Order Code RS21968
Updated May 2July 13, 2007
Iraq: Government Formation and PerformanceBenchmarks
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Elections in 2005 produced a permanent constitution and a broad-based but Shiiteled government that has been unable to reduce Sunni popular resentment and might be
fragmenting. U.S. officials are urging Iraqi leaders to complete efforts to achieve
national reconciliation; these efforts, a key part of the FY2007 supplemental
appropriation (H.R. 1591) that was vetoed on May 1, 2007, have proceeded far more
slowly than expected but are not at an impasse. (See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: PostSaddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.)unwilling or unable to take major steps to reduce Sunni
popular resentment. That assessment generally comports with findings of a
congressionally mandated (P.L. 110-28, FY2007 supplemental appropriation) progress
report released July 12, 2007. The Iraqi government is showing significant signs of
fragmentation. See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and
Security, by Kenneth Katzman.
After deposing Saddam Hussein militarily in April 2003, the Bush Administration
linked the end of U.S. military occupation to the adoption of a new constitution and
national elections, tasks expected to take two years. Prominent Iraqis persuaded the
Administration to accelerate the process, and sovereignty was given to an appointed
government on June 28, 2004. A government and a permanent constitution were voted
on thereafter, as stipulated in a March 8, 2004, Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).1
Elections and Constitutional Referendum in 2005
The first election (January 30, 2005) was for a 275-seat transitional National
Assembly, a provincial assembly in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces (41 seats each; 51 for
Baghdad), and a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). Run by an “Independent
Electoral Commission of Iraq” (IECI), the elections were conducted by proportional
The election system was
proportional representation (closed list); – voters chose among “political entities” (a party,
a coalition
of parties, or individuals). A female candidate occupied every third position
on electoral
lists in order to meet the TAL’s goal for at leastensure 25% female membership. A total of 111
entities were on the National Assembly ballot: 9 multi-party coalitions, 75 single parties,
and 27 individual persons. The 111 entities had 7,000 candidates
on the national ballot of which nine were multi-party coalitions. The cost was about
$250 million, of which – $130 million was offset, funded by international donors, including about
$40 million from the European Union and the following from the United States – $40
including the United States,
which paid $40 million to improve IECIIraqi election capacity; $42.5 million for Iraqi monitoring; and $40 million for
1
Text available at [http://cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html].
CRS-2
monitoring
by Iraqis (international monitoring was limited in all the elections in 2005); and $40
million for political party development. In this (and the December 15) election, Iraqis abroad were
were eligible to vote. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was tapped to run
the “out-of-country voting” (OCV) program, which took place in Australia, Canada,
ran “out-of1
Text available at [http://cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html].
CRS-2
country voting” (OCV) in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Iran, Jordan,
Sweden, Syria, Turkey, UAE, Britain,
Netherlands, and the United States. About
275,000 Iraqi expatriates (dual citizens and
anyone whose father was IraqiIraqi father) registered, and about 90% of them voted. OCV cost $92
million ($11 million was for the U.S.U.S.-based voting), but no U.S. funds were spent for OCV.
Polling places were staffed by about 200,000 Iraqis in all three elections in 2005.
International monitoring was limited in all the elections in 2005.
Violence was less than anticipated; insurgents conducted about 300 attacks. Polling
centers were guarded primarily by the 130,000 members of Iraq’s security forces, with
U.S. forces available for backup. In all the 2005 votes, two days prior to election day,
vehicle traffic was banned, Iraq’s borders were closed, and polling locations were
confirmed. The best-positioned parties were long-established Shiite Islamist parties, the
Kurds, and a few secular parties. The main bloc was the Shiite Islamist “United Iraqi
Alliance” (UIA), which fielded 228 candidates from 22 parties, primarily the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Da’wa Party. Eight followers
of radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr won seats on that slate. In all the 2005 votes, vehicle traffic was banned, Iraq’s borders were closed, and
polling centers were guarded primarily by Iraq’s security forces (ISF), with U.S. forces
as backup. Violence did not materially disrupt the voting. The January election was
dominated by the Shiite Islamist “United Iraqi Alliance” (UIA), the Kurds, and a few
secular parties. The UIA bloc was underpinned mainly by the Supreme Council for the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) - which in May 2007changed its named to the
Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq (SICI) – and the Da’wa Party. The two main Kurdish
parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) offered a joint 165-candidate list. Interim Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi filed a
six-party, 233-candidate “Iraqi List” led by his secular Iraqi National Accord (INA) party. Sunni
Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population), perceiving electoral defeat and insurgent
intimidation, mostly , mostly
boycotted and won only 17 seats spread over several lists nationally
and very few seats on the
provincial councils (only one seat on Baghdad’s 51-seat
provincial council, for example). Government formation was delayed by factional
bargaining over governmental posts, particularly the “presidency council” (president and
two deputies) and the post of prime minister, which had executive power. provincial council, for example).
During April
and May 2005, the factions formed a government that U.S. officials said was not
not sufficiently inclusive of Sunnis, even though it had Sunnis as Assembly speaker, one of
of two deputy presidents, one of three deputy prime ministers, Defense Minister, and five
other ministers. Other major positions were held by Shiites or Kurds, such asThe two top positions went to PUK leader
Jalal Talabani (President) and
Da’wa leader Ibrahim al-Jafari (Prime Minister).
Permanent Constitution and Referendum. The elected Assembly was to
draft a
constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005, subject
subject to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any three provinces. The Assembly
appointed (May 10, 2005) a 55-member drafting committee, but which included only two
Sunni Arabs, prompting Sunni resentment, although 15 Sunnis were later added as
committee members, with 10 more as advisors. The talks produced a draft on August 28
(missing an August 15 deadline) that set a December 31, 2007, deadline to resettle Kurds
in Kirkuk and to hold a
referendum on whether Kirkuk will join the Kurdish region
(Article 140); designated
Islam “a main source” of legislation and said no law can
contradict the “established”
provisions of Islam (Article 2);2 set a 25% electoral goal for
women (Article 47); allowed
families to choose which courts to use for family issues such
as divorce and inheritance
(Article 39); made only primary education mandatory (Article
34); and said that the
federal supreme court would include Islamic law experts and civil law
2
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
CRS-3
judges and experts
(Article 89). These provisions concerned many women who fear that
too much discretion
was given to males of their families.
The major disputes centered (and continue) on the draft’s provision allowing two or
more provinces together to form new autonomous “regions” and on provisions to allocate
oil revenues. Article 117 allowed each “region” to organize internal security forces,
which would legitimize the fielding of sectarian (presumably Shiite) militias, in addition
to the Kurds’ peshmerga (allowed by the TAL). Article 109 required the central
government to distribute oil and gas revenues from “current fields” in proportion to
population, and gave the “regions” a role in determining allocation of revenues from new
2
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
CRS-3
energy discoveries. Sunni negotiators opposed the draft on these grounds; Sunnidominated areas of Iraq have few oil or gas deposits, although some oil fields are said to
lie in Anbar Province. Article 62 established a “Federation Council,” a second chamber
of size and powers to be determined by subsequent law (not passed, to date).
After further talks, the Assembly approved a September 19, 2005, “final” draft, but
withWith contentious provisions unresolved., Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-85%
in some Sunni cities) to try to defeat the draft. Sunni opposition prompted then-U.S.
Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad to mediate an85%) to try to defeat it, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11) providing
for for
a panel to propose amendments within four months after a post-December 15 election
government took office (Article 137); the. The amendments would require a majority
Assembly vote of approval and, within another two months, would be put to a referendum
under the same rules as the October 15 referendum. In the October 15 referendum,
78.6% in favor and 21.4% against, nationwide. TheThe compromise did not reduce
Sunni opposition and, in the referendum, the Sunni provinces of Anbar and
Salahuddin Salahuddin
had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively. Mostly Sunni Nineveh province
voted 55% “no,” and Diyala, believed mostly Sunni, had a 51% “yes” vote. The draft
passed because
“no,” which meant that the constitution was adopted (only two provinces, not three, voted
“no” by a two-thirds majority).
December 15, 2005 Elections. The next step was the election of a permanent
government, to take place on December 15, 2005, and with the new government to take
office office
by December 31, 2005. In these elections, under a formula designed to enhance
Sunni representationthat attracted Sunni
participation, each province contributed a pre-determined number of seats to a
“Council
of Representatives” (COR). Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were allocated this
way, and there were way,
with 45 “compensatory” seats for entities that would have won additional
seats had the
election constituency been the whole nation. 361 political “entities”
registered: 19 were
coalition slates (comprising 125 different political spanning 125 parties), and 342
were other “entities” (parties or individual persons). About 7,500 candidates spanned all
entities
individuals). The UIA slate formally included Sadr’s faction as well as other hard line Shiite
Shiite parties including Fadilah (Virtue). Former Prime Minister Allawi’s mostly secular 15party
15-party “Iraqi NationalNation” slate was broader than his January 2005 list, incorporating not only
his Iraq National Accord but also several smaller secular parties. The Kurdish alliance
slate was intact from January.
Major Sunni slates competed, fearing long-lasting exclusion from Iraqi politics. A
adding several
smaller secular parties. The Kurdish alliance remained roughly intact.
The major Sunni slate was a three-party “Iraq Consensus Front” was led by the Iraq
Islamic Party (IIP), the party that
which had entered but then withdrew from the January 2005 elections.
Another major Sunni
faction (Saleh al-Mutlak’s National Iraqi Dialogue Front) ran a separate slate. The
separately. The hardline Muslim Scholars Association (MSA) did not participate,
although it did not, as
it had in January 2005, call for a broad Sunni boycott. Violence was minor (about 30
incidents) as
because Sunni insurgents, supporting greater Sunni representation, facilitated the
CRS-4
voting.
As shown in the table, results suggest that voters chose lists representing their
sects and
regions, not ideological platforms. The COR was inaugurated on March 16
but did not meet its deadlines to choose a speaker (February 25 deadline); to select a
President and two deputies (no deadline specified, but a thirty-day deadline for the choice
after subsequent COR elections, by two thirds vote); to designate the “nominee of the
[COR] bloc with the largest number” as Prime Minister (15 days after choosing the
presidency council, by two thirds vote); or to name a cabinet and obtain approval (with
another 30 days, by majority vote).
With 181 seats combined (nearly two thirds of the COR), the UIA and the Kurds
continued their joint dominance, but they differed over the UIA’s preference for Jafari to
continue as Prime Minister. On April 20, Jafari stepped aside in favor of another senior
Da’wa Party figure, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. On April 22, the COR approved Talabani to
continue as president, and selected his two deputies — SCIRI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi
(incumbent) and Consensus Front/IIP leader Tariq al-Hashimi. National Dialogue Front
figure Mahmoud Mashhadani, a Sunni hardliner, was chosen COR speaker. Maliki won
COR (majority vote) approval of a 36 member cabinet (including deputy prime ministers)
on May 20, 2006, one day prior to a 30-day deadline. Three key slots (Defense, Interior,
and National Security) were not filled permanently until June 8 because of factional
infighting; the Defense Ministry went to Gen. Abdul Qadir Mohammad Jassim al-Mifarji,
a Sunni who had been expelled from the Iraqi military and imprisoned for criticizing the
1990 invasion of Kuwait. The Interior Ministry went to Jawad al-Bulani, a relatively
non-partisan Shiite, replacing SCIRI’s Bayan Jabr, who became Finance Minister.
Sherwan al-Waili, a Shiite from a faction of the Da’wa Party, became Minister for
National Security. Kurdish official Barham Salih and Sunni Arab Salam al-Zubaie are
deputy prime ministers; the latter remains hospitalized from a March 2007 assassination
attempt. Four ministers are women. The KDP’s Hoshyar Zebari remained Foreign
Minister. Hussein Shahristani, aide to Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, is Oil Minister. Sadr
followers were Ministers of Health, of Transportation, and of Agriculture; as well as three
ministers of state, although all resigned on April 16, 2007. Of the 34 ministerial posts,
there are eight Sunnis; seven Kurds; eighteen Shiites; and one Christian.
Recent Developments and U.S. Policy
According to the Administration, the Iraqi government has put forward milestones
to achieve national reconciliation, but there is increasing Administration and
congressional frustration with the relative lack of progress on the major “benchmarks.”
Under a provision of the FY2007 supplemental appropriation to fund operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan (H.R. 1591, vetoed on May 1, 2007), progress was a condition to delay
the start of a U.S redeployment, although redeployment would be required to be
completed by April 1, 2008, whether or not the milestones are completed. President
Bush’s Baghdad security plan demands progress on the milestones but opposes specific
consequences, and he vetoed the legislation on the grounds that linking a U.S. pullout to
the benchmarks would be “setting a date for failure.” As shown below, few of the
milestones have been completely met, but many are in various stages of negotiation:
(1) By September 2006, formation of a committee to review the constitution under the special
amendment process (Article 137) promised; approval of a law to implement formation of regions;
approval of an investment law; and approval of a law establishing the Independent High
Electoral Commission (IHEC). The constitution review committee has been formed. The
CRS-5
investment law
The COR was inaugurated on March 16, and was quickly engulfed in factional
wrangling. With 181 seats combined (nearly two thirds of the COR), the UIA and the
Kurds continued to dominate. However, Kurdish and other opposition caused the UIA
to agree to Jafari’s Da’wa deputy, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as Prime Minister, who was
perceived as more sympathetic to Kurdish national aspirations. On April 22, the COR
approved Talabani to continue as president, and selected his two deputies — SICI’s Adel
Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) and Consensus Front/IIP leader Tariq al-Hashimi. Another
Consensus Front figure, the hardline Mahmoud Mashhadani (National Dialogue Council
party), was chosen COR speaker. Maliki won COR majority vote approval of a 36
member cabinet (including deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Three key slots
(Defense, Interior, and National Security) were not filled permanently until June 8
because of infighting. Kurdish official Barham Salih and Sunni Arab Salam al-Zubaie
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are deputy prime ministers. Of the 34 ministerial posts, there are eight Sunnis; seven
Kurds; eighteen Shiites; and one Christian. Four are women.
Iraqi Performance on Major “Benchmarks” and U.S. Policy
In August 2006, the Administration and the Iraqi government agreed on a series of
“benchmarks” that, if adopted and implemented, should achieve reconciliation among the
major communities. Congress subsequently made progress on these and other
benchmarks (a total of eighteen) – as certified in July 15 and September 15, 2007
Administration reports – a requirement for the United States to provide $1.5 billion in
Economic Support Funds (ESF) to the Iraqi government, under Section 1314 of the
FY2007 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 110-28). If little or no progress is made, the
president may provide the aid if he provides written justification for doing so. A separate
assessment of Iraqi progress is mandated to be provided by the Comptroller General, and
an assessment of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) is to be performed by an outside
commission (headed by ret. Gen James Jones). As noted in the July 15, 2007 progress
report (released July 12) and discussed below, none of the most significant political
reconciliation benchmarks have been completed, but several are in advanced stages of
negotiation and some of the minor political milestones showed progress. The dates
below reflect the original political benchmarks (and deadlines) as pledged by Iraqi leaders.
(1) By September 2006, formation of a committee to review the constitution under the special
amendment process (Article 137) promised; approval of a law to implement formation of regions;
approval of an investment law; and approval of a law establishing the Independent High
Electoral Commission (IHEC). The constitution review committee was appointed in November
2006, and made partial recommendations in late May 2007; it was given a new deadline of July
2007 (beyond the May 15 deadline) to finish its draft. Major decisions on presidential powers,
powers of individual regions, and on the status of Kirkuk (which the Kurds want to affiliate with
their region) await compromise by major factions. An investment law (not one of the P.L. 11028 benchmarks) was adopted in October 2006. The regions law was adopted October 12, 2006,
although, to mollify Sunni opposition, major factions agreed to delay the formation of new
regions for 18 months. The IHEC law was passed on January 23, 2007, butand the nine election
commissioners have not been named, to datebeen appointed.
(2) By October 2006, approval of a provincial election law (which would presumably lead to
more Sunnis on provincial councils); and approval of a new oil law. On February 26, 2007,
Iraq’s cabinet passed a draft oil law that would set up a broad Federal Oil and Gas Council that
would review exploration contracts signed with foreign energy companies, including those signed
by Iraq’s regions. According to circulating drafts, some seats on the Council could go to foreign
energy firms. To be fully implemented, other laws are needed simultaneously, including a law
on sharing oil revenues among Iraq’s communities, and a law regulating the dealings with foreign
energy firms. After further discussions to assuage Kurdish demands for greater regional control
over energy investments, it was formally presented to parliament on May 2, 2007. Poorer Shiites
have opposed the draft on the grounds that it would yield too much control over Iraq’s main
natural resource to foreign firms, and many Sunnis oppose it because the Shiites and Kurds would
have determinative power over energy contracts and likely revenue distribution. No agreement
on a provincial election law has been evident to date; the term of the existing councils expires
in January 2009.
(3) By November 2006, approval of a new de-Baathification law and approval of a flag and
national anthem law. The De-Baathification reform law reportedly remains stalled; members of
the Supreme National De-Baathification Commission expressed opposition to a draft reform law
reportedly agreed to in late March 2007 by President Talabani and Prime Minister Maliki. The
draft would have allowed all but members of the three highest Baath Party levels to return to their
jobs or obtain pensions. However, on April 7, 2007, Maliki ordered pensions be given to senior
officers in the Saddam-era ; and approval of a new oil law. No
agreement has been reached on a provincial election law – considered key to easing Sunni
resentment because the current councils, which expire in January 2009, have few Sunnis on them.
(The Sunnis boycotted the January 2005 elections that formed the councils.) A draft law
stipulating the powers of the provinces has received two readings in parliament, although
differences remain on the powers of the provincial governors and related issues.
On February 26, 2007, Iraq’s cabinet passed a draft framework oil law that would set up
a broad Federal Oil and Gas Council that would review exploration contracts signed with foreign
energy companies, including those signed by Iraq’s regions. However, implementing laws need
to be adopted simultaneously, including a law on sharing oil revenues among Iraq’s
communities, a law regulating the dealings with foreign energy firms, and a law delineating how
Iraq’s energy industry will run (“INOC law” - Iraq National Oil Company). The Kurds
vigorously oppose the draft INOC law, which the Kurds say was drafted secretly, because it puts
93% of Iraq’s oil fields under state control. Poorer Shiites opposed the draft framework law on
the grounds that it would yield too much control over Iraq’s main natural resource to foreign
firms – a provision of the draft gives seats on the Federal Oil and Gas Council to foreign energy
firms. Sunnis oppose it because the Shiites and Kurds would have determinative power over
CRS-5
energy contracts and likely revenue distribution. Some movement came in late June 2007 when
the Kurds reportedly agreed to a 17% share of oil revenues collected, to be deposited in a
separate account at the Central Bank.
(3) By November 2006, approval of a new de-Baathification law and approval of a flag and
national anthem law. The De-Baathification reform law remains stalled; members of the
Supreme National De-Baathification Commission, claiming support from revered Shiite leader
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, expressed opposition to a draft reform law reportedly agreed to in late
March 2007 by President Talabani and Prime Minister Maliki. The draft would have allowed all
but members of the three highest Baath Party levels to return to their jobs or obtain pensions.
However, on April 7, 2007, Maliki ordered pensions be given to senior officers in the Saddam-era
military and permission for return to service of lower ranking soldiers.
(4) By December 2006, approval of laws to curb militias and to offer amnesty to insurgent
supporters. No progress is evident to date.
(5) By January 2007, completion of the constitutional review process. The constitution review
committee has not completed drafting proposed amendments to date because militias, concerned about the general lack of
security, are unwilling to disarm. Others say the Shiite-led government fears that Sunnis are
plotting to return to power and that offering amnesty to Sunni insurgent supporters would only
accelerate that process. U.S. officials say Maliki has verbally committed to a militia
demobilization program, and an executive director of the program was named on May 12, 2007,
but committee members have not yet been appointed and a demobilization work plan is not
drafted. The July 12, 2007 progress report says that the pre-requisites for these laws are not in
place, given the security environment.
(6) By February 2007, the formation of independent commissions to oversee governance. No
progress has been reported to date.
(7) By March 2007, holding of a referendum on the constitutional amendments. (This is not one of the P.L. 110-28 benchmarks.)
(8) By April 2007, Iraqi assumption of control of its military. Six of the ten Iraqi Army divisions
are now under Iraqi control.
(9) By June 2007, the holding of provincial elections.
(10) By September 2007, Iraqi security control of all 18 provinces. Iraq Security Forces now
have security control for the provinces of Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Najaf. Maysan province is
expected to be turned over later in April 2007, and Basra by mid-2007, according to British
announcements in February 2007.
(11) By December 2007, Iraqi security self-reliance.
The President’s Baghdad security plan also requires the commitment of three Iraqi
brigades and an unspecified number of police commandos and regular police to Baghdad.
U.S. commanders say that these units have deployed, and at a better than anticipated 80%
CRS-6
strength and that Iraq has, as was required, designated a commander (Lt. Gen. Abboud
Qanbar) and deputy commander of Baghdad. Its 2007 budget, adopted February 8, 2007,
commits the pledged $10 billion in Iraqi funds for reconstruction.
As U.S. pressure on the Iraqi government grows while sectarian and Sunni insurgent
violence continues, splits within the ruling elite appear to be widening. In March 2007,
the Fadilah Party left the UIA on the grounds that it is not represented in the cabinet. In
April 2007, Justice Minister Hashim al-Shibly, a Sunni, resigned, purportedly over a
government plan to resettle Arabs from Kirkuk and pave the way for Kurds to win the
planned December 2007 referendum on the province’s affiliation with the Kurdish region.
On April 16, 2007, the six Sadrist cabinet members resigned, giving Maliki the
opportunity to fill those seats with “technocrats” or more moderate officials, but new
appointees have not been named to date. The Sadr bloc remains in parliament, however.
On April 30, 2007, President Bush reportedly intervened by telephone to forestall a
pullout from the cabinet of the five Sunni Consensus Front members; the Front is said to
believe Maliki is unwilling or unable to advance political reconciliation. To date,
Administration officials have maintained that the United States continues to fully support
Maliki and his government, but many observers say that U.S. backing could erode if his
government continues to fracture or if the Baghdad security plan – in a U.S. assessment
planned for September 2007 – is judged a failure. Some speculate that the secular former
Prime Minister Allawi is maneuvering to replace Maliki, but he appears to have little
chance of winning a vote of confidence in parliament to form a government.
Table 1. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Slate/Party
UIA (Shiite Islamist); Sadr formally joined list for Dec. vote
(SCIRI~30; Da’wa~28; Sadr~30; Fadilah (Virtue)~15; others 25)
Kurdistan Alliance (PUK and KDP)
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added some mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote
Iraq Consensus Front (Sunni). Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote
Dialogue National Iraqi (The P.L. 110-28 benchmarks do not include this milestone, but
instead require progress creating units capable of operating independently. Progress was judged
unsatisfactory in the July 12 report. Other security benchmarks and progress on those are
discussed in CRS Report RL31339. )
(10) By September 2007, Iraqi security control of all 18 provinces. Iraq Security Forces now
have security control for the provinces of Muthanna, Dhi Qar, Najaf, Maysan, Irbil,
Sulaymaniyah, and Dohuk - the latter three are Kurdish provinces turned over May 30, 2007.
(Not a P.L. 110-28 benchmark.)
(11) By December 2007, Iraqi security self-reliance.
(Not a P.L. 110-28 benchmark.)
Other security related benchmarks required by P.L. 110-28 center around reducing
sectarian behavior in the Iraqi security forces and in assisting the Baghdad security plan
(for example providing three Iraqi brigades and an unspecified number of police
commandos and regular police to Baghdad, setting up joint security stations, and making
available over $10 billion in reconstruction funds). The July 12, 2007 progress report
gives Iraq generally favorable assessments of cooperation with the Baghdad security but
almost universally unsatisfactory reviews on such indicators as reducing militia influence,
ensuring even handed law enforcement by the security forces, and excluding
political/sectarian influence from military operations.
Political Fragmentation. As U.S. pressure on the Iraqi government grows while
sectarian violence continues, splits within the power structure are widening; some believe
it might collapse. In March 2007, the Fadilah Party left the UIA on the grounds that it
is not represented in the cabinet. Six Sadrist cabinet members (Health, Transportation,
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and Agriculture; as well as three ministers of state) resigned on April 16, 2007 and
Maliki has named independent Shiites to replace them (although they have not been
confirmed by the COR, to date). Sadr himself - formerly a strong ally of Maliki returned to Iraq from Iran in May 2007 (he might now have returned to Iran), challenging
the U.S. “occupation.” The Sadr bloc remained in parliament until the June 13, 2007
second bombing of the Grand Mosque in Samarra (the first was in February 2006)
prompted a renewed Sadrist boycott.
In April 2007, President Bush reportedly intervened to (temporarily) forestall a
resignation of the five Sunni Consensus Front cabinet members. The Front believes
Maliki is unwilling or unable to advance reconciliation and its relations with Maliki
continue to be highly strained to the point where some Front members say they want a
vote of no-confidence against Maliki. The Front, as well as the other main Sunni bloc
(Dialogue Front), boycotting parliament (55 total seats) because of the COR’s vote on
June 12, 2007, to require Mashhadani’s resignation as COR speaker because of alleged
physical intimidation of parliamentarians. Yet, the COR has been able to obtain a
quorum (138 members attending) in early July 2007, and it has decided to reduce its
summer recess to the month of August (from July and August). Adding to Sunni distrust
is the June 2007 arrest warrant issued for Culture Minister Asad al-Hashimi, a Sunni, for
allegedly orchestrating a failed assassination attempt against Ummah Party leader Mithal
al-Alusi (whose two sons were killed in the plot). That warrant in June 2007 caused the
Front to suspend the participation of its five ministers in the cabinet.
Table 1. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Slate/Party
UIA (Shiite Islamist); Sadr formally joined list for Dec. vote
(SCIRI~30; Da’wa~28; Sadr~30; Fadilah (Virtue)~15; independent - 25)
Kurdistan Alliance (PUK and KDP)
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added some mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote
Iraq Consensus Front (Sunni). Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, Saleh al-Mutlak) Not in Jan. vote
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Mission, Dec) pro-Sadr
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd)
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Sunni, secular)
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
Seats
(Jan. 05)
Seats
(Dec. 05)
140
128
75
40
—
—
—
5
3
3
2
2
2
1
53
25
44
11
0
—
1
2
—
5
0
—
1
1
0
—
1
3
1
1
Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200.
Eligible voters: 14 million in January election; 15 million in October referendum and December.
Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66% (10 million)/ December: 75% (12 million).