Order Code RS21513
Updated June 29, 2005May 24, 2006
CRS Report for Congress
.Received through the CRS Web
Kuwait: Post-Saddam IssuesSecurity, Reform, and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
With the conventional military threat from Iraq reduced, Kuwait has begun
breaking longstanding political deadlock over leadership and political and economic
reform. However, Kuwaiti leaders are facing a new set of concerns posed by continuing
instability in Iraq. This report will be updated periodically. See also CRS Report
RL31533, The Persian Gulf States: Post-War Issues for U.S. Policy, 2004.
Overview
Kuwaitis are optimistic about their future now that Saddam Hussein is out of power
in Iraq, but a leadership transition remains incomplete. Shaykh Jabir Ahmad al-Jabir Al
Sabah, who is about 75 years old, has been Amir since 1978, but he suffered a stroke in
September 2001. His relative, Crown Prince Shaykh Sa’ad Abdullah Al Sabah, is also
seriously ill; he was running the government until 1998, when his ailments necessitated
that he delegate that operational role to deputy Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad
al-Jabir Al-Sabah (younger brother of the Amir). Following the July 5, 2003
parliamentary elections, Shaykh Sabah was appointed Prime Minister, separating that
post from that of Crown Prince for the first time and giving him clear day-to-day
operational leadership of Kuwait. Shaykh Sabah is perceived as reform-minded,
particularly on economic issues, but also as a traditional Arab nationalist. Younger
leaders, such as Foreign Minister Mohammad Al Sabah and Oil Minister Ahmad Fahd Al
Sabah, are unlikely to assert themselves as long as their elders remain in office. The Al
Sabah family rules over a population of about 2.4 million (900,000 are citizens).
U.S.-Kuwait Relations and Cooperation on Iraq
A U.S. consulate was opened in Kuwait in October 1951; it was elevated to an
embassy upon Kuwait’s independence from Britain in 1961. Kuwait, the first Gulf state
to establish relations with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, was not particularly close to the
United States in the 1960s and 1970s, opposing what it perceived as U.S. favoritism of
Israel. U.S.-Kuwait defense and political relations warmed considerably at the height of
the Iran-Iraq war (1987-88), when the United States established a U.S. naval escort and
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS-2
tanker reflagging program to protect Kuwaiti and international shipping from Iranian
naval attacks (Operation Earnest Will).
Kuwait was severely shaken by the 1990 Iraqi occupation and its leadership was
heavily criticized domestically for failing to mount a viable defense. The country drew
closer to the United States after U.S. forces spearheaded the liberation of Kuwait in the
January-March 1991 Persian Gulf war, signing a ten-year defense pact with the United
States on September 19, 1991, the text of which is classified. In September 2001, the
pact was renewed for another ten years. The pact reportedly does not explicitly require
that the United States defend Kuwait in a future crisis, but provides for mutual
discussions of crisis options. It also is said to provide for joint military exercises, U.S.
training of Kuwaiti forces, U.S. arms sales, pre-positioning of U.S. military equipment
(enough armor to outfit a U.S. brigade), and U.S. access to Kuwaiti facilities. A related
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) provides that U.S. forces in Kuwait be subject to
U.S. rather than Kuwaiti law.
Kuwait contributed materially to the defeat of Iraq in the 1991 war and subsequent
containment efforts, paying $16.059 billion to offset the costs of Desert Shield/Desert
Storm (all received by the end of 1991). It funded two thirds of the $51 million per year
U.N. budget for the Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) that monitored the IraqKuwait border until the 2003 war, and it contributed about $350 million per year to pay
for costs incurred by the U.S. military in its Kuwait-based Iraq containment operations.
During the 1990s, Kuwait hosted about 1,000 U.S. Air Force personnel performing the
U.S. and British-led enforcement of a “no fly zone” over southern Iraq, Operation
Southern Watch (OSW), which ended after Saddam Hussein was toppled. Kuwait hosted
additional U.S. forces (about 5,000) during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan,
which succeeded in ousting the Taliban.
Kuwait clearly supported the Bush Administration’s decision to militarily overthrow
Saddam Hussein, even though Kuwait joined other Arab states in publicly opposing the
U.S. action. In Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Kuwait closed off almost 60% of its
territory in order to secure the U.S.-led invasion force, which consisted of about 250,000
personnel and several thousand pieces of armor and related equipment. (Saudi Arabia,
which is larger and has more strategic depth, refused to host the force because it
questioned the necessity of the war.) Kuwaiti allowed OIF forces to operate out of two
air bases that the United States had helped upgrade (Ali al-Salem and Ali al-Jabir), as well
as its international airport and sea ports.
Kuwait provided $266 million in
burdensharing support to OIF, including base support, personnel support, and supplies
(food and laundry service and fuel). The key U.S. headquarters facility in Kuwait had
been Camp Doha, north of Kuwait City. Just before the 2003 war, the United States
moved many of its emplacements to Camp Arifjan — south of the city and upgraded by
Kuwait — and to another facility, Camp Buehring. Camp Doha is slated to close in
August 2005. In part to express appreciation for Kuwait’s support to OIF, on April 1,
2004, the Bush Administration designed Kuwait as a “major non-NATO ally (MNNA),”
a designation held by only one other Gulf state (Bahrain).
In post-Saddam Iraq, about 90,000 U.S. military personnel are in Kuwait at any given
time, mostly preparing to rotate into Iraq to replace or join the 140,000 person U.S. force
in Iraq. However, only about 20,000 are based in Kuwait more permanently. Kuwait has
built a water line into Iraq, it provides assistance to the Polish-led peacekeeping brigade
CRS-3
based in Hilla, Iraq, and it runs a humanitarian operation center (HOC) that has provided
about $425 million in assistance to Iraqis since the Saddam regime fell. It pledged an
additional $500 million in aid to the Iraqi government at a post-Saddam donors’
conference in Madrid in late 2003, although the State Department told CRS in April 2005
that very little of that pledge has been disbursed. In 2005, Kuwait offered an additional
$60 million to build schools and hospitals in Iraq, but Iraq has not responded to that offer.
Kuwait has urged U.S. officials to work to discover the fate of about 600 Kuwaitis
missing from the 1991 war; the bodies of about 220 of them have been found in Iraq
since Saddam fell. Kuwait also wants to receive the U.N.-supervised reparations by Iraq
for damages caused from the 1990 invasion; much of the awards made or yet to be made
will benefit Kuwait’s government or firms. However, U.N. Security Council Resolution
1483 (May 22, 2003) reduced to 5%, from 25%, the percentage of Iraqi oil revenues
deducted for reparations, reducing the rate of reparations payouts. Kuwait reportedly
pledged to U.S. envoy on Iraq debt James A. Baker that it would write off a substantial
amount of the estimated $25 billion owed to Kuwait, mostly incurred during the Iran-Iraq
war.1 Kuwait and Iraq have re-established diplomatic relations, although Kuwait has
some concerns about the Shiite Islamist factions that are ascendant in Iraq (see below) and
it has not sent an ambassador to Baghdad.
Building the Kuwaiti Military. U.S. officials say that the U.S.-Kuwait defense
relationship has improved the quality of the Kuwaiti military, particularly the air force.
The military, which numbered about 17,000 before the 1990 Iraqi invasion, has been
rebuilt to nearly that strength, but still fewer than the 25,000 troops recommended in 1991
U.S. and British studies of Kuwait’s defense needs. Recent sales of major systems to
Kuwait have encountered little congressional opposition, although some doubt Kuwait
has sufficient trained manpower to optimize use of all purchased weapons. Kuwait is a
“cash customer” — it is not eligible to receive U.S. excess defense articles and receives
no U.S. assistance. Major recent Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 2include (1) the purchase
of 218 M1A2 tanks at a value of $1.9 billion in 1993 (deliveries were completed in
1998); (2) a 1992 purchase of 5 Patriot anti-missile fire units, including 25 launchers and
210 Patriot missiles, valued at about $800 million (delivery completed in 1998). Some
of them were used to intercept Iraqi short-range missiles launched at Kuwait in the 2003
war; (3) a 1992 purchase of 40 FA-18 combat aircraft (delivery completed in 1999); and
(4) a September 2002 purchase of 16 AH-64 (Apache) helicopters equipped with the
Longbow fire-control system, a deal valued at about $940 million. Kuwait is said to be
considering purchasing about 10 additional FA-18 combat aircraft, although Kuwait does
not view new major arms purchases as urgent now that Saddam Hussein is gone.
Foreign Policy Issues
For nearly a decade after Kuwait’s liberation in 1991, Kuwait’s fear of Iraq colored
virtually all of its foreign policy decisions, particularly its relations with countries that
sympathized with Iraq’s 1990 invasion. Now that Saddam is no longer in power in Iraq,
1
Baker Secures Promises of Iraq Debt Relief From Gulf Oil States. Agence France Presse,
January 21, 2004.
2
Much of the information in this section provided by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
in March 2004.
CRS-4
some Kuwait leaders, including Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah, want to rejoin an Arab
consensus on major issues.
Relations with Iran. Kuwait’s preoccupation with the Iraqi threat had led it to
steadily improve relations with Iran during the 1990s. About 25% of Kuwait’s population
are Shiite Muslims, the sect that predominates in Iran, and Kuwaiti leaders have always
feared that this community could be manipulated by Iran. With an Iraqi conventional
threat gone, Kuwaiti leaders are growing more wary of Iran, and of the new political
strength in Iraq of pro-Iranian parties such as the Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party and the
Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Da’wa activists in Kuwait
were allegedly responsible for the December 1983 bombings of the U.S. and French
embassies in Kuwait and an attempted assassination of the Amir of Kuwait in May 1985.
Seventeen Da’wa activists were arrested for the 1983 attacks, and a Kuwait Airlines
plane was hijacked in 1987 with the demand that Kuwait release the prisoners; it did not.
No recent violence against Kuwait by these groups has been reported. Iraq’s new Prime
Minister, Ibrahim al-Jafari, is leader of Iraq’s Da’wa Party, although there is no published
evidence that he knew of or participated in these Da’wa attacks in Kuwait.
Arab-Israeli Dispute. The Arab-Israeli peace process has been overshadowed
by Iraq on Kuwait’s foreign policy agenda. On the Arab-Israeli dispute, Kuwait has tried
to remain within a broad Gulf state consensus, although it was far more critical of
Palestinian Authority (PA) president Yasir Arafat, who publicly supported Iraq in the
1991 Gulf war, than were other Gulf states. As a result of Arafat’s alignment with
Saddam, a reported 450,000 Palestinian workers were expelled or pressured to leave
Kuwait after the 1991 war. Since Arafat’s death, Kuwait has rebuilt its relations with the
mainstream Palestinian leadership, now led by new PA president Mahmoud Abbas.
Nonetheless, the Washington Post reported in May 2005 that Kuwait is still $140 million
behind in disbursing pledged aid to the PA, a larger arrearage than any Arab state other
than Libya. Kuwait participated in multilateral peace talks with Israel that took place
during 1992-1997 but, unlike Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman, it did not host sessions of those
talks. Commerce Department officials say the Gulf states have generally upheld a 1994
pledge to cease enforcement of the secondary (trade with firms that deal with Israel) and
tertiary (trade with firms that do business with blacklisted firms) Arab boycotts of Israel.
Cooperation with the Global War on Terrorism. The State Department
report on global terrorism for 2004 (released April 23, 2005) again praised Kuwait’s
cooperation against Al Qaeda and against militants seeking to attack U.S. forces in
Kuwait and its efforts against terrorism financing. Kuwait, shortly after the September
11, 2001 attacks, moved to block the accounts of suspected Al Qaeda activists in Kuwait.
A June 2005 State Department fact sheet says it has established an office at the Ministry
of Social Affairs and Labor to monitor Islamic charities such as the Islamic Heritage
Revival. Despite these measures, and Kuwait’s heightened internal security posture, some
attacks are still occurring in Kuwait. In four attacks during October 2002 - December
2003, one U.S. marine and one U.S. defense contractor were killed by alleged Al Qaeda
gunmen there. Since January 2005, Kuwaiti security forces have engaged terrorists in
four confrontations in Kuwait City, resulting in the deaths of the gunmen as well as
Kuwaiti security personnel. The militants purportedly were attempting to disrupt OIF
support activities in Kuwait, although these attacks did not succeed in reaching any
facilities used by U.S. forces. In May 2005, Kuwait arrested twenty suspected supporters
of Iraq’s Sunni Arab-led insurgency, but they were let out of jail pending appeal. A pro-
CRS-5
Al Qaeda faction is believed to still be operating in Kuwait, calling itself “Kuwaiti
Hamas.” Al Qaeda’s spokesman, Suleiman Abu Ghaith, is of Kuwaiti origin; he is
believed under arrest in Iran.
Democratization and Human Rights3
Kuwait has the longest serving all-elected National Assembly of the Gulf
monarchies; 50 seats are elected, comprising two seats each from 25 districts, plus up to
15 ministers serving in it ex-officio. The body was established by Kuwait’s November
1962 constitution. However, the Sabah family controls the highest levels of government
and sets overall policy direction. The Amir has sometimes used his power to dissolve the
Assembly (1976-81 and 1986-1992) when Assembly members aggressively challenged
government policies. The Assembly can vote no confidence in ministers and can veto
government decrees made when the Assembly is not in session. The government has
expanded the electorate gradually over the past decade4 by extending the franchise to sons
of naturalized Kuwaitis and Kuwaitis naturalized for at least twenty (as opposed to thirty)
years — but these modifications have raised the electorate to only about 130,000, or about
15% of the citizenry. Formal political parties are prohibited, but candidates are allowed
to organize as informal groupings, such as the Salafi movement (hardline Islamists); the
Islamic Constitutional Movement (moderate Islamist); merchant/nationalist bloc (Popular
Bloc); liberal bloc (Kuwait Democratic Forum); and tribal candidates. Kuwaitis also have
a parallel tradition of informal consultations in nightly “diwaniyyas” (social gatherings)
held by many elites.
Assembly elections held on July 5, 2003, resulted in the defeat of many prominent
so-called “liberals” who want rapid reform, but several new pro-government deputies
were elected. The results improved the prospects for passage of a government bill,
submitted to the Assembly in May 2004, to give women the right to vote and run. (A
government attempt in May 1999 to institute female suffrage by decree was vetoed by the
Assembly.) After one year of continued deadlock, Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah pressed
the Assembly to adopt the government bill rather than a narrower bill that would allow
women to participate only in June 2005 municipal council elections. The Assembly
passed the broader law on May 16, 2005, by a vote of 35-23, effective as of the 2007
National Assembly elections. Islamist deputies succeeded in adding a clause that women
can participate “in accordance with Islamic law,” which likely means segregated polling
places. Although women were not able to participate in the municipal elections of June
3, 2005, the government appointed two women to the 16 member body after the election.
On June 12, 2005, a prominent female activist, Massouma Mubarak, was named as the
first female minister ever in Kuwait (Minister of Planning and Minister of State for
Administrative Development).
3
Much of the information in this section is from the State Department’s country report on human
rights practices for 2004 (released February 28, 2005) and the Department’s report on
“Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record 2004-2005, by the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (released March 28, 2005).
4
This election was held one year earlier than expected because new elections were required after
a brief Assembly suspension by the Amir, precipitated by Assembly challenges on several issues.
CRS-6
According to the State Department democracy promotion report for 2004-2005, the
U.S. Embassy in Kuwait uses various programming tools, including dialogue and public
diplomacy and funds from the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), to encourage
democracy. The Embassy has sponsored several Kuwaitis to attend regional and U.S.
conferences and training programs, many of which were focused on women’s
participation in politics and government. U.S. embassy officers attend diwaniyyas and
conferences to promote rule of law, civil society, women’s empowerment, labor rights,
and democratization. Several Kuwaiti non-government organizations, such as the Kuwait
Women’s Cultural and Social Society, actively promote democratization.
The State Department’s human rights report for 2004 says Kuwait’s human rights
record “remained poor” in 2004. Shiite Muslims report official discrimination, including
limited access to religious education; there are five Shiites in the Assembly but generally
only one in the cabinet. There continue to be reports of abuses of mostly Asian domestic
workers. However, official press censorship ended in 1992, and Kuwait’s vibrant press
often criticizes government policy. Kuwait permits some public worship by non-Muslim
faiths and has seven officially recognized Christian churches of various denominations.
The government allows one trade union per occupation; the only legal union is the Kuwait
Trade Union Federation (KTUF). Kuwait was designated by the State Department
“Trafficking in Persons” report for 2005 (released June 3, 2005) as a “Tier Three” (worst
level, and down from a Tier Two ranking the previous year) because Kuwait has not fully
complied with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, particularly forced
labor. The State Department’s annual report on religious freedom for 2004 (released
September 15, 2004) noted some improvement in Kuwait’s performance during the past
year, particularly its treatment of the Shiite minority.
Economic Policy
Although Kuwait has a relatively open economy, U.S. officials have attempted to
persuade Kuwait to open its economy to foreign investment in order to attract technology
and expand the private sector. Since 2004, Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah has visited
several east Asian nations, such as Singapore, in an effort to identify potential models for
future Kuwaiti economic reform. Kuwait’s state-owned oil industry still accounts for
75% of government income and 90% of export earnings. The United States imports about
260,000 barrels per day in crude oil from Kuwait, equal to about 3% of U.S. oil imports.
Kuwait’s proven crude oil reserves are about 95 billion barrels, about 10% of total proven
world oil reserves and enough for about 140 years at current production levels (about 2
million barrels per day). The Kuwaiti government wants to open its northern oil fields
to foreign investors (“Project Kuwait”), but the National Assembly has been blocked for
about a decade because of concerns about Kuwait’s sovereignty. On June 8, 2005, the
government appeared to overcome that opposition when a key Assembly committee voted
to allow the project to proceed. It awaits full Assembly action. Several U.S. energy
firms, including Exxon Mobil, Chevron Texaco, and Conoco Phillips, are part of
consortia bidding on the project, which is expected to raise Kuwait’s oil production
capacity by about 400,000 barrels per day.
In 1994, Kuwait became a founding member of the World Trade Organization
(WTO). In February 2004, the United States and Kuwait signed a Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement (TIFA), often viewed as a prelude to a free trade agreement
Kuwaiti leaders peacefully resolved a succession crisis that erupted following the
January 15, 2006 death of its long-ruling Amir. However, a new crisis erupted in May
2006 over the structure of the next parliamentary elections, prompting a dissolution of
the existing parliament and scheduling of new elections for June 29, 2006. Women will
be able to run and to vote. This report will be updated. See also CRS Report RL31533,
The Persian Gulf States: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2004, by Kenneth Katzman.
Governmental Changes and Political Reform1
Kuwait’s optimism after the fall of its nemesis Saddam Hussein in 2003 was
interrupted by a succession crisis upon the January 15, 2006 death of Amir (ruler) Jabir
Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah at the age of 78. His relative, Crown Prince Shaykh Sa’d
Abdullah Al Sabah, was declared successor, but he is seriously ill, leading Prime
Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al-Sabah (about 76, the younger brother of the
late Amir) and his branch of the Sabah family to challenge the succession. After
extensive discussions within the ruling family and with the elected National Assembly,
which had never before had a role in succession, Shaykh Sa’d abdicated, and the
Assembly formally affirmed Shaykh Sabah as the new Amir on January 29, 2006. The
peaceful handling of the succession crisis was widely hailed, although the subsequent
appointments could aggravate long-standing rivalries within the Al Sabah.
Amir Sabah subsequently sidestepped a tacit agreement to alternate succession
between the Jabir and Salem branches of the family by appointing members of his Jabir
branch as his Crown Prince/heir apparent (his half-brother, Shaykh Nawwaf al-Ahmad
Al Sabah, age 67) and Prime Minister (his nephew, Shaykh Nasser Muhammad al-Ahmad
Al Sabah, age 64). The highest ranking “Salem” in the new cabinet is Dr. Mohammad
1
Much of the information in this section is from the State Department’s country report on human
rights practices for 2005 (released March 8, 2006); the Department’s report on “Supporting
Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record 2005-2006, by the Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor (April 5, 2006); the International Religious Freedom Report
(November 8, 2005); and the Trafficking in Persons Report for 2005 (June 3, 2005).
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS-2
Al Sabah, who kept his Foreign Minister post and simultaneously was made a second
deputy prime minister. However, in a further diminution of the Salem branch, a relative
from another branch, Shaykh Jabir al-Hamad Al Sabah was made first deputy prime
minister and given the powerful posts of defense and interior ministers. In other major
moves, two prominent reformists were removed from the cabinet, as was a prominent
hardline (Salafi) Sunni Islamist. A second Shiite Muslim was named, giving the cabinet
two Shiite ministers for the first time since 1992. The one woman, Massouma Mubarak,
was retained as Minister of Planning; she was first appointed in June 2005.
It was widely anticipated that, as Amir, Shaykh Sabah would accelerate political
reform, but he appears to want to ensure continued Sabah control of government. Kuwait
has the longest serving all-elected National Assembly of the Gulf monarchies; 50 seats
are elected, comprising two seats each from 25 districts, plus up to 15 ministers serving
in it ex-officio. The body was established by Kuwait’s November 1962 constitution, but
the Amir has sometimes used his power to dissolve the Assembly (1976-1981, 19861992, 1990, and 2003) when the Assembly aggressively challenged the government. The
Assembly can vote no confidence in ministers and can veto government decrees made
when the Assembly is not in session. Amir Sabah suspended the Assembly on May 21
and called new elections for June 29, 2006, after 29 Assembly members demanded to
question the Prime Minister over the government’s refusal to endorse a proposal to reduce
the number of electoral districts to 5, from the current 25. Reformists in the Assembly
want to reduce the number of districts, and thereby increase the size of each, so that it
would be more difficult to influence the outcome through alleged “vote buying” or tribal
politics. The June election will have the existing 25 districts, and many expect progovernment candidates will do well because of the short campaign period.
Reformists also want to see formal political parties allowed. They are prohibited
currently, although candidates are allowed to organize as informal currents, such as the
Salafi movement (hardline Islamists); the Islamic Constitutional Movement (Kuwait’s
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood); the “Popular Bloc” (merchants/nationalists); the
Kuwait Democratic Forum (liberal, pro-rapid reform); and tribal candidates. Kuwaitis
also have a parallel tradition of informal political consultations in nightly “diwaniyyas”
(social gatherings) held by many elites, including some women.
Kuwait is a country of about 2.4 million (900,000 are citizens). Over the past decade,
the government expanded the all-male electorate gradually2 by extending the franchise
to sons of naturalized Kuwaitis and Kuwaitis naturalized for at least twenty (as opposed
to thirty) years — but these modifications raised the electorate to only about 130,000, or
about 15% of the citizenry. The electorate will be far larger for the June 2006 elections
because women will be voting. To date, 11 women have filed to run as candidates in the
June election. The long deadlock on female suffrage began to break in May 2004, after
the government submitted to the Assembly a bill to give women the right to vote and run.
(A government attempt in May 1999 to institute female suffrage by decree was vetoed by
the Assembly.) In May 2005, then Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah pressed the Assembly
to adopt the government bill, which it did on May 16, 2005 (35-23), effective as of the
2
This election was held one year earlier than expected because new elections were required after
a brief Assembly suspension by the Amir, precipitated by Assembly challenges on several issues.
CRS-3
next National Assembly elections. Islamist deputies succeeded in adding a clause that
will require gender-segregated polling places (or entrances).
According to the State Department, the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait uses various
programming tools, including dialogue and public diplomacy and funds from the Middle
East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), to encourage democracy. The Embassy has sponsored
several Kuwaitis, particularly women, to attend regional and U.S. conferences and
training programs. MEPI funds have been used to fund political education brochures for
Kuwaiti women, among other uses. U.S. embassy officers attend nightly diwaniyyas and
conferences to promote rule of law, civil society, women’s empowerment, labor rights,
and democratization. Several Kuwaiti non-government organizations, such as the Kuwait
Women’s Cultural and Social Society, actively promote democratization.
The State Department human rights report for 2005 noted progress particularly on
female suffrage but says “serious problems remained.” Shiite Muslims report official
discrimination, including limited access to religious education, although the State
Department’s religious freedom report for 2005 noted some improvement over the past
year. There continue to be reports of abuses of mostly Asian domestic workers. Kuwait
was designated by the State Department “Trafficking in Persons” report for 2005 (released
June 3, 2005) as a “Tier Three” (worst level, and down from a Tier Two ranking the
previous year) because Kuwait had not made significant efforts to fully comply with
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, particularly forced labor. However,
official press censorship ended in 1992, and a vibrant press often criticizes the
government. Kuwait permits some public worship by non-Muslim faiths and has seven
officially recognized Christian churches of various denominations. The government
allows one trade union per occupation, but the only legal trade federation is the Kuwait
Trade Union Federation (KTUF). Foreign workers, with the exception of domestic
workers, are allowed to join unions.
U.S.-Kuwait Relations and Cooperation on Iraq
A U.S. consulate was opened in Kuwait in October 1951; it was elevated to an
embassy upon Kuwait’s independence from Britain in 1961. Kuwait, the first Gulf state
to establish relations with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, was not particularly close to the
United States in the 1960s and 1970s. Relations warmed considerably at the height of the
Iran-Iraq war (1987-88), when the United States established a U.S. naval escort and tanker
reflagging program to protect Kuwaiti and international shipping from Iranian naval
attacks (Operation Earnest Will).
Kuwait’s leaders were shaken by the 1990 Iraqi invasion, and they were heavily
criticized domestically for failing to mount a viable defense. The country drew even
closer to the United States after U.S. forces led the January-March 1991 Persian Gulf war
that liberated Kuwait, and it signed a ten-year defense pact with the United States on
September 19, 1991 (the text is classified). In September 2001, the pact was renewed for
another ten years. The pact reportedly does not explicitly require that the United States
defend Kuwait in a future crisis, but provides for mutual discussions of crisis options. It
also is said to provide for joint military exercises, U.S. training of Kuwaiti forces, U.S.
arms sales, pre-positioning of U.S. military equipment (enough armor to outfit a U.S.
brigade), and U.S. access to Kuwaiti facilities. A related Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) provides that U.S. forces in Kuwait be subject to U.S. rather than Kuwaiti law.
CRS-4
Kuwait contributed materially to the 1991 war and subsequent containment efforts,
paying $16.059 billion to offset the costs of Desert Shield/Desert Storm (all received by
the end of 1991). It funded two thirds of the $51 million per year U.N. budget for the
Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) that monitored the Iraq-Kuwait border until
the 2003 war, and it contributed about $350 million per year to pay for costs incurred by
the U.S. military in its Kuwait-based Iraq containment operations. During the 1990s,
Kuwait hosted about 1,000 U.S. Air Force personnel performing the U.S. and British-led
enforcement of a “no fly zone” over southern Iraq (Operation Southern Watch) which
ended after Saddam Hussein was toppled. Kuwait hosted additional U.S. forces (about
5,000) during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan that ousted the Taliban.
Kuwait privately supported the Bush Administration’s decision to militarily
overthrow Saddam Hussein (Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)), even though it joined other
Arab states in publicly opposing the U.S. action. Kuwait closed off 60% of its territory
in order to secure the U.S.-led invasion force of about 250,000 personnel and several
thousand pieces of armor. It allowed U.S. forces to use two air bases that the United
States had helped upgrade (Ali al-Salem and Ali al-Jabir), as well as its international
airport and sea ports. Kuwait provided $266 million in burdensharing support to the
combat, including base support, personnel support, and supplies such as food and fuel.
Since then, according to Defense Department budget documents, Kuwait contributed $213
million in burdensharing support to OIF in FY2005, and is expected to contribute $210
million in both FY2006 and FY2007. Kuwait also built a water line into Iraq, assists the
Polish-led security sector in Hilla, Iraq, and it runs a humanitarian operation center (HOC)
that has funneled over $500 million in assistance to Iraqis since Saddam fell.
Kuwait hosts as many as 90,000 U.S. military personnel, mostly rotating in or out
of the 133,000-person U.S. force in Iraq. However, only about 10,000 (military and
civilian) Defense Department personnel are based in Kuwait more permanently, down
from 18,000 in 2005, according to U.S. military officials in Kuwait. The key U.S. staging
facility in Kuwait for OIF is Camp Arifjan and a desert firing range facility, Camp
Buehring. Camp Doha, the facility that had been the primary command facility for U.S.
forces in Kuwait during the 1990s, was vacated by U.S. forces in December 2005. In part
to express appreciation for Kuwait’s support to OIF, on April 1, 2004, the Bush
Administration designed Kuwait as a “major non-NATO ally (MNNA),” a designation
held by only one other Gulf state (Bahrain). Partly to reciprocate U.S. friendship, Kuwait
pledged $500 million worth of oil to U.S. states affected by Hurricane Katrina.
Another of Kuwait’s concerns has been discovering the fate of about 600 Kuwaitis
missing from the 1991 war; the bodies of about 400 of them have been found in postSaddam searches. Kuwait also wants to receive the U.N.-supervised reparations by Iraq
for damages caused from the 1990 invasion; an estimated half of the awards judgments
announced to date are to Kuwait’s government or firms. However, U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2003) reduced to 5%, from 25%, the percentage of Iraqi oil
revenues deducted for reparations, reducing the rate of reparations payouts. Kuwait
reportedly pledged to U.S. envoy James A. Baker that it would forgive a substantial
portion of the $25 billion Iraq owes Kuwait, mostly incurred during the Iran-Iraq war.3
3
Baker Secures Promises of Iraq Debt Relief From Gulf Oil States. Agence France Presse,
January 21, 2004.
CRS-5
Kuwait and Iraq have re-established diplomatic relations, although Kuwait has some
concerns about the Shiite Islamist factions that are ascendant in Iraq. It has pledged to
send an ambassador to Baghdad but has not done so to date out of security concerns.
About 25% of Kuwait’s population are Shiite Muslims, the sect that predominates in Iran,
and Kuwaiti leaders have always feared that this community could be manipulated by
Iran, even though Kuwait’s Shiites are well integrated into its economy. Many Kuwaitis
recall a period of Shiite-led terrorism in Kuwait, including the December 1983 bombings
of the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait and an attempted assassination of the Amir
in May 1985. Those attacks were attributed to the Iraqi Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party;
seventeen Da’wa activists were arrested for these attacks and a Kuwait Airlines plane
was hijacked in 1987 with the demand that the prisoners be released; they were not.
Iraq’s two elected prime ministers, Ibrahim al-Jafari and Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, are
leaders of the Da’wa Party, but there is no evidence that they participated in these attacks.
U.S. officials say that the U.S.-Kuwait defense relationship has improved the quality
of the Kuwaiti military, particularly the air force. The military, which numbered about
17,000 before the 1990 Iraqi invasion, has now nearly regained that strength (15,500), but
it is fewer than the 25,000 troops recommended in 1991 U.S. and British studies of
Kuwait’s needs. Recent sales of major systems to Kuwait have encountered little
congressional opposition. Kuwait is a “cash customer” — it is not eligible to receive U.S.
excess defense articles and receives no U.S. assistance. Major post-1991 Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) 4include (1) the purchase of 218 M1A2 tanks at a value of $1.9
billion in 1993 (deliveries were completed in 1998); (2) a 1992 purchase of 5 Patriot antimissile fire units, including 25 launchers and 210 Patriot missiles, valued at about $800
million (delivery completed in 1998). Some of them were used to intercept Iraqi shortrange missiles launched at Kuwait in the 2003 war; (3) a 1992 purchase of 40 FA-18
combat aircraft (delivery completed in 1999); and (4) a September 2002 purchase of 16
AH-64 (Apache) helicopters equipped with the Longbow fire-control system, a deal
valued at about $940 million. Kuwait is said to be considering purchasing about 10
additional FA-18s, but it may not view new purchases as urgent now that Saddam is gone.
Other Foreign Policy Issues
After Kuwait’s liberation in 1991, Kuwait’s fear of Iraq colored virtually all of its
foreign policy decisions, particularly its relations with entities that sympathized with
Iraq’s 1990 invasion. On the Arab-Israeli dispute, Kuwait has tried to remain within a
broad Gulf state consensus, although it was far more critical than were the other Gulf
states of the late Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat because he publicly supported Iraq in the
1991 Gulf war. As a result of that alignment, about 450,000 Palestinian workers were
expelled or pressured to leave Kuwait after the 1991 war. Since Arafat’s death, Kuwait
has rebuilt its relations with the mainstream Palestinian Authority (PA) leadership,
including president Mahmoud Abbas. Nonetheless, the Washington Post reported in May
2005 that Kuwait is still $140 million behind in disbursing pledged aid to the PA, a larger
arrearage than any Arab state other than Libya. On February 13, 2006, Kuwait publicly
said it would work with Hamas as legitimate leader of a new Palestinian government, a
result of Hamas’s victory in January 25, 2006 Palestinian elections. In March 2006, it
pledged $7.5 million per month in aid to the Hamas-led government as part of a broader
4
Information in this section provided by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. March 2004.
CRS-6
Arab League pledge of $55 million per month to help the Palestinians cope with
reductions in Western aid. Kuwait participated in multilateral peace talks with Israel that
took place during 1992-1997, although it did not host any sessions. In 1994, Kuwait was
key in persuading the other Gulf monarchies to cease enforcement of the secondary (trade
with firms that deal with Israel) and tertiary (trade with firms that do business with
blacklisted firms) Arab boycotts of Israel.
Cooperation in Global War on Terrorism. The State Department report on
global terrorism for 2005 (released April 28, 2006) credits Kuwait for bolstering measures
to protect U.S. forces in Kuwait from terrorist attacks but notes that Kuwait has been
“reluctant to confront extremist elements within the local population.” Shortly after the
September 11, 2001, attacks, Kuwait moved to block the accounts of suspected Al Qaeda
activists in Kuwait. A June 2005 State Department fact sheet says it has established an
office at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor to monitor Islamic charities such as the
Islamic Heritage Revival. Nonetheless, some attacks have occurred in Kuwait. During
October 2002 - December 2003, one U.S. marine and one U.S. defense contractor were
killed by alleged Al Qaeda gunmen in four attacks there. Since January 2005, Kuwaiti
security forces have engaged terrorists in at least five confrontations in Kuwait City,
resulting in the deaths of the gunmen as well as some Kuwaiti security personnel. None
of the attacks reached any U.S. targets in Kuwait. In December 2005, Kuwait convicted
six men of belonging to a terrorist group (“Lions of the Peninsula”) allegedly planning
attacks on U.S. troops in Kuwait. In May 2006, Kuwaiti judges dismissed charges against
five Kuwaitis who were repatriated from the U.S. facility at Guatanamo Bay.
Economic Policy
Although Kuwait has a relatively open economy, U.S. officials have attempted to
persuade Kuwait to open its economy to foreign investment in order to attract technology
and expand the private sector. Kuwait’s state-owned oil industry still accounts for 75%
of government income and 90% of export earnings. The United States imports about
260,000 barrels per day in crude oil from Kuwait, equal to about 3% of U.S. oil imports.
Kuwait’s proven crude oil reserves are about 95 billion barrels, about 10% of total proven
world oil reserves and enough for about 140 years at current production levels (about 2.5
million barrels per day (mbd)). The Kuwaiti government wants to open its northern oil
fields to needed foreign investment (“Project Kuwait”) to raise oil production to 4.0 mbd
by the year 2020. Project Kuwait itself would generate about 500,000 barrels per day of
production. However, the National Assembly has blocked the $8.5 billion project for
about a decade because of concerns about Kuwait’s sovereignty. Assembly action might
hinge on the outcome of the June 2006 elections. Several U.S. energy firms, including
ExxonMobil, Chevron Corporation, and ConocoPhillips, are part of consortia that want
to bid on the project. In 1994, Kuwait became a founding member of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). In February 2004, the United States and Kuwait signed a Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), often viewed as a prelude to a free trade
agreement (FTA), which Kuwait has said it seeks.