Regular Vetoes and Pocket Vetoes: In Brief

Order Code RS22188 July 11, 2005Updated January 4, 2006 CRS Report for Congress .Received through the CRS Web Regular Vetoes and Pocket Vetoes: An Overview Kevin R. Kosar Analyst in American National Government Government and Finance Division Summary The veto power vested in the President by Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution has proven to be an effective tool for the chief executive in his dealings with Congress. Since the founding of the federal government in 1789, 35 of 43 Presidents have exercised their veto authority a total of 2,550 times. Congress has overridden these vetoes on 106 occasions (4.2%). Presidents have vetoed 80 appropriations bills, and Congress has overridden 12 (15.0%) of these vetoes. This report will be updated at the beginning of each new Congress. Constitutional Basis and Importance To become law, the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 7) provides that all bills that have been approved by both houses of Congress must be presented to the President for his approval and signature.1 The President may sign a bill into law within the 10-day period (excluding Sundays) provided in the Constitution,2 let it become law without his signature, or veto it. The Constitution states that, when the President vetoes a bill, “he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated.” This type of action is called a “regular” or “return” veto. If, on the other hand, Congress has adjourned within the 10-day period after presentation of the bill to the President (thereby preventing the return of the bill to Congress), the President may simply withhold his signature, and the bill does not become law — a practice that has been dubbed a “pocket” veto.3 The President’s veto authority is among his most significant tools in legislative 1 These bills include joint resolutions, but do not include proposed amendments to the Constitution, which require a two-thirds vote in each house, and are sent directly to the states for approval. U.S. Constitution, Art. V. 2 U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7. 3 Beginning in 1929, several judicial decisions have attempted to clarify when an adjournment by Congress “prevents” the President from returning a veto. For information on these cases, see (continued...) Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress CRS-2 The President’s veto authority is among his most significant tools in legislative dealings with Congress. Illustrative of this point is the fact that Presidents have vetoed 2,550 bills since 1789; of these, Congress has overridden 106 (4.2%). Moreover, the veto also can be effective as a threat, sometimes forcing Congress to modify legislation before it is presented to the President. This report presents information on how regular vetoes can be overridden by Congress, the number of vetoes by each President, and the use of vetoes in relation to appropriations bills. The report does not address two other types of vetoes — “line-item” vetoes (since the President has no such power at present) and “legislative” vetoes (which are wielded by Congress, not the President).4 Overriding a Veto If a bill is pocket vetoed while Congress is out of session, the only way for Congress to overcome the veto is to reintroduce the legislation as a new bill, pass it through both houses, and present it to the President again for his signature.5 On the other hand, Congress may override a regular veto without introducing new legislation. Upon receiving the President’s veto, his objections are to be entered into the journal of the House in which it originated. The Constitution is silent, however, on what it means for Congress to “reconsider” a vetoed bill, so House and Senate procedures and tradition govern the treatment of bills returned by the President. A vetoed bill becomes a question of “high privilege,” taking precedence over other pending business before Congress. The measure then may be “reconsidered” by being tabled, referred back to committee, postponed to a certain day, or brought to an immediate vote to override the veto. If a twothirds vote is successful in the originating house, the override vote then may be scheduled for the other house. Passage by a two-thirds margin in both houses is required before the end of the Congress in which the regular veto is received. Although the Constitution states that approval requires “two thirds of that House,” congressional procedure, tradition, and judicial rulings have interpreted this requirement to mean two-thirds of those Members present and voting, provided there is a quorum.6 However, neither house is under any constitutional, legal, or procedural obligation to schedule an override vote. It is not unusual for Congress to make no effort to override the veto if congressional leaders do not believe they have sufficient votes.According to Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution, when the President chooses not to sign a bill and instead returns it to the chamber that originated it, the chamber enters the message of the President detailing the reasons for the veto into its Journal and then proceeds “to reconsider” the bill. The Constitution is otherwise silent on how Congress should consider a vetoed bill, and it is therefore House and Senate procedures that govern the treatment of bills returned by the President.6 Passage by a two-thirds margin in both houses is required to override a veto before the end of the Congress in which the veto is received. Although the Constitution states that approval requires “two thirds of that House,” congressional procedure, tradition, and judicial rulings have interpreted this requirement to mean two-thirds of those Members present and voting, provided there is a quorum present. If a two-thirds vote is successful in the originating house, that house informs the other of its decision to override the veto by message. Neither house is under any constitutional, legal, or procedural obligation to 3 (...continued) CRS Report RL30909, The Pocket Veto: Its Current Status, by Louis Fisher. 4 On these types of vetoes, see CRS Report RS21991, A Presidential Item Veto, by Louis Fisher; and CRS Report RS22132, Legislative Vetoes After Chadha, by Louis Fisher. 5 6 Data are not readily available on overridden pocket vetoes. A “quorum” is defined as the number of Members whose presence is necessary for the transaction of business. In the Senate and House, it is a majority of the membership (when there are no vacancies, this is 51 in the Senate and 218 in the House). A quorum is 100 in the Committee of the Whole House. CRS-3For information on House procedures for considering vetoed bills, see (1) William Holmes Brown and Charles W. Johnson, House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents, and Procedures of the House (Washington: GPO, 2003), chapter 57, pp. 901-907; (2) U.S. Congress, Constitution, Jefferson’s Manual, and Rules of the House of Representatives, H.Doc. 108-241, 108th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 2005), pp. 51-56. For information on Senate procedures for considering vetoed bills, see Floyd M. Riddick and Alan S. Frumin, Riddick’s Senate Procedure: Precedents and Practices, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., S.Doc. 101-28 (Washington: GPO, 1992), pp 1381-1389. CRS-3 schedule an override vote. It is not unusual for Congress to make no effort to override the veto if congressional leaders do not believe they have sufficient votes. Vetoes Exercised and Overridden Pocket Vetoes and Returned Vetoes Table 1 shows that, since the beginning of the federal government in 1789, 35 of 43 Presidents have exercised their veto authority on a total of 2,550 occasions. Of that number, 1,484 (58.2%) have been regular vetoes — that is, the rejected legislation was returned to the congressional house of origin, while it was in session, with a presidential message of explanation — and 1,066 (41.8%) were pocket vetoed, or rejected while Congress was adjourned.7 Congress has overridden 106 (7.1%) of the 1,484 regular vetoes. This percentage, though, is skewed downward slightly by the enormous number of vetoes in administrations prior to the 87th Congress (which began in 1961).78 If one counts only the vetoes since 1961 (the beginning of the Kennedy Administration), one finds 350 vetoes and 33 overridden (9.4%). Table 1. Presidential Vetoes, 1789-2005 President Washington Coincident Congresses Regular Vetoes Pocket Vetoes Total Vetoes Vetoes Overridden 1st -4th 2 — 2 — — — — — th th Adams 5 -6 Jefferson 7th -10th Madison Monroe — — — — th th 5 2 7 — th th 1 — 1 — 11 -14 Monroe 15 -18 J. Q. Adams 19th -20th Jackson Van Burenth th — — — — st th 5 7 12 — th th — 1 1 — 21 -24 25 -26 W. H. Harrison 27 th th — — — — Tyler 27 -28 th 6 4 10 1 Polk 29th -30th 2 1 3 — st Taylor 31 — — — — Fillmore st nd — — — — rd th 9 — 9 5 th th 4 3 7 — 2 5 7 — 21 8 29 15 Pierce 31 -32 33 -34 Buchanan 35 -36 Lincoln 37th-39th A. Johnson 7 Coincident Congresses th 39 -40 th11 -14 15 -18 J. Q. Adams 19 -20 Jackson 21st -24th Van Buren th 25 -26 th th W. H. Harrison 27 — — — — Tyler th th 6 4 10 1 th th 2 1 3 — Polk 27 -28 29 -30 7 President George H.W. Bush attempted to pocket veto two bills during intrasession recesses. Congress considered the two bills enacted into law because the President had not returned the legislation. These two disputed vetoes are not included in Table 1. 8 Most of those vetoes prior to 1960 were of private bills, i.e., legislation that would confer benefits upon a single person or company, which were almost never overridden. In 1971, Congress gave administrators more discretion to handle the claims of individuals. Thus, the need for congressionally passed private bills has dropped dramatically — from hundreds per annum to a few dozen — and, therefore, the opportunities for vetoes. On private bills, see CRS Report 98-628, Private Bills: Procedure in the House, by Richard S. Beth. CRS-4 President Grant Hayes Garfield Arthur Cleveland B. Harrison Cleveland Coincident Congresses Regular Vetoes Pocket Vetoes Total Vetoes Vetoes Overridden 41st-44th 45 48 93 4 12 1 13 1 — — — — th 45 -46 47 th th 47th -48thTaylor 31st — — — — Fillmore st nd — — — — Pierce rd 33 -34 th 9 — 9 5 Buchanan 35th -36th 31 -32 4 3 7 — th 37 -39 th 2 5 7 — th th 21 8 29 15 Grant st 41 -44 th 45 48 93 4 Hayes th th 12 1 13 1 Lincoln A. Johnson 39 -40 45 -46 Garfield 47th — — — — Arthur th th 4 8 12 1 th th 304 110 414 2 st nd 19 25 44 1 rd th 42 128 170 5 th th 6 36 42 — Cleveland B. Harrison 47 -48 49 -50 51 -52 Cleveland 53 -54 McKinley 55 -5755th -57th T. Roosevelt 57th -60th Taft Wilson Taft Wilson 6 36 42 — th th 42 40 82 1 st nd 30 9 39 1 rd th 33 11 44 6 5 1 6 — 57 -60 61 -62 63 -66 th Harding 67 th th 5 1 6 — Coolidge 68 -70 th68th -70th 20 30 50 4 Hoover 71st -72ndst nd 21 16 37 3 rd th 372 263 635 9 th 79 -82 nd 180 70 250 12 rdEisenhower rd 83 -86 th 73 108 181 2 Kennedy th 87 -88 th 12 9 21 — L. B. Johnson 88th -90th F. D. Roosevelt Truman Eisenhower Nixon Ford Carter rd 73 -79 th 83 -8687th -88th Hoover F. D. Roosevelt Truman L. B. Johnson Nixon Ford 71 -72 73 -79 12 9 21 — th th 16 14 30 — st rd 26 17 43 7 rd th 48 18 66 12 th th 13 18 31 2 39 39 78 9 88 -90 91 -93 93 -94 95 -96 th th Carter 95 -96 Reagan 97 -10097th -100th G. H. W. Bush 101st -102nd Clinton G. W. Bush Total 39 39 78 9 st nd 29 15 44 1 rd th 36 1 37 2 th th — — — — 1,484 1,066 2,550 106 101 -102 103 -106 107 -109 Sources: U.S. Congress, Senate, Secretary of the Senate, Presidential Vetoes, 1789-1988, S.Pub. 10212, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1992); and U.S. Congress, Senate, Secretary of the Senate, Presidential Vetoes, 1989-1991, S.Pub.102-13, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1992). Perhaps CRS-5 It is, perhaps, noteworthy is that the present President has not wielded his veto thus far — a modern anomaly. Not since the presidency of Millard Fillmore (1850-1853) has a President served a full term without wielding his veto; not since the presidency of Thomas Jefferson (1801-1809) has a two-term President left office without vetoing a bill. CRS-5 bill. Vetoes of Appropriation Bills A veto of an appropriations bill can result in the closure of federal agencies, the furlough of federal employees, and the interruption of federal programs and services.8 9 Despite these high stakes, Presidents have vetoed many appropriation bills.910 For example, Presidents Carter, Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Clinton were presented with a total of 387 annual appropriations acts and vetoed 30 of them (7.8%).10 11 Congressional overrides of vetoes of appropriations are also not unusual. For example, of the 80 vetoes of appropriations since 1789, 12 (15.0%) were overridden (see Table 2). Interestingly, half of the vetoes of appropriations bills have occurred since 1968. since 1968. Table 2. Appropriations Bills Vetoed, 1789-2005 President Washington Coincident Congresses Approp. Acts Vetoed Vetoes of Approp. Acts Overridden 1st -4th — — — — th th Adams 5 -6 Jefferson 7th -10th — — th th — — th th — — J. Q. Adams th 19 -20 th — — Jackson 21st -24th — — — — Madison Monroe Van Buren 11 -14 15 -18 th 25 -26 th th W. H. Harrison 27 — — Tyler th th 2 — th th 1 — Polk 27 -28 29 -30 Taylor 31st — — Fillmore st nd — — rd th 4 2 th th 1 — th th — — Pierce Buchanan Lincoln 31 -32 33 -34 35 -36 37 -39 8th th — — Jackson st 21 -24 th — — Van Buren 25th -26th — — — — Madison Monroe J. Q. Adams W. H. Harrison 11 -14 15 -18 19 -20 27 th 9 For additional information on federal government shutdowns, see CRS Report 98-844, Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes, Effects, and Process, by Kevin R. Kosar (archived and available on request from author), and CRS , and CRS Report RL30339, Preventing Federal Government Shutdowns: Proposals for an Automatic Continuing Resolution, by Robert Keith (archived and available on request from author). 9. 10 The data in this section and in Table 2 include annual appropriations acts (which provide annual annual funding for the routine operations of most federal agencies), supplemental appropriations acts, and continuing appropriations acts. Excluded are measures dealing with impoundments, transfers, line-item vetoes under the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, and bills proposing appropriations for the relief of private claims. 10 11 CRS Report RS20719, Vetoed Annual Appropriation Acts: Presidents Carter Through Clinton, by Mitchell Sollenberger, p. 2 (archived and available on request from author). CRS-6 President A. JohnsonTyler Polk Taylor Coincident Congresses Approp. Acts Vetoed Vetoes of Approp. Acts Overridden 39th-40th — — Grant st 41 -44 th — — Hayes th th 5 — 45 -46 Garfield 47th Arthur th Cleveland B. Harrison — — th 1 1 th th 1 — st nd — — rd th 5 1 47 -48 49 -50 51 -52 Cleveland 53 -54 McKinley 55th -57th T. Roosevelt Taft Wilson — — th th — — st nd 4 — rd th 8 — 1 — 57 -60 61 -62 63 -66 th Harding 67 Coolidge 68th -70th Hoover F. D. Roosevelt Truman — — st nd 2 — rd th 1 1 th nd 1 1 rd th 3 1 71 -72 73 -79 79 -82 Eisenhower 83 -86 Kennedy 87th -88th L. B. Johnson Nixon Ford — — th th — — st rd 5 1 rd th 5 3 th th 2 — 88 -90 91 -93 93 -94 Carter 95 -96 Reagan 97th -100th G. H. W. Bush Clinton G. W. Bush Total 6 1 st nd 8 — rd th 14 — th th — — 80 12 101 -102 103 -106 107 -10927th -28th 2 — 1 — — — th 29 -30 31 th st 31st -32nd — — rd th 4 2 th th 1 — th 37 -39 th — — A. Johnson th 39 -40 th — — Grant 41st-44th — — 5 — Fillmore Pierce Buchanan Lincoln Hayes 33 -34 35 -36 th 45 -46 Garfield 47 Arthur th th th 47 -48 th — — th 1 1 th 1 — Cleveland 49 -50 B. Harrison 51st -52nd — — rd th 5 1 th th — — th th — — Taft st 61 -62 nd 4 — Wilson 63rd -66th 8 — Cleveland McKinley T. Roosevelt 53 -54 55 -57 57 -60 th Harding 67 1 — Coolidge th th — — st nd 2 — F. D. Roosevelt rd 73 -79 th 1 1 Truman 79th -82nd Hoover 68 -70 71 -72 1 1 rd th 3 1 th th — — th th — — Nixon st 91 -93 rd 5 1 Ford 93rd -94th 5 3 2 — Eisenhower Kennedy L. B. Johnson Carter Reagan 83 -86 87 -88 88 -90 th 95 -96 th th 97 -100 th 6 1 st nd 8 — Clinton rd 103 -106 th 14 — G. W. Bush 107th -109th — — 80 12 G. H. W. Bush Total 101 -102 Sources: U.S. Congress, Senate, Secretary of the Senate, Presidential Vetoes, 1789-1988, S.Pub. 10212, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1992); and U.S. Congress, Senate, Secretary of the Senate, Presidential Vetoes, 1989-1991, S.Pub.102-13, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1992).