Order Code RS21968
Updated June 15August 9, 2006
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Elections in 2005 for a transition government (January 30, 2005), a permanent
constitution (October 15), and a permanent (four year) government (December 15)
were concluded despite insurgent violence, progressively attracting Sunni participation.
On May 20, a unity government was formed as U.S. officials had been urging, but it is
not clear that the new government will be able to reduce ongoing violence. (See CRS
Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.)
After Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) deposed Saddam Hussein in April 2003, the
Bush Administration linked the end of U.S. military occupation to the adoption of a new
constitution and national elections, tasks expected to take two years. Prominent Iraqis
persuaded the Administration to accelerate the process, and sovereignty was given to an
appointed government on June 28, 2004, with a government and a permanent constitution
to be voted on thereafter, as stipulated in a Transitional Administrative Law (TAL, signed
March 8, 2004 [http://cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html]. Elections were held on
January 30, 2005, for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly; a provincial assembly
in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces (41 seats each; 51 for Baghdad); and a Kurdistan regional
assembly (111 seats). The Assembly chose a transitional “presidency council” (a
president and two deputies), a prime minister with executive power, and a cabinet. The
transitional Assembly was to draft a constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a
referendum by October 15, 2005. The draft could be vetoed with a two-thirds majority
of the votes in any three provinces. A permanent government, elected by December 15,
2005, was to take office by December 31, 2005. If the constitution was defeated, the
December 15 elections would be for another transitional National Assembly (which
would re-draft a constitution).
January 30 Elections
The January 30, 2005, elections, run by the “Independent Electoral Commission of
Iraq” (IECI), were conducted by proportional representation (closed list); voters chose
among “political entities” (a party, a coalition of parties, or individuals). Seats in the
Assembly and the provincial assemblies were allocated in proportion to a slate’s showing;
any entity receiving at least 1/275 of the vote (about 31,000 votes) won a seat. A female
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
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candidate occupied every third position on electoral lists in order to meet the TAL’s goal
for at least 25% female membership. A total of 111 entities were on the National
Assembly ballot: 9 multi-party coalitions, 75 single parties, and 27 individual persons.
The 111 entities contained over 7,000 candidates. About 9,000 candidates, organized into
party slates, ran in provincial and Kurdish elections.
In the January 30 (and December 15) elections, Iraqis abroad were eligible to vote.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was tapped to run the “out-of-country
voting” (OCV) program. OCV took place in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Iran, Jordan, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, UAE, Britain, Netherlands, and the United
States. (See [http://www.iraqocv.org].) About 275,000 Iraqi expatriates (dual citizens
and anyone whose father was Iraqi) registered, and about 90% of them voted (in January).
The Iraqi government budgeted about $250 million for the January elections, of
which $130 million was offset by international donors, including about $40 million from
the European Union. Out of $21 billion in U.S. reconstruction funds, the United States
provided $40 million to improve IECI capacity; $42.5 million for Iraqi monitoring; and
$40 million for political party development, through the International Republican Institute
and National Democratic Institute. OCV cost an additional $92 million, of which $11
million was for the U.S. component, but no U.S. funds were spent for OCV.
Violence was less than anticipated; insurgents conducted about 300 attacks, but no
polling stations were overrun. Polling centers were guarded by the 130,000 members of
Iraq’s security forces, with the 150,000 U.S. forces in Iraq available for backup. Two
days prior to election day, vehicle traffic was banned, Iraq’s borders were closed, and
polling locations were confirmed. Security measures were similar for the October 15 and
December 15 votes, although with more Iraqi troops and police trained (about 215,000)
than in January. Polling places were staffed by about 200,000 Iraqis in all three elections
in 2005. International monitoring was limited to 25 observers (in the January elections)
and some European parliament members and others (December elections).
Competition and Results. The Iraqi groups that took the most active interest in
the January elections were those best positioned: Shiite Islamist parties, the Kurds, and
established secular parties. The results of this and the December 2005 election are shown
in the table below. The most prominent slate was the Shiite Islamist “United Iraqi
Alliance” (UIA), consisting of 228 candidates from 22 parties, primarily the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Da’wa Party. The first
candidate on this slate was SCIRI leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim; Da’wa leader Ibrahim
al-Jafari was number seven. Even though Even though
radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr
denounced the election as a U.S.-led process, 14 of
his supporters were on the UIA slate;
eight of these won seats. The two main Kurdish
parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) offered a joint 165-candidate list.
Interim Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi filed a
six-party, 233-candidate “Iraqi List” led by
his Iraqi National Accord (INA) party.1
Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population), perceiving electoral defeat and
insurgent intimidation, mostly boycotted and won only 17 seats spread over several lists.
The relatively moderate Sunni “Iraqi Islamic Party” (IIP) filed a 275-seat slate, but it
1
See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.
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The relatively moderate Sunni “Iraqi Islamic Party” (IIP) filed a 275-seat slate, but it
withdrew in December 2004. The hard-line Iraqi Muslim Scholars Association (MSA),
said to be close to the insurgents, called for a Sunni boycott.
After the election, factional bargaining over governmental posts and disagreements
over Kurdish demands for substantial autonomy delayed formation of the government.
During April and May, the factions formed a government that U.S. officials said was not
sufficiently inclusive of Sunnis, even though it had a Sunni (Hajim al-Hassani) as
Assembly speaker; a Sunni deputy president (Ghazi al-Yawar); a Sunni deputy prime
minister (Abd al-Mutlak al-Jabburi); a Sunni Defense Minister (Sadoun Dulaymi); and
five other Sunni ministers. Most major positions were dominated by Shiites and Kurds,
such as PUK leader Jalal Talabani as president and Da’wa leader Ibrahim al-Jafari as
Prime Minister; SCIRI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi was second deputy president. In provincial
. In provincial elections, the Kurds won about 60% of the seats in Tamim
(Kirkuk) province (26 out of
41 seats), strengthening the Kurds’Kurdish efforts to gain control of the provincecontrol it.
Permanent Constitution and Referendum
The next step in the transition process was the drafting of a permanent constitution.
On May 10, the National Assembly appointed a 55-member drafting committee, chaired
by SCIRI activist Humam al-Hammoudi. The committee included only two Sunni Arabs,
prompting Sunni resentment, and 15 Sunnis (and one member of the small Sabian
community) were later added as full committee members,
with 10 more as advisors.
Missing the August 15 deadline to produce a draft, the The talks produced a document on
August 28 that included some compromises sought by Sunnis — the Shiites and Kurds
declared it final. The Kurds achieved a major goal; Article 136 set December 31, 2007,
draft on August 28, missing the August
15 deadline. It contained a provision highly favorable to the Kurds: Article 136, which
set December 31, 2007, as a deadline for resettling Kurds in Kirkuk and holding a
referendum on whether Kirkuk
will join the Kurdish region.
The draft It also (Article 2)2
designated Islam “a main source” of legislation and said no
law can contradict the
“established” provisions of Islam. Article 39 implied that families
could choose which
courts to use to adjudicate family issues such as divorce and
inheritance, and Article 34
made only primary education mandatory. These provisions
provoked opposition from
women who fear that the males of their families will decide to
use Sharia (Islamic law)
courts for family issues and limit girls’ education. The 25%
electoral goal for women was
retained (Article 47). Article 89 said that federal supreme
court will include experts in
Islamic law, as well as judges and experts in civil law.
The remaining controversy centered on the draft’s provision allowing two or more
provinces together to form new autonomous “regions.” Article 117 allowed each
“region”
to organize internal security forces, which would legitimize the fielding of sectarian
sectarian (presumably Shiite) militias, in addition to the Kurds’ peshmerga (allowed by
the TAL).
Article 109 requiresrequired the central government to distribute oil and gas revenues from
from “current fields” in proportion to population, implying that the regions might ultimately
ultimately control revenues from new energy discoveries. These provisions raised Sunni
alarms,
because their areas have few known oil or gas deposits. Sunni negotiators, including
including chief negotiator Saleh al-Mutlak of the National Dialogue Council opposed the draft on
2
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
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draft on these grounds. Article 62 establishesestablished a “Federation Council, a second chamber
of a size
with powers to be determined, presumablypurportedly to review legislation affectingon regions.
After further negotiations, on September 19, 2005, the National Assembly approved
a a September 19, 2005,
“final” draft, with somesuch Sunni proposals, such as a statement that Iraq has always been
part of
2
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
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the Arab League. However, no major changes to the provisions on new regions
regions were made
and Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-85% in some Sunni cities) to try
to defeat
the constitution. The United Nations printed and distributed 5 million copies.
The The
continued Sunni opposition prompted U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad
to to
mediate an agreement (October 11) between Kurdish and Shiite leaders and a major
Sunni party, the Iraqi Islamic Party, providing for (Article 137) a panel to convene after
the installation
of a post-December 15 election government and, within four months,
propose a bloc of amendments
amendments (Article 137). The amendments require a majority Assembly vote of
approval and, within another two months, would be put to a public referendum under the
same rules as the October 15, 2005 referendum. As of its seating on March 16, 2006, the
new parliament was expected to begin work on amending the constitution, as provided
in Article 137. It has not done so, to date, and might not do so until September 2006,
according to observers. Some believe that the Sunnis are not pressing the amendment
process because they fear that the UIA will not agree to major amendments, and the
Sunnis do not want to force a political confrontation.
The October 15 referendum was relatively peaceful. Results, released October 25,
were
In the relatively peaceful October 15 referendum, 78.6% in favor and 21.4% against,
nationwide. The Sunni provinces of Anbar and
Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no”
vote, respectively. Mostly Sunni Nineveh province
voted 55% “no,” and Diyala, believed
mostly Sunni, had a 51% “yes” vote. The draft
passed because only two provinces, not
three, voted “no” by a 2/3 majority. The
Administration praised the vote as evidence that Sunnis support the political process.
Sunnis support the political process. The special amendment process has not formally
begun, to date, and might not until September 2006, according to observers. The Sunnis
apparently are not pressing the amendment process because they fear that the Shiites will
not agree to major amendments, and the Sunnis do not want to force a confrontation.
December 15, 2005, Elections
In the December 15 elections, under a formula designed to enhance Sunni
representation, each province contributed a pre-determined number of seats to the new
“Council of Representatives.”” (COR). Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were allocated this
way,
and there were 45 “compensatory” seats for entities that did not win provincial seats but
but garnered votes nationwide, or which would have won additional seats had the election
constituency been the whole nation. A total of 361 political “entities” registered: 19 of
them were coalition slates (comprising 125 different political parties), and 342 were other
“entities” (parties or individual persons). About 7,500 candidates spanned all entities.
Most notably for U.S. policy, major Sunni slates competed. Most prominent was
the three-party “Iraqi Concord Front,” comprising the IIP, the National Dialogue
Council, and the Iraqi People’s General Council. The UIA slate formally included Sadr’s
faction as well as other hard line Shiite parties Fadila (Virtue). and Iraqi Hizballah.
Ahmad Chalabi’s Iraqi
National Congress ran separately. Former Prime Minister Iyad
al-Allawi’s mostly secular
15-party “Iraqi National” slate was broader than his January
list, incorporating not only
his Iraq National Accord but also several smaller secular
parties. The Kurdish alliance
slate was little changed from January.
Violence was minor (about 30 incidents) as Sunni insurgents, supporting greater
Sunni representation in parliament, facilitated the voting. However, results suggest that
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voters chose lists representing their sects and regions, not secular lists. The table gives
results that were court-certified on February 10, 2006. According to the constitution:
within 15 days of certification (by February 25), the Council of RepresentativesCOR was to
convene to select a
speaker and two deputy speakers. The CouncilCOR first convened on
March 16, but without
selecting these or any other positions. After choosing a speaker
the Council the COR was to select
(no deadline specified, but a thirty-day deadline for the choice
after subsequent Council COR
elections), a presidency council for Iraq (President and two
deputies). Those choices
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required a 2/3 vote of the Council. Within another 15 days, the
presidency council (by
consensus of its three officials) was to designate the “nominee of
the [CouncilCOR] bloc with the
largest number” as Prime Minister, the post that has executive
power. Within another 30
days, the prime minister designate was to name a cabinet for
approval by majority vote of the Council.
With 181 seats combined (nearly two thirds of the CouncilCOR), the UIA and the Kurds
were well positioned to continue their governing alliance. However, their, but this alliance frayed
when the
Kurds, Sunnis, and Alawi block protestedAllawi bloc opposed the UIA’s February 12 nomination
of Jafari to continue as Prime Minister. In March 2006, attempting to promote comity,
Iraqi leaders agreed to a U.S. proposal to form extra-constitutional economic and security
councils including all factions. On April 20, Jafari agreed to step aside, breaking the
logjam. On April 22, the Council of Representatives approved Talabani to continue as
president, Abd al-Mahdi to continue as a deputy president, and another deputy president,
continue as Prime Minister. On April 20, Jafari agreed to step aside, breaking the logjam.
Another senior Da’wa Party figure, Jawad al-Maliki, was nominated Prime Minister
instead. Maliki, who was in exile in Syria during Saddam’s rule, is considered a Shiite
hardliner, although he now professes non-sectarianism. On April 22, the COR approved
Talabani to continue as president, and two deputy presidents — SCIRI’s Adel Abd alMahdi (incumbent) and Concord Front/IIP leader Tariq al-Hashimi. National Dialogue
Front figure Mahmoud
Mashhadani was chosen Council speaker, with Mashhadani, a Sunni hardliner, was chosen COR speaker, with
deputies Khalid al-Attiya (UIA/Shiite) and
Arif Tayfour, a KDP activist (continuing in that post). Senior Da’wa Party figure Jawad
al-Maliki was named Prime Minister. Maliki, who was in exile in Syria during Saddam’s
rule, is considered a Shiite hardliner, although he now professes non-sectarianism Arif Tayfour, a KDP activist (incumbent).
New Cabinet. Amid U.S. and other congratulations, Maliki named and won
won approval of a 39
member cabinet (including deputy prime ministers) on May 20, one day
prior to hisa 30-day
deadline. However, three key cabinet slots (Defense, Interior, and
National Security) were not
filled permanently until June 8 because of factional
infighting. Many believe that Iran has substantial influence over the Iraqi government
because of the presence of several officials who belong to Shiite Islamist organizations
that have had close ties to Iran.
infighting. Of the 37 ministerial
posts, a total of eight are Sunnis; seven are Kurds; twenty-one
are Shiites; and one is
Christian. Kurdish official Barham Salih and Sunni Arab Salam
al-Zubaie are deputy
prime ministers. Four ministers are women. KDP activist Hoshyar
Zebari remained
Foreign Minister. The Defense Minister is Gen. Abdul Qadir
Mohammad Jasim al-MifarjialMifarji, a Sunni who had been expelled from the Iraqi military and
imprisoned for
criticizing the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. More recently, he commanded
operations of
the post-Saddam Iraqi Army in western Iraq. The Interior Minister is Jawad
al-Bulani,
a Shiite who has been associated with a number of Shiite Islamist trends,
including Sadr’s
faction, and the Fadila (Virtue) party that is prominent in Basra. The
Minister for
National Security is Sherwan al-Waili, a Shiite who is from a different
faction of the
Da’wa Party. He has served since 2003 as head of the provincial council
in the city of
Nassiriyah and as adviser in the national security ministry. The Minister of
Trade and
Minister of Education are from this Da’wa faction.
Many believe that Iran has substantial influence over the Iraqi government because
of the presence of several officials who belong to Shiite Islamist organizations that have
had close ties to Iran. Reflecting Shiite strength, Reflecting Shiite strength:
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!
Sadr followers are Ministers of Health, of Transportation, and of
Agriculture. Another is Minister of State for Tourism and Antiquities.
!
From SCIRI, the most pro-Iranian party, Adel Abd al-Mahdi, is one of
two Vice Presidents. Bayan Jabr is Finance Minister, moving there from
Minister of Interior. The Minister of Municipalities and Public Works
is from the Badr Organization, SCIRI’s militia wing.
!
Several officials in the new government are from other pro-Iranian Shiite
organizations. Deputy parliamentDeputy COR speaker Khalid al-Attiyah spent time
in exile in Iran. The
Minister of Civil Society Affairs is from the Islamic
Action Organization,
a Shiite Islamist grouping based in Karbala. A
minister of state (no
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portfolio) is from Iraqi Hizbollah, which represents
former Shiite
guerrilla fighters against Saddam’s regime based in the city
of Amarah.
The Minister of Oil (Hussein Shahristani) is an aide to Shiite
leader leader
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The Minister of Electricity and the
Minister of
Labor and Social Affairs are independent UIA Shiites.
Table 1. Election Results (January and December)
Slate/Party
UIA (Shiite Islamist); Sadr formally joined list for Dec. vote
(Of the 128: SCIRI~30; Da’wa~28; Sadr~30; Fadila~15; others~25)
Kurdistan Alliance (PUK and KDP)
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added some mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote
Iraq Concord Front (Sunni). Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote
Dialogue National Iraqi Front (Sunni, Saleh al-Mutlak) Not in Jan. vote
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Mission, Dec) pro-Sadr
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd)
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Sunni, secular)
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
Seats
(Jan. 05)
Seats
(Dec. 05)
140
128
75
40
—
—
—
5
3
3
2
2
2
1
53
25
44
11
0
—
1
2
—
5
0
—
1
1
0
—
1
3
1
1
Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200.
Eligible voters: 14 million in January election; 15 million in October referendum and December.
Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66% (10 million)/ December: 75% (12 million).
Recent Actions. Politically, the Maliki government has focused on trying to
reconcile with the resentful Sunni Arab community. In March 2006, Iraqi leaders agreed
to a U.S. proposal to form extra-constitutional economic and security councils including
all factions. On June 25, 2006, Maliki introduced the “National Reconciliation and
Dialogue Project,” intended primarily to persuade insurgent groups to disarm and support
the political process. Maliki has highlighted that project in his July 2006 visits to the
United States and several Persian Gulf states. As part of the reconciliation effort, on
August 6, 2006, the government reinstated about 10,000 Iraqis purged from their jobs
(mostly in the ministries of Defense and Interior) in the post-Saddam “de-Baathification”
process. On the other hand, Maliki’s security plans for Baghdad and for Basra have
foundered, and in July 2006, the Bush Administration decided to send about 6,000
additional U.S. troops to Baghdad to prevent growing sectarian violence there. The
forces are drawn from other areas of Iraq, particularly Mosul.