Order Code RS21968
Updated November 20, 2006
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS WebJanuary 26, 2007
Iraq: Elections, Government, and ConstitutionConstitution, and Government
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Elections in 2005 for a transition government (January 30, 2005), a permanent
constitution (October 15), and a permanent (four year) government (December 15)
were concluded despite insurgent violence, progressively attracting Sunni participation.
On May 20, a unity government was formed as U.S. officials had been urging, but the
government has been unable to reduce sectarian violence, and there are growing signs
of fragmentation within it and of strains with the United States. (See CRS Report
RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.)
After Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) deposed Saddam Hussein in April 2003, the
Bush Administration linked the end of U.S. military occupation to the adoption of a new
constitution and national elections, tasks expected to take two years. Prominent Iraqis
persuaded the Administration to accelerate the process, and sovereignty was given to an
appointed government on June 28, 2004, with a government and a permanent constitution
to be voted on thereafter, as stipulated in a Transitional Administrative Law (TAL, signed
March 8, 2004 [http://cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html]. Elections were held on
January 30, 2005, for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly; a provincial assembly
in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces (41 seats each; 51 for Baghdad); and a Kurdistan regional
assembly (111 seats). The Assembly chose a transitional “presidency council” (a
president and two deputies), a prime minister with executive power, and a cabinet. The
transitional Assembly was to draft a constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a
referendum by October 15, 2005. The draft could be vetoed with a two-thirds majority
of the votes in any three provinces. A permanent government, elected by December 15,
2005, was to take office by December 31, 2005. If the constitution were defeated, the
December 15 elections would have been for another transitional National Assembly.
January 30 Elections
The January 30, 2005, elections, run by the “Independent Electoral Commission of
Iraq” (IECI), were conducted by proportional representation (closed list); voters chose
among “political entities” (a party, a coalition of parties, or individuals). Any entity
receiving at least 1/275 of the vote (about 31,000 votes) won a seat. A female candidate
occupied every third position on electoral lists in order to meet the TAL’s goal for at least
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS-2
25% female membership. A total of 111 entities were on the National Assembly ballot:
9 multi-party coalitions, 75 single parties, and 27 individual persons. The 111 entities
contained over 7,000 candidates.
In the January 30 (and December 15) elections, Iraqis abroad were eligible to vote.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was tapped to run the “out-of-country
voting” (OCV) program. OCV took place in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Iran, Jordan, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, UAE, Britain, Netherlands, and the United
States. About 275,000 Iraqi expatriates (dual citizens and anyone whose father was Iraqi)
registered, and about 90% of them voted (in January).
The Iraqi government budgeted about $250 million for the January elections, of
which $130 million was offset by international donors, including about $40 million from
the European Union. Out of $21 billion in U.S. reconstruction funds, the United States
provided $40 million to improve IECI capacity; $42.5 million for Iraqi monitoring; and
$40 million for political party development, through the International Republican Institute
and National Democratic Institute. OCV cost an additional $92 million, of which $11
million was for the U.S. component, produced a Shiite-led government that many Sunnis view as biased. The December 6,
2006, Iraq Study Group report recommends a number of steps to accelerate national
reconciliation. President Bush’s new Iraq initiative, announced January 10, 2006,
requires promised cooperation from the Iraqi government to act against Shiite armed
elements participating in sectarian violence. (See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: PostSaddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.)
After deposing Saddam Hussein militarily in April 2003, the Bush Administration
linked the end of U.S. military occupation to the adoption of a new constitution and
national elections, tasks expected to take two years. Prominent Iraqis persuaded the
Administration to accelerate the process, and sovereignty was given to an appointed
government on June 28, 2004. A government and a permanent constitution were voted
on thereafter, as stipulated in a March 8, 2004, Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).1
January 30 Elections
Elections were held on January 30, 2005, for a 275-seat transitional National
Assembly, a provincial assembly in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces (41 seats each; 51 for
Baghdad), and a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). Run by an “Independent
Electoral Commission of Iraq” (IECI), the elections were conducted by proportional
representation (closed list); voters chose among “political entities” (a party, a coalition
of parties, or individuals). Any entity receiving at least 1/275 of the vote (about 31,000
votes) won a seat. A female candidate occupied every third position on electoral lists in
order to meet the TAL’s goal for at least 25% female membership. A total of 111 entities
were on the National Assembly ballot: 9 multi-party coalitions, 75 single parties, and 27
individual persons. The 111 entities contained over 7,000 candidates.
1
Text available at [http://cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html].
CRS-2
The Iraqi government budgeted about $250 million, of which $130 million was
offset by international donors, including about $40 million from the European Union.
Out of $21 billion in U.S. reconstruction funds, the United States provided $40 million
to improve IECI capacity; $42.5 million for Iraqi monitoring; and $40 million for political
party development. In the January 30 (and December 15) elections, Iraqis abroad were
eligible to vote. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was tapped to run
the “out-of-country voting” (OCV) program, which took place in Australia, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, Iran, Jordan, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, UAE, Britain,
Netherlands, and the United States. About 275,000 Iraqi expatriates (dual citizens and
anyone whose father was Iraqi) registered, and about 90% of them voted (in January).
OCV cost an additional $92 million, of which $11 million was for the U.S. component,
but no U.S. funds were spent for OCV.
Violence was less than anticipated; insurgents conducted about 300 attacks, but no
polling stations were overrun. Polling centers were guarded by the 130,000 members of
Iraq’s security forces, with the 150,000 U.S. forces in Iraq available for backup. Two
days prior to election day, vehicle traffic was banned, Iraq’s borders were closed, and
polling locations were confirmed. Security measures were similar for the October 15 and
December 15 votes. Polling places were staffed by about 200,000 Iraqis in all three
elections in 2005. International monitoring was limited to 25 observers (in the January
elections) and some European parliament members and others (December elections).
Competition and Results. The Iraqi groups that took the most active interest in
the January elections were those best positioned: Shiite Islamist parties, the Kurds, and
established secular parties, as shown in the table below. The most prominent slate was
. Most notable was the Shiite Islamist “United Iraqi Alliance” (UIA), consisting of
(UIA): 228 candidates from 22
parties, primarily the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the
Da’wa Party. Even though radical Shiite cleric
Moqtada al-Sadr denounced the election
as a U.S.-led process, 14 of his supporters were on the UIA slate; eight
of these won seats.
The two main Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK) and the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) offered a joint 165-candidate list.
Interim Prime Minister Iyad
al-Allawi filed a six-party, 233-candidate “Iraqi List” led by
his Iraqi National Accord
(INA) party. Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population),
perceiving electoral defeat
and insurgent intimidation, mostly boycotted and won only
17 seats spread over several
lists. The relatively moderate Sunni “Iraqi Islamic Party” (IIP) filed a 275-seat slate, but
it withdrew in December 2004. The hard-line Iraqi Muslim Scholars Association (MSA),
said to be close to the insurgents, called for a Sunni boycott.
After the election, factional bargaining over governmental posts and disagreements
over Kurdish demands for substantial autonomy delayed formation of the government.
During April lists. Government formation was delayed by factional
bargaining over governmental posts, particularly the “presidency council” (president and
two deputies) and the post of prime minister, which had executive power. During April
and May, the factions formed a government that U.S. officials said was not
sufficiently sufficiently
inclusive of Sunnis, even though it had Sunnis as Assembly speaker;, one of
the two deputy presidents;
presidents, one of the three deputy prime ministers;, Defense Minister;, and
five other
ministers. MostOther major positions were dominatedheld by Shiites andor Kurds, such
CRS-3
as PUK leader Jalal
Talabani as president and Da’wa leader Ibrahim al-Jafari as Prime
Minister. In provincial elections, the Kurds won about 60% of the seats in Tamim
(Kirkuk) province (26 out of 41 seats), strengthening Kurdish efforts to control it.
Permanent Constitution and Referendum
The next step in the transition process was the drafting of a permanent constitution.
On May 10, the National Assembly appointed a 55-member drafting committee, chaired
by SCIRI activist Humam al-Hammoudi. The committee included only two Sunni Arabs,
Minister.
Permanent Constitution and Referendum
The Assembly was to draft a constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a
referendum by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any
three provinces. To do so, the Assembly appointed (May 10, 2005) a 55-member drafting
committee, chaired by SCIRI official Humam al-Hammoudi. The committee included
only two Sunni Arabs, prompting Sunni resentment, and 15 Sunnis were later added as
full committee members,
with 10 more as advisors. The talks produced a draft on August
CRS-3
28, missing thean August
15 deadline. A provision highly favorable tofavoring the Kurds was Article 136, setting
140,
setting December 31, 2007, as a deadline to resettle Kurds in Kirkuk and to hold a referendum
referendum on whether Kirkuk will join the Kurdish region. It alsoThe draft designated Islam
“a main source”
of legislation and said no law can contradict the “established” provisions
of Islam (Article
2).12 Article 39 implied that families could choose which courts to use
for family issues
such as divorce and inheritance., and Article 34 made only primary
education mandatory.
These latter provisions were opposed by women, who fear that the males of their families
will decide to use Sharia (Islamic law) courts for family issues and to limit girls’
education. The; these provisions concerned many women who fear that the
provisions gave too much discretion to males of their families in personal legal issues.
A 25% electoral goal for women was retainedset (Article 47). Article 89 said
that federal supreme
court will include experts in Islamic law, as well as judges and
experts in civil law.
The remainingA major controversy centered (and continues) on the draft’s provision allowing two
or more
provinces together to form new autonomous “regions.” Article 117 allowed each
“region” ” and on provisions to
allocate oil revenues. Debates occurred later on laws to implement this and other
contentious provisions, as discussed further below. Article 117 allowed each “region”
to organize internal security forces, which would legitimize the fielding of
sectarian sectarian
(presumably Shiite) militias, in addition to the Kurds’ peshmerga (allowed by
the TAL).
Article 109 required the central government to distribute oil and gas revenues
from from
“current fields” in proportion to population, implying that the regions might
ultimately control revenues from new energy discoveries. These provisions raised Sunni
alarms, because their areas have few known oil or gas deposits. Sunni negotiators,
including chief negotiator Saleh al-Mutlak of the National Dialogue Council opposed the
draft on these grounds. Article 62 established a “Federation Council, a second chamber
of a size with powers to be determined, purportedly to review legislation on regionsand gave the “regions” a role in determining
allocation of revenues from new energy discoveries. Sunni negotiators opposed the draft
on these grounds; Sunni-dominated areas of Iraq have few oil or gas deposits, although
some oil fields are said to lie near Fallujah. Article 62 establishes a “Federation Council,”
a second chamber of size and powers to be determined by subsequent law.
After further negotiations, the National Assembly approved a September 19, 2005,
“final” draft, with such Sunni proposals as a statement that Iraq has always been part of
the Arab League. However,but no major changes to the provisions on regionscontentious provisions were made
and. Sunnis
registered in large numbers (70%-85% in some Sunni cities) to try to defeat
the constitution. The United Nations printed and distributed 5 million copies. The
continued the draft,
which was printed and distributed by the United Nations. Sunni opposition prompted
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad to
mediate an agreement (October 11) between Kurdish and Shiite leaders and a major
Sunni party, the Iraqi Islamic Party, providing for a panel to convene after the installation
providing for a panel to propose a bloc of amendments within four months after the
installation of a post-December 15 election government and, within four months, propose a bloc of
amendments (Article 137). The amendments
require a majority Assembly vote of
approval and, within another two months, would be
put to a public referendum under the
same rules as the October 15, 2005, referendum. referendum.
1
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
CRS-4
In the relatively peaceful October 15 referendum, 78.6% in favor and 21.4% against,
nationwide. The Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no”
vote, respectively. Mostly Sunni Nineveh province voted 55% “no,” and Diyala, believed
believed mostly Sunni, had a 51% “yes” vote. The draft passed because only two
provinces, not
three, voted “no” by a 2/3 majority. The Administration praised the vote as evidence that
Sunnis were supporting the political process.
December 15, 2005, Elections
In the December 15
December 15, 2005, Elections and Government Formation
The next transition step was the election of a permanent government, to take place
on December 15, 2005, and with the new government to take office by December 31,
2005. In these elections, under a formula designed to enhance Sunni
representation, each
province contributed a pre-determined number of seats to the new
“Council of
Representatives” (COR). Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were allocated this
way, and
2
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
CRS-4
there were 45 “compensatory” seats for entities that did not win provincial seats
but but
garnered votes nationwide, or which would have won additional seats had the election
constituency been the whole nation. A total of 361 political “entities” registered: 19 of
them were coalition slates (comprising 125 different political parties), and 342 were other
“entities” (parties or individual persons). About 7,500 candidates spanned all entities.
Most notably for U.S. policy, major Sunni slates competed. Most prominent was
the three-party “Iraqi Concord Front,” comprising the IIP, the National Dialogue
Council, and the Iraqi People’s General Council. The UIA slate formally included Sadr’s
faction as well as other hard line Shiite parties
Fadila (Virtue). Former Prime Minister
Iyad al-Allawi’s mostly secular 15-party “Iraqi
National” slate was broader than his
January list, incorporating not only his Iraq National
Accord but also several smaller
secular parties. The Kurdish alliance slate was little changed from January.
Violence was minor (about 30 incidents) as Sunni insurgents, supporting greater
Sunni representation in parliament, facilitated the voting. However, results suggest that
voters chose lists representing their sects and regions, not secular lists. The table gives
results (court-certified on February 10, 2006). According to the constitution: within 15
days of certification (by February 25), the COR was to convene to select a speaker and
two deputy speakers. The COR first convened on March 16, but without selecting these
or any other positions. After choosing a speaker the COR was to select (no deadline
specified, but a thirty-day deadline for the choice after subsequent COR elections), a
presidency council for Iraq (President and two deputies). Those choices required a 2/3
vote of the Council. Within another 15 days, the presidency council (by consensus of its
three officials) was to designate the “nominee of the [COR] bloc with the largest number”
as Prime Minister, the post that has executive power. Within another 30 days, the prime
minister designate was to name a cabinet for approval by majority vote.
With 181 seats combined (nearly two thirds of the COR), the UIA and the Kurds
were positioned to continue their governing alliance, but this alliance frayed over the
UIA’s nomination of Jafari to continue as Prime Minister. On April 20, Jafari stepped
aside in favor of another senior Da’wa Party figure, Jawad al-Maliki. Maliki, who was
in exile in Syria during Saddam’s rule, is considered a Shiite hardliner although he
professes non-sectarianism. On April 22, the COR approved Talabani to continue as
president, and two deputy presidents — SCIRI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) and
Concord Front/IIP leader Tariq al-Hashimi. National Dialogue Front figure Mahmoud
Mashhadani, a Sunni hardliner, was chosen COR speaker, with deputies Khalid al-Attiya
(UIA/Shiite) and Arif Tayfour, a KDP activist (incumbent).
CRS-5
changed from January.
A key U.S. goal has been to invest Sunnis in the political process, and major Sunni
slates, fearing complete exclusion from Iraqi politics, competed in the December
elections. The three-party “Iraqi Consensus” was led by the Iraq Islamic Party (IIP),
which initially entered but then withdrew from the January 2005 elections. Another major
Sunni faction (Saleh al-Mutlak’s National Iraqi Dialogue Front) ran a separate slate, but
the hardline Muslim Scholars Association (MSA) did not participate, although it did not,
as it had in January 2005, call for a broad Sunni boycott. Violence was minor (about 30
incidents) as Sunni insurgents, supporting greater Sunni representation in parliament,
facilitated the voting. As shown in the table below, results suggest that voters chose lists
representing their sects and regions, not secular lists. The COR first convened on March
16 but did not meet its deadlines to convene and choose a speaker (February 25 deadline);
to select a President and two deputies (no deadline specified, but a thirty-day deadline for
the choice after subsequent COR elections, by two thirds vote); to designate the
“nominee of the [COR] bloc with the largest number” as Prime Minister, the post that has
executive power (15 days after choosing the presidency council, by two thirds vote); or
to name a cabinet and obtain approval (with another 30 days, by majority vote).
With 181 seats combined (nearly two thirds of the COR), the UIA and the Kurds
continued their governing alliance, but they split over the UIA’s preference for Jafari to
continue as Prime Minister. On April 20, Jafari stepped aside in favor of another senior
Da’wa Party figure, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. On April 22, the COR approved Talabani to
continue as president, and selected his two deputies — SCIRI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi
(incumbent) and Consensus Front/IIP leader Tariq al-Hashimi. National Dialogue Front
figure Mahmoud Mashhadani, a Sunni hardliner, was chosen COR speaker.
New Cabinet. Amid U.S. and other congratulations, Maliki won approval of a 39
member cabinet (including deputy prime ministers) on May 20, one day prior to a 30-day
deadline. However, threeThree key slots (Defense, Interior, and National Security) were not
filled filled
permanently until June 8 because of factional infighting. Of the 37 ministerial
posts, a total of eight are Sunnis; seven are Kurds; twenty-one are Shiites; and one is
Christian. Kurdish official Barham Salih and Sunni Arab Salam al-Zubaie are deputy
prime ministers. Four ministers are women. KDP activist Hoshyar Zebari remained
Foreign Minister. Hussein Shahristani, an aide to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, became
Oil Minister. The Defense Minister is Gen. Abdul Qadir Mohammad Jasim al-Mifarji,
a Sunni who had been expelled from the Iraqi military and imprisoned for criticizing the
invasion of Kuwait in 1990. He has commanded operations of the post-Saddam Iraqi
Army in western Iraq. The Interior Minister is Jawad al-Bulani, a Shiite who is perceived
as relatively non-partisan. He replaced SCIRI’s Bayan Jabr, who became Finance
Minister. The Minister for National Security is Sherwan al-Waili, a Shiite who is from
a different faction of the Da’wa Party. He previously was head of the provincial council
in the city of Nassiriyah and as adviser in the national security ministry. Sadr followers
are Ministers of Health, of Transportation, and of Agriculture. Another is Minister of
State for Tourism and Antiquities.
Recent Actions and Political Disputes. Politically, the Maliki government has
focused on trying to reconcile with the resentful Sunni Arab community, although not
with the progress — or, according to some Sunnis, with the degree of commitment —
hoped for. On June 25, 2006, Maliki introduced the “National Reconciliation and
Dialogue Project,” intended primarily to persuade insurgent groups to enter the political
process. On August 6, 2006, the government reinstated about 10,000 Iraqis purged from
their jobs (mostly in the ministries of Defense and Interior) in the post-Saddam “deBaathification” process. An additional positive development came in August 2006 when
major factions agreed to share oil revenue on the basis of population size. However, amid
the Kurds’ insistence on their rights to deals with outside firms to explore for oil in the
Kurdish areas, disagreements remain over who is authorized to sign new development
deals.
Despite some of the agreements, Sunni-Shiite and intra-Shiite factional polarization
erupted as the National Assembly reconvened in September 2006. As the new session
began, SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim inflamed tensions by pressing for legislation
to implement the constitutional authorization for forming new regions (federalism).
Creating a large Shiite region in the south has been a major SCIRI goal, but Sunni
members teamed up with the Sadr faction — which fears SCIRI dominance of a Shiite
autonomous region — to oppose Hakim. To reduce acrimony, all Assembly factions
agreed on September 24 to (1) begin debate of the federalism legislation but to delay the
formation of any new region for 18 months; and to constitute the constitutional review
commission that was promised by the adopted constitution. However, the committee is
to complete its work within one year, not the four months stipulated in the constitution.
The committee is to have 12 UIA (Shiite) representatives, 5 Sunnis, 5 Kurds, 2 Allawi
bloc representatives, and 3 members from other blocs.
Press reports say the acrimony has widened, not narrowed, since the September 24
pact. The federalism law was passed, over Sunni opposition, on October 12, 2006. Sunni
cabinet and Assembly members, as well as U.S. officials, questioned Maliki’s
CRS-6
commitment to curbing Shiite militias, which Sunni leaders say are committing sectarian
killings in the guise of police/security operations. Maliki, for his part, is politically
dependent on Moqtada al-Sadr, and he has been hesitant to force his Mahdi Army to
disarm. During October and November 2006, Maliki obstructed some U.S. operations
against Sadr’s militia, causing U.S. military criticism. For several days in early November
2006, the COR was unable to obtain a quorum (only about 75 out its 275 members
attended). Some key Sunnis, including COR speaker Mashadani and deputy president
Hashimi, threatened to resign. In part to address the infighting, Maliki said in November
2006 that a broad cabinet reshuffle — perhaps half of the seats in the cabinet — is likely,
but that the overall factional balance would not change.
In part to try to stanch the perception that Maliki is a Shiite partisan increasingly at
odds with the United States, several high-level U.S. visitors went to Baghdad in October November 2006 (National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley and Director of National
Intelligence John Negroponte). President Bush held a videoconference with Maliki on
October 28, 2006, resulting in a statement of U.S.-Iraqi agreement on mechanisms to
cooperate to secure Iraq and communicating the impression that the United States still
fully supports his leadership. Yet, Maliki has denied agreeing to any U.S.-suggested
timetable for Iraqi security forces to take lead responsibility for security of all of Iraq.
Table 1. Election Results (January and December)
Slate/Party
UIA (Shiite Islamist); Sadr formally joined list for Dec. vote
(SCIRI~30; Da’wa~28; Sadr~30; Fadila (Virtue)~15; others 25)
Kurdistan Alliance (PUK and KDP)
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added some mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote
Iraq Concord; the Defense Ministry went to
Gen. Abdul Qadir Mohammad Jassim al-Mifarji, a Sunni who had been expelled from the
Iraqi military and imprisoned for criticizing the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The Interior
Ministry went to Jawad al-Bulani, a relatively non-partisan Shiite, replacing SCIRI’s
Bayan Jabr, who became Finance Minister. Sherwan al-Waili, a Shiite from a faction of
the Da’wa Party, became Minister for National Security. Kurdish official Barham Salih
and Sunni Arab Salam al-Zubaie are deputy prime ministers. Four ministers are women.
The KDP’s Hoshyar Zebari remained Foreign Minister. Hussein Shahristani, aide to
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, became Oil Minister. Sadr followers are Ministers of Health,
of Transportation, and of Agriculture; another is Minister of State for Tourism and
CRS-5
Antiquities. Of the 37 ministerial posts, there are eight Sunnis; seven Kurds; twenty-one
Shiites; and one Christian.
Recent Developments, Disputes, and U.S. Policy
U.S. policy has been predicated on achieving reconciliation among Iraq’s major
communities to reduce the causes of insurgency and sectarian violence. According to the
Iraq Study Group report, the Iraqi government has put forward several milestones to
achieve national reconciliation: (1) by early 2007, approval of a provincial election law
(which would presumably lead to more Sunnis on provincial councils), approval of a law
on sharing of oil revenues, approval of a new de-Baathification law, approval of a law to
curb militias, an increase in security spending over 2006 levels, a raise in interests rates
and appreciation of the Iraqi dinar, and an increase in domestic gas prices; (2) by March
2007, a referendum on amending the constitution; (3) by April 2007, Iraqi assumption
of control of its military; (4) by May 2007, implementation of the militias law, approval
of an amnesty agreement (with insurgent supporters), and completion of reconciliation
efforts; (5) by June 2007, the holding of provincial elections; (6) by September 2007, Iraqi
security control of all 18 provinces; and (7) Iraqi security self-reliance.
As of President Bush’s January 10, 2007, speech announcing a new Iraq security
plan, none of the above milestones had been completely met, but the Maliki government
has made advances on some. On June 25, 2006, Maliki introduced a “National
Reconciliation and Dialogue Project,” intended primarily to persuade insurgent groups
to enter the political process. A foreign investment law was adopted in November 2006.
The major factions have agreed to many provisions of a new oil law, including agreement
to share oil revenue on the basis of population size, although a final agreement awaits
consensus on several issues including the powers of the central government to handle oil
revenues and to approve deals between individual regions and outside firms to explore for
oil in the regional issues. A finalized draft would need cabinet and parliamentary
approval. A constitution review committee has been established, but it has not to date
drafted proposed amendments. About 700 ex-Baathists have been returned to their jobs,
but a new de-Baathification law has not been passed to date. Nor has a provincial election
law. A further complication to Sunni-Shiite reconciliation has been the insistence of
SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim on legislation to implement the constitutional
authorization for forming new regions (federalism). A law to provide for new regions was
passed on October 12, 2006, over Sunni opposition, but the factions agreed to delay the
formation of any new region for 18 months. On security issues, several Iraqi Army
divisions are now under Iraqi control, and the Iraq Security Forces now have security
control for the provinces of Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Najaf.
The President’s January 10, 2007, statement on Iraq requires cooperation from Iraq,
such as progress on the steps discussed above. The President’s Baghdad security plan
requires the commitment of 3 Iraqi brigades and an unspecified number of police
commandos and regular police in nine sectors of Baghdad. Iraq is to designate a
commander and deputy commander of Baghdad and commit $10 billion in unspent Iraqi
funds for reconstruction.
Perhaps most important is the Iraqi commitment to allow U.S. and Iraqi forces to
conduct raids and patrols against Shiite militias that are responsible for much of the
sectarian violence in Baghdad. Maliki, for his part, is politically dependent on Sadr’s
CRS-6
support, and he has previously been hesitant to force Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia to
disarm. During October and November 2006, Maliki obstructed some U.S. operations
against the Mahdi forces. However, he reportedly is shifting position and has told Sadr
supporters that the Mahdi Army will not be immune from U.S.-Iraqi operations under the
new security plan. Possibly in response, Mahdi commanders reportedly are planning not
to challenge the new security operations. The President’s January 10 plan does not adopt
the Iraq Study Group recommendation that the United States reduce its political, military,
and economic support for the government if it fails to meet reconciliation milestones.
In other efforts, U.S. officials have reportedly tried to forge a new coalition among
mainstream Shiites, Sunnis, and secular blocs that would exclude Sadr. This strategy
reportedly ran into opposition from Ayatollah Sistani, who has sought to ensure full
cooperation among all Shiite blocs. Demonstrating the difficulty of forging unity in Iraq,
the COR has only attracted a quorum on a few occasions since November 2006, and many
of the sessions are characterized by verbal arguments by parliamentarians from the rival
sects. One positive development for the COR, although not necessarily for U.S. efforts
to isolate Sadr, was the January 2007 decision by Sadr to end the boycott of his 32
parliamentarians, which helped the COR obtain a quorum on January 25, 2007. Some
take the view that, should Maliki not cooperate with the January 10 plan and refuse or fail
to curb Sadr, the United States might try to engineer his replacement by deputy president
and SCIRI leader Adel Abd al-Mahdi; President Bush’s meeting with SCIRI leader Hakim
in Washington, DC in early December 2006 fed such speculation.
Table 1. Election Results (January and December)
Slate/Party
UIA (Shiite Islamist); Sadr formally joined list for Dec. vote
(SCIRI~30; Da’wa~28; Sadr~30; Fadila (Virtue)~15; others 25)
Kurdistan Alliance (PUK and KDP)
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added some mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote
Iraq Consensus Front (Sunni). Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote
Dialogue National Iraqi Front (Sunni, Saleh al-Mutlak) Not in Jan. vote
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Mission, Dec) pro-Sadr
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd)
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Sunni, secular)
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
Seats
(Jan. 05)
Seats
(Dec. 05)
140
128
75
40
—
—
—
5
3
3
2
2
2
1
53
25
44
11
0
—
1
2
—
5
0
—
1
1
0
—
1
3
1
1
Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200.
Eligible voters: 14 million in January election; 15 million in October referendum and December.
Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66% (10 million)/ December: 75% (12 million).