Order Code RS21968
Updated January 26February 27, 2007
Iraq: Elections, Constitution, and Government
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Elections in 2005 for a transition government (January 30, 2005), a permanent
constitution (October 15), and a permanent (four year) government (December 15) have
produced a Shiite-led government that has been unable to reduce Sunni resentment.
President Bush’s new Iraq initiative, announced January 10, 2007, requires progress on
a series of steps intended to achieve national reconciliation, as well as Iraqi government
action against Shiite
produced a Shiite-led government that many Sunnis view as biased. The December 6,
2006, Iraq Study Group report recommends a number of steps to accelerate national
reconciliation. President Bush’s new Iraq initiative, announced January 10, 2006,
requires promised cooperation from the Iraqi government to act against Shiite armed
elements participating in sectarian violence. (See CRS Report
RL31339, Iraq: PostSaddamPost-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.)
After deposing Saddam Hussein militarily in April 2003, the Bush Administration
linked the end of U.S. military occupation to the adoption of a new constitution and
national elections, tasks expected to take two years. Prominent Iraqis persuaded the
Administration to accelerate the process, and sovereignty was given to an appointed
government on June 28, 2004. A government and a permanent constitution were voted
on thereafter, as stipulated in a March 8, 2004, Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).1
January 30 Elections
Elections wereElections and Constitutional Referendum in 2005
The first of the 2005 elections was held on January 30, 2005, for a 275-seat
transitional National
Assembly, a provincial assembly in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces (41
seats each; 51 for
Baghdad), and a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). Run by an
“Independent
Electoral Commission of Iraq” (IECI), the elections were conducted by proportional
proportional representation (closed list); voters chose among “political entities” (a party,
a coalition
of parties, or individuals). Any entity receiving at least 1/275 of the vote
(about 31,000
votes) won a seat. A female candidate occupied every third position on
electoral lists in
order to meet the TAL’s goal for at least 25% female membership. A
total of 111 entities
were on the National Assembly ballot: 9 multi-party coalitions, 75
single parties, and 27
individual persons. The 111 entities contained over 7,000
candidates.
1
Text available at [http://cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html].
CRS-2
The Iraqi government budgeted about $250 million, of which $130 million was
offset by international donors, including about $40 million from the European Union.
Out of $21 billion in U.S. reconstruction funds, the United States provided $40 million
to improve IECI capacity; $42.5 million for Iraqi monitoring; and $40 million for political
party development. In the January 30 (and December 15) elections, Iraqis abroad were
eligible to vote. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was tapped to run
the “out-of-country voting” (OCV) program, which took place in Australia, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, Iran, Jordan, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, UAE, Britain,
Netherlands, and the United States. About 275,000 Iraqi expatriates (dual citizens and
anyone whose father was Iraqi) registered, and about 90% of them voted (in January).
OCV cost an additional $92 million, of which $11 million was for the U.S. component,
but no U.S. funds were spent for OCV.
Violence was less than anticipated; insurgents conducted about 300 attacks, but no
polling stations were overrun. Polling centers were guarded by the 130,000 members of
Iraq’s security forces, with the 150,000 U.S. forces in Iraq available for backup. Two
days prior to election day, vehicle traffic was banned, Iraq’s borders were closed, and
polling locations were confirmed. Security measures were similar for the October 15 and
December 15 votes. Polling places were staffed by about 200,000 Iraqis in all three
elections in 2005. International monitoring was limited to 25 observers (in the January
elections) and some European parliament members and others (December elections).
Competition and Results. The Iraqi groups that took the most active interest in
the January elections were those
best positioned: Shiite Islamist parties, the Kurds, and
established secular parties. Most
notable was the Shiite Islamist “United Iraqi Alliance”
(UIA): 228 candidates from 22
parties, primarily the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the
Da’wa Party. Even though radical Shiite cleric
Moqtada al-Sadr denounced the election,
14 of his supporters were on the UIA slate; eight
of these won seats. The two main
Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic
Party (KDP) offered a joint 165-candidate list.
Interim Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi
filed a six-party, 233-candidate “Iraqi List” led by
his Iraqi National Accord (INA) party.
Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population),
perceiving electoral defeat and insurgent
intimidation, mostly boycotted and won only
17 seats spread over several lists.
Government formation was delayed by factional
bargaining over governmental posts,
particularly the “presidency council” (president and
two deputies) and the post of prime
minister, which had executive power. During April
and May, the factions formed a
government that U.S. officials said was not sufficiently
inclusive of Sunnis, even though
it had Sunnis as Assembly speaker, one of two deputy
presidents, one of three deputy
prime ministers, Defense Minister, and five other
ministers. Other major positions were
held by Shiites or Kurds, such as PUK leader Jalal
Talabani as president and Da’wa leader
Ibrahim al-Jafari as Prime Minister.
Permanent Constitution and Referendum
The . One duty of the newly elected
Assembly was to draft a constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a
referendum by
October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any
three provinces. To do so, the three
provinces. The Assembly appointed (May 10, 2005) a 55-member drafting
committee,
chaired by SCIRI official Humam al-Hammoudi. The committee included
only two Sunni
Arabs, prompting Sunni resentment, and 15 Sunnis were later added as
full committee
members, with 10 more as advisors. The talks produced a draft on August
CRS-3
28, missing
an August 15 deadline. A provision favoring the Kurds was Article 140,
setting setting
CRS-3
December 31, 2007, as a deadline to resettle Kurds in Kirkuk and to hold a
referendum referendum
on whether Kirkuk will join the Kurdish region. The draft designated Islam
“a main
source” of legislation and said no law can contradict the “established” provisions
of Islam
(Article 2).2 Article 39 implied that families could choose which courts to use
for family
issues such as divorce and inheritance, and Article 34 made only primary
education education
mandatory; these provisions concerned many women who fear that the
provisions gave
too much discretion to males of their families in personal legal issues.
A 25% electoral
goal for women was set (Article 47). Article 89 said that federal supreme
court will
include experts in Islamic law, as well as judges and experts in civil law.
A major controversy centered (and continues) on the draft’s provision allowing two
or more provinces together to form new autonomous “regions” and on provisions to
allocate oil revenues. Debates occurred later on laws to implement this and other
contentious provisions, as discussed further below. Article 117 allowed each “region”
to to
organize internal security forces, which would legitimize the fielding of sectarian
(presumably Shiite) militias, in addition to the Kurds’ peshmerga (allowed by the TAL).
Article 109 required the central government to distribute oil and gas revenues from
“current fields” in proportion to population, and gave the “regions” a role in determining
allocation of revenues from new energy discoveries. Sunni negotiators opposed the draft
on these grounds; Sunni-dominated areas of Iraq have few oil or gas deposits, although
some oil fields are said to lie near Fallujah. Article 62 establishes a “Federation Council,”
a second chamber of size and powers to be determined by subsequent law.
After further negotiations, the National Assembly approved a September 19, 2005,
“final” draft, but no major changes to the most contentious provisions were made. Sunnis
registered in large numbers (70%-85% in some Sunni cities) to try to defeat the draft,
which was printed and distributed by the United Nations. Sunni opposition prompted
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad to mediate an agreement (October 11)
providing for a panel to propose a bloc of amendments within four months after the
installation of a post-December 15 election government (Article 137). The amendments
would require a majority Assembly vote of approval and, within another two months,
would be
put to a public referendum under the same rules as the October 15, 2005, referendum.
In the relatively peaceful October 15 referendum, 78.6% in favor and 21.4% against,
nationwide. The Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no”
vote, respectively. Mostly Sunni Nineveh province voted 55% “no,” and Diyala,
believed mostly Sunni, had a 51% “yes” vote. The draft passed because only two
provinces, not three, voted “no” by a 2/3 majority.
December 15, 2005, Elections. and Government Formation
The next transition step was the election of a
permanent government, to take place
on December 15, 2005, and with the new
government to take office by December 31,
2005. In these elections, under a formula
designed to enhance Sunni representation, each
province contributed a pre-determined
number of seats to the new “Council of
Representatives” (COR). Of the 275-seat body,
230 seats were allocated this way, and
2
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
CRS-4
there were 45 “compensatory” seats for entities
that did not win provincial seats but
garnered votes nationwide, or which would have won
additional seats had the election
constituency been the whole nation. A total of 361
2
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
CRS-4
political “entities” registered: 19 of
them were coalition slates (comprising 125 different
political parties), and 342 were other
“entities” (parties or individual persons). About
7,500 candidates spanned all entities.
The UIA slate formally included Sadr’s faction as
well as other hard line Shiite parties
including Fadila (Virtue). Former Prime Minister
Iyad al-Allawi’s mostly secular 15-party “Iraqi
National” slate was broader than his January
January 2005 list, incorporating not only his Iraq National
Accord but also several smaller
secular parties. The Kurdish alliance slate was little
changed from January.
A key U.S. goal has been to invest Sunnis in the political process, and major Sunni
Major Sunni slates, fearing complete exclusion from Iraqi politics, competed in the Decemberthese
elections. The three-party “Iraqi Consensus” was led by the Iraq Islamic Party (IIP),
which initially entered but then withdrew from the January 2005 elections. Another major
major Sunni faction (Saleh al-Mutlak’s National Iraqi Dialogue Front) ran a separate slate, but
the.
The hardline Muslim Scholars Association (MSA) did not participate, although it did not,
as it had in January 2005, call for a broad Sunni boycott. Violence was minor (about 30
incidents) as Sunni insurgents, supporting greater Sunni representation in parliament,
facilitated the voting. As shown in the table below, results suggest that voters chose lists
representing their sects and regions, not secular lists. The COR first convened on March
16 but did not meet its deadlines to convene and choose a speaker (February 25 deadline);
to select a President and two deputies (no deadline specified, but a thirty-day deadline for
the choice after subsequent COR elections, by two thirds vote); to designate the
“nominee of the [COR] bloc with the largest number” as Prime Minister, the post that has
executive power (15 days after choosing the presidency council, by two thirds vote); or
to name a cabinet and obtain approval (with another 30 days, by majority vote).
With 181 seats combined (nearly two thirds of the COR), the UIA and the Kurds
continued their governing alliance, but they split over the UIA’s preference for Jafari to
continue as Prime Minister. On April 20, Jafari stepped aside in favor of another senior
Da’wa Party figure, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. On April 22, the COR approved Talabani to
continue as president, and selected his two deputies — SCIRI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi
(incumbent) and Consensus Front/IIP leader Tariq al-Hashimi. National Dialogue Front
figure Mahmoud Mashhadani, a Sunni hardliner, was chosen COR speaker.
New Cabinet.
Recent Developments, Disputes, and U.S. Policy
Amid U.S. and other congratulations, Maliki won approval of a 39
member cabinet
(including deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006, one day prior to a 30-day
deadline.
Three key slots (Defense, Interior, and National Security) were not filled
permanently permanently
until June 8 because of factional infighting; the Defense Ministry went to
Gen. Abdul
Qadir Mohammad Jassim al-Mifarji, a Sunni who had been expelled from the
Iraqi Iraqi
military and imprisoned for criticizing the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The Interior
Ministry Ministry
went to Jawad al-Bulani, a relatively non-partisan Shiite, replacing SCIRI’s
Bayan Jabr,
who became Finance Minister. Sherwan al-Waili, a Shiite from a faction of
the Da’wa
Party, became Minister for National Security. Kurdish official Barham Salih
and Sunni
Arab Salam al-Zubaie are deputy prime ministers. Four ministers are women.
The The
KDP’s Hoshyar Zebari remained Foreign Minister. Hussein Shahristani, aide to
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, became Oil Minister. Sadr followers are Ministers of Health,
of Transportation, and of Agriculture; another is Minister of State for Tourism and
CRS-5
Antiquities. Of the 37 ministerial posts, there are eight Sunnis; seven Kurds; twenty-one
Shiites; and one Christian.
Recent Developments, Disputes, and U.S. Policy
U.S. policy has been predicated on achieving reconciliation among Iraq’s major
communities to reduce the causes of insurgency and sectarian violence. According to the
CRS-5
According to the Administration and the Iraq Study Group report, the Iraqi government has
put forward several milestones to
achieve national reconciliation: (1) by early 2007, approval of a provincial election law
(which would presumably lead to more Sunnis on provincial councils), approval of a law
on sharing of oil revenues, approval of a new de-Baathification law, approval of a law to
curb militias, an increase in security spending over 2006 levels, a raise in interests rates
and appreciation of the Iraqi dinar, and an increase in domestic gas prices; (2) by March
2007, a referendum on amending the constitution; (3) by April 2007, Iraqi assumption
of control of its military; (4) by May 2007, implementation of the militias law, approval
of an amnesty agreement (with insurgent supporters), and completion of reconciliation
efforts; (5) by June 2007, the holding of provincial elections; (6) by September 2007, Iraqi
security control of all 18 provinces; and (7) Iraqi security self-reliance.
As of President Bush’s January 10, 2007, speech announcing a new Iraq security
plan, none of the above milestones had been completely met, but the Maliki government
has made advances on some. On June 25, 2006, Maliki introduced a “National
Reconciliation and Dialogue Project,” intended primarily to persuade insurgent groups
to enter the political process. A foreign investment law was adopted in November 2006.
The major factions have agreed to many provisions of a new oil law, including agreement
to share oil revenue on the basis of population size, although a final agreement awaits
consensus on several issues including the powers of the central government to handle oil
revenues and to approve deals between individual regions and outside firms to explore for
oil in the regional issues. A finalized draft would need cabinet and parliamentary
approval. A constitution review committee has been established, but it has not to date
drafted proposed amendments. About 700 ex-Baathists have been returned to their jobs,
but a new de-Baathification law has not been passed to date. Nor has a provincial election
law. A further complication to Sunni-Shiite reconciliation has been the insistence of
SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim on legislation to implement the constitutional
authorization for forming new regions (federalism). A law to provide for new regions was
passed on October 12, 2006, over Sunni opposition, but the factions agreed to delay the
formation of any new region for 18 months. On security issues, several Iraqi Army
divisions are now under Iraqi control, and the Iraq Security Forces now have security
control for the provinces of Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Najaf.
The President’s January 10, 2007, statement on Iraq requires cooperation from Iraq,
such as progress on the steps discussed above. The President’s Baghdad security plan
requires the commitment of 3 Iraqi brigades and an unspecified number of police
commandos and regular police in nine sectors of Baghdad. Iraq is to designate a
commander and deputy commander of Baghdad and commit $10 billion in unspent Iraqi
funds for reconstruction.
Perhaps most important is the Iraqi commitment to allow U.S. and Iraqi forces to
conduct raids and patrols against Shiite militias that are responsible for much of the
sectarian violence in Baghdad. Maliki, for his part, is politically dependent on Sadr’s
CRS-6
support, and he has previously been hesitant to force Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia to
disarm. During October and November 2006, Maliki obstructed some U.S. operations
against the Mahdi forces. However, he reportedly is shifting position and has told Sadr
supporters that the Mahdi Army will not be immune from U.S.-Iraqi operations under the
new security plan. Possibly in response, Mahdi commanders reportedly are planning not
to challenge the new security operations. The President’s January 10 plan does not adopt
the Iraq Study Group recommendation that the United States reduce its political, military,
and economic support for the government if it fails to meet reconciliation milestones.
In other efforts, U.S. officials have reportedly tried to forge a new coalition among
mainstream Shiites, Sunnis, and secular blocs that would exclude Sadr. This strategy
reportedly ran into opposition from Ayatollah Sistani, who has sought to ensure full
cooperation among all Shiite blocs. Demonstrating the difficulty of forging unity in Iraq,
the COR has only attracted a quorum on a few occasions since November 2006, and many
of the sessions are characterized by verbal arguments by parliamentarians from the rival
sects. One positive development for the COR, although not necessarily for U.S. efforts
to isolate Sadr, was the January 2007 decision by Sadr to end the boycott of his 32
parliamentarians, which helped the COR obtain a quorum on January 25, 2007. Some
take the view that, should Maliki not cooperate with the January 10 plan and refuse or fail
to curb Sadr, the United States might try to engineer his replacement by deputy president
and SCIRI leader Adel Abd al-Mahdi; President Bush’s meeting with SCIRI leader Hakim
in Washington, DC in early December 2006 fed such speculation.
Table 1. Election Results (January and December achieve national reconciliation. The President’s
January 10, 2007, security plan — announcing the addition of 21,500 U.S. troops to
secure Baghdad and Anbar Province — requires progress on the uncompleted steps to
achieve reconciliation, discussed below, but does not adopt the Iraq Study Group
recommendation that the United States reduce its political, military, and economic support
for the government if it fails to meet reconciliation milestones. In part because the
parliament has not reached a quorum on most days since November 2006, only a few of
the milestones have been completely met, as follows.
(1) By September 2006, formation of a committee to review the constitution under
the special amendment process promised; approval of a law to implement formation
of regions; approval of an investment law; and approval of a law for the Independent
High Electoral Commission (IHEC). The investment law was adopted in October
2006. The constitutional review committee has been formed, but it has not completed
drafting amendments. The law on regions was adopted October 12, 2006, although,
to mollify Sunni opposition, the major factions agreed to delay the formation of any
new region for 18 months. The IHEC law is close to completion, according to U.S.
officials in Iraq.
(2) By October 2006, approval of a provincial election law (which would presumably
lead to more Sunnis on provincial councils; the 51-seat Baghdad city council has only
one Sunni Arab, for example) and approval of a new oil law. On February 18, 2007,
Iraqi leaders submitted for cabinet consideration a draft oil law that would share
revenues according to population of major communities; the cabinet approved the
draft and sent it to parliamentary consideration on February 26, 2007. The draft had
been long delayed by differences over the central government’s review process for
energy deals with foreign firms.
(3) By November 2006, approval of a new de-Baathification law and approval of a
flag and national anthem law. Iraqi leaders announced on January 17, 2007, that they
had returned 2,300 ex-Baathists to their jobs or given them pensions instead, but a
draft law that reportedly would allow all but 1,500 senior ex-Baathists to return to
their jobs or receive pensions remains stalled by the dominant Shiite and Kurdish
factions.
(4) By December 2006, approval of laws to curb militias and to offer amnesty to
insurgent supporters.
(5) By January 2007, completion of the constitutional review process.
(6) By February 2007, the formation of independent commissions to oversee
governance.
(7) Holding of a referendum on the special amendments to the constitution.
(8) By April 2007, Iraqi assumption of control of its military.
(9) By June 2007, the holding of provincial elections.
(10) By September 2007, Iraqi security control of all 18 provinces. Several Iraqi
Army divisions are now under Iraqi control, and Iraq Security Forces now have
CRS-6
security control for the provinces of Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Najaf. Britain said on
February 21, 2007, that it would turn over Basra Province by mid-2007.
(11) By December 2007, Iraqi security self-reliance.
The President’s Baghdad security plan also requires the commitment of three Iraqi
brigades and an unspecified number of police commandos and regular police in nine
sectors of Baghdad. U.S. commanders say that these units are showing up, at a better than
anticipated 80% strength. Iraq has, as was required, designated a commander (Lt. Gen.
Abboud Qanbar) and deputy commander of Baghdad, and its 2007 budget, adopted
February 8, 2007, commits the pledged $10 billion in Iraqi funds for reconstruction.
Skeptics argue that Maliki’s government will not allow U.S. and Iraqi forces to
conduct raids against Shiite militias as well as against Sunni insurgent hotbeds. Maliki,
for his part, is politically dependent on Sadr’s support, and he has previously been hesitant
to force Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia to disarm. However, on February 13, 2007, he issued
a statement announcing the launching of the Baghdad security plan and its requirements,
banning all fielding of weapons by those not in the ISF. This was a signal to Moqtada
Al Sadr that the Mahdi Army will not be immune from U.S.-Iraqi operations under the
new plan. Possibly in response, Sadr reportedly directed his Mahdi commanders not to
challenge the new security operations, and some reports say Sadr himself fled to Iran to
avoid being targeted by the new plan. In other efforts, U.S. officials have reportedly tried
to forge a new coalition that would exclude Sadr. This strategy reportedly ran into
opposition from Ayatollah Sistani, who has sought to ensure full Shiite unity.
Table 1. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Slate/Party
UIA (Shiite Islamist); Sadr formally joined list for Dec. vote
(SCIRI~30; Da’wa~28; Sadr~30; Fadila (Virtue)~15; others 25)
Kurdistan Alliance (PUK and KDP)
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added some mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote
Iraq Consensus Front (Sunni). Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote
Dialogue National Iraqi Front (Sunni, Saleh al-Mutlak) Not in Jan. vote
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Mission, Dec) pro-Sadr
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd)
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Sunni, secular)
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
Seats
(Jan. 05)
Seats
(Dec. 05)
140
128
75
40
—
—
—
5
3
3
2
2
2
1
53
25
44
11
0
—
1
2
—
5
0
—
1
1
0
—
1
3
1
1
Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200.
Eligible voters: 14 million in January election; 15 million in October referendum and December.
Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66% (10 million)/ December: 75% (12 million).