Order Code RS21968
Updated April 24May 22, 2006
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Elections in 2005 for a transitionaltransition government (January 30, 2005), a permanent
constitution (October 15), and a permanent (four year) government (December 15) were
concluded despite insurgent violence, progressively attracting Sunni participation.
Sectarian violence and factional rivalry delayed formation of a new government until
late April. The government now forming is a coalition of major ethnic and sectarian
factions, similar to the 2004-2005 post-Saddam governments. (See CRS Report
On
May 20, a unity government was formed as U.S. officials had been urging, but it is not
clear that the new government will be able to reduce ongoing insurgent and sectarian
violence. (See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by
Kenneth Katzman.)
Shortly afterAfter Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) deposed Saddam Hussein’s regime in
in April 2003, the
Bush Administration linked the end of U.S. military occupation to the
completion adoption of a new
constitution and the holding of national elections, tasks expected to
take two years. Prominent Iraqis
persuaded the Administration to accelerate the process,
and sovereignty was given to an
appointed government on June 28, 2004, with a
government and a permanent constitution
to be voted on thereafter, as stipulated in a
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL, signed March 8, 2004), as follows:1
1
!
The elections held on January 30, 2005,
March 8, 2004; [http://cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html]), as follows:
!
The January 30, 2005, elections were for a 275-seat transitional
National National
Assembly; a provincial assembly in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces
(41 seats
each; 51 for Baghdad); and a Kurdistan regional assembly (111
seats).
The Assembly chose a transitional “presidency council” (a
president and
two deputies), a prime minister with executive power, and
a cabinet.
!
The transitional Assembly was to draft a constitution by August 15,
2005, to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005. The draft could be
vetoed with a two-thirds majority of the votes in any three provinces. A
permanent government would be, elected by December 15, 2005, and it
would take office
by December 31, 2005. If a constitution was defeated,
For text, see [http://cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html].
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS-2
the December 15
elections would be for another transitional National
Assembly (which
would re-draft a new constitution).
constitution).
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS-2
January 30 Elections
The January 30, 2005, elections, run by the “Independent Electoral Commission of
Iraq” (IECI), were conducted by proportional representation (closed list); voters chose
among “political entities” (a party, a coalition of parties, or individuals). Seats in the
Assembly and the provincial assemblies were allocated in proportion to a slate’s showing;
any entity receiving at least 1/275 of the vote (about 31,000 votes) won a seat. A female
candidate occupied every third position on electoral lists in order to meet the TAL’s goal
for at least 25% female membership. A total of 111 entities were on the National
Assembly ballot: 9 multi-party coalitions, 75 single parties, and 27 individual persons.
The 111 entities contained over 7,000 candidates. About 9,000 candidates, organized into
party slates, ran in provincial and Kurdish elections.
In the January 30 (and December 15) elections, Iraqis abroad were eligible to vote.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was tapped to run the “out-of-country
voting” (OCV) program. OCV took place in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Iran, Jordan, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, UAE, Britain, Netherlands, and the United
States. (See [http://www.iraqocv.org].) About 275,000 Iraqi expatriates (dual citizens
and anyone who can demonstrate that theirwhose father was Iraqi) registered, and about 90%
of them voted (in January).
There were about 14 million eligible voters (15 million in the two subsequent votes
in 2005). Voters need to be at least 18 years old. There were about 5,200 polling centers
in January, and 6,200 in the December elections, both staffed by about 200,000 Iraqis.
Monitoring was limited in both elections; in January, a Canada-led contingent of about
25 observers from eleven nations were based in Jordan (one was in Iraq). In the
December election, of them voted (in January).
Polling places were staffed by about 200,000 Iraqis in all three elections in 2005.
International monitoring in both elections was limited to 25 observers (January) and
some European parliament members and others monitored voting(December).
The Iraqi government budgeted about $250 million for the January elections, of
which $130 million was offset by international donors, including about $40 million from
the European Union. Out of $21 billion in U.S. reconstruction funds, the United States
provided $40 million to improve IECI capacity; $42.5 million for Iraqi monitoring; and
$40 million for political party development, through the International Republican Institute
and National Democratic Institute. OCV cost an additional $92 million, of which $11
million was for the U.S. component, but no U.S. funds were spent for OCV.
Violence was far less than some anticipated; insurgents conducted about 300 attacks,
but no
polling stations were overrun. Polling centers were guarded on election day by the
by the 130,000 members of
Iraq’s security forces, with the 150,000 U.S. forces in Iraq available
for backup. Two
days prior to election day, vehicle traffic was banned, Iraq’s borders
were closed, and
polling locations were confirmed. Security measures were similar for
the October 15 and
December 15 votes, although with more Iraqi troops and police
available trained (about 215,000)
than in January. Turnout was about 58% (about 8.5 million
votes).
Competition and Results. The Iraqi groups that took the most active interest in
the January elections were those best positioned: Shiite Islamist parties, the Kurds, and
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established secular parties. The results of this and the December 2005 election are shown
in the table below. The most prominent slate was the Shiite Islamist “United Iraqi
Alliance” (UIA), consisting of 228 candidates from 22 parties, primarily the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Da’wa Party. It was backed
by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The first candidate on this slate was SCIRI leader Abd
al-Aziz al-Hakim; Da’wa leader Ibrahim al-Jafari was number seven. Even though
radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr denounced the election as a U.S.-led process, 14 of
his supporters were on the UIA slate; eight of these won seats. The two main Kurdish
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parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) offered a joint 165-candidate list. Interim Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi filed a
six-party, 233-candidate “Iraqi List” led by his Iraqi National Accord (INA) party. The
Communist Party filed a 257-candidate “People’s Union” slate.21
Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population), perceiving electoral defeat and
insurgent intimidation, mostly boycotted and won only 17 seats spread over several lists.
The relatively moderate Sunni “Iraqi Islamic Party” (IIP) filed a 275-seat slate, but it
withdrew in December 2004. The hard-line Iraqi Muslim Scholars Association (MSA),
said to be close to the insurgents, called for a Sunni boycott.
After the election, factional bargaining over governmental posts and disagreements
over Kurdish demands for substantial autonomy delayed formation of the government.
During April and May, the factions formed a government that U.S. officials said was not
sufficiently inclusive of the Sunni minoritySunnis, even though it had a Sunni (Hajim alHassani) as al-Hassani) as
Assembly speaker; a Sunni deputy president (Ghazi al-Yawar); a Sunni
deputy prime
minister (Abd al-Mutlak al-Jabburi); a Sunni Defense Minister (Sadoun
Dulaymi); and
five other Sunni ministers. The Sunnis complained that their ministerial
slots (other than
Defense) were relatively unimportant, such as the ministries of culture
and of women’s
affairs. The otherMost major positions were dominated by Shiites and Kurds,
such as PUK leader
Jalal Talabani as president; Da’wa leader Ibrahim al-Jafari as Prime
Minister; SCIRI’s
Adel Abd al-Mahdi as the second deputy president; Bayan Jabr as
Interior Minister, which
controls the police and related commando forcescommandos; and KDP
activist Hoshyar Zebari as Foreign
Minister. Ahmad Chalabi and KDP activist Rosch
Shaways were named as the two other
deputy prime ministers, and there was one
Christian and one Turkoman minister. In
provincial elections, the Kurds won about 60%
of the seats in Tamim (Kirkuk) province
(26 out of 41 seats), strengthening the Kurds’
efforts to gain control of the province.
Permanent Constitution and Referendum
The next step in the transition process was the drafting of a permanent constitution.
On May 10, the National Assembly appointed a 55-member drafting committee, chaired
by SCIRI activist Humam al-Hammoudi. The committee included only two Sunni Arabs,
prompting Sunni resentment, and 15 Sunnis (and one member of the small Sabian
community) were later added as full committee members, with 10 more as advisors.
Missing the August 15 deadline to produce a draft, the talks produced a document on
August 28 that included some compromises sought by Sunnis — the Shiites and Kurds
2
For information on these groups, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance
and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.
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declared it final. The Kurds achieved a major goal; Article 136 set December 31, 2007,
as a deadline for resettling Kurds in Kirkuk and holding a referendum on whether Kirkuk
will join the Kurdish region.
The draft (Article 2)32 designated Islam “a main source” of legislation and said no
law can contradict the “established” provisions of Islam. Article 39 implied that families
could choose which courts to use to adjudicate family issues such as divorce and
inheritance, and Article 34 made only primary education mandatory. These provisions
1
For information on these groups, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance
and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.
2
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
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provoked opposition from women who fear that the males of their families will decide to
use Sharia (Islamic law) courts for family issues and limit girls’ education. The 25%
electoral goal for women was retained (Article 47). Article 89 said that federal supreme
court will include experts in Islamic law, as well as judges and experts in civil law.
The remaining controversy centered on the draft’s provision allowing two or more
provinces together to form new autonomous “regions.” Article 117 allowed each “region”
to organize internal security forces, which would legitimize the fielding of sectarian
militias, in addition to the Kurds’ peshmerga, which were allowed by the TAL. Article
109 required the central government to distribute oil and gas revenues from “current
fields” in proportion to population, implying that the regions might ultimately control
revenues from new energy discoveries. These provisions raised Sunni alarms, because
their areas have no known oil or gas deposits, and Sunni negotiators, including chief
negotiator Saleh al-Mutlak of the National Dialogue Council opposed the draft on these
grounds. Article 62 establishes a “Federation Council” — a second chamber of a size
with powers to be determined — presumably to review legislation affecting regions.
After further negotiations, on September 19, 2005, the National Assembly approved
a “final” draft, with some modifications that Sunnis wanted, including clarifying
government control over water rights, and a statement that Iraq has always been part of
the Arab League. However, no major changes to the provisions on new regions were
made and, ending their political boycott, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-85%
in some Sunni cities) to try to defeat the constitution. The United Nations printed and
distributed 5 million copies of the draft. .
The continued Sunni opposition prompted U.S.
Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad to mediate an agreement (October 11) between
Kurdish and Shiite leaders and a major Sunni party, the Iraqi Islamic Party, providing for
(Article 137) a panel to convene after the installation of a post-December 15 election
government and, within four months, propose a bloc of amendments. The amendments
require a majority Assembly vote of approval and, within another two months, would be
put to a public referendum under the same rules as the October 15, 2005 referendum. The
major assumption of the deal is that Sunnis would be politically strengthened by
participating in the December 15 election and would be able to demand amendments.
The referendum was relatively peaceful, with total turnout about 60% (about 10
million voting), suggesting high Sunni turnout. Final results (released October 25)
nationwide were 78.6% in favor and 21.4% against. The mostly Sunni provinces of
Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively. The mostly Sunni
province of Nineveh voted 55% “no.” Diyala province, believed mostly Sunni, had a
slight majority “yes” vote (51%). The draft was declared adopted because only two
3
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
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provinces, not three, voted “no” with a 2/3 majority. The Administration praised the vote
as evidence that Sunnis were moving into the political process.
December 15, 2005, Elections
Under a July 2005 election law designed to enhance Sunni representation, for the
, for the December 15 elections each province
constituted an election constituency and contributed
a fixed number of seats to the new
“Council of Representatives.” Of the 275-seat body,
230 seats were allocated thatthis way,
and there were 45 “compensatory” seats for entities
that did not win provincial seats but
garnered votes nationwide, or which would have won
additional seats had the election
constituency been the whole nation. The altered format was intended to improve the
prospects for Sunnis to win seats. A total of 361 A total of 361
political “entities” registered: 19 of
them were coalition slates (comprising 125 different
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political parties), and 342 were other
“entities” (parties or individual persons). About
7,500 candidates spanned all entities.
Most notably for U.S. policy, major Sunni slates competed. Most prominent was the
three-party “Iraqi Concord Front,” comprising the IIP, the National Dialogue Council,
and the Iraqi People’s General Council. In contrast to the January election, the UIA slate
formally included Sadr’s faction (about 30 candidates on the slate) as well as other harder
hard line Shiite parties Fadila (Virtue)
and Iraqi Hizballah. Ahmad Chalabi’s Iraqi National
Congress ran separately. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s office tacitly, but not publicly,
endorsed the UIA slate. Former Former
Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi’s mostly secular 15-party
“Iraqi National” slate was
broader than his January list, incorporating not only his Iraq
National Accord but also
the Communist Party, Yawar’s “Iraqis” party, and Adnan
Pachachi’s “Independent
Democratic Gathering.” The Kurdish alliance slate was little
changed from January.
Turnout was about 70%, mostly because of a Sunni vote that exceeded 50%.
Violence was minor (about 30 incidents) as some Sunni insurgents, supporting greater
greater Sunni representation in parliament, helped guardguarded rather than disrupt the voting. Results
suggest that voters appear to have chosendisrupted the voting.
However, results suggest that voters chose lists representing their sects and regions and did
not support , not
secular, non-sectarian lists. The table gives results that were court-certified
on February
10, 2006. According to the constitution, the timetable for subsequent
government government
formation should have been as follows:
!
within 15 days of certification (by February 25), the Council of
Representatives was to convene to select a speaker and two deputy
speakers. (The Council first convened on March 16 to be sworn in, but it did
not select , but without selecting
a Speaker or any other Council leadership positions);
!
after choosing a Council speaker the Council was to select (no deadline
specified, but a thirty-day deadline for the choice after subsequent
Council elections), a presidency council for Iraq (President and two
deputies). Those choices requirerequired a 2/3 vote of the Council;
!
within another 15 days, the presidency council (by consensus of its three
officials) was to designate the “nominee of the [Council] bloc with the
largest number” as Prime Minister, the post that has executive power;
!
within another 30 days, the prime minister designate was to name a
cabinet for approval by majority vote of the Council.
!
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The UIA and the Kurds were well positioned to continue their governing alliance;
combined they have 181 seats, just shy of the 184 (two-thirds) needed to name a
presidency council. However, their alliance frayed over the UIA’s February 12
nomination of Jafari to continue as Prime Minister. (With Sadr’s support, he edged out
SCIRI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi). (he was nominated by a one-vote
margin over SCIRI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi, largely because of support by Moqtada al-Sadr).
With senior U.S. officials urging formation of a “unity
government” as soon as possible,
the Kurds, Sunni groupings, and Allawi’s bloc, reversed opposed
the Jafari choice on the grounds
that he has been ineffective in securing that he did not secure Iraq and is too close to Sadr. In
March 2006,
attempting to promote comity, Iraqi leaders agreed to a U.S. proposal to form an extraconstitutional
form extra-constitutional economic and security councilcouncils including all factions.
On April 20, Jafari agreed to step aside, breaking the logjam. On April 22, the
Council of Representatives approved Talabani to continue as president, Abd al-Mahdi to
continue as a deputy president, and another deputy president, Concord Front/IIP leader
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Tariq al-Hashimi. Concord Front figure Mahmoud Mashhadani was chosen Council of
Representatives speaker, with deputies Khalid al-Attiya (UIA/Shiite) and Arif Tayfour,
a KDP activist (continuing in that post). For the key post of Prime Minister, senior
Da’wa Party figure Jawad al-Maliki replaced Jafari, his Da’wa boss; Maliki now has 30
days to appoint and obtain Council confirmation of his cabinetsuperior. Maliki, who
was in exile
in Syria during Saddam’s rule, is considered a decisive, Shiite hardliner who mostly
mostly shares Jafari’s views and has sought to exclude former Baathists from government. He
immediately pledged to rein in Shiite militias that are committing sectarian violence,
although he has professed unity and non-sectarianism since being named to the post.
New Cabinet. Amid U.S. and other congratulations, Maliki named and won
approval of a 39 member cabinet (including deputy prime ministers) on May 20, one day
prior to his 30-day deadline. He did not name permanent figures for the major posts of
Interior, Defense, and Ministry of State for National Security but said he would do so
within a few days. It is expected that these three posts will go to a UIA selectee, a Sunni,
and a Shiite, respectively. Among his other permanent selections were Kurdish official
Barham Salih and Sunni Arab Salam al-Zubaie as deputy prime ministers, and four
ministers are women. Of the 34 permanent ministerial posts named, a total of seven are
Sunnis; seven are Kurds; nineteen are Shiites; and one is Christian. Ayatollah Sistani
loyalist Hussein Shahristani was named Oil Minister; SCIRI official Bayan Jabr moved
to Finance Minister (from Interior); and KDP activist Hoshyar Zebari remains as Foreign
Minister. Sadr loyalists were named to the ministries of agriculture, health, and
transportation.
Table 1. Election Results (January and December)
Slate/Party
UIA (Shiite Islamist); Sadr formally joined list for Dec. vote
(Of the 128 seats: SCIRI ~ ~30; Da’wa ~ 28; Sadr ~ 30; others, remainder~28; Sadr~30; Fadila~15; others~25)
Kurdistan Alliance (PUK and KDP)
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added some mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote
Iraq Concord Front (Sunni). Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote
Dialogue National Iraqi Front (Sunni, Saleh al-Mutlak) Not in Jan. vote
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was onpart of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
National Independent and Elites Cadre (Jan)/Risalyun (Mission, Dec) Shiite,
pro-Sadr
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd)
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Sunni, secular)
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
Seats
(Jan. 05)
140
Seats
(Dec. 05)
140
128
75
40
—
—
—
5
3
3
2
2
2
1
53
25
44
11
0
—
1
2
2
2
2
1
—
5
0
—
1
1
0
—
1
3
1
1
—
5
0
—
1
1
0
—
1
3
1
1
Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200.
Eligible voters: 14 million in January election; 15 million in October referendum and December.
Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66% (10 million)/ December: 75% (12 million).