Order Code RS21968
Updated January 20March 13, 2006
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Elections for a transitional National Assembly and government (January 30, 2005),
a permanent constitution (October 15), and a permanent (four year) Council of
Representatives and government (December 15) have been concluded despite insurgent
violence. U.S. officials hope that the high turnout among Sunni ArabsDespite the Sunni Arab participation in the December
15 elections — and post-election bargaining among all factions — will produce an
inclusive government that reduces insurgent violence 15 elections, postelection bargaining amid escalating sectarian violence has delayed formation of a new
government. (See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq:
U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-SaddamPostSaddam Governance, by Kenneth Katzman.)
Shortly after Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) deposed Saddam Hussein’s regime in
April 2003, the Bush Administration linked the end of U.S. military occupation to the
completion of a new constitution and the holding of national elections, tasks expected to
take two years. Prominent Iraqis persuaded the Administration to accelerate the process,
and sovereignty was given to an appointed government on June 28, 2004, with a
government and a permanent constitution to be voted on thereafter, as stipulated in a
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), signed on March 8, 2004, as follows:1
1
!
The elections held on January 30, 2005 (within the TAL’s deadline)
were for a 275-seat National Assembly; a provincial assembly in each of
Iraq’s 18 provinces (41 seats each; 51 for Baghdad); and a Kurdistan
regional assembly (111 seats). The Assembly would choose a
transitional “presidency council” (a president and two deputies), and a
prime minister with executive power, and a cabinet.
!
The National Assembly would draft a constitution by August 15, 2005,
to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005. The draft could be vetoed
with a two-thirds majority of the votes in any three provinces. A
permanent government would be elected by December 15, 2005, and it
would take office by December 31, 2005. If a constitution was defeated,
For text, see [http://cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html].
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
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the December 15 elections would be for a transitional National Assembly
(which would draft a new constitution).
January 30 Elections
The January 30, 2005 elections, run by the “Independent Electoral Commission of
Iraq” (IECI) were conducted by proportional representation (closed list); voters chose
among “political entities” (a party, a coalition of parties, or individuals). Seats in the
Assembly and the provincial assemblies were allocated in proportion to a slate’s showing;
any entity receiving at least 1/275 of the vote (about 31,000 votes) won a seat. A female
candidate occupied every third position on electoral lists in order to meet the TAL’s goal
for at least 25% female membership. A total of 111 entities were on the National
Assembly ballot: 9 multi-party coalitions, 75 single parties, and 27 individual persons.
The 111 entities contained over 7,000 candidates. About 9,000 candidates, organized into
party slates, ran in provincial and Kurdish elections.
In the January 30 (and December 15) elections, Iraqis abroad were eligible to vote.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was tapped to run the “out-of-country
voting” (OCV) program. OCV took place in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Iran, Jordan, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, UAE, Britain, Netherlands, and the United
States. (See [http://www.iraqocv.org]). About 275,000 Iraqi expatriates (dual citizens
and anyone who can demonstrate that their father was Iraqi) registered, and about 90%
of them voted (in January).
There were about 14 million eligible voters (15 million in the two subsequent votes
in 2005). Voters need to be at least 18 years old. There were about 5,200 polling centers
in January, and 6,200 in the December elections. About 200,000 Iraqis staffed the polls
on both election days. Monitoring was limited in both elections; in January, a Canada-led
contingent of about 25 observers from eleven nations based in Jordan, which assessed
reports on the voting by about 50,000 Iraqi monitors. (One of the international observers
was in Iraq). In the December election, some European parliament members and others
contributed to the monitoring of the voting.
The Iraqi government budgeted about $250 million for the January elections, of
which $130 million was offset by international donors, including about $40 million from
the European Union. Out of $21 billion in U.S. reconstruction funds, the United States
provided $40 million to improve IECI capacity; $42.5 million for Iraqi monitoring; and
$40 million for political party development, through the International Republican Institute
and National Democratic Institute. OCV cost an additional $92 million, of which $11
million was for the U.S. component, but no U.S. funds were spent for OCV.
Competition and Results.2 The Iraqi groups that took the most active interest
in in
the January elections were those best positioned: Shiite Islamist parties, the Kurds, and
established secular parties. The most prominent slate was the Shiite Islamist “United Iraqi
Alliance” (UIA), consisting of 228 candidates from 22 parties, primarily the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Da’wa Party. It was backed
2
For a detailed discussion of many of these groups, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Regime
Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance, by Kenneth Katzman.
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by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The first candidate on this slate was SCIRI leader Abd
al-Aziz al-Hakim; Da’wa leader Ibrahim al-Jafari was number seven. Even though
radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr denounced the election as a product of U.S.
occupation, 14 of U.S.-led process, 14 of
his supporters were on the UIA slate; eight of these won seats. Some
pro-Sadr Shiites
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also competed separately. The two main Kurdish parties, the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan
(PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) offered a joint 165candidate165-candidate “Kurdish
Alliance” list. Interim Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi filed a six-party,
233-candidate
“Iraqi List” led by his Iraqi National Accord (INA) party. The Communist
Party filed a
257-candidate “People’s Union” slate.2
Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population), perceiving electoral defeat and
insurgent intimidation, mostly boycotted and won only 17 seats. spread over several lists.
The relatively moderate
Sunni “Iraqi Islamic Party” (IIP), filed a 275-seat slate, but it
withdrew in December 2004.
The hard-line Iraqi Muslim Clerics’Scholars Association (MCA), MSA),
said to be close to the
insurgents, called for a Sunni boycott.
Violence was far less than some anticipated. Polling centers were guarded on
election day by the 130,000 members of Iraq’s security forces, with the 150,000 U.S.
forces in Iraq available for backup. Two days prior to election day, vehicle traffic was
banned, Iraq’s borders were closed, and polling locations were confirmed. On election
day in January, insurgents conducted about 300 attacks but no polling stations were
overrun. (Security measures were similar for the October 15 and December 15 votes,
although with more Iraqi troops and police available (about 215,000) than in January.)
Total turnout in January was about 58% (about 8.5 million votes); results are in
Table 1. After the January election, factional bargaining over posts in the transition
government and the future of Iraq centered on Kurdish demands for substantial autonomy,
delaying formation of the government. On April 3, Hajim al-Hassani, a Sunni from the
Iraqi Islamic Party but who ran on former president Ghazi al-Yawar’s list, was named
Assembly speaker. Arif Tayfour, a Kurd, and Hussein Shahristani, an aide to Ayatollah
Sistani, as his two deputies. On April 6, PUK leader Jalal Talabani was named president,
along with two deputy presidents: SCIRI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi and Yawar. The three
named Ibrahim al-Jafari as Prime Minister. On April 28, Jafari received Assembly
approval for a cabinet of 32 ministers and three deputy prime ministers.3 Leading antiSaddam figure Ahmad Chalabi and KDP activist Rosch Shaways were named deputy
prime ministers. Five cabinet positions and a deputy prime ministership was initially
filled only temporarily or left vacant, pending an agreement to appoint more Sunnis. On
May 7, Jafari appointed three more Sunni ministers, along with two Shiites, as well as a
Sunni (Abid al-Jabburi) to be the third deputy prime minister. Even though these latter
appointments included a Sunni, Sadoun al-Dulaymi, as Defense Minister, Sunnis
complained that they were given relatively unimportant slots, such as the ministries of
culture and of women’s affairs. In provincial elections, the Kurds won about 60% of the
seats in Tamim (Kirkuk) province (26 out of 41 seats), strengthening the Kurds’ efforts
to gain control of the province.
3
The final cabinet is composed of 17 Shiite ministers, 8 Kurds, 6 Sunnis, and 1 Christian (a
Christian woman is Minister of Science and Technology), in addition to the 3 deputy prime
ministers. There are 6 female ministers.
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During April and May, the factions formed a
government that U.S. officials said was not sufficiently inclusive of the Sunni minority,
even though it had a Sunni (Hajim al-Hassani) as Assembly speaker; a Sunni deputy
president (Ghazi al-Yawar); a Sunni deputy prime minister (Abd al-Mutlak al-Jabburi);
a Sunni Defense Minister (Sadoun Dulaymi); and five other Sunni ministers. The Sunnis
complained that the ministerial slots they hold (other than Defense) are relatively
unimportant, such as the ministries of culture and of women’s affairs. The other major
positions were dominated by Shiites and Kurds, such as PUK leader Jalal Talabani as
president; Da’wa leader Ibrahim al-Jafari as Prime Minister; SCIRI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi
as the second deputy president; Bayan Jabr as Interior Minister, which controls the police
and police commando forces; and KDP activist Hoshyar Zebari as Foreign Minister.
Chalabi and KDP activist Rosch Shaways were named as the two other deputy prime
ministers. There is also one Christian and one Turkoman minister. In provincial
elections, the Kurds won about 60% of the seats in Tamim (Kirkuk) province (26 out of
41 seats), strengthening the Kurds’ efforts to gain control of the province.
Permanent Constitution and Referendum
The next step in the transition process was the drafting of a permanent constitution.
On May 10, the National Assembly appointed a 55-member drafting committee, with a
SCIRI official, Humam al-Hammoudi, as chair. The committee included only two Sunni
Arabs, prompting Sunni resentment, and 15 Sunnis (and one member of the small Sabian
community) were later added as full committee members, with 10 more as advisors. The
2
For a detailed discussion of many of these groups, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Regime
Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance, by Kenneth Katzman.
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committee did not request a six-month extension (there was an August 1, 2005 deadline
to do so), but instead amended the TAL to allow for extensions of the August 15
deadline. The talks produced a draft on August 28 that included some compromises
sought by Sunnis, and the Shiites and Kurds declared it final. The Kurds achieved a
major goal; Article 136 sets December 31, 2007, as a deadline for resettling Kurds in
Kirkuk and holding a referendum on whether Kirkuk will join the Kurdish region.
The constitution (Article 2)43 designates Islam “a main source” of legislation and says
no law can contradict the “established” provisions of Islam. Article 39 implies that
families could choose which courts to use to adjudicate domestic issues such as divorce
and inheritance. Article 34 makes only primary education mandatory. These provisions
provoked opposition from women who fear that the males of their families will decide to
use Sharia (Islamic law) courts for family issues and for girls’ education. The 25%
electoral goal for women was retained (Article 47). Article 89 says that federal supreme
court will include experts in Islamic law, as well as judges and experts in civil law.
Sunni negotiators, including chief negotiator Saleh al-Mutlak of the National
Dialogue Council opposed the August 28 draft because it allowed two or more provinces
together to form autonomous “regions.” Each “region” (Article 117) is able to organize
internal security forces, which in practice could lead to the dissolution of the national
security forces. Article 109 requires the central government to distribute oil and gas
revenues from “current fields” in proportion to population, implying that the regions
might ultimately control revenues from new energy discoveries. These provisions raised
Sunni alarms, because their areas have no known oil or gas deposits. Article 62
establishes a “Federation Council” — a second chamber of a size and with powers to be
determined, presumably to review legislation affecting the regions.
After further negotiations, on September 19, 2005, the National Assembly approved
a “final” draft, with some modifications that Sunnis wanted, including clarifying
government control over water rights, and a statement that Iraq has always been part of
the Arab League. The United Nations subsequently printed and distributed 5 million
copies of the draft. Ending their political boycott, Sunnis registered in large numbers
(70%-85% in some Sunni cities) in an effort to achieve the two-thirds negative vote in
three provinces needed to defeat the constitution. The continued Sunni opposition
prompted U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad to mediate an agreement (October
11) between Kurdish and Shiite leaders and a major Sunni party, the Iraqi Islamic Party,
providing for (Article 137) a panel to convene after the installation of a post-December
15 election government and, within four months, propose a bloc of amendments. The
amendments require a majority Assembly vote of approval and, within another two
months, would be put to a public referendum under the same rules as the October 15
4
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
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referendum. The major assumption of the deal is that Sunnis were likely to win more
seats in the December 15 election than they won in the January elections and would be
well ,
2005, referendum. The major assumption of the deal is that Sunnis would be politically
strengthened by their participation in the December 15 election and would be well
positioned to achieve adoption of amendments.
The referendum was relatively peaceful, with total turnout about 60% (about 10
million voting), suggesting high Sunni turnout. Final results (released October 25)
nationwide were 78.6% in favor and 21.4% against. The mostly Sunni provinces of
3
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
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Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively. The mostly Sunni
province of Nineveh voted 55% “no.” Diyala province, believed mostly Sunni, had a
slight majority “yes” vote (51%). The draft was declared adopted because only two
provinces, not three, voted “no” with a 2/3 majority. The Administration praised the vote
as evidence that Sunnis are moving into the political process.
December 15, 2005, Elections
In contrast to the January election, a July 2005 election law madein the December elections each province
constituteconstituted an election constituency and contributecontributes a fixed number of seats to the new
Assembly“Council of Representatives,” under a July 2005 election law. Of the 275-seat Assemblybody, 230
seats are allocated that way, and there are 45
“compensatory” seats for entities that did
not win provincial seats but garnered votes
nationwide, or would have won additional
seats had the election been conducted on a
national basis. The format improved the
prospects for Sunnis to win seats. At the
October 28, 2005 deadline, 361 political
“entities” had registered: 19 of them were
coalition slates (comprising 125 different
political parties), and 342 were other “entities”
(parties or individual persons). A total of
about 7,500 candidates spanned all entities.
The most notable difference from January was the filing of major Sunni slates.
Most prominent is the three-party “Iraqi Concord Front,” comprising the IIP, the
National Dialogue Council, and the Iraqi People’s General Council. In contrast to the
January election, the UIA slate formally included Sadr’s faction (about 30 candidates on
the slate) as well as other harder line Shiite parties Fadila (Virtue) and Iraqi Hizballah
— and Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress ran separately. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s
alSistani’s office only tacitly endorsed the UIA slate. Former Prime Minister Iyad al-AllawialAllawi’s mostly
secular 15-party “Iraqi National” slate was broader than his January list, incorporating
incorporating not only his Iraq National Accord but also the Communist Party, Yawar’s
“Iraqis” party,
and Adnan Pachachi’s “Independent Democratic Gathering.” The
“Kurdistan Alliance”
slate was little changed from January.
Turnout was about 70%, mostly because of a Sunni vote that exceeded 50%.
Violence was minor (about 30 incidents). However, Sunni and secular slates initially
denounced the elections as unfair, claiming that the UIA used its control over governing
institutions to affect the campaign and the vote, although they later softened those claims
and are participating in post-election bargaining on a new government. Partly to assuage
those criticisms, the IECI accepted help from international investigators (Arab League and
Canadian and European experts) to look into about 50 serious allegations of fraud, and
the observers issued their report on January 19, 2006, finding some instances of fraud but
not sufficient to have affected the result. After the court certification of results (expected
by the end of January 2006),
!
within 15 days, the new Council of Representatives (Assembly) is to
convene to select a speaker and two deputy speakers;
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!
!
!
subsequently (no deadline specified), the Council selects a presidency
council (President and two deputies) with a 2/3 vote of the Council;
within 15 days of its own selection, the presidency council, by consensus
of its three officials, designatesThe table below gives final results that were
released on January 20, 2006, and court-certified on February 10, 2006.
Voters appear to have chosen lists representing their sects and regions and did not
support secular, non-sectarian lists. On the strength of their showings, the Shiite UIA and
the Kurds were well positioned to continue their bilateral governing alliance; combined
they have 181 seats, just shy of the 184 (two-thirds) needed to name a presidency council,
but they can probably recruit small allied parties (pro-Sadr Shiites or Islamist Kurds) to
exceed that threshold. However, this alliance might be fraying, as discussed below. Now
that election results have been certified,
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!
!
!
!
within 15 days (February 25), the new Council of Representatives
(Assembly) is to convene to select a speaker and two deputy speakers;
subsequently (no deadline specified, but a thirty-day deadline for the
choice in subsequent terms), the Council is to select a presidency council
(President and two deputies) with a 2/3 vote of the Council;
within 15 days of its selection, the presidency council, by consensus of
its three officials, is to designate the “nominee of the [Council] bloc with
the largest number” as Prime Minister, the post that has executive power;
within another 30 days, the prime minister designate names hisa cabinet
for approval by majority vote of the Council.
As shown in the table below of final (but not court certified) results released January
20, 2006, voters chose lists representing their sects and regions and did not support
secular, non-sectarian lists. On the strength of their showings, the Shiite UIA and the
Kurds are well positioned to continue their bilateral governing alliance if they choose.
Combined, they have 181 seats, just shy of the 184 (two-thirds) needed to name a
presidency council, but they can probably recruit small allied parties (pro-Sadr Shiites or
Islamist Kurds) to exceed that threshold. In post-election bargaining thus far, the main
candidates for prime minister are Jafari, the incumbent, and SCIRI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi
(currently a deputy president). Some give the edge to Mahdi because of SCIRI’s strong
support of him. Allawi had hoped to exploit splits within the UIA, although his chances
to regain the post have been diminished by the relatively weak showing his slate. U.S.
officials have said that, no matter who becomes Prime Minister, they want a broad-based
government that gives the Sunnis a significant role, that furthers the chances to rework
the approved constitution to accommodate Sunni concerns, and potentially causes the
Sunni-based insurgency to diminish. The Sunnis are pushing hard to obtain the position
of presidency — a post that might symbolically reverse some of the Sunni sense of
humiliation — although the Kurds support Talabani to remain in that post.
for
approval by majority vote of the Council.
In post-election political bargaining, Prime Minister Jafari fended off a challenge
by SCIRI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi (currently a deputy president) for his post. Some gave the
edge to Mahdi because of SCIRI’s strong support of him, but Sadr threw his weight to
Jafari, who is more religious than is Mahdi, and Jafari won an intra-UIA poll (by one
vote) over Mahdi on February 12; he became UIA pick for Prime Minister. The Kurds
have nominated Talabani to continue as president. However, the Kurds, Sunni groupings,
and Allawi’s bloc have since jointly sought to reverse the Jafari choice on the grounds that
he has been ineffective in securing Iraq and he is too close politically to Sadr. The dispute
has delayed the first meeting of the new Council of Representatives (now set for March
16). Sadr continues to publicly back Jafari. The United States is urging that the factions
quickly come to agreement on a unity government, in part to reduce sectarian violence
that accelerated after the February 22 bombing of the Shiite Askariya mosque in Samarra.
Table 1. Election Results (January and December)
Seats
(Jan. 05)
Seats
(Dec. 05)
UIA (Shiite Islamist); Sadr formally joined list for Dec. vote
(Of the 128 seats: SCIRI ~ 30; Da’wa ~ 28; Sadr ~ 30; others, remainder)
140
128
Kurdistan Alliance (PUK and KDP)
75
53
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added some mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote
40
25
Iraq Concord Front (Sunni). Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote
—
44
Dialogue National Iraqi Front (Sunni, Saleh al-Mutlak) Not in Jan. vote
—
11
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was on UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
—
0
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
5
—
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
3
1
National Independent and Elites Cadre (Jan)/Risalyun (Mission, Dec) Shiite,
pro-Sadr
3
2
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
2
—
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd)
2
5
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
2
0
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
1
—
Slate/Party
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
1
1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Sunni, secular)
1
3
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
0
1
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
—
1