Order Code RS21968
Updated October 3November 20, 2006
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Elections in 2005 for a transition government (January 30, 2005), a permanent
constitution (October 15), and a permanent (four year) government (December 15)
were concluded despite insurgent violence, progressively attracting Sunni participation.
On May 20, a unity government was formed as U.S. officials had been urging, but the
government has been unable to reduce sectarian violence, and there are growing signs
of fragmentation within it and of strains with the United States. (See CRS Report
RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance
and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.)
After Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) deposed Saddam Hussein in April 2003, the
Bush Administration linked the end of U.S. military occupation to the adoption of a new
constitution and national elections, tasks expected to take two years. Prominent Iraqis
persuaded the Administration to accelerate the process, and sovereignty was given to an
appointed government on June 28, 2004, with a government and a permanent constitution
to be voted on thereafter, as stipulated in a Transitional Administrative Law (TAL, signed
March 8, 2004 [http://cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html]. Elections were held on
January 30, 2005, for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly; a provincial assembly
in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces (41 seats each; 51 for Baghdad); and a Kurdistan regional
assembly (111 seats). The Assembly chose a transitional “presidency council” (a
president and two deputies), a prime minister with executive power, and a cabinet. The
transitional Assembly was to draft a constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a
referendum by October 15, 2005. The draft could be vetoed with a two-thirds majority
of the votes in any three provinces. A permanent government, elected by December 15,
2005, was to take office by December 31, 2005. If the constitution were defeated, the
December 15 elections would have been for another transitional National Assembly.
January 30 Elections
The January 30, 2005, elections, run by the “Independent Electoral Commission of
Iraq” (IECI), were conducted by proportional representation (closed list); voters chose
among “political entities” (a party, a coalition of parties, or individuals). Any entity
receiving at least 1/275 of the vote (about 31,000 votes) won a seat. A female candidate
occupied every third position on electoral lists in order to meet the TAL’s goal for at least
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
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25% female membership. A total of 111 entities were on the National Assembly ballot:
9 multi-party coalitions, 75 single parties, and 27 individual persons. The 111 entities
contained over 7,000 candidates.
In the January 30 (and December 15) elections, Iraqis abroad were eligible to vote.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was tapped to run the “out-of-country
voting” (OCV) program. OCV took place in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Iran, Jordan, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, UAE, Britain, Netherlands, and the United
States. About 275,000 Iraqi expatriates (dual citizens and anyone whose father was Iraqi)
registered, and about 90% of them voted (in January).
The Iraqi government budgeted about $250 million for the January elections, of
which $130 million was offset by international donors, including about $40 million from
the European Union. Out of $21 billion in U.S. reconstruction funds, the United States
provided $40 million to improve IECI capacity; $42.5 million for Iraqi monitoring; and
$40 million for political party development, through the International Republican Institute
and National Democratic Institute. OCV cost an additional $92 million, of which $11
million was for the U.S. component, but no U.S. funds were spent for OCV.
Violence was less than anticipated; insurgents conducted about 300 attacks, but no
polling stations were overrun. Polling centers were guarded by the 130,000 members of
Iraq’s security forces, with the 150,000 U.S. forces in Iraq available for backup. Two
days prior to election day, vehicle traffic was banned, Iraq’s borders were closed, and
polling locations were confirmed. Security measures were similar for the October 15 and
December 15 votes. Polling places were staffed by about 200,000 Iraqis in all three
elections in 2005. International monitoring was limited to 25 observers (in the January
elections) and some European parliament members and others (December elections).
Competition and Results. The Iraqi groups that took the most active interest in
the January elections were those best positioned: Shiite Islamist parties, the Kurds, and
established secular parties, as shown in the table below. The most prominent slate was
the Shiite Islamist “United Iraqi Alliance” (UIA), consisting of 228 candidates from 22
parties, primarily the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the
Da’wa Party. Even though radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr denounced the election
as a U.S.-led process, 14 of his supporters were on the UIA slate; eight of these won seats.
The two main Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) offered a joint 165-candidate list. Interim Prime Minister Iyad
al-Allawi filed a six-party, 233-candidate “Iraqi List” led by his Iraqi National Accord
(INA) party. Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population), perceiving electoral defeat
and insurgent intimidation, mostly boycotted and won only 17 seats spread over several
lists. The relatively moderate Sunni “Iraqi Islamic Party” (IIP) filed a 275-seat slate, but
it withdrew in December 2004. The hard-line Iraqi Muslim Scholars Association (MSA),
said to be close to the insurgents, called for a Sunni boycott.
After the election, factional bargaining over governmental posts and disagreements
over Kurdish demands for substantial autonomy delayed formation of the government.
During April and May, the factions formed a government that U.S. officials said was not
sufficiently inclusive of Sunnis, even though it had Sunnis as Assembly speaker; one of
the two deputy presidents; one of the three deputy prime ministers; Defense Minister; and
five other ministers. Most major positions were dominated by Shiites and Kurds, such
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as PUK leader Jalal Talabani as president and Da’wa leader Ibrahim al-Jafari as Prime
Minister. In provincial elections, the Kurds won about 60% of the seats in Tamim
(Kirkuk) province (26 out of 41 seats), strengthening Kurdish efforts to control it.
Permanent Constitution and Referendum
The next step in the transition process was the drafting of a permanent constitution.
On May 10, the National Assembly appointed a 55-member drafting committee, chaired
by SCIRI activist Humam al-Hammoudi. The committee included only two Sunni Arabs,
prompting Sunni resentment, and 15 Sunnis were later added as full committee members,
with 10 more as advisors. The talks produced a draft on August 28, missing the August
15 deadline. A provision highly favorable to the Kurds was Article 136, setting
December 31, 2007, as a deadline to resettle Kurds in Kirkuk and to hold a referendum
on whether Kirkuk will join the Kurdish region. It also designated Islam “a main source”
of legislation and said no law can contradict the “established” provisions of Islam (Article
2).1 Article 39 implied that families could choose which courts to use for family issues
such as divorce and inheritance. Article 34 made only primary education mandatory.
These latter provisions were opposed by women, who fear that the males of their families
will decide to use Sharia (Islamic law) courts for family issues and to limit girls’
education. The 25% electoral goal for women was retained (Article 47). Article 89 said
that federal supreme court will include experts in Islamic law, as well as judges and
experts in civil law.
The remaining controversy centered on the draft’s provision allowing two or more
provinces together to form new autonomous “regions.” Article 117 allowed each
“region” to organize internal security forces, which would legitimize the fielding of
sectarian (presumably Shiite) militias, in addition to the Kurds’ peshmerga (allowed by
the TAL). Article 109 required the central government to distribute oil and gas revenues
from “current fields” in proportion to population, implying that the regions might
ultimately control revenues from new energy discoveries. These provisions raised Sunni
alarms, because their areas have few known oil or gas deposits. Sunni negotiators,
including chief negotiator Saleh al-Mutlak of the National Dialogue Council opposed the
draft on these grounds. Article 62 established a “Federation Council, a second chamber
of a size with powers to be determined, purportedly to review legislation on regions.
After further negotiations, the National Assembly approved a September 19, 2005,
“final” draft, with such Sunni proposals as a statement that Iraq has always been part of
the Arab League. However, no major changes to the provisions on regions were made
and Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-85% in some Sunni cities) to try to defeat
the constitution. The United Nations printed and distributed 5 million copies. The
continued Sunni opposition prompted U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad to
mediate an agreement (October 11) between Kurdish and Shiite leaders and a major
Sunni party, the Iraqi Islamic Party, providing for a panel to convene after the installation
of a post-December 15 election government and, within four months, propose a bloc of
amendments (Article 137). The amendments require a majority Assembly vote of
approval and, within another two months, would be put to a public referendum under the
same rules as the October 15, 2005 referendum.
1
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
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In the relatively peaceful October 15 referendum, 78.6% in favor and 21.4% against,
nationwide. The Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no”
vote, respectively. Mostly Sunni Nineveh province voted 55% “no,” and Diyala, believed
mostly Sunni, had a 51% “yes” vote. The draft passed because only two provinces, not
three, voted “no” by a 2/3 majority. The Administration praised the vote as evidence that
Sunnis were supporting the political process.
December 15, 2005, Elections
In the December 15 elections, under a formula designed to enhance Sunni
representation, each province contributed a pre-determined number of seats to the new
“Council of Representatives” (COR). Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were allocated this
way, and there were 45 “compensatory” seats for entities that did not win provincial seats
but garnered votes nationwide, or which would have won additional seats had the election
constituency been the whole nation. A total of 361 political “entities” registered: 19 of
them were coalition slates (comprising 125 different political parties), and 342 were other
“entities” (parties or individual persons). About 7,500 candidates spanned all entities.
Most notably for U.S. policy, major Sunni slates competed. Most prominent was
the three-party “Iraqi Concord Front,” comprising the IIP, the National Dialogue
Council, and the Iraqi People’s General Council. The UIA slate formally included Sadr’s
faction as well as other hard line Shiite parties Fadila (Virtue). Ahmad Chalabi’s Iraqi
National Congress ran separately. Former Prime Minister
Iyad al-Allawi’s mostly secular
15-party “Iraqi National” slate was broader than his
January list, incorporating not only
his Iraq National Accord but also several smaller
secular parties. The Kurdish alliance
slate was little changed from January.
Violence was minor (about 30 incidents) as Sunni insurgents, supporting greater
Sunni representation in parliament, facilitated the voting. However, results suggest that
voters chose lists representing their sects and regions, not secular lists. The table gives
results that were (court-certified on February 10, 2006). According to the constitution:
within 15
days of certification (by February 25), the COR was to convene to select a
speaker and
two deputy speakers. The COR first convened on March 16, but without
selecting these
or any other positions. After choosing a speaker the COR was to select
(no deadline
specified, but a thirty-day deadline for the choice after subsequent COR
elections), a
presidency council for Iraq (President and two deputies). Those choices
required a 2/3
vote of the Council. Within another 15 days, the presidency council (by
consensus of its
three officials) was to designate the “nominee of the [COR] bloc with the
largest number”
as Prime Minister, the post that has executive power. Within another 30
days, the prime
minister designate was to name a cabinet for approval by majority vote.
With 181 seats combined (nearly two thirds of the COR), the UIA and the Kurds
were positioned to continue their governing alliance, but this alliance frayed when the
Kurds, Sunnis, and Allawi bloc opposed the UIA’s February 12over the
UIA’s nomination of Jafari to
continue as Prime Minister. On April 20, Jafari agreed to step aside, breaking the logjam.
Anotherstepped
aside in favor of another senior Da’wa Party figure, Jawad al-Maliki, was nominated Prime Minister
instead. Maliki, who was
in exile in Syria during Saddam’s rule, is considered a Shiite
hardliner, hardliner although he now
professes non-sectarianism. On April 22, the COR approved
Talabani to continue as
president, and two deputy presidents — SCIRI’s Adel Abd al-
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Mahdi (incumbent) and
Concord Front/IIP leader Tariq al-Hashimi. National Dialogue
Front figure Mahmoud
Mashhadani, a Sunni hardliner, was chosen COR speaker, with
deputies Khalid al-Attiya
(UIA/Shiite) and Arif Tayfour, a KDP activist (incumbent).
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New Cabinet. Amid U.S. and other congratulations, Maliki won approval of a
39 39
member cabinet (including deputy prime ministers) on May 20, one day prior to a 30day 30-day
deadline. However, three key slots (Defense, Interior, and National Security) were
not not
filled permanently until June 8 because of factional infighting. Of the 37 ministerial
posts, a total of eight are Sunnis; seven are Kurds; twenty-one are Shiites; and one is
Christian. Kurdish official Barham Salih and Sunni Arab Salam al-Zubaie are deputy
prime ministers. Four ministers are women. KDP activist Hoshyar Zebari remained
Foreign Minister. Hussein Shahristani, an aide to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, became
Oil Minister. The Defense Minister is Gen. Abdul Qadir Mohammad Jasim al-Mifarji,
a Sunni who had been expelled from the Iraqi military and imprisoned for criticizing the
invasion of Kuwait in 1990. More recently, heHe has commanded operations of the postSaddam Iraqi post-Saddam Iraqi
Army in western Iraq. The Interior Minister is Jawad al-Bulani, a Shiite
who is perceived as not aligned with any major faction
as relatively non-partisan. He replaced SCIRI’s Bayan Jabr,
who became Finance
Minister. The Minister for National Security is Sherwan al-Waili,
a Shiite who is from
a different faction of the Da’wa Party. He has served since 2003 as
previously was head of the provincial council
in the city of Nassiriyah and as adviser in the national
security ministry. The Minister of Trade and Minister of Education are from this Da’wa
faction. The Minister of Municipalities and Public Works is from the Badr Organization,
SCIRI’s militia wing, and a minister of state (no portfolio) is from Iraqi Hizbollah, which
represents former Shiite guerrilla fighters against Saddam’s regime based in the city of
Amarah. security ministry. Sadr followers
are Ministers of Health, of Transportation, and of Agriculture.
Another is Minister of
State for Tourism and Antiquities.
Recent Actions and Political Disputes. Politically, the Maliki government
has has
focused on trying to reconcile with the resentful Sunni Arab community. In March
2006, Iraqi leaders agreed to a U.S. proposal to form extra-constitutional economic and
security councils including all factions, although not
with the progress — or, according to some Sunnis, with the degree of commitment —
hoped for. On June 25, 2006, Maliki introduced the
“National Reconciliation and
Dialogue Project,” intended primarily to persuade insurgent
groups to disarm and supportenter the political process. As part of the reconciliation effort, on
process. On August 6, 2006, the government reinstated about 10,000 Iraqis purged from
their jobs
(mostly in the ministries of Defense and Interior) in the post-Saddam “de-Baathification”
deBaathification” process. An additional positive development came in August 2006 when
major factions
agreed to share oil revenue on the basis of population size. However, amid
the Kurds’
insistence on their rights to deals with outside firms to explore for oil in the Kurdish
Kurdish areas, disagreements remain over who is authorized to sign new development deals.
Other tensions were evident in August 2006 when the Kurdish regional government
ordered that the Iraq flag not be flown, asserting it is a holdover from the Saddam era
deals.
Despite some of the positive agreements, agreements, Sunni-Shiite and intra-Shiite factional polarization
erupted as the
National Assembly reconvened in September 2006, primarily between Sunni and Shiite
members but also within the broader Shiite camp. As the new session
began, SCIRI
leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim inflamed tensions by pressing for legislation
to implement
the constitutional authorization for forming new regions. (federalism).
Creating a large Shiite region
in the south has been a major SCIRI goal, but Sunni
members teamed up with the Sadr
faction — which fears SCIRI dominance of a Shiite
autonomous region — to oppose
Hakim. The broad goal of reducing acrimony led to a tentative September 24 agreement
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by all Assembly factions to (1) begin debate of the Hakim-proposed legislation; (2) delay
the Hakim. To reduce acrimony, all Assembly factions
agreed on September 24 to (1) begin debate of the federalism legislation but to delay the
formation of any new region for 18 months; and (3)to constitute the long-delayed
constitutional review
commission that was promised by the adopted constitution.
However, the committee is
to complete its work within one year, not the four months
stipulated in the constitution.
The committee willis to have 12 UIA (Shiite) representatives,
5 Sunnis, 5 Kurds, 2 Allawi
bloc representatives, and 3 members from other blocs.
The September 24 pact only temporarily reduced factional schisms in the Assembly.
They erupted again on October 2, 2006, after a bodyguard of a leader of the Concord
Front (Sunni group) was arrested for allegedly hatching a foiled bombing plot within the
“Green Zone.” That alleged plot led to a demand by Sadr that Maliki purge his cabinet
of Sunnis that Sadr says have ties to the Sunni insurgency. The Sadr criticism came as
Maliki announced a plan to try to curb operations by sectarian militias, including Sadr’s
Mahdi Army militia, by empowering neighborhood consultative councils to monitor the
operations of the Iraqi security forces. Sadr, as well as SCIRI, which fields the Badr
militia, have resisted any forced disarmament of militias. Maliki has also received some
support from Sunni tribal leaders to try to curb insurgent activity, particularly by foreign
insurgent fightersPress reports say the acrimony has widened, not narrowed, since the September 24
pact. The federalism law was passed, over Sunni opposition, on October 12, 2006. Sunni
cabinet and Assembly members, as well as U.S. officials, questioned Maliki’s
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commitment to curbing Shiite militias, which Sunni leaders say are committing sectarian
killings in the guise of police/security operations. Maliki, for his part, is politically
dependent on Moqtada al-Sadr, and he has been hesitant to force his Mahdi Army to
disarm. During October and November 2006, Maliki obstructed some U.S. operations
against Sadr’s militia, causing U.S. military criticism. For several days in early November
2006, the COR was unable to obtain a quorum (only about 75 out its 275 members
attended). Some key Sunnis, including COR speaker Mashadani and deputy president
Hashimi, threatened to resign. In part to address the infighting, Maliki said in November
2006 that a broad cabinet reshuffle — perhaps half of the seats in the cabinet — is likely,
but that the overall factional balance would not change.
In part to try to stanch the perception that Maliki is a Shiite partisan increasingly at
odds with the United States, several high-level U.S. visitors went to Baghdad in October November 2006 (National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley and Director of National
Intelligence John Negroponte). President Bush held a videoconference with Maliki on
October 28, 2006, resulting in a statement of U.S.-Iraqi agreement on mechanisms to
cooperate to secure Iraq and communicating the impression that the United States still
fully supports his leadership. Yet, Maliki has denied agreeing to any U.S.-suggested
timetable for Iraqi security forces to take lead responsibility for security of all of Iraq.
Table 1. Election Results (January and December)
Slate/Party
UIA (Shiite Islamist); Sadr formally joined list for Dec. vote
(SCIRI~30; Da’wa~28; Sadr~30; Fadila (Virtue)~15; others 25)
Kurdistan Alliance (PUK and KDP)
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added some mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote
Iraq Concord Front (Sunni). Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote
Dialogue National Iraqi Front (Sunni, Saleh al-Mutlak) Not in Jan. vote
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Mission, Dec) pro-Sadr
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd)
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Sunni, secular)
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
Seats
(Jan. 05)
Seats
(Dec. 05)
140
128
75
40
—
—
—
5
3
3
2
2
2
1
53
25
44
11
0
—
1
2
—
5
0
—
1
1
0
—
1
3
1
1
Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200.
Eligible voters: 14 million in January election; 15 million in October referendum and December.
Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66% (10 million)/ December: 75% (12 million).