Order Code RS21968
Updated April 10May 2, 2007
Iraq: Elections, Constitution, and GovernmentGovernment Formation and Performance
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Elections in 2005 for a transition government (January 30, 2005), a permanent
constitution (October 15), and a permanent (four year) government (December 15)
producedproduced a permanent constitution and a broad-based but Shiite-ledShiiteled government that has been unable to reduce
Sunni popular resentment and might be
fragmenting. U.S. officials are urging Iraqi leaders to complete efforts to
achieve achieve
national reconciliation; these efforts, subject of a provision of the House-passed
a key part of the FY2007 supplemental
appropriation (H.R. 1591) that was vetoed on May 1, 2007, have proceeded far more
slowly than
expected but are not broadly deadlockedat an impasse. (See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: PostSaddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.)
After deposing Saddam Hussein militarily in April 2003, the Bush Administration
linked the end of U.S. military occupation to the adoption of a new constitution and
national elections, tasks expected to take two years. Prominent Iraqis persuaded the
Administration to accelerate the process, and sovereignty was given to an appointed
government on June 28, 2004. A government and a permanent constitution were voted
on thereafter, as stipulated in a March 8, 2004, Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).1
Elections and Constitutional Referendum in 2005
The first of the 2005 elections was held on election (January 30, 2005,) was for a 275-seat
transitional National
Assembly, a provincial assembly in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces (41
seats each; 51 for
Baghdad), and a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). Run by an
“Independent
Electoral Commission of Iraq” (IECI), the elections were conducted by
proportional proportional
representation (closed list); voters chose among “political entities” (a party,
a coalition
of parties, or individuals). A female candidate occupied every third position
on electoral
lists in order to meet the TAL’s goal for at least 25% female membership.
A total of 111
entities were on the National Assembly ballot: 9 multi-party coalitions, 75
single parties,
and 27 individual persons. The 111 entities had 7,000 candidates.
1
Text available at [http://cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html].
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The Iraqi government budgeted about The cost was about
$250 million, of which $130 million was
offset by international donors, including about
$40 million from the European Union.
Out of $21 billion in U.S. reconstruction funds, and the following from the United States provided $40 million
– $40
million to improve IECI capacity; $42.5 million for Iraqi monitoring; and $40 million for political
party development. In the January 30 (and December 15) elections
1
Text available at [http://cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html].
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political party development. In this (and the December 15) election, Iraqis abroad were
eligible to vote. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was tapped to run
the “out-of-country voting” (OCV) program, which took place in Australia, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, Iran, Jordan, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, UAE, Britain,
Netherlands, and the United States. About 275,000 Iraqi expatriates (dual citizens and
anyone whose father was Iraqi) registered, and about 90% of them voted. OCV cost $92
million ($11 million was for the U.S. voting), but no U.S. funds were spent for OCV.
Polling places were staffed by about 200,000 Iraqis in all three elections in 2005.
International monitoring was limited in all the elections in 2005.
Violence was less than anticipated; insurgents conducted about 300 attacks. Polling
centers were guarded primarily by the 130,000 members of Iraq’s security forces, with
U.S. forces available for backup. In all the 2005 votes, two days prior to election day,
vehicle traffic was banned, Iraq’s borders were closed, and polling locations were
confirmed. Polling places were staffed by about 200,000 Iraqis in all three elections in
2005. International monitoring was limited to 25 observers (in the January elections) and
some European parliament members and others (December elections).
In the January elections, theThe best-positioned parties were long-established Shiite
Islamist parties, the
Kurds, and a few secular parties. The main bloc was the Shiite
Islamist “United Iraqi
Alliance” (UIA), which fielded 228 candidates from 22 parties,
primarily the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Da’wa
Party. Eight followers
of radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr won seats on that slate.
The two main Kurdish
parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan
Democratic Party
(KDP) offered a joint 165-candidate list. Interim Prime Minister Iyad
al-Allawi filed a
six-party, 233-candidate “Iraqi List” led by his Iraqi National Accord
(INA) party. Sunni
Arabs (20% of the overall population), perceiving electoral defeat and
insurgent insurgent
intimidation, mostly boycotted and won only 17 seats spread over several lists
nationally nationally
and very few seats on the provincial councils (only one seat on Baghdad’s 51seat 51-seat
provincial council, for example). Government formation was delayed by factional
bargaining over governmental posts, particularly the “presidency council” (president and
two deputies) and the post of prime minister, which had executive power. During April
and May 2005, the factions formed a government that U.S. officials said was not
sufficiently inclusive of Sunnis, even though it had Sunnis as Assembly speaker, one of
two deputy presidents, one of three deputy prime ministers, Defense Minister, and five
other ministers. Other major positions were held by Shiites or Kurds, such as PUK leader
Jalal Talabani (President) and Da’wa leader Ibrahim al-Jafari (Prime Minister).
Permanent Constitution and Referendum. One duty of theThe Assembly was
to draft a
constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005,
subject subject
to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any three provinces. The Assembly
appointed (May 10, 2005) a 55-member drafting committee, chaired by SCIRI official
Humam al-Hammoudi. The committeebut which included only two
Sunni Arabs, prompting Sunni
resentment, andalthough 15 Sunnis were later added as full
committee members, with 10 more as
advisors. The talks produced a draft on August 28
(missing an August 15 deadline) that,
favoring the Kurds, set a December 31, 2007, deadline to resettle Kurds
in Kirkuk and to
hold a referendum on whether Kirkuk will join the Kurdish region
(Article 140);
designated Islam “a main source” of legislation and said no law can
contradict the
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“established” provisions of Islam (Article 2);2 set a 25% electoral goal for
women (Article
47); allowed families to choose which courts to use for family issues such
as divorce and
inheritance (Article 39); made only primary education mandatory (Article
34); and said
that federal supreme court would include Islamic law experts and civil law judges and
2
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
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judges and experts (Article 89). These provisions concerned many women who fear that
too much
discretion was given to males of their families in personal legal issues.
The major disputes centered (and continue) on the draft’s provision allowing two or
more provinces together to form new autonomous “regions” and on provisions to allocate
oil revenues. Article 117 allowed each “region” to organize internal security forces,
which would legitimize the fielding of sectarian (presumably Shiite) militias, in addition
to the Kurds’ peshmerga (allowed by the TAL). Article 109 required the central
government to distribute oil and gas revenues from “current fields” in proportion to
population, and gave the “regions” a role in determining allocation of revenues from new
energy discoveries. Sunni negotiators opposed the draft on these grounds; Sunnidominated areas of Iraq have few oil or gas deposits, although some oil fields are said to
lie in Anbar Province. Article 62 established a “Federation Council,” a second chamber
of size and powers to be determined by subsequent law (but still not determinednot passed, to date).
After further talks, the Assembly approved a September 19, 2005, “final” draft, but
with the contentious provisions unresolved. Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-85%
in some Sunni cities) to try to defeat the draft, which was printed and distributed by
the United Nations. Sunni opposition prompted then-U.S.
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay
Khalilzad to mediate an agreement (October 11) providing
for a panel to propose
amendments within four months after the installation of a post-December 15 election
government took office (Article 137); the amendments would require a majority
Assembly vote of
approval and, within another two months, would be put to a referendum
under the same
rules as the October 15 referendum. In the relatively peaceful October 15 referendum,
78.6% in favor and 21.4% against, nationwide. The Sunni provinces of Anbar and
Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively. Mostly Sunni Nineveh province
voted 55% “no,” and Diyala, believed mostly Sunni, had a 51% “yes” vote. The draft
passed because only two provinces, not three, voted “no” by a 2/3two-thirds majority.
December 15, 2005 Elections. The next step was the election of a permanent
government, to take place on December 15, 2005, and with the new government to take
office by December 31, 2005. In these elections, under a formula designed to enhance
Sunni representation, each province contributed a pre-determined number of seats to a
“Council of Representatives” (COR). Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were allocated this
way, and there were 45 “compensatory” seats for entities that would have won additional
seats had the election constituency been the whole nation. A total of 361 political
“entities”
registered: 19 of them were coalition slates (comprising 125 different
political parties), and 342
were other “entities” (parties or individual persons). About
7,500 candidates spanned all
entities. The UIA slate formally included Sadr’s faction as
well as other hard line Shiite
parties including Fadilah (Virtue). Former Prime Minister
Allawi’s mostly secular 15-party15party “Iraqi National” slate was broader than his January 2005
list, incorporating not only
his Iraq National Accord but also several smaller secular
parties. The Kurdish alliance
slate was intact from January.
2
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
CRS-4
Major Sunni slates competed, fearing long-lasting exclusion from Iraqi politics. TheA
three-party “IraqiIraq Consensus Front” was led by the Iraq Islamic Party (IIP), the party that
entered but then withdrew from the January 2005 elections. Another major Sunni
faction (Saleh al-Mutlak’s National Iraqi Dialogue Front) ran a separate slate. The
hardline Muslim Scholars Association (MSA) did not participate, although it did not, as
it had in January 2005, call for a broad Sunni boycott. Violence was minor (about 30
incidents) as Sunni insurgents, supporting greater Sunni representation, facilitated the
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voting. As shown in the table, results suggest that voters chose lists representing their
sects and regions, not secular listsideological platforms. The COR was inaugurated on March 16
but did not
meet its deadlines to choose a speaker (February 25 deadline); to select a
President and
two deputies (no deadline specified, but a thirty-day deadline for the choice after
after subsequent COR elections, by two thirds vote); to designate the “nominee of the
[COR]
bloc with the largest number” as Prime Minister (15 days after choosing the presidency
presidency council, by two thirds vote); or to name a cabinet and obtain approval (with
another 30
days, by majority vote).
With 181 seats combined (nearly two thirds of the COR), the UIA and the Kurds
continued their joint dominance, but they differed over the UIA’s preference for Jafari to
continue as Prime Minister. On April 20, Jafari stepped aside in favor of another senior
Da’wa Party figure, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. On April 22, the COR approved Talabani to
continue as president, and selected his two deputies — SCIRI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi
(incumbent) and Consensus Front/IIP leader Tariq al-Hashimi. National Dialogue Front
figure Mahmoud Mashhadani, a Sunni hardliner, was chosen COR speaker.
Amid U.S. and other congratulations, Maliki won Maliki won
COR (majority vote) approval of a 3936 member cabinet
(including deputy prime ministers)
on May 20, 2006, one day prior to a 30-day deadline.
Three key slots (Defense, Interior,
and National Security) were not filled permanently
until June 8 because of factional
infighting; the Defense Ministry went to Gen. Abdul
Qadir Mohammad Jassim al-Mifarji,
a Sunni who had been expelled from the Iraqi
military and imprisoned for criticizing the
1990 invasion of Kuwait. The Interior Ministry
went to Jawad al-Bulani, a relatively
non-partisan Shiite, replacing SCIRI’s Bayan Jabr,
who became Finance Minister.
Sherwan al-Waili, a Shiite from a faction of the Da’wa
Party, became Minister for
National Security. Kurdish official Barham Salih and Sunni
Arab Salam al-Zubaie are
deputy prime ministers; the latter remains hospitalized from a March 2007 assassination
attempt. Four ministers are women. The
KDP’s Hoshyar Zebari remained Foreign
Minister. Hussein Shahristani, aide to
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, is Oil Minister. Sadr
followers arewere Ministers of Health, of
Transportation, and of Agriculture; another is Minister of State for Tourism and
Antiquities. Of the 37 ministerial posts, there wereas well as three
ministers of state, although all resigned on April 16, 2007. Of the 34 ministerial posts,
there are eight Sunnis; seven Kurds; twentyoneeighteen Shiites; and one Christian.
Recent Developments and U.S. Policy
According to the Administration, the Iraqi government has put forward milestones
to achieve national reconciliation. Under a provision of the House-passed FY2007
supplemental appropriation (H.R. 1591) to fund operations in Iraq (and Afghanistan),
progress on these milestones is a condition to delay the start of a U.S redeployment,
although redeployment would be required to be completed by September 1, 2008, whether
or not the milestones are completed. President Bush’s Baghdad security plan demands
progress on the milestones, although the plan does not follow the ISG recommendation
that the United States reduce its political, military, and economic support for the
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government if it fails to meet them. Few of the milestones have been completely met, and
others are in various stages of progress or negotiation. Some believe that national
reconciliation will require full implementation of the benchmarks, and not just their legal
adoption, and possibly many other measures beyond that, such as the following.
(1) By September 2006, formation of a committee to review the constitution under
the special amendment process promised; approval of a law to implement formation
of regions; approval of an investment law; and approval of a law establishing the
Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC). The constitution review committee
has been formed. The investment law was adopted in October 2006. The regions law
was adopted October 12, 2006, although, to mollify Sunni opposition, major factions
agreed to delay the formation of new regions for 18 months. The IHEC law was
passed on January 23, 2007. Election commissioners have not been named, to date.
(2) By October 2006, approval of a provincial election law (which would presumably
lead to more Sunnis on provincial councils); and approval of a new oil law. On
February 26, 2007, Iraq’s cabinet passed and submitted to parliament a draft oil law
that would set up a broad Federal Oil and Gas Council that would review exploration
contracts signed with foreign energy companies, including those signed by Iraq’s
regions. According to circulating drafts, some seats on the Council could go to
foreign energy firms. To be fully implemented, other laws are needed simultaneously,
including a law on sharing oil revenues among Iraq’s communities, and a law
regulating the dealings with foreign energy firms. The draft had been long delayed
by the Kurd’s insistence that regions be allowed to sign contracts with foreign firms;
the draft included a provision to this effect. Poorer Shiites have opposed the draft on
the grounds that it would yield too much control over Iraq’s main natural resource to
foreign firms, and many Sunnis oppose it because the Shiites and Kurds would have
determinative power over energy contracts and likely revenue distribution. No
agreement on a provincial election law has been evident to date; the term of the
existing councils expires in January 2009.
(3) By November 2006, approval of a new de-Baathification law and approval of a
flag and national anthem law. The De-Baathification reform law reportedly remains
stalled; members of the Supreme National De-Baathification Commission expressed
opposition to a draft reform law reportedly agreed to in late March 2007 by President
Talabani and Prime Minister Maliki. The draft would have allowed all but members
of the three highest Baath Party levels to return to their jobs or obtain pensions.
However, on April 7, 2007, Maliki ordered pensions be given to senior officers in the
Saddam-era military and permission for return to service of lower ranking soldiers.
(4) By December 2006, approval of laws to curb militias and to offer amnesty to
insurgent supporters. No progress is evident to date.
(5) By January 2007, completion of the constitutional review process. The
constitution review committee has not completed proposed amendments to date.
(6) By February 2007, the formation of independent commissions to oversee
governance. No progress has been reported to date.
(7) By March 2007, holding of a referendum on the constitutional amendments.
(8) By April 2007, Iraqi assumption of control of its military. Six of the ten Iraqi
Army divisions are now under Iraqi control.
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(9) By June 2007, the holding of provincial elections.
(10) By September 2007, Iraqi security control of all 18 provinces. Iraq Security
Forces now have security control for the provinces of Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Najaf.
Maysan province is expected to be turned over later in April 2007, and Basra by mid2007, according to British , but there is increasing Administration and
congressional frustration with the relative lack of progress on the major “benchmarks.”
Under a provision of the FY2007 supplemental appropriation to fund operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan (H.R. 1591, vetoed on May 1, 2007), progress was a condition to delay
the start of a U.S redeployment, although redeployment would be required to be
completed by April 1, 2008, whether or not the milestones are completed. President
Bush’s Baghdad security plan demands progress on the milestones but opposes specific
consequences, and he vetoed the legislation on the grounds that linking a U.S. pullout to
the benchmarks would be “setting a date for failure.” As shown below, few of the
milestones have been completely met, but many are in various stages of negotiation:
(1) By September 2006, formation of a committee to review the constitution under the special
amendment process (Article 137) promised; approval of a law to implement formation of regions;
approval of an investment law; and approval of a law establishing the Independent High
Electoral Commission (IHEC). The constitution review committee has been formed. The
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investment law was adopted in October 2006. The regions law was adopted October 12, 2006,
although, to mollify Sunni opposition, major factions agreed to delay the formation of new
regions for 18 months. The IHEC law was passed on January 23, 2007, but election
commissioners have not been named, to date.
(2) By October 2006, approval of a provincial election law (which would presumably lead to
more Sunnis on provincial councils); and approval of a new oil law. On February 26, 2007,
Iraq’s cabinet passed a draft oil law that would set up a broad Federal Oil and Gas Council that
would review exploration contracts signed with foreign energy companies, including those signed
by Iraq’s regions. According to circulating drafts, some seats on the Council could go to foreign
energy firms. To be fully implemented, other laws are needed simultaneously, including a law
on sharing oil revenues among Iraq’s communities, and a law regulating the dealings with foreign
energy firms. After further discussions to assuage Kurdish demands for greater regional control
over energy investments, it was formally presented to parliament on May 2, 2007. Poorer Shiites
have opposed the draft on the grounds that it would yield too much control over Iraq’s main
natural resource to foreign firms, and many Sunnis oppose it because the Shiites and Kurds would
have determinative power over energy contracts and likely revenue distribution. No agreement
on a provincial election law has been evident to date; the term of the existing councils expires
in January 2009.
(3) By November 2006, approval of a new de-Baathification law and approval of a flag and
national anthem law. The De-Baathification reform law reportedly remains stalled; members of
the Supreme National De-Baathification Commission expressed opposition to a draft reform law
reportedly agreed to in late March 2007 by President Talabani and Prime Minister Maliki. The
draft would have allowed all but members of the three highest Baath Party levels to return to their
jobs or obtain pensions. However, on April 7, 2007, Maliki ordered pensions be given to senior
officers in the Saddam-era military and permission for return to service of lower ranking soldiers.
(4) By December 2006, approval of laws to curb militias and to offer amnesty to insurgent
supporters. No progress is evident to date.
(5) By January 2007, completion of the constitutional review process. The constitution review
committee has not completed drafting proposed amendments to date.
(6) By February 2007, the formation of independent commissions to oversee governance. No
progress has been reported to date.
(7) By March 2007, holding of a referendum on the constitutional amendments.
(8) By April 2007, Iraqi assumption of control of its military. Six of the ten Iraqi Army divisions
are now under Iraqi control.
(9) By June 2007, the holding of provincial elections.
(10) By September 2007, Iraqi security control of all 18 provinces. Iraq Security Forces now
have security control for the provinces of Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Najaf. Maysan province is
expected to be turned over later in April 2007, and Basra by mid-2007, according to British
announcements in February 2007.
(11) By December 2007, Iraqi security self-reliance.
The President’s Baghdad security plan also requires the commitment of three Iraqi
brigades and an unspecified number of police commandos and regular police to Baghdad.
U.S. commanders say that these units are showing uphave deployed, and at a better than anticipated 80%
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strength and that Iraq has, as was required, designated a commander (Lt. Gen. Abboud
Qanbar) and deputy commander of Baghdad. Its 2007 budget, adopted February 8, 2007,
commits the pledged $10 billion in Iraqi funds for reconstruction.
Splits within the ruling elite are increasingly evident as sectarian violence continues
and as Iraq’s leaders try to move forward on the key benchmarks, in part to address U.S.
pressure. In March 2007, the Fadilah Party left the UIA, amid reports of negotiations with
former Prime Minister Allawi on formation of a new governing alliance that would group
his bloc, Fadilah, Sunni parliamentarians, and possibly Sadr’s grouping, although even
this might not be enough to gain a majority in parliament. In April 2007, Justice Minister
Hashim al-Shibly, a Sunni, resigned, purportedly over a government plan to resettle
Arabs from Kirkuk and pave the way for Kurds to win the planned December 2007
referendum on the province’s affiliation with the Kurdish regionAs U.S. pressure on the Iraqi government grows while sectarian and Sunni insurgent
violence continues, splits within the ruling elite appear to be widening. In March 2007,
the Fadilah Party left the UIA on the grounds that it is not represented in the cabinet. In
April 2007, Justice Minister Hashim al-Shibly, a Sunni, resigned, purportedly over a
government plan to resettle Arabs from Kirkuk and pave the way for Kurds to win the
planned December 2007 referendum on the province’s affiliation with the Kurdish region.
On April 16, 2007, the six Sadrist cabinet members resigned, giving Maliki the
opportunity to fill those seats with “technocrats” or more moderate officials, but new
appointees have not been named to date. The Sadr bloc remains in parliament, however.
On April 30, 2007, President Bush reportedly intervened by telephone to forestall a
pullout from the cabinet of the five Sunni Consensus Front members; the Front is said to
believe Maliki is unwilling or unable to advance political reconciliation. To date,
Administration officials have maintained that the United States continues to fully support
Maliki and his government, but many observers say that U.S. backing could erode if his
government continues to fracture or if the Baghdad security plan – in a U.S. assessment
planned for September 2007 – is judged a failure. Some speculate that the secular former
Prime Minister Allawi is maneuvering to replace Maliki, but he appears to have little
chance of winning a vote of confidence in parliament to form a government.
Table 1. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Slate/Party
UIA (Shiite Islamist); Sadr formally joined list for Dec. vote
(SCIRI~30; Da’wa~28; Sadr~30; Fadilah (Virtue)~15; others 25)
Kurdistan Alliance (PUK and KDP)
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added some mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote
Iraq Consensus Front (Sunni). Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote
Dialogue National Iraqi Front (Sunni, Saleh al-Mutlak) Not in Jan. vote
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Mission, Dec) pro-Sadr
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd)
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Sunni, secular)
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
Seats
(Jan. 05)
Seats
(Dec. 05)
140
128
75
40
—
—
—
5
3
3
2
2
2
1
53
25
44
11
0
—
1
2
—
5
0
—
1
1
0
—
1
3
1
1
Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200.
Eligible voters: 14 million in January election; 15 million in October referendum and December.
Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66% (10 million)/ December: 75% (12 million).