Order Code RS21968
Updated August 2, 2005January 10, 2006
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Elections for a transitional National Assembly, provincial councils, and a Kurdish
regional assembly were held on January 30, 2005. Insurgent violence has remained
high, but a government has been formed, a permanent constitution is being drafted, and
additional Sunni Arabs are being brought into the new power structure. See CRS
Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance. and government (January 30, 2005),
a permanent constitution (October 15), and a permanent (four year) Council of
Representatives and government (December 15) have been concluded despite insurgent
violence. U.S. officials hope that the high turnout among Sunni Arabs in the December
15 elections — and post-election bargaining among all factions — will produce an
inclusive government that reduces insurgent violence. (See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq:
U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance, by Kenneth Katzman.)
Shortly after Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) deposed Saddam Hussein’s regime in
April 2003, the Bush Administration linked the end of U.S. military occupation to the
completion of a new constitution and the holding of national elections, tasks expected to
take two years. Prominent Iraqis prevailed on the Bush persuaded the Administration to accelerate the
process,
and sovereignty was given to an appointed Iraqi government on June 28, 2004.
A new , with a
government and a permanent constitution were to be voted on thereafter. The
subsequent transition was laid out in a , as stipulated in a
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), signed on
March 8, 2004, as follows:1
1
!
The elections held on January 30, 2005 (within the prescribed time
frame) TAL’s deadline)
were for a 275-seat National Assembly; for a provincial assembly
in each of
Iraq’s 18 provinces (41 seats each; 51 for Baghdad); and for a
Kurdistan a Kurdistan
regional assembly (111 seats). Results are in table below.
!
The TAL specified no deadline for the elected National Assembly to
select an executive (aThe Assembly would choose a
transitional “presidency council” of a president and two deputy
presidents) by a two-thirds Assembly vote. The presidency council had
two weeks to choose a prime minister by consensus, and the Prime
Minister had one month to obtain Assembly confirmation of his cabinet
choices. The Prime Minister and his cabinet are subject to confirmation
by a majority Assembly vote. Cabinet ministers may be persons not in
the Assembly.
For text, see [http://cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html].
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
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(a president and two deputies), and a
prime minister with executive power, and a cabinet.
!
The National Assembly is towould draft a constitution by August 15, 2005, to
to be put to a national vote by October 15, 2005. Two-thirds of the voters
in any three Iraqi provinces may veto the constitution, essentially giving
Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites a veto. If the permanent constitution is
approved, elections for a permanent government are to occur by
December 15, 2005, and it referendum by October 15, 2005. The draft could be vetoed
with a two-thirds majority of the votes in any three provinces. A
permanent government would be elected by December 15, 2005, and it
would take office by December 31, 2005. If
the a constitution iswas defeated,
For text, see [http://cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html].
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
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the December 15 elections would be for a
new transitional National Assembly and a new draft is to be voted on by
October 15, 2006.
The Election Process and Planning
In June 2004, the United Nations formed an 8-member central Independent Electoral
Commission of Iraq (IECI), nominated by notables from around Iraq, to run the election
process. CPA Orders 92, 96, and 97, issued in mid-2004, provided for voting by
(which would draft a new constitution).
January 30 Elections
The January 30, 2005 elections, run by the “Independent Electoral Commission of
Iraq” (IECI) were conducted by proportional representation (closed list). Voters; voters chose
among “political entities”: (a party,
a coalition of parties, or individuals running as independents). Seats in the
Assembly (and
and the provincial assemblies) were allocated in proportion to a slate’s showing. Any entity
that obtained;
any entity receiving at least 1/275 of the vote (about 31,000 votes) obtainedwon a seat. Under IECI
rules, aA female
candidate occupied every third position on electoral lists in order to meet
the TAL’s goal
for at least 25% female membership in the new Assembly. A total of 111
entities were on the National
Assembly ballot: 9 were multi-party coalitions, 75 were
single parties, and 27 were individual persons.
The 111 entities contained over 7,000
candidates. AnotherAbout 9,000 candidates, also organized into
party slates, competed in the
ran in provincial and Kurdish elections.
Under an Iraqi decision, Iraqis abroad, estimated at about 1.2 million, were eligible
to vote. In the January 30 (and December 15) elections, Iraqis abroad were eligible to vote.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was tapped to run the “outofout-of-country voting” (OCV) program. U.N. electoral advisers had opposed OCV because
of the complexity of the task, as well as the expense. 2 About 275,000 Iraqi expatriates
(including dual citizens and anyone who can demonstrate that their father was Iraqi)
registered, and about 90% of them voted.
Inside Iraq, certification of voters and political entities took place November 1December 15, 2004. Voter lists were based on ration card lists containing about 14
million names; voters needed to be at least 18 years old. Voters did not need to formally
“register,” but they verified or corrected personal information on file at 550 food ration
distribution points around Iraq. In the most restive areas, this verification process did not
take place, but voters were able to vote by presenting valid identification on election day.
Each political entity was required to obtain 500 signatures from eligible voters and pay
about $5,000. About 5,200 polling centers were established; each center housed several
polling stations. About 6,000 Iraqis staffed the branches of the IECI around Iraq, and
200,000 Iraqis staffed the polls on election day.
2
The 14 countries in which this voting took place were
voting” (OCV) program. OCV took place in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Iran, Jordan, Netherlands, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, UAE, Britain, Netherlands, and the United States.
For more information on the out-of-country voting, see [http://www.iraqocv.org].
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Security, Logistics, and Funding
Election security was an issue under nearly constant review in the months before the
election, but in December 2004, President Bush stated that postponement would represent
victory for the insurgents and that elections should proceed as scheduled. That U.S.
insistence came despite a postponement petition in November 2004 by seventeen mainly
Sunni Arab parties. Prior to the election, insurgents repeatedly targeted polling stations
and threatened to kill anyone who voted. In an effort to secure the vote, U.S. force levels
in Iraq rose to 150,000 from the prior level of about 138,000. Polling centers were
guarded on election day by the 130,000 members of Iraq’s security forces, with U.S.
forces close by for back-up. Two days prior to election day, all vehicle traffic was
banned, Iraq’s borders were closed, and polling locations were confirmed.
Security concerns also affected the ability of the United Nations to assist Iraq’s
election. The 100-person U.N. contingent in Iraq included only 19 election specialists,
with another 12 U.N. election specialists based in Jordan. U.S. officials obtained some
donors to a protection force for the U.N. contingent, provided for by U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1546 (June 8, 2004) — Fiji deployed 130 troops and Georgia
deployed 691. Vote monitoring was limited to a Canada-led contingent of about 25
observers from eleven nations based in Jordan, which assessed reports on the voting by
about 50,000 Iraqi monitors. (One of the international observers was in Iraq). Another
129 foreign observers, mainly foreign diplomats posted to Iraq, did some monitoring
from Baghdad’s “Green Zone.”
Funding. The Iraqi government budgeted about $250 million for the elections
inside Iraq, of which $130 million was offset by international donors, including about $40
million from the European Union. Out of $18.6 billion in U.S. funds for Iraq
reconstruction contained in an FY2004 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 108-106), the
United States provided $40 million to improve the capacity of the IECI; $42.5 million for
elections monitoring by Iraqis; and $40 million for political party development, through
the International Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute. The out-ofcountry voting cost an additional $92 million, of which $11 million was for the U.S.
component. No U.S. funds were spend for the out-of-country voting.
Election Competition and Results3
The Iraqi groups that took the most active interest in the elections were primarily
those parties best positioned to win seats: Shiite Islamist parties, the Kurds, and
established secular parties. The most prominent slate was the “United Iraqi Alliance”
(UIA), brokered by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and his top aides. The 228-candidate
UIA slate consisted of 22 parties, but dominated by two large Shiite Islamist parties, the
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Da’wa Party. Both,
but particularly SCIRI, are politically close to Tehran. The first candidate on this slate
was SCIRI leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim; Da’wa leader Ibrahim Jafari was number
seven. There were 14 supporters of radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr on the slate —
of which eight won seats — even though Sadr himself denounced the election as a
3
For a detailed discussion of many of these groups, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S.
Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance.
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product of U.S. occupation. Pro-Sadr Shiites also competed separately on a “National
Independent Elites and Cadres” list and competed in provincial elections.
Among other major slates, the two main Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) put aside lingering rivalries
to offer a joint 165-candidate “Kurdish Alliance” list. Interim Prime Minister Iyad alAllawi filed a six-party, 233-candidate “Iraqi List” led by his Iraqi National Accord (INA)
party, but including tribal leaders and some secular Sunnis and Shiites. The Communist
Party, headed by Hamid al-Musa, filed a 257-candidate “People’s Union” slate.
Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population), perceiving electoral defeat and
insurgent intimidation, mostly stood on the sidelines. The relatively moderate Sunni
Islamist group, the Iraqi Islamic Party, filed a 275-seat slate, but it withdrew from the
election in December 2004. The Iraqi Muslim Clerics’ Association, which is said to be
close to the insurgents, did not compete and called for a Sunni boycott. On the other
hand, an 80-candidate, mostly tribal Sunni, “Iraqis Party” slate was offered by interim
President Ghazi al-Yawar. Adnan Pachachi, a Sunni elder statesman who heads the Iraqi
Independent Democrats, offered a slate consisting mostly of Sunni professionals. A promonarchist slate of the Movement for Constitutional Monarchy (MCM) was mostly Sunni
as well. Some Sunni groups that boycotted the National Assembly contest nonetheless
participated in the provincial assembly elections.
The vote was conducted relatively smoothly. Insurgents conducted about 300
attacks, killing about 30 Iraqis, but no polling stations were overrun, and Shiite and
Kurdish voters appeared mostly undeterred. Total turnout was about 58% (about 8.5
million votes). After the polls closed, President Bush said “In great numbers and under
great risk...The Iraqi people, themselves, made this election a resounding success.” World
reaction was favorable, including from governments, such as France and Germany, that
have criticized U.S. Iraq policy. Members of Congress widely praised the vote.
National Assembly results, contained in a table below, appeared to match many
predictions. Sunnis hold only 17 seats (about 6% of the total seats), leaving them underrepresented relative to the population, and Kurds and Shiites over-represented. There are
about 90 women in the Assembly. In provincial elections, the Kurds won about 60% of
the seats in Tamim (Kirkuk) province (26 out of 41 seats); Sunni Arabs hold 6 and
Turkomens hold 9 seats. This has strengthened Kurdish attempts to gain control of oilrich city of Kirkuk and provoked an Arab and Turkmen boycott of that council.
Post-Election Government
The election results triggered factional bargaining over positions in the new
government and the future of Iraq; much of the negotiating centered on Kurdish demands
for substantial autonomy, control over resources, and the incorporation of Kirkuk, which
has a large Kurdish population, into the Kurdish-administered areas in northern Iraq.
Press reports suggest that the UIA and Kurdish blocs agreed to defer some of these issues,
but Sunnis were left unsatisfied at the extent of their incorporation into the government.
The groups began establishing the new government on April 3 with the naming of
a National Assembly speaker (Hajim al-Hassani, a Sunni from Ghazi Yawar’s list) and
two deputies: Arif Tayfour, a Kurd, and Hussein Shahristani, an aide to Ayatollah Sistani.
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On April 6, the presidency council was approved: PUK leader Jalal Talabani, whom the
Kurds were pushing for president, was given that post. His two deputies are SCIRI’s
Adel Abd al-Mahdi and Ghazi al-Yawar. They named the UIA’s choice for Prime
Minister, the Da’wa Party’s Ibrahim al-Jafari, to that post. Subsequently:
!
On April 28, Jafari received Assembly approval for a cabinet of 32
ministers, of which six are women, and 3 deputy prime ministers.4
Leading anti-Saddam figure Ahmad Chalabi and KDP activist Rosch
Shaways were named deputy prime ministers. Five cabinet positions
and a deputy prime ministership was initially filled only temporarily or
left vacant, pending an agreement to appoint more Sunnis.
!
On May 7, Jafari filled out the cabinet by appointing three Sunnis and
two Shiites to ministerial posts, and the remaining deputy prime minister
(Abid al-Jabburi, a Sunni). However, the nominated Minister of Human
Rights, Hashim al-Shibli, refused to take up his post on the grounds that
he was appointed only because he is a Sunni. (That post is filled by a
Kurdish woman on an acting basis). Even though these latter
appointments included a Sunni, Sadoun al-Dulaymi, as Defense Minister,
Sunni Arabs complained that Sunnis hold slots considered relatively
unimportant, such as the ministries of culture and of women’s affairs.
Of the four other major posts, SCIRI activists hold two — Interior and
Finance; the Oil Minister is an independent Shiite Islamist; and a KDP
activist is Foreign Minister.
Permanent Constitution
Continuing the transition process, on May 10, the National Assembly appointed a
55-member committee (all Assembly members) to begin drafting the permanent
constitution. The UIA was given 28 slots, and a SCIRI top official, Humam alHammoudi, was named committee chair. The Kurdish alliance was given 15 slots, and
Allawi’s bloc got 8 seats. Also appointed were one Christian, one Turkomen, and two
Sunni Arabs, prompting Sunni resentment and some reported U.S. pressure on Iraqi
leaders to appoint additional Sunni Arabs. On June 23, 2005, an agreement was finalized
for 15 additional Sunni Arabs (and one member of the small Sabian community) to
become voting members of the committee, with 10 more Sunni Arabs to serve as
advisors. One voting Sunni and one advisor were assassinated in early July 2005,
causing a several day boycott by the committee’s Sunni Arabs.
Iraqi leaders now say that a draft will be completed by the August 15, 2005, deadline,
although some are suggesting that some major issues discussed below might be left
unresolved in the draft. The committee had considered requesting an extension (there was
an August 1, 2005 deadline for such a request) but reported U.S. pressure led the
committee not to do so. Based on press reports of drafts of the constitution that are
4
In the final cabinet, there are 17 Shiite ministers, 8 Kurds, 6 Sunnis, and one Christian (a
Christian woman is Minister of Science and Technology), in addition to the three deputy prime
ministers.
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circulating, major disputes, which will be discussed at a national conference of Iraqi
factions on August 5, 2005, include:
!
Efforts by the UIA bloc to elevate the role of Islam as a source of law,
including a reported stipulation that families would be able to choose
Islamic courts from their sect to adjudicate domestic issues such as
divorce and inheritance. These provisions have provoked opposition
from women, who want domestic issues to come before civil courts, and
from the Kurds, who tend to be secular Muslims. On the other hand, the
25% electoral goal for women apparently will be retained, and the
concept of equal rights for men and women stated. The UIA bloc also
reportedly wants to designate a special status to the Shiite clergy (the
marjaiyya, currently Sistani) and (mostly Shiite) religious sites, and to
include “Islamic” in Iraq’s name.
!
The Kurdish and Shiite push for a weak central government, and for the
ability of several provinces together to form autonomous “regions” with
their own regional governments. The Sunnis are opposing this concept,
because their region, unlike those inhabited by the Shiites and the Kurds,
lacks oil and they depend on the central government for revenues.
!
The reported Kurdish threat to veto the constitution unless it expands the
boundaries of the Kurdish administrative region, puts in place a process
for the Kurds to gain control of Kirkuk, and allows them to retain their
peshmerga militia.
National Assembly Election Results
Slate/Party
Number of Seats
UIA (Shiite Islamist). About 58% of vote; Shiite turnout 75%
Kurdistan Alliance. About 26% of vote; Kurdish turnout 90%
140
75
Iraqis List (Allawi). About 14% of vote.
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni). 1.8% of vote. Sunni turnout less than 10%
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey
National Independent and Elites Cadre (pro-Sadr)
40
5
3
3
People’s Union (Communist, Sunni/Shiite)
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd)
2
2
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
National Democratic Alliance (secular)
2
1
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (secular)
1
1
States. (See [http://www.iraqocv.org]). About 275,000 Iraqi expatriates (dual citizens
and anyone who can demonstrate that their father was Iraqi) registered, and about 90%
of them voted (in January).
There were about 14 million eligible voters (15 million in the two subsequent votes
in 2005). Voters need to be at least 18 years old. There were about 5,200 polling centers
in January, and 6,200 in the December elections. About 200,000 Iraqis staffed the polls
on both election days. Monitoring was limited in both elections; in January, a Canada-led
contingent of about 25 observers from eleven nations based in Jordan, which assessed
reports on the voting by about 50,000 Iraqi monitors. (One of the international observers
was in Iraq). In the December election, some European parliament members and others
contributed to the monitoring of the voting.
The Iraqi government budgeted about $250 million for the January elections, of
which $130 million was offset by international donors, including about $40 million from
the European Union. Out of $21 billion in U.S. reconstruction funds, the United States
provided $40 million to improve IECI capacity; $42.5 million for Iraqi monitoring; and
$40 million for political party development, through the International Republican Institute
and National Democratic Institute. OCV cost an additional $92 million, of which $11
million was for the U.S. component, but no U.S. funds were spent for OCV.
Competition and Results.2 The Iraqi groups that took the most active interest
in the January elections were those best positioned: Shiite Islamist parties, the Kurds, and
established secular parties. The most prominent slate was the Shiite Islamist “United Iraqi
Alliance” (UIA), consisting of 228 candidates from 22 parties, primarily the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Da’wa Party. It was backed
2
For a detailed discussion of many of these groups, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Regime
Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance, by Kenneth Katzman.
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by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The first candidate on this slate was SCIRI leader Abd
al-Aziz al-Hakim; Da’wa leader Ibrahim al-Jafari was number seven. Even though
radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr denounced the election as a product of U.S.
occupation, 14 of his supporters were on the UIA slate; eight of these won seats. Some
pro-Sadr Shiites also competed separately. The two main Kurdish parties, the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) offered a joint 165candidate “Kurdish Alliance” list. Interim Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi filed a six-party,
233-candidate “Iraqi List” led by his Iraqi National Accord (INA) party. The Communist
Party filed a 257-candidate “People’s Union” slate.
Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population), perceiving electoral defeat and
insurgent intimidation, mostly boycotted and won only 17 seats. The relatively moderate
Sunni “Iraqi Islamic Party” (IIP), filed a 275-seat slate, but it withdrew in December 2004.
The hard-line Iraqi Muslim Clerics’ Association (MCA), said to be close to the
insurgents, called for a Sunni boycott.
Violence was far less than some anticipated. Polling centers were guarded on
election day by the 130,000 members of Iraq’s security forces, with the 150,000 U.S.
forces in Iraq available for backup. Two days prior to election day, vehicle traffic was
banned, Iraq’s borders were closed, and polling locations were confirmed. On election
day in January, insurgents conducted about 300 attacks but no polling stations were
overrun. (Security measures were similar for the October 15 and December 15 votes,
although with more Iraqi troops and police available (about 215,000) than in January.)
Total turnout in January was about 58% (about 8.5 million votes); results are in
Table 1. After the January election, factional bargaining over posts in the transition
government and the future of Iraq centered on Kurdish demands for substantial autonomy,
delaying formation of the government. On April 3, Hajim al-Hassani, a Sunni from the
Iraqi Islamic Party but who ran on former president Ghazi al-Yawar’s list, was named
Assembly speaker. Arif Tayfour, a Kurd, and Hussein Shahristani, an aide to Ayatollah
Sistani, as his two deputies. On April 6, PUK leader Jalal Talabani was named president,
along with two deputy presidents: SCIRI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi and Yawar. The three
named Ibrahim al-Jafari as Prime Minister. On April 28, Jafari received Assembly
approval for a cabinet of 32 ministers and three deputy prime ministers.3 Leading antiSaddam figure Ahmad Chalabi and KDP activist Rosch Shaways were named deputy
prime ministers. Five cabinet positions and a deputy prime ministership was initially
filled only temporarily or left vacant, pending an agreement to appoint more Sunnis. On
May 7, Jafari appointed three more Sunni ministers, along with two Shiites, as well as a
Sunni (Abid al-Jabburi) to be the third deputy prime minister. Even though these latter
appointments included a Sunni, Sadoun al-Dulaymi, as Defense Minister, Sunnis
complained that they were given relatively unimportant slots, such as the ministries of
culture and of women’s affairs. In provincial elections, the Kurds won about 60% of the
seats in Tamim (Kirkuk) province (26 out of 41 seats), strengthening the Kurds’ efforts
to gain control of the province.
3
The final cabinet is composed of 17 Shiite ministers, 8 Kurds, 6 Sunnis, and 1 Christian (a
Christian woman is Minister of Science and Technology), in addition to the 3 deputy prime
ministers. There are 6 female ministers.
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Permanent Constitution and Referendum
The next step in the transition process was the drafting of a permanent constitution.
On May 10, the National Assembly appointed a 55-member drafting committee, with a
SCIRI official, Humam al-Hammoudi, as chair. The committee included only two Sunni
Arabs, prompting Sunni resentment, and 15 Sunnis (and one member of the small Sabian
community) were later added as full committee members, with 10 more as advisors. The
committee did not request a six-month extension (there was an August 1, 2005 deadline
to do so), but instead amended the TAL to allow for extensions of the August 15
deadline. The talks produced a draft on August 28 that included some compromises
sought by Sunnis, and the Shiites and Kurds declared it final. The Kurds achieved a
major goal; Article 136 sets December 31, 2007, as a deadline for resettling Kurds in
Kirkuk and holding a referendum on whether Kirkuk will join the Kurdish region.
The constitution (Article 2)4 designates Islam “a main source” of legislation and says
no law can contradict the “established” provisions of Islam. Article 39 implies that
families could choose which courts to use to adjudicate domestic issues such as divorce
and inheritance. Article 34 makes only primary education mandatory. These provisions
provoked opposition from women who fear that the males of their families will decide to
use Sharia (Islamic law) courts for family issues and for girls’ education. The 25%
electoral goal for women was retained (Article 47). Article 89 says that federal supreme
court will include experts in Islamic law, as well as judges and experts in civil law.
Sunni negotiators, including chief negotiator Saleh al-Mutlak of the National
Dialogue Council opposed the August 28 draft because it allowed two or more provinces
together to form autonomous “regions.” Each “region” (Article 117) is able to organize
internal security forces, which in practice could lead to the dissolution of the national
security forces. Article 109 requires the central government to distribute oil and gas
revenues from “current fields” in proportion to population, implying that the regions
might ultimately control revenues from new energy discoveries. These provisions raised
Sunni alarms, because their areas have no known oil or gas deposits. Article 62
establishes a “Federation Council” — a second chamber of a size and with powers to be
determined, presumably to review legislation affecting the regions.
After further negotiations, on September 19, 2005, the National Assembly approved
a “final” draft, with some modifications that Sunnis wanted, including clarifying
government control over water rights, and a statement that Iraq has always been part of
the Arab League. The United Nations subsequently printed and distributed 5 million
copies of the draft. Ending their political boycott, Sunnis registered in large numbers
(70%-85% in some Sunni cities) in an effort to achieve the two-thirds negative vote in
three provinces needed to defeat the constitution. The continued Sunni opposition
prompted U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad to mediate an agreement (October
11) between Kurdish and Shiite leaders and a major Sunni party, the Iraqi Islamic Party,
to add a provision (Article 137) that a panel would convene after the installation of a postDecember 15 election government and, within four months, propose a bloc of
amendments. The amendments require a majority Assembly vote of approval and, within
another two months, would be put to a public referendum under the same rules as the
4
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].
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October 15 referendum. Changes limiting “de-Bathification” process were also included.
The major assumption of the deal is that Sunnis were likely to win more seats in the
December 15 election than they won in the January elections and would be well
positioned to achieve adoption of amendments.
The referendum was relatively peaceful, with total turnout about 60% (about 10
million voting), suggesting high Sunni turnout. Final results (released October 25)
nationwide were 78.6% in favor and 21.4% against. The mostly Sunni provinces of
Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively. The mostly Sunni
province of Nineveh voted 55% “no.” Diyala province, believed mostly Sunni, had a
slight majority “yes” vote (51%). The draft was declared adopted because only two
provinces, not three, voted “no” with a 2/3 majority. The Administration praised the vote
as evidence that Sunnis are moving into the political process.
December 15, 2005 Elections
In contrast to the January election, a July 2005 election law made each province
constitute an election constituency and contribute a fixed number of seats to the new
Assembly. Of the 275-seat Assembly, 230 seats will be allocated that way, and there are
45 “compensatory” seats for entities that did not win provincial seats but garnered votes
nationwide, or would have won additional seats had the election been conducted on a
national basis. The format improved the prospects for Sunnis to win seats. At the
October 28, 2005 deadline, 361 political “entities” had registered: 19 of them were
coalition slates (comprising 125 different political parties), and 342 were other “entities”
(parties or individual persons). A total of about 7,500 candidates spanned all entities.
The most notable difference in the field from January was the filing of major Sunni
slates. Most prominent of them is the three-party “Iraqi Concord Front,” comprising the
IIP, the National Dialogue Council, and the Iraqi People’s General Council. The major
change in the UIA slate from January was the formal inclusion of Sadr’s faction (about
30 candidates on the slate) as well as other harder line Shiite parties Fadila (Virtue) and
Iraqi Hizballah — and the absence of Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress. It ran separately
in the December election. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s office only tacitly endorsed
the UIA slate. Former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi’s mostly secular 15-party “Iraqi
National” slate was broader than his January list, incorporating not only his Iraq National
Accord but also the Communist Party, Yawar’s “Iraqis” party, and Adnan Pachachi’s
“Independent Democratic Gathering.” The “Kurdistani Gathering” slate was little
changed from January, although this time without the Kurdish “Islamic Union” faction.
Turnout was about 70%, mostly because of a Sunni vote that exceeded 50%.
Violence was minor (about 30 incidents). The table below contains estimates of seats the
major blocs have won, based on preliminary results announced December 19. The results
indicate that voters chose lists representing their sects and regions, and did not support
secular, non-sectarian lists such as that of Allawi. The Sunni and secular slates initially
denounced the elections as unfair, claiming that the UIA used its control over governing
institutions to affect the campaign and the vote. The IECI accepted help from
international investigators (Arab League and Canadian and European experts) to look into
about 40 serious allegations of fraud. The Concord Front and some other blocs
subsequently softened their claims of fraud and are participating in post-election
bargaining on a new government. Because of the fraud complaints, certified results will
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not likely be available until mid-January 2006, and the seating of a new government might
take until April 2006, according to some Iraqi politicians. After the certification,
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within 15 days, the new Council of Representatives (Assembly) is to
convene to select a speaker and two deputy speakers;
subsequently (no deadline specified), the Council selects a presidency
council (President and two deputies) with a 2/3 vote of the Council;
within 15 days of its own selection, the presidency council, by consensus
of its three officials, designates the “nominee of the [Council] bloc with
the largest number” as Prime Minister, the post that has executive power;
within another 30 days, the prime minister designate names his cabinet
for approval by majority vote of the Council.
On the apparent strength of the UIA showing, the UIA and the Kurds might be able
to continue their bilateral governing alliance (184 seats are needed to name a presidency
council), although some observers say they might fall slightly short of that threshhold.
In the post-election bargaining that has taken place thus far, the main candidates for prime
minister are Jafari and SCIRI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi (currently a deputy president). Some
give the edge to Mahdi because of SCIRI’s strong support of him. Allawi had hoped to
exploit splits within the UIA, although his chances to regain the position, as well as the
chances of Chalabi, have been diminished by the relatively weak showing of their slates.
U.S. officials have said that, no matter who becomes Prime Minister, they want a broadbased government that gives the Sunnis a significant role, that furthers the chances to
rework the approved constitution to accommodate Sunni concerns, and potentially causes
the Sunni-based insurgency to diminish. The Sunnis are pushing hard to obtain the
position of presidency — a post that might symbolically reverse some of the Sunni sense
of post-Saddam humiliation — although the Kurdish parties are supporting Talabani to
remain in that post.
Major Election Slates (January and December)
Seats
(Jan. 05)
Seats (est.)
(Dec. 05)
UIA (Shiite Islamist); Sadr formally joined list for Dec. vote
140
120-140
Kurdistan Alliance/Kurdistani Gathering
75
45-55
Iraqis List (Allawi); has added some mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote
40
20-30
Iraq Concord Front (Sunni). Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote
—
30-40
Dialogue National Iraqi Front (Sunni, Saleh al-Mutlak) Not in Jan. vote
—
5-10
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was on UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
—
0-1
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
5
—
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
3
—
National Independent and Elites Cadre (pro-Sadr)
3
—
People’s Union (Communist, Sunni/Shiite); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
2
—
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd)
2
—
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
2
1-2
National Democratic Alliance (secular)
1
—
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian); “Nahrain National List” in Dec.
1
2-3
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (secular)
1
—
Slate/Party