Order Code RS21513
Updated July 5, 2006
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS WebNovember 2, 2007
Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Kuwaiti leaders peacefully resolved a succession crisis that erupted following the
January 15, 2006 death of its long-ruling Amir. However, a new crisis erupted in May
2006 over the structure of the next parliamentary elections, prompting a dissolution of
the existing parliament and new elections on June 29, 2006. Women voted and ran for
the first time, but Kuwait, which would be pivotal to any U.S. decision to wind down its military
involvement in Iraq, has advanced its democratic development since the fall of Saddam
Hussein, but it remains concerned about security threats emanating from a still unstable
Iraq. In June 2006 parliamentary elections, women voted and ran for the first time, but
none won. This report will be updated. See also CRS Report
RL31533, The Persian
Gulf States: Issues for U.S. Policy, 20042006, by Kenneth Katzman.
Governmental Changes and Political Reform1
Kuwait’s optimism after the fall of its nemesis, Saddam Hussein, in 2003 was
interrupted by a succession crisis upon the January 15, 2006, death of Amir (ruler) Jabir
Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah at the age of 78. His relative, Crown Prince Shaykh Sa’d
Abdullah Al Sabah, was declared successor, but he ishis seriously ill, leading health led Prime
Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al-Sabah (about 7677, the younger brother of the
late Amir) and his branch of the Sabah family to successfully challenge the succession. After
After extensive discussions within the ruling family and with the elected National Assembly,
which had never before
had a role in succession, Shaykh Sa’d abdicated, and the
the Assembly formally affirmednamed Shaykh Sabah as the new Amir
on January 29, 2006. The
peaceful handling of the succession crisis was widely hailed.
Amir Sabah subsequently sidestepped a tacit agreement to alternate succession
between the Jabir and Salem branches of the family by appointing members of his Jabir
branch as his Crown Prince/heir apparent (his half-brother, Shaykh Nawwaf al-Ahmad
Al Sabah, age 67) and Prime Minister (his nephew, Shaykh Nasser Muhammad al-Ahmad
Al Sabah, age 64). The highest ranking “Salem” in the new cabinet is Dr. Mohammad
Al Sabah, who kept his Foreign Minister post and simultaneously was made a second
deputy
1
Much of the information in this section is from the State Department’s country report on human
rights practices for 2005 (released March 8, 20066, 2007); the Department’s report on “Supporting
Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record 2005-2006, by the Bureau of Democracy,
Human Human
Rights, and Labor (April 5, 20062007); the International Religious Freedom Report
(November 8, 2005 (September 14,
2007); and the Trafficking in Persons Report for 20062007 (June 5, 2006).
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress12, 2007).
CRS-2
deputy prime minister. However, in a further diminution of the Salem branch, a relative
from another branch, Shaykh Jabir al-Hamad Al Sabah was made first deputy prime
minister and given the powerful posts of defense and interior ministers. In other major
moves, two prominent reformists were removed from the cabinet, as was a prominent
hardline (Salafi) Sunni Islamist. A second Shiite Muslim was named, giving the cabinet
two Shiite ministers for the first time since 1992. The one woman, Massouma Mubarak,
was retained as Minister of Planning; she was first appointed in June 2005.
It was widely anticipated that, as Amir, Shaykh Sabah would accelerate political
reform, but he appears to want to ensure continued Sabah control of government. Kuwait
has the longest serving all-elected National Assembly of the Gulf monarchies; 50 seats
are elected, comprising two seats each from 25 districts, plus up to 15 ministers serving
in it ex-officio. The body was established by Kuwait’s November 1962 constitution, but
the Amir has sometimes used his power to dissolve the Assembly (1976-1981, 19861992, 1990, and 2003) when the Assembly aggressively challenged the government. The
Assembly can vote no confidence in ministers and can veto government decrees made
when the Assembly is not in session. Amir Sabah suspended the Assembly on May 21
and called new elections for June 29, 2006, after 29 prime minister. In moves that have broadened representation in government, a second
Shiite Muslim was named, giving the cabinet two Shiite ministers for the first time since
1992; a third (Minister of Public Works Musa al-Sarraf) was added in a March 2007
reshuffle. That reshuffle also added a second woman to the cabinet, Nuriya as-Sabih, as
Minister of Education and of Higher Education, joining Ms. Massouma Mubarak, a Shiite
who is now Minister of Health (she was first appointed Minister of Planning in June
2005). In a cabinet reshuffle in October 2007 intended to shield the Finance Minister
from Assembly questioning, Prime Minister Nasser moved the finance minister to Oil
Minister (thus exempting him from parliamentary questioning) and also appointed a new
Interior Minister, a post that was held simultaneously by first deputy prime and Defense
Minister Shaykh Jabir al-Hamad Al Sabah.
Amir Sabah supports political reform, but he wants to ensure continued Sabah
control. Kuwait has the longest serving all-elected National Assembly of the Gulf
monarchies; 50 seats are elected, plus up to 15 ministers serving in it ex-officio. The
body was established by Kuwait’s November 1962 constitution, but the Amir has
sometimes used his power to dissolve the Assembly (1976-1981, 1986-1992, 1990, and
2003) when the Assembly aggressively challenged the government. The Assembly can
vote no confidence in ministers and can veto government decrees made when the
Assembly is not in session. Amir Sabah suspended the Assembly on May 21 and called
new elections for June 29, 2006, after 29 opposition members — an alliance of liberals
and Islamists — demanded to question the Prime Minister over the government’s refusal
to endorse a proposal to reduce the number of electoral districts to 5, from the current 25.
The reformists in the Assembly want to reduce the number of districts, and thereby
opposition wanted to increase the size of each, district so that it would be more
difficult to influence the outcome
through alleged “vote buying” or tribal politics. Reformists, who
The opposition, which attracted youth support
under a banner called the “Orange”
movement, won a clear majority in the June 29
elections: 36 out of the 50 seats. None of the 28 female candidates (out of 249 total
candidates) won, even though women constituted 57% of the 340,000-person electorate.
The outcome sets up Sabah-parliament battles over a new cabinet and on the electoral
district issue. On other issues, the “Orange” camp could fracture because the Islamists
dominate this alliance. Islamists increased their number to 17 in the new Assembly, up
from 14, while liberals were reduced to six, from the previous eight. Turnout was 65%.
Reformists also want to see formal political parties allowed. They are prohibited
currently, although candidates are allowed to organize as informal currents, such as the
Salafi movement (hardline Islamists); the Islamic Constitutional Movement (Kuwait’s
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood); the “Popular Bloc” (merchants/nationalists); the
Kuwait Democratic Forum (liberal, pro-rapid reform); and tribal candidates. Kuwaitis
also have a parallel tradition of informal political consultations in nightly “diwaniyyas”
(social gatherings) held by many elites, including some women.
Kuwait is a country of about 2.4 million (900,000 are citizens). Over the past
decade, the government expanded the all-male electorate gradually2 by extending the
franchise to sons of naturalized Kuwaitis and Kuwaitis naturalized for at least twenty (as
34 out of the 50 seats as follows: the Salafi
movement (11 seats; hardline Islamist); the Islamic Constitutional Movement (6 seats;
moderate Islamist); the “Popular Bloc” (9 seats; merchants and nationalists); and the
“National Action Bloc” (8 seats; liberals and merchants). None of the 28 female
candidates (out of 249 candidates) won, even though women constituted 57% of the
340,000-person electorate. Islamists deputies increased to 17, up from 14, while liberals
were reduced to six, from the previous eight. Turnout was 65%. In post-election politics,
on July 17, 2006, the reformist alliance achieved passage of a law to reduce the number
of electoral districts to five, as they had sought. They have failed to achieve permission
to form political parties, but candidates are allowed to organize as informal currents.
Kuwaitis also have a parallel tradition of informal political consultations in nightly
“diwaniyyas” (social gatherings) held by many elites.
Kuwait’s population is only about 2.4 million, of which 900,000 are citizens. Over
the past decade, the government expanded the all-male electorate gradually by extending
the franchise to sons of naturalized Kuwaitis and Kuwaitis naturalized for at least twenty
(as opposed to thirty) years, but these modifications raised the electorate to only about
130,000, or about 15% of the citizenry. The long deadlock on female suffrage began to
break in May 2004, after the government submitted to the Assembly a bill to give women
the right to vote and run. (A government attempt in May 1999 to institute female suffrage
2
This election was held one year earlier than expected because new elections were required after
a brief Assembly suspension by the Amir, precipitated by Assembly challenges on several issues.
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by decree was vetoed by the Assembly.) In May 2005, then Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah
pressed the Assembly to adopt the government bill, which it did on May 16, 2005 (352335-
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23), effective as of the next National Assembly elections. Islamist deputies succeeded in
adding a clause that will require gender-segregated polling places (or entrances).
According to the State Department, the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait uses various
programming tools, including dialogue and public diplomacy and funds from the Middle
East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), to encourage democracy. The Embassy has sponsored
several Kuwaitis, particularly women, to attend regional and U.S. conferences and
training programs. MEPI funds have been used to fund political education brochures for
Kuwaiti women, among other uses. U.S. embassy officers attend nightly diwaniyyas and
conferences to promote rule of law, civil society, women’s empowerment, labor rights,
and democratization. Several Kuwaiti non-government organizations, such as the Kuwait
Women’s Cultural and Social Society, actively promote democratization.
The State Department human rights report for 2005 noted progress particularly on
female suffrage but says “serious problems remained.” Shiite Muslims report official
discrimination, including limited access to religious education, although the State
Department’s religious freedom report for 2005 noted some improvement over the past
year. Reports of abuses continue, mostly of Asian domestic workers. Kuwait was
designated by the State Department “Trafficking in Persons” report for 2006 (released
June 3, 2005) as a “Tier Two-Watch List.” The rating is an upgrade from the 2005 report
(Tier Three, worst level) because Kuwait has pledged significant efforts to comply with
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. Official press censorship ended in
1992, and a vibrant press often criticizes the government. Kuwait permits some public
worship by non-Muslim faiths and has seven officially recognized Christian churches of
various denominations. The government allows one trade union per occupation, but the
only legal trade federation is the Kuwait Trade Union Federation (KTUF). Foreign
workers, with the exception of domestic workers, are allowed to join unionsrequires gender-segregated polling places (or entrances).
The latest State Department reports on human rights and democracy praise Kuwait
for allowing female suffrage but list continuing abuses, such as arbitrary killings of some
in custody and continuing abuses of Asian domestic workers and stateless residents
(“bidoons”). Kuwait is now designated by the State Department’s “Trafficking in
Persons” report (for 2007) as a “Tier Three” (worst level) country – a downgrade from
the 2006 report (Tier Two Watch List) – because Kuwait is not “making significant
efforts” to comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. Official
press censorship ended in 1992, and a vibrant press often criticizes the government. The
government allows one trade union per occupation, but the only legal trade federation is
the Kuwait Trade Union Federation (KTUF). Foreign workers, with the exception of
domestic workers, are allowed to join unions. On religious freedom, the State
Department report for 2007 reports “no change” in Kuwait’s performance on that issue
during the reporting period. Shiite Muslims report official discrimination, including
limited access to religious education, but Kuwait permits some public worship by nonMuslim faiths and has seven officially recognized Christian churches.
The U.S. Embassy in Kuwait uses various programming tools, including dialogue
and public diplomacy and funds from the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), to
encourage democracy. The Embassy sponsors Kuwaitis, particularly women, to attend
regional and U.S. conferences and training programs. MEPI funds have been used to fund
political education brochures for Kuwaiti women, among other uses. Several Kuwaiti
non-government organizations, such as the Kuwait Women’s Cultural and Social Society,
actively promote democratization.
U.S.-Kuwait Relations and Cooperation on Iraq
A U.S. consulate was opened in Kuwait in October 1951; it was elevated to an
embassy upon Kuwait’s independence from Britain in 1961. Kuwait, the first Gulf state
to establish relations with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, was not particularly close to the
United States in the 1960s and 1970s. Relations warmed considerably atuntil the 1980s. At the height of the
Iran-Iraq war (1987-88), when the United
States established a U.S. naval escort and tanker
reflagging program to protect Kuwaiti
and international shipping from Iranian naval
attacks (Operation Earnest Will).
Kuwait’s
leaders were subsequently shaken by the 1990 Iraqi invasion, and they were heavily
criticized domestically for failing to mount a viable defense. The country drew even
closer to the United States after U.S. forces led the January-March 1991 Persian Gulf war
that liberated Kuwait, and itdrew even closer
to the United States after U.S. forces liberated Kuwait in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
Kuwait signed a ten-year defense pact with the United States on
September 19, 1991 (the
text is classified). In September 2001, the pact was renewed for
another ten years. The pact, which reportedly does not explicitly require that the United States
defend Kuwait in a future crisis, but provides for mutual discussions of crisis options. It
also is said to provide; for
joint military exercises, U.S. training of Kuwaiti forces, U.S.
arms sales, pre-positioning
of U.S. military equipment (enough armor to outfit a U.S.
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brigade), and U.S. access to
Kuwaiti facilities. A related Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) provides that U.S.
forces in Kuwait be subject to U.S. rather than Kuwaiti law.2 In September 2001, the
pact was renewed for another ten years.
2
Hajjar, Sami. U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects. U.S. Army War
College, Strategic Studies Institute. P.27.
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Kuwait contributed materially to the 1991 war and subsequent containment efforts,
paying
– it paid $16.059 billion to offset the costs of Desert Shield/Desert Storm (all received by
the end of 1991). It, funded two
thirds of the $51 million per year U.N. budget for the
Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission
(UNIKOM) that monitored the Iraq-Kuwait border until
the 2003 war, and it contributed ; and contributed
about $350 million per year to pay for costs incurred by
the U.S. military in its Kuwait-basedKuwaitbased Iraq containment operations. During the 1990s,
1992-2003, Kuwait hosted about 1,000 U.S.
Air Force personnel performing the U.S. and British-led
enforcement of a “no fly zone”
over southern Iraq (Operation Southern Watch) which
ended after Saddam Hussein was toppled. Kuwait hosted an additional 5,000 U.S.
forces U.S. forces (about
5,000) during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan that ousted the Taliban.
Kuwait privately supported the Bush Administration’s decision to militarily
overthrow Saddam Hussein (Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)), even though it joined other
Arab states in publicly opposing the U.S. action. Kuwait closed off 60% of its territory
in order to secure the U.S.-led invasion force of about 250,000 personnel and several
thousand pieces of armor. It allowed U.S. forces to use two air bases that the United
States had helped upgrade (Ali al-Salem and Ali al-Jabir), as well as its international
airport and sea ports. Kuwait provided $266 million in burdensharing support to the
combat, including base support, personnel support, and supplies such as food and fuel.
Since then, according to Defense Department budget documents, Kuwait contributed $213
million in burdensharing support to OIF in FY2005, and is expected to contribute $210
million in both FY2006 and FY2007. Kuwait also built a water line into Iraq, assists the
Polish-led security sector in Hilla, Iraq, and it runs a humanitarian operation center (HOC)
that has funneled over $500 million in assistance to Iraqis since Saddam fell.
Kuwait hosts as many as 90,000 U.S. military personnel, mostly rotating in or out
of the 133,000-person U.S. force in Iraq. However, only about 10,000 (military and
civilian) Defense Department personnel are based in Kuwait more permanently, down
from 18,000 in 2005, according to U.S. military officials in Kuwait. The key U.S. staging
facility in Kuwait for OIF is Camp Arifjan and a desert firing range facility, Camp
Buehring. Camp Doha, the facility that had been the primary command facility for U.S.
forces in Kuwait during the 1990s, was vacated by U.S. forces in December 2005. In part
to express appreciation for Kuwait’s support to OIF, on April 1, 2004, the Bush
Administration designed Kuwait as a “major non-NATO ally (MNNA),” a designation
held by only one other Gulf state (Bahrain). Partly to reciprocate U.S. friendship, Kuwait
pledged $500 million worth of oil to U.S. states affected by Hurricane Katrina.
Another of Kuwait’s concerns has been discovering the fate of about 600 Kuwaitis
missing from the 1991 war; the bodies of about 400 of them have been found in postSaddam searches. Kuwait also wants to receive the U.N.-supervised reparations by Iraq
for damages caused from the 1990 invasion; an estimated half of the awards judgments
announced to date are to Kuwait’s government or firms. However, U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2003) reduced to 5%, from 25%, the percentage of Iraqi oil
revenues deducted for reparations, reducing the rate of reparations payouts. Kuwait
CRS-5
reportedly pledged to U.S. envoy James A. Baker that it would forgive a substantial
portion of the $25 billion Iraq owes Kuwait, mostly incurred during the Iran-Iraq war.3
Kuwait and Iraq have re-established diplomatic relations, although Kuwait has some
concerns about the Shiite Islamist factions that are ascendant in Iraq. It has pledged to
send an ambassador to Baghdad but has not done so to date out of security concerns.
About 25% of Kuwait’s population are Shiite Muslims, the sect that predominates in Iran,
and Kuwaiti leaders have always feared that this community could be manipulated by
Iran, even though Kuwait’s Shiites are well integrated into its economy. Many Kuwaitis
recall a period of Shiite-led terrorism in Kuwait, including the December 1983 bombings
of the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait and an attempted assassination of the Amir
in May 1985. Those attacks were attributed to the Iraqi Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party;
seventeen Da’wa activists were arrested for these attacks and a Kuwait Airlines plane
was hijacked in 1987 with the demand that the prisoners be released; they were not.
Iraq’s two elected prime ministers, Ibrahim al-Jafari and Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, are
leaders of the Da’wa Party, but there is no evidence that they participated in these attacks.
U.S. officials say that the U.S.-Kuwait defense relationship has improved the quality
of the Kuwaiti military, particularly the air force. The military, which numbered about
17,000 before the 1990 Iraqi invasion, has now nearly regained that strength (15,500), but
it is fewer than the 25,000 troops recommended in 1991 U.S. and British studies of
Kuwait’s needs. Recent sales of major systems to Kuwait have encountered little
congressional opposition. Kuwait is a “cash customer”: it is not eligible to receive U.S.
excess defense articles and receives no U.S. assistance. Major post-1991 Foreign Military
Sales (FMS)4 include (1) the purchase of 218 M1A2 tanks at a value of $1.9 billion in
1993 (deliveries were completed in 1998); (2) a 1992 purchase of 5 Patriot anti-missile
fire units, including 25 launchers and 210 Patriot missiles, valued at about $800 million
(delivery completed in 1998). Some of them were used to intercept Iraqi short-range
missiles launched at Kuwait in the 2003 war; (3) a 1992 purchase of 40 FA-18 combat
aircraft (delivery completed in 1999); and (4) a September 2002 purchase of 16 AH-64
(Apache) helicopters equipped with the Longbow fire-control system, a deal valued at
about $940 million. Kuwait is said to be considering purchasing about 10 additional FA18s, but it may not view new purchases as urgent now that Saddam is gone.
Other Foreign Policy Issues
After Kuwait’s liberation in 1991, Kuwait’s fear of Iraq colored virtually all of its
foreign policy decisions, particularly its relations with entities that sympathized with
Iraq’s 1990 invasion. On the Arab-Israeli dispute, Kuwait has tried to remain within a
broad Gulf state consensus, although it was far more critical than were the other Gulf
states of the late Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat because he publicly supported Iraq in the
1991 Gulf war. As a result of that alignment, about 450,000 Palestinian workers were
expelled or pressured to leave Kuwait after the 1991 war. Since Arafat’s death, Kuwait
has rebuilt its relations with the mainstream Palestinian Authority (PA) leadership,
including president Mahmoud Abbas. Nonetheless, the Washington Post reported in May
3
Baker Secures Promises of Iraq Debt Relief From Gulf Oil States. Agence France Presse,
January 21, 2004.
4
Information in this section provided by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. March 2004.
CRS-6
2005 that Kuwait is still $140 million behind in disbursing pledged aid to the PA, a larger
arrearage than any Arab state other than Libya. On February 13, 2006, Kuwait publicly
said it would work with Hamas as legitimate leader of a new Palestinian government, a
result of Hamas’s victory in January 25, 2006 Palestinian elections. In March 2006, it
pledged $7.5 million per month in aid to the Hamas-led government as part of a broader
Arab League pledge of $55 million per month to help the Palestinians cope with
reductions in Western aid. Kuwait participated in multilateral peace talks with Israel that
took place during 1992-1997, although it did not host any sessions. In 1994, Kuwait was
key in persuading the other Gulf monarchies to cease enforcement of the secondary (trade
with firms that deal with Israel) and tertiary (trade with firms that do business with
blacklisted firms) Arab boycotts of Israel.
Cooperation in Global War on Terrorism. The State Department report on
global terrorism for 2005 (released April 28, 2006) credits Kuwait for bolstering measures
to protect U.S. forces in Kuwait from terrorist attacks but notes that Kuwait has been
“reluctant to confront extremist elements within the local population.” Shortly after the
September 11, 2001, attacks, Kuwait moved to block the accounts of suspected Al Qaeda
activists in Kuwait. A June 2005 State Department fact sheet says it has established an
office at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor to monitor Islamic charities such as the
Islamic Heritage Revival. Nonetheless, some attacks have occurred in Kuwait. During
October 2002 - December 2003, one U.S. marine and one U.S. defense contractor were
killed by alleged Al Qaeda gunmen in four attacks there. Since January 2005, Kuwaiti
security forces have engaged terrorists in at least five confrontations in Kuwait City,
resulting in the deaths of the gunmen as well as some Kuwaiti security personnel. None
of the attacks reached any U.S. targets in Kuwait. In December 2005, Kuwait convicted
six men of belonging to a terrorist group (“Lions of the Peninsula”) allegedly planning
attacks on U.S. troops in Kuwait. In May 2006, Kuwaiti judges dismissed charges against
five Kuwaitis who were repatriated from the U.S. facility at Guatanamo Bay.
Economic Policy
Although Kuwait has a relatively open economy, U.S. officials have attempted to
persuade Kuwait to open its economy to foreign investment in order to attract technology
and expand the private sector. Kuwait’s state-owned oil industry still accounts for 75%
of government income and 90% of export earnings. The United States imports about
260,000 barrels per day in crude oil from Kuwait, equal to about 3% of U.S. oil imports.
Kuwait’s proven crude oil reserves are about 95 billion barrels, about 10% of total proven
world oil reserves and enough for about 140 years at current production levels (about 2.5
million barrels per day (mbd)). The Kuwaiti government wants to open its northern oil
fields to needed foreign investment (“Project Kuwait”) to raise oil production to 4.0 mbd
by the year 2020. Project Kuwait itself would generate about 500,000 barrels per day of
production. However, the National Assembly has blocked the $8.5 billion project for
about a decade because of concerns about Kuwait’s sovereignty. Assembly action might
hinge on the outcome of the June 2006 elections. Several U.S. energy firms, including
ExxonMobil, Chevron Corporation, and ConocoPhillips, are part of consortia that want
to bid on the project
U.S. Aid to Kuwait and Purposes
(dollars in thousands)
FY2006
FY2007
Economic Support Funds
(ESF)
$470 for judicial reform, election
reform, and terrorism law development
International Military
Training and Education
(IMET)
Non-Proliferation, AntiTerrorism, De-Mining
and Related (NADR)
FY2008
Request
19
$15 for training Kuwaiti officers in
civil-military tradition, democratic
practices. Amounts allow Kuwait to
obtain discount for all students it funds
for U.S. training.
628; of which 193
for Anti-Terrorism
(ATA)
Kuwait supported the Bush Administration’s decision to militarily overthrow
Saddam Hussein (Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF); it closed off its entire northern half
to secure the U.S.-led invasion force, and allowed U.S. use of two air bases that the
United States had helped upgrade (Ali al-Salem and Ali al-Jabir), as well as its
international airport and sea ports. Kuwait provided $266 million in burdensharing
support to the combat, including base support, personnel support, and supplies such as
food and fuel. Since then, according to Defense Department budget documents, Kuwait
contributed $213 million in burdensharing support to OIF in FY2005, and is contributing
$210 million in both FY2006 and FY2007. Kuwait also built a water line into Iraq,
assists the Polish-led security sector in Hilla, Iraq, and it runs a humanitarian operation
center (HOC) that has funneled over $550 million in assistance to Iraqis since Saddam
fell, in line with Kuwait’s pledges at an October 2003 donors meeting and since.
Kuwait hosts an average of about 50,000 U.S. military personnel who are rotating
in or out of Iraq. The key U.S. staging facility in Kuwait for OIF is Camp Arifjan and a
desert firing range facility, Camp Buehring. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited
Arifjan in August 2007, in part to assess its ability to support a withdrawal of U.S. troops
from Iraq through Kuwait, were there a decision to withdraw. Kuwait’s facilities might
also host a post-withdrawal U.S. force that could assist the Iraqi government on short
notice. Camp Doha, the primary command facility for U.S. forces in Kuwait during the
1990s, was vacated by U.S. forces in December 2005. In appreciation of Kuwait’s
support to OIF, on April 1, 2004, the Bush Administration designated Kuwait as a “major
non-NATO ally (MNNA),” a designation held by only one other Gulf state (Bahrain).
Kuwait gave $500 million worth of oil to U. S. states affected by Hurricane Katrina.
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U.S. officials say that the U.S.-Kuwait defense relationship has improved the quality
of the Kuwaiti military, particularly the air force. The military, which numbered about
17,000 before the 1990 Iraqi invasion, has now nearly regained that strength (15,500).
Kuwait is a “cash customer”: it is not eligible to receive U.S. excess defense articles and
receives no U.S. assistance. Major post-1991 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) include (1)
the purchase of 218 M1A2 tanks at a value of $1.9 billion in 1993 (deliveries completed
in 1998); (2) a 1992 purchase of 5 Patriot anti-missile fire units, including 25 launchers
and 210 Patriot missiles, valued at about $800 million (delivered by 1998). Some of
them were used to intercept Iraqi short-range missiles launched at Kuwait in the 2003
war; (3) a 1992 purchase of 40 FA-18 combat aircraft (purchase of an additional 10 are
under consideration); and (4) a September 2002 purchase of 16 AH-64 (Apache)
helicopters equipped with the Longbow fire-control system, a deal valued at about $940
million. According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), another $730
million in purchases were agreed during 2005-2007, including a $20 million deal for 436
TOW anti-tank missiles. Other significant sales might be completed under the estimated
$20 billion “Gulf Security Dialogue” package of sales to the Gulf states designed to help
contain Iran.
Through its humanitarian aid, Kuwait is trying to build ties to the Shiite Islamist
factions that now dominate Iraq and secure the border from violence in southern Iraq.
Official relations with Iraq have been reestablished and Kuwait has pledged to send an
ambassador, but it has not established a full embassy in Iraq to date. About 30% of
Kuwait’s population are Shiite Muslims, the sect that predominates in Iran, although there
are few Sunni-Shiite tensions in Kuwait. The December 1983 bombings of the U.S. and
French embassies in Kuwait and an attempted assassination of the Amir in May 1985
were attributed to the Iraqi Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party, the party of elected prime minister
Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. Seventeen Da’wa activists were arrested for these attacks and a
Kuwait Airlines plane was hijacked in 1987 by Da’wa sympathizers.
Seeking to preserve some leverage over the Iraqi leadership, Kuwait still accepts
U.N.-supervised reparations by Iraq for damages caused from the 1990 invasion; about
$37 billion of the payments awarded to date — of a total of $52 billion awarded — are
to Kuwait’s government, firms, or residents. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483
(May 22, 2003) reduced to 5%, from 25%, the percentage of Iraqi oil revenues deducted
for reparations, slowing the rate of actual payouts. In 2004, Kuwait reportedly pledged
to forgive a substantial portion of the $25 billion Saddam era debt, 3 but it has not written
off the debt to date. Kuwait also seeks return of 600 Kuwaitis missing and presumed
dead from the 1991 war; the bodies of over 400 have been found in post-Saddam
searches. A Kuwait company, First Kuwaiti General Trading and Contracting, is one of
the lead contractors building the large new U.S. embassy in Iraq; the firm has been
criticized by competitors and others of shoddy work and delays in the embassy project.
Other Foreign Policy Issues
After Kuwait’s liberation in 1991, Kuwait’s fear of Saddam Hussein colored its
foreign relations, particularly with entities that sympathized with the 1990 invasion. On
3
Baker Secures Promises of Iraq Debt Relief From Gulf Oil States. Agence France Presse,
January 21, 2004.
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the Arab-Israeli dispute, Kuwait was more critical than were the other Gulf states of the
late Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat because he publicly opposed war to liberate Kuwait.
Kuwait expelled about 450,000 Palestinian workers after liberation. Since Arafat’s death,
Kuwait has rebuilt its relations with the mainstream Palestinian Authority (PA)
leadership. In March 2006, Kuwait pledged $7.5 million per month in aid to the Hamasled government as part of a broader Arab League pledge of $55 million per month to help
the Palestinians cope with reductions in Western aid. It supported an Abbas-Hamas
unity government forged in March 2007, but, unlike Saudi Arabia, was not directly
involved in forging that compromise, which has now broken down. Nor has Kuwait
joined a U.S.-forged grouping of Arab countries, established in March 2007, to promote
the new U.S. push for Israeli-Palestinian peace; the two Gulf countries in this grouping
are Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. Kuwait participated in multilateral peace
talks with Israel that took place during 1992-1997, although it did not host any sessions.
In 1994, Kuwait was key in persuading the other Gulf monarchies to cease enforcement
of the secondary (trade with firms that deal with Israel) and tertiary (trade with firms that
do business with blacklisted firms) Arab boycotts of Israel.
Cooperation in Global War on Terrorism. The State Department report on
global terrorism for 2006 (released April 2007) credits Kuwait for bolstering measures to
protect U.S. forces in Kuwait from terrorist attacks but notes that Kuwait has been
“reluctant to confront extremists.” The report also says Kuwait has had mixed results
prosecuting various alleged terrorists, including those belonging to the “Lions of the
Peninsula” group, the “Jihadists in Iraq” group, and eight terrorist suspects released to
Kuwaiti custody from the U.S. detention facility on Guantanamo Bay. During October
2002 - December 2003, one U.S. marine and one U.S. defense contractor were killed by
alleged Al Qaeda gunmen in four attacks there. Since January 2005, Kuwaiti security
forces have engaged terrorists in at least five confrontations in Kuwait City, preventing
attackers from reaching any U.S. targets there. Kuwait is credited by the report with
strengthening its legal regime against terrorism financing, but the report says enforcement
has been uneven. Shortly after the September 11, 2001, attacks, Kuwait blocked accounts
of suspected Al Qaeda activists. Kuwait’s Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor has
increased efforts to monitor Islamic charities such as the Islamic Heritage Revival.
Economic Policy
Although Kuwait has a relatively open economy, U.S. officials have attempted to
persuade Kuwait to open to foreign investment in the energy sector and to expand the
private sector. Kuwait’s state-owned oil industry still accounts for 75% of government
income and 90% of export earnings. The United States imports about 260,000 barrels per
day in crude oil from Kuwait, equal to about 3% of U.S. oil imports. Kuwait’s proven
crude oil reserves are about 95 billion barrels, about 10% of total proven world oil
reserves and enough for about 140 years at current production levels (about 2.5 million
barrels per day (mbd)). The Kuwaiti government wants to open its northern oil fields to
foreign investment (“Project Kuwait”) to generate about 500,000 barrels per day of extra
production from that project. However, the National Assembly has blocked the $8.5
billion project for over a decade because of professed concerns about Kuwait’s
sovereignty. In 1994, Kuwait became a founding member of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). In February 2004, the United States and Kuwait signed a Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), often viewed as a prelude to a free trade
agreement (FTA), which Kuwait has said it seeks.