Order Code RL33003
I
CRS R e ~ o rfor
t Conaress 1
'
Received through
the‘;^^CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Egypt: Background
and U.S. Relations
Updated September 21,2005February 8, 2006
Jeremy M. Sharp
Middle East Policy Analyst
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service *:*˜ The Library of Congress
I
Egypt: Background and U S .S. Relations
Summary
This report provides an overview of Egyptian politics and current issues in U. S.Egyptian relations. It briefly provides a political history of modemmodern Egypt, an
overview of its political institutions, and a discussion of the prospects for
democratization in Egypt. U.S.-Egyptian relations are complex and multi-faceted,
and this report addresses the following current topics: the Arab-Israeli peace process,
Iraq, terrorism, democratization and reform, human rights, trade, and military
cooperation. This report will be updated regularly. For more information on Egypt,
see CRS Report RS22274, Egypt: 2005 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections.
U.S. policy on Egypt is aimed at maintaining regional stability, improving
bilateral relations, continuing military cooperation, and sustaining the March 1979
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Successive Administrations have long viewed Egypt
as a leader and moderating influence in the Middle East, though in recent years, there
have been increasing calls for Egypt to democratize.
Congressional views of U.S.-Egyptian relations vary. Some lawmakers view
Egypt as stabilizing the region and helping to extend U.S. influence in the most
populous Arab country. Others would like the United States to pressure Egypt to
implement political reforms, improve its human rights record, and take a more active
role in reducing Arab-Israeli tensions.
Among the current issues in U.S.-Egyptian relations are a shared concern about
international terrorism. Egypt can claim some experience with the subject, having
defeated domestic Islamist terrorists intent on overthrowing the government. As the
war on terror continues, the United States relies on Egypt for intelligence
cooperation. Egypt provided valuable support during Operation Enduring Freedom
in Afghanistan. On the issue of Iraqi reconstruction, Egypt is helping to train Iraqi
security forces and has offered to increase its efforts. Egypt and the United States
agree on the importance of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the need to continue
current Arab-Israel peace talks. In support of this process, Egypt has been training
Palestinian police, and will send and has sent 750 Egyptian soldiers to the Egypt-Gaza border in
order to prevent weapons smuggling following Israel's ’s recent withdrawal from Gaza.
The United States and Egypt disagree over the speed and depth of, but not the
need for, some of Egypt'’s economic reforms. The two governments differ on Egypt'’s
need to introduce democratic reforms, and many U.S. officials argue that Egypt is not
moving quickly enough toward full democracy or in improving the human rights
situation. Others caution that movement toward democracy carries a risk of
establishment of an Islamist government.
The United States has provided Egypt with an annual average of over $2 billion
in economic and military foreign assistance since 1979. The United States will reduce
Economic Support Funds (ESF) to about $400 million per year by 2008 in keeping
with a plan to reduce aid to both Israel and Egypt. The Administration requested
$495455 million in economic grants and $1.3 billion in military grants for FY2006FY2007 for
Egypt.
Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Historical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Egypt During the Colonial Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
The Constitutional Monarchy & the British . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Nasser and Egypt During the Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Egypt-Israeli Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Egypt Under Mubarak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Regime Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Presidential Succession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
The Role of the Military in Egyptian Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
The National Democratic Party (NDP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
TheJudiciary8
The Judiciary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 8
Opposition Parties & Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Legal Opposition Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
The A1Al Ghad Party (Tomorrow) & Ayman Nour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
The Muslim Brotherhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
The Egyptian Movement for Change -— Kefaya (Enough) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Civil Society in Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Saad al-Din Ibrahim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Current Issues in U.S..-Egyptian Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2005 Presidential and Parliamentary ElectionsHamas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Arab-Israeli Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1I12
Egypt'’s Role in the Gaza Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213
Depiction of Israel and Jews in the Egyptian Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1314
Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1314
Egyptian Position on the 2003 Iraq War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1314
Training Iraqi Security Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1415
1992 .- 1997 Terror Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1415
Recent Terrorist Activity in Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Status of 16
Political and Economic Reform in Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 17
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Government-Driven Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Opposition Reform Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
U.S. Policy to Promote Reform in Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
EconomicReform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Economic Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
U.S. Policy to Promote Reform in Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1819
U.S..-Egyptian Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Trade Overview .20
.
Tradeoverview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Human Rights, Religious Freedom, and Women'’s Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 121
The 1981 Emergency Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 1
21
Religious Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Women'’s Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
22
Military Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
"“Bright Star"” and other Joint Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
"“Desert Storm"” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Intelligence Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Economic Aid24
EconomicAid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
MilitaryAidMilitary Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Recent U.S. Military Sales to Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
FY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
U.S. Assistance to Egypt: Possible Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Egypt
List of Tables
EgyptataGlance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
List of Tables
Table 1. U.S.-Egyptian Trade Statistics 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Table 2 . Recent U.S. Aid to Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Table 3 . U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt, 1946-1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations
Most Recent Developments
0
On September 7, 2005, Egypt conducted its first multi-candidate
presidential election, resulting in the reelection of President Hosni
Mubarak with 88% of the vote. For a complete overview of the
election, see CRS Report RS22274, Egypt: 2005 Presidential and
Parliamentary Elections, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
Historical Background
Egypt During the Colonial Era
Egypt'On February 1, 2006, Egyptian intelligence chief Omar Suleiman demanded that
Hamas should “one, stop the violence. Two, it should become doctrine with them to
be committed to all the agreements signed with Israel. Three, they have to recognize
Israel ... If Hamas won’t commit to these conditions, Mahmoud Abbas is not obliged
to ask them to form a government.”
On January 17, 2006, the New York Times reported that the United States had
put on hold its intention to announce free trade talks with Egypt. The decision to
table such an announcement was reportedly done in protest to the recent sentencing
of secular opposition leader Ayman Nour to five years in prison for his alleged fraud
in registering his political party. Nour, who placed second in Egypt’s 2005
presidential election, is appealing the decision and remains in prison. In October
2005, Rob Portman, the United States trade representative, told Congress that the
Administration was considering negotiating trade agreements with Egypt and three
other Middle Eastern countries.
On December 30, 2005, Egyptian riot police used deadly force to disperse a
squatter’s camp of Sudanese migrants who had refused to move from outside the
office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees until they were
relocated. Twenty-seven people, including women and small children, were killed
in the ensuing violence. After widespread international condemnation of the
refugee’s treatment, Egypt pledged not to deport most of the refugees back to Sudan.
On December 24, 2005, an Egyptian court sentenced 41-year old Ayman Nour
to five years in prison after convicting him of forging party registration documents.
President Bush has called for Nour’s release and his Administration has stated that
Nour’s conviction “calls into question Egypt’s commitment to democracy, freedom
and the rule of law.”
On December 6, 2005, U.S. State Department Deputy Spokesman Adam Ereli
remarked that “We’ve also seen a number of developments over the past couple
weeks during the parliamentary elections that raise serious concerns about the path
of political reform in Egypt. Those developments include the arrest of opposition
candidates and their supporters. They include clashes between Egyptian security
personnel and voters, physical abuse of domestic monitors and journalists, as well as
the barring of domestic monitors and in some cases even voters from polling places.
Clearly, these actions send the wrong signal about Egypt’s commitment to democracy
and freedom, and we see them as inconsistent with the Government of Egypt’s
professed commitment to increased political openness and dialogue within Egyptian
society.”
CRS-2
Historical Background
Egypt During the Colonial Era
Egypt’s relations with the West, including its current friendly relations with the
United States, are colored by a long history of foreign intervention in Egyptian
politics, which has made Egypt, along with other Arab states, wary of outside
influences on their domestic affairs. In the
19th century, Egypt was a semiautonomous province in the Ottoman Empire, which by then was in decline and
being propped up by the British in order to serve as a buffer between it and Czarist
Russia. At the time, Egypt was viewed as extremely valuable to the British and
French empires and was prized for its agricultural output, large domestic market, and
strategic location between the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Most importantly, the
British saw Egypt as vital to securing the sea route to its most prized colony, India.
Ottoman weakness led its Sultans to grant Europeans certain legal protections and
economic advantages in Egypt, which stifled the Egyptian economy by flooding it
with European manufactured goods, driving local merchants out of business.'1 Over
time, Egypt developed a "“cash crop"” economy based almost solely on the export of
cotton, the price of which constantly fluctuated, leaving the economy vulnerable and
dependent on good harvests. Without a strong, diverse economy, Egypt could not
generate enough capital to h n dfund its modernization, leading it to become even more
financially dependent on the West, as it rulers borrowed huge sums from European
banks. Six years after the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869, Egypt was forced
to sell all of its shares in the Suez Canal Company, which operated the Canal, in
order to make payments on its foreign-owned debt. When Egypt could no longer pay
' Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Egypt: A Country Study, accessible at
[http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frdlcs/egtoc.html].
its debts, the British and French became directly involved in Egyptian politics - a
trend that would continue until the mid 20thc e n t ~ r y . ~20th century.2
The Constitutional Monarchy & the British
Britain unilaterally declared Egyptian independence in 1922, and for the next
three decades, political power in Egypt was contested among three main actors: the
British, the Egyptian monarchy, and the nationalist Wafd party, which was the
driving force behind the Egyptian independence movement after World War I.
Thousands of British troops remained stationed near the Suez Canal, and British
officials served in the Egyptian ministries. Egypt'’s king could appoint a government
and dismiss parliament, but ultimately relied on the British for support. The Wafd
party dominated parliamentary elections during Egypt'’s experiment with
parliamentary democracy (1922-1%21952), though the Wafd gradually began to lose
popularity to more radical organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood.
1
Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Egypt: A Country Study, accessible at
[http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/egtoc.html].
2
Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798. The British invaded in 1882 and established a de facto
protectorate. They would keep a sizeable military force in Egypt until the 1950s.
CRS-3
Figure 1. Map of Egypt
Nasser and Egypt During the Cold War
By the early 1950s, anti-British sentiment in Egypt had sparked civil unrest,
allowing a cabal of Egyptian Army officers, known as the Free Officers Movement,
to oust the king in what is referred to as the July 1952 revolution. The Free Officer
Movement ushered in an era of military involvement in Egyptian politics, as all of
Egypt'’s presidents in the post-revolutionary period have been high ranking officers.
In the aftermath of the coup, Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser, the most charismatic of
the Free Officers, succeeded in gaining total control over the government. Nasser
abolished the monarchy and outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood (1954), which at the
time was the only potential rival for power. Nasser would rule Egypt until his death
in 1970.
During the Nasser era, Egypt found itself at the center of superpower
competition for influence in the Middle East. Wary of taking sides, Nasser managed,
for a short period, to steer Egypt clear of either the Soviet or Western "camp"“camp” and
was instrumental in helping to establish the non-aligned movement. U.S.-Egyptian
relations soured when Nasser turned to the Soviets and the Czechs in 1955 for
military training and equipment after the West, frustrated by Nasser'’s repeated
CRS-4
rejections and his support of Algerian independence against the French, refksedrefused to
provide Egypt with defense assistance. A year later, following a U.S.-British decision
to retract an offer of economic assistance and help for the construction of the Aswan
Dam, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company to use its revenues to finance the
dam project. (Egypt owned the Suez Canal, but the British-French company operated
the Canal, and collected the revenues from which it paid a small rent to Egypt.) In
October 1956, Israel, France, and Britain invaded Egypt - - Israel to stop Palestinian
guerrillas from using Egypt as a base for operations against Israel, and France and
Britain to occupy the Canal. President Eisenhower persuaded the three countries to
withdraw from Egypt in early 1957, which briefly improved U.S.-Egyptian relation^.^relations.3
After the 1956 Suez War, Nasser'’s popularity soared, as he came to embody
Arab nationalism in the post-colonial era. Nasser did not hesitate to brandish his
newfound authority and developed a muscular Egyptian foreign policy that attempted
to destabilize pro-WestemWestern governments in Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon, support
Palestinian guerrilla action against Israel, create a unified Arab state by merging
briefly with Syria (the United Arab Republic 1958- 196l1961), and intervene against the
Saudi-backed royalists in the Yemeni civil war.4 However, Egypt'’s defeat at the
hands of Israel in the June 1967 War and other setbacks temporarily deflated
Nasser'’s popularity and crushed his ambitions to spread a pan-Arab ideology across
the region.
On the domestic front, Nasser turned Egypt into a socialist dictatorship with
absolute power in the hands of the President. All banks and commercial firms were
M.E. Yapp, The Near East Since the First World War, London: Longman, 1991, p. 409.
During the Yemeni Civil War of 1963through 1967,Egypt reportedly used mustard bombs
in support of South Yemen against Saudi-backed royalist troops in North Yemen. See
Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Egypt Special Weapons Guide, available online
at [http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/egypt/index.html].
nationalized, large landowning estates were broken up into much smaller parcels and
held in a state trust, and all political parties were banned. The precursor to the present
National Democratic Party (NDP) was formed by Nasser in 1962 and was called the
Arab Socialist Union. It served as the Egyptian republic'’s first mass party and an
extension of the ruling elite. Other movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood,
were forced to go underground, as Nasser arrested thousands of Brotherhood activists
after a failed Brotherhood assassination attempt against him in 1954.5
Egypt-Israeli Peace
After Nasser'’s death in 1970, Anwar Sadat, one of the original Free Officers,
became President of Egypt. At the time, Egypt was humiliated by its defeat in the
June 1967 War and the ensuing loss of the Sinai Peninsula to Israel. In addition,
military rebuilding expenditures were absorbing nearly 25% of Egypt's gross
’s gross
3
M.E. Yapp, The Near East Since the First World War, London: Longman, 1991, p. 409.
4
During the Yemeni Civil War of 1963 through 1967, Egypt reportedly used mustard bombs
in support of South Yemen against Saudi-backed royalist troops in North Yemen. See
Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Egypt Special Weapons Guide, available online
at [http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/egypt/index.html].
5
One of the Brotherhood activists arrested was Sayyid Qutb, a writer and former
government official whose writings provided a philosophical foundation for Islamic
radicalism. Qutb spent years in prison and, after being briefly released in 1964, was
rearrested and hanged in 1966. See Daniel Benjamin & Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred
Terror, New York: Random House, 1966, p. 62.
CRS-5
domestic product. Under these circumstances, Sadat calculated that a military victory
was needed to boost his own legitimacy and improve Egypt'’s position in any hturefuture
negotiations with Israel. The October 1973 War, which initially took Israel by
surprise, was costly for both sides, but succeeded in boosting Sadat'’s credibility with
the Egyptian people, enabling him to embark on a path which would ultimately sever
Egypt'’s ties to the Soviet Union and bring it closer to the West.
In November 1973, Egypt and the United States restored diplomatic relations
(which had been cut off in 1967) and, in December, the two countries participated in
the Geneva peace conference. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger'’s shuttle
diplomacy led to Egyptian-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreements in
1974 and a second set ofEgyptianof Egyptian-Israeli disengagements in 1975. The United States
resumed economic aid to Egypt in 1975 after an eight-year hiatus.
The United States endorsed Anwar al-Sadat'’s historic trip to Jerusalem in
November 1977, and President Jimmy Carter assisted in the Israeli-Egyptian peace
negotiations at Camp David in September 1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty
of March 1979.6 The United States helped organize the peacekeeping mission along
the Egyptian-Israeli border, the Multi-National Force and Observers (MFO), and still
maintains a rotating infantry task force as part of it.'
One of the Brotherhood activists arrested was Sayyid Qutb, a writer and former
government official whose writings provided a philosophical foundation for Islamic
radicalism. Qutb spent years in prison and, after being briefly released in 1964, was
rearrested and hanged in 1966. See Daniel Benjamin & Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred
Terror, New York: Random House, 1966, p. 62.
A copy of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty is available online from MidEast Web
Gateway at [http://www.mideastweb.org/egyptisraeltreaty.htm].
The MFO is an independent (non-UN) peacekeeping mission, created as a result of the
1979 peace treaty. The MFO's expenses are funded in equal parts by Egypt, Israel, and the
United States with additional contributions from Germany, Japan, and Switzerland. For
more information on the MFO, see [http://www.mfo.org/Default.asp?bhcp=1].
7
Egypt Under Mubarak
Sadat'’s rule came to an abrupt end in 1981, when he was assassinated during a
military parade in Cairo by soldiers who also belonged to the Jamaah Islamiyah
(Islamic Group) and A1Al Jihad, the more radical offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Hosni Mubarak, Sadat'’s Vice President and former commander of the Egyptian Air
Force, immediately ascended to the presidency and has remained in office to the
present day. Under Mubarak, Egypt has continued to maintain good relations with the
United States, as evident in Egypt'’s 1991 decision to join the allied coalition against
Saddam Hussein in Operation Desert Storm. Following the path laid out by Sadat,
Egypt has remained at peace with Israel, although critics have characterized this as
a "“cold peace."” Mubarak has made a number of attempts to serve as a broker for
Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, most notably in 1999 and 2000, when Egypt hosted
the signing of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement for implementing past commitments
and meetings between then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former
Palestine President Yasir Arafat respectively. During the Mubarak era, the ongoing
conflict between Egyptian Islamists and the Egyptian authorities continued,
culminating in a period (1992- 1997) of violent confrontations between Islamic
militants and Egyptian police.
6
A copy of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty is available online from MidEast Web
Gateway at [http://www.mideastweb.org/egyptisraeltreaty.htm].
7
The MFO is an independent (non-UN) peacekeeping mission, created as a result of the
1979 peace treaty. The MFO’s expenses are funded in equal parts by Egypt, Israel, and the
United States with additional contributions from Germany, Japan, and Switzerland. For
more information on the MFO, see [http://www.mfo.org/Default.asp?bhcp=1].
CRS-6
After the September 11, 2001
After the September 11, 200 1, terrorist attacks and the ensuing U.S. focus on
promoting democracy in the Middle East, the Mubarak regime has come under
increasing U.S. pressure to accelerate political reforms and make Egypt more
democratic. In an effort to control the reform agenda without relinquishing their gnpgrip
on power, Mubarak and the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) have instituted
some political reforms, while emphasizing the need for economic growth as a
precondition for democratic change. In 2005, Mubarak proposed to alter the
constitution to allow for multi-candidate presidential elections. The proposal was
approved by parliament and then confirmed without opposition in a nationwide
referendum.
Regime Structure
Overview
Since the 1952 revolution, Egypt
has officially been a republic, and its
Egypt at a Glance
political system has developed some
aspects of a democracy, though most
observers continue to describe Egypt asPopulation:
77 million (est.)
observers continue to describe Egypt as
GDP per Capita:
$1,100 - $1,400
an authoritarian regime dominated by a
Religions:
90% Sunni Muslim
strong executive, who draws his
10% Coptic Christian
support from the ruling National
Democratic Party (NDP) and theLiteracy Rate:
57% (47% female)
Democratic Party (NDP) and the
Unemployment Rate: 15-20% (est.)
military. Under the 1971 Constitution,
External Debt:
$33 billion
authority is vested in an elected
(as % of GDP)
37.8%
president who must stand for reelection
every six years.8 The President
authority is vested in an elected
president who must stand for reelection
Egypt at a Glance
77 million (est.)
$1,100 - $1,400
90% Sunni Muslim
10% Coptic Christian
Literacy Rate:
57% (47% female)
Unemployment Rate: 15-20% (est.)
External Debt:
$33 billion
37.8%
(as % of GDP)
Population:
GDP per Capita:
Religions:
Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency World
Factbook 2005.
every six years.8 The President
appoints the cabinet, who in turn draft
and submit
legislation to the
legislature, the People'’s Assembly
(lower house) and the Shura
Council Council
(upper house). The People'’s Assembly debates legislation proposed by
government government
ministries and calls for amendments to government-sponsored bills but
rarely rarely
initiates its own bills. The Shura Council is an advisory body, offering reports
and and
recommendations on important subjects, but the Shura Council does not
introduce,
consider, or vote on legislation. Overall, analysts consider Egypt's
’s legislative branch
to be weak; the ruling party constitutes an overwhelming majority.
In the People'’s Assembly, 444 members are elected and ten are appointed by the
President; 176 members of the Shura Council are elected and 88 are appointed. One
half of the elected members of the People'’s Assembly and the Shura Council must
be farmers and laborers (Art. 87 and Art. 196 of the Constitution). People's
’s
8
In 1980, the Constitution was amended to allow the President to run for an unlimited
number of terms, rather than one as was stipulated in the 1971 Constitution. An English
language version of the Constitution is available at [http://www.parliament.gov.eg/EPA/
en/sections.jsp?typeID=1&levelid=54&parentlevel=6&levelno=2].
CRS-7
Assembly members are elected for five-year terms, and Shura Council members for
six-year terms (one-half the Council members are elected every three years). The
Currently, the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) won 388 seats in the October-November
2000 People's Assembly elections, independents won 37 seats (17 of whom were
Muslim Brotherhood supporters), the Wafd Party won 7, Tagarnmu ("Rally") won
6, the Nasserites won 3, and al-Ahrar won one seat. NDP members won 74 of the 88
seats contested in the MayIJune 2001 Shura Council election, with independents
controls 324 seats in
parliament, Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated members hold 88 seats, and the remaining
seats are held by a mix of independents and secular opposition parties. NDP members
won 74 of the 88 seats contested in the May/June 2001 Shura Council election, with
independents winning the other 14 seats. Religious parties, such as the Muslim
Brotherhood, are
officially banned.
Presidential Succession. Under Egyptian law, if the President should
become incapacitated, the Speaker of the People'’s Assembly becomes the interim
President until the People'’s Assembly can nominate a new President and the name
can be submitted to the people in a referendum. A Vice President plays no special
role in the transition, but in practice, recent Egyptian Presidents were succeeded by
their Vice Presidents. The health of 76-year old President Hosni Mubarak, who has
not named a Vice President, has been questioned. Some analysts believe that
Egyptian intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman, who has recently been an interlocutor
between Palestinians and Israelis, could be a potential successor to Mubarak. Others
consider A mAmr Moussa, the Secretary General of the Arab League, immensely popular
with the Egyptian people and a potential rival to President Mubarak. Over the past
several years, Mubarak'’s forty-one year old son, GarnalGamal, increasingly has become
involved at the highest levels of the NDP, though President Mubarak has denied
rumors that he is grooming his son to succeed him.9
The Role of the Military in Egyptian Society. Although military officers
no longer play a direct role in the affairs of the civilian-run Egyptian government, the
military is the preeminent institution in Egyptian society, and has been called on by
In 1980, the Constitution was amended to allow the President to run for an unlimited
number of terms, rather than one as was stipulated in the 1971 Constitution. An English
language version of the Constitution is available at [http://www.parliament.gov.eg/EPA/
edsecti0ns.jsp?typeID= 1&levelid=54&parentlevel=6&levelno=2].
"Mubarak: Comments on Son's Successioninaccurate,"Daily Star (Beirut),May 16,2005.
successive governments to maintain internal security and regime stability.l o10 From an
economic standpoint, the military also provides employment and social services for
hundreds of thousands of young people in a country with annual double digit
unemployment rates. Military experts have often asserted that Egypt'’s armed forces
are bloated and maintain manpower at unnecessary levels for peacetime. In response,
Egyptian officials and some scholars assert that the large size of Egypt'’s military is
justified based on the services it provides to soldiers and their families. Some
estimate that the military trains 12% of young Egyptian males and that Egypt'’s
defense industries employ over 100,000 people."11 The Egyptian military has its own
companies, which produce consumer products, pharmaceuticals, and manufactured
goods. The Egyptian officer corps also benefit from higher salaries, better housing,
and high quality healthcare, which help ensure their loyalty to the government. Some
members of the opposition have criticized these special benefits and the military's’s
9
“Mubarak: Comments on Son’s Succession inaccurate,” Daily Star (Beirut), May 16, 2005.
10
In 1986, President Mubarak called on the military to put down riots in Cairo, sparked by
the protests of Central Security conscripts who were angry with their low pay and poor
working conditions. The military also was deployed in 1977 during riots over a temporary
reduction in food subsidies.
11
Imad Harb, “The Egyptian Military in Politics: Disengagement or Accommodation?” The
Middle East Journal, Washington: Spring 2003. vol. 57, Iss. 2; pg.269.
CRS-8
fiscal autonomy, asserting that there is little civilian control over the military'’s
budget.
The National Democratic Party (NDP).I212 As the ruling party, the NDP
dominates the political scene in Egypt, controlling well over 80% of the seats in
parliament. In the 2000 parliamentary electionselection, popular dissatisfaction with the
status status
quo led to the defeat of many NDP incumbents, though the party maintained
its its
supra-majority in parliament after a number of "independents"“independents” who had been NDP
members rejoined the party. Thereafter, NDP officials embarked on a campaign to
improve the party'’s public image, holding the first party congress in ten years in
2002. Since then, the NDP has held conferences in each successive year, touting a
number of political reforms under the slogan of "“new thinking."” More importantly,
the President'’s son, Gamal Mubarak, was appointed to the NDP'’s higher policy
council, and other young reformers have become more visible in the party. Many
analysts speculate that the NDP is undergoing a generational struggle between an
"“old guard"” linked to tradition and deliberate change and young reformers who want
rapid, far-reaching change. Others believe that even if a "“new guard"” were to gain
control of the party, they would make no dramatic departures from previous NDP
policies.
The Judiciary. Although Articles 64 and 65 of the Constitution guarantee the
independence of the judiciary, the state continues to hold sway over most judges and
courts.I313 However, many analysts consider this branch of government to hold the
most potential for exercising greater "“checks and balances" on the regime.
loIn 1986, President Mubarak called on the military to put down riots in Cairo, sparked by
the protests of Central Security conscripts who were angry with their low pay and poor
working conditions. The military also was deployed in 1977 during riots over a temporary
reduction in food subsidies.
" Irnad Harb, "The Egyptian Military in Politics: Disengagement or Accommodation?" The
Middle East Journal, Washington: Spring 2003. vol. 57, Iss. 2; pg.269.
l2
The NDP's website is available at [http://www.ndp.org.eg/index-en.htm].
l 3 According to Egyptian law #47 (1 972), the Egyptian Justice Ministry controls the pay and
promotion scales for judges, thereby malung many judges hesitant to rule against the
government out of concern for their own careers and livelihoods.
” on the regime.
Opposition Parties & Movements
Political opposition in Egypt is divided among legal opposition parties approved
by the government, the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, considered the most powerfdpowerful
opposition force, and a small array of new movements, such as Kefaya ("Enough"“Enough”),
composed of civil society activists, academics, and intellectuals. By law, political
parties must be approved by the seven-member Political Parties Committee (PPC).
Since 1977, the Committee has approved 18 political parties and rejected almost 50.
The current make-up of the PPC consists of the Shura Council chairman, three
former senior judges, and the ministers of interior, parliamentary affairs and justice.
In September 2004, NDP officials announced plans to amend the 1977 political
parties law by adding three non-partisan public figures to the committee, though its
members would still be chosen by the President.
12
13
The NDP’s website is available at [http://www.ndp.org.eg/index_en.htm].
According to Egyptian law #47 (1972), the Egyptian Justice Ministry controls the pay and
promotion scales for judges, thereby making many judges hesitant to rule against the
government out of concern for their own careers and livelihoods.
CRS-9
Legal Opposition Parties
Most experts regard Egypt'’s legal opposition parties as divided with limited
popular support. In the 2000 parliamentary elections, the principal opposition parties
securedjustsecured just 17 seats, despite widespread popular dissatisfaction with the ruling NDP.
In 2005, these parties fared even worse, winning just 12 seats. Most recognized
Most recognized opposition parties publish their own newspapers, which frequently
criticize the
government and often expose human rights abuses. Most parties receive
government government
subsidies and, in some cases, subsidies from foreign interests.
The Al Ghad Party (Tomorrow) & Ayman Now. In November 2004, the
Political Parties Committee approved the registration of a new political party called
the Al-Ghad (Tomorrow) Party. Al-Ghad is a liberal party that promotes women's
rights, secularism, and democratic reforms. On January 29, 2005, Egyptian
authorities arrested Ayrnan Nour, the co-founder of Al-Ghad and member of the
Peoples' Assembly, allegedly for forging names on petitions required to get the party
authorized. Nour was released from jail on March 12 and finished second with 7%
of the vote in Egypt's first multi-candidate presidential election on September 7,
2005. Analysts note that if Egypt held early presidential elections before 2009, under
current law, Nour would be ineligible to run since a political party must have been
registered for five years in order to field a candidate in a presidential election. As
previously mentioned, Al-Ghad was registered in 2004.
Nour's trial in Egyptian criminal court was postponed after only a few days of
deliberations and is scheduled to resume in late September 2005. During the
campaign, his opponents labeled him as a "U.S. agent," though during a recent
speech Nour reportedly remarked that "we can be for democracy and against the
United States."14 During her June 2005 visit to Egypt, U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice met with Nour and his supporters together with representatives of
other opposition parties.I5
-
l4
"Egyptian Revel in Power of Dissent," Chicago Tribune, May 1 , 2005.
l5
"Rice Observes Limits On Middle East Trip," Washington Post, June 24, 2005.
Nour. Ayman Nour, a former
member of the Egyptian parliament and second place finisher in Egypt’s first multicandidate presidential election in 2005, is currently serving a five-year sentence for
forgery in a prison hospital. His case is pending appeal before Egypt’s Court of
Cassation. Nour’s imprisonment is considered a stumbling block in U.S.-Egyptian
bilateral relations, though opinions differ on how much of an impact his
imprisonment will have over the long term. Until his appeal is resolved, most
analysts believe that improvements in the relationship, such as announcing the United
States’ intention to negotiate a U.S.-Egyptian free trade agreement, will be put on
hold. In addition, Nour’s imprisonment could bolster efforts to alter Egypt’s foreign
assistance package. In 2002, the Administration and Congress rejected $134 million
in new economic assistance for Egypt to protest the imprisonment of Saad Eddin
Ibrahim. In many ways, Nour’s case is a trial balloon for the Administration’s larger
efforts to promote democracy in the region, and many observers are curious as to how
far the Bush Administration will push Egypt on the Nour issue. Experts note that
political reform is just one of a number of U.S. policy goals with Egypt and that other
priorities, including security cooperation, intelligence-sharing, and promoting peace
in the region, could influence U.S.-Egyptian relations.
The Muslim Brotherhood
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was founded in Egypt in 1928 to turn Egypt
away from secularism and toward an Islamic government based on Sharia (religious)
law and Muslim principles.'614 The Muslim Brotherhood operates as a religious
charitable and educational institution, having been banned as a political party in
1954; however, many Muslim Brotherhood members run for parliament as
independents. In the 2000 parliamentary elections, 17 independent candidates, who
were regarded as Brotherhood sympathizers, were elected. In 2005, Brotherhoodaffiliated candidates won 88 seats in parliament. Over the years, the Egyptian
Over the years, the
Egyptian government has alternated between tolerating and suppressing the Muslim
Brotherhood, sometimes arresting and jailing its members, and other times allowing
its members to operate almost without hindrance.
14
The Muslim Brotherhood is generally considered as the parent organization for
Brotherhood branches throughout the Middle East region. Former Brotherhood members
also have formed a number of radical and extremist off-shoots, including Hamas. See Gilles
Kippel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002,
p.151.
CRS-10
Many foreign observers agree that the organization has renounced the use of
violence as a political tactic, while many Egyptian officials continue to perceive the
Brotherhood as a threat and are unwilling to legalize the movement. In the West, the
issue of whether or not to recognize the Muslim Brotherhood as a legitimate political
actor continues to perplex policymakers, particularly after the September 1 1, 200 111, 2001
terrorist attacks. On the one hand, there has been a general reluctance to push for
Islamist inclusion in politics, out of concern that, once in power, groups such as the
Muslim Brotherhood will pursue policies counter to Western interests in the region
or will transform states into theocracies. On the other hand, some experts believe that
if these groups are not brought into the political mainstream, they will eventually
resort to violence out of fmstrationfrustration.
Most analysts believe that, from an organizational standpoint, the Brotherhood
is the only movement capable of mobilizing significant opposition to the government,
though opinions vary on how much mass support the Brotherhood commands. As is
typical for Islamist groups across the region, the Muslim Brotherhood is strongest
among the professional middle class, controlling many of the professional syndicates
(associations), including those representing engineers, doctors, lawyers and
academics. I 715
The Egyptian Movement for Change -— Kefaya (Enough)
In December 2004, a group of political activists, most of whom are secular in
orientation and hail from Egyptian universities, formed the Egyptian Movement for
Change, or what has been referred to in Arabic as Kefaya (enough), their primary
slogan which refers to their opposition to a further term for President Mubarak. Since
its formation, the movement has held a number of small demonstrations, and some
of the group'’s members have been detained. In May 2005, female Kefaya activists
l 6 The Muslim Brotherhood is generally considered as the parent organization for
Brotherhood branches throughout the Middle East region. Former Brotherhood members
also have formed a number of radical and extremist off-shoots, including Hamas. See Gilles
Kippel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002,
p.151.
l 7 John Walsh, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood," Harvard International Review, Cambridge:
Winter 2003, vol. 24, iss.4; p.32.
accused Egyptian police officers of sexually assaulting female protesters, which led
to widespread condemnation of the government by both secular and Islamic
opposition forces. Kefaya, which encompasses a mix of opposition groups,
boycotted the 2005 presidential election.
Civil Society in Egypt
Although political opposition continues to be stymied, observers note that, over
the past two decades, Egypt has developed a vibrant civil society, which some
development experts hope will firtherfurther democratization in the country. The term
"“civil society"” generally refers to the growing number of non-governmental
organizations (NGOsNGO), charities, and advocacy groups that openly operate in
Egyptian Egyptian
society. Many of these groups pursue so-called "“safe issues,"” such as
women' women’s rights,
human rights, and social equality, as a way to work toward the much
broader goal of
democratization. Often times, the Egyptian government has created
its own
associations in order to boost its reform image at home and abroad, such as
the the
government-sponsored National Council on Human Rights.
15
John Walsh, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood,” Harvard International Review, Cambridge:
Winter 2003, vol. 24, iss.4; p.32.
CRS-11
In Egypt, NGOs are required to apply for legal status and, according to
Association Law 84-2003, NGOs must be registered with the Ministry of Social
Affairs. There are an estimated 16,000 registered civic organizations in Egypt. In
some cases, it may take years before the ministry rules on an application, and many
groups are routinely rejected. If an NGO'’s application is rejected, it has few legal
rights and can be shut down. Its members can be imprisoned. However, even
registered NGOs must tread carefully when engaging in sensitive political issues, as
some groups have been periodically closed or have had their legal status revoked.
NGO'’s also must report all foreign donations to the Ministry of Social Affairs.
Overall, tolerance for the activities of non-registered groups varies, and many NGOs
operate without any legal protection.18
16
Saad al-Din Ibrahim. In 20012000, authorities closed the internationallyrecognized Egyptian NGO known as the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development
Studies and arrested its director, Saad al-Din Ibrahim, a sociology professor at
American University of Cairo. Ibrahim, who also holds U.S. citizenship, was arrested
for defaming Egypt by describing discrimination against Coptic Christians and for
not reporting a foreign donation from the European Union for a voter education
project. The international community condemned Ibrahim'’s detention and conviction,
and the United States threatened to withhold Egypt's foreign aid if Ibrahim wasn't
released. On March 18, withheld extra foreign assistance in protest.17 On March 18,
2003, an Egyptian court acquitted Ibrahim, and he was
released. Analysts note that
Ibrahim is not a popular figure in Egyptian politics but
is respected at home and
abroad for his work to promote reform. During the
September 2005 presidential
election, Ibrahim helped organize election monitors to
observe the voting process and
report violations.
l 8 Human Rights Watch, "Current Issues in U.S.-Egyptian Relations
Hamas
With the recent electoral victory of Hamas, Egypt, Israel, and the United States
all have a shared interest in attempting to moderate and isolate a Hamas-led
Palestinian government and prevent it from further exacerbating conflict in the
region. Though Egypt has often tried to steer a neutral course in dealing with the
Palestinians, most observers believe that Hamas’s rise to prominence poses a number
of challenges for Egyptian diplomacy in the region, since the Egyptian government
has traditionally been at odds with its own domestic Islamist groups. On February 1,
16
Human Rights Watch, “Margins of Repression: State Limits on Nongovernmental
Organization Activism,"” July 2005. Available online at [http://hnv.org/english/docs/
2005/07/04/egypt112 17.htmI.
CRS- 11
Current Issues in U.S.-Egyptian Relations
2005 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections
On September 7, 2005, Egypt conducted its first multi-candidate presidential
election, resulting in the reelection of President Hosni Mubarak with 88% ofthe vote.
Although some have credited Egypt for holding a competitive election, many have
criticized the outcome and alleged fraud. President Bush had called for international
monitoring of the election, which was subsequently rejected by Egypt. The
Administration has reiterated its call for international monitoring of parliamentary
elections this fall. For a complete overview of the presidential election and its
implications for U.S. policy toward Egypt and U.S. efforts to promote democracy in
the region, see CRS Report RS22274, Egypt: 2005 Presidential and Parliamentary
Elections, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
Ara b-Israel ihrw.org/english/docs/
2005/07/04/egypt11217.htm].
17
In August 2002, the Bush Administration rejected an Egyptian request for economic
assistance as part of the FY2002 Supplemental Act (P.L. 107-206) in order to protest the
arrest and conviction of Ibrahim. The House Appropriations Committee had already
considered and rejected an amendment to the FY2002 supplemental appropriations bill
(H.R. 4775) to provide $134 million in economic assistance for Egypt. The proposed funds
for Egypt would have maintained the three-to-two ratio of aid to Israel and Egypt; Israel was
slated to receive $200 million in ESF in the supplemental bill.
CRS-12
2006, Egyptian intelligence chief Omar Suleiman demanded that Hamas should “one,
stop the violence. Two, it should become doctrine with them to be committed to all
the agreements signed with Israel. Three, they have to recognize Israel ... If Hamas
won’t commit to these conditions, Mahmoud Abbas is not obliged to ask them to
form a government.”
Arab-Israeli Peace
The 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty has served as the basis for good relations
between Egypt and the United States. Although Israel and Egypt have maintained
cool relations since then, both parties have maintained the peace, and the United
States has continued to underwrite the "costs"“costs” of peace by providing high amounts
of annual economic and military aid to both parties. One "cost"“cost” for Egypt was the
diplomatic isolation it suffered following the peace treaty. In 1979, Egypt was
expelled from the Arab League, an organization it had helped found.19At18 At the time,
the rest of the Arab world had felt betrayed by Egypt for making a separate peace
with Israel.
Despite the treaty, the development of close economic, political, and diplomatic
relations between Israel and Egypt has been limited since 1979. Although there have
been some initiatives in recent years, such as President Mubarak'’s attendance at the
funeral for former Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and recent energy cooperation
agreement^,^'agreements,19 overall relations remain cool. In 1995, relations were strained when
Egypt advocated Israeli signature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Tensions
arose again when Egypt withdrew its ambassador to Tel Aviv in November 2000 to
protest Israeli actions against the Palestinians at the start oftheof the latest intifada. Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon sent two envoys to Cairo shortly after his February 6, 2001
election, reportedly to request the return of the Egyptian ambassador and to seek
Egyptian assistance in moderating Arab League reactions to Israeli policies. Egypt
announced that it would return its ambassador to Tel Aviv at the February 8, 2005
Palestinian-Israeli summit meeting at S h a m al-Shaykh.
l9 Egypt was readmitted to the Arab League in 1989 during a period of renewed international
interest in Arab-Israeli peace.
In June 2005, Egypt and Israel signed a long-delayed $2.5 billion agreement on sales of
Egyptian natural gas to Israel. Under the terms of the agreement, Israeli state-owned utility
Israel Electric Corp will purchase gas from Eastern Mediterranean Gas (EMG), a private
Israeli-Egyptian firm. A pipeline from Egypt to Israel is being built.
20
CRS- 12Sharm al-Shaykh.
Most experts believe that progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is the
key to improved Egyptian-Israeli relations, as well as Israel'’s wider relationships with
the Arab world. hIn light of the continued stalemate on the peace process, President
Mubarak has attempted to act as a broker, advisor, messenger, and arbitrator in the
hopes of galvanizing both sides to take the necessary risks for peace. In addition,
Egypt'’s intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman, has met with Hamas and Palestinian
Authority figures in order to secure ceasefire arrangements with Israel. Since the
resumption of negotiations in the early 1990s, Egypt has taken the following major
actions to support the peace process, among other steps:
0
0
0
0
18
Egypt was readmitted to the Arab League in 1989 during a period of renewed international
interest in Arab-Israeli peace.
19
In June 2005, Egypt and Israel signed a long-delayed $2.5 billion agreement on sales of
Egyptian natural gas to Israel. Under the terms of the agreement, Israeli state-owned utility
Israel Electric Corp will purchase gas from Eastern Mediterranean Gas (EMG), a private
Israeli-Egyptian firm. A pipeline from Egypt to Israel is being built.
CRS-13
!
Endorsed the Declaration of Principles signed by the PLO and Israel
in Washington on September 13, 1993;
!
Hosted the September 4, 1999 S h a mSharm al-Shaykh signing of an
Israeli-Palestinian agreement for implementing past commitments;
!
Hosted the meetings between then Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright and Palestine President Arafat at S h a mSharm al-Shaykh on
October 4, 2000, and also hosted the Arab League meetings that
began on October 2 1; and
21; and
!
Hosted the February 8, 2005 meeting between Israeli Prime Minister
Sharon and Palestinian President Abbas at S h a mSharm al-Shaykh.
Egypt'’s Role in the Gaza Withdrawal. Israel unilaterally dismantled its
settlements and withdrew its troops from the Gaza Strip in August and September
2005. In order to facilitate a smooth transition and take an active role in IsraeliPalestinian peace, Egypt offered to post border guards on the Gaza-Egyptian border,
increase its efforts to reorganize and train Palestinian security forces, and halt
smuggling of contraband into Gaza. After extensive negotiations with Israeli
officials, Egypt is deploying 750 soldiersdeployed 750 border guards to secure "“the Philadelphi Route,"” a strip
of land in Egypt immediately adjacent to the Gaza Strip that is notorious for tunnels
used for smuggling weapons and narcotics. The memorandum of understanding
between Israel and Egypt delineates the type of equipment the Egyptians may use
(small arms and jeeps, no heavy armor) and the length of the patrol area (14km on
the ground and 3 km into the sea).2'20 Most importantly, Egypt is said to have
promised not to provide weapons to Palestinian forces in order to allay Israeli
concerns that such weapons may be used in terrorist attacks.
After the last Israeli soldiers withdrew, Egyptian border guards began allowing
some Gazans to cross the border into Egypt despite Israeli calls for the temporary
closing of the border. Reports indicate that there was an initial surge in Palestinians
crossing and that Egyptian officials may have been reluctant to enforce a strict
closure of the border for fear of sparking a violent confrontation. Egyptian and
Palestinian officials reportedly have agreed to reclose the border after a few days.
21
For a summary of the Israeli-Egyptian border agreement, see [http://www.washington
institute.org/templateC05 .php?CID=2374].
CRS- 13On October 26,
2005, Israel accepted an Egyptian proposal to reopen the Rafah border crossing
between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. Under the terms of the arrangement, the Rafah
terminal will be operated under joint Palestinian-Egyptian management, with
European inspectors monitoring all entrants. The Rafah terminal will be used for the
movement of people only; merchandise will be moved through a new terminal built
in Kerem Shalom, Israel on the Israeli-Egyptian-Palestinian border.
Egyptian officials share the opinion of other governments in the region that the
unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza should be the first step toward a general
withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Palestinian territory. The Egyptians and others
point out that Israeli withdrawal is called for in U.N. resolutions, particularly 242,
and the recent "“Road Map"” approach to peace, and that many Israelis also favor
20
For a summary of the Israeli-Egyptian border agreement, see [http://www.washington
institute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2374].
CRS-14
withdrawal. Egyptian leaders believe that the United States should be less inclined
to accept and support Israeli positions and more inclined to support what they view
as an even handed approach that will ensure Palestinian rights. Egyptians also point
out that the Road Map calls for Israel to stop building and expanding settlements in
the occupied territories, and argue that the United States should be more forceful in
compelling Israel to meet those commitments.
Depiction of Israel and Jews in the Egyptian Media. Egypt, like other
Arab states, has received much criticism for allowing state-owned media outlets to
publish unsubstantiated conspiratorial theories regarding Israel and the Jewish
people, which likely contribute to detrimental or negative views of Israel by the
Egyptian people. Although some Egyptian intellectuals have called for an end to antiIsraeli incitement, Egyptian publications continue to publish stories that perpetuate
allegations of Jewish involvement in blood libels, deny the existence of the
Holocaust, and portray anti-Semitic publications, such as the Protocols of the Elders
of Zion, as
truth.21 U.S. officials and Members of Congress have urged the Egyptian
government to speak out against anti-Semitism in media and society. Egyptian
officials claim that they do not control the "“free press."
lraq”
Iraq
Egyptian Position on the 2003 Iraq War. The Egyptian public'’s
opposition to the Iraq war precluded the government from publicly supporting the
United States. Egypt advised against the March 2003 U.S. intervention in Iraq and
continues to question an extended presence of U.S. forces there. In response to U.S.
efforts to secure Arab participation in stabilizing Iraq, Egypt informed the United
States that it would not participate in any international security arrangements
involving force deployments in Iraq unless they were under United Nations
auspices.23In22 In the past, Egypt did cooperate with U.S.-led international military and
peacekeeping operations, such as the 1991 Kuwaiti liberation, Operation Restore
Hope in Somalia, A f g h a n i ~ t a nand
, ~ ~Afghanistan,23 and the Balkans. Egypt has allowed U.S. overflights
and waived the 30-day prior notification to pass nuclear-armed U.S. warships through
the Suez canal. At a June 2005 conference on Iraq reconstruction, Iraqi Foreign
Minister Hoshyar Zebari announced that Egypt and Jordan were the first Arab
countries sending ambassadors to Iraq. In July2005July 2005, Egypt'’s top diplomat in Iraq was
kidnaped by terrorists and executed several days later.
Training Iraqi Security Forces. Egypt has been active in helping to train
Iraq’s new security forces, and some U.S. lawmakers have demanded that the
21
For a report on instances of anti-Semitism in Egypt, see the Anti-Defamation League'’s
website at [http://www.adl.org/main~Arab~World~main_Arab_World/default.htm].
22
23 "“Friction Over Egypt'’s Role in Regional Issues Strains Relations With U.S.,"” Washington
Post, May 25, 2003.
23
In helping to rebuild Afghanistan , Egypt built a field hospital at Bagram Air Base. It has
declined to send peacekeeping forces there.
24
Training Iraqi Security Forces. Egypt has been active in helping to train
Iraq's new security forces, and some U.S. lawmakers have demanded that the
CRS-15
Administration further utilize Egypt'’s offer of a s ~ i s t a n c eIn
.~~
assistance.24 In late 2004, an Iraqi
infantry company was invited to Egypt to participate in a joint training program with
the Egyptian army. According to the Egyptian government, 134 soldiers from Iraq'’s
5th Infantry Division trained alongside Egypt'’s 3rd Infantry Division at the Mubarak
Military City in northern Egypt. No plans for future joint Iraqi-Egyptian training
exercises have been announced, although Egyptian officials have expressed their
willingness to expand their training program for Iraqi military officers.2625
Terrorism
Egyptian security forces have long been engaged in their own war on terror
against several radical Islamic groups, that have called for the violent overthrow of
Egypt'’s secular government and its replacement with an Islamic state. Two radical
offshoots of the aforementioned Muslim Brotherhood, the Jamaah Islamiya (Islamic
Group) and A1 ~ihad,*'Al Jihad,26 have been responsible for several attacks on high-ranking
Egyptian officials, including A1Al Jihad'’s 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat
and Jamaah Islamiya'’s 1990 killing of the speaker of the Egyptian People'’s
Assembly. Both groups also have attacked tourist sites popular with Western visitors,
bombed Coptic Christian churches, and attacked Egyptian banks and other centers
of commerce. The Islamic Group also has a nonviolent arm which recruits and builds
support openly in poor neighborhoods in Cairo, Alexandria, and throughout southern
Egypt, and runs social service programs. A1Al Jihad has operated only clandestinely,
focusing almost exclusively on assassinations.
-
1992
1992 - 1997 Terror Campaign. Jamaah Islamiya began a terror campaign
in 1992 that in six years resulted in 1,300 deaths (90 of whom were foreign tourists)
and several thousand injuries. The group also assassinated several Egyptian officials.
The government responded with an all-out campaign that included what some viewed
as harsh measures that abused human rights. Egyptian authorities used arrest, search,
and seizure without warrant, detention without trial, conviction without appeal, and,
according to some, physical torture in their drive to stop the Jamaah terrorists. Some
Egyptians defend the use of such measures as necessary to eliminate terrorists and
stop terrorism from threatening an even larger segment of the Egyptian populace.
President Mubarak and other Egyptian officials claimed that the extremists were
financed, trained, and directed by Iranian and Sudanese religious militants and
returning Egyptian volunteers from the Soviet-Afghan war.
25
"24
“Mubarak insists Palestinian, Iraqi Solutions Linked," ”Washington Times, April 14, 2004.
26 25
See CRS Report RL32105, Post-War Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Training,
Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction, by Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard.
26
Over a period of three decades following the 1952 revolution, there were a number of
defections from the Muslim Brotherhood, which had chosen to work within the Egyptian
political system after being crushed by former President Nasser. In the early 1970'’s, radicals
broke away from the Brotherhood and formed Jamaah Islamiya (Islamic Group) and A1Al
Jihad.
27
CRS- 1516
Jamaah leaders inside Egypt announced in 1997 and again in1998 that they were
ending the armed attacks.28In27 In the interim, six men claiming to be Jamaah members
attacked tourists at the Hatshepsut tomb near Luxor in southern Egypt in November
1997, killing 58 foreign tourists and four Egyptians before committing suicide.
Previously, Jamaah members involved in terror attacks tried to escape and did not
commit suicide, which led to some speculation that the Luxor attack was the
desperate act of a few members rather than an action of the whole group. There have
been no major incidents involving Jamaah since the Luxor attack and in June 2000,
Jamaah leaders inside Egypt repeated their claim that they had abandoned violence
and terrorism. Some observers suggest that harsh and persistent police pressure has
greatly reduced if not eliminated the Jamaah threat to Egypt.
Recent Terrorist Activity in Egypt. Over the past two years, there has been
a resumption of terrorist activity in Egypt, in what some suggest could be a revival
of earlier, more violent periods.
!
In October 2004, bombs exploded at two major resorts that cater to
Israelis and other Western tourists in the Sinai peninsula, 34 people
were killed and over 120 were wounded in the attack.
!
On April 7, 2005, an explosion in the Khan al-Khalili market area of
Cairo killed three, including one U.S. citizen. A group called the alEzz Islamic Brigade claimed responsibility for the attack.
!
On April 30, 2005, a man exploded a suicide bomb near the
Egyptian museum while being pursued by police, wounding seven;
and two women, the fianckfiancé and sister of the suicide bomber, fired at
a tourist bus before committing suicide. No one was injured in the
bus attack. Two groups claimed responsibility for the attacks, but
neither claim was confirmed.
!
On July 23, 2005, two car bombs and a set of explosives concealed
in a backpack exploded at various tourist destinations in the
Egyptian resort town of S h a mSharm al-Shaykh. As many as 88 people,
including one American, were killed in the blasts. Investigations into
the attacks have focused on the possible link to a local terrorist cell
who may have committed the October 2004 bombings.
Egypt has suffered through a new wave of attacks emanating from previously
unknown groups in the Sinai Peninsula. One group calling itselftheitself the Abdullah Azzam
Brigades, named after a mentor of A1Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, claimed
responsibility for the October 2004 bombs attacks in Taba and the July 2005 attack
in the Egyptian resort town of S h a mSharm al-Shaykh. After each attack, Egyptian
27
Experts note that Jamaah and A1Al Jihad members who fled Egypt never renounced the use
of violence against the Egyptian government, as both groups ultimately merged with A1Al
Qaeda. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the leader of A1Al Jihad, has long been known as A1Al Qaeda's
"’s
“second-in-command"” to Osama bin Laden. See "“Jihad Militant Leader Calls for Change
to Nonviolence,"” Dow Jones Newswires, February 6, 2000.
28
CRS- 1617
authorities identified some of the perpetrators as members of local Bedouin tribes.2928
Egyptian security forces have launched several operations in the Sinai and have
arrested hundreds of Bedouin suspects, leading some to speculate that police heavyhandedness may be further exacerbating tensions between Bedouin and the state.
The extent of outside involvement in the recent wave of terrorism in Egypt is
still uncertain. Some believe that the nature of the bombings, in which terrorists
closely coordinated their actions against symbolic targets, suggests that A1 Qaeda or
another international group emanating from the Sinai may have supported the
Bedouin operatives. The recent failed attack against a U.S. naval vessel in Aqaba,
Jordan was claimed to be carried out by the group known as A1 Qaeda in Iraq, which
is led by known terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Some analysts have speculated that
this attack is an indication that Zarqawi may be expanding his operations to target
Arab regimes with close relations to the United States. Zarqawi's group has already
claimed credit for the murder of an Egyptian diplomat and the bombing of a
Jordanian diplomatic facility in Baghdad. Some Egyptian observers discount the
possibility of outside involvement and believe that the Bedouin, who have
historically kept their distance from the state, have grown frustrated with poor living
conditions in the Sinai and sought revenge for the mass detentions that followed the
October 2004 bombings.
Status of On September 29, 2005, Egyptian police killed two men from Al Arish who
were involved in the explosions at Sharm al-Shaykh in July 2005. One of the men,
Khalid Mus’ad Salim (age 33), was identified as the mastermind of the terrorist cell
that committed the bombings. Salim had been a dentist in Al Arish before fleeing
to a mountainous region in the Sinai peninsula.
The extent of outside involvement in the recent wave of terrorism in Egypt is
still uncertain. Israeli officials have suggested that Al Qaeda or another international
group operating in the Sinai may have supported the Bedouin operatives. However,
other observers discount the possibility of outside involvement and believe that the
Bedouin, who have historically kept their distance from the state, have grown
frustrated with poor living conditions in the Sinai and sought revenge for the mass
detentions that followed the October 2004 bombings.
Political and Economic Reform in Egypt
Overview. Although there have been no fundamental political changes in
Egypt for decades, recent developments and ongoing trends have led to increasing
pressure on the government to reform and have called into question the durability of
one-party rule in Egypt. Many analysts attribute this opening to the continued
speculation over the health of 76-year old President Hosni Mubarak, the upcoming
parliamentary elections and recentrecent
parliamentary and presidential electionelections, popular dissatisfaction with
the Mubarak
regime, the government crackdown on militant Islamist groups over the
past decade,
and recent local and international calls for democratization in the Middle
East. Some
observers caution that the Egyptian ruling elite, which has embarked on
its own
program of economic reform, has a more limited vision for political
liberalization liberalization
than members of the opposition and many in the international
community.
Government-Driven Reform. In an effort to steer the reform agenda
without relinquishing its grip on power, the National Democratic Party (NDP) has
instituted some political reform measures, while emphasizing the need for economic
growth as a precondition for democratic change. When pressed by outside observers
dissatisfied with this approach, Egyptian officials warn of the potential for instability
On August 1, community.
For a complete overview of the recent presidential and parliamentary elections
and their implications for U.S. policy toward Egypt and U.S. efforts to promote
democracy in the region, see CRS Report RS22274, Egypt: 2005 Presidential and
Parliamentary Elections, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
U.S. Policy to Promote Reform in Egypt . Although the United States has
long advocated the promotion of human rights and political freedom in Egypt, most
experts agree that, prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, economic
28
On August 1, 2005, Egyptian police killed Mohamed Saleh Flayfil, a Bedouin and suspect
in the S h a mSharm al-Shaykh bombings, during a shootout in his mountain hide-out 17 miles east
of the Cairo-Suez highway. Police had been searching for Flayfil, 30, who also was wanted
for bomb attacks last year at the Taba resorts in the Sinai. His brother, Suleiman Flayfil, was
one of the Taba attackers who reportedly died in one of the explosions when he detonated
his charges prematurely. The brothers were reportedly part of an extremist cell based in the
Sinai town of El Arish.
29
CRS- 17
brought about by rapid democratization, particularly if such a process empowered
Islamists. Nevertheless, many Egyptian officials have realized the need to act on
some fronts and have made some changes over the past few years. In 2003, the
government passed legislation to establish the National Council of Human right^,^'
and to abolish hard labor as a penalty. In July 2004, President Mubarak reshuffled his
cabinet, bringing in several young, reform-minded ministers in order to galvanize a
moribund economy, which had contracted over the previous three years, particularly
after the September 11 attacks. The new ministers, who hail from both the private
sector and from academia, are colleagues of Gamal Mubarak.
A significant recent development took place in May 2005, when, in a
nationwide referendum, the Egyptian public approved a constitutional amendment
to allow for multiple candidates in a presidential e l e ~ t i o n . ~For
' details on the
amendment, see CRS Report RS22274, Egypt: 2005Presidential and Parliamentary
Elections, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
Opposition Reform Plans.
Opposition demands have included
constitutional amendments for direct, competitive presidential elections and term
limits, the lifting of the 24-year-old emergency laws which prohibit freedom of
assembly, the loosening of government controls over unions and non-governmental
organizations, freedom of the judiciary, and complete freedom of the press.
Although the opposition has recently become more vociferous in its calls for
real constitutional change, some analysts characterize political life as stagnant and
note the strong disconnect between activist demands for reform and public support
for democratic change. According to Arnr Hamzawy of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, "concepts such as democracy, good governance, and pluralism
evoke, at least partially, distrust among the majority of Egyptian citizens because of
the government's systematic misuse of these principle^."^^
CRS-18
reform superseded political reform in the West’s relations with Egypt. However,
with the recent push for democracy in the Middle East seen as a counterweight to
Islamic militancy and intellectual and social stagnation, U.S. policy regarding Egypt
has been reinvigorated, as policymakers seek to balance U.S. security interests with
U.S. democracy promotion policies.
Through annual foreign operations and State Department appropriations
legislation, Congress provides funding for reform in Egypt through the following
programs: the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Egypt
Office;29 the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), a State Department program
designed to encourage reform in Arab countries by strengthening Arab civil society,
encouraging micro-enterprise, expanding political participation, and promoting
women’s rights;30 the State Department’s Human Rights and Democracy Fund
(HRDF), an account that funds human rights promotion in Muslim-majority
countries; and the National Endowment for Democracy’s (NED) Muslim Democracy
Program.
Many in the Egyptian government appear to feel threatened by the current thrust
of U.S. policy and resist some U.S. advocated changes that seek to empower
opposition movements. Nevertheless, observers agree that President Bush’s
statements in support of democratic reform have prompted Egypt to pay more
attention to the issue and, in some cases, take new steps toward reform. On June 20,
2005, in a speech delivered at the American University in Cairo, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice remarked:
Now, here in Cairo, President Mubarak’s decision to amend the country’s
constitution and hold multiparty elections is encouraging. President Mubarak
has unlocked the door for change. Now, the Egyptian Government must put its
faith in its own people. We are all concerned for the future of Egypt’s reforms
when peaceful supporters of democracy — men and women — are not free from
violence. The day must come when the rule of law replaces emergency decrees
— and when the independent judiciary replaces arbitrary justice. The Egyptian
Government must fulfill the promise it has made to its people — and to the entire
world — by giving its citizens the freedom to choose. Egypt’s elections,
including the Parliamentary elections, must meet objective standards that define
every free election. Opposition groups must be free to assemble, and to
participate, and to speak to the media. Voting should occur without violence or
intimidation. And international election monitors and observers must have
unrestricted access to do their jobs.31
29
For a list of USAID’s democracy and good governance programs in Egypt, see the USAID
website at [http://www.usaid-eg.org/].
30
It was recently reported that, for the first time, MEPI has issued several small grants to
political activists and human rights organizations in Egypt. See “Tentative Steps:
Democracy Drive By America Meets Reality in Egypt,” Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2005.
31
“Remarks at the American University in Cairo, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, June
20, 2005. The full text of the speech is available at [http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/
2005/48328.htm].
CRS-19
Congress also seeks to ensure that U.S. foreign assistance for Egypt is being
appropriately used to promote reform. In conference report language accompanying
P.L. 108-447, the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, conferees specified that
“democracy and governance activities shall not be subject to the prior approval of the
GoE [government of Egypt]. The managers intend this language to include NGOs
and other segments of civil society that may not be registered with, or officially
recognized by, the GoE. However, the managers understand that the GoE should be
kept informed of funding provided pursuant to these activities.”32
Economic Reform. As a developing country with the largest population (and
the second largest economy) in the Arab world, Egypt faces a number of economic
and environmental challenges, including a lack of arable land, high unemployment,
rampant corruption, rapid urbanization, and extreme poverty (30% of the population
lives below the poverty line). Egypt'’s economy revolves around several sectors: the
state; the production of oil and natural gas; the tourism industry; remittances from
over 2 million Egyptians working abroad; revenues from the Suez Canal; agriculture;
clothing and textile manufacturing; pharmaceuticals; and foreign aid. Since the early
The National Council on Human Rights recently published its first annual report,
reportedly recommending abolishing the 1981 Emergency Laws and expressing concern
about torture in prisons. See Arab Reform Bulletin, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, April 2005, Volume 3, Issue 3.
30
3 1 Under the old law, one-third of the members of the People's Assembly nominated a
person to be President, and two-thirds of the members confirmed the nominee, who then
was placed on a ballot in a nationwide referendum for an up-or-down vote.
Amr Hamzawy, "The Continued Cost of Political Stagnation in Egypt," Policy Outlook,
Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
February 2005.
32
CRS- 18
years of Anwar Sadat'
years of Anwar Sadat’s rule, Egypt has been evolving from a centrally controlled,
socialist economy to a free market, capitalist society -— a gradual process that has
created difficult decisions for the Egyptian government, income inequality, and
hardships for the Egyptian people.33
In order to increase foreign investment and qualify for development loans from
international lending institutions, Egypt has had to demonstrate that it is making
tangible progress in liberalizing its economy. In recent years, the government has
reduced public subsidies for basic foodstuffs, privatized many state-owned
corporations, and removed trade
barriers.34 Although analysts remain cautious as to
what effect reforms may have on the economy, the government has recently
streamlined the tax system, canceled many customs duties, and forced smaller banks
to merge with the country'’s four largest banks.
Corruption. Egypt, like other developing nations, has struggled to overcome
high levels of corruption, which many analysts consider the biggest obstacle to
achieving economic growth. Corruption in Egypt is found in all sectors of the
government as, in recent years, a number of high level officials (including several
former ministers) has been indicted for fraud and influence peddling. Moreover,
Egypt'’s bloated, cumbersome bureaucracy is infamous for making bribery a common
practice, as poorly-paid government workers seek additional money and citizens seek
ways to circumvent the maze of public regulations and overlapping agencies. Some
analysts believe that the corruption issue enhances the popularity of the Muslim
Brotherhood, which frequently invokes Islam to rally against the moral corruption in
society. The Egyptian press also has been active in exposing corruption scandals.
U.S. Policy to Promote Reform in Egypt. Although the United States has
long advocated the promotion of human rights and political freedom in Egypt, most
experts agree that, prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, economic
reform superseded political reform in the West's relations with Egypt. However,
with the recent push for democracy in the Middle East seen as a counterweight to
Islamic militancy and intellectual and social stagnation, U.S. policy regarding Egypt
has been reinvigorated, as policymakers seek to balance U.S. security interests with
U.S. democracy promotion policies.
Through annual foreign operations and State Department appropriations
legislation, Congress provides hnding for reform in Egypt through the following
programs: the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Egypt
32
Conference report (H.Rept. 108-792) to accompany H.R. 4818, November 20, 2004.
33
It is estimated that the public sector in Egypt still employs nearly a third oftheof the population.
See American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, Egypt Key Economic Indicators, online at
[http://www.amcham.org.eg/BSAC/EconomicIndicators/EcIndicators.asp] .
33
34 .
34
In 1977, there were mass demonstrations throughout Egypt following the government'’s
decision to cut public subsidies on flour, rice, and cooking oil in order to demonstrate to
international lenders, such as the International Monetary Fund, that Egypt was making
necessary macroeconomic reforms. Over the course of two days, several hundred were killed
and hundreds more arrested, as the Egyptian army was called into the streets to restore
order.
Office;35the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) - a State Department program
designed to encourage reform in Arab countries by strengthening Arab civil society,
encouraging micro-enterprise, expanding political participation, and promoting
women's rights;36 the State Department's Human Rights and Democracy Fund
(HRDF) - an account which funds human rights promotion in Muslim-majority
countries; and the National Endowment for Democracy's (NED) Muslim Democracy
Program.
Many in the Egyptian government appear to feel threatened by the current thrust
of U.S. policy and resist some U.S. advocated changes that seek to empower
opposition movements. Nevertheless, observers agree that President Bush's
statements in support of democratic reform have prompted Egypt to pay more
attention to the issue and, in some cases, take new steps toward reform. On June 20,
2005, in a speech delivered at the American University in Cairo, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice remarked:
Now, here in Cairo, President Mubarak's decision to amend the country's
constitution and hold multiparty elections is encouraging. President Mubarak has
unlocked the door for change. Now, the Egyptian Government must put its faith
in its own people. We are all concerned for the future of Egypt's reforms when
peaceful supporters of democracy - men and women - are not free from
violence. The day must come when the rule of law replaces emergency decrees
-and when the independent judiciary replaces arbitraryjustice. The Egyptian
Government must fulfill the promise it has made to its people -and to the entire
world - by giving its citizens the freedom to choose. Egypt's elections,
including the Parliamentary elections, must meet objective standards that define
every free election. Opposition groups must be free to assemble, and to
participate, and to speak to the media. Voting should occur without violence or
intimidation. And international election monitors and observers must have
unrestricted access to do their jobs.37
Congress also seeks to ensure that U.S. foreign assistance for Egypt is being
appropriately used to promote reform. In conference report language accompanying
P.L. 108-447, the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, conferees specified that
"democracy and governance activities shall not be subject to the prior approval ofthe
GoE [government of Egypt]. The managers intend this language to include NGOs
and other segments of civil society that may not be registered with, or officially
recognized by, the GoE. However, the managers understand that the GoE should be
kept informed of funding provided pursuant to these a~tivities."~'
35 For a list of USAID's democracy and good governance programs in Egypt, see the USAID
website at [http:l/www.usaid-eg.org/].
36 It was recently reported that, for the first time, MEPI has issued several small grants to
political activists and human rights organizations in Egypt. See "Tentative Steps:
Democracy Drive By America Meets Reality in Egypt," Wall Street Journal, April 11,2005.
"Remarks at the American University in Cairo, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, June
20, 2005. The full text of the speech is available at [http:/lwww.state.gov/secretaryld
2005/48328.htm].
37
38
Conference Report (H.Rept. 108-792) to accompany H.R. 4818, November 20,2004.
CRS-20
ways to circumvent the maze of public regulations and overlapping agencies. Some
analysts believe that the corruption issue enhances the popularity of the Muslim
Brotherhood, which frequently invokes Islam to rally against the moral corruption in
society. The Egyptian press also has been active in exposing corruption scandals.
U.S.-Egyptian Trade
Trade Overview. The United States is Egypt'’s largest bilateral trading
partner, while Egypt is the United States' 55thlargest’ 55th largest trading partner.39According35 According to
the Department of Commerce'’s 2004 Country Commercial Guide for Egypt, Egypt
is the largest single market worldwide for American wheat and is a significant
importer of other agricultural commodities, machinery, and eq~ipment.~'
equipment.36 The United
States also is the second largest foreign investor in Egypt, primarily in the oil and gas
sector.
Table 1. U.S.-Egyptian Trade Statistics 2004
Selected Commodities
U.S. Exports to Egypt
$ Amount (Estimated)
($3.1 billion total in 2004)
Cereals
$808 million
Machinery
$514 million
Aircraft
$350 million
Vehicles
U.S. Imports from Egypt
$229 million
($1.3 billion total in 2004)
Apparel
$422 million
Mineral Fuel, Oil
$262 million
Iron & Steel
$254 million
Source: Trade Stat Express, U.S. Department of Commerce
Since the mid-1990s, Egyptian officials have sought to negotiate a free trade
agreement (FTA) with the United States, claiming that an Egyptian-American FTA
could boost Egypt'’s economy by as much as 3%. The two parties signed a Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in 1999. The TIFA established a Council
on Trade and Investment (TIFA Council) composed of representatives of both
governments and chaired by the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and
Egypt'’s Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade. In 1996, Congress authorized the
creation of Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZsQIZ) in order to entitle goods jointly
produced produced
by Israel and either Jordan or Egypt to enter the United States duty free.41
In December 2004, Egypt finally reached an agreement with Israel to designate
several Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) in Egypt under the mandate pf the U.S.Israeli Free Trade Agreement.
Table 1. U.S.-Egyptian Trade Statistics 2004
I
Selected Commodities
I
$ Amount
(Estimated)
U.S. Exports to Egypt
($3.1 billion total in 2004)
Cereals
$808 million
Machinery
$5 14 million
Aircraft
$350 million
Vehicles
1 $229 million
U.S. Imports from Egypt
($1.3 billion total in 2004)
Apparel
$422 million
Mineral Fuel, Oil
Iron & Steel
1 $262 million
I
I
I
$254 million
Source: Trade Stat Exprcss, U.S. Department of Commerce
39
The European Union is Egypt's largest multilateral trading partner.
'O
U S . Department of Commerce,Egypt Country Commercial Guide FY2OO4, October 2003.
41 See CRS Report RS22002, Qualified Industrial Zones in Jordan: A Model for Promoting
Peace and Development in the Middle East?
Human Rights, Religious Freedom, and Women'37 In
December 2004, Egypt finally reached an agreement with Israel to designate several
35
The European Union is Egypt’s largest multilateral trading partner.
36
U.S. Department of Commerce, Egypt Country Commercial Guide FY2004, October 2003.
37
See CRS Report RS22002, Qualified Industrial Zones in Jordan: A Model for Promoting
Peace and Development in the Middle East?, by Mary Jane Bolle, Alfred Prados, and
Jeremy Sharp.
CRS-21
Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) in Egypt under the mandate of the U.S.-Israeli Free
Trade Agreement. Goods produced in Egyptian QIZs allow Egyptian-made products
to be exported to the United States duty-free if the products contain at least 11.7%
input from Israel. On November 1, 2005, the USTR designated a new Qualified
Industrial Zone (QIZ) in the central Nile delta region, bringing the total number of
QIZs in Egypt to four.
Human Rights, Religious Freedom, and Women’s Rights
Egypt consistently ranks poorly in its human rights record, as the U.S. State
Department and international human rights organizations have long documented
instances of torture, arbitrary detainment, and discrimination against women,
homosexuals, and Coptic Christians. According to Human Rights Watch, Egyptian
security forces and police routinely torture and mistreat detainees, particularly during
interrogations. The government has long restricted freedom of assembly, though
recent opposition protests have been permitted and, in some cases, police were absent
from public demonstrations. The government also restricts free speech, as many
newspapers are partially government-owned and tend to follow the government
line.4238 However, Arab satellite televisions, like A1Al Jazeera and others, have
challenged Egyptian state-owned media by broadcasting, among other programs,
opposition demonstrations and interviews with Muslim Brotherhood members.
The 1981 Emergency Laws. After Islamic militants assassinated former
President Anwar Sadat in 1981, officials reinstated a set of laws granting the state
and security forces sweeping powers in order to curb the outbreak of firtherfurther violence.
Over time, these laws, which were extended for three years in February 2003, have
come under heavy scrutiny from reformers and human rights advocates for their
arbitrary application to non-security cases. According to the 2004 State Department
Report on Human Rights Practices in Egypt, the Emergency Laws:
!
!
!
!
authorize incommunicado detention for prolonged periods,
restrict or deny access to counsel for detainees in state security
facilities,
permit the state to refer any criminal case to the Emergency Courts,
in which the accused does not receive most of the constitutional
protections of the civilian judicial system,
suspend the constitutional provisions regarding the right to privacy.
Religious Freedom. There is no official government policy of discrimination
against the 9 million Coptic Christians in Egypt, and the Constitution provides for
equal rights without regard to religion. Nevertheless, critics note that there are no
Christians serving as governors, police commissioners, city mayors, public university
presidents, or deans.4339 Converts to Christianity in Egypt may face bureaucratic
obstacles in registering their new religious status with the state. In addition, there
have been reports of periodic discrimination against small minority communities of
Baha'38
39
Some Egyptian government-owned newspapers will voice anti-government opinions.
Egypt’s Minister of Finance, Yusef Boutros-Ghali, hails from a prominent Christian
family.
CRS-22
Baha’is, Shiites, and Jews (200 remain in Egypt). In an effort to promote tolerance,
President Mubarak in December 2003 recognized the Coptic Christmas, January 6,
as a national holiday.
Women'’s Rights. Although Egyptian women have played major roles in the
country'’s drive for independence and many women currently serve in prestigious
public posts, women face a number of obstacles at the legal, religious, and cultural
42
Some Egyptian government-owned newspapers will voice anti-government opinions.
Egypt's Minister of Finance, Yusef Boutros-Ghali, hails from a prominent Christian
family.
43
levels. For example, according to the U.S. State Department'’s 2004 Human Rights
Report on Egypt, female genital mutilation (FGM) remained a serious problem due
to widespread cultural acceptance, despite the government'’s attempts to eliminate the
practice.44Moreover40 Moreover, personal status laws governing marriage, divorce, custody, and
inheritance discriminate against women, particularly when it comes to divorce, as
there is much societal resistance to breaking up the family unit. Domestic violence
also is a major issue, as some estimate that as many as a third of all married Egyptian
women have faced some form of physical abuse.4541 In recent years, new nongovernmental organizations have started to provide services and counseling to
women, who may be too afraid to go to the authorities.
Military Cooperation
"“Bright Star"” and other Joint Military Operations. The United States
and Egypt conducted the first "“Bright Star"” joint military exercise in August 1983,
and continue to hold periodic "“Bright Star"” exercises for infantry, airborne, artillery,
and armored forces. The 1983 Bright Star was more than a training exercise:
President Mubarak asked the United States to send Airborne Warning and Control
System aircraft (AWACS) to monitor Libya'’s activity toward Sudan in February
1983. President Reagan sent AWACS planes and crews to monitor Libyan flights and
the AWACS remained to take part in the first Bright Star. AWACS returned to Egypt
in March-April 1984 to monitor Libyan flights toward Sudan after an incident in
which a Libyan plane allegedly bombed Khartoum. On August 1 1,11, 2003, the United
States announced that it was canceling the October 2003 Bright Star exercise because
U.S. armed forces were over-committed in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other areas.
Bright Star exercises are currently underway with over 9,000 U.S. troops
reportedly participating.
"“Desert Storm"”. In the week prior to the August 2, 1990, LraqiIraqi invasion of
Kuwait, President Mubarak traveled to Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia in an attempt
to negotiate a peaceful end to the crisis. After the invasion, Mubarak advised
President Bush to withhold sending armed forces to allow Egypt more time to work
out a peaceful resolution. On August 7, when the United States announced that it was
deploying troops to Saudi Arabia, Mubarak denied a U.S. request to allow U.S.
40
According to the report, an estimated 97% of Egyptian women who have ever been
married had undergone FGM. See U.S. State Department, Country Report on Human Rights
Practices: Egypt, February 2005. Available at [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2004/41720.htm].
41
Human Rights Watch, “Divorced from Justice: Women’s Unequal Access to Divorce in
Egypt,”June 2004. Available online at [http://hrw.org/reports/2004/egypt1204/].
CRS-23
forces use of Egyptian military bases on their way to the Arabian Peninsula so that
he would have time to negotiate (he later granted the request). Mubarak and other
Egyptian officials continued their peacemaking efforts in the Arab League, the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and through personal contacts and
visits with Arab leaders. On August 10, Egypt voted for an Arab League resolution
to send armed forces to defend Saudi Arabia against a possible Iraqi invasion. The
first contingent of Egyptian troops, a commando unit and a paratrooper unit, joined
According to the report, an estimated 97% of Egyptian women who have ever been
married had undergone FGM. See U. S. State Department, Country Report on Human Rights
Practices: Egypt, February 2005. Available at [http://www.state.govlgldrl/rlslhrrpt/
200414 1720.html.
44
Human Rights Watch, "Divorced from Justice: Women's Unequal Access to Divorce in
Egypt,"June 2004. Available online at [http:llhnv.org/reportsl2004/egypt1204/].
j5
U.S. forces along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border the next day, on August 1I11. Egypt stated
that its forces would assist in liberating Kuwait but would not attack or occupy Iraq.
In February 1991, an Egyptian reinforced infantry division of some 30,000 troops
took part in Desert Storm, advancing into western Kuwait in a corridor between U.S.
Marines to the east and U.S. Army forces to the west in Iraq. Egypt suffered 9 killed
and 74 wounded in action in Desert Storm.4642
Egyptian and U.S. military officers state that cooperation in Bright Star
exercises facilitated the U.S.-Egyptian cooperation and military compatibility in
Desert Storm, and Egyptian officers claim that Bright Star and Desert Storm serve
as precedents for future U.S.-Egyptian cooperative ventures. Moreover, Egyptian
participation in Desert Storm provided benefit to the U.S.-led operation in that it
helped broaden the allied coalition that liberated Kuwait. Later, Egyptian troops
served as peacekeeping forces in Somalia and Yugoslavia.
Intelligence Cooperation. Although it is difficult to discern the extent of
U.S.-Egyptian intelligence cooperation, there is a sense among many U.S. security
officials that Egypt'’s long struggle against domestic Islamic radicals has made it a
valuable partner in the global war on terrorism. Since the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, there have been several reports suggesting that the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency has deported several suspected A1Al Qaeda operatives to Egypt
~ ~May, Egyptian
(along with other Arab countries) in order to be i n t e r r ~ g a t e d .Ininterrogated.43 In May, Egyptian
Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif said the United States has dispatched 60 to 70 Egyptian
detainees to their home country since the September 11 attacks.48More44 More recently, an
Italian prosecutor has asked a judge to issue arrest warrants for 13 Americans
accused of kidnaping an Egyptian cleric off the streets of Milan and bringing him to
Egypt in 2003. The cleric reportedly has been held in prison for more than two years
without formal charges, though Egyptian officials have accused him of having ties
to Jamaah ~ s l a m i ~ a . ~ ~
42
On September 14, 1990, then President George H.W. Bush asked Congress to transfer
Egypt'’s $6.7 billion military debt from the Federal Financing Bank of the Treasury
Department to the Department of Defense, and to cancel the debt. President Bush was
rewarding Egypt for cooperating with the Desert Shield operations against the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait and was relieving Egypt ofpartof part of its debt repayment burden. Section 592 of P.L.
101-513, signed into law onNovember 5,1990,on November 5, 1990, provided for canceling Egypt'’s military debt
to the United States.
46
43
This practice is known as "“extraordinary rendition." "” “US ships A1Al Qaeda SuspectstoSuspects to Arab
States,"”Christian Science Monitor, July 26, 2002.
47
48 "44
“Abductee Still Jailed, Lawyer Says; Egyptian Cleric Was Seized in Milan in Alleged CIA
Action," ”Washington Post, July 2 1,2005.
49
Ibid.
21, 2005.
CRS-24
without formal charges, though Egyptian officials have accused him of having ties
to Jamaah Islamiya.45
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt
Since 1979, Egypt has been the second largest recipient, after Israel, of U.S.
foreign assistance, receiving an annual average of over $2 billion in economic and
military aid. Congress typically earmarks foreign assistance for Egypt in the foreign
operations appropriations bill. The annual earmark has included a statement that
Egypt should undertake further economic reforms in addition to reforms taken in
previous years.
Economic Aid
Annual bilateral economic assistance to Egypt is typically provided in three
different ways: (1) as a direct cash transfer to the Egyptian government; (2) as part
of the Commodity Import Program, which provides hard currency to the Egyptian
private sector to purchase U.S. agricultural goods; and (3) as funds for USAID
programming in Egypt. In recent years, Congress has sought to specify how Egypt'’s
economic aid would be spent, prioritizing funding for USAID'’s democracy and
education programs. Egypt claims that U.S. assistance programs must be jointly
negotiated and cannot be unilaterally dictated by the United States.
U.S. economic assistance to Egypt has been decreasing since 1998, when the
United States began reducing economic assistance to Egypt and Israel. In January
1998, Israeli officials negotiated with the United States to reduce economic aid and
increase military aid over a 10-year period. A 3 to 2 ratio similar to U.S. aid to Israel
and Egypt was applied to the reduction in aid ($60 million reduction for Israel and
$40 million reduction for Egypt), but Egypt has not received an increase in military
assistance. Economic aid has dropped in annual $40 million increments from $815
million in FY 1998 to $495FY1998 to $455 million in ESF for the FY2006 request5'FY2007 request.46
Military Aid
The Administration has requested $1.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) for Egypt in FY2006 -FY2007 — the same amount as in FY2005FY2006. Almost all of Egypt'’s
FMF is committed to payments on a $3.2 billion arms agreement with the United
States, through which Egypt purchased 24 F-16 aircraft, 200 M-1 tanks, and a Patriot
missile battery. Egypt also receives excess defense articles worth hundreds of
millions of dollars annually from the Pentagon.
45
46
Ibid.
Egypt has periodically received supplemental aid. The FY2003 Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-11) included $300 million in ESF for Egypt, which could be
used to cover the costs of up to $2 billion in loan guarantees. The loan guarantees are to be
issued over three years.
CRS-25
In addition to large amounts of annual U.S. military assistance, Egypt also
benefits from certain aid provisions that are available to only a few other countries.
Since 2000, Egypt'’s FMF funds have been deposited in an interest bearing account
in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and have remained there until they are
obligated. By law (P.L. 106-280), Congress must be notified if any of the interest
accrued in this account is obligated. Most importantly, Egypt is allowed to set aside
Egypt has periodically received supplemental aid. The FY2003 Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-1 1) included $300 million in ESF for Egypt, which could be
used to cover the costs of up to $2 billion in loan guarantees. The loan guarantees are to be
issued over three years.
50
FMF funds for current year payments only, rather than set aside the full amount
needed to meet the full cost of multi-year purchases. Cash flow financing allows
Egypt to negotiate major arms purchases with U.S. defense suppliers.
Recent U.S. Military Sales to Egypt. As stated earlier, Egypt uses its FMF
funds to purchase U.S. defense equipment. By law, Congress must be notified of any
new purchase agreement. Israel has protested U.S. sales of certain military
technologies to Egypt; the Egyptians insist that all U.S. weaponry is used for
defensive purposes and is intended to upgrade or replace its aging Soviet hardware.
The Department of Defense'’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), is
charged with managing U.S. arms sales to Egypt. Recent sales include
0
On July29,2005, one reported
on July 29, 2005, when the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified
Congress Congress
of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Egypt of 200
M 1O9A5 M109A5 155mm self-propelled
howitzers as well as associated
equipment and services. The total value, if all
options are exercised,
could be as high as $18 1 million181 million.
FY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill
The conference report (H.Rept. 109-265) on H.R. 3057, the FY2006 Foreign
Operations Appropriations Bill, provides the full request for Egypt ($495 million in
ESF, $1.43 billion in FMF); however, it designates $100 million in economic aid for
USAID education and democracy and governance programming and conditions
another $227.6 million on economic reform benchmarks set out in a March 2005
memorandum of understanding between the United States and Egypt. In addition,
conferees stated that “not less than 50 percent of the funds for democracy,
governance and human rights be provided through non-governmental organizations
for the purpose of strengthening Egyptian civil society organizations, enhancing their
participation in the political process and their ability to promote and monitor human
rights.”47 Finally, conferees did not include a Senate provision conditioning U.S.
assistance to Egypt on the construction of an FM transmitter tower for Radio Sawa.
U.S. Assistance to Egypt: Possible Changes
Some lawmakers believe that U.S. assistance to Egypt has not been effective in
promoting political and economic reform and that foreign assistance agreements
should be renegotiated to include benchmarks that Egypt would need to meet to
continue to qualify for U.S. foreign aid. Others have periodically called for
restrictions on U.S. aid to Egypt based on the allegations that Egypt indirectly
supports Palestinian terrorism, suppresses its own population, including minority
47
Conference report (H.Rept. 109-265) on H.R. 3057, Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2006, November 2, 2005.
CRS-26
Christians, and continues to allow Egyptian state-owned media outlets to publish
unsubstantiated conspiratorial theories regarding Israel and the Jewish people.
The Administration and Egyptian government assert that reducing Egypt'’s
military aid would undercut peace between Israel and Egypt. Overall, many U.S.
observers believe that U.S. support for Egypt stabilizes the region and extends U.S.
influence in the most populous Arab country. Supporters of continued U.S. assistance
note that Egypt helps train Iraqi and Palestinian security forces, cooperates with the
U.S. military, and will be helping to patrol the Egyptian-Gaza border after Israel'’s
withdrawal.
An amendment offered on July 15, 2004, to the House FY2005 foreign
operations bill (H.R. 481 84818) would have reduced U.S. military aid to Egypt by $570
million and increased economic aid by the same amount, but the amendment failed
by a vote of 131 to 287. More recently, an amendment offered on June 28, 2005 to
the House FY2006 foreign operations bill (H.R. 3057) would have reduced U.S.
military aid to Egypt by $750 million and would have transferred that amount to child
survival and health programs managed by USAID. The amendment failed by a
recorded vote of 87 to 326.
H.R. 3057, the House FY2006 foreign operations bill, earmarks $100 million
in ESF for good governance and education programs in Egypt, a doubling ofprevious
obligated amounts. The Senate version provides $35 million for democracy and
governance programs in Egypt.
H.R. 2601, the FY2006lFY20072601, the FY2006/FY2007 House Foreign Relations Authorization bill,
would reduce U.S. military assistance to Egypt by $240 million over the next three
fiscal years, while using the same amount of funds to promote economic changes,
fight poverty, and improve education in Egypt. There is no companion provision in
the Senate'’s Foreign Relations Authorization bill (S. 600). Section 535 of H.R. 2601
would establish a number of requirements Egypt would have to meet in order to
continue receiving U.S. economic assistance. It also would make cash flow financing
benefits available only for projects focused on economic reform, education, and
poverty reduction rather than for military purchases. Finally, H.R. 2601 would
transfer any interest earned from amounts in an interest bearing account for Egypt'’s
FMF to the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) for reform-oriented
programming in Egypt.
Table 2. Recent U.S. Aid to Egypt
(millions of dollars)
Year
Economic
Total
28969.2
Military
32735.4
IMET
36.1
Total
61740.7
Notes: FY2004 totals reflect the .59% across-the-board reduction. The
Administration has requested $1.3 billion in FMF, and $495 million in ESF
for FY2006.
Table 3. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt, 1946-1997
(millions of dollars)
Notes:
Totals may not add due to rounding.
No U.S. aid programs for years 1947, 1949, 1950, 1968, 1969, 1970, and 1971.
P.L. 480 I1 Grant for 1993 includes $2.1 million in Sec. 416 food donations.
= Transition
Quarter; change from June to September fiscal year
than $100,000
= International Military Education and Training
I.M.E.T.
= United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UNRWA
= Surplus Property
Surplus
Tech Asst = Technical Assistance
= International Narcotics Control
Narc.
= Development Assistance
D. A.
= Economic Support Funds
ESF
P.L. 480 1 = Public Law 480 (Food for Peace), Title I Loan
P.L. 480 I1 = Public Law 480 (Food for Peace), Title I1 Grant
= Preliminary
P
= less
1948-1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Total
Economic
23,288.6
815.0
775.0
727.3
695.0
655.0
911
571.6
530.7
28969.2
Military
22353.5
1300
1,300.0
1,300.0
1,300.0
1,300.0
1300
1292.3
1289.6
32735.4
IMET
27.3
1
1
1
1
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.2
36.1
Total
45669.4
2,116.0
2,076.0
2,028.3
1996
1,956.0
2212.2
1865.3
1821.5
61740.7
Notes: FY2004 totals reflect the .59% across-the-board reduction.
CRS-27
Table 3. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt, 1946-1997
(millions of dollars)
1946
9.6
Military
Loan
—
1948
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
TQ
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997P
Total
1.4
0.1
1.2
12.9
4
66.3
33.3
1
0.6
44.8
65.9
73.5
200.5
146.7
95.5
97.6
27.6
12.6
1.5
0.8
21.3
370.1
464.3
552.5
907.8
943.2
2588.5
1167.3
1681.2
1967.3
2332
2470.8
2468.7
2539.1
2317
2174.9
2269.6
2397.4
2300.2
2235.1
2052.9
1868.6
2414.5
2116.6
2116
45669.4
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
1500
—
550
700
900
900
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
4550
Year
Total
Military
Grant
—
I.M.E.T
Grant
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
200
425
465
1175
1244.1
1300
1300
1300
1294.4
1300
1300
1300
1300
1300
1300
1300
17803.5
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
0.4
0.8
0.8
2.4
1.9
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.8
1.5
1.5
1.6
1.9
1.8
1.8
0.8
1
1
1
27.3.0
Misc. Economic
Grant
9.3 Surplus
0.3 UNWRA
1.4 Surplus
0.1 Tech Asst
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.1 Narc.
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
11.2
CRS-28
Year
1946
1948
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
TQ
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997P
Total
D.A.
Loan
—
—
—
—
—
—
7.5
—
—
—
—
15.4
—
20
36.3
—
—
—
—
1.5
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
80.7
D.A.
Grant
—
—
—
0.4
12.9
3.3
35.3
2.6
0.7
0
2
5.7
2.3
2.2
2.3
1.4
2.3
1.5
0.8
—
—
—
—
5.4
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
1.5
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
—
—
82.8
ESF
Loan
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
20
10
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
194.3
150
429
600
617.4
250
280
70
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
2620.7
ESF
Grant
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
8.5
58.5
102.8
107.8
99.2
133.3
585
585
759
771
750
852.9
1065.1
1069.2
819.7
717.8
815
898.4
780.8
892.9
747.0
561.6
1113.3
815
815
15923.8
P.L.
480 I
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
13.2
—
—
33.9
36.6
48.6
114
78.5
85.2
84.9
16.4
—
—
—
9.5
104.5
201.7
14.6
196.8
179.7
230.7
285.3
272.5
262
238.3
237.5
213.8
217.5
191.7
153
150.5
203
165
40.4
—
35
—
—
—
4,114.3
Notes:
Totals may not add due to rounding.
No U.S. aid programs for years 1947, 1949, 1950, 1968, 1969, 1970, and 1971.
P.L. 480 II Grant for 1993 includes $2.1 million in Sec. 416 food donations.
P.L.
480 II
—
—
—
0.8
—
0.7
23.5
17.5
0.3
0.6
8.9
8.2
22.6
44.3
19.6
8.9
10.4
9.7
11.8
—
0.8
3.3
12.8
4.4
1.1
11.7
12.5
22.4
16.1
28.9
31.9
16.8
13.7
13.2
6.6
3.9
2.6
1.2
—
52.5
—
4.1
6.2
—
0.6
—
455.1
CRS-29
TQ
*
I.M.E.T.
UNRWA
Surplus
Tech Asst
Narc.
D. A.
ESF
P.L. 480 I
P.L. 480 II
P
= Transition Quarter; change from June to September fiscal year
= less than $100,000
= International Military Education and Training
= United Nations Relief and Works Agency
= Surplus Property
= Technical Assistance
= International Narcotics Control
= Development Assistance
= Economic Support Funds
= Public Law 480 (Food for Peace), Title I Loan
= Public Law 480 (Food for Peace), Title II Grant
= Preliminary