because of the sensitivities
they inevitably raise given the often conflicting priorities they address. These include (1) Israeli
determination to neutralize terrorist threats; (2) Palestinian uncertainty over whether a strong
national force should be more intent on (a) helping end Israeli occupation or (b) countering
factional militias (such as Hamas’s); and (3) international insistence on the criminal justice
system’s legality, transparency, and respect for human rights norms. Lieutenant General Keith
Dayton has served as the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority
(USSC) since December 2005 with a multi-national staff of Americans, Canadians, Britons, and
Turks based in Jerusalem and Ramallah. Funding for the American USSC staff members and for
security assistance activities in Jordan and the West Bank comes from the State Department’s
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (commonly known as the INL
Bureau). INL also funds small non-USSC projects in the PA criminal justice sector.
The effectiveness of U.S. assistance is challenged, logistically and strategically, not only by the
Israelis, the PLO, the PA, Fatah, Hamas, and their shifting and often conflicting interests, but also
by the U.S. interagency process and by the need to coordinate activities and assistance with
European states, Arab states, Russia, Japan, Canada and Turkey, among others; and with
international organizations and coordinating mechanisms such as the European Union, United
Nations,25 World Bank, the Office of the Quartet Representative, and the Ad Hoc Liaison
25
Over the years, U.N. organs have set up a number of bodies or offices, as well as five U.N. peacekeeping operations,
(continued...)
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Committee, 26 among others. Ensuring that international assistance complements U.S. objectives
can be difficult or even untenable depending on the circumstances.
For more details on governance, security, and economic matters, see “West Bank Governance
Under Israeli Occupation” and “Economic Issues and Trends” below. 27
Terrorism and Militancy
Along with Hamas, six other Palestinian groups have been designated Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTOs) by the State Department: Abu Nidal Organization, Al Aqsa Martyrs’
Brigades, Palestine Liberation Front, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine, and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. Most
Palestinian militant groups claim that they are opposed to peace with Israel on principle, but
some—such as the Fatah-affiliated Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—view militancy and terror as
tactics that can be used to improve the Palestinians’ negotiating position. Since Oslo, these groups
have engaged in a variety of methods of violence, killing approximately 1,350 Israelis (over 900
civilians—including Jewish settlers in the Palestinian territories—and 450 security force
personnel). 28 Palestinians who insist that they are engaging in asymmetric warfare with a stronger
enemy point to the approximately 7,000 deaths inflicted on Palestinians by Israelis during the
same period,29 some through acts of terrorism aimed at civilians. 30
Although damage is difficult to measure qualitatively, suicide bombings have constituted a
fearsome means of attack, claiming approximately 700 Israeli lives (mostly civilians within Israel
proper).31 After peaking during the second intifada years of 2001-2003, suicide bombings have
largely ceased (two occurrences and four deaths since early 2006). Many attribute the drop-off to
enhanced Israeli security measures—the withdrawal from Gaza and general closure of its borders,
the West Bank separation barrier and tightening of border checkpoints—but Hamas’s entry into a
(...continued)
which had mandates or functions directly related to Palestine or the Arab-Israeli dispute. Appendix B of this report
provides information on each of these bodies.
26
The Ad Hoc Liaison Committee is a coordinating mechanism for Israel, the PA, and all major international actors
providing assistance to the Palestinians that was established in the mid-1990s to facilitate reform and development in
the West Bank and Gaza in connection with the Oslo process. Norway permanently chairs the committee, which meets
periodically in various international venues and is divided into sectors with their own heads for discrete issue areas
such as economic development, security and justice, and civil society.
27
See also CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report R40664, U.S.
Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority, by Jim Zanotti.
28
Statistics culled from B’Tselem (The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories)
website at http://www.btselem.org/english/Statistics/Casualties.asp and http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/
First_Intifada_Tables.asp.
29
Ibid.
30
The most prominent attack by an Israeli against Palestinians was the killing of at least 29 Palestinians (and possibly
between 10 to 23 more) and the wounding of about 150 more by Israeli settler Baruch Goldstein (a Brooklyn-born
former military doctor) at the Ibrahimi Mosque (Mosque of Abraham) in the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron on
February 25, 1994 (the Jewish holy day of Purim) while the victims were at prayer. See George J. Church, “When Fury
Rules,” Time, March 7, 1994. This incident has been cited by many analysts as a provocation for the Palestinian suicide
bombing campaign that followed.
31
Suicide bombing figures culled from Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+before+2000/
Suicide%20and%20Other%20Bombing%20Attacks%20in%20Israel%20Since.
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position of responsibility and political power, the strengthening of PA security forces in the West
Bank, and general Palestinian exhaustion with violence have been posited as contributing factors
as well. Some analysts believe that militant West Bank organizations and cells are dormant, not
extinct,32 and Israeli officials claim that they continue to foil plots aimed at striking within Israel
proper.
Isolated attacks still occur within Israel, often perpetrated by Palestinians using small arms or
vehicles as weapons, but their impact pales in comparison with suicide bombings. Militants also
stage attacks and attempt to capture Israeli soldiers at or near Gaza border crossings. Antipathy
between Jewish settlers and Palestinian residents in the West Bank leads to occasional attacks on
both sides—particularly in Hebron and in the northern West Bank near Nablus.
The most pronounced trend since Israel’s disengagement from Gaza has been an increased firing
of rockets and mortars from the territory Hamas now controls. Tunnels leading from Egypt’s
Sinai Peninsula into Gaza allow militants to smuggle raw materials used to make crude, shortrange explosives (commonly known as “Qassam rockets”), as well as 122mm Grad-style rockets
(thought to come from Iran) that have ranges of at least 40 kilometers.33 The over 8,600 rockets
and mortars fired by Palestinians since 2001 have killed at least 28 Israelis and wounded
hundreds.34 The persistent threat of rocket fire has had a broader negative psychological effect on
Israelis living in targeted communities. 35 Because rockets are fired indiscriminately without
regard for avoiding these communities, most neutral observers view this as tantamount to
intentional targeting of civilians.
Israel is developing the “Iron Dome” missile defense system, and co-developing the “David’s
Sling” (aka “Magic Wand”) system with the United States, in response to the rocket threat.36 It
hopes to have both systems operational sometime in 2010. It also is seeking U.S. and
international help to slow or stop the Gaza smuggling network, out of concern that Palestinian
militants might soon acquire longer-range rockets and precision targeting capabilities that would
increase the danger to larger population centers such as Tel Aviv. The possibility that a far more
dangerous rocket threat could emerge in the West Bank underlies Israeli reluctance to consider
withdrawal without copious security guarantees. The possibility also exists of a coordinated or
simultaneous rocket attack by Palestinian militants from Gaza and by the militant Lebanese Shia
group Hezbollah. Relatively few rockets and mortars have been fired since the end of the Gaza
conflict in January 2009 (with only property damage and minor injuries reported), but most
analysts believe that Hamas and other militants have stockpiled a few thousand rockets for
potential future use.
32
Matthew Levitt, “Hamas’s Ideological Crisis,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology (Hudson Institute), November 6,
2009, available at http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/hamass-ideological-crisis.
33
For more information, see CRS Report R40101, Israel and Hamas: Conflict in Gaza (2008-2009) , coordinated by
Jim Zanotti.
34
“Q&A: Gaza conflict,” BBC News, January 18, 2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/
7818022.stm.
35
Toni O'Loughlin and Hazem Balousha, “News: Air Strikes on Gaza,” The Observer (UK), December 28, 2008;
David Isby, “Effective anti-Qassam defence could be more than six years away,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, January
1, 2007.
36
For more information on these two systems, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel , by Jeremy M.
Sharp.
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The Regional Context37
Without sovereignty or a self-sufficient economy, Palestinians’ fortunes depend to a large degree
on the policies of other countries and international organizations with influence in the
surrounding region. Almost every aspect of Palestinian existence has some connection with Israel
given its occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem and its large measure of control over
borders, resources, and trade in both the West Bank and Gaza. U.S. priorities continue to shape
the framework within which Israeli-Palestinian issues are treated. Some observers believe that the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict commands less U.S. attention than it deserves because issues in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran distract attention from it. Others suggest that U.S.
involvement with and support to the Palestinians, particularly since Yasser Arafat’s death in 2004,
demonstrates that the United States does accord the conflict priority status despite the many other
existing global concerns.
Arab states (especially Gulf states) provided large amounts of aid to the PA in 2006-2007 after the
United States and European Union withdrew their aid in the wake of Hamas’s legislative
victory,38 but following the reinstitution of U.S. and EU aid in mid-2007 (upon Hamas’s dismissal
from the PA government following its takeover of the Gaza Strip), most of them reduced
contributions.39 Routinely, they make generous pledges (including over $1.8 billion dollars in the
wake of the 2008-2009 Gaza conflict) of aid to the Palestinians, but often fulfill them only in part
and after significant delay. 40 Their reluctance to fulfill pledges may stem from misgivings over
“picking sides” in Palestinian factional disputes and from concerns that without imminent
prospects either for domestic political unity or for progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process, any money contributed could be wasted. On the part of the Gulf states in particular,
reluctance may also stem from a feeling that they are less responsible historically for the
Palestinians’ situation than Israel, the United States, and Europe.41 Some observers believe that
Arab states have been historically complicit in prolonging the plight of the Palestinians (and
Palestinian refugees in particular) because it pressures Israel and serves Arab states’ domestic
interests by deflecting attention from their leaders’ shortcomings and by avoiding difficulties that
might result from assimilating the refugees into their societies.
37
See the following reports for information on the Palestinians’ relations with other countries in the region: CRS
Report RL33476, Israel: Background and Relations with the United States, by Carol Migdalovitz; CRS Report
RL33530, Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy, by Carol Migdalovitz; CRS Report
R40092, Israel and the Palestinians: Prospects for a Two-State Solution, by Jim Zanotti; CRS Report R40849, Iran:
Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, coordinated by Casey L. Addis; CRS Report RL33003, Egypt: Background and
U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp; CRS Report RL33546, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M.
Sharp.
38
Before 2006, Saudi Arabian support to the PA was estimated at $80 million to $100 million per year. After Hamas
came to power in 2006, Saudi support was channeled through the office of President Abbas.
39
See Glenn Kessler, “Arab Aid to Palestinians Often Doesn’t Fulfill Pledges,” Washington Post, July 27, 2008;
“Falling Short,” Washington Post, July 27, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/
2008/07/27/GR2008072700095.html?sid=ST2008072700226.
40
Following international pressure, Saudi Arabia contributed over $240 million to the PA’s budget in 2009. Smaller
budget support contributions in 2009 have been made by the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Egypt, and Oman.
Information provided to CRS from State Department, October 2009.
41
Some believe that Gulf states remain hardened to the plight of Palestinian refugees at least partly because of
lingering resentment from Yasser Arafat’s support for Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait (which was reversed
by a U.S.-led coalition during the 1991 Gulf War), after which thousands of Palestinians were expelled from these
states.
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Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is recognized by the United Nations (including
Israel since 1993) as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, wherever they may
reside. It is an umbrella organization that includes 10 Palestinian factions (but not Hamas or other
Islamist rejectionist groups). As described in “Historical Background and Palestinian Identity”
above, the PLO was founded in 1964, and, since 1969, has been dominated by the secular
nationalist Fatah movement.
Organizationally, the PLO consists of an Executive Committee, the Palestinian National Council
(or PNC, its legislature), and a Central Council.42 The PNC is supposed to meet every two years
to conduct business, and consists of approximately 700 members, a majority of whom are from
the diaspora. The PNC elects the 18 members of the Executive Committee, who function as a
cabinet—with each member assuming discrete responsibilities—and the Executive Committee
elects its own chairperson. In August 2009, the PNC convened for the first time since 1998 when
Mahmoud Abbas (Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee) called an extraordinary session in
Ramallah to hold new Executive Committee elections.43 The Central Council is chaired by the
PNC president and has over 100 members—consisting of the entire Executive Committee, plus
(among others) representatives from Fatah and other PLO factions, the Palestinian Legislative
Council, and prominent interest groups and professions. The Central Council functions as a link
between the Executive Committee and the PNC that makes policy decisions between PNC
sessions.
After waging guerrilla warfare against Israel throughout the 1970s and 1980s under the leadership
of the late Yasser Arafat from exile in Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia, the PNC declared Palestinian
independence and statehood in 1988 at a point roughly coinciding with the PLO’s decision to
publicly accept the “land-for-peace” principle of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 and to
contemplate recognizing Israel’s right to exist. The declaration had little practical effect, however,
because the PLO was in exile in Tunisia and did not define the territorial scope of its state.44
Nevertheless, 94 countries have recognized the state of Palestine, including Russia and China,45
and the PLO refers to its Executive Committee chairman as the “President of the State of
Palestine.”
The PLO recognized the right of Israel to exist in 1993. In 1996, Arafat was elected as the first
president of the Palestinian National Authority (or Palestinian Authority, hereinafter PA) that was
granted limited rule (under supervening Israeli occupational authority) in the Gaza Strip and parts
of the West Bank in the mid-1990s pursuant to the Oslo Accords.
42
See “Palestinian Organizations and Parties,” MidEastWeb, available at http://www.mideastweb.org/
palestianparties.htm#PLO, as a source for much of the PLO organizational information in this paragraph.
43
In addition to Abbas, the PLO Executive Committee includes such figures as Yasser Abed Rabbo, Saeb Erekat,
Ahmed Qurei, and Hanan Ashrawi. A full listing can be found in “Abbas shuffles PLO Executive Committee, ousts
Qaddoumi,” Ma’an, September 14, 2009.
44
The declaration included the phrase: “The State of Palestine is the state of Palestinians wherever they may be.” The
text is available at http://www.mideastweb.org/plc1988.htm.
45
See the PA’s website at http://web.archive.org/web/20060404211437/http://www.pna.gov.ps/Government/gov/
recognition_of_the_State_of_Palestine.asp.
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While the PA administers the territories over which Israel has granted it jurisdiction, the PLO
remains the representative of the Palestinian people in negotiations with Israel and with other
international actors. The PLO has a representative in Washington, DC (although it is not
considered a formal diplomatic mission), maintains a permanent observer mission to the United
Nations in New York and in Geneva (under the name “Palestine”), and has missions and
embassies in other countries—some with full diplomatic status. It is a full member of both the
League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.
Palestinian Authority (PA)
General Profile
The PA, although not a state, is organized like one—complete with democratic mechanisms;
security forces; and executive, legislative, and judicial organs of governance. As mentioned
above, the PA was organized in the mid-1990s to administer the Gaza Strip and specified areas
within the West Bank.46 Ramallah is its de facto seat, but is not considered to be the PA capital
because of Palestinian determination to make Jerusalem (or at least the part east of the Green
Line) the capital of a Palestinian state. The executive branch has both a president and a prime
minister-led cabinet, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) is its legislature, and the judicial
branch has separate high courts to decide substantive disputes and to settle constitutional
controversies, as well as a High Judicial Council.47 The electoral base of the PA is composed of
Palestinians from the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. Direct U.S. assistance to
Palestinian governing institutions from the State Department and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) has always been provided through the PA, not through the
PLO or Palestinian factions.
The first PA elections were held January 20, 1996 in accordance with the Oslo Accords. Yasser
Arafat was elected president with 88% of the vote and Fatah won 55 of the then-88 seats in the
Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). After stalling repeatedly, Arafat ratified a Basic Law to
function as the PA’s charter in 2002 pending a permanent constitution for a Palestinian state.
Largely criticized by the United States and Israel for his complicity in Palestinian violence during
the second intifada, or for his inability to stanch it, Arafat—under pressure from both countries—
had the Basic Law amended in March 2003 to create the office of prime minister to oversee the
ministries that had originally been in Arafat’s domain as PA president.48 This formality, however,
did not substantially alter Arafat’s overarching control over the PA.
46
The relevant Israel-PLO agreements that created the PA and established its parameters were the Agreement on the
Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, dated May 4, 1994, text available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/
Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Agreement+on+Gaza+Strip+and+Jericho+Area.htm#articlev; and the Israeli-Palestinian
Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, dated September 28, 1995, available at
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/interim.html.
47
See U.N. Development Programme—Programme on Governance in the Arab Region website at
http://www.pogar.org/countries/country.aspx?cid=14. However, human rights groups have voiced concern that the PA
executive continues to circumvent civilian courts that might check its power by employing military courts on a wider
range of matters than the civilian courts deem proper. See Goldstone Report, op. cit., pp. 337-338.
48
The Basic Law was further amended in August 2005. The text is available at http://www.palestinianbasiclaw.org/.
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Following Arafat’s death in November 2004, Mahmoud Abbas was elected PA president in
January 2005. However, polling data between 1996 and 2004 showed a significant drop in
support for Fatah against a backdrop of widespread political alienation. Most observers believe
Fatah’s decline was due to the public’s perception that the PA was rife with corruption, out of
touch with the populace, and had failed to achieve progress toward statehood or provide law and
order.
In January 2006 legislative elections, Hamas won 74 of the 132 seats in the PLC,49 Fatah won 45
seats, and smaller parties claimed the remainder. Hamas’s margin of victory in the popular vote
was far narrower—44% to Fatah’s 41%. Most observers believe that the Hamas victory was a
function of several factors, including (1) a complicated, mixed electoral system that rewarded
Hamas’s better organization and party discipline, (2) disaffection among younger, marginalized
political activists, and a (3) general disenchantment with Fatah over its inability to deliver peace
and good governance.50 In several electoral districts, moreover, multiple candidates divided the
Fatah vote while Hamas ran only one candidate.
After Hamas won the 2006 legislative elections, the United States and the European Union halted
direct aid to the PA. The factional standoff between Fatah and Hamas that persisted with Abbas as
PA president and Hamas controlling the PLC and the government ministries51 was only
temporarily eased by a February 2007 Hamas-Fatah “unity agreement” brokered by Saudi Arabia
(known as the Mecca Accord). These tensions produced fighting between Hamas and Fatah that
led to Hamas’s forcible takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007. In response to the Hamas
takeover, PA President Abbas dissolved the Hamas-led government and appointed a “caretaker”
technocratic PA government in the West Bank (led by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, a former
World Bank and International Monetary Fund official), leading to renewed U.S. and international
assistance for the PA in the West Bank that prompted Hamas to further tighten its grip on Gaza.
The PLC is currently sidelined due to its lack of a quorum caused by the West Bank/Gaza split
and the imprisonment of several Hamas PLC members by Israel. However, Hamas uses its 2006
electoral mandate as an argument—along with the argument that Abbas used extra-legal means to
dismiss its government—to legitimize its rule over Gaza. In October 2009, Abbas called for
elections in January 2010, but in November 2009, the Central Elections Commission concluded
that elections could not be held owing to Hamas’s refusal to permit them in Gaza. In December
2009, the PLO Central Council met to extend Abbas’s presidential term and the PLC’s term
indefinitely until elections can be held, but Hamas and other non-PLO factions have challenged
the PLO’s authority to settle matters of PA law.
Because some PA leaders hold overlapping leadership roles within the PLO and various factions,
it is sometimes difficult to gauge the degree to which Palestinians consider the PA truly
authoritative even within the West Bank. For example, until his death in 2004, Yasser Arafat
served as PA president, PLO chairman, and head of Fatah, and following Arafat’s death,
Mahmoud Abbas has succeeded him in each of these roles. Many observers wonder how the PLO
49
The PLC amended the Electoral Law in 2005, expanding the PLC from 88 to 132 seats.
For a fuller discussion of the implications of the 2006 PLC election, see Riad Malki, “Beyond Hamas and Fatah,”
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 17, No. 3, July 2006.
51
This time, the United States and Israel supported increasing the power of the PA presidency at the expense of the
Hamas prime minister and cabinet—a turnabout from their 2003 approach to the organs of PA governance when Arafat
was PA president.
50
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and PA will coordinate their functions and be regarded by the Palestinian people at a future point
when the leadership of the two institutions and of Fatah might be different. Some speculate that
the PA could somehow forge an identity completely independent from (and perhaps in
competition with) the PLO, or, alternatively, that the PLO might attempt to restructure or dissolve
the PA (either in concert with Israel or unilaterally) pursuant to the claim that the PA is a
constitutional creature of PLO agreements with Israel and was only meant to be a temporary,
transitional mechanism for the five-year period prescribed for final-status negotiations, and not an
indefinite administrative authority.
Prime Minister Salam Fayyad
Salam Fayyad is the PA prime minister and finance minister. He is not a member of either Fatah
or Hamas, although PA President Mahmoud Abbas (of Fatah) appointed him to his current
position.52 Many believe that U.S. and international confidence in Fayyad is the primary reason
he obtained and maintains his position. The two-year institution-building, reform, and
development plan for “de facto Palestinian statehood” that Fayyad unveiled in summer 2009 is
the subject of much interest in policy and analytical circles.53
Born in 1952 in the West Bank, Fayyad received a Ph.D. in economics from the University of
Texas, and has worked with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Arab
Bank. He was elected to the PLC in 2006 as a member of the small centrist Third Way Party that
also includes the prominent female leader Hanan Ashrawi. He served as finance minister from
2002-2005 and again in the national unity government (including both Hamas and Fatah) from
March to June 2007, and has served as PA prime minister and finance minister since President
Abbas’s dismissal of Hamas from the government in response to Hamas’s Gaza takeover in June
2007. Fayyad formed his second government, which includes members of Fatah and other PLO
factions, in May 2009.
Fayyad has been attacked as an illegitimate political actor by Hamas and others because his
appointment by Abbas as prime minister was made without legislative backing. He also has faced
resistance from Fatah loyalists for actions that some might describe as independent in the face of
an entrenched patronage-based system and others might characterize as political opportunism
aimed at expanding his currently small political base. He has been careful in his public
pronouncements to support the concept of Palestinian unity, and even resigned his post in March
2009 to clear the way for a potential Fatah-Hamas power-sharing arrangement before being
reappointed by Abbas in May to form his second government.
West Bank Governance Under Israeli Occupation
The Palestinian Authority administers densely-populated Palestinian areas in the West Bank
subject to supervening Israeli control of the West Bank under the Oslo agreements (see Figure 2
below for map).54 Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers regularly mount arrest operations to
52
For information on other members of the PA government that was organized in May 2009, see “Profiles of
Palestinian Caretaker Government Ministers May 09,” Open Source Document GMP20090524745004, May 24, 2009.
53
See footnote 6.
54
The two agreements that define respective Israeli and PA zones of control are (1) the Israeli-Palestinian Interim
Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, dated September 28, 1995, available at
(continued...)
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apprehend wanted Palestinians or foil terrorist plots, and maintain permanent posts throughout the
West Bank and along the West Bank’s borders with Israel and Jordan to protect Jewish settlers
and for broader security reasons.
(...continued)
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/interim.html; and the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in
Hebron, dated January 17, 1997, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/hebron.htm. East Jerusalem
is excluded from these agreements, as Israel has annexed it.
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Figure 2. Map of West Bank
PA Governorates; Areas A, B, and C; and Selected Israeli Settlements
Source: CRS, adapted from the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
Notes: All boundaries and depictions are approximate. Areas A, B, and C were designated pursuant to the
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, dated September 28, 1995. H2 was
designated pursuant to the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, dated January 17, 1997.
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Additional Israeli settlements exist within Area C but are not denoted, particularly a group of settlements with
small populations located along the Jordanian border (the Jordan Valley).
Coordination between Israeli and PA authorities generally takes place on a case-by-case basis and
usually discreetly, given the political sensitivity for PA leaders to be seen “collaborating” with
Israeli occupiers. The physical and psychological effects of Operation Defensive Shield linger.
During the operation, which took place in early 2002 at the height of the second intifada, Israel
reoccupied PA-controlled areas of the West Bank—demolishing many official PA buildings,
Palestinian neighborhoods, and other infrastructure; and reinforcing many Palestinians’ opinion
that Israel retained ultimate control over their lives.
PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s reform plans and efforts have inspired confidence
internationally, including from several U.S. and Israeli officials and analysts, despite his facing a
multitude of internal and external challenges. His first challenge was to establish and maintain a
single treasury account and PA payroll to assure international donors that aid would not be
funneled to terrorists and that past PA practices of graft and corruption would not be repeated.
With the “de facto statehood” plan Fayyad rolled out during summer 2009,55 he signaled his
intent to deepen his commitment to reform in all areas of governance, security, and public
services:
We are talking about security capability, law and order, including a well-functioning
judiciary. Security is not complete unless there is a widespread belief on the part of the
public that there is due process.... Additionally, [we need] physical infrastructure to provide
services effectively to our people in all areas—social services, health, education.... The idea
behind this is to ensure that in a couple of years, it will not be difficult for people looking at
us from any corner of the universe to conclude that the Palestinians have a state.56
Many observers point to signs of progress with PA security capacities and West Bank economic
development, along with greater Israeli cooperation. It is less clear whether the progress they cite
can be made self-sustaining and can be useful in promoting a broader political solution, and
whether the level of Israeli cooperation is sufficient.57 Some are concerned that, without a
functioning Palestinian legislature and with the prospect of future PA elections uncertain, the rule
of President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad is becoming less legitimate and more
authoritarian.
Fatah and Other PLO Factions
Fatah: General Profile
Fatah, the secular nationalist movement formerly led by Arafat, has been the largest and dominant
faction in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for decades. Since the establishment of the
Palestinian Authority (PA) and limited self-rule in 1994, Fatah has dominated the PA, except for
55
See Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State, op. cit.
Lally Weymouth, “‘Institution building’ in Palestine,” Washington Post, October 24, 2009.
57
For a more detailed discussion of the issues raised in this paragraph, see CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to
the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report R40664, U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority, by Jim
Zanotti. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is currently conducting research for a report on U.S. assistance
to PA security forces and the PA criminal justice system that is expected to be published in spring 2010.
56
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during the period of Hamas rule from 2006-2007. Yet, problems with internecine violence,
widespread disenchantment with Fatah’s corruption and poor governance, and the failure to
establish a Palestinian state have led to popular disillusionment. The death of Arafat in 2004
removed Fatah’s unifying symbol, further eroding the movement’s support as Mahmoud Abbas
took over its leadership.
Additionally, the image of Fatah as the embodiment of Palestinian nationalism and resistance to
Israeli occupation has gradually faded away. Although he is the head of the movement, Mahmoud
Abbas generally carries out his PLO and PA leadership roles without close consultation with his
nominal allies in Fatah. In a November 2009 report, the International Crisis Group said, in
reference to Fatah’s seemingly declining influence:
Resistance in the region is spearheaded by Islamic, not secular groups; Arafat is no more;
diplomacy is President Abbas’s preserve; Salam Fayyad’s government dominates the West
Bank, while Hamas controls Gaza. Far from being a big tent under which all Palestinian
forces assemble, Fatah is being crowded out by competing forces.58
For years, analysts have pointed to a split within Fatah between those of the “old guard” (mainly
Arafat’s close associates from the period of exile) and those of a “young guard” some believe to
be more attuned to on-the-ground realities—personified by leaders such as the imprisoned (by
Israel) but popular Marwan Barghouti. Cleavages and overlaps within and among these groups
and the political coming-of-age of even younger Fatah partisans, combined with factors
mentioned above that have eroded Fatah’s support base and credibility, have created doubts
regarding Fatah’s long-term cohesion and viability.
In August 2009, Fatah held its Sixth Congress in Bethlehem. It was the first Fatah congress held
since 1989—the first of the post-Oslo, post-Arafat era. Although some exiled members of the
movement lamented that Abbas would hold the congress under Israeli occupation and thus sought
to marginalize him, most analysts deemed the congress a success simply for being held.
Interviews and polls indicated that it boosted Abbas’s image as a leader both among and outside
of the Fatah faithful. The long-term consequences of the congress for Fatah’s future in Palestinian
politics are less clear. The congress held elections for most of the members of both Fatah’s 23seat Central Committee (its executive board) and approximately 100-seat Revolutionary Council
(responsible for implementing Central Committee decisions). Observers believe that the resulting
bodies are more representative of the movement’s active membership and its power centers,
despite the acknowledged influence of patronage, disorganization, and lack of transparency on
voting procedures and results at the congress and in the local delegate selection process held
within the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem.
The congress failed to clearly resolve Fatah’s stance on accepted forms of resistance to continued
Israeli control over Palestinian territories. Abbas, in his speeches, emphasized “legitimate
peaceful resistance” according to international law and complemented by negotiations. Yet the
Fatah political program approved by the Revolutionary Council shortly after the congress referred
to armed struggle as an “immutable right that legitimacy and international law confers,” among
other (political, legal, diplomatic) means of resistance, though it also stated that “Fatah has
58
International Crisis Group, Palestine: Salvaging Fatah, Middle East Report No. 91, November 12, 2009, available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/arab_israeli_conflict/
91_palestine___salvaging_fatah.pdf.
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refused to target civilians of any kind or move the battle outside [of Palestine].”59 Nor did the
political program specifically amend Fatah’s 1960s charter, which has never been purged of its
clauses calling for the destruction of the Zionist state and its economic, political, military, and
cultural supports.60 Many Central Committee members are either less outspoken in their advocacy
of nonviolent resistance than Abbas, or explicitly insist on the need to preserve the option of
armed struggle.
Israeli leaders voiced concern over the congress’s unwillingness to forswear violence
unequivocally. Palestinian leaders and some analysts asserted that holding the congress in the
occupied West Bank was a sign that armed resistance is no longer central to Fatah’s mission, but
that the defiant rhetoric was symbolically necessary for Fatah to maintain credibility as a
movement that does not do Israel’s bidding. Others said that even if Abbas is truly committed to
nonviolence, the Fatah leadership’s unwillingness to take a clear public decision on the subject
raises legitimate questions about the direction Fatah and the PLO might take either when Abbas’s
leadership role ends or if the peace process is perceived to have failed.
The Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades is a militant offshoot of Fatah that emerged in the West Bank
early in the second intifada and later began operating in Gaza as well. The group initially targeted
only Israeli soldiers and settlers, but in 2002 began a spate of attacks on civilians in Israeli cities
and in March 2002 was added to the State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
According to terrorism experts, the group switched tactics to restore Fatah’s standing among
Palestinians at a time when Palestinian casualties were mounting, Hamas’s popularity was rising,
and Fatah was tainted by its cooperation with Israel during the Oslo years. Most of the Brigades’
members were believed to have hailed from the Palestinian security forces. As part of the PA’s
effort to centralize control over West Bank security since Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in mid-2007,
the Brigades have (mainly voluntarily, partly through various amnesty programs) disbanded or at
least lowered its profile in the West Bank. 61
Fatah loyalists hope that they can effectively mobilize people at the grassroots level when the
next democratic test arises for Palestinians, but some observers warn not to underestimate
Hamas’s organization and political base. Although most late 2009 opinion polls showed support
for Fatah outpacing that of Hamas by a sizable margin, the polls also indicated that close to 40
percent of Palestinians are unaffiliated with any particular movement.62
59
Ibid. The full text of the political program from the congress is available at http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=
45117.
60
This is the case even though Fatah is the predominant member faction of the PLO, and the PLO formally recognized
Israel’s right to exist pursuant to the “Letters of Mutual Recognition” of September 9, 1993 (although controversy
remains over whether the PLO charter has been amended to accommodate this recognition).
61
However, in December 2009, Israeli authorities killed three men in Nablus that Israel accused of being affiliated with
the Brigades and of killing an Israeli rabbi while he was driving to his home in a nearby Jewish settlement. See Ethan
Bronner, “Israeli Military Kills 6 Palestinians,” New York Times, December 26, 2009.
62
International Crisis Group, op. cit.
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Key Fatah Leaders
Mahmoud Abbas (aka “Abu Mazen”)
Born in 1935 in Safed in what is now northern Israel, Abbas and his family left as refugees for
Syria in 1948 when Israel was founded. He earned a B.A. in law from Damascus University and a
Ph.D. in history from Moscow’s Oriental Institute.63 Abbas was an early member of Yasser
Arafat’s Fatah movement, joining in Qatar, and became a top deputy to Arafat and head of the
PLO’s national and international relations department in 1980. Abbas initiated dialogue with
Jewish and pacifist movements as early as the 1970s, and, as the head of the Palestinian
negotiating team to the secret Oslo talks in the early 1990s, is widely seen as one of the main
architects of the peace process. 64
Abbas returned to the Palestinian territories in September 1995 and took residences in Gaza and
Ramallah. Together with Yossi Beilin (then an Israeli Labor government minister), Abbas drafted
a controversial “Framework for the Conclusion of a Final Status Agreement Between Israel and
the PLO” (better known as the “Abu Mazen-Beilin Plan”) in October 1995 (although its existence
was denied for five years before the text became public knowledge in September 2000).65 In
March 2003, he was named the first PA prime minister, but never was given full authority because
Arafat (the PA president) insisted that ultimate decision-making authority and control over
security services lie with him. Abbas resigned as prime minister in frustration with Arafat, the
United States, and Israel on September 6, 2003, after just four months in office.
Following the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004, Abbas succeeded Arafat as chairman of
the PLO’s Executive Committee, and he won election as Arafat’s successor as PA president in
January 2005 with 62% of the vote. His term has been marked by Israel’s withdrawal from the
Gaza Strip, Hamas’s victory in 2006 PLC elections and its subsequent takeover of Gaza and
dismissal from the PA government, ongoing attempts at establishing stability and reforming PA
institutions in the West Bank, inconclusive 2007-2008 negotiations with the Olmert government
in Israel, and the events of 2009 (described above). Hamas and many other third parties claimed
that Abbas’s term ended in January 2009, but Abbas and his political allies insisted that it was coterminous with the PLC’s term that was set to expire in January 201066—until the PLO Central
Council decided in December 2009 to extend both terms indefinitely (beyond January 2010) until
elections can be held.
63
Some Jewish groups allege that Abbas’s doctoral thesis and a book based on the thesis (entitled The Other Side: The
Secret Relationship Between Nazism and Zionism) downplayed the number of Holocaust victims and accused Jews of
collaborating with the Nazis. Abbas has maintained that his work merely cited differences between other historians on
Holocaust victim numbers, and has stated that “The Holocaust was a terrible, unforgivable crime against the Jewish
nation, a crime against humanity that cannot be accepted by humankind.” “Profile: Mahmoud Abbas,” BBC News,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1933453.stm.
64
Yet, one of the Black September assassins involved in the 1972 Munich Olympics terrorist attack that killed 11
Israeli athletes has claimed that Abbas was responsible for financing the attack, even though Abbas “didn’t know what
the money was being spent for.” Alexander Wolff, “The Mastermind,” Sports Illustrated, August 26, 2002.
65
The Abu Mazen-Beilin plan contemplated a two-state solution that, among other things, would create a special
mechanism for governing Jerusalem that would allow it to function as the capital of both Israel and Palestine, and
would resolve the Palestinian refugee issue by allowing return to Israel only in special cases and providing for a
compensation regime and resettlement elsewhere in most others. See “The Beilin-Abu Mazen Document,” October 31,
1995, available at http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/beilinmazen.html.
66
See “Middle East Politics: Prolonging Abu Mazen,” Economist Intelligence Unit, November 28, 2008.
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Marwan Barghouti
Born in 1959 near Ramallah, Barghouti is a member of Fatah’s “young guard” who first gained
prominence as a leader of the first intifada in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During the uprising,
he was arrested by Israel and deported to Jordan, where he stayed for seven years until he was
permitted to return in 1994 after the 1993 Oslo Accord. He became active in Fatah and was
elected to the PLC in 1996, where he regularly criticized Yasser Arafat for corruption and human
rights abuses. During the second intifada (which began in September 2000), he was a leader of
the Fatah offshoot Tanzim (thought to have been linked with the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades) that
perpetrated attacks on Israelis. He was arrested and detained by Israel in 2002 and convicted in
2004 (and given five life sentences) for murdering Israeli civilians; he refused to present a
defense, but claimed to condemn attacks against civilians inside Israel.
Barghouti has remained involved politically during his imprisonment, deciding to challenge
Mahmoud Abbas for the PA presidency in 2005 before changing his mind and supporting Abbas
under pressure from within Fatah, and winning election to the PLC in 2006 on the Fatah list.
Barghouti consistently leads Palestinian opinion polls for hypothetical presidential elections by
wide margins. Some consider him a potential compromise figure, acceptable both to supporters of
Fatah and to those of Hamas because he has resistance credentials and opposes corruption but
also supports negotiating peace with Israel. (He speaks Hebrew from his time spent in Israeli
prisons.) Others do not believe he can live up to popular expectations for a variety of reasons.
Both Abbas and Hamas have reportedly unsuccessfully sought Barghouti’s release from prison.
Success in obtaining a release could potentially make Barghouti beholden to the party perceived
to be responsible. Barghouti was elected to Fatah’s Central Committee in August 2009, and there
has been speculation that he might run in the next PA presidential election.
Other Key Fatah Leaders
Saeb Erekat, born in 1955 in Jericho, is the chief PLO negotiator with Israel and a close associate
of Abbas’s who was also close to Arafat. Some reports have speculated that Abbas is grooming
Erekat to succeed him as PA president and also to be his successor as head of Fatah and of the
PLO.67
Muhammad Dahlan, born in 1961 in Khan Younis refugee camp in Gaza, became and remained
prominent in the 1990s and in the early part of this decade less as a political leader in his own
right than as a Fatah and PA security sector chief, largely owing to his close ties with Arafat,
Abbas, and U.S. officials.68 Known as the Fatah strongman in Gaza, Dahlan was conspicuously
absent in Europe during the decisive fighting that led to the Hamas takeover in 2007. As a result,
many observers believed that his political prospects had faded. Yet, he returned to prominence in
2009 and won a seat on Fatah’s Central Committee in August, leading to speculation that he may
be one of the leading candidates to succeed Abbas in Fatah, PLO, and/or PA ranks.
67
Walid Awad, “Threats to Dismiss any Fatah Member Who Runs in the Presidential Elections Without Consultation
with Fatah Institutions and Central Committee. A Wave of Anger Within Fatah’s Ranks After Abbas’s Nomination of
Erekat in Palestinian Presidential Elections,” Al Quds al Arabi, Translated from Arabic in Open Source Document
GMP20091208825004, December 8, 2009.
68
An April 2008 Vanity Fair article set forth Dahlan’s alleged dealings with U.S. officials over the past decade in
detail. The article cites three unnamed U.S. officials who allegedly heard then President George W. Bush refer to
Dahlan as “our guy.” David Rose, “The Gaza Bombshell,” Vanity Fair, April 2008.
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Other PLO Factions and Leaders
Factions other than Fatah within the PLO include secular groups such as the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, a State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization), the
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Palestinian People’s Party. All of these
factions have minor political support relative to Fatah and Hamas.
A number of politicians and other leaders without factional affiliation have successfully gained
followings among Palestinians and in the international community under the PLO’s umbrella.
Although these figures—such as Hanan Ashrawi (a female Christian) and Mustafa Barghouti—
often have competing agendas, several of them support a negotiated two-state solution, generally
oppose violence, and appeal to the Palestinian intellectual elite and to prominent Western
governments and organizations.
Hamas and Other Non-PLO Factions
Hamas: General Profile
Origins and Emergence
No Palestinian movement has benefitted more from, or contributed more to, Fatah’s weakening
than Hamas, which is an Arabic acronym for the “Islamic Resistance Movement.” Hamas, for
many years the main opposition force in the Palestinian territories, grew out of the Muslim
Brotherhood, a religious and political organization founded in Egypt in 1928 with branches
throughout the Arab world. Since Hamas’s inception, it has maintained its primary base of
support and particularly strong influence in the Gaza Strip, even though its top leadership is
headquartered in exile in Damascus, Syria.
Hamas combines Palestinian nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism. Its founding charter
commits the group to the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state in all of
historic Palestine. 69 Written in 1988, Hamas’s charter is explicit about the struggle for Palestine
being a religious obligation. It describes the land as a waqf, or religious endowment, saying that
no one can “abandon it or part of it.” In the charter, Hamas describes itself as “a distinct
Palestinian Movement which owes its loyalty to Allah” and that strives to “raise the banner of
Allah over every inch of Palestine.” It calls for the elimination of Israel and Jews from Islamic
holy land and portrays the Jews in decidedly negative terms, citing anti-Semitic texts. Some
observers also note that no Hamas leader is on record as sanctioning a permanent recognition of
Israel’s right to exist side by side with an independent Palestinian state or as expressing a
willingness to disarm or to stop attacks on Israel and Israelis.70
Hamas’s politicization and militarization can be traced to the first intifada that began in the Gaza
Strip in 1987 in resistance to the Israeli occupation. Hamas’s founder and spiritual leader, the late
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, established Hamas as the Muslim Brotherhood’s local political arm in
69
70
For the English translation of the 1988 Hamas charter, see http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/hamas.htm.
Steven Erlanger, “Academics View Differences Within Hamas,” New York Times, January 29, 2006.
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December 1987, following the eruption of the intifada. Yassin had established the Islamic Center
in Gaza in 1973. In subsequent years leading up to the intifada, Yassin’s and his associates’
activities—which led to Hamas’s founding—were countenanced and sometimes supported by
Israel, which believed the Islamists to be a convenient foil for the secular nationalist factions such
as Fatah that Israel then perceived to be greater threats.71
Hamas rejected the Oslo Accords, boycotted the 1996 elections, and has waged an intermittent
terrorist campaign to undermine the peace process. Its military wing, the Izz Al Din al Qassam
Brigades,72 has killed over 200 Israelis in attacks since 1993.73 The State Department designated
Hamas as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 1997 in response to its perpetration of
suicide bombings against Israeli civilians, and U.S. aid to the Palestinians has been tailored to
bypass Hamas and Hamas-controlled entities. Many of Hamas’s leaders, including Sheikh Yassin,
have been assassinated by Israel. 74
Hamas gained popularity among many Palestinians apparently because of its reputation as a less
corrupt provider of social services (funded by donations from Palestinians, other Arabs, and
international charitable front groups) than Fatah and because of the image it cultivates of
unflinching resistance to Israeli occupation. Fatah’s political hegemony inside the occupied
territories has been undermined by the inability of the PLO to co-opt or incorporate Hamas,
which has proved more resistant than its secular rivals to the PLO’s inducements. Particularly
between 2000 and 2004, the popularity of Hamas began to increase as Fatah’s fell. Hamas made a
strong showing in a series of municipal elections held between December 2004 and December
2005. Still, many observers were surprised by the scale of Hamas’s victory in the January 2006
PLC election.
Key Questions Regarding Hamas
Does Iran Support Hamas?
According to the State Department, Iran provides financial and military assistance to Hamas.75
During a December 2009 visit to Tehran, Hamas politburo chief Khaled Meshaal (who is based in
Damascus, Syria) said, “Other Arab and Islamic states also support us ... but the Iranian backing
71
Later, some measures Israel took to weaken Hamas may have strengthened the movement. For example, several of
Hamas’s current leaders were deported by Israel from the West Bank and Gaza to southern Lebanon in December
1992. Not only did they persevere and bond through the hardships of a winter in exile, but they also cultivated relations
with and received mentorship from the Iran-backed Hezbollah movement before being repatriated to the West Bank
and Gaza by Israel in February 1993 as a result of pressure from human rights organizations and the United States. See
McGeough, op. cit., p. 68.
72
Izz Al Din al Qassam was a Muslim Brotherhood member, preacher, and leader of an anti-Zionist and anti-British
resistance movement during the Mandate period. He was killed by British forces on November 19, 1935.
73
Figures culled from Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+before+2000/
Suicide%20and%20Other%20Bombing%20Attacks%20in%20Israel%20Since.
74
Israel assassinated Yassin (a quadriplegic confined to a wheelchair) on March 22, 2004, using helicopter-fired
missiles, and then assassinated his successor in Gaza, Abdel Aziz al Rantissi, in the same manner less than one month
later.
75
See U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2008,” Chapter 3, available at http://www.state.gov/s/
ct/rls/crt/2008/122436.htm.
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is in the lead, and therefore we highly appreciate and thank Iran for this.”76 The Iran-backed
Hezbollah movement in Lebanon provides military training as well as financial and moral support
to Hamas and has acted in some ways as a mentor or role model for Hamas,77 which has sought to
emulate the Lebanese group’s political and media success. Moreover, Hamas and Hezbollah share
the stated goal of driving Israel from occupied territories and ultimately eliminating it. Yet, even
though Hamas welcomes direct and indirect Iranian assistance, and even though Iran’s reputation
among Arab populations has arguably been bolstered in recent years by its anti-Western and antiIsrael positions and rhetoric, many believe that Hamas and Iran intentionally maintain a measure
of distance from one another. An alternate interpretation is that they merely understate the extent
of their ties. They appear to understand the importance of Hamas maintaining an image among its
domestic constituents as an authentic Palestinian offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, instead of
as an Iranian proxy—owing to the ethnic, sectarian, and linguistic differences between
Palestinians (who are predominantly Arabic-speaking, Sunni, and Arab) and Iranians (who are
mostly Persian-speaking, Shia, and non-Arab).
Is Hamas a United Organization?
Various U.S. and international policymakers, including Secretary of State Hillary Rodham
Clinton, have said or implied that organizational fissures may exist, particularly between Hamas’s
Gaza-based leadership and its leadership-in-exile—viewed as more closely tied to Iran—in
Damascus, Syria.78 Some believe that these potential fissures could be exploited by promising
Gazan Hamas leaders greater engagement and other incentives in return for moderating their
goals and tactics. Others have said that Hamas is more united than it seems, and that it benefits
from the portrayal of its leadership as divided because this perception provides Hamas with
greater flexibility in dealing with both Western actors who hold out hope of its moderation and its
Syrian and Iranian benefactors who are reminded not to take its rejectionist stance for granted.
Presenting a divided front also may serve Hamas by providing it with a rationale to explain policy
inconsistencies or changes of direction to the Palestinian people.
Would Hamas Ever Accept Israel’s Existence?
Some observers see Hamas as a pragmatic, evolving movement.79 They note that Hamas has
already moderated its positions by participating in 2006 elections for the Palestinian Legislative
Council (a body created by the Oslo Accords, which the group has long rejected), by agreeing to a
June 2008 cease-fire with Israel through indirect negotiation, and by expressing willingness to
enter into a long-term cease-fire (or hudna) with Israel. Also, these observers say, Hamas signed
the Mecca Accord in February 2007, pursuant to which it agreed to share power with Fatah, to
“respect” previous agreements signed by the PLO, and to allow the PLO to negotiate with Israel
and submit any agreement reached to the Palestinian people for their approval. Finally, these
observers seek to liken Hamas to the PLO from earlier times. The PLO, also once a terrorist
76
Transcript of remarks by Khaled Meshaal, Al Jazeera TV, December 15, 2009, Open Source Document
GMP20091215648001 (translated from Arabic).
77
Anna Fitfield, “Hizbollah Confirms Broad Aid for Hamas,” Financial Times, May 12, 2009.
78
In testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs,
Secretary Clinton said, “In fact, we think there is [sic] some divisions between the Hamas leadership in Gaza and in
Damascus. There’s no doubt that those in Damascus take orders directly from Tehran.” Transcript of Subcommittee
hearing: “Supplemental Request,” April 23, 2009.
79
See Michael Bröning, “Hamas 2.0,” foreignaffairs.com, August 5, 2009.
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group, altered some of its tenets in the late 1980s and early 1990s—agreeing to condemn
terrorism, to recognize Israel’s right to exist, and to negotiate for a two-state solution.80
Others claim that a conciliatory tone that some detect from Hamas, particularly since Barack
Obama became President, may be due to the movement’s calculation that cultivating an image of
reasonableness presently serves its interests in light of (1) the diplomatic climate following
President Obama’s inauguration, (2) Israeli deterrence of Hamas-generated violence in the
aftermath of the Gaza conflict, and/or (3) geopolitical changes affecting Hamas’s principal
benefactors in the region—Syria, Hezbollah, and Iran.81
Those who are more skeptical of Hamas’s intentions have countered that nothing of substance has
changed in Hamas’s positions, and that any reasonable-sounding statements are best explained as
a ploy to give the impression of moderation. They cite Hamas’s continued efforts to build up its
military capabilities and to plan attacks on Israelis, along with the reported rise in prominence of
extremists (relative to other Hamas members) within the group’s governing shura (or
“consultative”) councils, as evidence to support their claims.82 These skeptics assert that “implicit
recognition” of Israel is no recognition at all, and that a long-term cease-fire would simply allow
Hamas to consolidate its position and await a more propitious moment to mount an assault on
Israel.
Hamas Rule in Gaza
Means of Control
One year following the December 2008-January 2009 Gaza conflict, Hamas remains firmly in
control of the Gaza Strip, even though the people of Gaza rely on Israel, Egypt, the PA in the
West Bank, UNRWA, and other international and non-governmental organizations for access to
and resources from the outside world (including water and fuel for electricity). Hamas is able to
finance its governance of Gaza and its independent activities through contributions from Iran
(some reports say between $20-30 million annually)83 and from private individuals and
organizations from the Palestinian diaspora and greater Arab and Muslim worlds (particularly in
80
However, in a February 2009 congressional hearing, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace analyst Michele
Dunne explained why the PLO analogy might have limited applicability to Hamas: “Regarding Hamas, I think that our
problem as the United States is we want Hamas to walk the road that the PLO walked 20 years ago. And Hamas sees
very well that the PLO walked that road, and it failed.” See Transcript of Hearing, “Gaza After the War: What Can Be
Built on the Wreckage,” House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, February 12, 2009,
available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/111/47420.pdf.
81
Some speculate that Syria may be encouraging Hamas, to whose exiled leadership it provides safe haven, to at least
appear more reasonable while Syria pursues a possible improvement in ties with the United States. Elections in
Lebanon and Iran in June may have—for the time being—turned the primary focus of both Hezbollah and the Iranian
regime to jockeying for power internally. Hezbollah’s coalition performed worse than expected in Lebanese national
elections, leading to uncertainty over its influence in the new government, and Iran has experienced turmoil over
allegations of fraud in its presidential elections and the repression of dissent by the regime and its allies in the election’s
aftermath.
82
See Matthew Levitt, “Score One for ‘Hamaswood,’” Middle East Strategy at Harvard, August 11, 2009, available at
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/08/score-one-for-hamaswood/.
83
See Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, “Hamas,” available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/8968/#p8;
Matthew Levitt, “The Real Connection Between Iran and Hamas,” Counterterrorism Blog, available at
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/01/the_real_connection_between_ir.php.
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Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states).84 Contributions are often made through Hamas’s affiliated
network of charitable organizations, including some that have operated and may still operate in
the United States, Canada, and Europe. 85 Hamas also receives revenue from licensing fees and
taxes, most of which are related to Gaza’s smuggling-tunnel-fueled economy.
Hamas directs the government’s activities and security forces through a self-appointed cabinet of
Hamas ministers led by Ismail Haniyeh, who served as PA prime minister prior to Hamas’s
dismissal from government after the June 2007 Gaza takeover. The process by which decisions
are taken is opaque, but analysts believe that parties involved include the movement-wide and
Gaza regional shura councils, the Damascus politburo, and Qassam Brigades leadership.86
Reference to the government in Gaza as the “Hamas regime” does not mean that all or even most
of the people employed in ministries, security forces, and civil service positions are necessarily
members of Hamas or even Hamas sympathizers. Hamas partisans are, however, intermingled
throughout. Consequently, distinguishing the “Hamas” component of security forces and
government agencies from the “ordinary citizen” component can be exceedingly difficult. Hamas
may intentionally foster this ambiguity to keep its opponents—both internal and external—off
guard and conflicted over the means by which its rule in Gaza might be confronted or opposed.
Israel faced this challenge during Operation Cast Lead, such as when it chose a Gaza police
graduation ceremony as its initial air strike target, killing Hamas and non-Hamas policemen alike.
The PA also faces this challenge in deciding whether to continue paying the salaries of nearly
80,000 public sector employees in Gaza (it has continued to pay them thus far).87
Since Hamas took power in 2007, the State Department reports that it has maintained at least four
separate security forces to patrol Gaza.88 From the “Executive Force” (tanfithya) of Hamas
loyalists formed in Gaza after Hamas’s legislative electoral victory in 2006, many personnel were
integrated into existing PA security organizations89—(1) internal intelligence, (2) civil police, (3)
coastal patrol, and (4) border guard—that include Gazans of varying backgrounds and political
loyalties. The degree to which these security forces (which number approximately 15,000) act in
concert with the Qassam Brigades (which number approximately 2,000) is unclear. Between
them, they suffered only a few hundred casualties during the 2008-2009 Gaza conflict.90 Although
84
See Don Van Natta, Jr., with Timothy L. O’Brien, “Flow of Saudi Cash to Hamas Is Under Scrutiny by U.S.,” New
York Times, September 17, 2003.
85
The most illustrative case is that of the Texas-based Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), once
the largest Islamic charity in the United States. After U.S. investigators determined that HLF was funneling money to
Hamas and had close ties with Hamas leader Musa Abu Marzouk during his time living in the United States in the
1990s, the Treasury Department designated HLF as a Specially Designated Terrorist Organization in 2001 and froze its
assets. In 2008, five of HLF’s leaders were found guilty of criminal charges of providing more than $12 million to an
FTO.
86
In a conversation with CRS in August 2009, an Israeli official claimed that the Damascus politburo, headed by
Khaled Meshaal, exercises more strategic control over Hamas’s activities than Hamas’s other leadership organs
because (the Israeli official claimed) the politburo is responsible for arranging the transport of cash, weapons, and other
supplies to the Gaza Strip.
87
See International Crisis Group, op. cit.
88
State Department Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, Middle East and North Africa Overview, available at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2008/122433.htm.
89
See Beverley Milton-Edwards, “Order Without Law? An Anatomy of Hamas Security: The Executive Force
(Tanfithya),” International Peacekeeping, November 2008, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533310802396236.
90
Yoram Cohen and Jeffrey White, “Hamas in Combat: The Military Performance of the Palestinian Islamic
Resistance Movement,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy PolicyFocus #97, October 2009, available at
(continued...)
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much international attention has focused on the improved professionalization of PA security
forces in the West Bank, analysts say that Hamas-led security forces in Gaza also exhibit
impressive levels of discipline and efficiency that have succeeded in keeping order. There are,
however, widespread reports of mistreatment and torture of Hamas political opponents
(particularly Fatah members) and other prisoners.
The Qassam Brigades and militias directed by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Al Aqsa Martyrs’
Brigades, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Resistance Committees,
and Salafist fundamentalist groups such as Army of Islam and the Jaljalat continue to operate in
Gaza. On balance, Hamas appears to have calculated that their existence helps rather than hinders
its position. On one hand, Hamas’s ability to rein in the militias shows Israel and the international
community that it can deliver on cease-fires and other informal or formal security arrangements.
On the other hand, the possibility that Hamas could collaborate with, unleash, or even lose control
over the militias could dissuade Israel from threatening Hamas too gravely and perhaps even
create a stake for Israel and other international actors in stabilizing Hamas rule in Gaza and
strengthening it relative to more extreme or less predictable forces. Some observers, however,
believe that the threats posed by non-Hamas militias are overstated, and that any leverage Hamas
has with Israel comes from its own militia. Since the end of the Gaza conflict in January 2009,
Hamas has mostly refrained from rocket attacks, and other Palestinian militants have fired rockets
and mortars on a “much smaller scale than before,”91 causing few injuries and no deaths. Israeli
forces have made periodic incursions and strikes against militants launching rockets or
undermining border security.
Influence Over Society: Congress and Al Aqsa Television
By reshaping PA institutions, laws, and norms to fit its ends—instead of fully overhauling them—
and by retaining the welcome in Gaza for UNRWA and the international community, Hamas has
opted—for the time being—for stability over a comprehensive societal transformation. Hamas
interior minister Fathi Hamad has insisted:
Claims that we are trying to establish an Islamic state are false. Hamas is not the Taliban. It
is not al-Qaeda. It is an enlightened, moderate Islamic movement.92
Some ideologues who believed that Hamas would or should have implemented sharia law and
formally and fully Islamized public and private life soon after taking power have been
disappointed. Along with the perception that Hamas’s periodic willingness to halt violence and to
negotiate does not comport with its self-proclaimed stance of unrelenting resistance against Israel,
this disappointment has resulted in some Islamists joining more fundamentalist groups, though it
does not appear to present a near-term challenge to Hamas’s rule and it is unclear how
pronounced or significant this trend will be long term.
Yet, there has been some movement toward a greater Islamization of society through the broader
Hamas community network of mosques, government ministries and courts, security forces,
religious scholars, and schools. Islamic fatwas (legal opinions) have been offered as an alternative
(...continued)
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus97.pdf.
91
“Hamas: All Gaza militant groups agree to halt rocket attacks,” haaretz.com, December 8, 2009.
92
Pelham and Rodenbeck, op. cit.
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to secular justice for some police detainees. “Morality police,” judges, and school principals
advocate for and enforce Islamic dress codes—especially for women—in publicly conspicuous
places, although resistance to these measures has slowed or reversed their implementation in
some instances. 93
Hamas has used its control over Gaza’s media to cast Islamist, anti-Israel, and anti-Semitic
teachings within a narrative portraying “martyrdom” and violence against Israel and Jews as
heroic. Public dissent is suppressed, and Hamas uses its Al Aqsa television channel and summer
camps to indoctrinate children and youth with its hybrid Islamist/Palestinian nationalist views. In
2009, Hamas even produced its first feature-length film celebrating the life and death of a Qassam
Brigades militant from the first intifada.94
The 111th Congress is considering legislation to counter Hamas incitement. H.R. 2278, which
passed the House of Representatives on December 8, 2009 (by a vote of 395-3) and has been
referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, would seek to make it U.S. policy to urge all
parties with influence over satellite transmissions to quell broadcasts of Al Aqsa TV and similar
channels (including Hezbollah’s Al Manar TV, which is also popular in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip—for additional information, see CRS Report R40054, Lebanon: Background and U.S.
Relations, by Casey L. Addis) and to consider implementing punitive measures against satellite
providers that do not quell such broadcasts. H.R. 2278 also would require an annual presidential
report to Congress on “anti-American incitement to violence” that would include a country-bycountry breakdown of (1) all media outlets that engage in such incitement and (2) all satellite
providers that carry programming classified as such incitement. 95 Thus far, congressional
deliberation has had little or no effect on the availability of Al Aqsa and similar channels to
viewers in the region.
Although Hamas’s rule in Gaza is clearly authoritarian, some believe that the future possibility of
elections makes it responsive to public opinion. Declining support for Hamas in polls following
the Gaza conflict has led some to conclude that the population holds Hamas at least partly
culpable for the casualties and destruction they suffered.
Nevertheless, many believe that Hamas rule remains stable and effective in some areas despite the
miserable post-conflict situation and Gaza’s dilapidated infrastructure. Some see the beginnings
of a patronage system materializing, citing, among other evidence, the $60 million in handouts
Hamas is reported to have distributed in $1,500-6,000 increments to families whose homes were
lost or damaged in the conflict.96
93
Ibid.
Levitt, “Hamas’s Ideological Crisis,” op. cit.
95
It is unclear whether the executive branch would consider such legislation binding on its formulation of U.S. policy.
On September 9, 2008 (during the 110th Congress), the House of Representatives passed H.Res. 1069 (by a 409-1 vote),
which condemned Hamas’s Al Aqsa TV (among other Middle East TV channels, including Al Manar) for anti-Israel,
anti-Semitic, and anti-U.S. incitement and called upon satellite TV providers Arabsat (Arab League-owned, Saudibased) and Eutelsat (privately-owned, France-based) to cease transmitting Al Aqsa programming.
96
“Country Report: Palestinian Territories,” Economist Intelligence Unit, October 2009. Yet, some observers note that
Hamas leaders have mostly avoided the type of conspicuous consumption in which many Fatah leaders have engaged
since the 1990s, and which feeds widespread perceptions of corruption.
94
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Smuggling Tunnels97
Since Israel’s disengagement from Gaza in 2005, the network of smuggling tunnels connecting
Gaza with Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula has expanded dramatically with Hamas’s encouragement.
Under the closure regime aimed at undermining Hamas’s control over the territory, the tunneling
network has become Gaza’s primary economic engine and mode of rearmament for militants.
Israeli officials estimate that 7,000 people work on the tunnels, which number over 500. The
tunnels are reportedly of a generally high quality of engineering and construction—with some
including electricity, ventilation, intercoms, and a rail system. The openings to many tunnels are
found within buildings in or around Gaza’s southernmost city of Rafah. Although over 100
tunnels were rendered inoperative by Israeli airstrikes during Operation Cast Lead, many of the
damaged tunnels were restored within a few weeks because the main damage was sustained at the
openings, not in the middle sections.
In addition to cash and all types of marketable goods (from foodstuffs to automobiles), since the
end of the conflict in February 2009 the tunnels have reportedly transported hundreds of Gradstyle rockets into Gaza, along with raw materials (fertilizer, chemicals, TNT) for constructing
shorter-range Qassam rockets and other explosive devices. In addition, militants have reportedly
received thousands of mortars, several anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, and small arms
through the tunnels. Although Israel, Egypt, the United States, and other NATO countries have
pledged to stop or slow smuggling to Gaza by land and sea, and some measures have been taken,
anti-smuggling capabilities remain limited and/or constrained. 98
Key Hamas Leaders
Khaled Meshaal
Khaled Meshaal, based in Damascus, is the chief of Hamas’s politburo.
Born in 1956 near Ramallah, Meshaal (alternate spellings: Mish’al, Mashal) moved to Jordan in
1967. As a student and schoolteacher in Kuwait, he became a leader in the Palestinian Islamist
movement. After the founding of Hamas in 1987, Meshaal led the Kuwaiti branch of the
organization, then moved to Jordan in 1991 after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
In September 1997, Meshaal was targeted in Amman by the Mossad (Israel’s foreign intelligence
service) in an assassination attempt that became a major international incident—culminating in
King Hussein of Jordan threatening to abrogate the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty in order to get
Benjamin Netanyahu (in his first stint as Israeli prime minister) to supply an antidote to the nerve
toxin to which Meshaal had been exposed.99 After the Hamas leadership was expelled from
Jordan in August 1999, Meshaal first moved to Doha, Qatar, then settled two years later in
Damascus, Syria. He became Hamas’s overall leader in 2004, following the assassination of
97
Much of the information from this subsection came from a CRS meeting with an Israeli official in August 2009. For
a description of past smuggling activities related to Gaza, see CRS Report R40849, Iran: Regional Perspectives and
U.S. Policy, coordinated by Casey L. Addis.
98
See CRS Report RL33003, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp; and CRS Report RL34346,
The Egypt-Gaza Border and its Effect on Israeli-Egyptian Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
99
For a detailed account of the failed assassination attempt and Meshaal’s rise to power within Hamas, see McGeough,
op. cit.
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Abdel Aziz al Rantissi by Israel. Meshaal serves as Hamas’s top diplomat, traveling and meeting
with various governments and political leaders (including his political rival Mahmoud Abbas,
Iran, Arab countries, Russia, European legislators, and former U.S. President Jimmy Carter). He
has repeatedly indicated that Hamas would accept a two-state solution if ratified by the
Palestinian people in a referendum. Nevertheless, he insists that Hamas will not formally
recognize Israel and will not disarm.
Ismail Haniyeh
Ismail Haniyeh is Hamas’s “prime minister” in Gaza.
Haniyeh was born in or around 1955 in the Shati refugee camp in the Gaza Strip. In 1989, he was
imprisoned for three years by Israeli authorities for participation in the first intifada. Following
his release in 1992, he was deported to Lebanon along with approximately 400 other Hamas
activists, but was eventually allowed to return to Gaza in 1993.100 Upon his return, he was
appointed dean of the Islamic University, and became the leader of Hamas’s student movement.
He was closely associated with Hamas co-founder and spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, and,
following the assassination of Yassin and much of the Hamas leadership in 2004, became a
prominent Hamas leader in Gaza.
Haniyeh was one of the main people responsible for Hamas’s decision to participate in the 2006
PLC elections, and headed the Hamas list. Following Hamas’s victory, he served as PA prime
minister from March 2006 until June 2007. Following Hamas’s takeover of Gaza and its dismissal
from the PA government in the West Bank, Hamas has continued to insist that Haniyeh is the PA
prime minister, and he is treated as such in Gaza. Some observers believe that Haniyeh is more
responsive to political realities than Hamas’s leadership-in-exile, and use this rationale to argue
that Haniyeh and/or other Gaza-based Hamas leaders might be persuaded to moderate their goals
and tactics, even though he continues to advocate violent resistance against Israel. In Palestinian
opinion polls for hypothetical presidential elections, Haniyeh consistently runs close to Mahmoud
Abbas in head-to-head pairings.
Other Key Hamas Leaders
Musa Abu Marzouk (born in 1951 in the Rafah refugee camp in Gaza, now based in Damascus),
Mahmoud al Zahar (a medical doctor born in 1945 and based in Gaza—he served as foreign
minister from 2006-2007 in the Hamas-led PA government), and Osama Hamdan (born in 1965
in the Bureij refugee camp in Gaza, now based in Beirut after having spent four years during the
1990s based in Iran) are other key members of the Hamas politburo.
Ahmed Jabari is thought to be the Gaza-based commander of the Izz Al Din al Qassam Brigades,
Hamas’s military wing. Muhammad Deif, Jaabri’s predecessor, has kept a low profile in recent
years, possibly as the result of injury from a 2006 Israeli airstrike. 101
100
101
See footnote 71.
Yaakov Katz, “Meet the Hamas military leadership,” jpost.com, December 22, 2008.
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Other Rejectionist/Terrorist Groups
Several other small Palestinian groups continue to reject the PLO’s decision to recognize Israel’s
right to exist and to negotiate a two-state solution. They remain active in the territories and retain
some ability to carry out terrorist attacks and other forms of violence to undermine efforts at
cooperation and conciliation.
The largest of these is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a designated Foreign Terrorist
Organization that, like Hamas, is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. The PIJ, estimated at a
few hundred members, emerged in the 1980s in the Gaza Strip as a rival to Hamas. Inspired by
the Iranian revolution, it combined Palestinian nationalism, Sunni Islamic fundamentalism, and
Shiite revolutionary thought. The PIJ seeks liberation of all of historic Palestine through armed
revolt and the establishment of an Islamic state, but unlike Hamas has not established a social
services network, formed a political movement, or participated in elections. Mainly for these
reasons, PIJ has never approached the same level of support among Palestinians as Hamas. PIJ
headquarters, like those of Hamas, are in Damascus. Iran, however, is the PIJ’s chief sponsor. Its
secretary-general since 1995 has been Ramadan Abdullah Muhammad Shallah. Since 2000, the
PIJ has conducted hundreds of attacks against Israeli targets (including over 30 suicide
bombings), killing scores of Israelis.
Another—though smaller—Damascus-based, Iran-sponsored militant group designated as an
FTO is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). PFLPGC is a splinter group from the PFLP and has a following among Palestinian refugees in Lebanon
and Syria. PFLP-GC’s founder and secretary-general is Ahmed Jibril.102
The Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) is a loose alliance of armed dissidents and militants
that first appeared in the Gaza Strip in 2000. Its founder, Jamal Abu Samhadana, a former
member of Fatah, was killed in an Israeli air strike in June 2006. The membership of the PRC
encompasses both the secular and Islamic fundamentalist Palestinian movements, including
Fatah, Hamas, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Ex-members of the PA’s
Preventive Security Organization also are reported to be active in the PRC. The group also was
implicated in the October 15, 2003 attack that killed three U.S. diplomatic security personnel in
the Gaza Strip.103 The attack, a roadside bomb that destroyed the van in which the men were
traveling, was claimed and then later denied by the PRC. In part to avenge the death of their
leader Samhadana, in June 2006 the PRC (along with Hamas and a splinter group calling itself
the Army of Islam) launched the raid on an Israeli army post near the Gaza Strip that captured
Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit (who remains in Hamas’s custody and is the subject of ongoing
German-mediated indirect Israel-Hamas prisoner swap negotiations) and killed two of Shalit’s
comrades.
A number of small but potentially growing Salafist fundamentalist militant groups with an
affinity for Al Qaeda-style ideology and tactics are based in the Gaza Strip.104 These include the
102
Jibril was included, along with Khaled Meshaal of Hamas and Ramadan Shallah of PIJ, in the January 2009
emergency meeting of Arab states (excluding Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Morocco, or Tunisia) in
Qatar that was convened to address the ongoing Gaza conflict. The meeting also included Iranian president Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad.
103
See Conal Urquhart, Chris McGreal, and Suzanne Goldenberg, “Palestinians bomb US convoy,” Guardian (UK),
October 16, 2003.
104
See Yoram Cohen, “Jihadist Groups in Gaza: A Developing Threat,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy
(continued...)
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Army of Islam and the Jaljalat, a group that reportedly includes several former Hamas Qassam
Brigades commanders who became disaffected with Hamas’s 2008 cease-fire with Israel and with
other actions they perceived as having moderated Hamas’s stance. These groups do not threaten
Hamas’s current rule in Gaza, which has been made clear by the swift and brutal retributive
action taken by Hamas—against the Army of Islam in September 2008 and against the Jaljalataffiliated group Jund Ansar Allah in August 2009—at any sign of a public challenge. 105 Yet, some
analysts believe that these groups could pose a long-term challenge to Hamas if they attract
enough influential adherents or support from organizations or countries outside Gaza.
Palestinian Refugees
Of the some 700,000 Palestinians displaced during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, about one third
ended up in the West Bank, one third in the Gaza Strip, and one third in neighboring Arab
countries. They and their descendants now number over 4.6 million, with roughly one third living
in refugee camps in the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Jordan offered Palestinian
refugees citizenship, but the remainder in the region are stateless and therefore limited in their
ability to travel. Refugees receive little or no assistance from Arab host governments and many
(including those who do not live in camps) remain reliant on the U.N. Relief and Works Agency
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) for food, health care, and/or education. For
political and economic reasons, Arab host governments generally have not actively supported the
assimilation of Palestinian refugees into their societies. Even if able to assimilate, many
Palestinian refugees hold out hope of returning to the homes they or their ancestors left behind or
possibly to a future Palestinian state. According to many observers, it is difficult to overstate the
deep sense of dispossession and betrayal refugees feel over never having been allowed to return
to their homes, land, and property. Some Palestinian factions have organized followings among
refugee populations, and militias have proliferated in some refugee areas outside of the
Palestinian territories, particularly in Lebanon.106 Thus, the refugees exert significant pressure on
both their host governments and the Palestinian leadership in the territories to seek a solution to
their claims as part of any final status deal with Israel.
U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East (UNRWA)
Profile
In 1949, to ease the plight of Palestinian refugees resulting from the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the
U.N. General Assembly set up the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East (UNRWA) to shelter, feed, and clothe the refugees. Although seen at the time as a
(...continued)
PolicyWatch #1449, January 5, 2009, available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2981.
105
See Nicolas Pelham and Max Rodenbeck, “Which Way for Hamas?” New York Review of Books, Vol. 56, No. 17,
November 5, 2009.
106
A case in point is the small Palestinian-associated Islamist fundamentalist militant group known as Fatah al Islam.
In 2007, Fatah al Islam was battled and eventually defeated by Lebanese security forces in and around Tripoli and the
Nahr al Bared refugee camp. Numbering between 100 and 300, this group was variously described by some as being
mainly Palestinian, by others as more pan-Arab, and as having ties to Al Qaeda or to Syrian intelligence.
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temporary measure, the General Assembly has repeatedly renewed UNRWA’s mandate—which
currently runs through June 30, 2011—in the absence of a comprehensive resolution of the
Palestinian refugee problem. Over time, its operations have evolved to meet changing needs and
circumstances. UNRWA now provides both basic humanitarian relief and human development
services, including education, vocational training, and micro-credit loans. UNRWA defines those
eligible for its services as “anyone whose normal place of residence was in Mandate Palestine
during the period from 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both home and means of
livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.” The descendants of the original refugees also
are eligible to register. As of 2009, UNRWA has registered 4.6 million Palestine refugees living in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.
For additional information on UNRWA (including historical U.S. contributions), see CRS Report
RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RS21668,
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), by
Rhoda Margesson.
Congressional Concerns
The primary concern raised by some Members of Congress is that U.S. contributions to UNRWA
might be used to support terrorists. Section 301(c) of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act (P.L. 87195), as amended, says that “No contributions by the United States shall be made to [UNRWA]
except on the condition that [UNRWA] take[s] all possible measures to assure that no part of the
United States contribution shall be used to furnish assistance to any refugee who is receiving
military training as a member of the so-called Palestine Liberation Army or any other guerrilla
type organization or who has engaged in any act of terrorism.” A May 2009 Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report addressed these concerns.107
Some in Congress have questioned whether UNRWA refugee rolls are inflated. There is also
concern that no effort has been made to settle the refugees permanently or extend the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) mandate to include Palestinian refugees.
UNRWA’s defenders point out that UNRWA periodically updates the rolls to try to eliminate
duplication and that its mandate covers relief and social services, but not resettlement. (However,
the State Department announced in 2009 that approximately 1,350 Palestinian refugees from
Iraq—within the territorial mandate of UNHCR, not UNRWA—are planned to be resettled in the
United States.)108 At present, many observers consider UNRWA a unique organization that is
better left in place until a way forward on the peace process can be found.
For many years, Congress has raised concerns about how to ensure that UNRWA funds are used
for the programs it supports and not for terrorist activities or corrupt purposes. Some in Congress
have been concerned that refugee camps have been used as military training grounds. 109 The
camps are not controlled or policed by UNRWA, but by the host countries or governing
authorities. 110 Concerns also have been expressed about the content of textbooks and educational
107
See Government Accountability Office, Measures to Prevent Inadvertent Payments to Terrorists Under Palestinian
Aid Programs Have Been Strengthened, but Some Weaknesses Remain, GAO-09-622, May 2009, available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09622.pdf.
108
See CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti.
109
See footnote 106.
110
UNRWA’s responsibilities are limited to providing its services to refugees and administering its own installations.
(continued...)
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materials used by UNRWA, with claims that they promote anti-Semitism and exacerbate tensions
between Israelis and Palestinians. UNRWA responds that the host country, not UNRWA, provides
the textbooks and determines their content because students must take exams in host country
degree programs.
Economic Issues and Trends
General Profile
The combination of 40 years of Israeli occupation, international involvement, political turmoil,
and corruption in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have produced a distorted economy that is highly
dependent on foreign assistance. The Palestinian public sector is bloated, with past patronage and
cronyism contributing to an expanded PA payroll. The private sector is dominated by services and
small family-owned businesses.
According to the World Bank, Palestinian per capita GDP in the West Bank and Gaza is
significantly lower than it was during the years immediately prior to the second intifada.111
Lacking a self-sufficient private sector, Palestinians have historically depended on easy entry into
and exit out of Israel for their workers and goods. Following the outbreak of the second intifada,
Israel began construction of the West Bank separation barrier, increased security at crossing
points, issued permits to control access, and, in many cases, halted the flow of people and goods
altogether.112
For most of the time since Hamas’s forcible takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007,113 most of
Gaza’s border crossings—including the Rafah border crossing with Egypt—have been closed to
everything but a minimum of goods deemed necessary to meet basic humanitarian needs. In this
environment, the formal Gazan economy has been brought to a virtual standstill, and illicit
smuggling from tunnels between Gaza and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula has thrived. The Palestinian
Federation of Industries estimated in September 2008 that 98% of Gaza’s industrial operations are
inactive.114 Up to 90% of Gazans are reportedly living below the poverty line, 115 and 75% are
“food insecure” (see Table 2 above for related statistics).116 Conditions worsened as a result of
(...continued)
See UNRWA website at http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/wheredo.html.
111
Per capita GDP (calculated at real value to take inflation into account, but not adjusted for purchasing power parity)
has gone from between $1,200 and $1,500 in 1997-2000 to just over $1,000 at the end of 2008. The World Bank,
Palestinian Economic Prospects: Gaza Recovery and West Bank Revival—Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc
Liaison Committee, June 8, 2009, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/
AHLCJune09Reportfinal.pdf.
112
The Economist Intelligence Unit reports that the separation barrier has harmed the West Bank economy by affecting
access to 10.2% of all cultivated land in the territory. “Country Report: Palestinian Territories,” Economist Intelligence
Unit, October 2009.
113
See footnote 20.
114
The World Bank, Palestinian Economic Prospects: Aid, Access and Reform—Economic Monitoring Report to the
Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, September 22, 2008, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/AHLCSept15,08.pdf.
115
Pelham and Rodenbeck, op. cit.
116
U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (occupied Palestinian territory), Locked In: The
Humanitarian Impact of Two Years of Blockade on the Gaza Strip, August 2009, available at http://www.ochaopt.org/
(continued...)
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the significant destruction to infrastructure and neighborhoods during the 2008-2009 IsraelHamas conflict, and the closure regime has prevented any significant program of
reconstruction. 117
Although in 2009 Israel significantly reduced post-second intifada obstacles to Palestinian
movement within the West Bank, many obstacles remain, and controls on movement between
Israel and the West Bank remain largely unchanged (other than a relaxation on weekend access by
Arab Israelis to northern West Bank cities). Goods imported to or exported from the West Bank
(including those coming from Jordan via the Allenby Bridge) are subjected by Israel to a costly
and time-consuming “back-to-back” trucking process, in which goods are unloaded from one
truck on one side of the border crossing, scanned for security purposes, and taken over the border
crossing to be loaded into a second truck for final transport. There is no indication of plans to halt
or modify this process in the near future, other than to make it more efficient.
The alternatives for the Palestinians to economic interdependence with Israel would likely be: (1)
to attract investment and build a self-sufficient economy, which is probably years if not decades
away; (2) to look to neighboring Egypt and Jordan (which struggle with their own economic
problems) for economic integration; (3) or to depend indefinitely upon external assistance. To
attract enough long-term investment to become self-sufficient, most observers agree that
uncertainties regarding the political and security situation and Israeli movement restrictions
would need to be significantly reduced or eliminated.
West Bank Economic Development
PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and former British prime minister Tony Blair, who is the
representative of the international Quartet (the United States, the United Nations, the European
Union, and Russia), have encouraged a number of investment conferences and initiatives in
support of Fayyad’s 2008-2010 Palestinian Reform and Development Plan. Several high-profile
projects—housing developments, industrial parks, superstores, entertainment complexes—have
been completed or are in various stages of proposal or construction in and around Ramallah,
Bethlehem, Jericho and the northern West Bank in an effort to jumpstart private sector
development.118 Yet, most analysts advise against drawing the conclusion that the overall
economy has turned a corner. In an October 2009 Washington Post interview, Fayyad
acknowledged that the West Bank economy was growing at a rate of 8%, if not even more, but
questioned whether this growth was sustainable. 119 He advocates political progress with Israel and
(...continued)
documents/Ocha_opt_Gaza_impact_of_two_years_of_blockade_August_2009_english.pdf.
117
See Martha Myers, “Negative Impact of Policy on the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance in the Gaza Strip,”
Middle East Policy, Summer 2009.
118
Some of these ventures have been supported by U.S. organizations—including the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC), the Aspen Institute, the Center for American Progress, and CHF International—affiliated or
involved with a public-private partnership known as the Middle East Investment Initiative. See http://meiinitiative.org.
119
Weymouth, op. cit. Many Israelis emphasize an International Monetary Fund projection of 7% growth for the West
Bank in 2009 and the loosening of some Israel Defense Forces obstacles to Palestinian movement. Nonetheless, some
Palestinians and international analysts assert that actual and prospective economic development should not be
overstated because the Palestinian economy continues to be propped up by external aid, and uncertainty remains
regarding movement and access and regarding progress in negotiations with Israel. See The World Bank, Palestinian
Economic Prospects: Aid, Access and Reform, op. cit.; Zahi Khouri, “The West Bank’s Deceptive Growth,” New York
Times, September 8, 2009.
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the simultaneous pursuit of a “critical mass” of major infrastructure and private investment
projects throughout the West Bank. Fayyad’s and Blair’s open campaigning to build Palestinian
buildings and infrastructure in so-called “Area C” (see Figure 2 above for map),120 which falls
under full Israeli administrative and security control, has been coolly received by Israeli officials
and analysts, some of whom deem Palestinian construction in Area C a security threat.
The November 2009 launch of Wataniya Mobile, the Palestinian territories’ second mobile phone
service provider,121 presented grounds both for optimism and for skepticism regarding the West
Bank’s near-term economic prospects. On one hand, Wataniya’s introduction into the market is
expected to provide 2,750 jobs, $354 million in licensing fees to the cash-strapped PA, and
increased options to consumers. On the other hand, Wataniya’s protracted and ultimately only
partially successful struggle to obtain its desired communications frequencies from the Israeli
government raises questions—not only specific doubts about Wataniya’s potential to transform
the economy, but also general concerns over whether Israel’s professed desire to aid Palestinian
economic development is a genuine priority. Wataniya, expecting 4.8 MHz (the frequency held by
Kuwaiti-owned competitor Jawwal/Paltel) under a 2008 agreement with Israel and the PA, had to
settle for 3.8 MHz—and thus can only serve 250,000 customers instead of 1 million.122 Israel
claims that it will provide the remaining bandwidth at a later date, but the reasons behind the
delay are unclear.123
120
See Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, dated September 28, 1995,
available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/interim.html.
121
Wataniya is a 57-43 joint venture between Qatari-owned QTel and the Palestine Investment Fund. Its investment in
the Palestinian market is reportedly backed by $16 million in loan guarantees from the U.S. Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC). See Charles Levinson, “Mobile Venture Lifts Hope in West Bank,” Wall Street
Journal, November 11, 2009. The Palestine Investment Fund is an investment vehicle for PA money that has existed
since 2002. Its 7-member board and 30-member General Assembly are appointed by President Abbas, and concerns
have been raised about its transparency and its independence from political interference. See Adam Entous, “Debate
over control of Palestinian investment fund,” Reuters, April 28, 2009.
122
Economist Intelligence Unit, op. cit. EIU reports that this is the narrowest frequency range ever allocated to an
operator at launch (the previous low was 4.6 MHz, in Bulgaria). Wireless companies based in Israel that are also
available to Palestinians, such as Orange and Cellcom, operate with dramatically higher frequencies (20.4 and 37 MHz,
respectively), allowing them to service a far higher number of customers and to provide a broader array of services—
such as email and Internet browsing.
123
Some Israeli officials cited the PA’s failure to fulfill unspecified obligations.
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Appendix A. Historical Background124
The Palestine Mandate
Following World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the United Kingdom was given
the mandate for Palestine, which encompassed what is today Jordan, Israel, the West Bank, and
the Gaza Strip.125 Britain’s stewardship of Palestine was troubled from the beginning as it became
embroiled in the struggle between Jewish settlers seeking to establish their own state and Arab
inhabitants who were resisting these efforts. Because of uncertain data, precise population figures
for Palestine at this time are not available; the numbers most frequently cited are from a 1922
British census, which put the figures at 660,000 Arabs, 84,000 Jews, and 7,600 others. By 1948,
there were an estimated 1.35 million Arabs and 650,000 Jews.126 During the 1920s and 1930s,
Jewish-Arab relations in Palestine worsened and were marked by spasms of violence. Repeated
British efforts to find a formula that would satisfy all parties succeeded only in further angering
and alienating the two sides. As World War II wound down, violence in Palestine escalated and
Jewish underground groups began attacking British installations and assassinating British
officials. In February 1947, Britain told the U.N. General Assembly that it wished to relinquish
the mandate and asked the new body to settle the issue.
The 1947 U.N. Partition Plan and the Creation of Israel
The U.N. Special Commission on Palestine eventually recommended dividing Palestine into a
Jewish state (about 56% of the territory) and an Arab state (about 42% of the territory) and
placing Jerusalem and its vicinity (about 2% of the territory) under international administration. 127
The U.N. General Assembly adopted this plan on November 29, 1947 as U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 181.128 Many observers believed the plan was unworkable, not least because it left
many Arabs living in the proposed Jewish state. The Jews saw the U.N. decision as imperfect but
accepted it as a step toward creating the Jewish state for which they had worked so long. The
Arabs felt that it was unjust to ignore the rights of the majority of the population of Palestine and
rejected the partition plan. Both sides began organizing and arming themselves, and groups on
both sides carried out attacks on civilians. As violence mounted, many Palestinian Arabs began
fleeing to neighboring countries. On May 14, 1948, the British withdrew from Palestine and the
Jews proclaimed the independent state of Israel. In the following days and weeks, neighboring
Arab states invaded the newly proclaimed state.
When the fighting ended in 1949, Israel held territories beyond the boundaries set by the U.N.
plan—a total of 78% of the area west of the Jordan river. Jordan held East Jerusalem and the West
Bank and Egypt held the Gaza Strip. About 700,000 Palestinian Arabs fled or were driven out of
Israel.129 Palestinians call their defeat and exile in 1948 al Nakba (the “Catastrophe”). Many
124
This appendix was mostly written by Paul Morro.
125
In 1922, Britain set up a separate administration for the land east of the Jordan River and soon began transferring
authority to the newly created Emirate of Transjordan, later renamed Jordan.
126
MidEast Web, “The Population of Palestine Prior to 1948,” http://www.mideastweb.org/palpop.htm.
127
For a map of the 1947 U.N. Partition Plan, see http://www.mideastweb.org/unpartition.htm.
128
For the full text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181, see http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22562.htm.
129
There is no reliable data for the precise number of Palestinian refugees who fled in 1948. Most scholars place the
(continued...)
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Palestinian refugees ended up in camps in the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip, the Jordanian-ruled
West Bank, Jordan proper, Syria, and Lebanon, where they and their descendants remain today.
The Arab countries resisted assimilating the refugees for both political and economic reasons.
Many Palestinians did not wish to assimilate, hoping to one day return to their homes. Israel
refused to readmit the refugees, seeing them as both a physical and demographic threat to the
new state.
The 1967 Six-Day War
During the 1950s and 1960s, as pan-Arab nationalism gained prominence, Arab leaders in Egypt
and Syria pressed for military action against Israel. In May 1967, Egypt moved military units into
the Sinai Peninsula and concluded a military agreement with Jordan. On June 5, 1967, Israel,
assuming war was inevitable, launched preemptive air strikes against its Arab neighbors.130 Its
subsequent victory over Egypt, Jordan, and Syria took only six days. Israel took control of the
Sinai and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the
Golan Heights from Syria. Almost 1 million Arabs, mostly Palestinians, came under Israeli rule.
In November 1967, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 242, calling for Israeli
withdrawal from territories occupied during the war and the right of every state in the region to
live in peace within secure and recognized borders.131 The defeated Arabs states refused to
recognize or negotiate with Israel. The Israeli government decided to keep the territories as
bargaining chips in future peace talks.
Many observers believe one consequence of the war was the emergence of a stronger sense of
Palestinian national identity. Palestinians began to more forcefully advocate for a state of their
own. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which had been established in 1964, became
more militant and portrayed itself as a movement struggling for national liberation. In time, the
PLO became recognized by the Palestinian people, the Arab states, and much of the international
community as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Israel strongly opposed the
PLO because of terrorist attacks by its component groups and because its charter at the time
aimed to destroy the state of Israel.
The October 1973 (“Yom Kippur”) War and Camp David
In 1973, the Arabs, led by Egypt and Syria, launched a surprise attack on Israel in part to regain
the lost territory. The Arab armies made initial advances but eventually Israel drove the Arab
forces back to roughly the 1967 armistice lines. By 1977, with the pan-Arab dream shattered,
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat offered peace if Israel withdrew from the occupied lands and
agreed to a Palestinian state. In 1978, following vigorous diplomatic efforts by President Carter,
Egypt and Israel signed framework agreements that led to the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty
and Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai, and promised autonomy talks for Palestinians in the West
Bank and Gaza. The autonomy talks, however, never materialized and other Arab states did not
(...continued)
figure between 600,000 and 750,000.
130
For a contrary view that asserts that Israel was motivated more by fear of being disadvantaged diplomatically than
by genuine military threat, see Roland Popp, “Stumbling Decidedly Into the Six-Day War,” Middle East Journal,
Spring 2006.
131
For the full text of UNSCR 242 see http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1967/scres67.htm.
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accept the Camp David Accords. (In the mid-1970s, Israeli nationalist-religious groups had
accelerated their campaign to establish Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. In 1977,
when the right-wing Likud party came to power in Israel for the first time, the government began
backing the settlement enterprise more intensively.)
The First Intifada (Uprising)
A growing sense of frustration set in among Palestinians during the 1980s over the lack of
progress in finding a durable resolution of their nationalist claims. In December 1987, after four
Gaza Palestinians were killed by an Israel Defense Force (IDF) truck in a traffic accident, rioting
broke out and quickly spread through the territories. Initially, Palestinian youth hurled stones and
Molotov cocktails at IDF soldiers, although in some later clashes hand grenades and guns were
used. The IDF struggled at first to contain the crowds and often resorted to firing into them,
killing hundreds of Palestinians. The protests also featured acts of civil disobedience, including
strikes, demonstrations, tax resistance, and boycotts of Israeli products, all coordinated through
locally based popular committees. Over the next six years, over 1,100 Palestinians and 160
Israelis were killed in the violence.132
The uprising put the Palestinian question back on the international agenda. In July 1988, in
response to the months of demonstrations by Palestinians in the West Bank, Jordan ceded to the
PLO all Jordanian claims to the territory (which it had annexed in 1950, although the annexation
only achieved international recognition from Pakistan and the United Kingdom). To try and fill
the political vacuum, in November 1988 the Palestine National Council (the PLO legislature)
declared the establishment of the State of Palestine, in accordance with U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 181, the 1947 partition plan. Though symbolic, the PLO’s declaration was seen by
many as tacit recognition of Israel and acceptance of a two-state solution. From the Palestinian
perspective, by engaging the Israelis directly, rather than relying on neighboring Arab states, the
Palestinians reinforced their identity as a separate nation worthy of self-determination. The
impact on Israelis was equally profound. Many observers have noted that the first intifada caused
many Israelis to believe that the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza could not continue
indefinitely.
The Oslo Years
By the early 1990s, the intifada and the changed international climate owing to the end of the
Cold War led Israel’s new Labor government and the PLO to conduct secret negotiations in Oslo,
Norway to settle the conflict. The breakthrough came in 1993 and the resulting agreements, called
the Oslo Accords, included letters of mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, the
establishment of a Palestinian interim self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza, and a
five-year window in which to conclude a final status deal. The new Palestinian Authority (PA)
had a directly elected president and a legislative council, elected separately. The PA assumed full
control of major West Bank cities and limited control in other areas. However, Palestinian
rejectionist violence and Israeli settlement building in the territories undermined the process.
Nonetheless, in July 2000, President Clinton invited Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PLO
Chairman Yasser Arafat to Camp David to press them to conclude a final status deal. Most Israeli
132
Figures according to B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories,
http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/First_Intifada_Tables.asp.
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and American accounts say that Barak’s offer went further than any previous Israeli offer, but it
still fell short of Palestinian demands. The summit collapsed and the two sides traded accusations
over who was to blame.
The Second Intifada and Israel’s Withdrawal From Gaza
In September 2000, with tensions high, then-Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon visited the
Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif in Jerusalem’s Old City, a site holy to both Jews and Muslims.
The visit sparked Palestinian riots in Jerusalem, which quickly spread through the territories,
igniting the second or “Al-Aqsa” intifada.133 As Palestinian crowds rioted, in some instances
members of the Palestinian security forces opened fire on Israeli forces. Israeli soldiers often
responded with deadly force, killing more than 100 Palestinians over the next few weeks.
Palestinian militant groups responded with a suicide bombing campaign against Israeli civilian
and military targets, killing scores of Israelis and several Americans. Sharon was elected Israeli
prime minister in February 2001, bringing an end to whatever hope had remained that IsraeliPalestinian negotiations might continue.
In 2002, to try to stem Palestinian attacks, the IDF reoccupied all major West Bank cities and
began building a separation barrier in the West Bank. At the end of 2003, Prime Minister Sharon
announced his intention to “disengage” from the Palestinians by unilaterally withdrawing settlers
and IDF forces from the Gaza Strip and a small area of the West Bank. In September 2005, Israel
completed its unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. Yet, Israel still controls the flow of people and
goods in and out of the territories (in tandem with Egypt, which controls the border crossing at
Rafah between Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula). It also continues to occupy the West Bank, and has
erected hundreds of checkpoints and roadblocks to thwart terrorism. Over 5,000 Palestinians and
over 1,000 Israelis have been killed since the second intifada began. 134
The United Nations Context135
As events have unfolded in Israel and the Palestinian territories, two major U.N. organs—the
Security Council and the General Assembly—have worked to carry out their Charter functions.136
Some observers have asserted that U.N. debate and resolutions on these issues are primarily
intended to criticize and target Israel. Others have viewed the United Nations as a necessary actor
in any solution leading to lasting stability for the region.137 The Security Council, as the organ
with primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, has worked to bring an
133
The name “Al Aqsa” intifada is taken from the Al Aqsa mosque, the third holiest site in Islam, located on the
Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif (Noble Sanctuary), the scene of Sharon’s visit.
134
Figures according to B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories,
http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Casualties.asp.
135
This section was written by Marjorie Ann Browne, Specialist in International Relations.
136
The 1945 U.N. Charter sets forth a number of legal principles to be followed by U.N. member states. They include
refraining “from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” and
settling “their international disputes by peaceful means.” [Article 2, para. 4 and 3] At the same time, Article 51
recognizes “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a [U.N.]
Member....”
137
The Security Council has 15 members, five of which are permanent and have the right to veto adoption of a
resolution. Some Council decisions bind all U.N. members to carry them out. The General Assembly is made up of all
192 U.N. members. Its resolutions are recommendatory, except in certain circumstances.
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end to any immediate conflict and to set agreed-upon long-range principles and goals. The
General Assembly has passed resolutions to reflect the views of a majority, but not necessarily all,
of the international community.
Since 1947, the U.N. General Assembly has annually passed at least one resolution relating in
some way to Arab-Israeli or Palestinian issues. The numbers of resolutions adopted each session
slowly increased after the 1967 Six-Day War, when the Assembly passed resolutions dealing with
human rights and with conditions in the occupied territories. Resolutions adopted after the 1973
“Yom Kippur War” began to focus increasingly on Palestinians and on the PLO, with the
Assembly granting observer status to the PLO in 1974, declaring that Zionism is a form of racism
in 1975, and broadening PLO rights as “observer” in the Assembly in 1998.138 The General
Assembly held special sessions on Palestine in 1947 and in 1948. The remaining Assembly
special sessions on these issues have been convened as emergency special sessions.139 Of the 10
emergency special sessions held since 1956, six have related to Arab-Israeli or Palestine issues.
The U.N. Security Council adopted fewer resolutions on these issues. In part, this was because
the United States used its veto to prevent adoption of resolutions it viewed as one-sided or
unbalanced. The veto has been used in the Council in approximately 25 percent, or 53 of 210,
cases, to prevent adoption of a resolution on issues involving the Arab-Israeli disputes or
Palestine.140
138
In 1988, the Assembly redesignated the PLO as Palestine and in 1991 repealed the “Zionism equals racism”
resolution. The Institute for Palestine Studies publishes a comprehensive compilation of all related U.N. and U.N.
system agency resolutions: United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Volumes I - V cover
1947 through 1998. The table of contents in these volumes is very detailed. The United Nations provides links to the
texts of related U.N. resolutions at its website, at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/qpal. Resolutions of U.N. system
agencies are not included.
139
The Assembly adopted the Uniting for Peace Resolution (A/RES/377 (V)) in 1950 to enable Assembly
consideration of an issue, then before the Security Council, in instances when the Council, thwarted by use of the veto,
was unable to act on that issue. For a list of emergency special sessions, see http://lib-unique.un.org/lib/unique.nsf/
Link/R03055.
140
See Subject of UN Security Council Vetoes, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/membship/veto/
vetosubj.htm.
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Appendix B. List of Current or Former U.N. Bodies
and Offices That Focus on Palestinian or
Arab-Israeli Issues141
Entity
When Created
Comments
U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine
(UNCCP)
U.N. General
Assembly
1948
Reports annually to the Assembly. Most
recent report, A/61/172, was two pages,
to the effect that the UNCCP had nothing
to report.
U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
U.N. General
Assembly
1949
http://www.un.org/unrwa/english.html
Special Committee to Investigate Israeli
Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the
Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the
Occupied Territories
U.N. General
Assembly
1968
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/7/a/
moatsc.htm
Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable
Rights of the Palestinian People (CEIRPP)
U.N. General
Assembly
1975
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/qpalnew/
committee.htm
Division for Palestinian Rights [Originally
established as the Special Unit on Palestinian
Rights] Serves as the Secretariat for the
CEIRPP)
U.N. General
Assembly
1977 (as Special
Unit)
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/qpalnew/
dpr.htm
U.N. Register of Damage Caused by the
Construction of the Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory
U.N. General
Assembly
2006
Three-member Board of the Register has
been appointed, including a U.S. expert.
U.N. Special Coordinator for the Middle East
Peace Process (UNSCO) and Personal
Representative of the Secretary-General to
the PLO and the Palestinian Authority
U.N. Security
Council
1999
http://www.un.org/unsco
U.N. Truce Supervision Organization
(UNTSO)
U.N. Security
Council
1948
Current U.N. peacekeeping operation
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/
undof/index.html
U.N. Disengagement Observer Force
(UNDOF)c
U.N. Security
Council
1974
Current U.N. peacekeeping operation
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/
undof/index.html
U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
U.N. Security
Council
1978
Current U.N. peacekeeping operation
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/
unifil/index.html
U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF I)c
1956-1967
U.N. peacekeeping operation – ended
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/
co_mission/unefi.htm
U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF II)c
1973-1979
U.N. peacekeeping operation – ended
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/
U.N. Peacekeeping Operations
141
This appendix was prepared by Marjorie Ann Browne, Specialist in International Relations.
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Entity
When Created
Comments
co_mission/unefii.htm
Special Rapporteur on the Situation of
Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories
occupied since 1967
U.N. Commission
on Human Rights
1993; continued
under the U.N.
Human Rights
Council, 2006.
http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ps/
mandate/index.htm
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) Program of Assistance to the
Palestinian People
UNCTAD
1995-1997, based
on studies initiated
in 1979
http://r0.unctad.org/palestine
U.N. Development Program of Assistance to
the Palestinian People (UNDP/PAPP)
U.N. General
Assembly
1978
http://www.undp.ps/en/aboutundp/
aboutpapp.html
U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) Program of
Assistance to the Palestinian People
UNESCO, General
Conference
1995
U.N. Economic and Social Commission for
Western Asia (ESCWA)
U.N. Economic and
Social Council 1973
Programs of Assistance
c.
Palestine is a full member
http://www.escwa.org.lb/about/main.asp
These forces were established following military clashes between Israel and other Arab neighbors, not
between Israel and the Palestinians.
Author Contact Information
Jim Zanotti
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
jzanotti@crs.loc.gov, 7-1441
Acknowledgments
Much of this version of this report was derived from an earlier version written by Paul Morro, dated
October 12, 2007.
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