Order Code RS21534
Updated June 28, 2005
CRS Report for Congress
.Received through the CRS WebMay 29, 2008
Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The Sultanate of Oman, is a long-time strategic U.S. ally in the Persian Gulf,; it has allowed
U.S. access to its military facilities long before the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis. It hosted
U.S. forces participating in recent major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Sultan Qaboos has been slowly opening the political process while trying to manage an
economy that lacks vast oil reserves. This report will be updated periodically. See also
CRS Report RL31533, The Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2004.
Introduction
Oman is located along the Arabian Sea and guards the southern approaches to the
Strait of for virtually every U.S. military operation in and
around the Gulf since 1980. Partly in appreciation, the United States signed a free trade
agreement (FTA) with Oman on January 19, 2006; implementing legislation was signed
on September 26, 2006 (P.L. 109-283). Sultan Qaboos has been opening the political
process slowly while managing an economy that lacks vast oil reserves. This report,
prepared with the assistance of Kim Klarman, will be updated.
Introduction
Oman is located along the Arabian Sea, on the southern approaches to the Strait of
Hormuz, across from Iran. Except for a brief period of Persian rule, Omanis
have have
remained independent since 1650, when they expelled the Portuguese. The Al Said
monarchy began in 1744, and it extendedexpelling the Portuguese in 1650. The Al Said monarchy
began in 1744, extending Omani influence into Zanzibar and other parts
of east Africa
until 1861. A long-term rebellion led by the Imam of Oman, (leader of the
Ibadhi sect of Islam) ended in 1959, but a leftist revolt broke out in Dhofar Province in
1964. It was defeated by 1975, partly with help from Iranian troops provided by the Shah
of Iran Ibadhi sect
(neither Sunni or Shiite and widely considered “moderate conservative”) ended in 1959;
Oman’s population is 75% Ibadhi. Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id Al Said, born in November
1940, is the eighth in the line
of the Al Said monarchy; he became Sultan in July 1970 after hewhen, with
British support,
he forced his father to abdicate. He is considered highly popular, but he was married only
brieflyhis
brief marriage in the 1970s produced no children and therefore no clear successor.
Succession would be decided by a “Ruling Family Council” of his relatively small Al Said
family (about 50 male members) or, if they fail to reach an agreement, by a succession
letter written by Qaboos prior to his death. and has no clear successor. Oman is unique in that its population is
75% Ibadhi Muslim, a sect of Islam that is neither Sunni or Shiite and is described by the
State Department as “moderate conservative.”
The United States signed a treaty of friendship
with Oman in 1833, one of the first
of its kind with an Arab state. Oman sent an official
envoy to the United States in 1840.
A U.S. consulate was maintained in Muscat during
1880-1915, and a U.S. embassy was
opened in 1972. The, and the first resident U.S. Ambassador took up his post
arrived in July 1974. Oman
opened its embassy in Washington in 1973.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS-2
Defense and Security Ties1
Oman’s Ties
Sultan Qaboos, who is Sandhurst-educated and is respected as a defense
strategist by the other Gulf leaders, sees strategist,
has long seen the United States as the key security guarantor
of the region, although he is an advocate of improving and enlarging joint Gulf state
defense capabilities. Qaboos has focused on regional defense cooperation even though
Oman, because it is far down the Persian Gulf, did not sense an acute threat from Iraq’s
Saddam Hussein.
Although Oman has not been as wary of Iran’s Islamic revolutionary government as
most of the other Gulf states, perhaps because there is no sizable Shiite community in Iran
with which Iran could meddle in Oman, Oman became the first Gulf state to formalize
of the region, although he
also advocates expanding defense cooperation among the Gulf states. Oman was the first
Gulf state to formalize defense relations with the United States just after the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran.
after the Persian Gulf
region was shaken by Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution; Oman signed an agreement to allow
U.S. forces access to Omani military facilities (April
on April 21, 1980). Three days after the agreement was signedlater, the
United States used Oman’s
Masirah Island air base in the course ofto launch the failed attempt to rescue
the U.S. embassy
hostages in Iran. (Oman alsolater served as an intermediary between the
United States and
Iran for the return of Iranians captured in skirmishesclashes with U.S. naval forces
in the Gulf.)
during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. Under the access agreement, which was
renewed in 1985, 1990, and 2000 (for ten years),
the United States reportedly can use Oman’s airfields, including–
with advance notice and for specified purposes – Oman’s military airfields in Muscat (the
capital), Thumrait, and Masirah Island, and some U.S. Air Force equipment, including bombs
and other
lethal munitions, are pre-positioned at these bases.2 Although not a condition
for Oman to renew the access agreement in 2000, the stored at these bases.1 During the renewal negotiations in 2000, the
United States acceded to Oman’s
request that the United States fund the upgrading of the jointly a $120 million
upgrade of some jointly-used facilities,32 including
a fourth air base at Musnanah, about (Khasab) at Musnanah
(50 miles northwest of the capital, Muscat. That cost
was about $120 million, and the base is operational).
Cooperation With U.S. War Efforts/War on Terrorism. Oman’s facilities
contributed significantly to the recent majorto recent U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan
(Operation Enduring
Freedom, OEF) and, to a lesser extent, Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom, OIF), although
Omani leaders were publicly critical of the U.S. decision to go to war against Iraq, saying
iteven though
Omani leaders said that invading Iraq could “incite revenge” against the United States in
the Arab world. According to fact
sheets provided by the Defense Department, during OEF, there were about
4,300 U.S.
personnel in Oman, mostly Air Force, suggesting that Oman air facilities — which also
hosted U.S. B-1 bombers —and U.S. B-1 bombers, indicating that
the Omani facilities were used extensively for strikes during OEF. The U.S.
presence fell
slightly to 3,750 during OIF; other facilities closer to Iraq, such as air bases
in Kuwait, were more
extensively used in OIF than in OEFfor OIF. There are now only about 26
U.S. about 35 U.S. military personnel in Oman, below the
pre-September 11, 2001 figure of about 200 U.S.
personnel. This indicates that personnel, and Omani facilities are
reportedly not now not being used for air support
operations in either the Afghanistan or Iraq theater at this time. There was little evident
popular opposition in Oman to the U.S. military presence there at the height of either OEF
1
Some of the information in this section comes from CRS conversations with U.S. Embassy
officials in Oman during December 2003.
2
Hajjar, Sami. U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects. U.S. Army War
College, Strategic Studies Institute. P.27.
3
Finnegan, Philip. Oman Seeks U.S. Base Upgrades. Defense News, April 12, 1999.
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or OIF, despite the perception among many Omanis that these operations were against
Islam and were harming innocent Muslims in the course of the combat.
Oman has been cooperative in the legal, intelligence-sharing, and financial aspects
of the global war on terrorism. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, Oman issued new
laws to prevent terrorist organizations from raising or laundering money in Oman.
According to the State Department report on global terrorism for 2004 (p. 67), Oman has
established surveillance systems to identify unusual financial transactions, and it has
demonstrated its commitment to freezing the assets of suspected terrorists from Al Qaeda
and related organizations. According to U.S. diplomats in Oman, the government wants
to join U.S.-led initiatives to combat terrorist threats emanating from container shipping.
Oman’s Capabilities and U.S. Security Assistance.4 Oman’s 43,000 man
armed force is the third largest of the Gulf Cooperation Council states (GCC, including
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Oman, Bahrain, and Qatar). It force is widely considered
one of the best trained, but not particularly well equipped with the most modern heavy
systems. Qaboos early on relied on seconded British officers to command entire services
in the Omani military, but these officers are now mostly limited to an advisory role. Still,
British advisers remain particularly influential in Oman’s navy, and much of Oman’s
arsenal is British-supplied. Most of the new equipment Oman is ordering or considering
is U.S.-made.
Oman is eligible for grant U.S. excess defense articles (EDA) under Section 516 of
the Foreign Assistance Act. It received 30 U.S.-made M-60A3 tanks in September 1996
on a “no rent” lease basis, and it later was given title to the tanks outright. There have
been virtually no EDA transactions since 2000. U.S. officials say Oman might want
Bradley fighting vehicles and Humvees as EDA, but in 2004 it turned down a U.S. offer
of EDA U.S.-made M1A1 tanks. Any additional armor would supplement the 38 Britishmade Challenger 2 tanks and 80 British-made Piranha armored personnel carriers it
bought in the mid-1990s. In an effort to modernize its Air Force, in October 2001, after
several years of consideration, Oman announced the purchase of 12 U.S.-made F-16 A/B
aircraft and associated weapons (Harpoon and AIM missiles) and training, at a cost of
about $800 million. The purchase might have been intended, in part, to keep pace with
Oman’s Gulf neighbors that have recently bought F-16s, including the UAE and Bahrain.
Oman is using its own funds and the aircraft will be newly produced; Oman wants
delivery by the end of 2005. The new aircraft will supplement the 12 less-capable Britishmade Hawk aircraft Oman flies. Oman is also buying three U.S.-made coastal patrol
boats suited for anti-narcotics and anti-smuggling missions.
Over the past four years, Oman has been receiving increased amounts of U.S.
security assistance, partly in appreciation of Oman’s help in OEF and OIF and partly to
familiarize Omani officers with U.S. equipment and military values. Amounts are shown
in the table below. The United States phased out development assistance to Oman in
1996. At the height of that development assistance program in the 1980s, the United
4 operations in either the Afghanistan or Iraq
theater. Oman’s views on Iran suggest that Oman might resist allowing the United States
to use facilities in Oman for a strike on Iran, were there a decision to do so.
Since September 11, 2001, Oman has cooperated with U.S. legal, intelligence, and
financial efforts against terrorism. According to the State Department report on global
terrorism for 2007, released April 2008, Oman has been “proactive in its implementation
of counterterrorism strategies and its cooperation with neighboring countries to prevent
terrorists from moving freely throughout the Arabian Peninsula.” Among Oman’s steps
was a January 2007 law establishing a National Committee for Combating Terrorism and
a December 2006 agreement with Saudi Arabia to control cross-border transit. Oman has
continued its interagency coordination to prevent money laundering. On November 22,
2005, the State Department announced Oman had joined the U.S. “Container Security
Initiative,” agreeing to pre-screening of U.S.-bound cargo from its port of Salalah. Cargo
will be checked for illicit trafficking of nuclear and other materials, as well as for
1
Hajjar, Sami. U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects. U.S. Army War
College, Strategic Studies Institute. P. 27.
2
Finnegan, Philip. "Oman Seeks U.S. Base Upgrades." Defense News, April 12, 1999.
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terrorists and their weapons. The table below includes U.S. aid to Oman ( NonProliferation, Anti-Terrorism and Related Programs funds, NADR) to help it establish
effective export controls and to sustain its counter-terrorism training capabilities.
Oman’s Capabilities and U.S. Security Assistance.3 Oman’s 43,000 person
armed force is the third largest of the Gulf Cooperation Council states (GCC, including
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Oman, Bahrain, and Qatar). Its force is widely considered
one of the best trained; its arsenal is being modernized with purchases from the United
States but is not large. Qaboos early on relied on seconded British officers to command
Omani military services, and much of its arsenal is British-made, but British officers are
now mostly advisory, particularly in Oman’s navy.
In an effort to modernize its Air Force, in October 2001, after years of consideration,
Oman purchased (with its own funds) 12 U.S.-made F-16 C/D aircraft from new
production. Along with associated weapons (Harpoon and AIM missiles), a podded
reconnaissance system, and training, the sale was valued at about $825 million; deliveries
were completed in 2006. Oman probably made the purchase to keep pace with its Gulf
neighbors, including UAE and Bahrain, that had bought F-16s. With U.S. Foreign
Military Financing (FMF), – recent amounts of which are shown below – Oman has
bought U.S.-made coastal patrol boats for anti-narcotics and anti-smuggling missions, as
well as aircraft munitions, night-vision goggles, upgrades to coastal surveillance systems,
communications equipment, and de-mining equipment. In July 2006, according to the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Oman bought the JAVELIN anti-tank
system, at a cost of about $48 million. Some major U.S. sales to Oman are expected as
part of an estimated $20 billion sales package to the Gulf states under the U.S. “Gulf
Security Dialogue” intended to contain Iran, although most of the sales notified thus far
are to the much wealthier Saudi Arabia and UAE. One potential Omani purchase
discussed by observers is the U.S.-made C-17 “Globemaster” transport aircraft.
Oman is eligible for grant U.S. excess defense articles (EDA) under Section 516 of
the Foreign Assistance Act. It received 30 U.S.-made M-60A3 tanks in September 1996
on a “no rent” lease basis (later receiving title outright). There have been minor EDA
grants since 2000, particularly gear to help Oman monitor its borders and waters and to
improve inter-operability with U.S. forces. In 2004, it turned down a U.S. offer of EDA
U.S.-made M1A1 tanks. Some Omani officers say they need new armor to supplement
the 38 British-made Challenger 2 tanks and 80 British-made Piranha armored personnel
carriers Oman bought in the mid-1990s.
U.S. security assistance to Oman not only helps finance equipment purchases, but
it also, through the International Military Education and Training program (IMET)
program, promotes U.S. standards of human rights and civilian control of military and
security forces. The United States phased out development assistance to Oman in 1996.
At the height of that development assistance program in the 1980s, the United States was
3
Section 564 of Title V, Part C of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1994 and
FY1995 (P.L. 103-236) banned U.S. arms transfers to countries that maintain the Arab boycott
of Israel. As applied to the GCC states, this provision has been waived each year on the grounds
that doing so wasis in the national interest.
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States was giving Oman about $15 million per year in Economic Support Funds (ESF)
in combined loans and grants. The funds were used mostly to improve in loans and
grants, mostly for conservation and
management of Omani fisheries and water resources.
Table 1. Recent U.S. Aid to Oman
(In millions of dollars)
IMET
0.5
0.75
0.825
FY2005
(estimated)
1.1
FMF
NADR
25
80
24.85
0.4
19.84
0.4
FY2002
FY2003
FY2004
FY2006
(request)
1.1
20
0.5
FY2003
IMET
FMF
NADR
(ATA,EXBS,
and TIP)
0.75
80
FY2004
0.825
24.85
0.4
FY2005
1.141
19.84
0.554
FY2006
1.135
13.86
0.4
FY2007
1.135
14.0
1.284
FY2008
(est.)
1.42
4.712
2.089
FY2009
(request)
1.45
12.0
0.95
Note: IMET is International Military Education and Training; FMF is Foreign Military Financing; NADR
is Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-Mining and Related Programs (ATA is Anti-Terrorism Assistance;
EXBS is Export Control and Related Border Security; TIP is Terrorism Interdiction Program).
Democratization and Human Rights5Rights4
Oman, which has a population of 2.36 million (including about 550,000 foreigners),
remains a monarchy in which decision-making still is largely concentrated in the office of
of Sultan Qaboos. Believing that Omanis would ultimately demand political reform, in the
1980s, Qaboos embarked on a long-term program of gradual political liberalization, even
though he was not under evident popular pressure to do so at that time. In November
1991, Qaboos established
the 1980s, Qaboos embarked on gradual political liberalization. In November 1991, he
appointed a 59-seat Consultative Council (expanded to 83 seats in 1993),
to replace a ten-year old purely appointive advisory council. In September 2000, the first
direct elections were held to the Consultative Council, which serves a three year term,
but the electorate was limited to 25% of all citizens over 21 years old. The year 2000
process contrasted with the 1994 and 1997 elections in which a small electorate chose
two or three nominees per district and the Sultan then selected final membership. In
November 2002, Qaboos extended voting rights to all citizens, male and female, over 21
years of age, beginning with the 2003 Consultative Council elections. Those elections,
held on October 4, 2003, resulted in a Council similar to that elected in 2000, including
the election of the same two women as in the previous election (out of 15 women
candidates). Like the other Gulf states, formal political parties are not allowed. Unlike
Bahrain or Kuwait, there are no evident groupings or factions within the Consultative
Council. The Council also lacks binding legislative powers.
In November 1996, Qaboos made the “legislature” bicameral. In his “Basic Law,”
providing for individual rights, he established an appointed State Council to serve, in part,
as a check and balance on the elected Consultative Council. Together, the State Council
and the Consultative Council constitute an “Oman Council.” The State Council has 57
seats, up from the original 53 seats. State Council appointees tend to be somewhat older
than the members of the Consultative Council; many State Council members are former
5
Some of the information in this section is taken from the State Department report on human
rights for 2004 - country report on Oman. Released February 28, 2005.
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government officials. Qaboos has gradually increased the number of women on the State
Council; there are now eight.
Some aspects of Islamic tradition in Oman discriminate against women, as is the case
in most other Islamic countries; for example, male heirs are favored in adjudication of
inheritance claims. Sultan Qaboos has given major speeches on the equality of women
and their importance in national development, and they now constitute about 30% of the
work force. In March 2003, he named a woman to the rank of minister, bestowing that
rank on an appointee in charge of the national authority for industrial craftsmanship. He
has since added three female ministers — of higher education, of tourism, and of social
development — in March, June, and November 2004, respectively. In April 2004,
Qaboos made five women among the 29 appointees to the public prosecutors office,
making Oman unique in the Gulf for appointing women to the judiciary.
The 1996 Basic Law affirms Islam as the state religion, and the State Department’s
International Religious Freedom Report for 2004 (released September 15, 2004) notes
some restrictions on religious rights, in practice. Non-Muslims are free to worship at
temples and churches built on land donated by the Sultan, but non-Muslims may not
publish religious materials in Oman. Members of all religions and sects are free to
maintain links with coreligionists abroad and travel outside Oman for religious purposes.
On related issues, press criticism of the government is tolerated, but criticism of the
Sultan is not. In April 2005, the government arrested 31 persons accused of conspiring
to overthrow the government; they were reportedly pardoned by Qaboos in June 2005.
Private ownership of radio and television stations is prohibited, but the availability of
satellite dishes has made foreign broadcasts accessible to the public. Workers are not
permitted to form or join unions, but they can form representational committees. The
State Department report on U.S. efforts to support human rights and democracy (20042005, released March 28, 2005) does not list any U.S. democratization initiatives in
Oman during the time frame covered in the report. However, U.S. officials say some
U.S. funds, from the Middle East Partnership Initiative and other sources, is being used
to fund women’s empowerment programs in Oman. The State Department’s “Trafficking
in Persons Report” for 2005, released June 2005, lists Oman as a “Tier 2” country because
it is a “destination country” for women and men from South Asia who are trafficked into
“involuntary servitude,” and government is not fully complying with minimum standards
to eliminate the trafficking. Oman was not placed on any of the three tiers in the
trafficking report for 2004.
Regional Relations
Sultan Qaboos has often pursued foreign policies outside an Arab or Gulf consensus.
Oman was the one of the few Arab countries not to break relations with Egypt after the
signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979. All the GCC states participated in
the multilateral peace talks established by the U.S.-sponsored Madrid peace process, but
only Oman, Bahrain, and Qatar hosted working group sessions of the multilaterals. Oman
hosted an April 1994 session of the working group on water and, as a result of those talks,
a Middle East Desalination Research Center was established in Oman. In September
1994, Oman and the other GCC states renounced the secondary and tertiary Arab boycott
of Israel and, two months later (December 26, 1994), it became the first Gulf state to
officially host a visit by an Israeli Prime Minister (Yitzhak Rabin). Oman hosted a visit
by then Prime Minister Shimon Peres in April 1996. In October 1995, Oman agreed with
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Israel to exchange trade representatives, essentially a renunciation of the primary boycott
of Israel, and trade offices were subsequently opened in the respective capitals. However,
Oman stopped short of establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, and Oman closed the
trade offices after the September 2000 Palestinian uprising began. Oman has not agreed
to the reopening of those offices, and there has been no known recent official contact
between the two countries.
Oman has experienced more evident tension with Yemen than with any other
neighboring state; these tensions have led to brief armed border clashes on a few
occasions over the past two decades. On October 1, 1992, Oman and Yemen ratified a
border demarcation agreement that ended a 25-year border disagreement between them;
the demarcation was completed in June 1995. Under the pact, Oman relinquished its
claim to a vast area bordering its western Dhofar province.
Economic and Trade Issues
Oil remains a foundation of the Omani economy, generating nearly 75% of
government revenues. However, Oman has a relatively small 5 billion barrels of proven
oil reserves, enough for about 15 years, and some press reports say that production at
some Omani fields has been declining since 1997.6 Oman exports about 900,000 barrels
per day of oil, which is less than 3% of internationally traded crude oil. It is not a member
of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), probably because it is too
small a producer. However, it is a leader in group of independent petroleum exporting
countries that coordinate production and pricing with OPEC. Oman is a small oil supplier
to the United States (about 40,000 barrels of crude oil per day).
Recognizing that its crude oil fields are aging, Oman is trying to privatize its
economy and diversify its sources of revenue. It is investing several billion dollars in a
project to produce and export liquid natural gas (LNG), for which Oman has identified
large markets in Asia and elsewhere. Oman has about 30 trillion cubic feet of proven gas
reserves. The Oman Oil Company (OOC) is coordinating an oil concession in
Kazakhstan and an Omani partnership in a Caspian Sea pipeline consortium, and it is part
of the “Dolphin project,” under which Qatar is exporting natural gas to UAE (by replacing
Omani gas supplies - 135 million cubic feet per day - to the UAE). Oman’s government
is encouraging Omani citizens to work in the private sector, and it has funded a high
technology industrial park (Knowledge Oasis Muscat) to develop Oman’s information
technology sector.
The United States has been Oman’s fourth largest trading partner. Oman was
admitted to the WTO in September 2000. In November 2004, the Bush Administration
announced it would negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) with Oman (and with UAE).
U.S. official statements during the first round of negotiations in March 2005 said that an
agreement is expected to be reached by the end of 2005. A second round of talks was
held in April 2005its current size of 84 seats in
1993), replacing a ten-year old advisory council. In a move toward a popular selection
process, in 1994 and 1997 “notables” in each of Oman’s districts chose up to three
nominees, with Qaboos making a final selection. The first direct elections to the
Consultative Council were held in September 2000 (three year term), but the electorate
was limited (25% of all citizens over 21 years old). In November 2002, Qaboos extended
voting rights to all citizens, male and female, over 21 years of age and the October 4,
2003 Council elections – in which 195,000 Omanis voted (74% turnout)– resulted in a
Council similar to that elected in 2000, including the election of the same two women as
in the previous election (out of 15 women candidates). Like the other Gulf states, formal
political parties are not allowed. Unlike Bahrain or Kuwait, there are no evident groupings
or factions within the Consultative Council, and Qaboos has constrained the Council’s
authority to mostly public works and social benefits issues. It does not draft legislation,
lacks binding legislative powers, and some Omanis say the Council’s influence over
policy has diminished over time – to the point where many experts now say Oman lags
the other Gulf states on political reform. Qaboos appoints the Council president (he
appointed a new president in September 2007, replacing a sixteen year incumbent),
although the Council chooses two vice presidents. For the October 27, 2007 election,
Qaboos allowed, for the first time, public campaigning by candidates. Turnout among
4
Information in this section is from several State Department reports: The Human Rights report
for 2007 (March 11, 2008); the International Religious Freedom Report for 2007 (September 14,
2007); and the Trafficking in Persons Report for 2007 (June 12, 2007). See also: Carpenter,
J.Scott and Simon Henderson. Democracy in Slow Motion: Oman Goes to the Polls. Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch 1298. October 26, 2007.
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388,000 registered voters was 63%, including what appeared to be enthusiastic
participation by women, but none of the 21 female candidates (out of 631 total
candidates) won. In a 1996 “Basic Law,” Qaboos made the “legislature” bicameral by
appointing a “State Council” to serve, in part, as a check and balance on the elected
Consultative Council. Together, the two bodies constitute the “Oman Council.” The State
Council now has 70 seats, up from the original 53 seats. The State Council appointed
following the October 27 election has fourteen women, up from nine previously.
Qaboos has given major speeches on the equality of women and their importance in
national development, and they now constitute about 30% of the work force. In March
2003, he named a woman to the rank of minister, giving that rank to a woman in charge
of the national authority for industrial craftsmanship. He has since added three female
ministers — of higher education, of tourism, and of social development — in March,
June, and November 2004, respectively. In April 2004, Qaboos made five women among
the 29 appointees to the public prosecutors office. However, allegations of spousal abuse
and domestic violence are fairly common, with women finding protection primarily
through their families. Omani women also continue to face social discrimination often as
a result of the interpretation of Islamic law and tradition, which, for example, favors male
heirs in adjudication of inheritance claims.
The 1996 Basic Law affirmed Islam as the state religion, and the State Department’s
religious freedom report for 2007 notes no change from the previous year on restrictions
on religious rights. Non-Muslims are free to worship at temples and churches built on
land donated by the Sultan, but there are some limitations on non-Muslims’ proselytizing
or publishing religious materials and on religious gatherings in other than governmentapproved houses of worship. Members of all religions and sects are free to maintain links
with coreligionists abroad and travel outside Oman for religious purposes. On related
issues, press criticism of the government is tolerated, but criticism of the Sultan is not. In
December 2004, the government arrested 31 Ibadhi Muslims on suspicion of conspiring
to establish a religious state, but Qaboos pardoned them in June 2005. Private ownership
of radio and television stations is prohibited, but the availability of satellite dishes has
made foreign broadcasts accessible to the public. The State Department notes progress in
improving workers’ rights, in conjunction with the U.S.-Oman FTA.
U.S. funds from the Middle East Partnership Initiative have been used to fund civil
society and political process strengthening, judicial reform, democracy building and
election management, media independence, and women’s empowerment programs. The
State Department’s “Trafficking in Persons Report” for 2007 listed Oman in “Tier 3”
(down from Tier 2-Watch List the previous year) because Oman does not fully comply
with the minimum standards to eliminate the trafficking.
Regional Relations
Qaboos has often pursued foreign policies outside an Arab or Gulf consensus. Oman
is not as wary of Iran as are the other GCC states; Oman has no sizable Shiite community
with which Iran could meddle in Oman, and it still appreciates the military help the Shah
of Iran provided in helping end a leftist revolt in Oman’s Dhofar Province during 1964 1975. Oman, as do the other GCC states, publicly opposes any U.S. attack on Iran. On
Iraq, and generally in line with other GCC states, Omani officials say that the Omani
government and population are dismayed at the Shiite Islamist domination of post-
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Saddam Iraq and its pro-Iranian tilt, and at the inability of the United States to prevent
substantial civilian deaths. Yet, Oman has not remitted $3 million it pledged in 2004 for
Iraq reconstruction nor has it opened a full embassy in Iraq; both are typical of most of
the other GCC states as well.
On the Arab-Israeli dispute, Oman was the one of the few Arab countries not to
break relations with Egypt after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979.
All the GCC states participated in the multilateral peace talks established by the U.S.sponsored Madrid peace process, but only Oman, Bahrain, and Qatar hosted working
group sessions of the multilaterals. Oman hosted an April 1994 session of the working
group on water and, as a result of those talks, a Middle East Desalination Research Center
was established in Oman. In September 1994, Oman and the other GCC states renounced
the secondary and tertiary Arab boycott of Israel. In December 1994, it became the first
Gulf state to officially host a visit by an Israeli Prime Minister (Yitzhak Rabin), and it
hosted then Prime Minister Shimon Peres in April 1996. In October 1995, Oman
exchanged trade offices with Israel, essentially renouncing the primary boycott of Israel.
However, Oman did not establish diplomatic relations with Israel, and the trade offices
have been closed since the September 2000 Palestinian uprising. Though Oman did not
actively pursue reinvigorating the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in 2006 and 2007,
Omani officials reached out to regional Arab states and Israeli officials to resolve the
Palestinian issue. In an April 2008 meeting, Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Yusuf bin
Alawi bin Abdullah informed Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni that the Israeli trade
office in Oman would remain closed until agreement was reached on a Palestinian state.
Economic and Trade Issues5
Despite Omani efforts to diversify its economy, oil exports generated 62% of
government revenues in 2007. Oman has a relatively small 5.5 billion barrels of proven
oil reserves, enough for about 15 years, and some energy development firms say that
production at some Omani fields is declining.6 Oman exports about 222 million barrels
per year of oil (less than 3% of internationally traded oil), of which about 11.5 million are
imported by the United States. Oman is not a member of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), but it is a leader among non-OPEC exporters in
coordinating with OPEC. Recognizing that its crude oil fields are aging, Oman is trying
to privatize its economy, diversify its sources of revenue, and develop its liquid natural
gas (LNG) sector, for which Oman has identified large markets in Asia and elsewhere.
Oman has about 30 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves. Oman is part of the
“Dolphin project,” under which Qatar is exporting natural gas to UAE (by replacing
Omani gas supplies, at 135 million cubic feet per day, to the UAE). The United States has
been Oman’s fourth largest trading partner. Oman was admitted to the WTO in September
2000. The U.S.-Oman FTA was signed on January 19, 2006, and ratified by Congress
(P.L. 109-283, signed September 26, 2006). Oman recently set back Gulf state plans to
form a monetary union by 2010 by saying it would not join it.
5
For more information on Oman’s economy and U.S.-Oman trade, see CRS Report RL33328,
U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement, by Mary Jane Bolle.
6
Gerth, Jeff and Stephen Labaton. “Oman’s Oil Yield Long in Decline, Shell Data Show.” New
York Times, April 8, 2004.