Order Code RS20643
Updated September 19, 2007April 7, 2008
Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class (CVN-21) Aircraft
Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for
Congress
Ronald O’Rourke
Specialist in National DefenseNaval Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The Navy’s proposed FY2008FY2009 budget requests $2,724712 million in procurement
funding for CVN-78, the first ship in the Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class of aircraft
carriers, also known as the CVN-21 class. which was earlier known as the CVN-21 class. Although CVN-78 was
procured in FY2008, the Navy’s budget includes procurement funding for the ship in
FY2009, FY2010, and FY2011. The Navy’s proposed FY2008 budget also
requests $124 requests
$1,214 million in advance procurement funding for CVN-79, the second ship in
the class, and $233 million in research and development funding for the two ships. The
the
class, which the Navy wants to procure in FY2012. The Navy’s estimated procurement
costs for CVN-78 and CVN-79 are about $10.5 billion
and $9.2 billion, respectively.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
Background
The Navy’s Current Carrier Force. The Navy’s current aircraft carrier force
includes one conventionally powered carrier, the Kitty Hawk (CV-63), and 10 nuclearpowered carriers — the one-of-a-kind Enterprise (CVN-65) and 9 Nimitz-class ships
(CVN-68 through CVN-76). The most recently commissioned carrier, the Ronald Reagan
(CVN-76), was procured in FY1995 and entered service in July 2003 as the replacement
for the Constellation (CV-64). The next carrier, the George H. W. Bush (CVN-77), also
a Nimitz-class ship, was procured in FY2001 and is scheduled to enter service in 2008 as
the replacement for the Kitty Hawk.1
The Aircraft Carrier Construction Industrial Base. All U.S. aircraft carriers
procured since FY1958 have been built by Northrop Grumman Newport News
Shipbuilding (NGNN) of Newport
News, VA —, a shipyard that forms part of Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB).
Newport News is the only U.S. shipyard that can build
large-deck, nuclear-powered
aircraft carriers. The aircraft carrier construction industrial
base also includes hundreds
of subcontractors and suppliers in dozens of states.
1
Another conventionally powered carrier, the John F. Kennedy (CV-67), was retired on March
23, 2007; for a discussion, see CRS Report RL32731, Navy Aircraft Carriers: Retirement of USS
John F. Kennedy — Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS-2
CVN-77. CVN-77, which was named the George H. W. Bush on December 9, 2002,
is to be the Navy’s tenth and final Nimitz-class carrier. Congress approved $4,053.7
million million
in FY2001 procurement funding to complete the ship’s then-estimated total
procurement procurement
cost of $4,974.9 million. Section 122 of the FY1998 defense authorization
act (H.R.
1119/P.L. 105-85 of November 18, 1997) limited the ship’s procurement cost
to $4.6
billion, plus adjustments for inflation and other factors. The Navy testified in
2006 that
with these permitted adjustments, the cost cap stood at $5.357 billion. The
Navy also
testified that CVN-77’s estimated construction cost had increased to $6.057
billion, or
$700 million above the adjusted cost cap. Consequently, the Navy in 2006
requested that
Congress increase the cost cap to $6.057 billion. Congress approved this
request: Section
123 of the FY2007 defense authorization act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364
of October 17,
2006), increases the cost cap for CVN-77 to $6.057 billion.
Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) Class (CVN-21) Program. The Navy’s successor
to the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier design is the Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class design,
also.
The design was earlier known as the CVN-21 designclass, which meansmeant nuclear-powered aircraft
carrier for the
21st Century. Compared to the Nimitz-class design, the Ford-class design
will incorporate
several improvements, including an ability to generate substantially more
aircraft sorties
per day and features permitting the ship to be operated by several hundred
fewer sailors
than a Nimitz-class ship, significantly reducing life-cycle operating and
support costs.
Navy plans call for procuring at least three Ford-class carriers — CVN-78,
CVN-79, and
CVN-80 — in FY2008, FY2012, and FY2016, respectively. Table 1 shows
funding for the
three ships through FY2013.
Table 1. Funding for CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN-80, FY1997-FY2013
(millions of then-year dollars, rounded to nearest million; figures may not add due to rounding)
CVN
9700
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
Total
thru
FY13
Procurement (Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy [SCN] account)
CVN-78
0 22 135 395 1163 623 619 736 2724 4072
0
0
0
0 10489
CVN-2685 2712 688 679
0
0 10457
79
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
53 124 399 1620 465 3338 3192 9191
CVN-1214 807 465 2312 2286 7261
80
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 201 523 724886 1087
Subtotal
0 22 135 395 1163 623 619 789 2848 4471 1620 465 3539 3715 204042809 3926 1495 1144 2513 3172 18805
Research and development (Research, Development, Test and Evaluation [RDTEN] account)
CVN-78 78
308 231 277 319 306 350 301 273 205 175 143 110 108 107 3213
CVN-317 306 350 303 284 202 223 153 109 107 106 3276
79
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
35
28
39
40 31
19
17 214
CVN-17
27
38
39
30
19
17 192
80
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
42
48
48 138
Subtotal 308 231 277 319 306 350 301 308 233 214 183 183 175 172 3565282 317 306 350 303 301 229 261 192 181 174 171 3606
TOTAL 308 253 417 714 1469 973 920 1097 3081 4685 1803 648 3714 3887 23969
Source: U.S.712 1469 973 922 1090 3038 4187 1687 1325 2687 3343 22411
Source: Navy data provided to CRS on March 28, 2007.
Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78). Section 1012 of the FY2007 defense authorization
act expressed the sense of the Congress that CVN-78 should be named for president
Gerald R. Ford. On January 16, 2007, the Navy announced that CVN-78 would be so
CRS-3
named.2 CVN-78 and other carriers built to the same design will consequently be
referred to as Ford (CVN-78) class carriers.
The Navy wants to procure CVN-78 in FY2008 and have it enter service in FY2015
as the replacement for the Enterprise, which is scheduled to retire in 2013, at age 52. The
6, 2008.
CRS-3
Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78). CVN-78 was procured in FY2008 and is scheduled
to enter service in 2015 as the replacement for Enterprise, which is scheduled to retire in
2012, at age 52.1 The Navy projects that there will be a 33-month period between the
scheduled decommissioning of Enterprise in November 2012 and the scheduled
commissioning of CVN-78 in September 2015. During this 33-month period, the Navy’s
carrier force will decline from 11 ships to 10.
As can be seen in Table 1, although CVN-78 was procured in FY2008, the Navy’s
FY2009 budget includes procurement funding for the ship in FY2009, FY2010, and
FY2011. This is consistent with Section 121 of the FY2007 defense authorization act
(H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17, 2006), which granted the Navy the authority to
use four-year incremental funding for CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN-80. The Navy’s
proposed FY2009 budget requests $2,712 million in procurement funding for CVN-78.
The Navy estimates CVN-78’s total acquisition (i.e., research and development plus
procurement) cost at more than $13.7 billion. This figure includes about $3.2 billion in
research and development costs through FY2013, and (as shown in Table 1), a total of
about $10.5 billion in
procurement costs. The procurement cost figure includes about
$2.4 billion for detailed
design and nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) work for the
CVN-78 class, and about
$8.1 billion for building CVN-78 itself. Including the DD/NRE
costs for a ship class in
the procurement cost of the lead ship in the class is a traditional
Navy ship procurement
budgeting practice.
The Navy’s proposed FY2008 budget requests $2,724 million in procurement
funding for CVN-78. As shown in Table 1, under the Navy’s proposed funding plan, the
ship is to be funded over a total of nine years, with about 35.2% of its procurement cost
provided in advance procurement funding between FY2001 and FY2007, about 26.1%
to be provided in the procurement year of FY2008, and about 38.8% to be provided in
FY2009. Dividing the main portion of the ship’s procurement cost between two years
(FY2008 and FY2009) is called split funding, which is a two-year form of incremental
funding. Section 121 of the FY2007 defense authorization act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364
of September 29, 2006) authorizes the Navy to use four-year incremental funding for
CVN-79, CVN-79, and CVN-80.
budgeting practice.
CVN-79 and CVN-80. The Navy wants to procure CVN-79 in FY2012 and have
it enter service in 2019. As shown in Table 1, theThe Navy’s estimated procurement cost
for CVN-79 is about
$9.2 billion in then-year dollars, and the Navy’s proposed FY2008
FY2009 budget requests $124 1,214
million in advance procurement funding for the ship. The Navy
wants to procure CVN-80
in FY2016 and have it enter service around 2023. The Navy’s
estimated procurement cost
for CVN-80 is about $10.7 billion in then-year dollars. As
shown in Table 1, the Navy
plans to request an initial increment of $201 million in
advance procurement funding for
the ship in FY2012.
Procurement Cost Cap. Section 122 of P.L. 109-364 establishes a procurement
cost cap for CVN-78 of $10.5 billion, plus adjustments for inflation and other factors,
and and
a procurement cost cap for subsequent Ford-class carriers of $8.1 billion each, plus
adjustments for inflation and other factors. The conference report on P.L. 109-364
(H.Rept. 109-702 of September 29, 2006) discusses Section 122 on pages 551-552.
Issues for Congress
Accuracy of Cost Estimate for CVN-78. Both the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have questioned the
Navy’s cost estimate for CVN-78. CBO testified in July 2007 that it estimates that CVN-
2
1
Section 1012 of the FY2007 defense authorization act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17,
2006) expressed the sense of the Congress that CVN-78 should be named for president Gerald
R. Ford. On January 16, 2007, the Navy announced that CVN-78 would be so named. CVN-78
and other carriers built to the same design will consequently be referred to as Ford (CVN-78)
class carriers. For further discussion of Navy ship names, see CRS Report RS22478, Navy Ship
Names:
Background For Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS-4
78 will cost about $1 billion more than the Navy estimates, and perhaps more than that.3
GAO testified in July 2007 that the CVN-78 “faces risks in the area of cost because the
estimate that underpins the budget is optimistic” and that “costs [for the ship] will likely
exceed budget if technologies or other materials are delivered late or labor hour
efficiencies are not realized.”4 Although the Navy publicly expresses confidence in its
cost estimate for CVN-78, CBO testified in July 2007 that the Navy has assigned a
confidence level of less than 50% to its estimate, meaning that the Navy believes there
is more than a 50% chance that the estimate will be exceeded.5
Technical Risk. GAO testified in July 2007 that the CVN-78 program faces
technical risks, particularly with regard to three new technologies that are to be
incorporated into the ship — the electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS), which
is to replace the steam-powered catapults used on today’s aircraft carriers; the advanced
arresting gear, which is to replace the hydraulic arresting gear used on today’s aircraft
carriers; and the dual-band radar that is to be carried by both Ford-class carriers and the
Navy’s new DDG-1000 class destroyer. GAO testified that
the Navy may face challenges in maintaining its design schedule [for CVN-78]
because of delays in the development of the ship’s critical technologies. Such delays
could impede the completion of the ship’s design and interfere with the construction
of the ship.... The Navy has focused much attention on developing [CVN-78]
technologies and has retired much risk. Yet risk remains. The schedule for installing
CVN 78’s technologies takes advantage of construction efficiencies. The shipbuilder
has identified key dates when technologies need to be delivered to the yard in order
to meet its optimal construction schedule. A number of CVN 78’s technologies have
an increased potential to affect this schedule because they are (1) located low in the
ship and needed early in construction or (2) highly integrated or embedded in the
ship’s design.... While the Navy has mitigated the risk posed by some technologies,
like the nuclear propulsion and electric plant, key systems, in particular, EMALS, the
advanced arresting gear, and the dual band radar have encountered difficulties during
development that will likely prevent timely delivery to the shipyard.6
Cost Cap. The Navy interprets the procurement cost caps for the CVN-78
program that were established by Section 122 of the FY2007 defense authorization act
as being expressed in “FY2006 then-year dollars,” meaning the cost of the ship in thenyear dollars if the ship were procured in FY2006 rather than in FY2008 (for CVN-78)
or in FY2012 (for CVN-79). The Navy states that the estimated then-year-dollar costs
for CVN-78 and CVN-79 of about $10.5 billion and $9.2 billion, respectively, de3
Statement of J. Michael Gilmore, Assistant Director for National Security, and Eric J. Labs,
Senior Analyst, [on] The Navy’s 2008 Shipbuilding Plan and Key Ship Programs before the
Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
House of Representatives, July 24, 2007, pp. 12-13.
4
Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Realistic Business Cases Needed
to Execute Navy Shipbuilding Programs, Statement of Paul L. Francis, Director, Acquisition and
Sourcing Management Team, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Seapower and
Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, July 24, 2007
(GAO-07-943T), p. 15.
5
Statement of J. Michael Gilmore and Eric J. Labs, op cit, p. 13.
6
GAO-07-943T, op cit, pp. 13-14.
CRS-5
escalate into FY2006 then-year dollar figures of about $10.0 billion and $7.4 billion,
respectively.
One potential question for Congress is whether the Navy is correct in interpreting
the cost cap figures in Section 122 as being expressed in “FY2006 then-year dollars.”
If the Navy is correct in this interpretation, then CVN-78 could experience about $500
million in cost growth for reasons outside those permitted in Section 122 without
exceeding its cost cap, and CVN-79 could experience about $700 million in cost growth
for reasons outside those permitted in Section 122 without exceeding its cost cap. Other
things held equal, this would reduce the chance that these ships will exceed their
respective cost caps. At the same time, however, the existence of a cost cap that is higher
than a ship’s currently estimated cost might not be viewed as conducive to rigorous cost
control on the ship, as it might encourage some to believe that cost increases up to the
cap would be acceptable.
Four-Year Incremental Funding. Although Section 121 of the FY2007 defense
authorization act granted the Navy the authority to use four-year incremental funding for
CVN-78 and CVN-79, the Navy, in its FY2008-FY2013 budget submission, did not use
this authority and continued to budget for the two ships using split funding (i.e., two-year
incremental funding). The Navy has the option of using the four-year authority when it
submits its FY2009-FY2013 budget plan next year. Using the authority for CVN-78
would permit a reduction in the amount of funding required for the ship in FY2009.
Other things held equal, that might permit additional things to be funded that year. It
would also, however, increase funding requirements for CVN-78 in FY2010 and
FY2011, which could make it more difficult at the margin to fund other things in those
years.
More generally, proponents of using four-year incremental funding for carriers
could argue that doing so would more fully mitigate the budget spikes associated with
procuring aircraft carriers, and consequently further reduce the need to disrupt other
programs by shifting them away from the year that the carrier is procured. Opponents
could argue that the budget spike associated with procuring a carrier is sufficiently
mitigated by two-year incremental funding, that shifting to four-year incremental funding
would result in an 11-year funding profile for a ship with a nominal seven-year shipyard
construction period, and that shifting to four-year incremental funding would encourage
advocates of other defense programs to seek the use of incremental funding for their
programs.
Block-Buy Contract. One possible option for Congress to consider for the CVN78 program would be to authorize the Navy to use a block-buy arrangement, particularly
if Congress decides that there is a high likelihood procuring CVN-79 and CVN-80.
Block-buy contracting was invented for the Virginia-class submarine program, where it
was used to contract for the first four boats in the program over the five-year period
FY1998-FY2002. One option for a block-buy arrangement would encompass CVN-78
and CVN-79. If that option is not used, another option would be a block-buy
arrangement encompassing CVN-79 and CVN-80. A block-buy arrangement in the
CVN-78 program could reduce the cost of the ships covered in the arrangement by a few
percent — perhaps enough to fund the procurement, for example, of an additional Navy
auxiliary ship or two additional Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs). The alternative strategy
of a multiyear procurement (MYP) would likely not be available for CVN-78 and CVN-
CRS-6
79 because the Navy won’t be able to demonstrate design stability in the CVN-78
program — a requirement to qualify for MYP — until CVN-78 is delivered in FY2015,
which is three years after the planned procurement year for CVN-79.
Supporters of a block-buy contract could argue that the potential savings, though
fairly small in percentage terms, could be significant in absolute terms, in light of the
combined construction cost of the two ships. Opponents could argue that it would tie the
hands of future Congresses by creating a commitment to procure a ship that is not
scheduled for procurement until a future fiscal year.
Legislative Activity in 2007
FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 1585/S. 1547). The House
Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 110-146 of May 11, 2007) on H.R.
1585 recommended approving the Navy’s FY2008 request for procurement and advance
procurement funding for CVN-78 program. The Senate Armed Services Committee,
in its report (S.Rept. 110-77 of June 5, 2007) on S. 1547, recommended reducing by $20
million the Navy’s FY2008 request for procurement funding for CVN-78 program and
approving the Navy’s FY2008 request for advance procurement funding for the program.
The report stated:
Within the budget for the CVN-78, the committee notes that the unit cost for the Ship
Self Defense System (SSDS) is 150 percent greater than the similar system procured
for the fiscal year 2007 amphibious assault ship, LHA(R). The committee has placed
significant emphasis on the importance of the Navy’s managing shipbuilding costs
in other sections of this report on costs from the shipbuilding prime contractors.
Given the high proportion of ship costs that accrue from sources other than the prime
contractors, the committee believes that it is equally important for the Navy to
manage the cost for Government-furnished equipment. The committee recommends
a reduction of $20.0 million in SCN for the SSDS for CVN-78. (Page 95)
FY2008 Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3222).
The House
Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 110-279 of July 30, 2007) on H.R.
3222, recommended reducing by $20 million the Navy’s FY2008 request for
procurement funding for CVN-78 program and approving the Navy’s FY2008 request
for advance procurement funding for the program. The report stated:
The Ship Self Defense System (SSDS) suite of equipment that will be installed on
board the CVN-78 is a new capability system that is still under development. The
$99,546,000 estimated cost of the system is more than double the cost of the current
version of SSDS that is being installed on CVN-77 and also LHA-6. While the
Committee recognizes that an increased capability is bound to bear an increased cost,
it seems quite unreasonable that an incremental increase in capability will cost more
than twice that of the current system. Therefore, $79,546,000 is provided for the
CVN-78 SSDS, a decrease of $20,000,000. (Pages 228-229)
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 110-155 of
September 14, 2007) on H.R. 3222, recommended reducing by $20 million the Navy’s
FY2008 request for procurement funding for CVN-78 program and approving the Navy’s
crsphpgw
FY2008 request for advance procurement funding for the program
Issues for Congress
Accuracy of Cost Estimate for CVN-78. Both the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) have questioned the accuracy
of the Navy’s cost estimate for CVN-78. GAO reported in August 2007 that:
Costs for CVN 78 will likely exceed the budget for several reasons. First, the
Navy’s cost estimate, which underpins the budget, is optimistic. For example, the
Navy assumes that CVN 78 will be built with fewer labor hours than were needed for
the previous two carriers. Second, the Navy’s target cost for ship construction may not
be achievable. The shipbuilder’s initial cost estimate for construction was 22 percent
higher than the Navy’s cost target, which was based on the budget. Although the Navy
and the shipbuilder are working on ways to reduce costs, the actual costs to build the
ship will likely increase above the Navy’s target. Third, the Navy’s ability to manage
issues that affect cost suffers from insufficient cost surveillance. Without effective
cost surveillance, the Navy will not be able to identify early signs of cost growth and
take necessary corrective action.2
CBO testified in July 2007 that it estimates that CVN-78 will cost about $1 billion
more than the Navy estimates, and perhaps more than that. CBO also testified that,
although the Navy publicly expresses confidence in its cost estimate for CVN-78, the
Navy has assigned a confidence level of less than 50% to its estimate, meaning that the
Navy believes there is more than a 50% chance that the estimate will be exceeded.3
Technical Risk. The Navy faces challenges in developing certain new
technologies intended for CVN-21. Problems in developing these technologies could
delay the ship’s completion and increase its procurement cost. GAO reported in March
2008 that:
Five of 15 current critical technologies [for CVN-21] are fully mature, including
the nuclear propulsion and electric plant. Six technologies are expected to approach
maturity, while four others will remain at lower maturity by construction contract
award.... Of CVN 21’s technologies, the electromagnetic aircraft launch system
(EMALS), the advanced arresting gear, and the dual band radar (composed of the
volume search and multifunction radars) present the greatest risk to the ship’s cost and
schedule.... Challenges in technology development could lead to delays in maintaining
the design schedule needed for construction....
2
Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Navy Faces Challenges
Constructing the Aircraft Carrier Gerald R. Ford within Budget, GAO-07-866, August 2007,
summary page. See also Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Realistic
Business Cases Needed to Execute Navy Shipbuilding Programs, Statement of Paul L. Francis,
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management Team, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on
Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives,
July 24, 2007 (GAO-07-943T), p. 15.
3
Statement of J. Michael Gilmore, Assistant Director for National Security, and Eric J. Labs,
Senior Analyst, [on] The Navy’s 2008 Shipbuilding Plan and Key Ship Programs before the
Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
House of Representatives, July 24, 2007, pp. 12-13..
CRS-5
EMALS will not be tested at sea, but a production model is now scheduled to
begin land-based testing in 2009. Difficulties developing the generator and meeting
detailed Navy requirements have already led to a 15-month schedule delay. Problems
manufacturing the generator recently delayed testing scheduled to begin by February
2008. The Navy is considering authorizing production of the generators prior to
completing initial testing in order to ensure delivery to support CVN 78’s construction
schedule. As a consequence, production may begin prior to demonstrating that the
generators work as intended. Timely delivery of EMALS remains at risk. Problems
that occur in testing or production will likely prevent EMALS from being delivered
to the shipyard to meet the construction schedule.
The dual band radar is being developed as part of the DDG 1000 [destroyer]
program.4 In 2007 DOD reassessed the multifunction radar’s readiness. Since modes
critical to CVN 21 have not yet been tested, including electronic protection and air
traffic control, the radar could not be considered fully mature. While the multifunction
radar has been tested at sea, considerable testing remains for the volume search radar.
Due to problems with a critical circuit technology, the volume search radar will not
demonstrate the power output needed to meet requirements during upcoming testing.
Full power output will not be tested on a complete system until the first production
unit in 2010, and the radar will not be fully demonstrated until operational testing on
DDG 1000 in 2013. Problems discovered during testing may affect installation on the
carrier scheduled to begin in 2012.
The advanced arresting gear completed early verification tests that proved the
system’s concept and tested components. Integrated testing with simulated and live
aircraft is scheduled to begin in 2009. Delays have led the Navy to consolidate test
events in order to maintain the shipyard delivery date, leaving little time to address
any problems prior to production. Late delivery will require the shipbuilder to install
this system after the flight deck has been laid, disrupting the optimal build sequence
and increasing cost.
Other technologies will not be fully matured by construction contract award, but
present less risk to ship construction....
According to the Navy, the design [for CVN-78] is on track to support construction.
However, the program may face challenges in maintaining its design schedule due to
delays in the receipt of technical information on some key technologies. In particular,
late delivery of information on EMALS is driving inefficiencies in design
development and must be resolved to prevent late delivery of design products needed
for construction.5
Decline in Carrier Force Between Enterprise Decommissioning and
CVN-78 Commissioning. As mentioned earlier, during the projected 33-month period
between the scheduled decommissioning of Enterprise in 2012 and the scheduled
commissioning of CVN-78 in 2015, the Navy’s carrier force will decline from 11 ships
to 10. 10 USC 5062(b) requires the Navy to maintain a force of at least 11 carriers. The
Navy in 2007 asked Congress to amend this law to permit the carrier force to decline to
4
For more on the DDG-1000 program, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-1000 Destroyer
Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
5
Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon
Programs, GAO-08-467SP, March 2008, pp. 65-66.
CRS-6
10 ships during the period between the decommissioning of Enterprise and the
commissioning of CVN-78. Congress in 2007 did not act on that request.
The Navy in 2008 has again asked to Congress that Congress to amend 10 USC
5062(b) to permit the carrier force to decline to 10 ships during the period between the
decommissioning of Enterprise and the commissioning of CVN-78. On March 6, 2008,
for example, the Navy testified that:
The Navy is committed to maintaining an aircraft carrier force of 11. However,
during the 33-month period between the planned 2012 decommissioning of USS
ENTERPRISE and the 2015 delivery of the USS GERALD R. FORD, legislative
relief is requested to temporarily reduce the carrier force to ten. Extending
ENTERPRISE to 2015 would involve significant technical risk, challenge our
manpower and industrial bases, and require significant resource expenditure; with
only minor gain for the warfighter in carrier operational availability and significant
opportunity costs in force structure and readiness. The Navy is adjusting carrier
maintenance schedules to meet the FRP and ensure a responsive carrier force for the
Nation during this proposed ten carrier period.6
Some Members, in hearings this year on the Navy’s proposed FY2009 defense
budget, have expressed ambivalence or reluctance to amend 10 USC 5062(b) to permit
the carrier force to decline to 10 ships during the period between the decommissioning
of Enterprise and the commissioning of CVN-78. Some of them have noted that if the
completion of CVN-78 is delayed because of problems in developing key technologies
or other issues, the period between the decommissioning of Enterprise and the
commissioning of CVN-78 could become longer than 33 months. The Navy has argued
that extending the service life of Enterprise to cover the projected 33-month period would
cost about $2.2 billion in ship-maintenance and other costs, and would result in only one
more 7-month deployment for the Enterprise during this period. The Navy states that the
this $2.2 billion cost is not currently programmed into the Navy’s budget, and that
incorporating this cost into its budget would reduce funding for other Navy programs.
Some Members have noted in response that, under 10 USC 5062(b), the Navy is
responsible for maintaining the carrier force consistently at 11 ships, and that the Navy
consequently is obliged to include this $2.2-billion cost in its budget plans.
Legislative Activity in 2008
The Navy’s proposed FY2009 budget was submitted to Congress in early February
2008.
6
Statement of Honorable Donald C. Winter, Secretary of the Navy, Before the House Armed
Services Committee, 6 March 2008, p. 10.