Order Code RS21968
Updated June 24August 2, 2005
CRS Report for Congress
.Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: Elections and New Government, Government, and Constitution
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Elections for a transitional National Assembly, provincial councils, and a Kurdish
regional assembly were held on January 30, 2005. High turnout in Shiite and Kurdish
areas led to first- and second-place finishes for slates of these two communities, and
they determined the composition of a new government inaugurated in MayInsurgent violence has remained
high, but a government has been formed, a permanent constitution is being drafted, and
additional Sunni Arabs are being brought into the new power structure. See CRS
Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance.
Shortly after Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) deposed Saddam Hussein’s regime in
April 2003, the Bush Administration linked the end of U.S. military occupation to the
completion of a new constitution and the holding of national elections, tasks expected to
take two years. Prominent Iraqis prevailed on the Bush Administration to accelerate the
process, and sovereignty was given to an appointed Iraqi government on June 28, 2004.
A new government and a permanent constitution were to be voted on thereafter. The
elections were provided forsubsequent transition was laid out in a Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), signed on March
8, 2004. Its transition road-map is
March 8, 2004, as follows:1
1
!
The elections held on January 30, 2005 (within the prescribed time
frame) were for a 275-seat National Assembly; for a provincial assembly
in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces (41 seats each; 51 for Baghdad); and for a
Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). Results are in table below.
!
The TAL specified no deadline for the elected National Assembly to
select an executive (a “presidency council” of a president and two deputy
presidents) by a two-thirds Assembly vote. The presidency council had
two weeks to choose a prime minister by consensus, and the Prime
Minister had one month to obtain Assembly confirmation of his cabinet
choices. The Prime Minister and his cabinet are subject to confirmation
by a majority Assembly vote. Cabinet ministers may be persons not in
the Assembly.
1
The text of the TAL can be obtained from the Coalition Provisional Authority website
For text, see [http://cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html].
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS-2
!
The National Assembly is to draft a constitution by August 15, 2005, to
be put to a national vote by October 15, 2005. Two-thirds of the voters
in any three Iraqi provinces may veto the constitution, essentially giving
Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites a veto. If the permanent constitution is
approved, elections for a permanent government are to occur by
December 15, 2005, and it would take office by December 31, 2005. If
the constitution is defeated, the December 15 elections would be for a
new transitional National Assembly and a new draft is to be voted on by
October 15, 2006. By August 1, 2005, the Assembly could, if needed,
request six additional months to draft the constitution; such a delay
would postpone the transition process by that amount of time.
The Election Process and Planning
In June 2004, the United Nations formed an 8-member central Independent Electoral
Commission of Iraq (IECI), nominated by notables from around Iraq, to run the election
process. CPA Orders 92, 96, and 97, issued just before the June 28, 2004 sovereignty
handoverin mid-2004, provided for voting by
proportional representation (closed list). Voters chose
among “political entities”: a party,
a coalition of parties, or individuals running as
independents. Seats in the Assembly (and
the provincial assemblies) were allocated in
proportion to a slate’s showing. Any entity
that obtained at least 1/275 of the vote (about
31,000 votes) obtained a seat. Under IECI
rules, a female candidate occupied every third
position on electoral lists in order to meet
the TAL’s goal for at least 25% female
membership in the new Assembly. A total of 111
entities were on the National Assembly
ballot: 9 were multi-party coalitions, 75 were
single parties, and 27 were individual
persons. The 111 entities contained over 7,000
candidates. Another 9,000 candidates,
also organized into party slates, competed in the
provincial and Kurdish elections.
Under an Iraqi decision, Iraqis abroad, estimated at about 1.2 million, were eligible
to vote. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was tapped to run the “outof-country voting” (OCV) program. U.N. electoral advisers had opposed OCV because
of the complexity of the task, as well as the expense. The 14 countries in which this
voting took place were Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Iran, Jordan,
Netherlands, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, UAE, Britain, and the United States.2 About
2 About 275,000 Iraqi expatriates
(including dual citizens and anyone who can demonstrate that
their father was Iraqi)
registered, and about 90% of them voted.
Inside Iraq, certification of voters and political entities took place November 1December 15, 2004. Voter lists were based on ration card lists containing about 14
million names; voters needed to be at least 18 years old. Voters did not need to formally
“register,” but they verified or corrected personal information on file at 550 food ration
distribution points around Iraq. In the most restive areas, this verification process did not
take place, but voters were able to vote by presenting valid identification on election day.
Each political entity was required to obtain 500 signatures from eligible voters and pay
about $5,000. About 5,200 polling centers were established; each center housed several
2
For more information on the out-of-country voting, see [http://www.iraqocv.org].
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polling stations. About 6,000 Iraqis staffed the branches of the IECI around Iraq, and
200,000 Iraqis staffed the polls on election day.
2
The 14 countries in which this voting took place were Australia, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Iran, Jordan, Netherlands, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, UAE, Britain, and the United States.
For more information on the out-of-country voting, see [http://www.iraqocv.org].
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Security, Logistics, and Funding
Election security was an issue under nearly constant review in the months before the
election, but in December 2004, President Bush stated that postponement would represent
victory for the insurgents and that elections should proceed as scheduled. That U.S.
insistence came despite a postponement petition in November 2004 by seventeen mainly
Sunni Arab parties. Prior to the election, insurgents repeatedly targeted polling stations
and threatened to kill anyone who voted. In an effort to secure restive cities for the vote,
U.S. forces conducted numerous counter-insurgency operations in the four months prior
to the vote, including a November 2004 operation to end insurgent control of Fallujah.
the vote, U.S. force levels
in Iraq rose to 150,000 from the prior level of about 138,000. Polling
centers were
guarded on election day by the 130,000 members of Iraq’s security forces,
with U.S.
forces close by for back-up. Two days prior to election day, all vehicle traffic
was was
banned, Iraq’s borders were closed, and polling locations were confirmed.
Security concerns also affected the ability of the United Nations to assist Iraq’s
election. The 100-person U.N. contingent in Iraq included only 19 election specialists,
with another 12 U.N. election specialists based in Jordan. In an effort to bolster U.N.
assistance, U.S. officials obtained some
donors to a protection force for the U.N.
contingent, provided for by U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1546 (June 8, 2004). — Fiji
deployed 130 troops and Georgia
deployed 691 troops. Vote monitoring was limited;
Canada led a to a Canada-led contingent of about 25 observers (“International Mission for Iraq Elections”)
from eleven nations to monitor the Iraq vote. However, the mission took place in Jordan
and mostly involved assessing reports by about 50,000 Iraqis who directly monitored the
voting
observers from eleven nations based in Jordan, which assessed reports on the voting by
about 50,000 Iraqi monitors. (One of the international observers was in Iraq). Another
129 foreign observers,
mainly foreign diplomats posted to Iraq, did some monitoring
from Baghdad’s “Green Zone.”
Funding. The Iraqi government budgeted about $250 million for the elections
inside Iraq, of which $130 million was offset by international donors, including about $40
million from the European Union. Out of $18.6 billion in U.S. funds for Iraq
reconstruction contained in an FY2004 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 108-106), the
United States provided $40 million to improve the capacity of the IECI; $42.5 million for
elections monitoring by Iraqis; and $40 million for political party development, through
the International Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute. The funds were
apportioned from $832 million in FY2004 funds for “democracy and governance.” The
out-of-countryout-ofcountry voting cost an additional $92 million, of which $11 million was for the
U.S.
component. No U.S. funds were spend for the out-of-country voting.
Election Competition and Results3
The Iraqi groups that took the most active interest in the elections were primarily
those parties best positioned to win seats: Shiite Islamist parties, the Kurds, and
established secular parties. The most prominent slate was the “United Iraqi Alliance”
3
For a detailed discussion of many of these groups, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S.
Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance.
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(UIA), brokered by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and his top aides. The 228-candidate
UIA slate consisted of 22 parties, but dominated by two large Shiite Islamist parties, the
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Da’wa Party. Both,
but particularly SCIRI, are politically close to Tehran. The first candidate on this slate
was SCIRI leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim; Da’wa leader Ibrahim Jafari was number
seven. In the tenth position was secular Shiite Ahmad Chalabi, a former U.S. ally who
has aligned himself with Shiite Islamists. In an effort to be inclusive, the UIA slate
included some non-Islamist Shiites and 30 Sunnis. There were at least 14 supporters of
radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr on the slate, even though Sadr himself denounced
the election as a There were 14 supporters of radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr on the slate —
of which eight won seats — even though Sadr himself denounced the election as a
3
For a detailed discussion of many of these groups, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S.
Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance.
CRS-4
product of U.S. occupation. Pro-Sadr Shiites also competed separately
on a “National
Independent Elites and Cadres” list and competed in provincial elections.
Among other major slates, the two main Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) put aside lingering rivalries
to offer a joint 165-candidate “Kurdish Alliance” list. Interim Prime Minister Iyad alAllawi filed a six-party, 233-candidate “the Iraqi List” led by his Iraqi National Accord
(INA) party, which included
party, but including tribal leaders and some secular Sunni and Shiite
independentsSunnis and Shiites. The Communist
Party, headed by Hamid al-Musa, filed a 257-candidate
slate called the “People’s Union.”
Due to insurgent activity or Sunni Arab (20% of the overall population) perceptions
of inevitable election defeat, indicators of voter interest were low in the restive Sunni
areas (Anbar, Nineveh, Salahuddin, and Diyala provinces, plus Sunni neighborhoods of
Baghdad). A large, moderate Sunni ” slate.
Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population), perceiving electoral defeat and
insurgent intimidation, mostly stood on the sidelines. The relatively moderate Sunni
Islamist group, the Iraqi Islamic Party of Muhsin
Abd al-Hamid, filed a 275-seat slate, but it withdrew from the
election in December
2004. The Iraqi Muslim Clerics’ Association, which is said to be
close to the insurgents,
did not compete and called for a Sunni boycott. On the other
hand, an 80-candidate Sunni
, mostly tribal Sunni, “Iraqis Party” slate was offered by interim
President Ghazi al-Yawar, a tribal figure who formed the
“Iraqis Party.”
. Adnan Pachachi, a Sunni elder statesman who heads the Iraqi
Independent Democrats, offered a slate consisting mostly of Sunni professionals. A promonarchist slate of the Movement for Constitutional Monarchy (MCM) was mostly Sunni
as well. Some Sunni groups that boycotted the National Assembly contest nonetheless
participated in the provincial assembly elections.
The vote was conducted relatively smoothly. Insurgents conducted about 300
attacks, killing about 30 Iraqis, but no polling stations were overrun, and Shiite and
Kurdish voters appeared mostly undeterred. Total turnout was about 58% (about 8.5
million votes). After the polls closed, President Bush said “In great numbers and under
great risk...The Iraqi people, themselves, made this election a resounding success.” World
reaction was favorable, including from governments, such as France and Germany, that
have criticized U.S. Iraq policy. Members of Congress widely praised the vote.
National Assembly results, contained in a table below, appeared to match many
predictions. Sunnis hold only 17 seats (about 6% of the total seats), leaving them
underrepresented relative to the population, and Kurds and Shiites overrepresented. There
are over-represented. There are
about 90 women in the Assembly. In provincial elections, the Kurds won about 60%
of of
the seats in Tamim (Kirkuk) province (26 out of 41 seats); Sunni Arabs hold 6 and
Turkomens hold 9 seats. This has strengthened Kurdish attempts to gain control of oilrich city of Kirkuk and provoked an Arab and Turkmen boycott of that council, according
to press reports. Pro-Sadr candidates won pluralities or majorities in several Shiite
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provinces (Wasit, Dhi Qar, and Maysan) while SCIRI (running separately) won in Najaf,
Karbala, Qadisiyah, and Muthana provinces.
Post-Election Government
The election results triggered factional bargaining over positions in the new
government and the future of Iraq. The UIA nominated Ibrahim al-Jafari for prime
minister; that post has executive power. The Kurds insisted that PUK leader Jalal
Talabani become president and that they have.
Post-Election Government
The election results triggered factional bargaining over positions in the new
government and the future of Iraq; much of the negotiating centered on Kurdish demands
for substantial autonomy, control over
resources, and the incorporation of Kirkuk, which
has a large Kurdish population, into the
Kurdish-administered areas in northern Iraq.
Press reports suggest that the UIA and
Kurdish blocs agreed to defer some of the key Kurd-related issues, although it appears
that the Kurds were assured of gaining eventual control of Kirkuk and of equitable
distribution of oil revenues. The UIA and Kurds also apparently agreed that their militia
forces would be largely allowed to operate under party rather than national control. No
agreement was reached to incorporate Allawi’s bloc into the new government, and Sunnis
Kurdish blocs agreed to defer some of these issues,
but Sunnis were left unsatisfied at the extent of their incorporation into the government.
The groups began establishing the new government on April 3 with the naming of
a National Assembly speaker (Hajim al-Hassani, a Sunni from Ghazi Yawar’s list) and
two deputies: Arif Tayfour, a Kurd, and Hussein Shahristani, an aide to Ayatollah Sistani.
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On April 6, the presidency council was approved: Talabani is president and his two
deputies are SCIRI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi and Ghazi al-Yawar. The three were sworn in
on April 7, and they named Jafari as Prime Minister. The Assembly confirmed him on
April 8. Subsequently:
4
!
On April 28, with the one-month deadline for naming a cabinet
approaching, Jafari received Assembly approval (180 votes out of 185
members present) for a cabinet of 32 ministers and 3 deputy prime
ministers.4 Chalabi and KDP activist Rosch Shaways were named as
deputy prime ministers. Six ministers are women. However, five cabinet
positions and a deputy prime ministership was initially filled only
temporarily or PUK leader Jalal Talabani, whom the
Kurds were pushing for president, was given that post. His two deputies are SCIRI’s
Adel Abd al-Mahdi and Ghazi al-Yawar. They named the UIA’s choice for Prime
Minister, the Da’wa Party’s Ibrahim al-Jafari, to that post. Subsequently:
!
On April 28, Jafari received Assembly approval for a cabinet of 32
ministers, of which six are women, and 3 deputy prime ministers.4
Leading anti-Saddam figure Ahmad Chalabi and KDP activist Rosch
Shaways were named deputy prime ministers. Five cabinet positions
and a deputy prime ministership was initially filled only temporarily or
left vacant, pending an agreement to appoint more Sunnis.
!
On May 7, Jafari continued fillingfilled out the cabinet by appointing 3three Sunnis
and and
two Shiites to permanent cabinet seatsministerial posts, and the remaining deputy
prime minister
(Abid al-Jabburi, a Sunni). However, the nominee to be
nominated Minister of Human
Rights, Hashim al-Shibli, refused to take up his post
on the grounds that he was appointed only because he is a Sunni.
!
Among the five major ministries, SCIRI activists hold two of them:
Bayan Jabor is Interior Minister and Ali Allawi is Finance Minister. The
Oil Minister is an independent Shiite Islamist, Ibrahim Bahr al-Ulum.
Hoshyar Zebari of the KDP is Foreign Minister. The other major post,
Defense Minister, went to Sadoun al-Dulaymi, a Sunni who was a former
In the final cabinet, there are 17 Shiite ministers, 8 Kurds, 6 Sunnis, and one Christian (a
Christian woman is Minister of Science and Technology), in addition to the three deputy prime
ministers.
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official in Saddam Hussein’s security service but broke with the regime
in 1984 and lived in exile in Saudi Arabia.
!
Dulaymi is the most important Sunni official in the new government.
However, Sunni Arabs are complaining that the other Sunni ministers
hold slots they consider relatively unimportant, such as the ministries of
culture and of women’s affairs. Some of the difficulties in appointing
Sunnis were reportedly caused by UIA and Kurdish resistance to
appointing any Sunnis who were in Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party.
!
Continuing the transition process, on May 10, the National Assembly
appointed a 55-member committee (all Assembly members) to begin
drafting the permanent constitution. The UIA was given 28 slots, and
a SCIRI top official, Homan al-Hammoudi, was named committee chair.
The Kurdish alliance was given 15 slots, and Allawi’s bloc got 8 seats.
Also appointed were one Christian, one Turkomen, and two Sunni Arabs,
he was appointed only because he is a Sunni. (That post is filled by a
Kurdish woman on an acting basis). Even though these latter
appointments included a Sunni, Sadoun al-Dulaymi, as Defense Minister,
Sunni Arabs complained that Sunnis hold slots considered relatively
unimportant, such as the ministries of culture and of women’s affairs.
Of the four other major posts, SCIRI activists hold two — Interior and
Finance; the Oil Minister is an independent Shiite Islamist; and a KDP
activist is Foreign Minister.
Permanent Constitution
Continuing the transition process, on May 10, the National Assembly appointed a
55-member committee (all Assembly members) to begin drafting the permanent
constitution. The UIA was given 28 slots, and a SCIRI top official, Humam alHammoudi, was named committee chair. The Kurdish alliance was given 15 slots, and
Allawi’s bloc got 8 seats. Also appointed were one Christian, one Turkomen, and two
Sunni Arabs, prompting Sunni resentment and some reported U.S. pressure on Iraqi
leaders to appoint additional Sunni Arabs. After about one month of
further bargaining, onOn June 23, 2005, an agreement was finalized
for 15
additional Sunni Arabs (and one member of the small Sabian
community) to
become equalvoting members of the drafting committee, with
an additional ten 10 more Sunni Arabs to serve as advisors. However, the
committee says it will operate by consensus. Iraqi leaders say that a
advisors. One voting Sunni and one advisor were assassinated in early July 2005,
causing a several day boycott by the committee’s Sunni Arabs.
Iraqi leaders now say that a draft will be completed by the August 15, 2005, deadline. Observers say
there are six subcommittees working on specific issues of the new
constitution, including the most difficult issues of Kurdish autonomy and
the role of Islam in law,
although some are suggesting that some major issues discussed below might be left
unresolved in the draft. The committee had considered requesting an extension (there was
an August 1, 2005 deadline for such a request) but reported U.S. pressure led the
committee not to do so. Based on press reports of drafts of the constitution that are
4
In the final cabinet, there are 17 Shiite ministers, 8 Kurds, 6 Sunnis, and one Christian (a
Christian woman is Minister of Science and Technology), in addition to the three deputy prime
ministers.
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circulating, major disputes, which will be discussed at a national conference of Iraqi
factions on August 5, 2005, include:
!
Efforts by the UIA bloc to elevate the role of Islam as a source of law,
including a reported stipulation that families would be able to choose
Islamic courts from their sect to adjudicate domestic issues such as
divorce and inheritance. These provisions have provoked opposition
from women, who want domestic issues to come before civil courts, and
from the Kurds, who tend to be secular Muslims. On the other hand, the
25% electoral goal for women apparently will be retained, and the
concept of equal rights for men and women stated. The UIA bloc also
reportedly wants to designate a special status to the Shiite clergy (the
marjaiyya, currently Sistani) and (mostly Shiite) religious sites, and to
include “Islamic” in Iraq’s name.
!
The Kurdish and Shiite push for a weak central government, and for the
ability of several provinces together to form autonomous “regions” with
their own regional governments. The Sunnis are opposing this concept,
because their region, unlike those inhabited by the Shiites and the Kurds,
lacks oil and they depend on the central government for revenues.
!
The reported Kurdish threat to veto the constitution unless it expands the
boundaries of the Kurdish administrative region, puts in place a process
for the Kurds to gain control of Kirkuk, and allows them to retain their
peshmerga militia.
National Assembly Election Results
Slate/Party
Number of Seats
UIA (Shiite Islamist). About 58% of vote; Shiite turnout 75%
Kurdistan Alliance. About 26% of vote; Kurdish turnout 90%
140
75
Iraqis List (Allawi). About 14% of vote.
40
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni). 1.8% of vote. Sunni turnout less than 10%
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey
National Independent and Elites Cadre (pro-Sadr)
40
5
3
3
People’s Union (Communist, Sunni/Shiite)
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd)
2
2
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
2
2
2
National Democratic Alliance (secular)
2
1
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
1
1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (secular)
1
1