Order Code RL33153
China Naval Modernization: Implications for
U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and
Issues for Congress
Updated July 20October 18, 2007
Ronald O’Rourke
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
Concern has grown in Congress and elsewhere about China’s military
modernization. The topic is an increasing factor in discussions over future required
U.S. Navy capabilities. The issue for Congress addressed in this report is: How
should China’s military modernization be factored into decisions about U.S. Navy
programs?
Several elements of China’s military modernization have potential implications
for future required U.S. Navy capabilities. These include theater-range ballistic
missiles (TBMs), land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), anti-ship cruise missiles
(ASCMs), surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based aircraft, submarines, surface
combatants, amphibious ships, naval mines, nuclear weapons, and possibly highpower microwave (HPM) devices. China’s naval limitations or weaknesses include
capabilities for operating in waters more distant from China, joint operations, C4ISR
(command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance), long-range surveillance and targeting systems, anti-air warfare
(AAW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), mine countermeasures (MCM), and logistics.
Observers believe a near-term focus of China’s military modernization is to field
a force that can succeed in a short-duration conflict with Taiwan and act as an antiaccess force to deter U.S. intervention or delay the arrival of U.S. forces, particularly
naval and air forces, in such a conflict. Some analysts speculate that China may
attain (or believe that it has attained) a capable maritime anti-access force, or
elements of it, by about 2010. Other observers believe this will happen later.
Potential broader or longer-term goals of China’s naval modernization include
asserting China’s regional military leadership and protecting China’s maritime
territorial, economic, and energy interests.
China’s naval modernization has potential implications for required U.S. Navy
capabilities in terms of preparing for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait area, maintaining
U.S. Navy presence and military influence in the Western Pacific, and countering
Chinese ballistic missile submarines. Preparing for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait
area could place a premium on the following: on-station or early-arriving Navy
forces, capabilities for defeating China’s maritime anti-access forces, and capabilities
for operating in an environment that could be characterized by information warfare
and possibly electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and the use of nuclear weapons.
Certain options are available for improving U.S. Navy capabilities by 2010;
additional options, particularly in shipbuilding, can improve U.S. Navy capabilities
in subsequent years. China’s naval modernization raises potential issues for
Congress concerning the role of China in Department of Defense (DOD) and Navy
planning; the size of the Navy; the Pacific Fleet’s share of the Navy; forward
homeporting of Navy ships in the Western Pacific; the number of aircraft carriers,
submarines, and ASW-capable platforms; Navy missile defense, air-warfare, AAW,
ASW, and mine warfare programs; Navy computer network security; and EMP
hardening of Navy systems. This report will be updated as events warrant.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Congressional And Navy Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Issue for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Scope of Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
China’s Naval Modernization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Maritime-Relevant Elements of China’s Military Modernization . . . . . 5
China’s Naval Limitations and Weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2225
Goals or Significance of China’s Naval Modernization . . . . . . . . . . . 2932
Potential Implications for Required U.S. Navy Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 4245
Capabilities for Taiwan Strait Crisis or Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4245
Capabilities for Maintaining Regional Presence and Influence . . . . . . 5054
Capabilities for Tracking and Countering PLA SSBNs . . . . . . . . . . . . 5154
Potential Oversight Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5155
China as a Defense-Planning Priority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5155
DOD Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5155
Navy Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5255
Navy Force Structure and Basing Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5357
Size of the Fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5357
Division of Fleet Between Atlantic and Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5358
Forward Homeporting in the Western Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5459
Number of Aircraft Carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5559
Number of Attack Submarines (SSNs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5560
ASW-Capable Ships and Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5762
Navy Warfare Areas and Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5863
Missile Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5863
Air Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6165
Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6367
Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6569
Mine Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6973
Computer Network Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6973
EMP Hardening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7074
Legislative Activity For FY2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7377
FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 1585) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7377
House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7377
Appendix. Additional Details on China’s Naval Modernization Efforts . . . . . . 7478
List of Tables
Table 1.
Table 2.
Table 3.
Table 4.
Table 5.
PLA Navy Submarine Commissionings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Chinese Submarine Patrols Per Year, 1981-2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
New PLA Navy Destroyer Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1517
New PLA Navy Frigate Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1618
Potential Ship Travel Times to Taiwan Strait Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4448
China Naval Modernization: Implications for
U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and
Issues for Congress
Introduction
Congressional And Navy Concern
Concern has grown in Congress and elsewhere since the 1990s about China’s
military modernization and its potential implications for required U.S. military
capabilities. China’s military modernization is an increasing element in discussions
of future U.S. Navy requirements. A May 2005 press report, for example, stated that:
China is one of the central issues, along with terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction, in the U.S. military’s 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, a
congressionally directed study of military plans.... [W]hen the [then-]chief of
naval operations, Adm. Vern Clark, held a classified briefing for congressional
defense committees earlier this month about threats, his focus was “mainly” on
China, about which he is “gravely concerned,” recalled John W. Warner, the
Virginia Republican who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee....
China has come up repeatedly in congressional debate over the size of the Navy.
The 288-ship fleet of today is half the size it was three decades ago. “You never
want to broadcast to the world that something’s insufficient,” Warner says, “but
clearly China poses a challenge to the sizing of the U.S. Navy.”1
In an address delivered on February 7, 2007, Secretary of the Navy Donald
Winter stated:
Naval forces must be ready, above all, to conduct major combat operations
should the need arise.
We cannot ignore events and trends that reinforce that belief. A recent
White Paper prepared by the Chinese military outlined a three-step strategy for
modernizing its defense, to include its blue-water ambitions. The third step in
their strategy states as a strategic goal “building modernized armed forces and
being capable of winning modern, net-centric wars by the mid-21st century.”
This document implicitly suggests that China hopes to be in a position to
successfully challenge the United States, a challenge that would certainly entail
blue-water operations.
1
John M. Donnelly, “China On Course To Be Pentagon’s Next Worry,” CQ Weekly, May
2, 2005, p. 1126.
CRS-2
Public declarations such as this statement and many others serve as
reminders that we must be prepared for a world that does not always follow our
preferences. Of course, we hope that China will choose a peaceful path. But
hope is not a strategy, so we must be prepared.
Those who might be tempted to dismiss or discount the need to be prepared
for major combat operations ought to keep in mind that their goodwill and
optimism towards totalitarian regimes may not be reciprocated.2
A press article reporting on an April 3, 2007, address by Admiral Michael
Mullen, the current Chief of Naval Operations, stated that in addition to other topics,
The admiral also commented on the threats that drive military spending
needs. For example, he noted, China is building a new, modernized navy.
“The Chinese are shifting from land-centric” forces as their main focus “to
air-centric and naval-centric” buildups. China is acquiring cutting-edge aircraft,
new destroyers, four new classes of submarines, and hundreds of radar-guided
missiles. “Those investments very much have our attention,” Mullen said.3
Another short news article, reporting on comments made by Mullen at a
breakfast meeting in early May 2007, stated that:
In response to a question about the need for large Navy vessels, Mullen
[told] attendees that while he doesn’t expect to see big sea battles, the service has
to be mindful of China’s naval build up. “China is very actively investing in their
navy, building more ships each year. Their building rate is much higher than ours
right now,” he says. “We have to be mindful of that. Not to be mindful of that
would be irresponsible.”4
Issue for Congress
The issue for Congress addressed in this report is: How should China’s military
modernization be factored into decisions about U.S. Navy programs? Congress’s
decisions on this issue could significantly affect future U.S. Navy capabilities, U.S.
Navy funding requirements, and the U.S. defense industrial base, including the
shipbuilding industry.
2
Donald C. Winter, “Navy Transformation: A Stable, Long-Term View,” Heritage Lectures,
No. 1004, March 19, 2007, [remarks] delivered February 7, 2007, p. 2. (Published by The
Heritage Foundation)
3
Dave Ahearn, “Mullen Says Military Faces Financial Crisis, But Nation Can Afford
Arms,” Defense Daily, April 5, 2007. The passage as originally published was in the form
of five one-sentence paragraphs and has been condensed here into two paragraphs for ease
of reading.
4
“Interesting Times,” Defense Daily, May 7, 2007.
CRS-3
Scope of Report
This report focuses on the implications that certain elements of China’s military
modernization may have for future required U.S. Navy capabilities. It does not
discuss the following:
!
other elements of China’s military modernization that may be less
relevant to future required U.S. Navy capabilities;
!
the potential implications of China’s military modernization for
parts of DOD other than the Navy (such as the Air Force and the
Missile Defense Agency), federal agencies other than DOD (such as
the Department of State), and countries other than the United States;
and
!
China’s foreign or economic policy, U.S. defense policy toward
Taiwan, or the political likelihood of a military conflict involving
China and the United States over Taiwan or some other issue.
Other CRS reports address some of these issues.
Terminology
For convenience, this report uses the term China’s naval modernization, even
though some of the military modernization efforts that could affect required U.S.
Navy capabilities are occurring in other parts of China’s military, such as the air force
or the missile force.
China’s military is formally called the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA. Its
navy is called the PLA Navy, or PLAN, and its air force is called the PLA Air Force,
or PLAAF. The PLA Navy includes an air component that is called the PLA Naval
Air Force, or PLANAF. China refers to its ballistic missile force as the Second
Artillery Force.
Sources
Sources of information for this report, all of which are unclassified, include the
following:
!
5
the 2007 edition DOD’s annual report to Congress on China’s
military power, which was released on May 25, 2007, and previous
annual editions of this report;5
U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report To Congress [on] Military Power of the
People’s Republic of China, 2007. Washington, Office of the Secretary of Defense, released
May 25, 2007. (Hereafter cited as 2007 DOD CMP.) Previous annual editions cited
similarly.
CRS-4
!
the 2004 edition of Worldwide Maritime Challenges, a publication
of the U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI);6
!
China’s 2006 and 2004 defense white papers;7
!
the prepared statements and transcript of a July 27, 2005, hearing on
China grand strategy and military modernization before the House
Armed Services Committee;8
!
the prepared statements for March 16, 2006, and September 15,
2005, hearings on China’s military modernization before the U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission, an advisory
body created by the FY2001 defense authorization act (P.L. 106398) and subsequent legislation,9 and the prepared statements and
published transcript of a similar hearing before the commission on
February 6, 2004;10
!
a 2007 report on China’s military antiaccess strategies and a 2005
report on China’s defense industry, both by the RAND
Corporation;11
!
a 2003 report on China’s military power by an independent task
force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations;12
6
U.S. Department of the Navy, Worldwide Maritime Challenges 2004, Washington,
prepared by the Office of Naval Intelligence. (Hereafter cited as 2004 ONI WMC.)
7
The white papers are entitled China’s National Defense in 2006 and China’s National
Defense in 2004. (Hereafter cited as 2006 China White Paper and 2004 China White
Paper.) The English-language texts of the papers can be found on the Internet at
[http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/wp2006.html] and
[http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/natdef2004.html].
8
Transcript hereafter cited as 7/27/05 HASC hearing.
9
Hereafter cited as 3/16/06 USCC hearing and 9/15/05 USCC hearing. The Commission’s
website, which includes these and other past hearings, is at [http://www.uscc.gov].
10
Hearing On Military Modernization and Cross-Strait Balance, Hearing Before the U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 6, 2004. Washington, U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 2004. (Hereafter cited as 2/6/04 USCC hearing. )
11
Roger Cliff et al., Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their
Implications for the United States. Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, 2007. 129 pp.
(MG-524-AF, RAND Project Air Force.) Evan S. Medeiros et al., A New Direction for
China’s Defense Industry. Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, 2005. 304 pp. (MG334, RAND Project Air Force.) (Hereafter cited as 2007 RAND report and 2005 RAND
report.)
12
Chinese Military Power, Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council
on Foreign Relations Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies. Washington,
2003. (Harold Brown, Chair, Joseph W. Prueher, Vice Chair, Adam Segal, Project Director)
(Hereafter cited as 2003 CFR task force report.)
CRS-5
!
open-source military reference sources such as the Jane’s
Information Group; and
!
journal articles and news articles, including articles from the defense
trade press.13
Background
China’s Naval Modernization
Maritime-Relevant Elements of China’s Military Modernization14.
This section summarizes elements of China’s military modernization that may have
implications for required U.S. Navy capabilities. See Appendix A for additional
details and commentary on several of these modernization activities.
Theater-Range Ballistic Missiles (TBMs). One of the most prominent
elements of China’s military modernization has been the deployment of large
numbers of theater-range ballistic missiles (TBMs)15 capable of attacking targets in
Taiwan or other regional locations. Among these are CSS-6 and CSS-7 short-range
ballistic missiles (SRBMs) deployed in locations across from Taiwan. DOD states
that China as of October 2006 had deployed 875 to 975 CSS-6 and CSS-7 TBMs, and
that this total is increasing at a rate of more than 100 missiles per year.16
Although ballistic missiles in the past have traditionally been used to attack
fixed targets on land, DOD and other observers believe China is developing TBMs
equipped with maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) capable of hitting moving
ships at sea. In January 2007, the Director of National Intelligence stated:
The Chinese are developing more capable long-range conventional strike systems
and short- and medium-range ballistic missiles with terminally guided
maneuverable warheads able to attack US carriers and airbases.17
Observers have expressed strong concern about this development, because such
missiles, in combination with broad-area maritime surveillance and targeting
13
An additional source of reference information on China’s navy, particularly with regard
to its organization, leadership, political system, doctrine, and training is, U.S. Department
of the Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, China’s Navy 2007, Washington, 2007. 130 pp.
14
Unless otherwise indicated, shipbuilding program information in this section is taken from
Jane’s Fighting Ships 2006-2007.2007-2008, and previous editions Other sources of information on
these shipbuilding
programs may disagree regarding projected ship commissioning dates or
other details, but
sources present similar overall pictures regarding PLA Navy shipbuilding.
15
Depending on their ranges, TBMs can be divided into short-, medium-, and intermediaterange ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs, respectively).
16
17
2007 DOD CMP, pp. 3 and 42.
Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence, January 11, 2007,
John D. Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence, p. 10.
CRS-6
systems, would permit China to attack moving U.S. Navy ships in the Western
Pacific. The U.S. Navy has not previously faced a threat from highly accurate
ballistic missiles capable of hitting moving ships at sea. Due to their ability to
change course, MaRVs would be more difficult to intercept than non-maneuvering
ballistic missile reentry vehicles. DOD states that:
To prevent deployment of naval forces into western Pacific waters, PLA
planners are focused on targeting surface ships at long ranges. Analyses of
current and projected force structure improvements suggest that in the near term,
China is seeking the capacity to hold surface ships at risk through a layered
defense that reaches out to the “second island chain” (i.e., the islands extending
south and east from Japan, to and beyond Guam in the western Pacific Ocean).
One area of apparent investment emphasis involves a combination of mediumrange ballistic missiles, C4ISR for geo-location of targets, and onboard guidance
systems for terminal homing to strike surface ships on the high seas or their
onshore support infrastructure. This capability would have particular
significance, owing to the preemptive and coercive options it would provide
China in a regional crisis.18
According to a 2005 press report, “navy officials project [that such missiles]
could be capable of targeting US warships from sometime around 2015.”19 A July
2007 press report states that another observer believes that a MARV-equipped
version of the CSS-6 may be close to initial operational status.20 The CSS-6 is also
known as the DF-21, and the MARV-equipped version has been referred to as the
DF-21C.21
Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs). China is developing land-attack
cruise missiles (LACMs) that can be fired from land bases, land-based aircraft, or
Navy platforms such as submarines to attack targets, including air and naval bases,
in Taiwan or other regional locations, such as Japan or Guam. DOD states that
“First- and second-generation LACMs may be deployed in the near future.”22 The
18
2007 DOD CMP, pp. 16-17. DOD also states: “China continues to explore the use of
ballistic and cruise missiles for anti-access missions, including counter-carrier and land
attack, and is working on reconnaissance and communication systems to improve command,
control, and targeting.” (2007 DOD CMP, p. 3.)
19
Yihong Chang and Andrew Koch, “Is China Building A Carrier?” Jane’s Defence Weekly,
August 17, 2005.
20
Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring,” Washington Times, July 20, 2007: 6. (Item entitled “New
Chinese Missiles”). The article stated that it was reporting information from forthcoming
report on China’s military from the International Assessment and Strategy Center authored
by Richard Fisher.
21
The MARV-equipped version of the missile was referred to as the DF-21C in a briefing
by Robert O. Work and Thomas P. Ehrhard of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments (CSBA) presented on July 11, 2007, in room S-211 of the Capitol, entitled
“The Unmanned Combat Air System Carrier Demonstration Program: A New Dawn for
Naval Aviation?”
22
2007 DOD CMP, p. 17.
CRS-7
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) stated in 2005 that “We judge that by 2015,
[China] will have hundreds of highly accurate air- and ground-launched LACMs.”23
Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs). China is modernizing its extensive
inventory of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), which can be launched from landbased strike fighters and bombers, surface combatants, submarines and possibly
shore-based launchers. Among the most capable of the new ASCMs that have been
or are being acquired by the PLA Navy are the Russian-made SS-N-22 Sunburn
(carried by China’s four Russian-made Sovremenny-class destroyers) and the SS-N27 Sizzler (carried by eightat least 8 of China’s 12 Russian-made Kilo-class submarines). DOD
DOD states that “The pace of [China’s] indigenous ASCM research, development and
and production — and of foreign procurement — has accelerated over the past
decade.”24
Surface-To-Air Missiles (SAMs). China is deploying modern surface-to-air
missile (SAM) systems across from Taiwan, including long-range and high-altitude
systems that have an advertised range sufficient to cover the entire Taiwan Strait,
which is roughly 100 nautical miles (185 kilometers) wide. Advanced SAMs may
have some effectiveness against stealthy aircraft. Longer- and shorter- range SAM
systems deployed along China’s coast opposite Taiwan would in combination give
China a multilayer defense against enemy aircraft seeking to operate over the Strait
or approach that portion of China’s coast.25
Land-Based Aircraft. China is introducing increasing numbers of modern
and capable (so-called fourth-generation) fighters and strike fighters into the PLA Air
Force and PLA Naval Air Force. These include Russian-made Su-27s and Su-30s
and indigenously produced FB-7s, F-10s, and F-11s. At least some of the strike
fighters will be armed with modern ASCMs. China is also upgrading the ASCMs
carried by its land-based maritime bombers. The effectiveness of China’s combat
aircraft could be enhanced by new support aircraft, including tankers and airborne
warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft.
23
Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Vice Admiral
Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement for the
Record [before the] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 16 February 2005, p. 13. See
also Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Vice Admiral
Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement For the
Record [before the] Senate Armed Services Committee, 17 March 2005, p. 13.
24
2007 DOD CMP, p. 17. For a recent article discussing China’s ASCMs, see Robert
Hewson, “Dragon’s Teeth — Chinese Missiles Raise Their Game,” Jane’s Navy
International, January/February 2007: 19-23.
25
See, for example, Figure 7 (the map entitled “Taiwan Strait SAM coverage”) in 2007
DOD CMP, p. 31.
CRS-8
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). DOD states that “acquisition of
UAVs and UCAVs,26 including the Israeli HARPY [UCAV], expands China’s
options for long-range reconnaissance and strike.”27
Submarines. China’s submarine modernization effort has attracted
substantial attention and concern.28 The effort in recent years has involved the
acquisition of at least five classes of submarines, making it, in terms of number of
designs involved, one of the more ambitious submarine-acquisition efforts on record
by any country. China by the end of 2006 completed taking delivery on eight
Russian-made Kilo-class non-nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSs) that are in
addition to four Kilos that China purchased from Russia in the 1990s,29 and is
building four other classes of submarines, including the following:
!
a new nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) design
called the Jin class or Type 094;
!
a new nuclear powered attack submarine (SSN) design called the
Shang class or Type 093;
!
a new SS design called the Yuan class or Type 041; and
!
another (and also fairly new) SS design called the Song class or
Type 039/039G.
These five classes of Along with the Kilo-class boats, these four classes of indigenously built
submarines are expected to be much more modern and
capable than China’s aging
older-generation submarines.
As shown in Table 1, China commissioned one to three new submarines per
year between 1995 and 2004. EightSeven new submarines (including fivefour Kilos) were
commissioned in 2005, and seven new submarines (including three Kilos) were
commissioned in 2006.30
, and one new submarine was commissioned in 2007.
26
UCAV means unmanned combat aerial vehicle (i.e., an armed UAV).
27
2007 DOD CMP, p. 18. The report states further that “The Israelis transferred HARPY
UCAVs to China in 2001 and conducted maintenance on HARPY parts during 2003-2004.
In 2005, Israel began to improve government oversight of exports to China by strengthening
controls of military exports, establishing controls on dual-use exports, and increasing the
role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in export-related decisions.” (Page 28)
28
For a detailed discussion of China’s submarine modernization program and a strong
expression of concern regarding the implications of this effort for Taiwan and the United
States, see the statement of Lyle J. Goldstein and William Murray as printed in 2/6/04
USCC hearing, pp. 129-156. Goldstein and Murray’s written statement was also published
as a journal article; see Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “Undersea Dragons, China’s
Maturing Submarine Force,” International Security, Spring 2004, pp. 161-196. See also
Richard R. Burgess, “Sub Reliance,” Seapower, February 2007: 20-22.
29
A previous CRS report discussed these four Kilo-class boats at length. See CRS Report
RL30700, China’s Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions: Background and Analysis, by
Shirley Kan (Coordinator), Christopher Bolkcom, and Ronald O’Rourke.
30
Some sources project that the final Kilos would be delivered in 2007 rather than 2006.
CRS-9
PLA Navy submarines are armed with one or more of the following: ASCMs,
wire-guided and wake-homing torpedoes, and mines. China’s eight recently
delivered Kilos are reportedly armed with the highly capable SS-N-27 Sizzler
ASCM.3130 China’s four older Kilos reportedly are to be refitted in Russia, with the
upgrades likely to include the installation of the SS-N-27.
Although ASCMs are often highlighted as sources of concern, wake-homing
torpedoes can also be very difficult for surface ships to counter. In addition to some
combination of ASCMs, torpedoes, and mines, Jin-class SSBNs will carry a new type
of submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), and Shang-class SSNs may carry
LACMs.
China’s submarine modernization effort is producing a substantially more
modern and capable submarine force. As shown in Table 1, observers expect China
to have a total of 28 Shang, Kilo, Yuan, and Song class submarines in commission
by the end of 2007.
Although China’s aging Ming- and Romeo-class submarines are based on old
technology and
are much less capable than the PLA Navy’s newer-design
submarines, China may
decide that these older boats have continued value as
minelayers or as bait or decoy
submarines that can be used to draw out enemy
submarines (such as U.S. SSNs) that
can then be attacked by more modern PLA
Navy submarines.32
ONI states that “Chinese diesel submarine force levels are stabilizing as quality
replaces quantity,” and has published a graph accompanying this statement
suggesting that the figure may stabilize at a level between 25 and 50.33
31 Navy submarines.31
30
There are also reports that the Kilos might also be armed with the Shkval, a Russian-made,
supercavitating, high-speed torpedo, and that China might be building its own
supercavitating torpedoes. (Statement of Lyle J. Goldstein and William Murray as printed
in 2/6/04 USCC hearing, p. 139.) A supercavitating torpedo surrounds itself with an
envelope of gas bubbles, which dramatically reduces its resistance as it moves through the
water, thereby permitting very high underwater speeds. The Shkval has a reported speed of
200 knots or more.
3231
One observer states that
older and less sophisticated submarines will likely be employed to screen the
higher-value assets. Chinese sources openly describe using certain submarines
as “bait.” Employing this tactic, it is conceivable that United States submarines
could reveal their own presence to lurking Kilos by executing attacks against
nuisance Mings and Romeos. No wonder China continues to operate the
vessels, which are widely derided as obsolete by Western observers. The threat
from these older submarines cannot be dismissed out of hand. Informal United
States Navy testimony suggests that the PLAN can operate the older classes of
diesel submarines with surprising tactical efficiency. (Statement of Lyle J.
Goldstein and William Murray as printed in 2/6/04 USCC hearing, p. 153)
33
2004 ONI WMC, p. 11. The range of 25 to 50 is based on visual inspection of the graph.
CRS-10
Table 1. PLA Navy Submarine Commissionings
Actual (1995-2004) and Projected (2005-2010)
Jin
(Type
094)
SSBN
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Shang
(Type
093)
SSN
Kilo SS
(Russianmade)
Yuan
(Type
041) SS
Song
(Type
039) SS
2b
1
1
2
2
1b
1b
1
2
1
e
1
1e
1e
1
1d
n/a
n/a
n/a
5
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
1
4
3
Ming
(Type
035) SSa
1
1
n/a
n/a
2
3
3
2c
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
2
3
3
2c
1
1
1
Total
3
1
2
3
2
1
3
1
2
3
8
7
$1
$24
7
7
1
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships 2006-20072007-2008, and previous editions.
Note: n/a = data not available.
a. Figures for Ming-class boats are when the boats were launched (i.e., put into the water for final
construction). Actual commissioning dates for these boats may have been later.
b. First four boats, commissioned in the 1990s, are to be refitted in Russia; upgrades are likely to
include installation of SS-N-27 ASCM.
c. Unclear whether there will be any additional boats beyondNo further units expected after the 12th and 13th shown for 2006.
d. Construction of a third ship (possibly to a modified design) may have started but has not been
confirmed. A total of 5five boats is
expected.
e. Additional units are expected, perhaps at two-year intervals. A total of 4 to 6four boats is expected.
One One
news article, citing information from the Office of Naval Intelligence, states that a total of 5 are
five
are expected. (Bill Gertz, “China Expands Sub Fleet,” Washington Times, March 2, 2007.)
n/a = data not available.
CRS-11
ONI stated in 2004 that “Chinese diesel submarine force levels are stabilizing
as quality replaces quantity,” and published a graph accompanying this statement
suggesting that the figure may stabilize at a level between 25 and 50.32
Another set of observers states:
In order to grasp the energy that China is now committing to undersea
warfare, consider that during 2002-2004 China’s navy launched thirteen
submarines while simultaneously undertaking the purchase of submarines from
Russia on an unprecedented scale. Indeed, China commissioned thirty-one new
submarines between 1995 and 2005. Given this rapid evolution, appraisals of
China’s capability to fi eldfield competent and lethal diesel submarines in the littorals
have slowly changed from ridicule to grudging respect of late. China’s potential
for complex technological development is fi nally being taken seriously abroad.34
34
Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, “China’s Future Submarine Force: Insights
From Chinese Writings,” Naval War College Review, Winter 2007: 55.
CRS-11
33
Another observer states:
Looking ahead, further modern conventional boats are expected to be constructed
as the 27 older and less capable units (Romeo and Ming classes) are paid off
[i.e., retired] and, while predictions are hazardous, an overall force level of about
40-50 boats is expected.34
Another observer states:
China’s submarine fleet is now considered the PLAN’s most “potent
strength.” Since 1995, the PLAN has commissioned about 31 new submarines,
including two nuclear-powered submarines based on advanced Russian
technology. Eight submarines were commissioned in 2005, and seven were
commissioned in 2006, including new Song-class boats and a Yuan-class boat
heavily inspired by Russia’s Amur-class sub with its anechoic tile coatings and
quiet seven-bladed skewed propeller. The reported incorporation of
“air-independent propulsion” systems that permit submarines to operate
underwater for up to 30 days would make the Song and Yuan submarines
virtually undetectable to existing U.S. surveillance networks.
In addition, China has three new nuclear-powered submarine design and
construction programs. The Type-093 Shang-class nuclear attack boat and the
Type-094 Jin-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine programs are underway.
Two Shang submarines are deployed, and three are under construction, and five
Jin-class ballistic missile submarines are reportedly under construction. Five
Type-095 submarines, a larger version of the Shang/Jin hull, are also under
development.60 Together with its procurement program for improved Russianmade Kilo-class submarines, China has at least six new submarine programs
under way simultaneously — a submarine development campaign that is
unprecedented in peacetime. China will have at least 34 advanced submarines
deployed in the Pacific by 2010 — some analysts expect as many as 50 to 60 —
32
2004 ONI WMC, p. 11. The range of 25 to 50 is based on visual inspection of the graph.
33
Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, “China’s Future Submarine Force: Insights
From Chinese Writings,” Naval War College Review, Winter 2007: 55.
34
Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007-2008, p. 31 (Executive Overview).
CRS-12
assuming that those under construction will be completed within three years.
China will certainly have over 60 advanced submarines by 2020.35
Another observer states:
Although China is modernizing its submarine force, it is not “expanding”
it. Since the mid-1980s, the force has been in steady decline from nearly 120
boats to roughly 55 operational submarines today. The U.S. Navy expects the
force will level out around 40 boats in the next decade.
The decline of the submarine fleet is part of a transition where large older
classes are being phased out and replaced with newer but less numerous
submarine classes.36
Although China is modernizing its submarine force through the construction of
new boats, one report, citing U.S. Navy data, shows the annual rate of Chinese
submarine patrols to be relatively low. As shown in Table 2, over the last five years,
according to this report, China’s submarine force has conducted an average total of
2.4 individual submarine patrols per year.
35
John J. Tkacik, Jr., China’s Quest for a Superpower Military, Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 2036, May 17, 2007, pp. 9-10. A footnote at the end of this quoted
passage states: “Including at least five Type-94 Jins, five Type-093 Shangs, five Type-095s,
one Yuan, 13 Songs, and 13 Kilo 877s and 636s.”
36
Federation of American Scientists (FAS), “China’s Submarine Fleet Continues Low Patrol
Rate,” published online at [http://fas.org/blog/ssp/2007/02/].
CRS-12
Table 2. Chinese Submarine Patrols Per Year, 1981-2006
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
1
94
1
0
95
1
2
96
1
2
97
2
2
98
3
1
99
2
1
00
6
5
01
3
2
02
4
0
03
3
1
04
3
1
05
0
0
06
2
Source: Federation of American Scientists (FAS), “China’s Submarine Fleet Continues Low
Patrol Patrol
Rate,” published online at [http://fas.org/blog/ssp/2007/02/]. FAS states in the online
article that it
received the data from the U.S. Navy under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA).
The Federation of American Scientists (FAS), which published the figures
shown in Table 2, states:
China’s entire submarine fleet conducted only two patrols in 2006,
according to information declassified by the U.S. Navy and obtained by the
Federation of American Scientists under the Freedom of Information Act. The
low patrol rate follows a drop from an all-time high of only six patrols in 2000
to none in 2005. China’s single sea-launched ballistic missile submarine Xia, the
data shows, has never conducted a deterrent patrol.
The low level of Chinese submarine patrols is a curious contrast to
warnings by the Pentagon, some private institutes and news media that China is
35
John J. Tkacik, Jr., China’s Quest for a Superpower Military, Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 2036, May 17, 2007, pp. 9-10. A footnote at the end of this quoted
passage states: “Including at least five Type-94 Jins, five Type-093 Shangs, five Type-095s,
one Yuan, 13 Songs, and 13 Kilo 877s and 636s.”
36
Federation of American Scientists (FAS), “China’s Submarine Fleet Continues Low Patrol
Rate,” published online at [http://fas.org/blog/ssp/2007/02/].
CRS-13
expanding its submarine operations deeper into the Pacific. Although Chinese
submarines occasionally venture into the waters around Japan and Taiwan, the
fleet is surprisingly inactive.
Since 1981, the first year for which patrol data is available, the Chinese
submarine force has conducted an average of less than two patrols per year. The
highest number of annual patrols conducted since 1981 was six patrols in 2000.
In four years (1982, 1990, 1993 and 2005), no patrols were conducted at all.
Over the 25-year period, the trend is that patrols have only increased from one
per year to approximately 2.8 patrols per year....
If one assumes that U.S. Naval Intelligence’s use of the term “patrol”
follows the DOD’s definitions, then the declassified patrol data suggests that
Chinese general purpose submarines in 2006 twice conducted investigations to
detect other submarines, participated in naval defense operations in coastal or
outside coastal areas, or deployed for the purpose of gathering information or
harassing. That implies an almost dormant submarine fleet....
One of the two patrols conducted in 2006 appears to have been the widely
reported surfacing of a Song-class diesel-electric submarine near the U.S. aircraft
carrier USS Kitty Hawk in the South China Sea. The news media and pundits
dramatized the incident as an example of China expanding its submarine
operations, the Chinese government downplayed the reports as inaccurate, and
the Pentagon said the media made too much of the incident....
The new [Chinese] submarines are more capable than the ones they replace, but
the modernization has not resulted in an increase in the number of submarine
patrols. On the contrary, during the period between 2000 and 2006, when China
CRS-13
acquired a dozen new Kilo and Song class submarines, the number of patrols
declined from six to two (with no patrols at all in 2005)....
The implications of the low patrol rate are significant. The total operational
experience for the entire Chinese submarine force is only 49 patrols in 25 years,
corresponding to each submarine conducting an average of one patrol every third
year.
As a result, Chinese submarine crews appear to have relatively little
operational experience and consequently limited skills in operating their boats
safely and competently. It suggests that the tactical skills that would be needed
for the Chinese submarine force to operate effectively in a war may be limited.
China continues — at least for now — to use its submarine force as a
coastal defense force.37
Another observer, expressing a different view on the issue of the frequency of
Chinese submarine patrols, states that “Chinese submarines slip out into open seas
from underwater tunnels and are virtually undetectable.” Regarding an October 2006
incident involving a Song-class SS that surfaced near the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty
Hawk while it was operating near Okinawa, this observer states that after the
37
Federation of American Scientists (FAS), “China’s Submarine Fleet Continues Low Patrol
Rate,” published online at [http://fas.org/blog/ssp/2007/02/].
CRS-14
submarine was detected on the surface, the submarine “submerged and disappeared,
defeating all U.S. anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts to detect it.” The observer
states that
The ease with which the submarine maneuvered undetected into Japanese waters
and evaded U.S. and Japan Self Defense Force submarine sensors suggests that
China’s large submarine fleet engages in far more sea patrols than the U.S. has
any hope of tracking.38
Another observer states that the October 2006 incident involving the Song-class
SS was
in contrast to claims that the Chinese submarine fleet conducted only two patrols
in 2006, according to information declassified by the U.S. Navy and obtained by
the Federation of American Scientists under the Freedom of Information Act.
Such relative inactivity seems at first extraordinary but can at least partly be
explained by probable ambiguity about what constitutes a “patrol.” However, a
more obvious reason is that half of China’s 26 modern (Yuan, Song, Kilo class)
submarines have entered service since 2004 and it would be surprising if it was
not proving difficult to build up the necessary levels of training and experience
before more frequent out-of-area deployments can be undertaken.39
Aircraft Carriers. The issue of whether and when China might deploy one
or more aircraft carriers, and what the design and capabilities of Chinese aircraft
carriers might be, has been a topic of discussion among government and nongovernment observers for the last several years. DOD states that:
In October 2006, Lieutenant General Wang Zhiyuan, vice chairman of the
Science and Technology Commission of the PLA’s General Armament
Department stated that the “Chinese army will study how to manufacture aircraft
carriers so that we can develop our own .... [A]ircraft carriers are indispensable
if we want to protect our interests in oceans.”
China first began to discuss developing an indigenous aircraft carrier in the
late 1970s. In 1985, China purchased the Australian carrier the HMAS
Melbourne. Although the hull was scrapped, Chinese technicians studied the ship
and built a replica of its flight deck for pilot training. China purchased two
former Soviet carriers — the Minsk in 1998 and the Kiev in 2000. Neither carrier
37
Federation of American Scientists (FAS), “China’s Submarine Fleet Continues Low Patrol
Rate,” published online at [http://fas.org/blog/ssp/2007/02/].
38
John J. Tkacik, Jr., China’s Quest for a Superpower Military, Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 2036, May 17, 2007, pp. 9 and 10.
CRS-14
was made operational; instead, they were used as floating military theme parks.
Nevertheless, both provided design information to PLA Navy engineers.
In 1998 China purchased the ex-Varyag, a Kuznetsov-class Soviet carrier
that was only 70 percent complete at the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse.
Recent deck refurbishment, electrical work, fresh hull paint with PLA Navy
markings, and expressed interest in Russia’s Su-33 fighter has re-kindled debate
about a Chinese carrier fleet. The PLA’s ultimate intentions for the Varyag
remain unclear, but a number of possibilities exist: turning it into an operational
38
John J. Tkacik, Jr., China’s Quest for a Superpower Military, Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 2036, May 17, 2007, pp. 9 and 10.
39
Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007-2008, p. 31 (Executive Overview).
CRS-15
aircraft carrier, a training or transitional platform, or a floating theme park — its
originally-stated purpose.
Regardless of Beijing’s final objective for the ex-Varyag, PLA Navy study
of the ship’s structural design could eventually assist China in creating its own
carrier program. Lieutenant General Wang stated that, “we cannot establish a real
naval force of aircraft carriers within three or fi vefive years.” Some analysts in and
out of government predict that China could have an operational carrier by the end
of the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015); others assess the earliest it could deploy
an operational aircraft carrier is 2020 or beyond.39
The question of China’s potential development and acquisition of aircraft
carriers is discussed at length in an article in the Autumn 2006 issue of the Naval
War College Review.40
Surface Combatants. China since the early 1990s has purchased four
Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia and deployed eight new classes of
indigenously built destroyers and frigates that demonstrate a significant
modernization of PLA Navy surface combatant technology. The introduction of
eight new destroyer and frigate designs over a period of about 15 years is an
undertaking with few parallels by any country in recent decades. China has also
deployed a new 40
Another observer projects that China will return the Varyag to service in 2008,
possibly under the name Shi Lang, and that the ship might become fully operational
as an aviation training ship in 2010:
Procurement of an aircraft carrier capability has been a high priority for the
Chinese Navy since the 1990s. Ex-Varyag, the second of the Kuznetsov class
(the first of class, Admiral Kuznetsov, remains in service in the Russian Navy)
was between 70 and 80 per cent complete by early 1993 when building was
terminated after an unsuccessful attempt by the Russian Navy to fund
completion. Subsequently the ship was bought by China and, having been towed
through the Bosporus on 2 November 2001, arrived at Dalian in March 2002.
Since then, there have been conflicting reports about Chinese plans for the ship
but, following its emergence from dock in mid-2005 painted in military colours,
it is likely that it is intended to bring the ship into operational service. Work in
2006 included the apparent application of a non-skid surface to the flight deck.
Reports in November 2006 that China was negotiating to procure up to 50
Sukhoi Su-33 fighters was a further indicator of Chinese intentions. A further
major docking period is probably required to fit shafts and/or propellors and to
complete survey and renovation of hull fittings....
Initial sea trials are expected to start in 2008 after which an extensive
period of trials and training is likely to follow. It is unlikely that the ship will
begin operational flying training until about 2010. The ship’s (unconfirmed)
pennant number [83] suggests that her initial status will be as a training ship. The
aircraft inventory is not yet known but is likely to comprise a mixture of
Russian-built fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. The ship’s name has also not
been confirmed; Admiral Shi Lang was commander-in-chief of the Manchu fleets
which conquered Taiwan in 1681.41
40
2007 DOD CMP, pp. 22-24. Brackets and ellipses as in the original.
41
Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007-2008, p. 122. This source similarly states at another point that
work being done on
the ex-Russian carrier Varyag (possibly to be named Shi Lang), continued at
Dalian during 2006 and there now seems little doubt that the ship is destined to
become the first Chinese aircraft carrier. The announcement in October 2006 by
Rosoboronexport, Russia’s arms export agency, that the Chinese government was
in negotiations to buy up to 50 Su-33 naval fighters was a clear indication of
intentions. A tentative timetable is for the ship to begin sea trials in 2008 with
a view to commencing operational flying training in about 2010. It may be some
years after that before the ship becomes fully operational and its initial status is
CRS-16
The Varyag has an estimated full load displacement of about 58,500 tons,
compared with about 100,000 tons for a U.S. Navy Nimitz (CVN-68) class aircraft
carrier, about 42,000 tons for the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle (which
was commissioned in 2001), and about 65,000 tons to 70,000 tons for aircraft carriers
that the United Kingdom and France plan to commission into service between 2013
and 2016. It is estimated that the Varyag can embark an air wing of 18 Su-33 Flanker
fighters, compared with 70 or more aircraft on a Nimitz-class carrier, 36 aircraft on
the Charles de Gaulle, and 40 to 45 aircraft on the future UK and French carriers.
The question of China’s potential development and acquisition of aircraft
carriers is discussed at length in an article in the Autumn 2006 issue of the Naval
War College Review.42
Surface Combatants. China since the early 1990s has purchased four
Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia and deployed nine new classes of
indigenously built destroyers and frigates that demonstrate a significant
modernization of PLA Navy surface combatant technology. The introduction of nine
new destroyer and frigate designs over a period of about 15 years is an undertaking
with few parallels by any country in recent decades. China has also deployed a new
kind of fast attack craft that uses a stealthy catamaran hull design.
Sovremenny-Class Destroyers. China in 1996 ordered two Sovremennyclass destroyers from Russia; the ships entered service in 1999 and 2001. China in
2002 ordered two additional Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia; the ships
entered service in 2005 and 2006. Sovremenny-class destroyers are equipped with
the SS-N-22 Sunburn ASCM, anothera highly capable ASCM.4143 DOD says the two
ships ships
ordered in 2002 “are fitted with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and
wide-area air
defense systems that feature qualitative improvements over the [two]
earlier earlier
SOVREMENNYY-class DDGs China purchased from Russia.42 China
reportedly 44 China reportedly
has an option for another two Sovremenny-class ships.
39
2007 DOD CMP, pp. 22-24. Brackets and ellipses as in the original.
40
Five New Indigenously Built Destroyer Classes. China since the early
1990s has built five new classes of destroyers. Compared to China’s 16 older Luda
(Type 051) class destroyers, which entered service between 1971 and 1991, these five
new destroyer classes are substantially more modern in terms of their hull designs,
propulsion systems, sensors, weapons, and electronics. A key area of improvement
in the new destroyer designs is their anti-air warfare (AAW) technology,45 which has
likely to be as a training ship and as a test-bed for the development of China’s
indigenous carrier programme.
(Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007-2008, p. 31 [Executive Overview])
42
Andrew S. Erickson and Andrew R. Wilson, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Dilemma,” Naval
War College Review, Autumn 2006: 13-45.
4143
A previous CRS report discussed the PLA Navy’s first two Sovremenny-class destroyers
and their SS-N-22 ASCMs at length. See CRS Report RL30700, op. cit.
4244
45
2007 DOD CMP, p. 3. The DOD report spells Sovremenny with two “y”s at the end.
CRS-15
Five New Indigenously Built Destroyer Classes. China since the early
1990s has built five new classes of destroyers. Compared to China’s 16 older Luda
(Type 051) class destroyers, which entered service between 1971 and 1991, these 5
new destroyer classes are substantially more modern in terms of their hull designs,
propulsion systems, sensors, weapons, and electronics. A key area of improvement
in the new destroyer designs is their anti-air warfare (AAW) technology,43 which has
AAW is a term most frequently found in discussions of naval systems. Discussions of
systems in other military services tend to use the term air defense.
CRS-17
been a significant PLA Navy shortcoming. Like the older Luda-class destroyers,
these new destroyer classes are armed with ASCMs.
As shown in Table 3, China to date has commissioned only 1 or 2 ships in each
of these five classes, suggesting that a key purpose of at least some of these classes
may have been to serve as stepping stones in a plan to modernize the PLA Navy’s
surface combatant technology incrementally before committing to larger-scale series
production.4446 If one or more of these designs are put into larger-scale production, it
would accelerate the modernization of China’s surface combatant force.
Table 3. New PLA Navy Destroyer Classes
Class name
Type
Number
built
Hull number(s)
In service (actual or
projected)
Luhu
052
2
112, 113
1994, 1996
Luhai
051B
1
167
1999
Luyang I
052B
2
168, 169
2004
Luyang II
052C
2
170, 171
2004, 2005
Luzhou
051C
2
115, 116
2006, 2007
Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships 2006-20072007-2008.
The Luhu-class ships reportedly were ordered in 1985 but had their
construction delayed by a decision to give priority to the construction of six frigates
43
AAW is a term most frequently found in discussions of naval systems. Discussions of
systems in other military services tend to use the term air defense.
44
that were ordered by Thailand. The Luhai-class ship is believed to have served as
the basis for the Luyang-class designs. Compared to the Luhai, the Luyang I-class
ships appear stealthier. DOD states that the Luyang I design is equipped with the
Russian-made SA-N-7B Grizzly SAM and the Chinese-made YJ-83 ASCM.47
46
One observer states:
It is of note that the Chinese navy has chosen to adopt an incremental approach,
in which only two ships of each class are built, rather than opt for a longer
shipbuilding line with corresponding economies in development and building
costs and equipment commonality. A possible explanation is that the navy is on
a steep learning curve and that, rather than being cautious about the introduction
of new technology, it is keen to ensure that every ship introduced into service
reflects the latest developments.
(Jane’s Fighting Ships 2006-2007, p. 30 (Executive Overview))
Another set of observers states that “China was forced to cancel its production of the Luhu
class of destroyers because the U.S.-made gas turbine engines were no longer available after
the United States imposed export restrictions on military-related goods following the
Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. China’s newest operational destroyers use Ukrainian,
not Chinese, engines.” (2005 RAND report, p. 140.)
CRS-16
that were ordered by Thailand. The Luhai-class ship is believed to have served as
the basis for the Luyang-class designs. Compared to the Luhai, the Luyang I-class
ships appear stealthier. DOD states that the Luyang I design is equipped with the
Russian-made SA-N-7B Grizzly SAM and the Chinese-made YJ-83 ASCM.45
47
2007 DOD CMP, pp. 3-4
CRS-18
The Luyang II-class ships appear to feature an even more capable AAW
system that includes a Chinese-made SAM system called the HHQ-9 that has an even
longer range, a vertical launch system (VLS), and a phased-array radar that is
outwardly somewhat similar to the SPY-1 radar used in the U.S.-made Aegis combat
system. Indeed, the Luyang II-class design bears some resemblance to U.S. and
Japanese Aegis destroyers, though they are probably not as modern or capable in
some respects as the U.S. and Japanese ships.4648
DOD says the Luzhou-class design “is designed for anti-air warfare. It will be
equipped with the Russian SA-N-20 SAM system controlled by the TOMBSTONE
phased-array radar. The SA-N-20 more than doubles the range of current PLA Navy
air defense systems marking a significant improvement in China’s ship-borne air
defense capability.”47
Three49 Both Luzhou-class ships have conducted sea trials and are
expected to enter service during 2007.50
Four New Indigenously Built Frigate Classes. China since the early 1990s
has built threefour new classes of frigates that are more modern than China’s 31 older
Jianghu (Type 053) class frigates, which entered service between the mid-1970s and
1989. The threefour new frigate classes, like the new destroyer classes, feature improved
AAW capabilities. Unlike the new destroyer designs, at least twosome of the new frigate
designs have been put into larger-scale series production. Table 4 summarizes the
three new classes.
Table 4. New PLA Navy Frigate Classes
Class name
Jiangwei I
Jiangwei II
Type
Number
built or
building
Hull number(s)
In service
(actual or
projected)
053G H2G
4
539-542
1991-1994
053H3
10
between 521 and 567
1998-2005
054
2
525, 526
2005
Jiangkai054A
4
530 (lead ship)
2007-2008
Jiangkai I
Jiangkai II
Number
built or
building
Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships 2006-20072007-2008.
Construction of Jiangwei I-class ships appears to have ceased. It is unclear
whether construction of Jiangwei II-class ships will continue after the 10th ship. A
third Jiangkai-class ship may be under construction, but this has not yet been
45
2007 DOD CMP, pp. 3-4
46
The Jiangkai I-class ships feature a stealthy design that somewhat resembles
France’s La Fayette-class frigate, which first entered service in 1996.51 The Jiangkai
II-class ships are a modified version of the Jiangkai I-class design that features a
48
For a detailed article about the Luyang II class, see James C. Bussert, “China Debuts
Aegis Destroyers,” Signal, July 2005, pp. 59-62. See also Fisher 7/27/05 testimony, p. 12.
47
2007 DOD CMP, p. 3.
CRS-17
confirmed.48 The Jiangkai-class ships feature a stealthy design that somewhat
resembles France’s La Fayette-class frigate, which first entered service in 1996.4949
2007 DOD CMP, p. 3.
50
Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007-2008, p. 31 (Executive Overview).
51
France sold a modified version of the La Fayette-class design to Taiwan; the six ships that
Taiwan built to the design entered service in 1996-1998. See also Fisher 7/27/05 testimony,
pp. 12-13.
CRS-19
VLS system for its SAMs. One observer states, “Under construction at two
shipyards, it is likely that this design will be built in sufficient numbers to replace the
ageing Jianghu class frigates.”52
Houbei-Class Fast Attack Craft. In addition to its 190 older fast attack craft
(including 37 armed with ASCMs), China in 2004 introduced a new type of ASCMarmed fast attack craft, called the Houbei class, that uses a stealthy, wave-piercing,
catamaran hull. Observers believe the hull design — one of the more advanced used
by any navy in the world today — is based on a design developed by a firm in
Australia, a country which is a world leader in high-speed catamaran designs. At
least four of these new fast attack craft are now in service. A large number additional
units are expected as replacements for China’s older and less-advanced fast attack
craft, although one observer states that production of the Houbei-class design has not
been as fast as originally expected.”50
Amphibious Ships. China since 2003 has built three new classes of
amphibious ships and landing craft. Each type has been built at three or four
shipyards. Between these three classes, China built a total of 19 amphibious ships
and 10 amphibious landing craft in 2003-2005.
Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Ships. China is building a new class of
mine countermeasures (MCM) ship, called the Wozang class. The first unit was
commissioned in 2005, and a total of 10 to 15 are expected. One observer states that
the Wozang-class design “looks remarkably similar to the 1950s vintage T43 class,”
and that “further units have failed to materialise so far, although minecountermeasures is perhaps the weakest part of the Chinese naval inventory.”51
Naval Mines. Regarding naval mines, ONI states:
China is developing and exporting numerous advanced mines of all types. One
example is the wireless remote controlled EM57, a mine that offers many tactical
options. For example, the mine can be turned off and on remotely to prolong its
48
Jane’s Fighting Ships 2006-2007, also states: “Production of Jiangkai (Type 054) frigates
has paused, possibly due to technical problems, although building of more advanced variants
is expected.” (Page 30 (Executive Overview).)
49
France sold a modified version of the La Fayette-class design to Taiwan; the six ships that
Taiwan built to the design entered service in 1996-1998. See also Fisher 7/27/05 testimony,
pp. 12-13. One observer views the Jiangwei II-class ships as roughly comparable to
France’s Georges Leygues-class destroyer design, which entered service in 1979, Italy’s
Maestrale-class frigate design, which entered service in 1982, and the UK’s Type 21
frigates, which entered service in starting in 1975 and were transferred to Pakistan in 19931994. (Massimo Annati, “China’s PLA Navy, The Revolution,” Naval Forces, No. 6, 2004,
pp. 66-67.)
50
Jane’s Fighting Ships 2006-2007, p. 30 (Executive Overview). See also Fisher 7/27/05
testimony, p. 13; “PRC Appears Ready To Field New Trimaran Fast Missile Warship,”
Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, October 5, 2004; Yihong Chang, “First Sight Of Chinese
Catamaran,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 26, 2004.
51
Jane’s Fighting Ships 2006-2007, p. 30 (Executive Overview)
CRS-18
life, or it can be activated and deactivated to allow safe passage for friendly
vessels.52
DOD stated in 2003 that the PLA’s mines
include bottom and moored influence mines, mobile mines, remotely controlled
mines, command-detonated mines, and propelled-warhead mines. Use of
propelled-warhead mines in deep waters has the potential to deny enemy naval
formations large operational areas.53
DOD stated in 2002 that China “likely has enough mine warfare assets to lay a
good defensive and a modest offensive minefield using a wide variety of launch
platforms.”54The
Houbei class is being built in at least six shipyards. At least 25 were in service as of
2007, and a total of at least 40 are expected.53
Amphibious Ships.
Type 071 Amphibious Ship. China is building a new class of amphibious
ship called the Type 071 class. The design has an estimated displacement of about
17,600 tons, compared with about 15,900 tons to 16,700 tons for the U.S. Navy’s
Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry (LSD-41/49) class amphibious ships, which were
commissioned into service between 1985 and 1998, and about 25,900 tons for the
U.S. Navy’s new San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships, the first of which
was commissioned into service in 2006. The first Type 071 ship is expected to enter
service in 2008. The Type 071 design features a hull with clean, sloped sides — a
design that resembles the hulls of modern western amphibious ships and appears
intended to reduce the ship’s visibility to radar. One observer states:
After several years’ speculation, the existence of the [Type 071]
programme was confirmed when construction of a ship was initiated in
mid-2006. The programme constitutes a key component of the PLA(N)’s plan to
improve its sealift and power projection capabilities. Further ships are
expected....
The principal features of the ship include a large well deck area to
accommodate four Air Cushion Vehicles (ACV) in the aft two-thirds of the ship.
The ACVs are likely to access the ship through a stern gate. The ship may have
to ballast down for operation. There is a large stern helicopter flight deck and a
hangar. An internal garage deck for vehicles may be accessed via side ramps
(port and starboard). There is space for the HQ7 launcher which may be fitted at
a later date....
52
Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007-2008, p. 129. This source states at another point that on
October 12, 2006, China launched (i.e., put into the water for final construction) “the first
of what is expected to be a large class of Jiangkai II [class] ships. Noteworthy features
include a vertical-launch system for the HHQ-16 missile.” (Jane’s Fighting Ships 20072008, p. 31 [Executive Overview].)
53
Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007-2008, p. 31 (Executive Overview) and p. 136. See also
Fisher 7/27/05 testimony, p. 13; “PRC Appears Ready To Field New Trimaran Fast Missile
Warship,” Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, October 5, 2004; Yihong Chang, “First Sight
Of Chinese Catamaran,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 26, 2004.
CRS-20
This ship represents a major enhancement of amphibious capability.54
Report of Potential Type 081 Amphibious Ship. In August 2007, it was
reported that
At the May 2007 IMDEX naval technology show in Singapore, a Chinese
industry source confirmed to Jane’s that China has a programme for a LHD [i.e.,
a large amphibious assault ship], but did not disclose details other than to note:
“We can now build that ship.”
However, late 2006 reports in India’s Force magazine noted that China
would build up to three Type 081 LHD ships and six Type 071 LPD vessels, the
first of which was launched in late December 2006. One Asian military source
has told Jane’s that the flat-deck Type 081 will displace about 20,000 tonnes, and
as such, would be similar in size to the French Mistral LHD.55
There have been no reports so far that China has starting building LHDs.
China’s interest in LHDs has been noted since the late 1990s and would form a
logical compliment to its Type 071 LPDs. Asian military sources put the Type
071 also at about 20,000 tonnes displacement with a capacity to carry up to 800
troops plus scores of armoured vehicles. One Asian military source tells Jane’s
that China could build two to eight Type 071s.56
Other New Amphibious Ships and Landing Craft. In addition to the Type
071 design, China between 2003 and 2005 commissioned into service three new
classes of smaller amphibious ships and landing craft. Each type was built at three
or four shipyards. Between these three other classes, China commissioned into
service a total of 20 amphibious ships and 10 amphibious landing craft in 2003-2005.
Additional units in some of these classes are possible. China also has numerous
older amphibious ships and landing craft of various designs.
Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Ships. China is building one or two new
classes of mine countermeasures (MCM) ships called the Wozang class and the
Wochi class. One observer states that “modernisation plans for the minecountermeasures force are difficult to discern. The first Wozang class [ship] entered
service in 2005 and was expected to replace the [existing] T-43 [class mine warfare
ship]s, albeit that the design looked very similar. This ship was then followed in
2006 by a longer version known a the Wochi class. Little is known about the
capabilities of either vessel.”57
Naval Mines. Regarding naval mines, ONI states:
China is developing and exporting numerous advanced mines of all types. One
example is the wireless remote controlled EM57, a mine that offers many tactical
54
Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007-2008, p. 139.
55
A 20,000-ton LHD would also be about half the size of U.S. Navy LHDs.
56
Richard D. Fisher Jr., “Naval Gazing, Emerging Expeditionary Capabilities in the Western
Pacific,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 2007: 55.
57
Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007-2008, p. 31 (Executive Overview) and p. 136.
CRS-21
options. For example, the mine can be turned off and on remotely to prolong its
life, or it can be activated and deactivated to allow safe passage for friendly
vessels.58
DOD stated in 2003 that the PLA’s mines
include bottom and moored influence mines, mobile mines, remotely controlled
mines, command-detonated mines, and propelled-warhead mines. Use of
propelled-warhead mines in deep waters has the potential to deny enemy naval
formations large operational areas.59
DOD stated in 2002 that China “likely has enough mine warfare assets to lay a
good defensive and a modest offensive minefield using a wide variety of launch
platforms.”60
Another observer stated in a presentation that China has
a large inventory of mines. And we see a tremendous interest in some of the
most modern deadly mines going. These deep water rising mines [on the
projection screen] can be purchased from Russia. They have tremendous ability
to mine deeper waters where we would prefer to operate. So what we would
consider to have been a haven [for U.S. Navy ships] may no longer be a haven.5561
Information Warfare/Information Operations (IW/IO). China opensource writings demonstrate ana strong interest in information warfare (IW), also called
information operations (IO), as an increasingly important element of warfare,
particularly against a sophisticated opposing force such as the U.S. military. Concern
about potential PLA IW/IO capabilities has been heightened by recent press reports
52
58
2004 ONI WMC, p. 19.
5359
2003 DOD CMP, p. 27.
5460
2002 DOD CMP, p. 23. In 2000, DOD stated:
The PLAN’s mine stockpiles include vintage Russian moored-contact and bottom
influence mines, as well as an assortment of domestically built mines. China
currently produces the EM11 bottom-influence mine; the EM31 moored mine;
the EM32 moored influence mine; the EM52 rocket-propelled rising mine; and,
the EM-53 ship-laid bottom influence mine which is remotely controlled by a
shore station. China is believed to have available acoustically activated remote
control technology for its EM53. This technology probably could be used with
other Chinese ship-laid mines including the EM52. Application of this
technology could allow entire mines to be laid in advance of hostilities in a
dormant position and activated or deactivated when required. China reportedly
has completed development of a mobile mine and may be producing improved
variants of Russian bottom mines and moored-influence mines. Over the next
decade, China likely will attempt to acquire advanced propelled-warhead mines,
as well as submarine-launched mobile bottom mines. (Department of Defense,
Annual Report On The Military Power of the People’s Republic Of China, 2000.
Washington, 2000. See the subsection on subsurface warfare.)
5561
Statement of Lyle J. Goldstein and William Murray as printed in 2/6/04 USCC hearing,
p. 133. See also p. 152.
CRS-1922
about attacks on U.S. computer systems that in some cases appear to have originated
in China.5662 One observer has stated that “China even now is planting viruses in U.S.
computer systems that they will activate” in the event of a military conflict with the
United States.5763 DOD states that
There has been much writing on information warfare among China’s
military thinkers, who indicate a strong conceptual understanding of its methods
and uses....
The PLA is investing in electronic countermeasures, defenses against
electronic attack (e.g., electronic and infrared decoys, angle reflectors, and false
target generators), and computer network operations (CNO). China’s CNO
concepts include computer network attack, computer network defense, and
computer network exploitation. The PLA sees CNO as critical to achieving
“electromagnetic dominance” early in a conflict. Although there is no evidence
of a formal Chinese CNO doctrine, PLA theorists have coined the term
“Integrated Network Electronic Warfare” to prescribe the use of electronic
warfare, CNO, and kinetic strikes to disrupt battlefield network information
systems.
The PLA has established information warfare units to develop viruses to
attack enemy computer systems and networks, and tactics and measures to
protect friendly computer systems and networks. In 2005, the PLA began to
incorporate offensive CNO into its exercises, primarily in first strikes against
enemy networks.5864
In January 2007, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency stated:
China has developed an apparent large scale CNO [computer network
operations] program, including military exercises to refine and implement
concepts. China’s robust presence in the global IT [information technology]
hardware and software supply chain enhances its technical expertise and IO
capability. China is the number one IT hardware provider for U.S. consumers,
accounting for 42 percent of U.S. IT hardware imports in 2005. As such, U.S.
dependence on China for certain items critical to the U.S. defense industry and
the waning of U.S. global IT dominance are valid concerns that demand
vigilance.59
5665
62
See 2005 DOD CMP, p. 36; 2003 CFR task force report, pp. 55-56; Peter Brookes, “The
Art Of (Cyber) War, New York Post, August 29, 2005; Bradley Graham, “Hackers Attack
Via Chinese websites,” Washington Post, August 25, 2005: 1; Frank Tiboni, “The New
Trojan War,” Federal Computer Week, August 22, 2005: 60.
5763
Eric McVadon, as quoted in Dave Ahearn, “U.S. Can’t Use Trade Imbalance To Avert
China Invasion Of Taiwan,” Defense Today, August 2, 2005, pp. 1-2.
58
5964
65
2007 DOD CMP, pp. 21-22.
Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Lieutenant General
Michael D. Maples, U.S. Army, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement for the
Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Committee [sic], 11 January 2007, p. 28.
CRS-2023
Nuclear Weapons.6066 China, as a longstanding nuclear weapon state, could
put nuclear warheads on weapons such as TBMs, LACMs, ASCMs, torpedoes, and
naval mines. China could use nuclear-armed versions of these weapons (except the
LACMs) to attack U.S. Navy ships at sea. China might do so in the belief that it
could subsequently confuse the issue in the public arena of whose nuclear warhead
had detonated,6167 or that the United States in any event would not escalate the conflict
by retaliating with a nuclear attack on a land target in China. During the Cold War,
analysts debated whether the use of a Soviet nuclear weapon against U.S. Navy ships
during a conflict would lead to a U.S. nuclear response.
China could also use a nuclear-armed ballistic missile to detonate a nuclear
warhead in the atmosphere to create a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (EMP)
intended to temporarily or permanently disable the electronic circuits of U.S. or other
civilian and military electronic systems. Some observers have expressed concern in
recent years over the potential vulnerability of U.S. military systems to EMP
effects.6268
High-Power Microwave (HPM) Weapons. Some observers are concerned
that China might develop or already possess high-power microwave (HPM) weapons,
also called radio frequency weapons (RFWs) or E-bombs, which are non-nuclear
devices that can be used to generate damaging EMP effects over relatively short
distances to disable the electronic circuits of nearby enemy civilian and military
systems.6369 In theory, an HPM weapon could be placed on a TBM or ASCM and fired
at a U.S. Navy ship. Although the effective EMP radius of such devices might be on
6066
For a general discussion of the potential role of nuclear weapons in notional crisis and
conflict situations involving China, see CRS Report RL33607, U.S. Conventional Forces
and Nuclear Deterrence: A China Case Study, by Christopher Bolkcom, Shirley A. Kan, and
Amy F. Woolf.
6167
Following the April 1, 2001, collision in international airspace off China’s coast of a U.S.
Navy EP-3 electronic surveillance aircraft and a PLA F-8 fighter, which many observers
believed was caused by reckless flying by the pilot of the F-8, China attempted to convince
others that the collision was caused by poor flying by the pilot of the slower-flying and less
maneuverable U.S. EP-3. For more on this event, see CRS Report RL30946, China-U.S.
Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy Implications, by Shirley
A. Kan, coordinator.
6268
See CRS Report RL32544, High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and High Power
Microwave (HPM) Devices: Threat Assessments, by Clay Wilson; (Hereafter cited as CRS
Report RL32544.) and John S. Foster, Jr., et al., Report of the Commission to Assess the
Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, Volume 1: Executive
Report 2004. Washington, 2004, 53 pp. (Hereafter cited as 2004 EMP commission report.)
See also the transcripts and written statements of hearings on EMP held before the House
Armed Services Committee on July 22, 2004, and before the Military Research and
Development Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on October 7, 1999,
and July 16, 1997. (In 1997, the full committee was called the House National Security
Committee.)
6369
For more on HPM weapons, see CRS Report RL32544.
CRS-2124
the order of only a few hundred yards,6470 such devices could be used to attack
individual U.S. Navy ships without the political or escalatory risks of a high-altitude
nuclear detonation.6571
Military Doctrine, Education, Training, Exercises, and Logistics.
Military capability is a product not simply of having weapons, but of having a
doctrine for how to use them, well-educated and well-trained personnel, realistic
exercises, and logistic support. In past years, the PLA was considered weak in some
or all of these areas, and PLA military capability consequently was considered not as
great as its inventory of weapons alone might suggest. The 2004 China defense
white paper statesstated an intention to improve in these areas,6672 and observers believe the
PLA is acting on these intentions. DOD stated in 2005 that “China has stated its
intentions and allocated resources to pursue force-wide professionalization, improve
training, conduct more robust, realistic joint exercises, and accelerate acquisition of
6470
One source states that “a 2,000-pound microwave munition will have a minimum radius
[of effect] of approximately 200 meters,” or roughly 650 feet. (“High-power microwave
(HPM)/E-Bomb,” available on the Internet at [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
systems/munitions/hpm.htm].)
A second source says HPM weapons might have effective radii “on the order of hundreds
of meters, subject to weapon performance and target set electrical hardness.” (Section 4.1
of Carlo Kopp, “The Electromagnetic Bomb — a Weapon of Electrical Mass Destruction,”
available on the Internet at [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/
1996/apjemp.htm].
A third source states that “a small RF device might have a range measured in feet, while a
relatively large RF device might produce upset or damage in electronics systems at a range
measured in hundreds of feet, and interference at a range of hundreds of miles.” (Statement
of William R. Graham, Ph.D., before the Military Research and Development Subcommittee
of the House Armed Services Committee, October 7, 1999.)
6571
One source states that:
An electromagnetic warhead detonated within lethal radius of a surface
combatant will render its air defence system inoperable, as well as damaging
other electronic equipment such as electronic countermeasures, electronic
support measures and communications. This leaves the vessel undefended until
these systems can be restored, which may or may not be possible on the high
seas. Therefore launching an electromagnetic glidebomb on to a surface
combatant, and then reducing it with laser or television guided weapons is an
alternate strategy for dealing with such targets. (Section 10.4 of Carlo Kopp,
“The Electromagnetic Bomb — a Weapon of Electrical Mass Destruction,” op.
cit.)
For additional discussion HPM weapons at sea, see Massimo Annati, “Non-Lethal
Weapons: Their Application in the Maritime World,” Naval Forces, No. 1, 2006,
particularly pages 50, 51, and 53.
6672
See the sections entitled “Reducing the PLA by 200,000,” “Implementing the Strategic
Project for Talented People,” “Intensifying Joint Training,” and “Deepening Logistical
Reforms,” in Chapter II on national defense policy.
CRS-2225
modern weapons.”6773 DOD stated in 2007 that “In June 2006, the PLA released new
guidance to increase realism in training and to expand the use of simulators and
opposing forces in training evolutions.”6874
The PLA in recent years has developed a doctrine for joint operations involving
multiple military services,6975 improved its military education and training and
conducted more realistic exercises,7076 and reformed its logistics system.7177
Improvements in these areas might be considered as important as the weaponmodernization activities discussed above. Some of these improvements may require
several years to fully implement.
China’s Naval Limitations and Weaknesses. In spite of the concerns
raised by the modernization effort described above, observers believe PLA military
(including naval) forces continue to have limitations or weaknesses in the following
areas, among others:
!
sustained operations in waters and air space that are more distant
from China;
!
joint operations;
!
C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) systems, including, for
example, airborne warning and control system (AWACS)
capabilities;
!
long-range surveillance and targeting systems for detecting and
tracking ships at sea — a capability needed to take full advantage of
longer-ranged anti-ship weapons;
!
anti-air warfare (AAW) capability for defending surface ships
against air attack;
!
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability for defending surface ships
against submarine attack;
6773
2005 DOD CMP, p. 26.
6874
2007 DOD CMP, p. 5.
6975
See, for example, 2005 DOD CMP, pp. 5-6; the statement of David M. Finkelstein as
printed in 2/6/04 USCC hearing, p. 90-93; and 2003 CFR task force report, pp. 38-39.
7076
See, for example, [Statement of] Dennis J. Blasko, Independent Consultant, September
15, 2005, Hearing on “Net Assessment of Cross-Strait Military Capabilities” Before the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission; the statement by Lyle J. Goldstein
and William Murray as printed in 2/6/04 USCC hearing, pp. 131-132, 143-145; and 2003
CFR task force report, pp. 39-41, 45-46, 49.
7177
Regarding reformed logistics, see 2005 DOD CMP, p. 34, and the statement of Lyle J.
Goldstein and William Murray as printed in 2/6/04 USCC hearing, p. 145.
CRS-2326
!
mine countermeasures (MCM) capability; and
!
logistics.
The paragraphs below elaborate on these items.
Weaknesses and Limitations in General. Regarding weaknesses and
limitations of China’s military in general, a 2007 report by a task force sponsored by
the Council on Foreign Relations stated that despite advances,
the PLA confronts many obstacles:
• The sophistication of new equipment generally exceeds current joint
command-and-control capabilities.
• Its reliance on a blend of obsolete and modern equipment makes effective
large-scale planning, training, and operations difficult.
• Its dependence on multiple foreign arms suppliers makes it hard to build
efficient supply chains and maintenance regimes.
• It has a shortage of technically knowledgeable, innovative, initiative-taking
personnel who can operate high-tech systems, a deficiency exacerbated by
China’s lack of a professional corps of noncommissioned officers.
• It has little combat experience — Chinese military forces have not been
involved in major combat since 1979, when they performed poorly against
Vietnamese forces.
• It lacks many of the instruments of force projection, including long-range
bombers, aircraft carriers, large airborne units, and the logistics capability to
support and sustain combat forces beyond its borders.
None of these obstacles can be overcome swiftly, and none can be overcome
merely by throwing more money at the problem.7278
Regarding PLA Navy limitations and weaknesses in general, DIA states:
China continues to develop or import modern weapons.... The PLA must
overcome significant integration challenges to turn these new, advanced and
disparate weapon systems into improved capabilities. Beijing also faces
technical and operational difficulties in numerous areas.73
7279
78
Council on Foreign Relations, U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A
responsible Course, Report of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on
Foreign Relations, Washington, 2007, p. 47.
7379
Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Vice Admiral
Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement for the
Record [before the] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 16 February 2005, p. 16. See
also Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Vice Admiral
Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement For the
CRS-2427
Another set of observers states:
The PLAN is limited by a lack of integration in its command, control, and
communication systems; targeting; air defense; and antisubmarine warfare
capabilities. PLAN ships are vulnerable to attack by aircraft, torpedoes, and
antiship missiles. The navies of the ASEAN nations could, if able to operate
together, exclude the PLAN from the South China Sea....
New capabilities are limited by the lack of some critical supporting systems. The
PLAN is deficient in antisubmarine warfare capabilities. PLAN ships are also
vulnerable to air attack by both aircraft and antiship missiles.7480
A separate set of observers states that weaknesses in China’s shipbuilding
industry
are more problematic for naval projects [than for commercial shipbuilding
projects]. Although China is designing and building increasingly sophisticated
warships, Chinese naval shipbuilders still need to import key components or
modules, such as propulsion systems, navigation and sensor suites, and major
weapon systems, to outfit these vessels. Such a reliance on imported subsystems
creates systems-integration challenges, as well as security concerns stemming
from dependence on foreign suppliers. China appears to be improving its ability
to absorb imported equipment and technologies, but it will take time before these
and other problems are overcome.7581
These observers also state that
the capabilities of most of China’s current naval SAM and SSM systems and
much of its naval electronics are limited and not equivalent to U.S. capabilities
or those of other Asian militaries. The limited range and accuracy of Chinese
SSMs and SAMs create serious problems for air-defense and antisubmarine
warfare. Many of these systems also do not operate with over-the-horizon
targeting, further degrading their already-limited capabilities.
Record [before the] Senate Armed Services Committee, 17 March 2005, p. 16.
7480
2003 CFR task force report, pp. 28 and 47.
7581
2005 RAND report, pp. 110-111. On page 153, the report similarly states that
China’s SBI [shipbuilding industry] exhibits a number of limitations and
weaknesses that will constrain naval modernization. Although the design and
construction of vessels have improved, the SBI has experienced numerous
problems producing quality subsystems for both merchant and naval vessels.
Chinese shipbuilders have had to rely heavily on foreign imports for the power
plants, navigation and sensor suites, and key weapon systems for its newest naval
platforms. For example, Chinese marine-engine factories have had difficulties
producing gas turbine engines powerful enough for large destroyers and related
combatants. The last two classes of Chinese destroyers have relied on imported
gas turbine engines, for example. This high degree of reliance on foreign goods
creates major challenges for systems integration and, given the inconsistent
availability of certain weapon systems, complicates serial production of some
platforms.
CRS-2528
Furthermore, few — if any — advances were made in the development and
production of naval propulsion or navigation equipment in the 1980s or 1990s.
This lack continues to be a major weakness in China’s domestic naval production
efforts, and one that the PLAN’s heavy reliance on foreign subsystems for its
second-generation vessels testifies to.7682
Regarding the submarine force, one observer states that
by no means should the PLAN submarine force be considered ten feet tall.
China’s submarine force has some significant weaknesses: a reliance on diesel
submarines that have to approach the surface to snorkel; especially in the wake
of the Ming 361 accident,7783 it is evident that crew training and professionalism
remain a fundamental problem; finally, there is little evidence of a robust, remote
cueing capability, and probable weakness in the sphere of command and
control.7884
Sustained Operations in Distant Waters. Regarding sustained operations
in more distant waters, DOD states: “China’s ability to sustain military power at a
distance, at present, remains limited....”7985 DOD stated in 2005 that:
China does not appear to have broadened its concept of operations for
anti-access and sea denial to encompass sea control in waters beyond Taiwan and
its immediate periphery. If China were to shift to a broader “sea control”
strategy, the primary indicators would include: development of an aircraft carrier,
development of robust anti-submarine warfare capabilities, development of a true
area anti-air warfare capability, acquisition of large numbers of nuclear attack
submarines, development of effective maritime C4ISR, and increased open water
training....
With its present force structure, according to the Intelligence Community,
Chinese surface combatants would have difficulty projecting power into the
Strait of Malacca, especially if it were conducting simultaneous blockade or
7682
2005 RAND report, p. 139-140. On pages 153-154, the report similarly states that
Chinese combatants lack long-range air-defense systems, modern anti —
submarine warfare (ASW) weapons, and advanced electronic warfare capabilities
needed to outfit its new ships. China’s other defense sectors have been slow to
produce modern versions of these crucial technologies beyond copies or
modifications of Soviet or Western systems. For example, Chinese firms have
experienced several delays in the indigenous production of a medium and
long-range SAM system for naval area defense, which has complicated the
completion of some naval projects.... [T]his situation is changing as China’s
defense-industrial complex modernizes. But, some past weaknesses persist and,
over the medium term, they will continue to constrain China’s ability to project
and sustain naval power for extended periods in the coming decade.
7783
This is a reference to an April 2003 fatal accident aboard a Ming-class boat with hull
number 361. See Appendix A for additional details concerning this accident.
7884
Statement of Lyle J. Goldstein and William Murray as printed in 2/6/04 USCC hearing,
p. 156.
7985
2007 DOD CMP, p. I (Executive Summary).
CRS-2629
invasion operations elsewhere. Similarly, although the PLA Navy occasionally
patrols as far as the Spratly Islands, its limited organic air defense capability
leaves surface ships vulnerable to attack from hostile air and naval forces. The
PLA Navy Air Force and PLA Air Force currently lack the operational range to
support PLA Navy operations. In recent years, however, the PLA Navy’s South
Sea Fleet, which has operational responsibility over the South China Sea, has
been assigned more capable surface combatants and submarines, including two
destroyers (one LUDA IV class and one LUHAI class) that provide it with its
first short-range area air-defense capability, the HHQ-7C surface-to-air missile
systems.8086
Joint Operations. Regarding joint operations, DOD states:
Since 2004, the PLA has conducted a number of exercises designed to develop
the PLA’s joint operational concepts and demonstrate new capabilities, command
automation systems, and weapons. The PLA hopes eventually to fuse
service-level capabilities with an integrated network for command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(C4ISR), a new command structure, and a joint logistics system. However, it
continues to face deficiencies in inter-service cooperation and actual experience
in joint operations.8187
Another observer states:
There is no question that China has achieved a remarkable leap in
modernization of the forces needed for these missions and that it is urgently
continuing on that path. There is question about how China is now proceeding
to exercise these new assets so as to make them truly operational in a combat
environment. There is considerable question about China’s capability to
coordinate all these forces in two major simultaneous operations: (1) to bring
Taiwan to its knees and (2) cause the U.S. to be tardy, indecisive, or ineffective
in responding.8288
Anti-Air Warfare (AAW). Regarding AAW, one observer states that China’s
decision to “shed its strictly coastal defense force structure in favor of acquiring
larger and more modern fighting vessels capable of blue-water operations” has
exposed a significant vulnerability — the PLAN’s inability to provide a
sophisticated, layered air defense for these new forces. Fleet air defense is the
Achilles’ heel of the 21st-century Chinese Navy....
As the PLAN’s ships increased in size, capability and endurance, and with
operational deployments taking them well beyond the navy’s traditional
8086
2005 DOD CMP, executive summary and pp. 33-34.
8187
2007 DOD CMP, p. 15.
8288
[Statement of] Rear Admiral (U.S. Navy, Retired) Eric A. McVadon, Director of AsiaPacific Studies, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Consultant on East Asia Security
Affairs, Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, [regarding]
Recent Trends in China’s Military Modernization, 15 September 2005, p. 6. (Hereafter
cited as McVadon 9/15/05 testimony.) Italics as in the original.
CRS-2730
mainland-based air defenses, a challenge not faced previously became apparent:
having to defend these units from air attack in the event of hostilities. Response
to this concern has been slow and inadequate at best, and serious consideration
to providing the surface navy with the kind of air defense systems one normally
associates with modern naval fleets has only begun. Not until the late 1990s was
an effort made to outfit PLAN destroyers and frigates with an antiair “point
defense” system, giving them some measure of self-defense.... The PLAN
surface fleet, however, still lacks “modern air surveillance systems and data links
required for area air defense missions. The combination of short-range weapons
and lack of modern surveillance systems limits the PLAN to self-defense and
point-defense [AAW] only. As a result, except in unusual circumstances, no
PLAN ship is capable of conducting air defense of another ship.”8389
In a similar vein, today’s PLAN naval aviation forces alone cannot provide
fighter coverage for the entire Chinese coast or the fleet, so interceptor duties
have ben distributed by region between naval aviation units and the PLA Air
Force. This increases the number of assets available for the task, but questions
remain about joint patrolling, separate chains of command, and air force overwater proficiency. When faced with training scenarios that incorporated factors
likely found in a modern air combat environment, such as electronic
countermeasures or even inclement weather, neither service was up to the task.
In light of these facts, the potential effectiveness of the cooperation between the
two services is doubtful.
Significant gaps exist in the present PLAN fleet air defense posture. Given
the forces available today, China cannot adequately defend its fleet from air
attack in the modern air threat environment.8490
Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW). Regarding ASW, one observer states:
The most serious deficiency of the PLAN is certainly in the area of
Anti-Submarine Warfare. Good submarines, like the “Kilo” class and (possibly)
the forthcoming Type-093, will play an important ASW role, but the lack of
maritime patrol aircraft and of surface ships equipped with advanced acoustic
sensors make the Chinese vessels vulnerable for [sic] any of the foreign
high-capability submarines operating in the area.8591
Mine Countermeasures (MCM). Regarding MCM, one observer writes that
for the PLA Navy a
serious operational deficiency involves the mine countermeasures vessels
(MCMV). Though China has an intense shipping [sicactivity] along its coasts, the
PLAN has virtually no mine-sweeping or mine-hunting capabilities. This was
due, perhaps, to the consideration that the U.S. Navy is usually more concerned
to keep the sea lanes open, instead of laying mines, but nevertheless the lack of
8389
The passage at this point is quoting from the 2003 edition of DOD’s annual report on
China’s military power (2003 DOD CMP, p. 25).
8490
Dominic DeScisciolo, “Red Aegis,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 2004, pp. 5658.
8591
Massimo Annati, “China’s PLA Navy, The Revolution,” Naval Forces, No. 6, 2004, p.
75.
CRS-2831
MCM is simply stunning. Any hostile organisation (including, but not limited
to, state-sponsored terrorists and insurgents) could play havoc with the Chinese
shipping simply by laying a few mines here and there.8692
Logistics. Regarding logistics, DOD stated in 2005:
Since 2000, China has improved the structure, material coordination, and
efficiency of its joint logistics system. However, the command system is still not
compatible with the support system, and organization and planning is
incompatible with supply management. The first experimental joint logistics unit
was created only in July 2004.8793
Regarding logistic support of China’s new destroyers, one observer states:
The ships’ new sensors, missiles and combat systems are mainly of Russian and
Western origin. However, China now is faced with the challenge of operating
and maintaining these advanced systems to create a credible threat to foreign
navies in Far Eastern waters....
Every piece of equipment [on China’s Sovremenny-class destroyers] from hull,
mechanical and electrical (HM&E) technologies to guns, sonar, communications,
electronic countermeasures (ECM) and missiles are totally new to the PLAN....
[For these ships,] China is dependent on Russian advisers for training, operations
and maintenance. These ships largely remain in the Russian support cocoon in
Dinghai rather than at a fleet base....
Isolation from other ships and crews hurts fleet integration and coordinated
operations.... It is no coincidence that the Sovremnyi and Kilo submarine home
bases are in an enclave of Russian support in an isolated area near the Eastern
Fleet headquarters at Ningbo.
It is unlikely that Russian advisers would be onboard during actual combat
operations against Taiwan and U.S. Navy air, surface and subsurface threats.
PLAN officers and crew are not expected to be able to handle operations when
under fire, sustaining hits and suffering system degradation or loss. This could
include problems in night or rough weather environment as well. Because all of
the combat systems, except for three noted, are modern Russian equipments,
China has minimal capability even to repair peacetime losses in port....
A comparison [of the AAW system on the Luyang II class destroyers] to
[the] U.S. Navy Aegis [combat system] is inevitable, but Aegis was on [the U.S.
Navy test ship] Norton Sound for nine years of development testing prior to the
first installation on the USS Ticonderoga (CG-47) 20 years ago. Developing the
software for signal processing and tracking a hundred air, surface and submarine
targets will take even longer for China. Integration to various indigenous ship
guns and missiles and other sensors, as well as other ships’ data management and
weapons, will take longer. These Chinese “Aegis” ships may be limited to 1940s
era radar tasks of detecting and tracking air and surface targets for their own ship
weapons. Further in the future will be an 8,000-ton DDG that is predicted to be
8692
Ibid., p. 73.
8793
2005 DOD CMP, pp. 34-35.
CRS-2932
a true area-control warship with additional Aegis capabilities. It is now in early
construction stages in the new Dalian shipyard.
What kind of record is provided by prior Chinese built warships with
imported Russian and Western technology? These include sensors, fire control,
weapons and communications as well as HM&E. The Chinese new-construction
DDGs are a mix of local designed and manufactured systems, foreign imports
with production rights, illegally copied import equipment and illegal examples
with no local production capability at all. The latter two represent serious
training and maintenance problems. Unfortunately for the PLAN, some of them
are in the highest mission-critical areas. For example, the DDGs being built have
a rapid-fire Gatling gun close-in weapon system that looks like the Dutch
Goalkeeper system. Signaal and the Dutch government deny exporting the
equipment or production rights to China. This key weapon responsible for
downing incoming cruise missiles is probably lacking documentation and
training because it must be illegally obtained.8894
Goals or Significance of China’s Naval Modernization.
PLA Navy as a Modernization Priority. The PLA Navy is one of three
stated priorities within China’s overall military modernization effort. China’s 2004
defense white paper sayssaid three times that the effort will emphasize the navy, air force,
and the ballistic missile force.8995 China’s 2006 defense white paper statesstated: “Through
restructuring, the proportion of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force in the
PLA has been raised by 3.8 percent while that of the Army has been lowered by 1.5
percent.”9096 The 2006 white paper further states:
The Navy aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive
operations and enhancing its capabilities in integrated maritime operations and
nuclear counterattacks....
8894
James C. Bussert, “China Builds Destroyers Around Imported Technology,” Signal,
August 2004, p. 67.
8995
The white paper states:
The PLA will promote coordinated development of firepower, mobility and
information capability, enhance the development of its operational strength with
priority given to the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force, and strengthen
its comprehensive deterrence and warfighting capabilities....
The Army is streamlined by reducing the ordinary troops that are technologically
backward while the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force are
strengthened....
While continuing to attach importance to the building of the Army, the PLA
gives priority to the building of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force
to seek balanced development of the combat force structure, in order to
strengthen the capabilities for winning both command of the sea and command
of the air, and conducting strategic counter-strikes. (2004 China White Paper,
op cit, Chapter II national defense policy.)
9096
2006 China White Paper, paragraph entitled “Downsizing the PLA.”
CRS-3033
The Navy and Air Force have cut some ship groups and aviation divisions,
regiments and stations, and set up some high-tech surface ship, aviation and
ground-to-air missile units....
The Navy is working to build itself into a modern maritime force of
operation consisting of combined arms with both nuclear and conventional
means of operations. Taking informationization as the goal and strategic focus
in its modernization drive, the Navy gives high priority to the development of
maritime information systems, and new-generation weaponry and equipment.
Efforts are being made to improve maritime battlefield capabilities, with
emphasis on the construction of relevant facilities for new equipment and the
development of combat support capabilities. The Navy is endeavoring to build
mobile maritime troops capable of conducting operations under conditions of
informationization, and strengthen its overall capabilities of operations in coastal
waters, joint operations and integrated maritime support. Efforts are being made
to improve and reform training programs and methods to intensify training in
joint integrated maritime operations. The Navy is enhancing research into the
theory of naval operations and exploring the strategy and tactics of maritime
people’s war under modern conditions.9197
The heads of the PLA Navy, Air Force, and missile force were added to the
Central Military Commission in September 2004, and Navy and Air Force officers
were appointed Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff.9298 Regarding this development,
a 2007 report from the Office of Naval Intelligence states:
In September 2004, the commander of the PLAN, Admiral Zhang Dingfa,
became the first PLAN commander ever to serve concurrently as a member of the
CCP Central Committee’s Military Commission (CMC). His promotion in grade
and appointment to the CMC provided a unique challenge for the PLAN within
the PLA hierarchy.
[A]ll organizations within the PLA are assigned one of 15 grades. In
addition, the commander and political officer are assigned the same grade.
However, when Zhang Dingfa was promoted one grade as a CMC member,
neither the grade for the PLAN as an organization nor the grade of the PLAN
political commissar was raised to the same level. Therefore, although Zhang and
his successors will hold the same grade as the Chief of the General Staff and the
directors of the General Political Department (GPD), General Logistics
Department (GLD), and General Equipment Department (GED), the PLAN as
an organization is not equal to the four General Departments and is still at the
same grade as the seven Military Regions.93
Near-Term Focus: Taiwan Situation. DOD and other observers believe
that the near-term focus of China’s military modernization is to develop military
9199
Another observer states:
97
2006 China White Paper, paragraphs entitled “Implementing the military strategy of
active defense,” and “Improving the structure of services and arms,” and a paragraph in the
section entitled “Development of the Services and Arms.”
92
9398
99
See, for example, 2005 DOD CMP, p. 1.
U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, China’s Navy 2007,
Washington, 2007. p. 11.
CRS-3134
If there had been any doubts about China’s plans to develop into a major
naval power, they were dispelled by President Hu Jintao on 27 December 2006.
In his speech to representatives of the navy’s 10th national Communist Party
congress in Beijing he said “in the process of protecting the nation’s authority
and security and maintaining our maritime rights, the navy’s role is very
important.” He called on military commanders to build a “powerful people’s
navy that can adapt to its historical mission during a new century and a new
period,” while adding that the Navy should be ready to protect the country’s
interests “at any time.” Two years after the promotion of the Commander-inChief, Admiral Zhang Dingfa, to a full seat on the Central Military Commission,
the navy’s evolution from being a coastal force to one that is at the centre of
Chinese strategy is now assured.100
Near-Term Focus: Taiwan Situation. DOD and other observers believe
that the near-term focus of China’s military modernization is to develop military
options for addressing the situation with Taiwan. DOD lists China’s potential
military options regarding Taiwan as follows:
94100
!
limited force options that “could include computer network attacks
against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to
undermine the Taiwan population’s confidence in its leadership.
PLA special operations forces infiltrated into Taiwan could conduct
acts of economic, political, and military sabotage. Beijing might also
employ SRBM, special operations forces, and air strikes against air
fields, radars, and communications facilities on Taiwan....”;
!
an air and missile campaign, in which “Surprise SRBM attacks
and precision air strikes against Taiwan’s air defense system,
including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and
communications facilities could support a campaign to degrade
Taiwan defenses neutralize its military and political leadership, and
rapidly break its will to fight while attempting to preclude an
effective international response;”
!
a blockade, in which “Beijing could threaten or deploy a naval
blockade as a “non-war” pressure tactic in the pre-hostility phase or
as a transition to active conflict. Beijing could declare that ships en
route to Taiwan ports must stop in mainland ports for inspections
prior to transiting on to Taiwan. It could also attempt the equivalent
of a blockade by declaring exercise or missile closure areas in
approaches and roadsteads to ports to divert merchant traffic, as
occurred during the 1995-96 missile firings and live-fire exercises.
Chinese doctrine also includes activities such as air blockades,
missile attacks, and mining or otherwise obstructing harbors and
approaches. More traditional blockades would have greater impact
on Taiwan, but tax PLA Navy capabilities. Any attempt to limit
maritime traffic to and from Taiwan would likely trigger
countervailing international pressure, and risk military escalation.
Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007-2008, pp. 30-31 (Executive Overview).
CRS-35
Such restrictions would have immediate economic effects, but would
take time to realize decisive political results, diminishing the
ultimate effectiveness and inviting international reaction;”94101 and
!
an amphibious invasion, about which DOD states that “Publicly
available Chinese writings offer different strategies... the most
prominent being the Joint Island Landing Campaign. The Joint
Island Landing Campaign envisions a complex operation relying on
Analysts disagree regarding China’s potential for mounting an effective blockade,
particularly with its submarine force. For an analysis that casts a skeptical eye on the
potential, see Michael A. Glosny, “Strangulation from the Sea? A PRC Submarine Blockade
of Taiwan,” International Security, spring 2004, pp. 125-160. For an analysis that expresses
more concern about this potential, see the statement of Lyle J. Goldstein and William
Murray as printed in 2/6/04 USCC hearing, pp. 132-133, 147-151. See also Michael C.
Grubb, “Merchant Shipping In A Chinese Blockade Of Taiwan,” Naval War College
Review, Winter 2007: 81-102.
CRS-32
supporting sub-campaigns for logistics, electronic warfare, and air
and naval support, to break through or circumvent shore defenses,
establish and build a beachhead, and then launch an attack to split,
seize, and occupy the entire island or key targets.95
102
Anti-Access Force for Short-Duration Conflict. More specifically,
observers believe that China’s military modernization is aimed at fielding a force that
can succeed in a short-duration conflict with Taiwan that finishes before the United
States is able to intervene, so that China can present the United States and the rest of
the world with a fait accompli.96103
Consistent with the goal of a short-duration conflict and a fait accompli,
observers believe, China wants its modernized military to be capable of acting as a
so-called anti-access force — a force that can deter U.S. intervention, or failing that,
delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of U.S. intervention forces, particularly
U.S. Navy forces. DOD states that “If a quick resolution [to a situation involving
Taiwan] is not possible, Beijing would seek to deter U.S. intervention or, failing that,
delay such intervention, defeat it in an asymmetric, limited, quick war; or, fight it to
a standstill and pursue a protracted conflict.”97 DOD also states that:
In the near term, China is prioritizing measures to deter or counter
third-party intervention in any future cross-Strait crises. China’s approach to
dealing with this challenge centers on what DoD’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense
Review report refers to as disruptive capabilities: forces and operational concepts
aimed at preventing an adversary from deploying military forces to forward
operating locations, and/or rapidly destabilizing critical military balances. In this
context, the PLA appears engaged in a sustained effort to develop the capability
to interdict, at long ranges, aircraft carrier and expeditionary strike groups that
might deploy to the western Pacific. Increasingly, China’s area denial/anti-access
95
101
Analysts disagree regarding China’s potential for mounting an effective blockade,
particularly with its submarine force. For an analysis that casts a skeptical eye on the
potential, see Michael A. Glosny, “Strangulation from the Sea? A PRC Submarine Blockade
of Taiwan,” International Security, spring 2004, pp. 125-160. For an analysis that expresses
more concern about this potential, see the statement of Lyle J. Goldstein and William
Murray as printed in 2/6/04 USCC hearing, pp. 132-133, 147-151. See also Michael C.
Grubb, “Merchant Shipping In A Chinese Blockade Of Taiwan,” Naval War College
Review, Winter 2007: 81-102.
102
2007 DOD CMP, pp. 32-33. DOD further notes that
Amphibious operations are logistics-intensive, and their success depends upon
air and sea superiority in the vicinity of the operation, the rapid buildup of
supplies and sustainment on shore, and an uninterrupted fl ow of support
thereafter. An amphibious campaign of the scale outlined in the Joint Island
Landing Campaign would tax the capabilities of China’s armed forces and almost
certainly invite international intervention. Add to these strains the combat
attrition of China’s forces, and the complex tasks of urban warfare and
counterinsurgency — assuming a successful landing and breakout — and an
amphibious invasion of Taiwan would be a significant political and military risk
for China’s leaders.” (Pages 32-33)
See also 2003 CFR task force report, pp. 2, 3, and 53.
96103
See, for example, Eric A. McVadon, “Alarm Bells Ring as China Builds up its Armoury
on a Massive Sale,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 16, 2005, p. 23; Edward Cody, “China
Builds A Smaller, Stronger Military,” Washington Post, April 12, 2005, p. 1; Bryan Bender,
“China Bolsters Its Forces, US Says,” Boston Globe, April 10, 2005, p. 1; Jim Yardley and
Thom Shanker, “Chinese Navy Buildup Gives Pentagon New Worries,” New York Times,
April 8, 2005.
97
2007 DOD CMP, p. 32.
CRS-33
CRS-36
so-called anti-access force — a force that can deter U.S. intervention, or failing that,
delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of U.S. intervention forces, particularly
U.S. naval and air forces. DOD states that “If a quick resolution [to a situation
involving Taiwan] is not possible, Beijing would seek to deter U.S. intervention or,
failing that, delay such intervention, defeat it in an asymmetric, limited, quick war;
or, fight it to a standstill and pursue a protracted conflict.”104 DOD also states that:
In the near term, China is prioritizing measures to deter or counter
third-party intervention in any future cross-Strait crises. China’s approach to
dealing with this challenge centers on what DoD’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense
Review report refers to as disruptive capabilities: forces and operational concepts
aimed at preventing an adversary from deploying military forces to forward
operating locations, and/or rapidly destabilizing critical military balances. In this
context, the PLA appears engaged in a sustained effort to develop the capability
to interdict, at long ranges, aircraft carrier and expeditionary strike groups that
might deploy to the western Pacific. Increasingly, China’s area denial/anti-access
forces overlap, providing multiple layers of offensive systems, utilizing the sea,
air, and space....
The PLA envisions precision strike capabilities sufficient to hold at risk western
Pacific airbases, ports, surface combatants, land and space-based C4ISR, air
defense systems, and command facilities.
To prevent deployment of naval forces into western Pacific waters, PLA planners
are focused on targeting surface ships at long ranges. Analyses of current and
projected force structure improvements suggest that in the near term, China is
seeking the capacity to hold surface ships at risk through a layered defense that
reaches out to the “second island chain” (i.e., the islands extending south and
east from Japan, to and beyond Guam in the western Pacific Ocean). One area
of apparent investment emphasis involves a combination of medium-range
ballistic missiles, C4ISR for geo-location of targets, and onboard guidance
systems for terminal homing to strike surface ships on the high seas or their
onshore support infrastructure. This capability would have particular
significance, owing to the preemptive and coercive options it would provide
China in a regional crisis.
Chinese military analysts have also concluded that logistics and
mobilization are potential vulnerabilities in modern warfare, given the heavy
requirements for precisely coordinated transportation, communications, and
logistics networks. To threaten in-theater bases and logistics points, China could
employ its theater ballistic missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, special
operations forces, and computer network attacks. Strike aircraft, enabled by
aerial refueling, could engage distant targets using air-launched cruise missiles
equipped with a variety of terminal-homing warheads.
Advanced mines, submarines, maritime strike aircraft, and modern surface
combatants equipped with advanced ASCMs would provide a supporting layer
of defense for its long-range anti-access systems. Acquisition of the KILO,
SONG, SHANG, and YUAN-class submarines illustrates the importance the
PLA places on undersea warfare. The purchase of SOVREMENNYY II-class
DDGs and indigenous production of the LUYANG I/LUYANG II DDGs
104
2007 DOD CMP, p. 32.
CRS-37
equipped with long-range ASCM and SAM systems demonstrate a continuing
emphasis on improving anti-surface warfare, combined with mobile, wide-area
air control.98
98
2007 DOD CMP, pp. 15-18. Another observer states that
This mission, in essence, is to be able quickly to overwhelm Taiwan’s military,
cow the Taiwan government, and deter, delay, or complicate effective and timely
U.S. intervention....
The concept is ... to be able very rapidly, in a matter of days, to cause Taiwan to
capitulate, with such capitulation abetted by the failure of the U.S. to respond
promptly and effectively. As has been said often, Beijing’s concept is to be able
to present to Washington and the world a fait accompli concerning Taiwan....
Beijing has ... developed a concept to use force, if it feels it must, to defeat
Taiwan, deter or delay U.S. intervention, and at least cause Japan to think twice
before introducing overt military assistance in a developing crisis....
CRS-34
105
Regarding the potential time line for a short-duration conflict with Taiwan, one
observer states:
The U.S. (particularly the U.S. Pacific Command/PACOM) seems to want
Taiwan to focus on [acquiring] systems and defensive operational capabilities
that would lengthen the amount of time Taiwan could deny the PRC from gaining
air superiority, sea control, and physical occupation of Taiwan’s leadership core
(namely Taipei). The idea is to permit sufficient time to bring U.S. forces to
bear. The amount of time needed is understood to be at least 5 days, presumably
after credible warning that hostilities either are imminent or are already
underway.99106
China’s emerging maritime anti-access force can be viewed as broadly
analogous to the sea-denial force that the Soviet Union developed during the Cold
War to deny U.S. use of the sea or counter U.S. forces participating in a NATOWarsaw Pact conflict. One potential difference between the Soviet sea-denial force
and China’s emerging maritime anti-access force is that China’s force could include
MaRV-equipped TBMs capable of hitting moving ships at sea.
Some analysts speculate that China may attain (or believe that is has attained)
a capable maritime anti-access capability, or important elements of it, by about
2010.100 Other observers believe China will attain (or believe that it has attained)
105
2007 DOD CMP, pp. 15-18. Another observer states that
This mission, in essence, is to be able quickly to overwhelm Taiwan’s military,
cow the Taiwan government, and deter, delay, or complicate effective and timely
U.S. intervention....
The concept is ... to be able very rapidly, in a matter of days, to cause Taiwan to
capitulate, with such capitulation abetted by the failure of the U.S. to respond
promptly and effectively. As has been said often, Beijing’s concept is to be able
to present to Washington and the world a fait accompli concerning Taiwan....
Beijing has ... developed a concept to use force, if it feels it must, to defeat
Taiwan, deter or delay U.S. intervention, and at least cause Japan to think twice
before introducing overt military assistance in a developing crisis....
There is, in my opinion, no question that this is Beijing’s concept for
overwhelming Taiwan and deterring or confronting U.S. forces. (McVadon
9/15/05 testimony, pp. 1, 2, 2-3, 6.)
See also Statement of Cortez A. Cooper III for 3/16/06 USCC hearing, p. 3.
99106
Testimony of Fu S. Mei, Director, Taiwan Security Analysis Center (TAISAC), Before
the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission [regarding] “Taiwan Straits
Issues and Chinese Military-Defense Budget,” September 15, 2005, p. 3.
100
CRS-38
2010.107 Other observers believe China will attain (or believe that it has attained)
such a capability some time after 2010. DOD states that “The Intelligence
Community estimates China will take until the end of this decade or later to produce
a modern force capable of defeating a moderate-size adversary.”108 The term
“moderate-size adversary” would appear to apply to a country other than the United
States. The issue of when China might attain (or believe that it has attained) a
107
One observer states:
By 2008, China will have the capability to credibly conduct short-term sea denial
operations out to about 400 nautical miles from its coastline; and by 2010 may
be able to sustain such operations for a few weeks. Obviously, this capability
does not accrue to the Straits of Malacca and the Indian Ocean — China can at
best hope to “show the flag” for coercive and/or defensive purposes in those
waters until after 2015.
(Statement of Cortez A. Cooper III for 3/16/06 USCC hearing, p.3.)
This observer also states:
Looking at a net assessment of emerging Chinese capabilities and U.S. power
projection in the Pacific theater, there is a window of concern between roughly
2008 and 2015. Many Chinese programs focused on Taiwan and the near
periphery (new cruise and maneuverable ballistic missiles, submarines, and
destroyers) will be fully online around 2008; but some of the US capabilities to
defeat China’s sea denial strategy (missile defenses, littoral strike assets, a
state-of-the-art, integrated ASW network) may not be in place until around the
middle of the next decade.
CRS-35
such a capability some time after 2010. DOD states that “The Intelligence
Community estimates China will take until the end of this decade or later to produce
a modern force capable of defeating a moderate-size adversary.”101 The term
“moderate-size adversary” would appear to apply to a country other than the United
States. The issue of when China might attain (or believe that it has attained) a
capable anti-access capability is significant because it can influence the kinds of
options that are available to U.S. policymakers for addressing the situation.
Broader or Longer-Term Regional Goals. In addition to the near-term
focus on developing military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan, DOD
and some other observers believe that broader or longer-term goals of China’s
military modernization, including naval modernization, include one or more of the
following:
!
asserting China’s regional military leadership, displacing U.S.
regional military influence, prevailing in regional rivalries, and
encouraging eventual U.S. military withdrawal form the region;
!
defending China’s claims in maritime territorial disputes, some
of which have implications for oil, gas, or mineral exploration
rights;102 and
(Ibid., p. 8.)
Another observer states:
Because the Chinese submarine fleet will operate in nearby waters and in the
mid-Pacific, China need not wait until 2020 to challenge the U.S. at sea. It will
likely have a home-field advantage in any East Asian conflict contingency as
early as 2010, while the U.S. fleet will still have operational demands in the
Middle East, and in tracking Russian ballistic missile submarines elsewhere.
(Tkacik 7/27/05 testimony, p. 8.)
See also Fisher 7/27/05 testimony, which cites the year 2010 on pages 3, 4, 7, 9 (twice), 11,
and 16 in discussing China’s military modernization and the resulting impact on the regional
military balance, and Fisher’s statement as printed in 2/6/04 USCC hearing, p. 85, which
states, “It is possible that before the end of the decade the PLA will have the capability to
coordinate mass missile attacks on U.S. Naval Forces by submarines and Su-30s,” and p. 88,
which prints his table summarizing potential PLA anti-carrier forces by 2010.
101108
2007 DOD CMP, p. 15. Another observer states: “QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review]
planners have recently moved forward (to 2012) their estimate of when key warfighting
capabilities might be needed to fight China, and have postulated conflict scenarios lasting
as long as seven years.” (Loren B. Thompson, “Pentagon Fighter Study Raises Questions,”
August 22, 2005. Lexington Institute Issue Brief.) 2003 CFR task force report discusses
the difficulty of assessing the pace at which China’s military modernization is occurring and
presents a series of indicators on pages 11-15 (and again on pages 64-68) that can be
monitored to help gauge the pace and direction of China’s military modernization.
102
For more on this topic, see CRS Report RL31183, China’s Maritime Territorial Claims:
Implications for U.S. Interests, Kerry Dumbaugh, coordinator. See also Chris Johnson,
“Analysts Discuss Maritime Implications of China’s Energy Strategy,” Inside the Navy,
December 18, 2006.
CRS-36
CRS-39
capable anti-access capability is significant because it can influence the kinds of
options that are available to U.S. policymakers for addressing the situation.
Broader or Longer-Term Regional Goals. In addition to the near-term
focus on developing military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan, DOD
and some other observers believe that broader or longer-term goals of China’s
military modernization, including naval modernization, include one or more of the
following:
!
asserting China’s regional military leadership, displacing U.S.
regional military influence, prevailing in regional rivalries, and
encouraging eventual U.S. military withdrawal form the region;
!
defending China’s claims in maritime territorial disputes, some
of which have implications for oil, gas, or mineral exploration
rights;109 and
!
protecting China’s sea lines of communication, which China
relies upon increasingly for oil and other imports.103110
DOD states that:
China’s near-term focus on preparing for military contingencies in the
Taiwan Strait, including the possibility of U.S. intervention, appears to be an
important driver of its modernization plans. However, analysis of China’s
military acquisitions and strategic thinking suggests Beijing is also generating
capabilities for other regional contingencies, such as conflict over resources or
territory.104111
Similarly, DOD states that:
For the moment, China’s military is focused on assuring the capability to prevent
Taiwan independence and, if Beijing were to decide to adopt such an approach,
to compel the island to negotiate a settlement on Beijing’s terms. At the same
time, China is laying the foundation for a force able to accomplish broader
regional and global objectives.105
112
109
For more on this topic, see CRS Report RL31183, China’s Maritime Territorial Claims:
Implications for U.S. Interests, Kerry Dumbaugh, coordinator. See also Chris Johnson,
“Analysts Discuss Maritime Implications of China’s Energy Strategy,” Inside the Navy,
December 18, 2006.
110
See, for example, Statement of Cortez A. Cooper III for 3/16/06 USCC hearing, p. 3;
Fisher 7/27/05 testimony, p. 4; McVadon 9/15/05 testimony, p. 1; 2003 CFR task force
report, pp. 24-25, 31-32, 62-63; Edward Cody, “China Builds A Smaller, Stronger Military,”
April 12, 2005, p. 1; David Lague, “China’s Growing Undersea Fleet Presents Challenge
To Its Neighbors,” Wall Street Journal, November 29, 2004. See also Chris Johnson,
“Analysts Discuss Maritime Implications of China’s Energy Strategy,” Inside the Navy,
December 18, 2006.
111
2007 DOD CMP, p. I (Executive Summary).
112
2007 DOD CMP, p. 15.
CRS-40
DOD also states that:
As China’s economy grows, dependence on secure access to markets and
natural resources, particularly metals and fossil fuels, is becoming a more urgent
influence on China’s strategic behavior. At present, China can neither protect its
foreign energy supplies nor the routes on which they travel, including the Straits
of Malacca through which some 80 percent of China’s cruse oil imports transit
— a vulnerability [Chinese] President Hu refers to as the “Malacca Dilemma.”...
China’s reliance on foreign energy imports has affected its strategy and
policy in significant ways. It has pursued long-term energy supply agreements in
[various countries]...
In the past few years, China has also offered economic assistance and
military cooperation with countries located astride key maritime transit routes.
Concern over these routes has also prompted China to pursue maritime
capabilities that would help it ensure the safe passage of resources through
international waterways.106
103
See, for example, Statement of Cortez A. Cooper III for 3/16/06 USCC hearing, p. 3;
Fisher 7/27/05 testimony, p. 4; McVadon 9/15/05 testimony, p. 1; 2003 CFR task force
report, pp. 24-25, 31-32, 62-63; Edward Cody, “China Builds A Smaller, Stronger Military,”
April 12, 2005, p. 1; David Lague, “China’s Growing Undersea Fleet Presents Challenge
To Its Neighbors,” Wall Street Journal, November 29, 2004. See also Chris Johnson,
“Analysts Discuss Maritime Implications of China’s Energy Strategy,” Inside the Navy,
December 18, 2006.
104
2007 DOD CMP, p. I (Executive Summary).
105
2007 DOD CMP, p. 15.
106
2007 DOD CMP, pp. 8-9.
CRS-37
113
DOD further states that:
The principal focus of, and driver for, China’s military modernization in the
near term appears to remain preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
However, official documents and the writings of Chinese military strategists
suggest Beijing is increasingly surveying the strategic landscape beyond Taiwan.
Some Chinese analysts have explored the geopolitical value of Taiwan in
extending China’s maritime “defensive” perimeter and improving its ability to
influence regional sea lines of communication....
China’s 2006 Defense White Paper similarly raises concerns about
resources and transportation links when it states that “security issues related to
energy, resources, finance, information, and international shipping routes are
mounting.”... Disagreements that remain with Japan over maritime claims and
with several Southeast Asian claimants to all or parts of the Spratly Islands in the
South China Sea could lead to renewed tensions in these areas....
Analysis of China’s weapons acquisitions also suggests China is looking
beyond Taiwan as it builds its force. For example, new missile units outfitted
with conventional theater-range missiles at various locations in China could be
used in a variety of non-Taiwan contingencies. Airborne early warning and
control and aerial-refueling programs will permit extended air operations into the
South China Sea. Advanced destroyers and submarines reflect Beijing’s desire
to protect and advance its maritime interests. Expeditionary forces (three
airborne divisions, two amphibious infantry divisions, two marine brigades,
about seven special operations groups, and one regimental-size reconnaissance
element in the Second Artillery) are improving with the introduction of new
equipment, better unit-level tactics, and greater coordination of joint operations.
Over the long term, improvements in China’s C4ISR, including space-based and
over-the-horizon sensors, could enable Beijing to identify, track and target
military activities deep into the western Pacific Ocean.
113
2007 DOD CMP, pp. 8-9.
CRS-41
Finally, analysis of PLA training activities provides an additional indication
that the PLA is exploring contingencies other than Taiwan.107114
In January 2007, the Director of National Intelligence stated:
Beijing continues its rapid rate of military modernization, initiated in 1999. We
assess that China’s aspirations for great power status, threat perceptions, and
security strategy would drive this modernization effort even if the Taiwan
problem were resolved.108115
A 2007 report by a task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations
stated:
107
108
2007 DOD CMP, pp. 22-24.
Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence, January 11, 2007,
John D. Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence, p. 10.
CRS-38
China’s military modernization has two main drivers, one with a clear
operational objective (Taiwan) and the other with a clear strategic objective (to
build a modern military because China will be a modern power).109116
Another observer states, in discussing China’s 2006 defense white paper, that
While the navy would have a major role in the event of Taiwan operations, it was
its wider role that was emphasised. “The Navy aims at gradual extension of the
strategic depth for offshore defensive operations and enhancing its capabilities
in integrated maritime operations and nuclear counterattacks,” the paper stated,
while the need to protect maritime trade, particularly crucial imports of oil and
raw materials, was also stressed.117
Another observer states:
While committed to deterring or defeating Taiwan and thwarting U.S.
intervention, the PLAN’s focus increasingly represents a more general — and
ambitious — goal of attaining the means of projecting power across the sea lines
of communication (SLOC) and protecting the ocean commerce on which China’s
economy relies. Such an objective explains certain aspects of its modernization,
such as the aggressive construction of a new class of nuclear attack submarines
(SSNs). The successful development of the SSNs would allow the PLAN to deter
would-be disrupters of Chinese energy supplies, the majority of which are
transported by sea. Moreover, sea-lane security presents a rationale for the
development of an aircraft carrier, a type of ship that would serve only as an easy
target in a Taiwan scenario — where China’s land-based airfields are more than
sufficient — but would allow for the Chinese military to project its power across
maritime regions far beyond the range of land-based aircraft.
114
2007 DOD CMP, pp. 22-24.
115
Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence, January 11, 2007,
John D. Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence, p. 10.
116
Council on Foreign Relations, U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A
responsible Course, Report of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on
Foreign Relations, Washington, 2007, p. 43.
117
Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007-2008, p. 31 (Executive Overview)
CRS-42
Indeed, these developments indicate that China’s senior leaders and
strategists are increasingly concerned with traditional and non-traditional threats
(e.g. piracy, smuggling, terrorism and other disruptions by non-state actors) to
ocean commerce.110118
Some PLA Navy units have recently been deployed outside China’s home
waters. In November 2004, for example, a Han-class SSN was detected in Japanese
territorial waters near Okinawa.111119 DIA states that, as part of the same deployment,
this submarine traveled “far into the western Pacific Ocean....”112120 Press reports state
that the submarine operated in the vicinity of Guam before moving toward
Okinawa.113
109
Council on Foreign Relations, U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A
responsible Course, Report of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on
Foreign Relations, Washington, 2007, p. 43.
110121
As another example, on September 9, 2005,
China deployed a fleet of five warships ... near a gas field in the East China Sea,
a potentially resource-rich area that is disputed by China and Japan. The ships,
including a guided-missile destroyer, were spotted by a Japanese military patrol
plane near the Chunxiao gas field, according to the [Japan] Maritime
Self-Defense Forces.122
As a third example,
China said on Sept. 29 [of 2005 that] it has sent warships to the disputed
East China Sea, a day ahead of talks with Japan over competing territorial claims
in the gas-rich waters.
“I can now confirm that in the East China Sea, a Chinese reserve vessel
squadron has been established,” foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang told a
regular briefing....
118
Eric A. McVadon, “U.S.-PRC Maritime Cooperation: An Idea Whose Time Has Come,”
China Brief (Jamestown Foundation), June 13, 2007.
111119
Mark Magnier, “China Regrets Sub Incident, Japan Says,” Los Angeles Times, November
17, 2004; Martin Fackler, “Japanese Pursuit Of Chinese Sub Raises Tensions,” Wall Street
Journal, November 15, 2004: 20; Kenji Hall, “Japan: Unidentified sub is Chinese,”
NavyTimes.com (Associated Press), November 12, 2004. See also 2006 DOD CMP, pp. 1112.
112120
Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Vice Admiral
Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement for the
Record [before the] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 16 February 2005, p. 16-17.
See also Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Vice Admiral
Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement For the
Record [before the] Senate Armed Services Committee, 17 March 2005, p. 17.
113
121
Timothy Hu, “Ready, steady, go...,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 13, 2005: 27; “China
Sub Tracked By U.S. Off Guam Before Japan Intrusion,” Japan Times, November 17, 2004.
CRS-39
As another example, on September 9, 2005,
China deployed a fleet of five warships ... near a gas field in the East China Sea,
a potentially resource-rich area that is disputed by China and Japan. The ships,
including a guided-missile destroyer, were spotted by a Japanese military patrol
plane near the Chunxiao gas field, according to the [Japan] Maritime
Self-Defense Forces.114
As a third example,
China said on Sept. 29 [of 2005 that] it has sent warships to the disputed
East China Sea, a day ahead of talks with Japan over competing territorial claims
in the gas-rich waters.
“I can now confirm that in the East China Sea, a Chinese reserve vessel
squadron has been established,” foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang told a
regular briefing....
122
Norimitsu Onishi and Howard W. French, “Japan’s Rivalry With China Is Stirring A
Crowded Sea,” New York Times, September 11, 2005. See also “Japan Upset Over Chinese
Warships Near Disputed Area,” DefenseNews.com, October 3, 2005.
CRS-43
No details were given on the size of the squadron or the area it will patrol.
The establishment of the squadron follows China’s creation of two naval groups
in the Bohai Sea and Yellow Sea off the northern China coast, the agency said.115123
On October 26, 2006, a Song-class SS reportedly surfaced five miles away from
the Japan-homeported U.S. Navy aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk (CV-63), which
reportedly was operating at the time with its strike group in international waters in
the East China Sea, near Okinawa. According to press reports, the carrier strike
group at the time was not actively searching for submarines, and the Song-class boat
remained undetected by the strike group until it surfaced and was observed by one
of the strike group’s aircraft.116124 The Chinese government denied that the submarine
was following the strike group.117
114
Norimitsu Onishi and Howard W. French, “Japan’s Rivalry With China Is Stirring A
Crowded Sea,” New York Times, September 11, 2005. See also “Japan Upset Over Chinese
Warships Near Disputed Area,” DefenseNews.com, October 3, 2005.
115125
A distance of five miles would be well within the typical defensive perimeter
for a carrier strike group. (Such a perimeter might extend tens of miles, or more than
100 miles, from a strike group’s ships.) It would also be within the reported firing
range of certain modern submarine-launched torpedoes, and well within the firing
range of submarine-launched ASCMs.
The surfacing of an undetected submarine well within the defensive perimeter
of another country’s surface naval formation can sometimes be intended as a
deterrent action — a warning from the submarine-operating country that submarines
like the one in question can penetrate the ASW systems of the other country’s surface
naval forces. Whether that was the intent behind the Song-class boat’s decision to
surface is not clear; the boat may have surfaced for other reasons. Since the Kitty
Hawk strike group was not actively searching for submarines at the time, the
implications of the incident for assessing U.S. ASW capabilities against Song-class
submarines are also not clear. U.S. officials reportedly reviewed their ASW defenses
in light of the incident.126
123
“China Sends Warships to East China Sea,” DefenseNews.com, September 29, 2005.
2006 DOD CMP, p. 2, states that in the Fall of 2005, “PLA Navy vessels trained their
weapons on Japanese Self Defense Forces aircraft monitoring Chinese drilling and survey
activity in the disputed area.”
116124
Bill Gertz, “China Sub Secretly Stalked U.S. Fleet,” Washington Times, November 13,
2006: 13; Philip Creed, “Navy Confirms Chinese Sub Spotted Near Carrier,”
NavyTimes.com, November 13, 2006; Bill Gertz, “Defenses On [sic] Subs To Be
Reviewed,” Washington Times, November 14, 2006; En-Lai Yeoh, “Fallon Confirms
Chinese Stalked Carrier,” NavyTimes.com, November 14, 2006; Bill Gertz, “Admiral Says
Sub Risked A Shootout,” Washington Times, November 15, 2006; Jeff Schogol, “Admiral
Disputes Report That Kitty Hawk, Chinese Sub Could Have Clashed,” Mideast Starts and
Stripes, November 17, 2006.
117125
Associated Press, “China Denies Reports That Sub Followed Kitty Hawk,”
NavyTimes.com, November 16, 2006. A shorter version of the same story was published as
Associated Press, “China Denies Sub Followed A Group Of U.S. Warships,” Asian Wall
Street Journal, November 17, 2006: 11.
CRS-40
A distance of five miles would be well within the typical defensive perimeter
for a carrier strike group. (Such a perimeter might extend tens of miles, or more than
100 miles, from a strike group’s ships.) It would also be within the reported firing
range of certain modern submarine-launched torpedoes, and well within the firing
range of submarine-launched ASCMs.
The surfacing of an undetected submarine well within the defensive perimeter
of another country’s surface naval formation can sometimes be intended as a
deterrent action — a warning from the submarine-operating country that submarines
like the one in question can penetrate the ASW systems of the other country’s surface
naval forces. Whether that was the intent behind the Song-class boat’s decision to
surface is not clear; the boat may have surfaced for other reasons. Since the Kitty
Hawk strike group was not actively searching for submarines at the time, the
implications of the incident for assessing U.S. ASW capabilities against Song-class
submarines are also not clear. U.S. officials reportedly will review their ASW
defenses in light of the incident.118
Regarding base access and support facilities to support more distant PLA Navy
operations, one press report states:
China is building up military forces and setting up bases along sea lanes
from the Middle East to project its power overseas and protect its oil shipments,
according to a previously undisclosed internal report prepared for Defense
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.
118
Bill Gertz, “Defenses On [sic] Subs To Be Reviewed,” Washington Times, November 14,
2006: 1. One observer recounts the incident as follows:
In September 2006, Rear Admiral Ding Yiping, China’s top submarine
126
Bill Gertz, “Defenses On [sic] Subs To Be Reviewed,” Washington Times, November 14,
2006: 1. One observer recounts the incident as follows:
In September 2006, Rear Admiral Ding Yiping, China’s top submarine
CRS-44
Regarding base access and support facilities to support more distant PLA Navy
operations, one press report states:
China is building up military forces and setting up bases along sea lanes
from the Middle East to project its power overseas and protect its oil shipments,
according to a previously undisclosed internal report prepared for Defense
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.
“China is building strategic relationships along the sea lanes from the
Middle East to the South China Sea in ways that suggest defensive and offensive
positioning to protect China’s energy interests, but also to serve broad security
objectives,” said the report sponsored by the director, Net Assessment, who
heads Mr. Rumsfeld’s office on future-oriented strategies.
The Washington Times obtained a copy of the report, titled “Energy
Futures in Asia,” which was produced by defense contractor Booz Allen
Hamilton.
The internal report stated that China is adopting a “string of pearls” strategy
of bases and diplomatic ties stretching from the Middle East to southern
China....127
officer and PLAN Vice Chief of Staff, sent a Song submarine on a mission to
hunt an American carrier. On October 27 (October 26, Washington time), the
submarine surfaced in waters off Okinawa within torpedo range of the U.S.S.
Kitty Hawk, where it was seen in the Kitty Hawk’s wake by an F-18 pilot on
landing approach. It then submerged and disappeared, defeating all U.S.
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts to detect it. The carrier battle group’s
ASW systems did not detect the sub because it had apparently waited —
submerged, stationary, and silent — for at least one day as the task force
approached the area. Beijing’s state-controlled media reported that Admiral
Ding had personally commanded the entire operation, perhaps even skippering
the submarine himself, and predicted that the success of his mission would lead
to a promotion....
The official Chinese press noted the PLA high command’s confidence in
Admiral Ding — ample evidence of their pleasure at the success the mission
against the Kitty Hawk. The Chinese foreign ministry’s protest that the vessel
had not stalked the Kitty Hawk is likely the literal truth, indicating that the
submarine simply waited submerged until the U.S. battle group sailed over it.
(John J. Tkacik, Jr., China’s Quest for a Superpower Military, Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 2036, May 17, 2007, pp. 9 and 10.)
CRS-41
“China is building strategic relationships along the sea lanes from the
Middle East to the South China Sea in ways that suggest defensive and offensive
positioning to protect China’s energy interests, but also to serve broad security
objectives,” said the report sponsored by the director, Net Assessment, who
heads Mr. Rumsfeld’s office on future-oriented strategies.
The Washington Times obtained a copy of the report, titled “Energy
Futures in Asia,” which was produced by defense contractor Booz Allen
Hamilton.
The internal report stated that China is adopting a “string of pearls” strategy
of bases and diplomatic ties stretching from the Middle East to southern
China....119
119
127
Bill Gertz, “China Builds Up Strategic Sea Lanes,” Washington Times, January 18, 2005,
p.1. The report stated that China is:
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
operating an eavesdropping post and building a naval base at Gwadar,
Pakistan, near the Persian Gulf;
building a container port facility at Chittagong, Bangladesh, and seeking
“much more extensive naval and commercial access” in Bangladesh;
building naval bases in Burma, which is near the Strait of Malacca;
operating electronic intelligence-gathering facilities on islands in the Bay
of Bengal and near the Strait of Malacca;
CRS-45
Potential Implications for Required U.S. Navy Capabilities
Potential implications of China’s naval modernization for required U.S. Navy
capabilities can be organized into three groups:
!
capabilities for a crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait area;
!
capabilities for maintaining U.S. Navy presence and military
influence in the Western Pacific; and
!
capabilities for detecting, tracking, and if necessary countering PLA
Navy SSBNs equipped with long-range SLBMs.
Each of these is discussed below.
Capabilities for Taiwan Strait Crisis or Conflict. U.S. military
operations in a potential crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait area would likely
!
!
!
building a railway line from China through Cambodia to the sea;
improving its ability to project air and sea power into the South China Sea
from mainland China and Hainan Island;
considering funding a $20-billion canal that would cross the Kra Isthmus
of Thailand, which would allow ships to bypass the Strait of Malacca and
permit China to establish port facilities there.
According to the article,
The Pentagon report said China, by militarily controlling oil shipping sea
lanes, could threaten ships, “thereby creating a climate of uncertainty about the
safety of all ships on the high seas.”
The report noted that the vast amount of oil shipments through the sea
lanes, along with growing piracy and maritime terrorism, prompted China, as
well as India, to build up naval power at “chokepoints” along the sea routes from
the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea.
“China ... is looking not only to build a blue-water navy to control the sea
lanes, but also to develop undersea mines and missile capabilities to deter the
potential disruption of its energy supplies from potential threats, including the
U.S. Navy, especially in the case of a conflict with Taiwan,” the report said....
“The Iraq war, in particular, revived concerns over the impact of a
disturbance in Middle Eastern supplies or a U.S. naval blockade,” the report said,
noting that Chinese military leaders want an ocean-going navy and “undersea
retaliatory capability to protect the sea lanes.”
China believes the U.S. military will disrupt China’s energy imports in any
CRS-42
Potential Implications for Required U.S. Navy Capabilities
Potential implications of China’s naval modernization for required U.S. Navy
capabilities can be organized into three groups:
!
capabilities for a crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait area;
!
capabilities for maintaining U.S. Navy presence and military
influence in the Western Pacific; and
!
capabilities for detecting, tracking, and if necessary countering PLA
Navy SSBNs equipped with long-range SLBMs.
Each of these is discussed below.
Capabilities for Taiwan Strait Crisis or Conflict. U.S. military
operations in a potential crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait area would likely
conflict over Taiwan, and sees the United States as an unpredictable country that
violates others’ sovereignty and wants to “encircle” China, the report said.
See also Edward Cody, “China Builds A Smaller, Stronger Military,” Washington Post,
April 12, 2005, p. 1.
CRS-46
feature a strong reliance on U.S. Navy forces and land-based U.S. Air Force
aircraft.120128 If air bases in Japan and South Korea are, for political reasons, not
available to the United States for use in the operation, or if air bases in Japan, South
Korea, or Guam are rendered less useful by PLA attacks using TBMs, LACMs, or
special operations forces, then the reliance on U.S. Navy forces could become
greater.
For the U.S. Navy, a crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait could place a
premium on the following:
!
on-station or early-arriving forces;
!
forces with a capability to defeat PLA anti-access weapons and
platforms;
!
forces with an ability to operate in an environment that could be
characterized by IW/IO and possibly EMP or the use of nuclear
weapons directly against Navy ships; and
!
forces that can be ready to conduct operations by about 2010, or by
some later date.
conflict over Taiwan, and sees the United States as an unpredictable country that
violates others’ sovereignty and wants to “encircle” China, the report said.
See also Edward Cody, “China Builds A Smaller, Stronger Military,” Washington Post,
April 12, 2005, p. 1.
120
For discussions relating to Taiwan’s potential military capabilities in such a scenario, see
CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990; and CRS Report
RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the ‘One China’ Policy — Key Statements from
Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, both by Shirley A. Kan.
CRS-43
On-Station and Early-Arriving Forces. In the scenario of a short-duration
conflict, on-station and early-arriving U.S. Navy forces could be of particular value,
while later-arriving U.S. Navy forces might be of less value, at least in preventing
initial success by PLA forces.
On-Station Forces. Given the difficulty of knowing with certainty when a
Taiwan Strait crisis or conflict might occur, having forces on-station at the start of
the crisis or conflict is a goal that would most reliably be met by maintaining a
standing forward deployment of U.S. Navy forces in the area. Maintaining a standing
forward deployment of U.S. Navy forces in the area while also maintaining U.S.
Navy forward deployments in other regions, such as the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean
region and the Mediterranean Sea, would require a Navy with a certain minimum
number of ships.
Although it is sometimes said that it takes three U.S. Navy ships to keep one
ship forward deployed in an overseas location, the actual ratio traditionally has been
higher. For example, if U.S. Navy ships are operated in the traditional manner —
with a single crew for each ship and deployments lasting six months — then
maintaining one U.S. Navy cruiser or destroyer continuously forward-deployed to the
128
For discussions relating to Taiwan’s potential military capabilities in such a scenario, see
CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990; and CRS Report
RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the ‘One China’ Policy — Key Statements from
Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, both by Shirley A. Kan.
CRS-47
Western Pacific might require a total of about five San Diego-based cruisers or
destroyers.121129
Stationkeeping multipliers like these can be reduced by homeporting U.S. Navy
ships at locations closer to Taiwan (such as Japan, Guam, Hawaii, or perhaps
Singapore) or by deploying ships for longer periods of time and operating them with
multiple crews that are rotated out to each ship. The Navy has an aircraft carrier
strike group and other ships122, amphibious ships, and mine warfare ships homeported in Japan, and
three attack submarines
homeported in Guam.123130 The Navy has also experimented
with the concept of
deploying certain Navy ships (particularly surface combatants)
for 12, 18, or 24
months and rotating multiple crews out to each ship.124131
Early-Arriving Forces. Having early-arriving U.S. Navy forces could mean
having forces based in locations Western Pacific locations such as Japan, Guam,
Singapore, or perhaps Hawaii, rather than on the U.S. West Coast.125 Table 5 shows
121
For a discussion, see archived CRS Report 92-803, Naval Forward Deployments and the
Size of the Navy, by Ronald O’Rourke. See Table 1. (Out of print and available directly
from the author.)
122
The other ships include amphibious ships and mine countermeasures ships.
123
One of these SSNs, the San Francisco, was significantly damaged in a collision with an
undersea mountain near Guam in January 2005. The ship was transferred to the Puget
Sound Naval Shipyard at Bremerton, WA, for repairs, and is to be replaced at Guam by
another SSN, the Buffalo, in July 2007.
124
For a discussion see CRS Report RS21338, Navy Ship Deployments: New Approaches
— Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
125
Other potential Western Pacific locations, at least in theory, include South Korea (where
other U.S. forces have been based for years), the Philippines (where the U.S. Navy ships
used as a major repair port until the early 1990s), and Australia.
CRS-44132 Table 5 shows
potential ship travel times to the Taiwan Strait area from various ports in the Pacific,
based on average ship travel speeds. All the ports shown in the table except
Singapore are current U.S. Navy home ports.126133 U.S. Navy submarines, aircraft
carriers, cruisers, and destroyers have maximum sustained speeds of more than 30
knots, but their average speeds over longer transits in some cases might be closer to
25 knots or less due rough sea conditions or, in the case of the cruisers or destroyers,
which are conventionally powered, the need slow down for at-sea refueling. The
Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is to have a maximum sustained speed of about
45 knots, but its average speed over long transits would likely be less than that.
As can be seen in the table, Yokosuka, Guam, and Singapore are less than half
as far from the Taiwan Strait area as are Pearl Harbor, Everett, WA,127134 and San
Diego. Depending on their average travel speeds, ships homeported in Yokosuka,
Guam, and Singapore could arrive in the Taiwan Strait area roughly two to four days
after leaving port, ships homeported in Pearl Harbor might arrive about six to nine
days after leaving port, and ships homeported on the U.S. West Coast might arrive
about 7 to 12 days after leaving port. The time needed to get a ship and its crew
ready to leave port would add to their total response times. Depending on a ship’s
129
For a discussion, see archived CRS Report 92-803, Naval Forward Deployments and the
Size of the Navy, by Ronald O’Rourke. (Out of print and available directly from the author.)
130
One of these SSNs, the San Francisco, was significantly damaged in a collision with an
undersea mountain near Guam in January 2005. The ship was transferred to the Puget
Sound Naval Shipyard at Bremerton, WA, for repairs, and is to be replaced at Guam by
another SSN, the Buffalo, in July 2007.
131
For a discussion see CRS Report RS21338, Navy Ship Deployments: New Approaches
— Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
132
Other potential Western Pacific locations, at least in theory, include South Korea (where
other U.S. forces have been based for years), the Philippines (where the U.S. Navy ships
used as a major repair port until the early 1990s), and Australia.
133
U.S. Navy ships visit Singapore, and there is a U.S. Navy logistic group there, but no U.S.
Navy ships are currently homeported at Singapore.
134
Everett is located on the Puget Sound, about 23 nautical miles north of Seattle.
CRS-48
status at the moment it was ordered to the Taiwan Strait area, preparing it for rapid
departure might require anywhere from less than one day to a few days.
Table 5. Potential Ship Travel Times to Taiwan Strait Area
Minimum travel time in days,
based on average speeds belowb
Straight-line distance to
Taiwan Strait areaa
(nautical miles)
20 knots
25 knots
30 knots
Yokosuka, Japan
1,076
2.2
1.8
1.5
Guam
1,336
2.8
2.2
1.9
1,794
3.7
3.0
2.5
4,283
8.9
7.1
5.9
Everett, WA
5,223
10.9
8.7
7.3
San Diego
5,933
12.3
9.9
8.2
Port
c
Singapore
d
Pearl Harbor
e
Source: Table prepared by CRS using straight-line distances calculated by the “how far is it”
calculator, available at [http://www.indo.com/distance/].
a. Defined as a position in the sea at 24oN, 124oE, which is roughly 130 nautical miles east of Taiwan,
i.e., on the other side of Taiwan from the Taiwan Strait.
b. Actual travel times may be greater due to the possible need for ships to depart from a straight-line
course so as to avoid land barriers, remain within port-area shipping channels, etc.
c. Distance calculated from Tokyo, which is about 25 nautical miles north of Yokosuka.
d. No U.S. Navy ships are currently homeported at Singapore.
e. Distance calculated from Honolulu, which is about 6 nautical miles southeast of Pearl Harbor.
126
U.S. Navy ships visit Singapore, and there is a U.S. Navy logistic group there, but no U.S.
Navy ships are currently homeported at Singapore.
127
Everett is located on the Puget Sound, about 23 nautical miles north of Seattle.
CRS-45
Regarding the possibility of transferring of a carrier from the continental United
States to Hawaii or Guam — an option that DOD considered in 2005-2006 but
decided against in 20071282007135 — one observer states:
Currently the United States maintains one aircraft carrier full-time in the Western
Pacific. In the event of a conflict with China over Taiwan, however, particularly
given the various [PLA] threats to land-based air outlined above, having more
aircraft carriers on the scene will be extremely valuable. Other than any carriers
that might be transiting through the region, however, currently the closest
additional carriers would be those based on the west coast of the United States.
Given that a conflict with China could begin with little warning, this means that
as much as two weeks could elapse before additional aircraft carriers reached the
area of combat operations. The Department of Defense has already
recommended forward-deploying an additional aircraft carrier in the Pacific, but
it is important to note that precisely where this carrier is forward-deployed is
significant. In particular, an aircraft carrier based in Hawaii would still take at
least a week to reach waters near Taiwan. An aircraft carrier based in Guam,
Singapore, or elsewhere in the Western Pacific, by contrast, could arrive on the
scene in about three days.129
136
135
136
DOD decided to home port the carrier in question, the Carl Vinson, at San Diego.
China’s Military Modernization and the Cross-Strait Balance, [Statement of] Roger Cliff,
September 2005, Testimony presented before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission on September 15, 2005, pp. 9-10. (Hereafter cited as Cliff 9/15/05
testimony.)
CRS-49
Basing additional forces in Japan, Guam, Singapore, or Hawaii could increase
the importance of taking actions to defend these locations against potential attack by
TBMs, LACMs, or special operations forces.130137
Defeating PLA Anti-Access Forces. Defeating PLA maritime anti-access
forces would require capabilities for countering:
128
!
large numbers of TBMs, including some possibly equipped with
MaRVs;
!
large numbers of LACMs and ASCMs, including some advanced
ASCMs such as the SS-N-27 and SS-N-22;
!
substantial numbers of land-based fighters, strike fighters, maritime
bombers, and SAMs, including some built to modern designs;
!
a substantial number of submarines, including a few that are nuclearpowered and a significant portion that are built to modern designs;
!
a substantial number of destroyers, frigates, and fast attack craft,
including some built to modern designs; and
DOD decided to home port the carrier in question, the Carl Vinson, at San Diego.
129
China’s Military Modernization and the Cross-Strait Balance, [Statement of] Roger Cliff,
September 2005, Testimony presented before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission on September 15, 2005, pp. 9-10. (Hereafter cited as Cliff 9/15/05
testimony.)
130
For a list of recommended actions for improving the ability of bases in the Western
Pacific to defend themselves from PLA attack, 2007 RAND report, pp. 95-101.
CRS-46
!
potentially large numbers of mines of different types, including some
advanced models.
Countering TBMs. Countering large numbers of TBMs, including some
possibly equipped with MaRVs, could entail some or all of the following:
!
operating, if possible, in a way that reduces the likelihood of being
detected and tracked by PLA maritime surveillance systems;
!
attacking the surveillance systems that detect and track U.S. Navy
ships operating at sea, and the network that transmits this targeting
data to the TBMs;
!
attacking TBMs at their launch sites;
!
intercepting TBMs in flight, which in some cases could require
firing two or perhaps even three interceptor missiles at individual
TBMs to ensure their destruction;
!
decoying MaRVs away from U.S. Navy ships.
Potential implications of the above points for Navy missile-defense programs
are discussed in this next section of this report.
137
For a list of recommended actions for improving the ability of bases in the Western
Pacific to defend themselves from PLA attack, 2007 RAND report, pp. 95-101.
CRS-50
Countering Submarines. Countering a substantial number of submarines
would likely require a coordinated effort by an ASW network consisting of some or
all of the following: distributed sensors, unmanned vehicles, submarines, surface
ships, helicopters, and maritime patrol aircraft. Defeating torpedoes fired by PLA
submarines would require U.S. submarines and surface ships to have systems for
detecting, decoying, and perhaps destroying those torpedoes.
ASW operations against well-maintained and well-operated submarines
traditionally have often been time-consuming. Acoustic conditions in at least some
of the waters around Taiwan are reportedly poor for ASW, which could make the
task of countering PLA submarines in these areas more difficult.131138 Success in an
ASW operation is highly dependent on the proficiency of the people operating the
ASW equipment. ASW operational proficiency can take time to develop and can
atrophy significantly if not regularly exercised.
In December 2004, the Navy approved a new concept of operations (CONOPS)
— a new general approach — to ASW. As described in one article,
The Navy’s new concept of operations for anti-submarine warfare calls for
the use of standoff weapons, networked sensor fields and unmanned vehicles to
detect and attack diesel submarines in littoral waters, rather than a reliance on
“force on force” engagements.
131
See, for example, the statement of Lyle J. Goldstein and William Murray in 2/6/04 USCC
hearing, pp. 148, 150, and 152.
CRS-47
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Vern Clark approved the CONOPS Dec.
20, according to a Navy spokesman. The five-page document will guide the
development of a comprehensive ASW master plan that is expected to be
classified, though it might have an unclassified version.
The CONOPS envisions hundreds or thousands of small sensors that would
“permeate the operating environment, yielding unprecedented situational
awareness and highly detailed pictures of the battlespace.” Attack submarines
that today carry sensors and weapons could in the future provide logistical
support to and serve as command and control bases for off-board sensors and
“kill vehicles,” the CONOPS states. The networking of autonomous sensor
fields with manned and unmanned vehicles will change ASW from a
“platform-intensive” to a “sensor-rich” operation, it adds.132
139
138
See, for example, the statement of Lyle J. Goldstein and William Murray in 2/6/04 USCC
hearing, pp. 148, 150, and 152.
139
Jason Ma, “ASW Concept Of Operations Sees ‘Sensor Rich Way Of Fighting Subs,”
Inside the Navy, February 7, 2005. A January 2005 article stated:
The Navy cannot fight diesel subs with “force on force,” such as sending
one sub to defeat another sub, because that is not cost effective, [Rear Admiral
John Waickwicz, chief of Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare Command] told Inside
the Navy. For example, the new Virginia-class subs cost about $2 billion each,
while advanced diesel subs cost hundreds of millions of dollars each.
Instead of force on force, ASW tactics will emphasize using networked
sensors and communications to allow one platform — like a sub, Littoral Combat
Ship, or aircraft — to defeat multiple diesel subs, he said. “You have to be able
CRS-51
At a June 20, 2005, conference on the future of the Navy organized by the
American Enterprise Institute (AEI), Admiral Vernon Clark, who was the Chief of
Naval Operations until July 22, 2005, stated:
[The Chinese are] building submarines at a rapid rate. They’re buying them
from other countries. They’re building their own capabilities. And let me just
to make a long story short, I published a new ASW concept [of operations] a
couple of months ago. I fundamentally don’t believe that the old attrition
warfare[,] force on force anti-submarine warfare[,] construct is the right way to
go in the 21st century. [The questioner] mentioned that I had spent part of my
past life in the submarine warfare business. I have. I trailed the Soviets around.
I know what that’s about. And what I really believe is going to happen in the
future is that when we apply the netted force construct in anti-submarine warfare,
it will change the calculus in that area of warfighting forever. And it will be a
courageous commander who decides that he’s going to come waltzing into our
network.133
132
Jason Ma, “ASW Concept Of Operations Sees ‘Sensor Rich Way Of Fighting Subs,”
Inside the Navy, February 7, 2005. A January 2005 article stated:
The Navy cannot fight diesel subs with “force on force,” such as sending
one sub to defeat another sub, because that is not cost effective, [Rear Admiral
John Waickwicz, chief of Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare Command] told Inside
the Navy. For example, the new Virginia-class subs cost about $2 billion each,
while advanced diesel subs cost hundreds of millions of dollars each.
Instead of force on force, ASW tactics will emphasize using networked
sensors and communications to allow one platform — like a sub, Littoral Combat
Ship, or aircraft — to defeat multiple diesel subs, he said. “You have to be able
140
to destroy them at a very large rate, because potential enemies may have a large
number” of subs, he explained.
“We don’t have that luxury to go one against one anymore,” he added,
noting that individual ASW platforms will rely on their greater capability to take
on multiple subs. (Jason Ma, “Admiral: Navy’s ASW Tactics To Be Aggressive
And Offense-Minded,” Inside the Navy, January 17, 2005.)
133140
Transcript of conference, as posted on the Internet by AEI at [http://www.aei.org/events/
filter.all,eventID.1051/transcript.asp].
CRS-48
Implementing this new ASW concept of operations reportedly will require
overcoming some technical challenges, particularly with regard to linking together
large numbers of distributed sensors, some of which might be sonobuoys as small as
soda cans.134
Countering Mines. Countering naval mines is a notoriously time-consuming
task that can require meticulous operations by participating surface ships,
submarines, and helicopters. The Navy’s mine countermeasures (MCM) capabilities
have been an area of concern in Congress and elsewhere for a number of years.135
The Navy for the last several years has been developing several new MCM systems
that are scheduled to enter service over the next few years.136 Unmanned surface
vehicles (USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) are playing an
increasing role in MCM operations.
An October 2004 article stated:
more than just improving antisubmarine operations, Clark’s goal is to
“fundamentally change” ASW operations away from individual platforms —
ship, submarine or aircraft — to a system with the attributes of “pervasive
awareness, persistence and speed, all enabled by technological agility.”
To meet this goal, “we think we’re going to have to go offboard of our
platforms,” using unmanned aerial, surface and underwater vehicles, and a
network of distributed sensors to provide the identification and localization that
would allow quick transition to the attack, [Rear Admiral Mark W. Kenny, the
flag officer in charge of Task Force ASW] said. “That’s what we’re focused on:
(finding) a high number of quiet contacts in a demanding environment with a
timeline that requires us to gain access quickly.”
The task force has tested those concepts in at-sea experiments focused on
distributive systems, which could be an array of easily deployed underwater
sensors, passive and active, networked together and linked to manned platforms,
he explained.
Among them is the Advanced Deployable System, which the Program
Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems currently is studying, along
with such other ASW-related concepts as a multisensor Torpedo Recognition and
Alertment Function Segment (previously known as Torpedo Recognition and
Alertment Function Processor) and the Multifunction Towed Array to improve
detection and tracking capability. (Otto Kreisher, “As Underwater Threat ReEmerges, Navy Renews Emphasis On ASW,” Seapower, October 2004, p. 15.)
134
Jason Ma, “Autonomous ASW Sensor Field Seen As High-Risk Technical Hurdle,”
Inside the Navy, June 6, 2005. See also Jason Ma, “Navy’s Surface Warfare Chief Cites
Progress In ASW Development,” Inside the Navy, January 17, 2005.
135
See, for example, General Accounting Office, Navy Acquisitions[:] Improved Littoral
War-Fighting Capabilities Needed, GAO-01-493, May 2001; and General Accounting
Office, Navy Mine Warfare[:] Plans to Improve Countermeasures Capabilities Unclear,
GAO/NSIAD-98-135, June 1998.
136
The Navy’s mine warfare plan is available on the Internet at [http://www.exwar.org/
Htm/4000.htm]. See also Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy
FY 2008 Budget, Washington, 2007. (Office of Budget, February 2007) pp. 3-14.
CRS-49Re-
CRS-52
Implementing this new ASW concept of operations reportedly will require
overcoming some technical challenges, particularly with regard to linking together
large numbers of distributed sensors, some of which might be sonobuoys as small as
soda cans.141
Countering Mines. Countering naval mines is a notoriously time-consuming
task that can require meticulous operations by participating surface ships,
submarines, and helicopters. The Navy’s mine countermeasures (MCM) capabilities
have been an area of concern in Congress and elsewhere for a number of years.142
The Navy for the last several years has been developing several new MCM systems
that are scheduled to enter service over the next few years.143 Unmanned surface
vehicles (USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) are playing an
increasing role in MCM operations.
Operating Amidst IW/IO, EMP, and Nuclear Weapons. Operating
effectively in an environment that could be characterized by IW/IO and possibly
EMP or the use of nuclear weapons directly against Navy ships could require, among
other things:
!
measures to achieve and maintain strong computer network security;
!
hardening of ships, aircraft, and their various systems against EMP;
and
!
hardening of ships against the overpressure, thermal, and radiation
effects of a nuclear weapon that is detonated somewhat close to the
ship, but not close enough to destroy the ship outright.
Forces Ready by About 2010, or by a Later Date. As mentioned earlier,
some analysts speculate that China may attain (or believe that is has attained) a
capable maritime anti-access capability, or important elements of it, by about 2010,
while other observers believe this will happen some time after 2010. The issue of
whether or when China might attain such a capability can influence the kinds of
options that are available to U.S. policymakers for addressing the situation.
Emerges, Navy Renews Emphasis On ASW,” Seapower, October 2004, p. 15.)
141
Jason Ma, “Autonomous ASW Sensor Field Seen As High-Risk Technical Hurdle,”
Inside the Navy, June 6, 2005. See also Jason Ma, “Navy’s Surface Warfare Chief Cites
Progress In ASW Development,” Inside the Navy, January 17, 2005.
142
See, for example, General Accounting Office, Navy Acquisitions[:] Improved Littoral
War-Fighting Capabilities Needed, GAO-01-493, May 2001; and General Accounting
Office, Navy Mine Warfare[:] Plans to Improve Countermeasures Capabilities Unclear,
GAO/NSIAD-98-135, June 1998.
143
The Navy’s mine warfare plan is available on the Internet at [http://www.exwar.org/
Htm/4000.htm]. See also Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy
FY 2008 Budget, Washington, 2007. (Office of Budget, February 2007) pp. 3-14.
CRS-53
Options for a Conflict Between Now and 2010. Options that could enhance
U.S. Navy capabilities for a crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait area between now
and 2010 include, among others, the following:
137
!
increasing currently planned activities for physically surveying the
physical environment around Taiwan, so as to more quickly update
older data that might unreliable, and to fill in any gaps in
understanding regarding how local atmospheric and water conditions
might affect the performance of radars and sonars;
!
increasing currently planned levels of monitoring and surveillance
of PLA forces that are likely to participate in a crisis or conflict in
the Taiwan Strait area;137144
!
increasing currently planned levels of contact between the U.S. Navy
and Taiwan military forces, so as to maintain a fully up-to-date U.S.
understanding of Taiwan military capabilities, plans, and doctrine
(and vice versa);
A November 2006 press report, quoting unnamed U.S. defense officials, stated that
Admiral William Fallon, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, “has restricted U.S.
intelligence-gathering activities against China, fearing that disclosure of the activities would
upset relations with Beijing. The restrictions are hindering efforts to know more about
China’s military buildup, the officials said.” (Bill Gertz, “China Sub Secretly Stalked U.S.
Fleet, Washington Times, November 13, 2006: 13.)
CRS-50
!
increasing currently planned military exercises that are tailored to
the potential requirements of a crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait
area;
!
increasing the number of ships that are assigned to the Pacific Fleet,
or the number that are forward-homeported at locations such as
Japan, Guam, Hawaii, and perhaps Singapore, or the numbers of
both;
!
deferring current plans for retiring existing ships or aircraft before
2010, particularly ships and aircraft whose nominal service lives
would otherwise extend to 2010 or beyond;
!
modernizing ships and aircraft now in service;
!
reactivating recently retired ships and aircraft;138 and
!
increasing currently planned military exercises that are tailored to
the potential requirements of a crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait
area;
!
increasing the number of ships that are assigned to the Pacific Fleet,
or the number that are forward-homeported at locations such as
Japan, Guam, Hawaii, and perhaps Singapore, or the numbers of
both;
!
deferring current plans for retiring existing ships or aircraft before
2010, particularly ships and aircraft whose nominal service lives
would otherwise extend to 2010 or beyond;
!
modernizing ships and aircraft now in service;
!
reactivating recently retired ships and aircraft;145 and
144
A November 2006 press report, quoting unnamed U.S. defense officials, stated that
Admiral William Fallon, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, “has restricted U.S.
intelligence-gathering activities against China, fearing that disclosure of the activities would
upset relations with Beijing. The restrictions are hindering efforts to know more about
China’s military buildup, the officials said.” (Bill Gertz, “China Sub Secretly Stalked U.S.
Fleet, Washington Times, November 13, 2006: 13.)
145
Potential candidates include, among others, Spruance (DD-963) class destroyers, which
could be reactivated as ASW platforms or missile shooters, Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)
class frigates and TAGOS-type ocean surveillance (i.e., towed-array sonar) ships, both of
which could be reactivated as ASW platforms, and ASW-capable aircraft such as S-3
carrier-based airplanes and P-3 land-based maritime patrol aircraft.
CRS-54
!
procuring new items that can be completed between now and 2010,
such as weapons, aircraft, and Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs).
Options For A Conflict After 2010. Options that could enhance U.S. Navy
capabilities for a crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait area some time after 2010
include items from the above list, plus the procurement of larger ships that take
several years to build (e.g., SSNs, aircraft carriers, destroyers, and cruisers), and the
development and procurement of aircraft and weapons that are not currently ready
for procurement.
Capabilities for Maintaining Regional Presence and Influence. For
the U.S. Navy, maintaining regional presence and military influence in the Western
Pacific could place a premium on the following, among other things:
138
!
maintaining a substantial U.S. Navy ship presence throughout the
region;
!
making frequent port calls in the region;
!
conducting frequent exercises with other navies in the region;
!
taking actions to ensure system compatibility between U.S. Navy
ships and ships of allied and friendly nations in the region; and
!
conducting frequent exchanges between U.S. Navy personnel and
military and political leaders of other countries in the region.
Potential candidates include, among others, Spruance (DD-963) class destroyers, which
could be reactivated as ASW platforms or missile shooters, Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)
class frigates and TAGOS-type ocean surveillance (i.e., towed-array sonar) ships, both of
which could be reactivated as ASW platforms, and ASW-capable aircraft such as S-3
carrier-based airplanes and P-3 land-based maritime patrol aircraft.
CRS-51
Factors influencing the Navy’s ability to maintain a substantial U.S. Navy ship
presence throughout the region include the total number of ships in the Navy’s
Pacific Fleet, the number of Navy ships forward-homeported at locations such as
Japan, Guam, Hawaii, and perhaps Singapore, and ship-crewing and -deployment
approaches (e.g., six-month deployments and single crews vs. longer deployments
with crew rotation).
Capabilities for Tracking and Countering PLA SSBNs. Detecting,
tracking, and if necessary countering PLA Navy SSBNs equipped with long-range
SLBMs could require some or all of the following:
!
a seabed-based sensor network analogous to the Sound Surveillance
System (SOSUS) that the U.S. Navy used during the Cold War to
detect and track Soviet nuclear-powered submarines;
!
ocean surveillance ships with additional sonars, which would be
similar to the TAGOS-type ocean-surveillance ships that the Navy
also used during the Cold War to help detect and track Soviet
nuclear-powered submarines; and
CRS-55
!
enough SSNs so that some can be assigned to tracking and if
necessary attacking PLA SSBNs.139146
Potential Oversight Issues for Congress
Potential oversight questions for Congress arising from China’s military
modernization and its potential implications for required U.S. Navy capabilities can
be organized into three groups:
!
questions relating to China’s military modernization as a defenseplanning priority;
!
questions relating to U.S. Navy force structure and basing
arrangements; and
!
questions relating to Navy warfare areas and programs.
Each of these is discussed below.
China as a Defense-Planning Priority
DOD Planning. Is DOD giving adequate weight in its planning to China’s
military modernization as opposed to other concerns, such as current operations in
139
Additional measures that could assist in tracking PLA SSBNs include satellite
surveillance (particularly when the SSBNs are in port or if they surface during their
deployments) and human intelligence.
CRS-52
Iraq and Afghanistan and the global war on terrorism (GWOT) generally? Is DOD
giving adequate weight in its planning to the funding needs of the Navy as opposed
to those of the other services, such as the Army?
Military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to increased focus on the
funding needs of the Army and Marine Corps, since these two services are heavily
committed to those operations. Placing increasing emphasis on China in DOD
planning, on the other hand, would likely lead to increased focus on the funding
needs of the Navy and Air Force, since these two services are generally viewed as the
ones most likely to be of the most importance for a crisis or conflict in the Taiwan
Strait area. In a situation of finite DOD resources, striking the correct planning
balance between operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the GWOT generally, and
China’s military modernization is viewed by some observers as a key DOD planning
challenge.
Navy Planning. Is the Navy is giving adequate weight in its planning to
China’s military modernization as opposed to other concerns, such as the GWOT?
Required Navy capabilities for participating in the GWOT overlap with, but are
not identical to, required Navy capabilities for responding to China’s naval
modernization. In a situation of finite Navy resources, striking the correct balance
146
Additional measures that could assist in tracking PLA SSBNs include satellite
surveillance (particularly when the SSBNs are in port or if they surface during their
deployments) and human intelligence.
CRS-56
between investments for participating in the GWOT and those for responding to
China’s naval modernization is viewed by some observers as a key Navy planning
challenge.
The Navy since 2005 has implemented several organizational and programmatic
initiatives that reflect an interest in increasing the Navy’s role in the GWOT.140147 At
the same time, the Navy has occasionally affirmed the importance of China’s military
modernization in its budget planning. At a June 20, 2005 conference on the future
of the Navy organized by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), for example,
Admiral Clark was asked to comment on China. He stated in part:
Well, I think that, you know, we’re always quick to point out that China’s
not our enemy, but China is building a very capable maritime capability, and so
we should not be blind to that.
So what does it mean? Well, here’s what I believe that it means. I believe
that if you study the Chinese, you see that there’s been some change in their
thinking over the course of the last number of years. Here’s this mammoth land,
continent; here’s — you know, it would be easy to think about this country as
being land-centric in terms of its national security focus, but what we’re seeing
is that that really isn’t where they’re putting their money. They’re putting their
investments in, and what it looks like, if you interpret their actions, is that their
primary concerns are in the area of aviation and maritime capability that other
nations would bring to bear in their area, in their region of the world. And so
they’re trying to build a capability to make sure that they’re not pushed into a
corner in their own part of the world.
140
For further discussion, see CRS Report RS22373, Navy Role in Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT) — Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS-53
I understand that this morning there was conjecture about their ability to
build missile systems that will threaten long-range land bases and moving targets
in the future, like ships at sea. And I will tell you that whether they’re going to
do that or not, I guarantee you that I believe that it is my duty and responsibility
to expect that, based on what I understand about what they’re doing, to expect
that they’re trying to do that. And I will tell you that the budget submit that’s on
the Hill is providing the kind of capability to make sure that the United States
Navy can fight in that theater or exist in that theater, understanding the kind of
capability that they’re trying to bring to bear.141148
A Navy-Marine Corps-Coast Guard maritime strategy document released on
October 17, 2007,149 uses the terms “terrorism,” “terrorists,” or “terrorist networks”
eight times, and the terms “major power war,” “major power,” and “major combat
operations” six times. The document does not mention specific terrorist
organizations (such as al Qaeda) or specific foreign countries (such as China, Iran,
147
For further discussion, see CRS Report RS22373, Navy Role in Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT) — Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
148
Transcript of conference, as posted on the Internet by AEI at [http://www.aei.org/events/
filter.all,eventID.1051/transcript.asp].
149
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, October 2007, 18 pp.
CRS-57
North Korea, or Russia) by name, perhaps because the authors of the document
believed it would be inappropriate to do so in a general strategy document.150
An October 9, 2007, memorandum on Department of the Navy objectives for
FY2008 and beyond presents six major objectives, along with supporting tasks for
each objective. The second of the six objectives is “Use the Navy-Marine Corps
Team to aggressively prosecute the Global War on Terrorism.” None of the other
five objectives focuses specifically on preparing for major power conflict, though
several of them contain supporting tasks that relate to being prepared for major power
conflict. The document does not mention specific terrorist organizations or specific
foreign countries by name, perhaps because the authors of the document believed it
would be inappropriate to do so in an objectives memorandum.151
Navy Force Structure and Basing Arrangements
Size of the Fleet. Is the Navy planning a fleet with enough ships to address
potential challenges posed by China’s naval modernization while also meeting other
responsibilities?
As of May 11October 12, 2007, the Navy included a total of 276279 ships of various kinds.
The Navy is proposing to maintain in coming years a fleet of 313 ships.142152 In
assessing the adequacy of the 313-ship proposal, a key potential issue for Congress
is whether it includes enough ships to address potential challenges posed by China’s
naval modernization while also meeting other responsibilities, including maintaining
forward deployments of Navy ships in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region and
conducting less-frequent operations in other parts of the world, such as the
Mediterranean Sea, the Caribbean, the waters around South America, and the waters
off West Africa. If increased numbers of Navy ships are needed to address potential
150
The Navy’s final Cold War-era strategy document — the mid-1980s Maritime Strategy,
also called the Forward Maritime Strategy — referred to the Soviet Union and its military
forces, and to certain other named countries, on several occasions. (See James D. Watkins,
“The Maritime Strategy,” in The Maritime Strategy, a supplement to the January 1986 issue
of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.)
151
Memorandum dated October 9, 2007, entitled “Department of the Navy Objectives for
FY 2008 and Beyond,” and signed by the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval
Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The other five objectives listed in
the memorandum are “Provide a Total Naval Workforce capable and optimized to support
the National Defense Strategy,” “Build the Navy-Marine Corps Force for Tomorrow,”
“Safeguard the People and Resources of the Navy-Marine Corps Team [and] Integrate
Safety and Risk Management into all on and off-duty evolutions to maximize mission
readiness and to establish DON [the Department of the Navy] as an organization with world
class safety where no mishap is accepted as the cost of doing business,” “Strengthen ethics
as a foundation of exemplary conduct within the Department of the Navy,” and “Provide
first-rate facilities to support stationing, training and operations of Naval forces.”
(Underlining as in the original.)
152
For a detailed discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and
Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS-58
challenges posed by China’s naval modernization, fewer ships might be available for
meeting other responsibilities.
Some Members of Congress have expressed concern in recent years that the
declining total number of ships in the Navy may make it difficult for the Navy to
perform all if its various missions, at least not without putting undue stress on Navy
personnel and equipment. Navy officials have responded that the proposed 313-ship
Navy would be sufficient to perform the Navy’s various peacetime and wartime
missions.
Division of Fleet Between Atlantic and Pacific. Should a greater
percentage of the Navy be assigned to the Pacific Fleet? The division of the Navy’s
ships between the Atlantic and Pacific fleets is a longstanding question in U.S. Navy
planning. Atlantic Fleet ships conduct operations in the North and South Atlantic,
the Caribbean, and the Mediterranean Sea, while Pacific Fleet ships conduct
operations in the Pacific Ocean, including the Western Pacific. Ships from both
fleets are used to conduct operations in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean area. Atlantic
Fleet ships homeported on the U.S. East Coast that use the Suez Canal have a shorter
141
Transcript of conference, as posted on the Internet by AEI at [http://www.aei.org/events/
filter.all,eventID.1051/transcript.asp].
142
For a detailed discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and
Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS-54
transit distance to the Persian Gulf than do Pacific Fleet ships homeported on the
U.S. West Coast.
In recent years, roughly 45% to 47% of the Navy’s ships had been assigned to
the Pacific Fleet, including 46% to 50% of the Navy’s SSNs and 45% to 48% of the
Navy’s cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. Increasing the share of the Navy assigned
to the Pacific Fleet could, other things held equal, permit the Navy to maintain a
larger number of ships forward deployed to the Western Pacific. Using the size of
the Navy as of the end of FY2005 (282 ships, including 54 SSNs and 99 cruisers,
destroyers, and frigates), increasing the Pacific Fleet’s share by 5 or 10 percentage
points would result in the Pacific fleet having an additional 14 to 28 ships, including
roughly 3 to 5 SSNs and roughly 5 to 10 to cruisers, destroyers, and frigates.
The final report on the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) directed the
Navy to “to adjust its force posture and basing to provide at least six operationally
available and sustainable carriers and 60% of its submarines in the Pacific to support
engagement, presence and deterrence.”143153
Supporters of shifting a greater share of the Navy to the Pacific Fleet could
argue that responding to China’s naval modernization requires, among other things,
maintaining an increased number of ships forward deployed to the Western Pacific,
and that the low likelihood of war in Europe and the ability of U.S. allies in Europe
to deploy their own ships to the Mediterranean reduces the number of ships that the
Navy needs to maintain there. Opponents of this option could argue that shifting
Navy ships from the U.S. East Coast to the U.S. West Coast could make it harder to
maintain deployments of a given number of ships to the Persian Gulf (due to the
increase in transit distance to the Gulf for ships transferred from the East Coast to the
West Coast) and could make it more difficult for the Navy to balance the
153
U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, 2006.
(February 6, 2006) p. 47.
CRS-59
maintenance demands of the fleet against the locations of repair and overhaul yards,
many of which are located on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts.
Forward Homeporting in the Western Pacific. Is the Navy moving
quickly enough to forward-homeport additional ships in the Western Pacific? Should
the Navy expand the number of additional ships it is thinking of homeporting in the
area?
Increasing the number of ships forward homeported in the Western Pacific can
increase both the number of ships that the Navy can maintain forward-deployed to
that area on a day to day basis, and the number that can arrive in the early stages of
a conflict in the Western Pacific, including the Taiwan Strait area. Observers who
are concerned about deterring or responding to a conflict in the Taiwan Strait area by
2010 might emphasize the importance of implementing these actions as quickly as
possible. They might also argue in favor of expanding the number of ships to be
transferred to Western Pacific home ports. These additional ships could include
SSNs, converted Trident cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), surface combatants,
and perhaps one more aircraft carrier (i.e., a carrier beyond the one that the Navy
143
U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, 2006.
(February 6, 2006) p. 47.
CRS-55
reportedly is already considering transferring to Hawaii or Guam). A 2002
A 2002 Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) report discussed the option of homeporting a
total of up to 11 SSNs at
Guam.144154 Expanding the number of ships to be homeported
in the Western Pacific
could require construction of additional homeporting and support facilities,
particularly in locations such as Guam. Transferring ships from the U.S. West Coast
to the Western Pacific can also have implications for crew training and ship
maintenance for those ships.
In April 2007, it was reported that the Navy is considering transferring a group
of three amphibious ships, including a large amphibious assault ship, from the
continental United States to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.155 In July 2007, it was reported
that the Navy had issued contracts indicating that it intends to transfer two additional
mine-countermeasures ships in 2009 from Ingleside, Texas (a Navy home port that
is scheduled to close in 2010), to Sasebo, Japan, where a group of Navy amphibious
ships and two mine warfare ships are already homeported.156
Number of Aircraft Carriers. How many aircraft carriers should the Navy
include? The Navy’s proposal for a 313-ship fleet includes 11, and eventually 12,
aircraft carriers. The issue of how many carriers the Navy should operate is
discussed at some length in another CRS report.145157 Advocates of maintaining a force
of at least 11 carriers could argue that, in light of China’s naval modernization,
including the introduction of new land-based fighters and strike fighters and the
possibility that the PLA might, as part of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait area, use
TBMs, LACMs, or special operations forces to attack U.S. land bases in the Western
154
U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Increasing the Mission Capability of the Attack
Submarine Force, Washington, CBO, 2002. (A CBO Study, March 2002), 41 pp.
155
William Cole, “Pearl Harbor May Get Navy Ship Group,” NavyTimes.com, April 16,
2007.
156
Christopher J. Castelli, “U.S. Navy Plans To More Two More Minesweepers To Japan
In 2009,” Inside the Navy, July 23, 2007.
157
CRS Report RL32731, Navy Aircraft Carriers: Proposed Retirement of USS John F.
Kennedy — Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS-60
Pacific, a force of at least 11 carriers is needed to deter or prevail in such a conflict.
Those supporting a reduction in the carrier force to fewer than 11 ships could argue
that such a reduction is acceptable in light of the increasing capabilities of individual
Navy carrier air wings, the Navy’s plan to transfer an additional carrier to the
Western Pacific, and options for improving the defenses of U.S. bases in the Western
Pacific against attack from TBMs, LACMs, and special operations forces.
Number of Attack Submarines (SSNs). Should the number of nuclearpowered attack submarines be 48, or some other number? The Navy at the end of
FY2006 operated a total of 55 SSNs. The Navy’s proposal for ’s proposal for
a 313-ship fleet
includes 48 SSNs (plus four converted Trident cruise missile
submarines, or SSGNs).
Supporters of SSNs have argued that China’s naval
modernization, and in particular
China’s submarine modernization, is a significant
reason for supporting a force of 48
or more SSNs. The issue of the SSN force-level
goal is discussed at length in
another CRS report.146158
Although discussion of the proper future size of the U.S. SSN force is
discussions of how U.S. SSNs would fit into U.S. Navy operations
against PLA forces are sometimes cast in terms of U.S. SSNs fighting PLA Navy
submarines, this captures
only a part of how U.S. SSNs would fit into potential U.S. Navy operations against
PLA forcessuch
operations. On the one hand, ASW is conducted by platforms other than SSNs, and
an SSN is not always the best platform for countering an enemy submarine. On the
other hand, SSNs perform a number of potentially significant missions other than
ASW.
144
U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Increasing the Mission Capability of the Attack
Submarine Force, Washington, CBO, 2002. (A CBO Study, March 2002), 41 pp.
145
CRS Report RL32731, Navy Aircraft Carriers: Proposed Retirement of USS John F.
Kennedy — Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
146
CRS Report RL32418, Navy Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal and Procurement Rate:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS-56
Supporters of maintaining 48 or more SSNs in light of China’s naval
modernization could argue that, in addition to participating in operations against PLA
Navy submarines, U.S. SSNs could do the following:
158
!
Conduct pre-crisis covert intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) of PLA Navy forces and bases. Such
operations could improve U.S. understanding PLA capabilities and
weaknesses.
!
Covertly lay mines around China’s naval bases. In light of the
PLA Navy’s limited mine countermeasures capabilities, the presence
of mines around PLA Navy bases could significantly delay the
deployment of PLA Navy forces at the outset of a crisis or conflict.
!
Attack or threaten PLA Navy surface ships. In light of the PLA
Navy’s limitations in ASW, a threat from U.S. SSNs could
substantially complicate PLA military planning, particularly for an
intended short-duration conflict.
!
Fire Tomahawk cruise missiles from unexpected locations.
Tomahawks could be used to attack on PLA command and control
nodes, air bases, and TBM, LACM, ASCM, and SAM launch sites.
CRS Report RL32418, Navy Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal and Procurement Rate:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS-61
!
Covertly insert and recover special operations forces (SOF).
SOF can be used to attack PLA Navy bases or other PLA coastal
facilities.
Supporters of maintaining 48 or more SSNs could also argue that submerged
U.S. SSNs cannot be attacked by conventionally armed TBMs and ASCMs and are
less vulnerable than are U.S. Navy surface ships to EMP effects and to certain other
nuclear weapon effects.
Supporters of maintaining fewer than 48 SSNs could argue that U.S. SSNs,
though very capable for performing certain missions, they are less capable for
performing others. U.S. SSNs, they can argue, cannot shoot down enemy missiles
or aircraft, nor can they act as platforms for operating manned aircraft. U.S. cruisers
and destroyers, they could argue, carry substantial numbers of Tomahawks. In light
of the complementary capabilities of Navy platforms and the need for an array of
U.S. Navy capabilities in operations against PLA forces, they could argue, the need
for SSNs needs to be balanced against the need for aircraft carriers and surface
combatants.
One set of observers states that China’s new nuclear-powered submarines:
CRS-57
are entering the PLA Navy (PLAN) at a time when reductions are projected to
occur in the U.S. Navy submarine force; that fact was duly noted by a senior
PLAN strategist recently in one of China’s premier naval journals.147159
These same observers state that:
Chinese researchers display intimate familiarity with all U.S. Navy submarine
force programs, including the most cutting-edge platforms, such as Seawolf and
Virginia. Additionally, there is great interest in the ongoing transformation of
some SSBNs into SSGNs. Ample focus is also devoted to the capabilities of the
Los Angeles class as the backbone of the U.S. Navy submarine force. Beyond
platforms and programs, there is also a keen interest in America’s industrial
organization for nuclear submarine production and maintenance.148160
These observers also state that:
Chinese analysts acknowledge that America has long been dominant in
undersea warfare, especially after the Cold War. Many Westerners are therefore
surprised that China would have the temerity to challenge the United States
directly in this specialized domain of warfare. Yet PLAN analysts keep close tabs
on U.S. Navy submarine building rates and carefully probe for potential
American submarine force vulnerabilities. They have studied the 8 January 2005
159
Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, “China’s Future Submarine Force: Insights
From Chinese Writings,” Naval War College Review, Winter 2007: 55-56.
160
Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, “China’s Future Submarine Force: Insights
From Chinese Writings,” Naval War College Review, Winter 2007: 61.
CRS-62
accident involving [the Los Angeles-class SSN] USS San Francisco149Francisco161 with great
interest. A 2006 article by a senior PLAN strategist suggests that “China already
exceeds [U.S. submarine production] five times over” and that eighteen U.S.
Navy submarines based in the Pacific might be at a severe disadvantage against
seventy-five or more Chinese submarines. While these assessments are ultimately
attributed to an American source, the PLAN analyst makes no effort to deny or
reject these assessments.150162
ASW-Capable Ships and Aircraft. Will the Navy have enough ASWcapable ships and aircraft between now and 2010? Should recently deactivated
ASW-capable ships and aircraft be returned to service? The Navy in recent years
has deactivated a substantial number of ASW-capable ships and aircraft, including
Spruance (DD-963) class destroyers, Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class frigates,
TAGOS-type ocean surveillance ships, carrier-based S-3 airplanes, and land-based
P-3 maritime patrol aircraft. Since ASW traditionally has been a platform-intensive
undertaking — meaning that a significant number of platforms (e.g., ships and
aircraft) traditionally has been required to conduct an effective ASW operation
147
Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, “China’s Future Submarine Force: Insights
From Chinese Writings,” Naval War College Review, Winter 2007: 55-56.
148
Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, “China’s Future Submarine Force: Insights
From Chinese Writings,” Naval War College Review, Winter 2007: 61.
149
The quoted passage is referring at this point to the collision of the San Francisco with an
undersea mountain near Guam — an accident that severely damaged the ship.
150
Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, “China’s Future Submarine Force: Insights
From Chinese Writings,” Naval War College Review, Winter 2007: 71. The first bracketed
phrase identifying the San Francisco as a Los Angeles-class SSN was inserted by this CRS
report for purposes of explanation; the second bracketed phrase referring to U.S. submarine
production appears in the quoted passage.
CRS-58
against a small number of enemy submarines, or even a single submarine — some
observers have expressed concern about the resulting decline in numbers of U.S.
Navy ASW-capable platforms.151163
As discussed in the Background section, the Navy plans to shift to a new, less
platform-intensive ASW concept of operations. The Navy also plans to introduce
new ASW-capable platforms in coming years, including Littoral Combat Ships
(LCSs). The Navy’s proposal for a 313-ship fleet includes 55 LCSs. Fully realizing
the new ASW concept of operations, however, may take some time, particularly in
light of the technical challenges involved, and LCSs will not be available in large
numbers until after 2010. This raises a potential question of whether the Navy will
have enough ASW-capable ships and aircraft between now and 2010, and whether
the Navy should reactivate recently retired ASW-capable platforms and keep them
in service until the new ASW concept is substantially implemented and larger
numbers of LCSs and other new ASW-capable platforms join the fleet.
Advocates of this option could argue that the recent retirements of ASWcapable platforms occurred before the dimensions of the PLA Navy submarine
modernization effort were fully understood. Opponents could argue that even with
these recent retirements, the Navy retains a substantial number of such platforms,
including SSNs, Aegis cruisers and destroyers, remaining Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG7FFG161
The quoted passage is referring at this point to the collision of the San Francisco with an
undersea mountain near Guam — an accident that severely damaged the ship.
162
Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, “China’s Future Submarine Force: Insights
From Chinese Writings,” Naval War College Review, Winter 2007: 71. The first bracketed
phrase identifying the San Francisco as a Los Angeles-class SSN was inserted by this CRS
report for purposes of explanation; the second bracketed phrase referring to U.S. submarine
production appears in the quoted passage.
163
See, for example, John R. Benedict, “The Unraveling And Revitalization Of U.S. Navy
Antisubmarine Warfare,” Naval War College Review, spring 2005, pp. 93-120, particularly
pp. 104-106; and the statement by Lyle J. Goldstein and William Murray in 2/6/04 USCC
hearing, pp. 149-150.
CRS-63
7) class frigates, carrier- and surface combatant-based SH-60 helicopters, and
remaining P-3s. They could also argue that there are more cost-effective ways to
improve the Navy’s ASW capabilities between now and 2010, such as increased
ASW training and exercises (see discussion below).
Navy Warfare Areas and Programs
Missile Defense.
Replacement for NAD Program. Is the Missile Defense Agency’s seabased terminal missile defense program sufficiently robust?
In December 2001, DOD announced that it had canceled the Navy Area Defense
(NAD) program, the program that was being pursued as the Sea-Based Terminal
portion of the Administration’s overall missile-defense effort. (The NAD program
was also sometimes called the Navy Lower Tier program.) In announcing its
decision, DOD cited poor performance, significant cost overruns, and substantial
development delays.
The NAD system was to have been deployed on Navy Aegis cruisers and
destroyers. It was designed to intercept short- and medium-range theater ballistic
missiles in the final, or descent, phase of flight, so as to provide local-area defense
of U.S. ships and friendly forces, ports, airfields, and other critical assets ashore. The
151
See, for example, John R. Benedict, “The Unraveling And Revitalization Of U.S. Navy
Antisubmarine Warfare,” Naval War College Review, spring 2005, pp. 93-120, particularly
pp. 104-106; and the statement by Lyle J. Goldstein and William Murray in 2/6/04 USCC
hearing, pp. 149-150.
CRS-59
program involved modifying both the Aegis ships’ radar capabilities and the Standard
SM-2 Block IV air-defense missile fired by Aegis ships. The missile, as modified,
was called the Block IVA version. The system was designed to intercept descending
missiles within the Earth’s atmosphere (endoatmospheric intercept) and destroy them
with the Block IVA missile’s blast-fragmentation warhead.
Following cancellation of the program, DOD officials stated that the
requirement for a sea-based terminal system remained intact. This led some
observers to believe that a replacement for the NAD program might be initiated. In
May 2002, however, DOD announced that instead of starting a replacement program,
MDA had instead decided on a two-part strategy to (1) modify the Standard SM-3
missile — the missile to be used in the sea-based midcourse (i.e., Upper Tier)
program — to intercept ballistic missiles at somewhat lower altitudes, and (2)
modify the SM-2 Block four air defense missile (i.e., a missile designed to shoot
down aircraft and cruise missiles) to cover some of the remaining portion of the
sea-based terminal defense requirement. DOD officials said the two modified
missiles could together provide much (but not all) of the capability that was to have
been provided by the NAD program. One aim of the modification strategy, DOD
officials suggested, was to avoid the added costs to the missile defense program of
starting a replacement sea-based terminal defense program.
The Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA’s) FY2008 budget submission for the
Aegis BMD program now divides the sea-based terminal program into a near-term
(Block 2008) capability and a far-term (Block 2014) capability. The Block 2008
capability includes a fuze-modified SM-2 Block IV and is to provide a near-term
sea-based terminal capability against a finite set of SRBMs. The Navy (not MDA)
is funding the modification of 100 SM-2 Block IV missiles. This capability is
CRS-64
scheduled to enter service in FY2009. MDA states that the Block 2014 capability is
envisioned as including a new type of missile, the design of which is not yet
determined, that is to provide a more capable and robust sea-based terminal
capability. Reported options for the new missile include a system using a modified
version of the Army’s Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) interceptor or a
modified version of the Navy’s new Standard Missile 6 Extended Range Active
Missile (SM-6 ERAM) air defense missile.152164
In light of PLA TBM modernization efforts, including the possibility of TBMs
equipped with MaRVs capable of hitting moving ships at sea, one potential issue is
whether the sea-based terminal program as outlined in MDA’s FY2008 budget
submission is sufficiently robust in terms of schedule and annual funding levels.
Ships with CG(X) Radar Capabilities. Should planned annual
procurement rates for ships with CG(X) radar capabilities be increased?
152
See, for example, Jason Ma and Christopher J. Castelli, “Adaptation Of PAC-3 For SeaBased Terminal Missile Defense Examined,” Inside the Navy, July 19, 2004; Malina Brown,
“Navy Rebuilding Case For Terminal Missile Defense Requirement,” Inside the Navy, April
19, 2004.
CRS-60procurement of
the CG(X) cruiser be accelerated?
The Navy is planning to procure a new kind of cruiser called the CG(X) as the
replacement for its 22 remaining Ticonderoga (CG-47) class Aegis cruisers. Navy
plans call for the CG(X) to be equipped with a new radar that, compared to the Aegis
system’s SPY-1 radar, is more powerful and thus more capable for supporting
ballistic missile defense operations. If improvements to Aegis radar capabilities are
not sufficient to achieve the Navy’s desired radar capability for countering
modernized PLA TBMs, then CG(X) radar capabilities could become important to
achieving this desired capability.
As part of its FY2006-FY2011 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) submitted
to Congress in February 2005, the Navy accelerated the planned start of CG(X)
procurement from FY2018 to FY2011. The Navy wants to procure 19 CG(X)s
a total of 19
CG(X)s between FY2011 and FY2023. If procured on that schedule, the ships might enter
enter service between 2017 and 2029.153165
In light of PLA TBM modernization efforts, including the possibility of TBMs
equipped with MaRVs capable of hitting moving ships at sea, one issue is whether
it would be feasible to accelerate planned CG(X) procurement. Given the time
needed to develop the CG(X)’s new radar, it might not be possible to accelerate the
procurement of the first CG(X) from FY2011 to an earlier year.
Once CG(X) procurement were to begin however, it might be possible to
accelerate the procurement dates of later ships in the program, so as to get more of
the ships in service sooner. Issues to address for this option would include industry
capacity and available financial resources. Based on past procurement rates for Aegis
cruisers and destroyers, industry capacity might not pose a significant constraint to
accelerated CG(X) procurement. In light of the CG(X)’s potential procurement cost,
accelerating procurement of CG(X)s to earlier years would, in a situation of a
constrained Navy budget, leave less funding available in those years for meeting
other Navy needs.
A second potential issue concerns the potential affordability of the CG(X)
design. In a situation of a constrained Navy budget, the procurement cost of the
CG(X) combined with funding demands for other Navy needs might make it difficult
for the Navy to complete a 19-ship CG(X) procurement program by FY2023. If so,
then one potential alternative would be to design a reduced-cost alternative to the
CG(X) that preserves CG(X) radar capabilities while reducing other CG(X) payload
elements. Such a ship might be more easily procured in desired numbers within
available resources. The option of a reduced-cost alternative to the CG(X) that
preserves certain CG(X) capabilities while reducing others is discussed in more detail
in another CRS report.154
153
For more on the CG(X), see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-1000 (DD(X)) and CG(X)
Ship Acquisition Programs: Oversight Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke.
154
CRS Report RS22559, Navy CG(X) Cruiser Design Options: Background and Oversight
Issues For Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS-61
164
See, for example, Jason Ma and Christopher J. Castelli, “Adaptation Of PAC-3 For SeaBased Terminal Missile Defense Examined,” Inside the Navy, July 19, 2004; Malina Brown,
“Navy Rebuilding Case For Terminal Missile Defense Requirement,” Inside the Navy, April
19, 2004.
165
For more on the CG(X), see CRS Report RL34179, Navy CG(X) Cruiser Program:
Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS-65
accelerated CG(X) procurement. In light of the CG(X)’s potential procurement cost,
accelerating procurement of CG(X)s to earlier years would, in a situation of a
constrained Navy budget, leave less funding available in those years for meeting
other Navy needs.
Number of SM-3 Missiles Planned For Procurement. Is the number of
SM-3 interceptors that DOD plans to procure sufficient?
The Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) is the Navy’s ballistic missile defense
interceptor. DOD is currently planning to procure a total of 147 SM-3s. One
potential oversight issue for Congress is whether this planned total is sufficient in
light of potential numbers of Chinese TBMs to be countered. A May 2007 press
report stated that:
A preliminary DOD study points to the need for more Standard Missile-3
(SM-3) sea-based missile defense interceptors and Terminal High-Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) interceptors, according to Lt. Gen. Kevin Campbell,
commander of U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC).
The study examined various major combat operations around the world,
estimating the percentages of enemy missiles that would be taken out by
conventional forces or felled by system failures. The current SM-3/THAAD
interceptor inventory then was compared to a list of critical assets identified by
DOD combatant commanders that need to be defended.
Near-term U.S. missile defense capabilities are “limited” primarily by interceptor
inventory, Campbell said at a May 16 breakfast in Washington sponsored by
National Defense University. In addition to SM-3s and THAAD interceptors,
DOD also needs more Patriot battalions and ground-based interceptors,
according to Campbell.155166
Air Warfare.
Carrier-Based Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS). Should
development of the Navy’s carrier-based unmanned combat air system (UCAS) be
accelerated? Should the Navy increase the number of UCASs that it plans to deploy
on its carrier air wings?
The Navy is currently developing a stealthy, long-range, unmanned combat air
system (UCAS) for use in the Navy’s carrier air wings. Competing prototypes for the
aircraft lookA prototype for the aircraft
looks somewhat like a small version of the B-2 bomber. The aircraft
potentially potentially
could be used for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
operations, air-toairto-air warfare, air-to-ground warfare, and perhaps even antisubmarine
warfare. A
demonstration program for the system (UCAS-D) is to be completed in
FY2013. The
production version of the aircraft (called N-UCAS, with the N
standing for Navy)
would follow in subsequent years.
166
Jefferson Morris, “Study Points To Need For More SM-3s, THAAD Interceptors,”
Aerospace Daily & Defense Report,” May 17, 2007: 3.
CRS-66
Some observers, including analysts at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments (CSBA), believe that N-UCAS would be highly useful, if not critical,
for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces. N-UCASs, they argue,
could be launched from a carrier shortly after the ship leaves port in Hawaii, be
refueled in flight, and arrive in the Taiwan Strait area in a matter of hours, permitting
155
Jefferson Morris, “Study Points To Need For More SM-3s, THAAD Interceptors,”
Aerospace Daily & Defense Report,” May 17, 2007: 3.
CRS-62
the carrier air wing to contribute to U.S. operations there days before the carrier itself
would arrive. They also argue that N-UCASs would permit Navy carriers to operate
effectively while remaining outside the reach of China’s anti-access weapons,
including MaRV-equipped TBMs. These observers argue that funding for UCAS-D
should be increased, so as to accelerate the completion of the demonstration program
to FY2011 (a completion date that the Navy had earlier planned), and that the Navy
should expand the number of N-UCASs that it plans to put on its carrier air wings.156167
Mix of F/A-18E/Fs and F-35 Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs). Should the
Navy’s planned mix of carrier-based F/A-18E/F strike fighters and F-35 Joint Strike
Fighters (JSFs) be changed to include more JSFs and fewer F/A-18E/Fs?
The Department of the Navy, which includes the Navy and the Marine Corps,
plans to procure a mix of F/A-18E/F Super Hornet strike fighters and F-35 Joint
Strike Fighters (JSFs). The F/A-18E/Fs would be operated by the Navy, and the JSFs
would be operated by both services. Marine Corps JSFs could be operated from
Navy carriers to perform Navy missions. The F/A-18E/F incorporates a few stealth
features and is believed to be very capable in air-to-air combat. Compared to the
F/A-18E/F, the JSF is much more stealthy and is believed to be more capable in airto-air combat.
The growing number of fourth-generation fighters and strike-fighters in the PLA
Air Force and the PLA Naval Air Force, and the growing number of modern PLA
SAM systems, raises a potential question of whether the Navy should change its
planned mix of carrier-based strike fighters to include more Navy JSFs and fewer
F/A-18E/Fs. Such a change would produce a force with a better ability to avoid PLA
SAM systems and more total air-to-air combat capability than the currently planned
force.
The Department of the Navy’s planned mix of F/A-18E/Fs and JSFs can be
compared to the Air Force’s strike fighter procurement plans. The Air Force plans
to replace its current force of F-15 and F-16 fighters with a mix of F-22 Raptor strike
fighters and JSFs. The F-22 is more stealthy and capable in air-to-air combat than
the JSF. The Navy does not have an equivalent to the F-22. The Air Force argues
that a mix of F-22s and JSFs will be needed in the future in part to counter fourthgeneration fighters and strike fighters operated by other countries, including China.
Supporters of the F-22 argue that the challenge posed by fourth-generation fighters
in combination with modern integrated air defenses, is a key reason for procuring 381
156167
Thomas P. Ehrhard and Robert O. Work, The Unmanned Combat Air System Carrier
Demonstration Program: A New Dawn For Naval Aviation?, Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, Washington, 2007. 39 pp. (CSBA Backgrounder, May 10, 2007).
The authors briefed key points from this document on July 11, 2007, in room S-211 of the
Capitol.
CRS-6367
or more F-22s, rather than the planed number of 179.157168 Potential oversight questions
include the following:
!
If the Air Force is correct in its belief that a combination of F-22s
and JSFs will be needed in part to counter fourth-generation fighters
and modern SAM systems operated by other countries, including
China, would the Department of the Navy’s planned mix of JSFs and
F/A-18E/Fs be sufficient to counter a PLA force of fighters and
strike fighters that includes fourth-generation designs?
!
If PLA attacks on U.S. air bases in the Western Pacific reduce the
number of Air Force F-22s and JSFs that can participate in a conflict
in the Taiwan Strait area, would the Department of the Navy’s
planned mix of F/A-18E/Fs and JSFs have sufficient air-to-air
combat capability to counter the PLA’s force of fighters and strike
fighters?158169
Anti-Air Warfare (AAW).
Surface Ship AAW Upgrades. Are current Navy plans for upgrading
surface ship anti-air warfare (AAW) capabilities adequate?
The PLA’s acquisition of advanced and highly capable ASCMs such as the SSN-27 Sizzler and the SS-N-22 Sunburn raises the question of whether current plans
for modernizing Navy surface ship AAW capabilities are adequate. The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) in previous years has expressed concerns regarding the
Navy’s ability to counter ASCMs.159170 Potential areas for modernization include,
among other things, the following:
!
ship radars, such as the SPY-1 radar on Aegis ships or the radars
now planned for the DDG-1000 destroyer and CG(X) cruiser;
157171
168
For more on the F-22, JSF, and F/A-18E/F, see CRS Report RL33543, Tactical Aircraft
Modernization: Issues for Congress; CRS Report RL31673, F-22A Raptor; CRS Report
RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background, Status, and Issues; and
CRS Report RL30624, Military Aircraft, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, all by Christopher Bolkcom.
158169
An article by an Air Force officer raises a related issue — whether Air Force aircraft
have sufficient capability for attacking targets at sea to adequately assist Navy aircraft in
countering Chinese naval forces operating in the Strait of Mallaca area as part of a “string
of pearls” strategy. See Lawrence Spinetta, “Cutting China’s ‘Sting of Pearls,’” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, October 2006: 40-42.
159170
General Accounting Office, Navy Acquisitions[:] Improved Littoral War-Fighting
Capabilities Needed, GAO-01-493, May 2001; and General Accounting Office, Defense
Acquisitions[:] Comprehensive Strategy Needed to Improve Ship Cruise Missile Defense,
GAO/NSIAD-00-149, July 2000.
171
For more on the DDG-1000 and CG(X), see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-1000
Destroyer Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald
(continued...)
CRS-68
CRS-64
!
AAW-related computer networking capabilities, such as the
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and the Naval Integrated
Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) system;160172
!
air defense missiles such as the Standard Missile,161173 the Evolved Sea
Sparrow Missile (ESSM), and the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM);
!
close-in weapon systems, such as the Phalanx radar-directed gun;
!
potential directed-energy weapons, such as solid state or freeelectron lasers;
!
decoys, such as the U.S.-Australian Nulka active electronic decoy;
and
!
aerial targets for AAW tests and exercises, particularly targets for
emulating supersonic ASCMs.162
160174
171
(...continued)
O’Rourke, and CRS REport RL34179, Navy CG(X) Cruiser Program: Background,
Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
172
For more on CEC and NIFC-CA, see CRS Report RS20557, Navy Network-Centric
Warfare Concept: Key Programs and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
161
173
The Navy is currently developing a new version of the Standard Missile called the SM-6
Extended Range Active Missile (ERAM) that will have a considerably longer range than the
current SM-2 air defense missile. The SM-6 will also have an active seeker that will permit
the missile to home in on the target on its own, without being illuminated by a ship-based
radar, as is the case with the SM-2.
162174
An October 2005 report from the Defense Science Board (DSB) highlights “The dire
need for several types of supersonic targets to represent existing anti-ship cruise missile
threats.” (Page 1) The report states:
The Russians have produced and deployed a variety of supersonic, anti-ship
cruise missiles. Some of these missiles are sea-skimming vehicles; others attack
from high altitudes. At the time of the Task Force, the United States had zero
capability to test its air defense systems such as AEGIS or Improved Sea Sparrow
against supersonic targets, and the Task Force views this shortfall as the major
deficiency in our overall aerial targets enterprise. Aggressive actions are needed
to fix the problem. (Department of Defense, Report of the Defense Science
Board Task Force on Aerial Targets. Washington, 2005. (October 2005, Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)
pp. 2.)
A cover memorandum attached to the report from William P. Delaney and General Michael
Williams, USMC (Ret.), the co-chairmen of the task force, states:
The area of greatest concern to the Task Force was our gap in supersonic antiship cruise missiles for testing. The Russians have deployed at least three such
cruise missiles that involve either sea-skimming flight profiles or a high-altitude
profile involving a power dive to the target. At this time, we have no test
vehicles for either flight profile.
See also John Liang, “DSB Highlights ‘Dire’ Need For Supersonic Cruise Missile Targets,”
(continued...)
CRS-65
(continued...)
CRS-69
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) AAW Capability. Should the currently
planned AAW capability of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) be increased?
The Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is to be armed with 11 Rolling
Airframe Missiles (RAMs). The ship will also be equipped with an AAW decoy
launcher.163175
The PLA’s acquisition of ASCMs that can be fired from aircraft, surface ships,
and submarines raises the possibility that LCSs participating in a conflict in the
Taiwan Strait area could come under attack by substantial numbers of ASCMs.
Other Navy ships, such as Aegis cruisers and destroyers and, in the future, DDG1000 destroyers and CG(X)s cruisers, could help defend LCSs against attacking
ASCMs, but such ships might not always be in the best position to do this,
particularly if ASCMs are launched at LCSs from undetected submarines or if the
supporting U.S. Navy ships are busy performing other duties. If LCSs were damaged
or sunk by ASCMs, the Navy’s ability to counter enemy mines, submarines, and
small boats — the LCS’s three primary missions — would be reduced.
The possibility that the LCS’s AAW system might be overwhelmed or
exhausted by attacks from multiple ASCMs raises the question of whether the AAW
capability planned for the LCS should be increased. Options for increasing the
LCS’s planned AAW capability include, among other things, adding another 11round RAM launcher or supplementing the currently planned RAM launcher with a
battery of Evolved Sea Sparrow (ESSM) missiles. In assessing such options, one
factor to consider would be whether installing additional RAMs or ESSMs would
require an increase in the planned size and cost of the LCS.
Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW).
Technologies. Are current Navy efforts for improving antisubmarine warfare
(ASW) technologies adequate?
In addition to the issue discussed earlier of whether the Navy between now and
2010 will have enough ASW-capable platforms, another potential issue raised by the
PLA submarine modernization effort is whether current Navy plans for improving
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) technologies are adequate. The Navy states that it
intends to introduce several new ASW technologies, including distributed sensors,
162
(...continued)
Inside the Navy, November 14, 2005.
174
(...continued)
profile involving a power dive to the target. At this time, we have no test
vehicles for either flight profile.
See also John Liang, “DSB Highlights ‘Dire’ Need For Supersonic Cruise Missile Targets,”
Inside the Navy, November 14, 2005.
The lack of targets for fully emulating supersonic ASCMs has been an issue since the early
1980s, when the Navy first deployed the Aegis AAW system. See CRS Report 84-180, The
Aegis Anti-Air Warfare System: Its Principal Components, Its Installation On The CG-47
And DDG-51 Class Ships, And Its Effectiveness, by Ronald O’Rourke. (October 24, 1984)
pp. 16-17. (This report is out of print and is available directly from the author.)
163175
For more on the LCS, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS-6670
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) technologies are adequate. The Navy states that it
intends to introduce several new ASW technologies, including distributed sensors,
unmanned vehicles, and technologies for networking ASW systems and platforms.
In March 2007, Admiral Mullen testified that:
Submarines with improving stealth and attack capability — particularly
modern diesel attack submarines — are proliferating world-wide at an alarming
rate. Locating these relatively inexpensive but extremely quiet boats presents our
Navy with a formidable challenge. Navy is pursuing a distributed and netted
approach to ASW. Some of the key ASW programs we must continue to develop
and field as quickly as possible include: the Deployable Distributed Autonomous
system (DADS); the Reliable Acoustic Path Vertical Line Array (RAPVLA); the
Surface Ship Torpedo Defense System (SSTD); the Aircraft Carrier Periscope
Detection Radar (CVNPDR); and, the High Altitude ASW Weapon Concept
(HAAWC)....
The Navy continues to pursue research and development of Distributed
Netted Sensors (DNS); low-cost, rapidly deployable, autonomous sensors that
can be fielded in sufficient numbers to provide the cueing and detection of
adversary submarines far from the Sea Base. Examples of our FY 2008 request
of $24 million in these technologies include:
• Reliable Acoustic Path, Vertical Line Array (RAP VLA). A passive-only
distributed system exploiting the deep water propagation phenomena. In essence,
a towed array vertically suspended in the water column.
• Deep Water Active Distributed System (DWADS). An active sonar distributed
system optimized for use in deep water.
• Deployable Autonomous Distributed System (DADS). A shallow water array,
using both acoustic and non-acoustic sensors to detect passing submarines.
DADS will test at sea in FY 2008.
• Littoral ASW Multi-static Project (LAMP). A shallow water distributed buoy
system employing the advanced principles of multi-static (many receivers,
one/few active sources) sonar propagation.
Further developing the Undersea Warfare Decision Support System
(USW-DSS) will leverage existing data-links, networks, and sensor data from air,
surface, and sub-surface platforms and integrate them into a common ASW
operating picture with tactical decision aids to better plan, conduct, and
coordinate ASW operations. We are requesting $23 million in FY 2008 towards
this system.
To engage the threat, our forces must have the means to attack effectively
the first time, every time. The Navy has continued a robust weapons development
investment plan including $293 million requested in the FY 2008 on such
capabilities as:
• High-Altitude ASW Weapons Concept (HAAWC). Current maritime patrol
aircraft must descend to very low altitude to place ASW weapons on target, often
losing communications with the sonobuoy (or distributed sensor) field. This
allows the aircraft to remain at high altitude and conduct an effective attack
CRS-71
while simultaneously enabling the crew to maintain and exploit the full sensor
field in the process. This capability will be particularly important in concert with
the new jet-powered P-8A MMA. A test is scheduled for May 2007.
CRS-67
• Common Very Lightweight Torpedo (CVLWT). The Navy is developing a
6.75” torpedo suitable for use in the surface ship and submarine antitorpedo
torpedo defense, and the offensive Compact Rapid Attack Weapon (CRAW)
intended for the developing manned and unmanned aerial vehicles....
Platform Sensor Improvements. Against the quieter, modern diesel-electric
submarines, work continues on both towed arrays and hull mounted sonars. Our
$410 million request in FY 2008 includes work on the following:
• TB-33 thin-line towed array upgrades to forward deployed SSN’s provides near
term improvement in submarine towed array reliability over existing TB-29
arrays. TB-33 upgrades are being accelerated to Guam based SSN’s.
• Continued development of twin-line thin line (TLTL) and vector-sensor towed
arrays (VSTA) are under development for mid-far term capability gaps. TLTL
enables longer detection ranges/contact holding times, improves localization, and
classification of contacts. VSTA is an Office of Naval Research project that
would provide TLTL capability on a single array while still obviating the bearing
ambiguity issue inherent in traditional single line arrays.164176
Training and Exercises. Are current Navy plans for ASW training and
exercises adequate?
As mentioned earlier, success in an ASW operation is highly dependent on the
proficiency of the people operating the ASW equipment, and ASW operational
proficiency can take time to develop and can atrophy significantly if not regularly
exercised. At various times since the end of the Cold War, some observers have
expressed concerns about whether the Navy was placing adequate emphasis on
maintaining ASW proficiency. The Navy in April 2004 established a new Fleet
ASW Command, based in San Diego, to provide more focus to its ASW efforts, and
since then has taken various steps to enhance its ASW training and exercises,
including the following:
!
!
:
!
In April 2004, it was reported that carrier strike groups deploying
from the U.S. West Coast would now stop in Hawaiian waters for
three- to five-day ASW exercises before proceeding to the Western
Pacific.165
!
177
In March 2005, the Navy reached an agreement to lease a Swedish
non-nuclear-powered submarine and its crew for a 12-month period.
The submarine, which is equipped with an air-independent
propulsion (AIP) system, arrived in San Diego in June 2005, where
164
176
Statement of Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Chief of Naval Operations, Before the House
Armed Services Committee, 01 March 2007, pp. 8, 43-45.
165177
Christopher Munsey, “Fleet Anti-Sub Command Stands Up,” Navy Times, April 19, 2004,
p. 29. See also Audrey McAvoy, “U.S. Navy Puts New Emphasis On Anti-Submarine
Training; New Threat From China Seen,” NavyTimes.com, January 26, 2006; and a similar
article by the same author, “USS Ronald Reagan Trains To Find Silent Threat,” Honolulu
Star-Bulletin, January 22, 2006.
CRS-68
it is being used to72
The submarine, which is equipped with an air-independent
propulsion (AIP) system, arrived in San Diego in June 2005, where
it was used as a mock enemy submarine in Pacific Fleet ASW
exercises.166178
!
The Navy in 2005 also reached an agreement with Colombia and
Peru under which one non-nuclear-powered submarine from each
country deployed to the Navy base at Mayport, FL, in April 2005 to
support Atlantic Fleet ASW exercises for a period of two to five
months. South American non-nuclear-powered submarines have
been integrated into U.S. Navy exercises since 2002.167179
!
In October 2005, the commander of the Navy’s Pacific Fleet said
that, upon assuming command earlier in the year, he made ASW his
highest priority and instituted a cyclic approach to ASW training that
includes more frequent (quarterly) assessments, as well as training
exercises with other navies.168180
In light of these actions, the potential question is whether the Navy ASW
training and exercises are now adequate, or whether they should be expanded further.
Active-Kill Torpedo Defense. If feasible, should Navy plans for acquiring
an active-kill torpedo defense system be accelerated?
Navy surface ships and submarines are equipped with decoy systems for
diverting enemy torpedoes away from their intended targets. Such decoys, however,
might not always work, particularly against wake-homing torpedoes, which can be
difficult to decoy. Under the Navy’s surface ship torpedo defense (SSTD)
development program, the U.S. Navy is developing an “active-kill” torpedo-defense
capability for surface ships and also submarines that would use a small (6.75-inch
diameter) anti-torpedo torpedo (ATT) to physically destroy incoming torpedoes. In
March 2007, Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chief of Naval Operations, testified that
the Navy’s surface ship torpedo defense (SSTD) program
delivers near term and far term torpedo defense. The planned FY 2008 $16
million R&D [research and development] investment supports ongoing
development of the 6 ¾ inch Common Very Lightweight Torpedo (CVLWT)
which supports both the Anti-Torpedo Torpedo (ATT) and the Compact Rapid
Attack Weapon (CRAW). Also, several capability upgrades to the AN/SLQ-25A
(NIXIE) [torpedo decoy system] are being incorporated to improve both acoustic
166
178
Jose Higuera, “Sweden’s Gotland Heads For A Year With US Navy,” Jane’s Navy
International, July/August 2005; 8; S. C. Irwin, “Swedish Submarine Expected To Enhance
Navy’s Antisubmarine Warfare Primacy,” Navy Newsstand, June 20, 2005; Gidget Fuentes,
“Swedish Sub To Drill With U.S. Navy For A Year,” DefenseNews.com, May 18, 2005;
“U.S., Swedish Navies Sign Agreement To Bilaterally Train On State-Of-The-Art Sub,”
Navy Newsstand, March 23, 2005.
167179
Christopher Munsey, “Colombian, Peruvian Subs To Take Part In Exercise,”
NavyTimes.com, April 14, 2005; Mark O. Piggott, “South American Submarines Enhance
U.S. Navy’s Fleet Readiness,” Navy Newsstand, April 14, 2005.
168180
Jennifer H. Svan, “Pacific Fleet Commander: Sub Threats Top Priority,” Pacific Stars
and Stripes, October 3, 2005.
CRS-6973
which supports both the Anti-Torpedo Torpedo (ATT) and the Compact Rapid
Attack Weapon (CRAW). Also, several capability upgrades to the AN/SLQ-25A
(NIXIE) [torpedo decoy system] are being incorporated to improve both acoustic
and nonacoustic system performance to counter current threat torpedoes. These
enhancements also support their use in the littorals and are scheduled to complete
in FY 2009. The AN/WSQ-11 System uses active and passive acoustic sensors
for an improved torpedo Detection Classification and Localization (DCL)
capability, and a hard kill Anti-Torpedo Torpedo (ATT) to produce an effective,
automated and layered system to counter future torpedo threats. DCL
improvements include lower false alarm rates and better range determination.169181
In light of the modern torpedoes, including wake-homing torpedoes, that are
expected to be carried by modern PLA submarines, a potential question is whether,
if feasible, the current ATT acquisition schedule should be accelerated.
Mine Warfare. Are current Navy mine warfare plans adequate?
The PLA’s interest in modern mines may underscore the importance of the
Navy’s efforts to develop and acquire new mine countermeasures (MCM) systems,
and perhaps raise a question regarding whether they should be expanded or
accelerated. The Navy’s MCM capabilities have been a matter of concern among
members of the congressional defense committees for several years.
Conversely, the PLA Navy’s own reported vulnerability to mines (see section
on PLA Navy limitations and weaknesses) can raise a question regarding the lessfrequently-discussed topic of the U.S. Navy’s offensive mine warfare capability. To
what degree can minelaying complicate PLA plans for winning a conflict, particularly
a short-duration conflict, in the Taiwan Strait area? Do U.S. Navy plans include
sufficient mines and minelaying platforms to fully exploit the PLA Navy’s
vulnerability to mines? The Navy has various mines either in service or under
development.170182
Computer Network Security. Are Navy efforts to ensure computer network
security adequate?
The PLA’s published interest in IW/IO, and concerns that recent attacks on U.S.
computer networks have in some cases originated in China, underscore the
importance of U.S. military computer network security. The Navy in July 2002
established the Naval Network Warfare Command in part to prevent and respond to
attacks on Navy computer networks.171 Another CRS report discusses computer
network security at length.172
169
181
Statement of Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Chief of Naval Operations, Before the House
Armed Services Committee, 01 March 2007, p. 45.
170182
Current information on Navy mines and mine development programs is available on the
Internet at [http://www.exwar.org/Htm/4000.htm].
171
Harold Kennedy, “Navy Command Engages In Info Warfare Campaign,” National
Defense, November 2003. See also Frank Tiboni, “DOD’s ‘Manhattan Project’,” Federal
Computer Week, August 29, 2005.
172
CRS Report RL32114, Computer Attack and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy
Issues for Congress, by Clay Wilson.
CRS-70
CRS-74
attacks on Navy computer networks.183 Another CRS report discusses computer
network security at length.184
EMP Hardening. Are Navy efforts to harden its systems against
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) adequate?
The possibility that the PLA might use nuclear weapons or high-power
microwave (HPM) weapons to generate electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects against
the electronic systems on U.S. Navy ships and aircraft raises a potential question
regarding the adequacy of the Navy’s efforts to harden its systems against EMP
effects. A 2004 commission studying the EMP issue expressed concerns about the
potential vulnerability of U.S. tactical forces to EMP.173
173185
183
Harold Kennedy, “Navy Command Engages In Info Warfare Campaign,” National
Defense, November 2003. See also Frank Tiboni, “DOD’s ‘Manhattan Project’,” Federal
Computer Week, August 29, 2005.
184
CRS Report RL32114, Computer Attack and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy
Issues for Congress, by Clay Wilson.
185
2004 EMP commission report. The report of the commission stated on page 1 that “The
high-altitude nuclear weapon-generated electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is one of a small
number of threats that has the potential to hold our society seriously at risk and might result
in defeat of our military forces.” The report stated later that
The end of the Cold War relaxed the discipline for achieving EMP
survivability within the Department of Defense, and gave rise to the perception that
an erosion of EMP survivability of military forces was an acceptable risk. EMP
simulation and test facilities have been mothballed or dismantled, and research
concerning EMP phenomena, hardening design, testing, and maintenance has been
substantially decreased. However, the emerging threat environment, characterized
by a wide spectrum of actors that include near-peers, established nuclear powers,
rogue nations, sub-national groups, and terrorist organizations that either now have
access to nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles or may have such access over the
next 15 years have combined to place the risk of EMP attack and adverse
consequences on the US to a level that is not acceptable.
Current policy is to continue to provide EMP protection to strategic [i.e.,
long-range nuclear] forces and their controls; however, the end of the Cold War
has relaxed the discipline for achieving and maintaining that capability within
these forces....
The situation for general-purpose forces (GPF) is more complex.... Our
increasing dependence on advanced electronics systems results in the potential
for an increased EMP vulnerability of our technologically advanced forces, and
if unaddressed makes EMP employment by an adversary an attractive
asymmetric option.
The United States must not permit an EMP attack to defeat its capability to
prevail. The Commission believes it is not practical to protect all of the tactical
forces of the US and its coalition partners from EMP in a regional conflict. A
strategy of replacement and reinforcement will be necessary. However, there is
a set of critical capabilities that is essential to tactical regional conflicts that must
be available to these reinforcements. This set includes satellite navigation
systems, satellite and airborne intelligence and targeting systems, an adequate
communications infrastructure, and missile defense.
The current capability to field a tactical force for regional conflict is
inadequate in light of this requirement. Even though it has been US policy to
create EMP-hardened tactical systems, the strategy for achieving this has been
to use the DoD acquisition process. This has provided many equipment
components that meet criteria for durability in an EMP environment, but this
(continued...)
CRS-71(continued...)
CRS-75
The commission’s report was received at a July 22, 2004, hearing before the
House Armed Services Committee. At the hearing, Representative Steve Israel asked
about the role of EMP in exercises simulating operations in the Taiwan Strait:
Representative Steve Israel: [Representative Roscoe] Bartlett and I just
attended an NDU [National Defense University] tabletop [exercise] with respect
to the Straits of the Taiwan just last week. To your knowledge, has there been
any tabletop exercise, has there been any simulation, any war-game that
anticipates an EMP attack, and, if there has not been, do you believe that that
would, in fact, be a useful exercise for NDU, the Pentagon or any other relevant
entity? Dr. Graham, do you want to answer that?
Dr. William R. Graham (Commission Chairman): Thank you. Let me
poll the commission and see if they have any experience with that. General
Lawson?
General Richard L. Lawson, USAF (Ret.) (Commissioner): No, sir.
Graham: Dr. Wood?
Dr. Lowell L. Wood, Jr. (Commissioner): I don’t believe there’s been
any formal exercise, certainly not to my knowledge. There’s been extensive
discussion of what the impact of Chinese EMP laydowns would be, not on
Taiwan, which is, after all, considered by China to be part of its own territory,
but on U.S. forces in the region which might be involved in the active defense of
Taiwan. In particular, the consequences the EMP laydown on U.S. carrier task
forces has been explored, and while, it’s not appropriate to discuss the details in
an open session like this, the assessed consequences of such an attack, a
single-explosion attack, are very somber.
Since that is a circumstance in which the target might be considered a pure
military one in which the loss of life might be relatively small, but the loss of
military capability might be absolutely staggering, it poses a very attractive
option, at least for consideration on the part of the Chinese military.
185
(...continued)
a set of critical capabilities that is essential to tactical regional conflicts that must
be available to these reinforcements. This set includes satellite navigation
systems, satellite and airborne intelligence and targeting systems, an adequate
communications infrastructure, and missile defense.
The current capability to field a tactical force for regional conflict is
inadequate in light of this requirement. Even though it has been US policy to
create EMP-hardened tactical systems, the strategy for achieving this has been
to use the DoD acquisition process. This has provided many equipment
components that meet criteria for durability in an EMP environment, but this
does not result in confidence that fielded forces, as a system, can reliably
withstand EMP attack. Adherence to the equipment acquisition policy also has
been spotty, and the huge challenge of organizing and fielding an EMP-durable
tactical force has been a disincentive to applying the rigor and discipline needed
to do so. (Pages 47-48.)
CRS-76
I would also remark that Chinese nuclear explosive workers at their very
cloistered research center in northwestern China very recently published an
authoritative digest and technical commentary on EMP in English, in a Chinese
publication. It is very difficult to understand what the purpose of publishing a
lengthy, authoritative article in English in a Chinese publication would be, if it
was not to convey a very pointed message. This came not from military workers.
It came from the people who would be fielding the weapon that would conduct
the attack.
173
(...continued)
does not result in confidence that fielded forces, as a system, can reliably
withstand EMP attack. Adherence to the equipment acquisition policy also has
been spotty, and the huge challenge of organizing and fielding an EMP-durable
tactical force has been a disincentive to applying the rigor and discipline needed
to do so. (Pages 47-48.)
CRS-72
Graham: Dr. Pry on our staff has made a survey of foreign writings on
EMP, and he noted that while U.S. exercises have not to our knowledge played
that scenario, Chinese military writings have discussed that scenario. So it’s
certainly something they have thought of and it is within their mind. I have
observed generally over the last 40 years that there’s a tendency in the U.S.
military not to introduce nuclear weapons in general and EMP in particular into
exercise scenarios or game scenarios because it tends to end the game, and that’s
not a good sign. I think it would be a very interesting subject for the NDU group
to take up and see and force them not to end the game. Time will not stop if such
an event happens. Let them understand what the consequences will be.174186
Later in the hearing, Representative Roscoe Bartlett returned to the topic of the
potential effects of EMP on Navy ships:
Representative Bartlett: If China were to detonate a weapon high over
our carrier task force, can we note in this [open] session what would the effects
on the carrier task force be?
Graham: Mr. Bartlett, several years ago, the Navy dismantled the one
simulator it had for exposing ships directly [to EMP]. It was the Empress
simulator located in the Chesapeake Bay. So I don’t believe any direct
experimental work has been done for quite some time.
However, the general character of modern naval forces follows the other
trends we’ve described, which is an increasing dependence upon sophisticated
electronics for its functionality, and, therefore, I believe there’s substantial
reason to be concerned.
[Would] Any other commissioners [care to comment]?
Representative Bartlett: Dr. Wood?
Wood: In open session, sir, I don’t believe it’s appropriate to go much
further than the comment that I made to [Representative] Israel that the
assessments that are made of such attacks and their impacts are very somber.
The Navy generally believes — that portion of the Navy that’s at all
cognizant of these matters — that because they operate in an extremely
radar-intensive environment, [since] they have a great deal of electromagnetic
gear on board, some of which radiates pulses — radar pulses, for instance —
because they can operate in that type of environment, that they surely must be
186
Source: Transcript of hearing.
CRS-77
EMP robust. These free-floating beliefs on the part of some Navy officers are
not — repeat not — well grounded technically.175
174
Source: Transcript of hearing.
175
Ibid.
CRS-73187
Legislative Activity For FY2008
FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 1585)
House. Section 1244 of the House-reported version of the FY2008 defense
authorization bill (H.R. 1585) states:
SEC. 1244. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING THE STRATEGIC
MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
It is the sense of Congress that —
(1) United States military war-fighting capabilities are potentially threatened by
the strategic military capabilities and intentions of the People’s Republic of
China, as demonstrated by —
(A) the October 2006 undetected broach of a Chinese SONG-class diesel-electric
submarine in close proximity of the USS Kitty Hawk in international waters; and
(B) the January 2007 test of a direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon, posing
a potential threat to United States military assets in space;
(2) it is in the national security interests of the United States to make every effort
to understand China’s strategic military capabilities and intentions; and
(3) as part of such an effort, the Secretary of Defense should expand efforts to
develop an accurate assessment of China’s strategic military modernization,
particularly with regard to its sea- and space-based strategic capabilities.
187
Ibid.
CRS-7478
Appendix. Additional Details on China’s Naval
Modernization Efforts176Efforts188
This appendix presents additional details and commentary on several of the
elements of China’s military modernization discussed in the Background section of
this report.
Theater-Range Ballistic Missiles (TBMs). Regarding the potential for using
TBMs against moving U.S. Navy ships at sea, ONI states that “One of the newest
innovations in TBM weapons developments involves the use of ballistic missiles to
target ships at sea. This is assessed as being very difficult because it involves much
more than just a missile.”177189 ONI continues:
The use of ballistic missiles against ships at sea has been discussed for
years. Chinese writings state China intends to develop the capability to attack
ships, including carrier strike groups, in the waters around Taiwan using
conventional theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) as part of a combined-arms
campaign. The current conventional TBM force in China consists of CSS-6 and
CSS-7 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) deployed in large numbers. The
current TBM force would be modified by changing some of the current missiles’
ballistic reentry vehicles (RVs) to maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs) with
radar or IR seekers to provide the accuracy needed to attack ships at sea. The
TBMs with MaRVs would have good defense penetration capabilities because
of their high reentry speed and maneuverability. Their lethality could be
increased, especially with terminally guided submunitions.
In order to attack a ship or a carrier battle group with TBMs, the target must
be tracked, and its position, direction, and speed determined. This information
would be relayed in near real time to the missile launchers. China may be
planning ultimately to use over-the-horizon (OTH) radar, satellites, and
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to monitor the target’s position.
Reconnaissance assets would be used to detect the ship or carrier strike group
before it entered into the range of Chinese TBMs, facilitating early preparation
for the engagement, and refining the target’s position. Target information would
be relayed through communication satellites or other channels to a command
center, and then to the missile launchers. TBMs with MaRVs would then be
launched at the target’s projected position. The missiles would fly their
preplanned trajectories until onboard seekers could acquire the ship and guide
the missiles to impact.178
176190
188
Unless otherwise indicated, shipbuilding program information in this section is taken
from Jane’s Fighting Ships 2006-2007, and previous editions. Other sources of information
on these shipbuilding
programs may disagree regarding projected ship commissioning dates
or other details, but
sources present similar overall pictures regarding PLA Navy
shipbuilding.
177189
2004 ONI WMC, p. 21. On Page 3 (Overview), ONI notes, without reference to any
specific country, that “antiship ballistic missiles could be fired at our ships at sea.”
178190
2004 ONI WMC, p. 22. Page 20 states: “Maneuvering reentry vehicles serve two
purposes: one to provide an unpredictable target to complicate missile defense efforts and
the other, potentially, to adjust missile flight path to achieve greater accuracy.”
CRS-75(continued...)
CRS-79
Another observer states:
The PLA’s historic penchant for secrecy and surprise, when combined with
known programs to develop highly advanced technologies that will lead to new
and advanced weapons, leads to the conclusion that the PLA is seeking [to] field
new weapon systems that could shock an adversary and accelerate their defeat.
In the mid-1990s former leader Jiang Zemin re-popularized an ancient Chinese
term for such weapons, “Shashaojian,” translated most frequently as “Assassin’s
Mace,” or “silver bullet” weapons.
One potential Shashoujian is identified by the [DOD’s 2005 report on
China military power]: a maneuvering ballistic missile design to target U.S. naval
forces. In 1996 a Chinese technician revealed that a “terminal guidance system”
that would confer very high accuracy was being developed for the DF-21
[intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM]. Such a system could employ a
radar similar to the defunct U.S. Pershing-2 MRBM or could employ off-board
sensors with rapid data-links to the missile tied to satellite-navigation systems.
Nevertheless, should such missiles be realized they will pose a considerable
threat as the U.S. Navy is not yet ready to deploy adequate missile defenses.179191
A separate observer states:
Land-based conventional tipped ballistic missiles with maneuverable
(MarV) warheads that can hit ships at sea .... would be a Chinese “assassin’s
mace” sort of capability — something impossible to deal with today, and very
difficult under any circumstances if one is forced to defend by shooting down
ballistic missiles. The capability is dependent on Beijing’s ability to put together
the appropriate space-based surveillance, command, and targeting architecture
necessary to make this work.180192
One more observer states:
There is yet another exceedingly important chapter being written in the
[PLA] ballistic-missile saga. China is trying to move rapidly in developing
ballistic missiles that could hit ships at sea at MRBM [medium-range ballistic
missile] ranges — in other words, to threaten carriers beyond the range at which
they could engage Chinese forces or strike China. Among its other advantages
for China, this method of attack avoids altogether the daunting prospect of
having to cope with the U.S. Navy submarine force — as anti-submarine warfare
is a big Chinese weakness. Along with these efforts to develop ballistic missiles
to hit ships, they are, of course, working diligently to perfect the means to locate
and target our carrier strike groups (CSGs). In that regard, an imperfect or
rudimentary (fishing boats with satellite phones) means of location and targeting
might be employed even earlier than the delay of several more years likely
needed to perfect more reliable and consistent targeting of ships. Chinese missile
specialists are writing openly and convincingly of MaRV’d ballistic missiles
179
180
190
(...continued)
the other, potentially, to adjust missile flight path to achieve greater accuracy.”
191
192
Fisher 7/27/05 testimony, p. 6.
Presentation entitled “Beijing Eye View of Strategic Landscale” by Mike McDevitt at a
June 20, 2005, conference on the future of the U.S. Navy held in Washington, DC, by the
American Enterprise Institute. Quote taken from McDevitt’s notes for the presentation,
which he provided to CRS.
CRS-7680
needed to perfect more reliable and consistent targeting of ships. Chinese missile
specialists are writing openly and convincingly of MaRV’d ballistic missiles
(missiles with maneuverable reentry vehicles) that maneuver both to defeat
defenses and to follow the commands of seekers that spot the target ships. There
seems little doubt that our naval forces will face this threat long before the
Taiwan issue is resolved.181193
Land-Attack Cruise Missile (LACMs). Regarding LACMs, ONI states:
Land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) are available for sale from many
countries, and are marketed at arms shows around the world. Land-attack cruise
missiles are becoming a significant adjunct to theater ballistic missiles in strike
and deterrent roles. The number of countries manufacturing and purchasing
LACMs continues to grow. Some of the systems in development are derivatives
of antiship missiles, and some are dedicated designs, and a few weaponized
UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] complete the inventory....
Israel, China, Germany, and South Africa are among the countries with LACM
development programs.182194
Another observer states:
Taiwanese civilian and military officials contend that in 2005 the PLA has
started deployment of its long-awaited new land attack cruise missiles
(LACMs).32 Asian sources contend that two Chinese companies are making
LACMs; one for the Second Artillery missile forces, and one for PLA Navy and
PLA Airforce platforms, most likely based on the new 300+ km range YJ-62
anti-ship missile.33 It has been well reported that China has sought to develop
modern LACMs since the 1970s and has sought technology from Russia, Israel,
and has obtained at least six Russian Novator Kh-55 LACMs via the Ukraine,
and has obtained parts of U.S. RGM/UGM-109 Tomahawk LACMs via Iraq,
Afghanistan and very likely, Pakistan. When these LACMs are married to new
Russian-assisted EO and Radar satellites, French assisted communication
satellite, access to U.S., Russian and European navigation satellites signals, and
then carried by Russian assisted nuclear submarines or future Russian-made
bombers, then the PLA will have its first limited non-nuclear global strike
capability.34 Such a synergy could emerge by 2010 or shortly thereafter. This
might not equal the U.S. all-weather intimate moving-target hitting capability,
but China may be able to use LACMs for political-military influence much as the
U.S. does today.183195
Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs). Regarding the SS-N-27s carried by the
eight newly delivered Kilo-class submarines, ONI states:
Russia continues to develop supersonic ASCMs. The most interesting is the
3M-54E design which has a cruise vehicle that ejects a rocket-propelled terminal
sprint vehicle approximately 10 nautical miles from its target. The sprint vehicle
181193
McVadon 9/15/05 testimony, pp. 4-5.
182194
2004 ONI WMC, pp. 25, 26.
183195
Testimony of Richard D. Fisher, Jr., for 3/16/06 USCC hearing, p. 9.
CRS-7781
accelerates to speeds as high as Mach 3 and has the potential to perform very
high-g defensive maneuvers.184196
Another observer states that “the very dangerous and lethal SS-N-27Bs [are]
said by experts to be part of the best family of ASCMs in the world....”185197
Land-Based Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs). Regarding SAM systems, DOD
states:
In the next few years, China will receive its first battalion of Russian-made
S-300PMU-2 surface-to-air missile systems. With an advertised intercept range
of 200 km, the S-300PMU-2 provides increased lethality against tactical ballistic
missiles and more effective electronic countermeasures. China also is developing
the indigenous HQ-9 air defense missile system, a phased array radar-based SAM
with a 150 km range.186198
Another observer states:
One area where Russian technology in particular is producing a new and
dangerous PLA capability is that of modern air defenses. The PLA Air Force is
on its way to purchasing up to 14 to 20 Battalions of Russian
S-300/PMU-1/PMU-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), which could mean the
purchase of 700 to 1,000 of these deadly missiles. The S-300 family is very
difficult to jam and can only be evaded with some assurance by stealthy F-22A
or B-2 aircraft. The range of the S-300PMU-2 allows it to target aircraft that
operate over Taiwan, thus denying the Taiwan Strait as an air defense buffer
zone for the Taiwan Air Force. Jane’s reports that China may be funding the
development of the even longer-range S-400 missile, while Asian sources report
that China may be co-producing the deadly short range TOR-M1,44 which can
shoot down precision-guided cruise missiles and bombs.187199
Land-Based Aircraft. Regarding land-based aircraft, DOD states:
China has more than 700 combat aircraft based within an un-refueled
operational range of Taiwan and the airfi eld capacity to expand that number
significantly. Many aircraft in the PLA force structure are upgrades of older
models (e.g., re-engined B-6 bombers for extended ranges); however, newer
aircraft make up a growing percentage of the inventory.
— The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is deploying the F-10 multi-role fighter to
operational units. The F-10, a fourth generation aircraft, will be China’s premier
fighter in the coming decades.
— China is now producing the multi-role Su-27SMK/FLANKER (F-11A)
fighter under a licensed co-production agreement with Russia following an initial
production run of Su-27SKs (F-11). China is employing increasing numbers of
184196
2004 ONI WMC, p. 23.
185197
McVadon 9/15/05 testimony, p. 5.
186198
2007 DOD CMP, p. 4
187199
Testimony of Richard D. Fisher, Jr., for 3/16/06 USCC hearing, p. 11.
CRS-7882
the multi-role Su-30MKK/FLANKER fighter-bomber and its naval variant, the
Su-30MK2.
— Chinese aircraft are armed with an increasingly sophisticated array of
air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons, satellite and laser-guided precision
munitions, and cruise missiles....
— Improvements to the FB-7 fighter program will enable this older aircraft to
perform nighttime maritime strike operations and use improved weapons such as
the Kh-31P (AS-17) anti-radiation missile and KAB-500 laser-guided
munitions.188200
DOD also states that:
PLA air defense has shifted from point defense of key military, industrial,
and political targets to a new Joint Anti-Air Raid Campaign based on a modern,
integrated air defense system and offensive and defensive counter-air operations.
These operations extend beyond the defense of Chinese airspace to include
strikes against an adversary’s bases (including aircraft carriers) and logistics to
degrade the adversary’s ability to conduct air operations.
The air defense component of anti-access/area-denial includes SAMs such
as the SA-10, SA-20, HQ-9, HQ-15, and extended-range C2 suites such as the
S-300PMU2. Beijing will also use Russian-built and domestic fourth-generation
aircraft (e.g., Su-27 and Su-30 FLANKER variants, and the indigenous F-10).
The PLA Navy would employ recently acquired Russian Su-30MK2 fighters,
armed with AS-17/Kh-31A anti-ship missiles. The acquisition of refueling
aircraft, including the Russian IL-78/MIDAS and the indigenously developed
B-6U refueling aircraft, will extend operational ranges for PLAAF and PLA
Navy strike aircraft armed with precision munitions, thereby increasing the threat
to surface and air forces distant from China’s coast. Additionally, acquisition of
UAVs and UCAVs, including the Israeli HARPY, expands China’s options for
long-range reconnaissance and strike.189201
ONI states:
China operates a force of 1950s vintage B-6D Badger dedicated naval strike
bombers. Today, these aircraft are armed with the C601, an air-launched
derivative of the Styx ASCM, but a program to arm them with the modern
C802K is underway....
China and Russia also are working on new tactical aircraft dedicated to the
antiship mission. China’s FB-7 Flounder has been in development since the
1970s; its production limited by engine difficulties. The C801K-armed FB-7
entered service with the Chinese Navy, and integration of the longer-range
C802K on the FB-7 is underway.190
188202
200
2007 DOD CMP, p. 4.
189201
2007 DOD CMP, p. 18.
190202
2004 ONI WMC, p. 27. Fisher 7/27/05 testimony, pp. 3-4, 9-10.
CRS-7983
Another observer states:
Although the modernization of the PLA Air Force has taken a backseat to
nuclear, space, and naval development, the PLAAF is a much more modern
fighting force in 2007 than it was in 1997. It now boasts about 450 advanced
fighter aircraft, including about 300 Russian-designed fourth-generation Su-27
Flankers and Chinese Jian-11s and 76 Su-30MKK fighter-bombers, which
display substantial ground attack capabilities and are armed with Russia’s most
advanced air-to-air missiles.
In January 2007, the PLAAF unveiled its new Jian-10 multirole fighter jet,
which is based on the Israeli Lavi airframe, itself an evolutionary offshoot of the
F-16. As of March 2007, the PLAAF had reportedly deployed 60 Jian-10s, with
the total production run estimated at around 250. Although its forward-wing
canards are a novelty among Chinese-designed fighters, the Jian-10’s most
remarkable characteristic is its midair refueling module. The PLAAF has been
practicing in-flight refueling since at least 2005 with both Su-27 and older Jian-8
fighters. Following Peace Mission 2005, a joint Chinese — Russian military
exercise on China’s Shandong peninsula, China contracted for six to 10
Illyushin-78s configured as aerial refueling platforms and 30 Illyushin-76 cargo
aircraft configured for paratroop drops.
The increasing size of China’s fourth-generation fighter fleet, which is
heavily armed with the latest Russian and Chinese air-to-air missiles and
equipped with fire control systems and refueling modules, gives the PLAAF a
technological and numerical edge in the Taiwan Strait.191203
Submarines. Regarding China’s submarine force, one observer states that by
2010,
the PLA Navy could take delivery of over 20 new domestic SONG A and
YUAN-class conventional submarines, 12 Russian KILO-877/636/636M
conventional submarines, and five or more new indigenous Type 093 nuclear
attack submarines (SSNs) — the third Type 093 is now under construction. In
addition, the PLAN could retain up to 20 older Type 035 MING-class
conventional [attack submarines] and about 4 older Type 091 HAN-class SSNs.
This raises the prospect by 2010 of a Chinese fleet of over 50 modern-tomoderate [sic] attack submarines capable of engaging Taiwan, U.S. and Japanese
naval forces.192204
Another observer states that:
the PLA Navy now has the capability to make the antisubmarine warfare (ASW)
mission very difficult for U.S. forces. With a total of more than 50 operational
submarines, and with a substantial number of them new and quiet, China, quite
simply, can put to sea more submarines than the U.S. Navy can locate and
191203
John J. Tkacik, Jr., China’s Quest for a Superpower Military, Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 2036, May 17, 2007, pp. 13-14.
192204
Fisher 7/27/05 testimony, p. 11. On page 4, Fisher similarly states “It can be estimated
that by 2010 the PLA Navy could have 50 to 60 nuclear and new conventional attack
submarines....”
CRS-8084
counter. Its older Ming and Romeo submarines are not only still lethal if ignored
but also serve to disperse and dilute the efforts of the ASW forces. In other
words, some, or even many, of the already large and diverse, but still rapidly
growing, fleet of very capable Shang SSNs, and Kilo, Song, and Yuan SSs can
reasonably expect to remain undetected as they seek to interdict the U.S. carrier
strike groups. If the “shooting has started,” eventually U.S. ASW forces could
take a big toll against the Chinese submarine force, but the delay in sanitizing the
area before the entry of carrier strike groups is what the Chinese are counting on
as adequate delay to present the world with the aforementioned fait accompli
with respect to Taiwan.193205
Another observer states:
Evidence suggests that China is seeking to become a first-class submarine
power. While the PLAN modernization shows impressive breadth with major
new purchases of naval aircraft and surface combatants, submarines appear to be
the centerpiece of China’s strategic reorientation toward the sea. The May 2002
contract for eight additional Kilos, the likely continuation of the Song program,
and nuclear force modernization, taken together with the evident new priority on
training, technological research and doctrinal development all suggest that
Beijing recognizes the value of submarines as a potent, asymmetric answer to
United States maritime superiority. The recent ascendance of a submariner,
Adm. Zhang Dingfa, to the position of commanding officer of the PLAN
underlines these tendencies. Further investments in diesel submarines,
particularly when enhanced by air independent propulsion, will afford Beijing
increasing near-term leverage in the East Asian littoral, while methodical nuclear
modernization signifies a long-term commitment to global power projection. As
one Chinese strategist recently observed, “The scale [of recent purchases]
indicates that in the coming years, China will build an offshore defense system
with submarines as the key point.”194206
The paragraphs below discuss China’s submarine modernization effort in more
detail on a class-by-class basis.
Jin-class (Type 094) SSBN. China is building a new class of SSBN known
as the Jin class or Type 094. The first two Jin-class boats are expected to enter
service in 2008 and 2010. Additional units are expected, perhaps at two-year
intervals. A total of four to six boats are expected.195 The Jin-class design may be
is expected to become operational as a
submarine in mid-2007 and as an SSBN in 2008-2009, depending on progress with
the new JL-2 (submarine-launched ballistic) missile.207 Additional units are
expected, perhaps at two-year intervals. A total of four is expected.208 The Jin-class
design may be derived from the Shang-class (Type 093) SSN design discussed below.
ONI states
that China “wishes to develop a credible, survivable, sea-based deterrent with the
capability to reach the United States” and that the Jin-class design “benefits from
substantial Russian technical assistance.”196
193
205
McVadon 9/15/05 testimony, p. 5.
194206
Statement of Lyle J. Goldstein and William Murray as printed in 2/6/04 USCC hearing,
pp. 155-156.
195207
208
Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007-2008, p. 116. See also p. 31 (Executive Overview).
One news article, citing information from the Office of Naval Intelligence, states that a
total of 5 are expected. (Bill Gertz, “China Expands Sub Fleet,” Washington Times, March
2, 2007.)
196
2004 ONI WMC, p. 37.
CRS-81
CRS-85
with the capability to reach the United States” and that the Jin-class design “benefits
from substantial Russian technical assistance.”209
The Jin-class SSBN is expected to be armed with 12 JL-2 nuclear-armed
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, also known as JL-2s. DOD estimates that
these missiles will enter service between 2007 and 2010, and that they will have a
range of 8,000+ kilometers (about 4,320+ nautical miles).197210 Such a range could
permit Jin-class SSBNs operating in protected bastions close to China to attack
targets in Hawaii, Alaska, and locations in the continental United States that are north
and west and north of a line running from central or southern California to northern
Minnesota.198211 A March 2007 news article states:
China’s military is engaged in a major buildup of submarines that includes
five new strategic nuclear-missile boats and several advanced nuclear-powered
attack submarines, according to the Office of Naval Intelligence.
The new nuclear-powered missile submarines (SSBNs), identified as Type
094s, will be outfitted with new 5,000-mile range JL-2 missiles that “will provide
China with a modern and robust sea-based nuclear deterrent force,” the ONI
stated in report made up of written answers to questions on the Chinese
submarine buildup.
The ONI report was first disclosed to Sea Power magazine, and a copy was
obtained by The Washington Times. It was the first time the Pentagon has
identified the number of new Chinese strategic submarines under construction.
The five new missile submarines will “provide more redundancy and
capacity for a near-continuous at-sea SSBN presence,” the ONI said, which noted
that sea trials for some of the submarines are under way and the first
deployments could begin as early as next year.199212
Shang-class (Type 093) SSN. China is building a new class of SSN, called
the Shang (or Type 093) class. The boats are viewed as replacements for China’s
aging Han-class SSNs.213 DOD states that the first Shang-class SSN began sea
trials in 2005.200 Construction of a third may have begun, but has not yet been
confirmed. A total of five boats is expected.
Observers believe the Shang-class SSNs will likely represent a substantial
improvement over China’s five older and reportedly fairly noisy Han (Type 091)
class SSNs, which entered service between 1974 and 1990. The first Han-class boat
reportedly was decommissioned in 2003, and observers expect the others will be
decommissioned as Shang-class boats enter service.
The Shang class reportedly was designed in conjunction with Russian experts
and is derived from the Soviet Victor III-class SSN design that was first deployed by
197 trials
in 2005.214 The first was expected to be commissioned in 2006 and the second in
2007; the actual in-service dates for the two boats are expected to be 2007 and 2008.
Construction of a third (possibly to a modified design) may have begun, but has not
yet been confirmed. A total of five boats is expected.
209
2004 ONI WMC, p. 37.
210
2007 DOD CMP, pp. 3, 19 (Figure 3), and 42 (Figure 14).
198211
2007 DOD CMP, p. 19 (Figure 3). China also operates a single Xia (Type 092) class
SSBN that entered service in 1987, and a single Golf (Type 031) non-nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarine (SSB) that entered service in the late 1960s. The Xia-class boat
is armed with 12 CSS-N-3 (JL-1) SLBMs that have a range of roughly 1,200 nautical miles.
The Golf-class boat is used as an SLBM test platform.
199212
Bill Gertz, “China Expands Sub Fleet,” Washington Times, March 2, 2007.
200
2007 DOD CMP, p. 3.
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Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007-2008, p. 31 (Executive Overview).
214
2007 DOD CMP, p. 3.
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Observers believe the Shang-class SSNs will likely represent a substantial
improvement over China’s five older and reportedly fairly noisy Han (Type 091)
class SSNs, which entered service between 1974 and 1990. The first Han-class boat
reportedly was decommissioned in 2003, and observers expect the others will be
decommissioned as Shang-class boats enter service.
The Shang class reportedly was designed in conjunction with Russian experts
and is derived from the Soviet Victor III-class SSN design that was first deployed by
the Soviet Union around 1978. The Victor III was the first in a series of quieter
Soviet SSN designs that, by the mid-1980s, led to substantial concern among U.S.
Navy officials that the Soviet Union was closing the U.S. lead in SSN technology and
thereby creating what Navy officials described an antisubmarine warfare (ASW)
“crisis” for the U.S. Navy.201215
ONI states that the Shang-class “is intended primarily for antisurface warfare
at greater ranges from the Chinese coast than the current diesel force. China looks at
SSNs as a primary weapon against aircraft carrier battle groups and their associated
logistics support.”202216 Observers expect the Shang-class boats to be armed with a
modern ASCM and also with a LACM broadly similar to the U.S. Tomahawk landattack cruise missile. One observer states:
At first, [China’s LACMs] will be launched by Second Artillery units, but soon
after, they may also be used by PLA Air Force H-6 bombers and by the Navy’s
new Type 093 nuclear attack submarines. When used by the latter, the PLA will
have its first platform capable of limited but politically useful non-nuclear power
projection on a global scale....
Once there is a build-up of Type 093s it should be expected that the PLA Navy
may undertake patrols near the U.S. in order to draw U.S. SSNs back to
defensive patrols.203217
Regarding the Jin- and Shang-class programs, one set of observers state:
Whereas the Yuan’s debut allegedly surprised Western analysts, the
emergence of China’s [Type] 093 SSN and [Type] 094 SSBN has been
anticipated for some time. Nevertheless, these programs remain shrouded in
mystery, and there is little consensus regarding their operational and strategic
significance. In the broadest terms, it can be said that a successful [Type] 093
program will significantly enlarge the scope of Chinese submarine operations,
perhaps ultimately serving as the cornerstone of a genuine blue-water navy. The
[Type] 094 could take the survivability of China’s nuclear deterrent to a new
level, potentially enabling more aggressive posturing by Beijing in a crisis.
Moreover, these platforms are entering the PLA Navy (PLAN) at a time when
reductions are projected to occur in the U.S. Navy submarine force; that fact was
duly noted by a senior PLAN strategist recently in one of China’s premier naval
journals.204
These observers also state:
Chinese sources universally recognize that noise reduction is one of the greatest
challenges in building an effective nuclear submarine. PRC scientists have long
201
215
See, for example, Ronald O’Rourke, “Maintaining the Edge in US ASW,” Navy
International, July/August 1988, pp. 348-354.
202
216
2005 ONI WMC, p. 14.
203217
Fisher 7/27/05 testimony, pp. 9, 11.
204
Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, “China’s Future Submarine Force: Insights
From Chinese Writings,” Naval War College Review, Winter 2007: 55-56.
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duly noted by a senior PLAN strategist recently in one of China’s premier naval
journals.218
These observers also state:
Chinese sources universally recognize that noise reduction is one of the greatest
challenges in building an effective nuclear submarine. PRC scientists have long
been conducting research concerning the fundamental sources of propeller noise.
For instance, experts at China Ship Scientific Research Center developed a
relatively advanced guide-vane propeller by the late 1990s. This, and the fact that
China already has advanced seven-blade propellers with cruciform vortex
dissipaters on its indigenous Song-class and imported Kilo-class diesel
submarines, suggests that the [Type] 093 and [Type] 094 will have significantly
improved propellers. A researcher in Qingdao’s 4808 Factory also demonstrates
Chinese attention to the need to use sound-isolation couplings to prevent
transmission of vibrations to the ocean from major fresh-water circulating pumps
in the steam cycle. Advanced composite materials are credited with capability to
absorb vibrations and sound.
One Chinese researcher states that the [Type] 093 is not as quiet as the U.S.
Seawolf class or Virginia class but is on a par with the improved Los Angeles
class. Another analyst estimates that the [Type] 093’s noise level has been
reduced to that of the Russian Akula-class submarine at 110 decibels. He states
that the [Type] 094’s acoustic signature has been reduced to 120 decibels.
According to this report, this is definitely not equal to that of the Ohio class, but
is on a par with the Los Angeles. There is no additional information given to
evaluate concerning the origins or comparability of these “data.”205219
Kilo-class SS. China ordered four Kilo-class SSs from Russia in 1993; the
ships entered service in 1995-1999. The first two were of the less capable (but still
fairly capable) Project 877 variant, which Russia has exported to several countries;
the other two were of the more capable Project 636 variant that Russia had previously
reserved for its own use.
China in 2002 ordered eight additional Kilos from Russia, reportedly all of the
Project 636 design. Five of theThe eight boats were reportedly delivered in 2005, and the
remaining three reportedly were delivered in 2006.206delivered in 2004-2006. ONI states that
the delivery of
these eight boats “will provide the Chinese Navy with a significant qualitative
qualitative increase in warfighting capability,”207220 while another observer states that the Kiloclass
the Kilo-class boats are “Among the most worrisome of China’s foreign
acquisitions....”208221
The eight Kilos are believed to be armed with wire-guided and wake-homing
torpedoes, and with the Russian-made SS-N-27 Sizzler ASCM, also known as the
218
Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, “China’s Future Submarine Force: Insights
From Chinese Writings,” Naval War College Review, Winter 2007: 55-56.
219
Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, “China’s Future Submarine Force: Insights
From Chinese Writings,” Naval War College Review, Winter 2007: 67.
220
2004 ONI WMC, p. 12.
221
Tkacik 7/27/05 testimony, p. 8. See also Fisher 7/27/05 testimony, pp. 11-12.
CRS-88
Novator Alfa Klub 3M-54E — a highly capable ASCM that might as difficult to
shoot down, or perhaps even more difficult to shoot down, than the SS-N-22 Sunburn
ASCM on China’s Russian-made Sovremenny-class destroyers (see discussion below
on surface combatants). The four Kilos commissioned in 1995-1999 are expected
to be refitted in Russia; upgrades are expected to include installation of the SS-N-27
ASCM.
205
Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, “China’s Future Submarine Force: Insights
From Chinese Writings,” Naval War College Review, Winter 2007: 67.
206
Some sources project that the final Kilos would be delivered in 2007.
207
2004 ONI WMC, p. 12.
208
Tkacik 7/27/05 testimony, p. 8. See also Fisher 7/27/05 testimony, pp. 11-12.
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Yuan-class (Type 041) SS. China is building a new class of SS called the
Yuan (or Type 041) class. The first Yuan-class boat, whose appearance reportedly
came as a surprise to western observers,209222 was launched (i.e., put into the water for
the final stage of construction) in 2004. Observers expect the first Yuan-class boat
to enter service in 2006 and the second to enter service in 20082009.
Some observers believe the Yuan class may incorporate technology from
Russia’s most recent SS design, known as the Lada or Amur class, including possibly
an air-independent propulsion (AIP) system.210223 One observer says the Yuan class
strongly resembles both the Russian Amur 1650-class and French Agosta-class SS
designs.211 Another set of observers states:
Evidence of China’s advances in submarine design and construction
emerged in July 2004, when Western media reports suddenly revealed China’s
production of the new Yuan class of conventional submarine. While much is still
unknown about the Yuan, it appears to possess attributes of both the Song- and
Kilo-class vessels, suggesting that China may have optimized features from each
vessel class to meet its specific requirements for underwater warfare.212
Song-class (Type 039/039G) SS. China is also building a relatively new
SS design called the Song (or Type 039/039G) class. The first Song-class boat
entered service in 1999, and a total of 13 are expected to be in service by 2006. It is
unclear whether there will be any additional boats beyond the 13th.
The first boat reportedly experienced problems, resulting in design changes that
were incorporated into subsequent (Type 039G) boats. Some observers believe the
Song-class design may have benefitted from PLA Navy experience with the Kilo
class. One report states that one Song-class boat has been equipped with an AIP
system.213 One set of observers states:
The design and production rates of China’s new Song-class diesel
submarine represent a significant advance over its predecessor, the Ming-class
submarine. The Song class has a hydrodynamically sleek (teardrop) profile,
possesses new cylindrical environmental sensors, and relies on German engines
for propulsion. Most significantly, the Song is much quieter because it is fitted
with an asymmetrical seven-blade skew propeller, and the Song uses anechoic
209224 Another observer states:
There are few details at present but the design appears to exhibit some features
of the Song class, although it appears to be shorter and broader, and possibly also
of the Russian Kilo class. The design of the fin [i.e., the “conning tower”] is
similar to that of the former while a distinctive ‘hump’ on top of a teardrop
shaped hull is characteristic of the latter. It is possible therefore that the boat is
of double-hulled construction. Fitted with a seven-bladed propeller. It is not
known whether an AIP system has been incorporated.225
Another set of observers stated in 2005:
Evidence of China’s advances in submarine design and construction
emerged in July 2004, when Western media reports suddenly revealed China’s
production of the new Yuan class of conventional submarine. While much is still
unknown about the Yuan, it appears to possess attributes of both the Song- and
Kilo-class vessels, suggesting that China may have optimized features from each
vessel class to meet its specific requirements for underwater warfare.226
222
Jane’s Fighting Ships 2005-2006, for example, states: “It is fair to say that the
intelligence community was caught completely unawares by the emergence of the Yuan
class....” Jane’s Fighting Ships 2005-2006, p. 30 (Executive Overview). See also Bill
Gertz, “Chinese Produce New Type Of Sub,” Washington Times, July 16, 2004: 1.
210223
An AIP system, such as a fuel cell system or a closed-cycle diesel engine, extends the
stationary or low-speed submerged endurance of a non-nuclear-powered submarine from a
few days to perhaps two or three weeks. AIP technology does not extend the high-speed
submerged endurance of a non-nuclear-powered submarine, which remains limited, due to
battery capacity, to about 1 to 3 hours of high-speed operations.
211224
Fisher 7/27/05 testimony, p. 11.
212
2005 RAND report, pp. 148-149.
213
“CHINA — Submarine Force Moving Forward,” Submarine Review, April 2005: 106.
CRS-85225
Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007-2008, p. 118.
226
2005 RAND report, pp. 148-149.
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Song-class (Type 039/039G) SS. China in recent years also built a
relatively new SS design called the Song (or Type 039/039G) class. The first Songclass boat entered service in 1999, and a total of 13 were in service by 2006. Further
ships in the class are not expected.
The first boat reportedly experienced problems, resulting in design changes that
were incorporated into subsequent (Type 039G) boats. Some observers believe the
Song-class design may have benefitted from PLA Navy experience with the Kilo
class. One report states that one Song-class boat has been equipped with an AIP
system.227 One set of observers states:
The design and production rates of China’s new Song-class diesel
submarine represent a significant advance over its predecessor, the Ming-class
submarine. The Song class has a hydrodynamically sleek (teardrop) profile,
possesses new cylindrical environmental sensors, and relies on German engines
for propulsion. Most significantly, the Song is much quieter because it is fitted
with an asymmetrical seven-blade skew propeller, and the Song uses anechoic
rubber dampening tiles on the hull and shock absorbency for the engine to reduce
its acoustic signature. The Song may also be able to launch cruise missiles when
submerged, another design advance for China’s conventional submarines. Seven
Song-class vessels have reportedly been launched already, and additional ones
have entered serial production at the Wuchang Shipyard in Wuhan. The rate of
Song production has clearly increased in recent years.214228
Older Ming-class (Type 035) and Romeo-class (Type 033) SSs.
China in 20052007 also had about 2019 older Ming (Type 035) class SSs and about 168 evenolder remaining Romeo (Type 033) class SSs. The Romeos are expected to be
decommissioned soon.
The first Ming-class boat entered service in 1971 and the 20th was launched in
2002. Production may have ended in favor of Song- and Yuan-class production. In
April 2003, a malfunction aboard one of the boats (hull number 361) killed its 70man crew. Observers believe they were killed by carbon monoxide or chlorine
poisoning. The boatship was repaired and returned to service in 2004.
China’s Romeo-class boats entered service between the early 1960s and the late
1980s. A total of 84 were built. Of the 168 still in service as of 20062007, one is a
modified modified
boat that has been used as a cruise missile test ship. Ten additional Romeos
that until recently were in reserve status (and of dubious operational condition)
reportedly have all been scrapped. The total number of Romeos in service has been
declining over timeWith the possible exception of
this missile test ship, the remaining Romeos are expected to be decommissioned
soon.
If China decides that Ming- and Romeo-class boats have continued value as
minelayers or
as bait or decoy submarines that can be used to draw out enemy
submarines (such as
U.S. SSNs), it may elect to keep some of these older submarines
in service even as
new submarines enter service.
227
“CHINA — Submarine Force Moving Forward,” Submarine Review, April 2005: 106.
228
2005 RAND report, p. 148.
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Aircraft Carriers. Regarding China’s activities for developing an aircraft
carrier, one observer stated in May 2007 that:
For over a year, the PLAN has been more or less open about China’s
eventual deployment of an aircraft carrier battle group. Except for the carrier,
China has all the elements of a carrier battle group in place, according to
Lieutenant General Wang Zhiyuan of the PLA General Armaments Department.
China will finish constructing its first aircraft carrier by 2010, according to an
unnamed lieutenant general (probably General Wang again), but its first
operational carrier will likely be the Varyag, the former Soviet carrier bought
from Ukraine.
China’s once-secret naval aviation program appears to be underway at full
steam. At its center is the massive 67,000-ton former Ukrainian aircraft carrier,
which the Chinese government extracted from the Black Sea in 2001 after
considerable costs in both treasure and political capital with Turkey. In March
2002, the Varyag finally completed its 15,200-mile journey to its new home port
of Dalian, where it was immediately placed under heavy security at the PLAN
dry docks.
214
2005 RAND report, p. 148.
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China has reportedly negotiated a contract for 48 Sukhoi-33 jet fighters, the
carrier-based version of the Su-27, and is now preparing the Varyag’s flight deck
for flight operations. Reports in the PRC media indicate that China will also
configure its new Jian-10 fighter for carrier operations.
The PLAN Air Force (PLANAF) schedule apparently envisions developing
a carrier air wing by the time China launches its own aircraft carrier, despite
official Beijing’s continuing protestations that while “China already is capable
of building an aircraft carrier, a final decision on construction has not yet been
made.”215
Another observer states:
The [Chinese] aircraft carrier conundrum resurfaced in mid-[2005] when the
former Russian carrier Varyag, which had arrived at [the Chinese port of] Dalian
on 4th March 2002, emerged from dock painted in Chinese naval colours. This
led to speculation, intensified by the construction of two new Type 051C
Louzhou class destroyers in the same dockyard, that deployment of the ship was
imminent. Wide discussion of its potential roles included development into a
fully operational carrier or amphibious ship or a more modest function as an
aviation training vessel (the name Shi Lang has been suggested). In the event,
the ship did not go to sea in 2005 and lack of information continues to frustrate
objective assessment. In particular, the material state of Varyag when it arrived
in China is unclear. The outward appearance of the ship suggested that she had
not been well maintained and that possibly she was derelict. If this was the case,
there would be a requirement for a very large work-package including the
checking and/or replacement of wiring, installation of electronic systems, setting
to work of main machinery, which did not appear to have been removed before
transfer, and raising habitability to acceptable standards. All of this could be
achieved, at a cost, but it would probably require longer than the ten weeks spent
by the ship in dock during 2005.216229
Another observer states:
The year 2005 marked a turning point in China’s willingness to continue
to deny or obfuscate its ambitions to build aircraft carriers. Last May it moved
the old Russian uncompleted aircraft carrier hulk the Varyag, that it purchased
and moved to Dalian harbor in 2002, from dockside into a drydock. It then
emerged in early August painted in PLA Navy grey, and the most recent
Internet-source photos show that the carrier deck is receiving new multiple
coatings. China’s ruse was that the Varyag would be turned into a casino and
Chinese officials have repeatedly denied they were developing carriers. But on
March 10, Hong Kong’s Wen Wei Po quoted General Wang Zhiyuan, a Deputy
Director of the Science and Technology Committee of the General Armaments
Department, that in “three to five years,” “The Chinese army will conduct
research and build an aircraft carrier and develop our own aircraft carrier fleet.”
He went on to add that the escort and support ships for this carrier group are
either being built or have already been built. These would likely include the new
215
John J. Tkacik, Jr., China’s Quest for a Superpower Military, Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 2036, May 17, 2007, pp. 12-13.
216
Jane’s Fighting Ships 2006-2007, p. 30 (Executive Overview)
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Luyang 1, Luyang 2 and Luzhou class air defense destroyers launched from 2003
to 2005, new Type 093 nuclear powered attack submarines, and new Fuchi class
underway replenishment ships.
229
John J. Tkacik, Jr., China’s Quest for a Superpower Military, Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 2036, May 17, 2007, pp. 12-13.
CRS-91
If General Wang is to be believed, then the carrier Varyag, now undergoing
what appears to be substantial refurbishment, will be used for some kind of
military mission. These could include the refinement of China’s anti-aircraft
carrier doctrine and tactics, training and development of a new carrier air wing,
and future aerial and amphibious support combat missions. In August 2005
Russian sources interviewed at the Moscow Airshow offered confirmation of
China’s carrier plans in that two Russian companies offered that China was
interested in two types of future carrier combat aircraft, the Sukhoi Su-33 and the
Chengdu J-10 modified with a new Russian engine thrust vector to enable slower
carrier landing speeds. The Russians also used the Moscow Airshow to market
the twin-seat Su-33UB, but modified with thrust vector engines. It is quite likely
that all three will be upgraded with new more powerful Russian Al-31 engines,
have new active-phased array radar, and carry a range of active guided and
helmet display sighted air-to-air missiles and precision ground attack missiles.
As such both could offer some performance parameters that equal or even exceed
that of the U.S. Boeing F/A-18E/F, the main U.S. carrier combat aircraft.
Internet sources also indicate that China is developing a carrier-sized AWACS
aircraft that could also be developed into antisubmarine and cargo support
variants. While the U.S. Navy benefits from its over 70 years of constant
practice and employment of effective carrier aviation, it is nonetheless a major
shock that China’s carrier fleet could commence with combat capabilities that
could neutralize those of the U.S. Navy in some scenarios.217
A press report states:
Chinese shipyard workers have been repairing a badly damaged ex-Russian
aircraft carrier and have repainted it with the country’s military markings, raising
the question once again of whether China is pursuing longer-term plans to field
its first carrier.
In the latest developments, images show that workers at the Chinese Dalian
Shipyard have repainted the ex-Russian Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier Varyag
with the markings and colour scheme of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
Navy (PLAN). Additional new photographs show that other work, the specifics
of which could not be determined, appears to be continuing and that the
condition of the vessel is being improved....
Still, China’s ultimate intentions for the Varyag remain unclear. One
possibility is that Beijing intends to eventually have it enter into some level of
service. A military strategist from a Chinese military university has commented
publicly that the Varyag “would be China’s first aircraft carrier.”
It is possible that the PLAN will modify the Varyag into a training aircraft
carrier. A US intelligence official said the vessel could be made seaworthy again
with enough time, effort and resources. However, US defence officials said that
217
Testimony of Richard D. Fisher, Jr. For 3/16/06 USCC hearing, pp. 5-6. See also David
Lague, “An Aircraft Carrier For China?” International Herald-Tribune, January 31, 2006;
Norman Friedman, “Varyag Redux?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 2005: 91.
CRS-88
repairing the Varyag to become fully operational would be an extraordinarily
large task. The carrier was about 70 per cent complete at the time of transfer and
sensitive portions were destroyed, including damage to the core structure, before
China was permitted to take possession. Given the difficulty and expense, it is
questionable whether Beijing would pursue the effort only to use the Varyag as
a training platform; such a move could, however, mark a transitional phase en
route to a fully operational capability.
Another possibility is that China does, indeed, plan to repair the vessel to
become its first seagoing aircraft carrier or use knowledge gained from it for an
indigenously built carrier programme. The US intelligence official said such an
outcome “is certainly a possibility” if China is seeking a blue-water navy capable
of protecting long-range national interests far from its shores such as sea lanes
in the Strait of Malacca. If this strategy were to be followed, China would have
to reinstate the structural integrity degraded before delivery and study the
structural design of the carrier’s deck. These two activities, along with the
blueprints and the ship itself, could be used to design an indigenous carrier. Such
a plan would very likely be a long-term project preceded by the development of
smaller vessels such as amphibious landing ships.218230
Another set of observers states that China’s increased shipbuilding capacity:
has direct implications for China’s ability to build an aircraft carrier. For the past
decade, rumors have circulated that China is interested in buying or building a
carrier. A Chinese military delegation is known to have considered buying
Ukraine’s Varyag, and the Spanish shipbuilder Bazan is reported to have
submitted to China a design for a basic carrier.... China now has eight yards
capable of VLCC and ULCC219ULCC231 construction, and it will add more such yards in
the coming years. Many of these yards would be suitable for the construction of
a large carrier. Another option for China would be to build a medium-sized
carrier (30,-50,000 tons) for launching and retrieving helicopters or vertical short
take-off/landing (VSTOL) fixed-wing aircraft. Such a ship could be built from
a relatively basic design based on LHD-type platforms (i.e., multipurpose
amphibious assault ships) similar to the ones used by the United Kingdom,
Japan, and Thailand. Such a vessel could also be completed at a number of
modern yards in China, even ones without VLCC capacity — although with
substantial naval shipbuilding experience.
Although Chinese shipbuilders are quite capable of building the hull, other
parts of China’s defense industry would have to develop the equipment necessary
to outfit an aircraft carrier with the necessary propulsion systems, navigational
electronics, or weapon suites for self-defense or long-range operations. In
addition, China lacks the capability to build either large-capacity aircraft-lift
elevators or steam catapults for the movement and launching of aircraft; so a
Chinese carrier would have to rely on a ski-jump design. Thus, a Chinese carrier
would not resemble in any way, shape, or form a U.S. “big-deck” carrier, which
218
Yihong Chang and Andrew Koch, “Is China Building A Carrier?,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly, August 17, 2005. See also Ian Storey and You Ji, “China’s Aircraft Carrier
Ambitions, Seeking Truth from Rumors,” Naval War College Review, winter 2004, pp. 7793.
219
230
Testimony of Richard D. Fisher, Jr. For 3/16/06 USCC hearing, pp. 5-6. See also David
Lague, “An Aircraft Carrier For China?” International Herald-Tribune, January 31, 2006;
Norman Friedman, “Varyag Redux?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 2005: 91.
231
VLCCs (very large crude carriers) and ULCCs (ultra-large crude carriers) are the two
largest kinds of commercial crude oil tankers.
CRS-8992
Chinese carrier would have to rely on a ski-jump design. Thus, a Chinese carrier
would not resemble in any way, shape, or form a U.S. “big-deck” carrier, which
serves as the operational hub for an entire carrier battle group. If China chooses
to build an aircraft carrier, the need for more ships will become especially
pressing in order to regularly protect and replenish the carrier. The PLAN
currently lacks enough modern, multipurpose warships to adequately meet the
needs of defending and replenishing a carrier. It is to this end that an expanding
and improving shipbuilding infrastructure is a necessary condition for the
development of modern, long-range naval capabilities.220232
Surface Combatants. One observer states that by 2010, China’s surface
combatant force
could exceed 31 destroyers and 50 frigates, backed up by 30 ocean-capable
stealthy fast attack craft. Such a force could then be used in conjunction with
submarines and attack aircraft to impose a naval blockade around Taiwan.
Surface ships could also defend the airspace around Taiwan from U.S. Naval
forces, especially its P-3 anti-submarine warfare aircraft which would play a
critical role in defeating a blockade.221233
Another set of observers states that improvements in China’s shipbuilding
industry
are also reflected in the improvements in Chinese warships commissioned in the
late 1990s and in many of the new naval projects currently coming online. The
newest vessels are more durable, are more capable of surviving damage, have
longer ranges, are stealthier, and are capable of carrying a variety of modern
weapon systems. China’s serial production of a variety of new naval platforms
in the past five years is notable in this regard. The current degree of
simultaneous production of several new classes of naval platforms has not been
seen in China for decades.222234
Luhai (Type 051B) Destroyer. One set of observers states:
The Luhai-class destroyer, which was launched in October 1997 and
commissioned into the PLAN in late 1998, represented a significant design
advance over China’s second-generation Luhu-class destroyer. In terms of
overall size, the Luhai is 20 percent larger. It has a widened hull beam to
enhance stability, armament-carrying capacity, and crew living space. In
particular, the Luhai’s larger size permits four quad launchers for C801/C802
anti-ship missiles, which is double the number, deployed on the Luhu. The
220232
2005 RAND report, pp. 149-150. See also Statement of Cortez A. Cooper III for 3/16/06
USCC hearing, p. 5.
221233
Fisher 7/27/05 testimony, p. 12.
222234
2005 RAND report, p. 110. Similarly, the report states on page 140 that
The expansion and modernization of China’s shipbuilding industry
contributed to the PLAN’s efforts to design and build better naval vessels....
These developments have enabled Chinese shipbuilders to build more-seaworthy
and more reliable naval ships with better habitability, damage control facilities,
engines, and electronics. In short, Chinese shipbuilders have become more
efficient, better skilled, and more sophisticated in designing and building ships
for the PLAN.
CRS-9093
particular, the Luhai’s larger size permits four quad launchers for C801/C802
anti-ship missiles, which is double the number, deployed on the Luhu. The
Luhai also uses a gas turbine engine, which is more powerful than the Luhu’s
diesel gas turbine system. In addition, the design of the Luhai’s bridge and
superstructure exhibits a number of stealthy characteristics (particularly in
comparison to the Luhu’s structure). These design features include a streamlined
superstructure with inclined angles and two solid masts with fewer protruding
electronic sensor arrays. The stepped superstructure may have been designed
with the intention to equip the Luhai with vertical launch systems, possibly for
SAMs for an enhanced area-defense capability. The absence of such a system
on the Luhai suggests that that option was deferred for a time.223235
Luyang I (Type 052 B) and II (Type 052C) Destroyers. One set of
observers states that the Luyang I and II classes
represent important advances in the shipbuilding industry’s overall design and
production techniques.... The latter have a similar design as the former, but they
appear to be optimized for air-defense missions....
These four new destroyers represent an important evolution in shipbuilding
design capabilities, production techniques, and management practices. The hulls
are larger than the Luhai’s, which increases their weapons capacity, versatility,
and stability on the high seas. The designs of these vessels are even stealthier,
with sloped sides and a superstructure with a reduced profile — attributes that,
collectively, reduce the vessel’s radar signature. Also, these hulls were built
using modular shipbuilding, a technique increasingly widespread in China’s most
modern shipyards. Modular construction (as opposed to keel-up) allows for
work to be done on different sections at the same time, increasing the efficiency
and speed of the production process. One of the most significant aspects of the
new destroyers is the fact that China constructed these four new destroyers at the
same time and quite quickly as well, at least compared with past experiences.
This serial production of an indigenously designed vessel is a first in the PRC’s
naval history and a testament to improved project management. The four new
052B- and 052C-class vessels have been built or have been under construction
within the past four years. By comparison, in the entire decade of the 1990s
China only built a second Luhu (1993) and one Luhai (1997) destroyer.
The 052C-class destroyer, in particular, possesses several important
attributes. First, according to Goldstein and Murray, it uses a phased array or
planar radar on the four corners of the bridges’ vertical superstructure, which
would be used with a SAM vertical launch system (VLS) for air-defense missiles
— a second important innovation. Both of these attributes are a first for a
Chinese combatant and help the PLAN resolve its long-standing weakness with
air defense. In the past, Chinese combatants relied on short-range SAMs for air
defense. A medium-range VLS SAM system would provide the Chinese navy
with its first, real area-defense vessel, and a collection of such ships could allow
the PLA Navy to operate surface action groups. If China is able to successfully
reverse engineer Russian-purchased SAMs, then it may deploy them on the 052C
destroyer. Some reports indicate that China may deploy its HQ-9 system (a
Chinese version of a Russian SAM with a range of about 120 km) on the new
destroyers. Such a system on the front of the new platform, combined with older
223235
2005 RAND report, pp. 144-145.
CRS-9194
Chinese SAMs in the stern, would give the Chinese their first fleet air-defense
vessels.224236
Regarding the radar to be carried by the Luyang II class, a January 2006 press
article states: “The two Chinese Project 052C destroyers have fixed array radars that
are often described as active arrays, though that cannot be certain.”225237 Active radar
arrays use a technology that is more modern and more capable in certain respects
than the technology used in the SPY-1 radars on the U.S. Navy’s Aegis ships.
Regarding the HQ-9 SAM believed to be carried by the Luyang II-class
destroyers, ONI states:
The most challenging threat to aircraft and cruise missiles comes from
high-performance, long-range [SAM] systems like the Russian SA-10/SA-20
family. The system combines very powerful three-dimensional radar and a highperformance missile with engagement ranges in excess of 100 nautical miles
against a conventional target. The SA-10/SA-20 has been marketed widely and
has enjoyed some success in the export market, but its high cost has limited its
proliferation. Technology from the SA-10 is being incorporated into China’s
50-nautical mile range HQ-9 SAM, which is intended for use on the new
LUYANG destroyer. The HQ-9 will provide China’s navy with its first true area
air defense capability when the SAM becomes operational in the next few
years.226238
Jiangkai I (Type 054) Frigates. One set of observers states that the JiangkaiclassJiangkai
I-class design
is larger and more modern than that of China’s Jiangwei II — class frigates. Like
China’s new destroyers, the new frigate has a more streamlined design and has
a larger displacement. These changes augment the new vessel’s warfighting
capabilities and its seaworthiness. Some sources note that the 054 frigate
resembles the French Layfayette-class guided-missile frigate because of the
minimalist design of the Type 054’s superstructure. The design of the new
frigate also offers greater options for outfitting the vessel with various weapon
suites. Some estimates indicate that the new frigate will have a significantly
enhanced set of weapon capabilities over the Jiangwei-class frigates, possibly
including VLS capabilities.227
Amphibious Ships. The three new classes of amphibious ships and craft now
under construction in China, all of which began construction in 2003, are as follows:
!
224239
Amphibious Ships. In addition to the new Type 071 class amphibious ship
discussed earlier in this report, the three other new classes of smaller amphibious
ships and craft that entered service between 2003 and 2005 are as follows:
!
236
Yuting II-class helicopter-capable tank landing ships (LSTs).
Three of these 4,800-ton ships entered service in 2003 and another six in 2004.
Each ship can transport 10 tanks and 250 soldiers, and has a, another six
2005 RAND report, pp. 146-147.
225237
Norman Friedman, “A New Role For Active Radar Arrays?” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, January 2006: 91.
226238
2004 ONI WMC, p. 29.
227239
2005 RAND report, p. 147.
CRS-92
95
in 2004, and a 10th in 2005. Each ship can transport 10 tanks and
250 soldiers, and has a helicopter landing platform for two medium-sizedmediumsized helicopters. The
ships were built at three shipyards, and two more are reportedly
under construction
observers believe additional units might be built.
!
Yunshu-class landing ships (LSMs). Ten of these ships entered
1,850-ton ships
entered service in 2004. Each ship can transport 6 tanks or 12 trucks
or 250
tons of supplies. The ships were built at four shipyards, and
observers believe additional units might be built.
!
Yubei-class utility landing craft (LCUs). Eight of these landing
craft entered service in 2004and2004 and another two in 2005. Each craft can
can transport 10 tanks and 150 soldiers. The ships were built at four
shipyards, and observers expect additional units.
China also has numerous older landing ships and craft of various designs,
including 10 Yuting I (Type 072 IV) class helicopter-capable tank landing ships
displacing 4,800 tons each that entered service between 1992 and 2002.
DOD states:
The PLA has increased amphibious ship production to address its lift
deficiencies; however, the Intelligence Community believes these increases alone
will be inadequate to meet requirements. The PLA is also organizing its civilian
merchant fleet and militia, which, given adequate notification, could augment
organic lift in amphibious operations. Transport increases were accompanied by
an increase of 25,000 troops, 200 tanks and 2,300 artillery pieces in the military
regions opposite Taiwan, according to the latest figures from DIA. The
increased troops and equipment in these military regions all appear capable of
participating in expeditionary operations.228
Another observer states:
240
Another observer states:
The surface fleet highlight of the last year was the launch on 21 December
2006 of a 17,000 ton Type 071 [amphibious] assault ship (LPD) at HudongZhongua Shipyard, Shanghai. The construction of such a vessel had been
anticipated for several years as the logical next-step in the modernisation of
amphibious forces. The new ship, and expected follow-on units, is intended to
overcome shortcomings in command and control and rapid cross-beach
movement that have constrained amphibious capability. This despite the
introduction into service of three new classes of landing craft, comprising 30
ships, since 2003. The principal methods of landing troops from the LPD are to
be by heavy helicopters and by air-cushion vehicles, four of which can be
accommodated. The ship is unlikely to be commissioned until 2008 and,
thereafter, a long period of trials can be expected as the Chinese Navy evaluates
and learns to operate in its first major [amphibious] unit.241
Another observer states:
240
2006 DOD CMP, p. 30. See also Fisher 7/27/05 testimony, p. 13.
241
Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007-2008, p. 31 (Executive Overview).
CRS-96
On December 20, 2006, China launched the PLAN’s largest combat
amphibious assault ship, an indigenously designed amphibious landing dock
(LPD) identified as the Type 071, which is similar to but a little bigger than the
U.S. Whidbey Island-class LPD.229242 Designed in the 10th five-year plan (2001 —
200520012005), the ship was built in about six months in the second half of 2006 and
appears to be the first of four LPDs. The Type 071 appears to be designed to land
500 — -800 troops and 25 — -50 armored vehicles and supplies using 15 landing
craft craft
or several large hovercraft. It will carry at least two Changhe Z-8
helicopters,
each capable of transporting 30 soldiers inland beyond the
beachhead.230243
Another set of observers states that
China’s development and production of new classes of amphibious vessels [is]
a testament to the SBI’s [shipbuilding industry’s] improved production capacity,
as well as to advances in ship-design and project-management skills. In the past
228
2006 DOD CMP, p. 30. See also Fisher 7/27/05 testimony, p. 13.
229
This is a reference to the U.S. Navy’s Whidbey Island (LSD-41) class amphibious ships,
which have a full load displacement of about 15,800 tons.
230
John J. Tkacik, Jr., China’s Quest for a Superpower Military, Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 2036, May 17, 2007, p. 131.
CRS-93
few years, China has designed a new class of landing ships/tanks (LSTs) and has
built at least seven of them. This new follow-on to the Yuting-class vessels is
enlarged and has a greater carrying capacity. With these new ships, China’s
inventory of LSTs has grown from 16 to 23. China also designed and built
several new medium-landing ships (LSMs), which appear to be a follow-on to
China’s Yuedeng-class vessels. In addition, Goldstein and Murray note that the
PLA Navy aspires to building a 12,300-ton amphibious transport dock (LDP)
capable of transporting several helicopters and air-cushion landing crafts.231244
Information Warfare/Information Operations (IW/IO). Regarding IW/IO
capabilities, ONI states, without reference to any specific country:
IO is the combination of computer network attack, electronic warfare, denial and
deception (D&D), and psychological operations (PSYOP)....
Outside attack on Navy networks can take different forms depending on the
attacker’s goals and sophistication. Navy networks have been targeted for denial
of service attacks from the Internet. More sophisticated operations, perhaps
conducted by foreign military or intelligence services, might include covertly
mapping Navy networks, installing backdoors to facilitate future intrusions,
stealing data, and leaving behind destructive code packages to be activated in
time of conflict. Malicious codes like the Melissa virus have appeared in
classified networks, demonstrating that an external attack on ostensibly protected
networks could succeed. Attacks could selectively alter information in Navy
databases and files, introducing errors into the system. When discovered or
revealed, this corruption of trusted data could cause us to lose confidence in the
integrity of the entire database.232
A November 2006 press report stated that:245
A November 2006 press report stated that:
242
This is a reference to the U.S. Navy’s Whidbey Island (LSD-41) class amphibious ships,
which have a full load displacement of about 15,800 tons.
243
John J. Tkacik, Jr., China’s Quest for a Superpower Military, Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 2036, May 17, 2007, p. 131.
244
2005 RAND report, pp. 147-148.
245
2004 ONI WMC, p. 38.
CRS-97
Chinese computer hackers penetrated the Naval War College network
earlier this month, forcing security authorities to shut down all e-mail and official
computer network work at the Navy’s school for senior officers.
Navy officials said the computer attack was detected Nov. 15 and two days
later the U.S. Strategic Command raised the security alert level for the
Pentagon’s 12,000 computer networks and 5 million computers.
A spokesman for the Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command, located
in Norfolk, said “network intrusions” were detected at the Newport, R.I., military
school two weeks ago.
“The system-network connection was terminated and known affected
systems were removed and are being examined for forensic evidence to
determine the extent of the intrusion,” said Lt. Cmdr. Doug Gabos, the
spokesman.
231
2005 RAND report, pp. 147-148.
232
2004 ONI WMC, p. 38.
CRS-94
“The Naval War College computer system-network is used by students at
the war college and contains Navy Professional Reading Program and other
materials, all of which are unclassified information.”...
Cmdr. Gabos declined to comment on the origin of the attack. “The nature
and extent of intrusion are operational issues,” he said. “I can tell you it was an
isolated incident and did not affect other elements of Department of Defense.”
However, the U.S. Strategic Command, which is in charge of Defense
Department computer warfare and defenses, issued a directive about the time the
attack was detected ordering all defense computer users to heighten security by
changing passwords....
Alan Paller, a computer security specialist with the private SANS Institute,
said the Chinese network attack against the war college is “the tip of the
iceberg.”
“The depth of the penetration is more than anybody is even admitting,” he
said in an interview. “People are trying to hide this because they’re
embarrassed.”
Mr. Paller said the Chinese military’s doctrine calls for waging
cyber-warfare against computer networks. “Part of it is gathering data and part
is leaving a back door so they can get in [to military computers] in the future,”
he said.233246
Commenting on this event, another observer states:
In mid-November [2006], computer security officials determined that
Chinese hackers had penetrated the computer network at the Naval War College
in Rhode Island. Retired Air Force Major General Richard Goetze, a professor
at the Naval War College, said the Chinese took down the entire Naval War
College computer network, an operation that prompted the U.S. Strategic
246
Bill Gertz, “Chinese Hackers Prompt Navy College Site Closure,” Washington Times,
November 30, 2007. Bracketed material as in the original.
CRS-98
Command to raise the security alert level for the Pentagon’s 12,000 computer
networks and 5 million computers. One report hinted that the Chinese
cyberwarriors may have been targeting the college’s Strategic Studies Group,
which had begun developing concepts for waging cyberwarfare.234247
Nuclear Weapons. Regarding the potential use of nuclear weapons against
U.S. Navy forces, one study states that
there is some evidence the PLA considers nuclear weapons to be a useful element
of an anti-access strategy. In addition to the nuclear-capable [ballistic] missiles...
China has nuclear bombs and aircraft to carry them, and is reported to have
nuclear mines for use at sea and nuclear anti-ship missiles. At the very least,
233
Bill Gertz, “Chinese Hackers Prompt Navy College Site Closure,” Washington Times,
November 30, 2007. Bracketed material as in the original.
234
John J. Tkacik, Jr., China’s Quest for a Superpower Military, Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 2036, May 17, 2007, p. 17.
CRS-95
China would expect the presence of these weapons and the threat to use them to
be a significant deterrent to American action.235248
Regarding the possibility of China using a high-altitude nuclear detonation to
create an EMP effect, DOD states:
Some PLA theorists are aware of the electromagnetic effects of using a
high-altitude nuclear burst to generate high-altitude electromagnetic pulse
(HEMP), and might consider using HEMP as an unconventional attack, believing
the United States and other nations would not interpret it as a use of force and as
crossing the nuclear threshold. This capability would most likely be used as part
of a larger campaign to intimidate, if not decapitate, the Taiwan leadership.
HEMP causes a substantial change in the ionization of the upper atmosphere,
including the ionosphere and magnetosphere. These effects likely would result
in the degradation of important war fighting capabilities, such as key
communication links, radar transmissions, and the full spectrum of electro-optic
sensors. Additional effects could include severe disruptions to civil
electric/power and transportation. These effects cannot easily be localized to
Taiwan and would likely affect the mainland, Japan, the Philippines, and
commercial shipping and air routes in the region.236249
Whether China would agree with the above view that EMP effects could not
easily be localized to Taiwan and surrounding waters is not clear. The effective
radius of a high-altitude EMP burst is dependent to a strong degree on the altitude at
which the warhead is exploded (the higher the altitude, the greater the radius).237250
China might therefore believe that it could detonate a nuclear warhead somewhere
east of Taiwan at a relatively low altitude, so that the resulting EMP radius would be
sufficient to affect systems in Taiwan and on surface ships in surrounding waters, but
not great enough to reach systems on China’s mainland.238 Following the detonation,
235247
John J. Tkacik, Jr., China’s Quest for a Superpower Military, Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 2036, May 17, 2007, p. 17.
248
The Chinese Military, An Emerging Maritime Challenge, Washington, Lexington
Institute, 2004, pp. 13-14.
236249
250
2005 DOD CMP, p. 40.
237
A report by the Office of Technology Assessment (a congressional support agency that
was closed in 1995), states: “The size of the area that could be affected by EMP is primarily
determined by the height of burst and is only very weakly dependent on the yield.” (MX
Missile Basing. Washington, Office of Technology Assessment, 1981. (September 1981)
p. 297. The document is available on the Internet at [http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/
ns20/year_f.html].
238
CRS Report RL32544, op cit., states that “creating a HEMP [high-altitude EMP] effect
over an area 250 miles in diameter [i.e., a radius of 125 miles], an example size for a
battlefield, might only require a rocket with a modest altitude and payload capability that
could loft a relatively small nuclear device.”
One observer states that a detonation height of 200 kilometers (108 nautical miles) would
produce an EMP effect out to a radius of about 1,600 kilometers (864 nautical miles), while
a detonation height of 50 kilometers would produce an EMP effect out to a radius of about
800 kilometers (432 nautical miles). (Written Statement by Dr. Michael Bernardin, Provost
for the Theoretical Institute for Thermonuclear and Nuclear Studies, Applied Theoretical
and Computational Physics Division, Los Alamos National Laboratory, before the Military
(continued...)
CRS-96
CRS-99
sufficient to affect systems in Taiwan and on surface ships in surrounding waters, but
not great enough to reach systems on China’s mainland.251 Following the detonation,
China could attempt to confuse the issue in the public arena of whose nuclear
warhead had detonated. Alternatively, China could claim that the missile launch was
an accident, and that China command-detonated the warhead at altitude as a failsafe
measure, to prevent it from detonating closer to the surface and destroying any nearby
ships.239252
High-Power Microwave (HPM) Weapons.
weapons, DOD states:
Regarding radio-frequency
Chinese technicians are working to develop several types of “new concept”
weapon systems, two of which are radio frequency and laser-based systems.
Long-range beam weapons would use narrow radio frequency (RF) beams
to engage targets such as aircraft or precision guided munitions (PGMs).
Short-range systems would be packaged into missiles or artillery shells and
launched into the vicinity of targets such as radars or command posts before
releasing an RF pulse. In recent years, the application of RF weapons has
expanded to include deployment on small vehicles or in suitcases for targeting
critical military or civilian infrastructures where close access is possible.
PRC officials have publicly indicated their intent to acquire RF weapons
as a means of defeating technologically advanced military forces. Chinese
writings have suggested that RF weapons could be used against C4ISR, guided
missiles, computer networks, electronically-fused mines, aircraft carrier battle
groups, and satellites in orbit.
Analysis of Chinese technical literature indicates a major effort is underway
to develop the technologies required for RF weapons, including high-power
238
(...continued)
251
CRS Report RL32544, op cit., states that “creating a HEMP [high-altitude EMP] effect
over an area 250 miles in diameter [i.e., a radius of 125 miles], an example size for a
battlefield, might only require a rocket with a modest altitude and payload capability that
could loft a relatively small nuclear device.”
One observer states that a detonation height of 200 kilometers (108 nautical miles) would
produce an EMP effect out to a radius of about 1,600 kilometers (864 nautical miles), while
a detonation height of 50 kilometers would produce an EMP effect out to a radius of about
800 kilometers (432 nautical miles). (Written Statement by Dr. Michael Bernardin, Provost
for the Theoretical Institute for Thermonuclear and Nuclear Studies, Applied Theoretical
and Computational Physics Division, Los Alamos National Laboratory, before the Military
Research and Development Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee,
October 7, 1999.)
A map presented by another observer shows that a detonation height of 100 kilometers (54
nautical miles) would produce an EMP effect out to a radius of about 1,000 kilometers (540
nautical miles). (Statement of Dr. Gary Smith, Director, The Johns Hopkins University
Applied Physics Laboratory, before Military Research and Development Subcommittee of
the House Armed Services Committee, July 16, 1996.)
Another published map states that a detonation height of 30 miles would produce an EMP
effect out to a radius of 480 miles. A source note attached to the map attributes it to the
above-cited July 16, 1997 testimony of Gary Smith. (See page 3 of Jack Spencer, America’s
Vulnerability To A Different Nuclear Threat: An Electromagnetic Pulse. Washington,
Heritage Foundation, 2000. 7 pp. (Backgrounder No. 1372, May 26, 2000) The document
is available on the Internet at [http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/
bg1372.cfm]).
239252
Even if China does not have the capability to command the early detonation of a warhead
on a ballistic missile in flight, it could claim afterward that it did.
CRS-97100
PRC officials have publicly indicated their intent to acquire RF weapons
as a means of defeating technologically advanced military forces. Chinese
writings have suggested that RF weapons could be used against C4ISR, guided
missiles, computer networks, electronically-fused mines, aircraft carrier battle
groups, and satellites in orbit.
Analysis of Chinese technical literature indicates a major effort is underway
to develop the technologies required for RF weapons, including high-power
radiofrequency sources, prime-power generators, and antennas to radiate RF
pulses.240253
ONI states:
Radio-frequency weapons (RFW) could be used against military networks
since they transmit high power radio/microwave energy to damage/disrupt
electronic components. RFWs fall into two categories, beam and warhead. A
beam weapon is a multiple use system that can repeatedly send directional RF
energy at different targets. An RF warhead is a single-use explosive device that
can be delivered to the target by multiple means, including missiles or artillery
shells. RFWs can be assembled with little technical knowledge from commercial
off-the-shelf components, such as surplus military radars.241254
One observer states that, “at least one U.S. source indicates the PLA has
developed” non-nuclear radio frequency warheads for ballistic missiles.242255 When
asked at a hearing about the possibility of China using a nuclear weapon to generate
an EMP effect against Taiwan and U.S. naval forces, this observer stated:
What worries me more, Congressman, is non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse
weapons. Non-nuclear explosive propelled radio frequency or EMP-like devices
that could be used with far greater frequency and far more effect because they
would not run the danger for China of prompting a possible nuclear response.
Thereby it would be much more tempting to use and use effectively.
If you could combine a non-nuclear radio frequency weapon with a
maneuvering ballistic missile of the type that the Pentagon report describes very
briefly this year, that would constitute a real Assassin’s Mace weapon. One that,
in my opinion, we cannot defend ourselves against and would possibly
effectively deny effective military — effective American military intervention
in the event of — not just a Taiwan crisis, but other crises as well.243
240256
253
2006 DOD CMP, p. 34.
241254
2004 ONI WMC, p. 39.
242255
Fisher 7/27/05 testimony, p. 6. A footnote at this point in Fisher’s statement says this
information was: “Disclosed to the author by a U.S. source in September 2004.” See also
page 9.
243256
Spoken testimony of Richard D. Fisher, Jr., in transcript of 7/27/05 HASC hearing, in
response to a question from Representative Curt Weldon.