Order Code RL31382
CRS Report for Congress
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Expulsion, Censure, Reprimand, and Fine:
Legislative Discipline in the House of
Updated January 25, 2005
American Law Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Expulsion, Censure, Reprimand, and Fine: Legislative
Discipline in the House of Representatives
The House of Representatives is expressly authorized within the United States
Constitution (Article I, Section 5, clause 2) to discipline or “punish” its own
Members. This authority of the institution of the House to discipline a Member for
“disorderly Behaviour” is in addition to any criminal or civil liability that a Member
of the House may incur for particular misconduct, and is a device or procedure
designed not so much as merely a punishment of the individual Member, but rather
ultimately as a measure to protect the institutional integrity of the House of
Representatives, its proceedings and its reputation.
Congressional discipline of a Member by the House of Representatives is done
by the House itself, without the necessity of Senate concurrence, and may take
several forms. The most common forms of discipline in the House are now
“expulsion,” “censure,” or “reprimand,” although the House may also discipline its
Members in others ways, including fine or monetary restitution, loss of seniority, and
suspension or loss of certain privileges. In addition to such sanctions imposed by the
full House of Representatives, the standing committee in the House dealing with
ethics and official conduct matters, the House Committee on Standards of Official
Conduct, is authorized by House Rules to issue a formal Committee reproach in the
form of a “Letter of Reproval” for misconduct which does not rise to the level of
consideration or sanction by the entire House of Representatives. Additionally, the
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct has also expressed its disapproval of
certain conduct in informal letters and communications to Members.
The House may generally discipline its Members for violations of statutory law,
including crimes; for violations of internal congressional rules; or for any conduct
which the House of Representatives finds has reflected discredit upon the institution.
Thus, each House of Congress has disciplined its own Members for conduct which
has not necessarily violated any specific rule or law, but which was found to breach
its privileges, demonstrate contempt for the institution, or which was found to
discredit the House or Senate. When the most severe sanction of expulsion has been
employed in the House, however, the conduct has historically involved either
disloyalty to the United States Government, or the violation of a criminal law
involving the abuse of one’s official position, such as bribery. The House of
Representatives has actually expelled only 5 Members in its history, but a number of
Members, believing that they were facing certain congressional discipline for various
misconduct, resigned from Congress prior to any formal House action.
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Expulsion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Grounds for Expulsion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Precedents and Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Consequences of Expulsion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Censure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Grounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Precedents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Consequence of Censures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Reprimand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Fines; Monetary Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Suspension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Letters of Reproval and Other Committee Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
APPENDIX: Disciplinary Actions Taken by the Full House Against
a Member . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
List of Tables
Table I. Censure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Table II. Reprimand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Table III. Expulsion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Expulsion, Censure, Reprimand, and Fine:
Legislative Discipline in the House of
Each House of the United States Congress is expressly authorized within the
Constitution to “punish” its own Members for misconduct. In imposing legislative
discipline against its Members, the House operates through its rule making powers,1
and the express provision for legislative discipline is set out along with Congress’
rule-making authority in Article I, Section 5, clause 2, of the Constitution:
Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.
The underlying justification for legislative discipline has traditionally been to
protect the integrity and dignity of the legislative institution and its proceedings,
rather than merely to punish an individual;2 and such internal legislative process is
additional to any potential criminal or civil liability that a Member might incur for
any particular misconduct.3 Members of Congress, like any other persons in the
United States, are subject generally to outside law enforcement and criminal
prosecution if their misconduct constitutes a violation of federal, State, or local
criminal law. Unlike members of the legislatures or parliaments of many foreign
nations, there is no general immunity from all criminal prosecution for Members of
the United States Congress during their tenure in office. Rather, Members of
Deschler's Precedents of the United States House of Representatives, H. Doc. 94-661, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., Volume 3, Ch. 12, § 12, p. 168 (1979); Justice Joseph Story, Commentaries
on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. II, § 835 (Boston 1883).
Cushing, The Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, pp.250-251, 257-259, 268-270
(Boston 1874). Internal disciplinary action is “rooted in the judgment of the House as to
what was necessary or appropriate for it to do to assure the integrity of its legislative
performance and its institutional acceptability to the people at large as a serious and
responsible instrument of government.” Deschler’s Precedents, supra at 174, citing Powell
v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577, McGowan concurring, at 607 (D.C.Cir. 1968), rev’d on other
grounds, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Story, supra at § 835. Note British Parliamentary practice:
“The practice of expulsion is not so much disciplinary as remedial, not so much to punish
Members as to rid the House of persons who are unfit for membership.” Erskine May, Law,
Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, at 105 (London 1964).
House ethics action does not foreclose a criminal prosecution on the same matter. United
States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181, 189-190 (D.C.Cir. 1994); 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 655 (1834); United
States v. Traficant, 368 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. ___ (Jan. 10, 2005).
Congress have a fairly limited immunity from outside prosecution for “Speech or
Debate” in either House of Congress.4
Members of the House of Representatives are subject to internal, congressional
discipline for any conduct which the institution of the House believes warrants such
discipline. The express constitutional authority drafted by the Framers of the
Constitution was drawn from the British parliamentary practice, as well as from our
own colonial legislative experience, and reflects the principle and understanding that
although the qualifications of Members of Congress were intentionally kept to a
minimum to allow the voters the broadest discretion in sending whomever they
please to represent them in Congress,5 the institution of the House has the right to
discipline those who breach its privileges or decorum, or who damage its integrity
or reputation, even to the extent of expelling from Congress a duly-elected Member.6
Internal, congressional discipline of a Member may take several forms. The
most common forms of discipline in the House of Representatives are now
“expulsion,” “censure,” or “reprimand,” although the House may also discipline its
Members in others ways, including fine or monetary assessment, loss of seniority, or
loss of certain privileges.7 An “expulsion” is a removal of a Member from the House
of Representatives by a two-thirds vote of the House. A “censure” or a “reprimand”
is a legislative procedure where the full House, by majority vote on a simple
resolution, expresses a formal disapproval of the conduct of a Member. In addition
to these punishments or disciplines by the entire House of Representatives, the House
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct is authorized to issue, on its own
accord, a “Letter of Reproval” to a Member when the Committee disapproves of
conduct but makes no recommendation for legislative sanctions to the full House of
Under the “Speech or Debate” clause of the Constitution (Article I, Section 6, cl. 1),
Members of Congress may not be questioned outside of Congress “for any Speech or Debate
in either House,” that is, they are immune from criminal or civil proceedings only for their
official conduct or activities which are deemed to be “an integral part of the deliberative and
communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and House
proceedings.” Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972). The constitutional bar
to the “Arrest” of Members during their attendance of, or “going to and returning from” a
session of Congress for other than a felony or “Breach of the Peace” (Article I, Section 6,
cl. 1), is an “obsolete” provision which applies only to arrests in civil suits, common in the
18th century, but does not apply to criminal arrests. Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S.
425, 446 (1908); Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76 (1934); Gravel, supra at 614; Deschler’s
Precedents, supra at Ch. 12, § 3.1; see discussion in The Constitution of the United States,
Analysis and Interpretation, S. Doc. 103-6, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 127 (1996). Contrary
to popular myth and misunderstanding, Members of Congress are not constitutionally
immune from arrest for traffic violations under this clause.
Alexander Hamilton, II Eliot’s Debates 257; note also James Madison, 2 Farrand, Records
of the Federal Convention of 1787, 249-250, and Federalist Papers, No. 57; Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 508, 509, 531 (1969).
See note 2, supra; Story, supra at §§ 835-836. Note also Senator John Quincy Adams’
arguments in 1807 on Senate’s authority to expel a Member even after re-election, II Hinds’
Precedents of the House of Representatives, § 1264, p. 817 (1907).
Rules of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, March 19, 2003, 108th Congress,
Rule 24(e). Deschler's Precedents, supra at Ch. 12, § 12.
Representatives. The Committee has also from time-to-time expressed its
disapproval of particular conduct in informal letters and other communications to
There is no precise listing or description in the Rules of the House of
Representatives of the specific types of misconduct or ethical improprieties which
might subject a Member to the various potential disciplines. The Rules adopted by
the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct provide simply that:
With respect to the sanctions that the Committee may recommend, reprimand is
appropriate for serious violations, censure is appropriate for more serious
violations, and expulsion of a Member or dismissal of an officer or employee is
appropriate for the most serious violations. A recommendation of a fine is
appropriate in a case in which it is likely that the violation was committed to
secure a personal financial benefit; and a recommendation of a denial or
limitation of a right, power, privilege, or immunity of a Member is appropriate
when the violation bears upon the exercise or holding of such right, power,
privilege, or immunity.8
The House may discipline its Members for violations of statutory law, including
crimes; for violations of internal congressional rules; or for any conduct which the
House of Representatives finds has reflected discredit upon the institution.9 Each
House of Congress has disciplined its own Members for conduct which has not
necessarily violated any specific rule or law, but which was found to breach its
privileges, demonstrate contempt for the institution, or which was found to discredit
the House or Senate;10 when the most severe sanction of expulsion has been
employed or recommended in the House, however, the conduct has historically
involved either disloyalty to the United States Government, or the violation of a
criminal law involving the abuse of one's official position, such as bribery.
Expulsion is the form of action by which the House of Representatives, after a
Member has taken the oath of office, removes that Representative from membership
in the body by a vote of two-thirds of the Members present and voting.11 An
expulsion is considered a disciplinary matter and a matter of self-protection of the
integrity of the institution and its proceedings, and as such is substantively and
procedurally different from an “exclusion,” which denies a Member-elect his or her
Rules of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, supra at Rule 24(g).
In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 669-670 (1897); H.R. Rpt. No. 570, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess.
(1914) (Judiciary Committee), at VI Cannon’s Precedents of the House of Representatives,
§ 398, p. 558; Brown, House Practice, Guide to the Rules, Precedents and Procedures of
the House, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. “Misconduct; Sanctions,” at 581-582 (1996). Note
authority of Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, Rules of the House of
Representatives, Rule XI, para. 3(a)(2), and Code of Official Conduct, Rule XXIII(1).
See Appendix for listing of House disciplinary actions.
Brown, supra, “Voting,” at p. 908: “A two-thirds vote ordinarily means two-thirds of those
voting, a quorum being present, and not two-thirds of the entire membership.”
seat by a simple majority vote of the body, prior to the Member-elect being seated (or
after being seated “without prejudice” pending investigation and resolution of the
matter), because of failure of the Member-elect to meet the constitutional
qualifications for office (i.e., age, citizenship and inhabitancy in the
elected), or because of a failure to have been
”; “exclusion” is now
to be a disciplinary procedure.
A Member is
“expelled” by a twothirds
vote, however, precisely for issues of misconduct, and expulsion is generally
taken against a Member after the Member has been sworn into office.
Members of the United States Congress are not removed by way of an
procedure in the legislature, as are executive and judicial officers, but
are subject to the more simplified and expedited legislative process of expulsion.
A removal through an impeachment, it should be noted, requires the action of both
impeachment in the House and trial and conviction in the
Senate. An expulsion, however, is accomplished merely by the House or Senate
acting alone concerning one of its own Members, without the consent or action of the
other body, and without the constitutional requirement of trial and conviction.
Grounds for Expulsion
There is no limitation apparent on the face of the Constitution, nor in the
deliberations of the Framers, on the authority to expel a Member of Congress, other
than the two-thirds vote requirement. One study of the expulsion clause summarized
intent as follows:
[From] the history of Article I, Section 5, clause 2, and in particular its course in
the Committee of Detail, it is clear that the Framers ... did not intend to impose
any limitation on Congressional power to determine what conduct warranted
.... Nor do the debates in the Convention suggest any desire to impose
any other substantive restrictions on the expulsion power.
Justice Joseph Story similarly concluded that it would be
difficult to draw a clear
line of distinction between the right to inflict the punishment of expulsion, and any
other punishment upon a member, founded on the time, place, or nature or the
expulsion may be for any misdemeanor, which, though not
punishable by any statute, is inconsistent with the trust and duty of
The Supreme Court of the United States, citing Justice Story
s historic treatise
on the Constitution, found an expansive authority and discretion within each
See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522 (1969). Deschler’s Precedents, supra at Ch.
12, §12, p. 169, n. 21.
See case of Senator William Blount of Tennessee, expelled on July 8, 1797; and found not
subject to impeachment. III Hinds’ Precedents, supra at §§ 2294-2318.
II Hinds’ Precedents, supra at § 1275.
Bowman and Bowman, "Article I, Section 5: Congress' Power to Expel - An Exercise in
Self Restraint," 29 Syracuse Law Review 1071, 1089-1090 (1978).
Story, supra at § 836.
of Congress concerning the grounds for expulsion. In In re Chapman, the Supreme
Court noted the Senate expulsion case of Senator William
as supporting the
constitutional authority of either
of Congress to punish a Member for conduct
which in the judgment of the body
is inconsistent with the trust and duty of a
even if such conduct was
not a statutable offense nor was it committed in
his official character, nor was it committed during the session of Congress, nor at the
seat of government.
of Congress has broad authority as to the
grounds for an expulsion, this disciplinary action is generally understood to be
reserved only for the
most serious violations.
As noted above, expulsions in
have traditionally involved conduct which
implicated disloyalty to the Union, or the commission of a crime involving the abuse
of one's office or authority.
Precedents and Practice
The House of Representatives has actually expelled only five Members (four
Members and one Member-elect) in its history, three of whom were expelled during
the Civil War period in 1861 for disloyalty to the Union.
The fourth Member of the
House to be expelled was Representative Michael J. (Ozzie) Myers, of Pennsylvania,
on October 2, 1980, after his bribery conviction for receiving a payment in return for
promising to use official influence on immigration bills in the so-called ABSCAM
run by the FBI.
The fifth and last Member of the House to be
expelled was Representative James A. Traficant, Jr., of Ohio, who was expelled on
July 24, 2002, after his ten-count federal conviction for activities concerning the
receipt of favors, gifts and money in return for performing official acts on behalf of
the donors, and the receipt of salary kickbacks from staff.
The numbers of actual expulsions from the House may be small because some
Members of the House who have been found to have engaged in serious misconduct
have chosen to resign
their seats in Congress
(or have lost an election) before any
formal action could be taken against them by the House. Thus, the House
committees investigating allegations of misconduct have from time-to-time expressly
recommended the expulsion of a Member, who then resigned from Congress before
II Hinds' Precedents, supra at §1263. See footnote 12, supra.
166 U.S. 661, 669-670 (1897).
Rules of the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, supra at Rule 24(g).
See House expulsions of Representative-elect John B. Clark of Missouri (1861),
Representative John W. Reid of Missouri (1861), and Representative Henry C. Burnett of
Kentucky (1861), for disloyalty to the Union. II Hinds’ Precedents, supra at §§ 1261,1262.
H.R. Rpt. No. 96-1387, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., In the Matter of Representative Michael J.
Myers (1980), 126 Congressional Record 28,978 (October 2, 1980). Representative Myers
was expelled after conviction for bribery, conspiracy and violation of the Travel Act.
H.R. Rpt. No. 107-594, 107th Cong., 2d Sess., In the Matter of Representative James A.
Traficant, Jr. (2002), 148 Congressional Record H5375-5393 (daily ed., July 24, 2002).
Representative Traficant was expelled after conviction of conspiracy to violate federal
bribery laws, receipt of illegal gratuities, obstruction of justice, conspiracy to defraud the
United States, filing false income tax returns, and racketeering.
the expulsion vote could be taken by the full body.
Additionally, several other
Members of the House who might have been subject to expulsion or other legislative
discipline because of misconduct either resigned
from Congress before any
committee recommendation was made,
or, soon after their misconduct became
known, lost their next election (either the primary or the general election) before
congressional action was completed.
The defeat at the polls of Members who had
engaged in misconduct was precisely the principal
oversight planned by the
of the Constitution, who looked to the necessity of re-election to be the most
efficient method of regulating Representatives
conduct. James Madison explained
in the Federalist Papers that despite all the precautions taken by structural separation
of powers in the
, or by the institution of the Congress or the law, the
best control of Members
conduct would be their
habitual recollection of their
dependence on the people
through the necessity
of frequent elections.
Although the authority and power of each
of Congress to expel appears
to be within the broad discretion of the institution,
policy considerations, as opposed
Note, e.g., H.R. Rpt. No. 97-110, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., In the Matter of Representative
Raymond F. Lederer (1981), and House Committee on Standards recommendation of
expulsion for bribery; and H.R. Rpt. No. 100-506, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., In the Matter of
Representative Mario Biaggi (1988), recommendation of expulsion after conviction for
illegal gratuities, Travel Act violations, and obstruction of justice. Note case of Rep. B.F.
Whittemore, recommended for expulsion by Military Affairs Committee for sale of Military
Academy appointments, who subsequently resigned in 1870, and who was then censured in
absentia by the House (II Hinds’ Precedents, supra at § 1273); and House censure of John
DeWeese after his resignation (also for the sale of Academy appointments), but before the
committee reported the resolution of expulsion. II Hinds’ Precedents, supra at § 1239. See
also expulsion resolutions, reported from an ad hoc committee, for bribery, and subsequent
resignations during House consideration of resolutions, by Representatives William Gilbert,
Frances Edwards, and Orasmus Matteson, in 1857 (II Hinds’ Precedents, supra at § 1275).
H.R. Rpt. No. 96-1537, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11, In the Matter of Representative John
W. Jenrette, Jr. (1980); H.R. Rpt. No. 104-886, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. at 19 (1997), Summary
of Activities, One Hundred Fourth Congress (concerning Representative Mel Reynolds);
H.R. Rpt. No. 101-995, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. at 10-11 (1990), Summary of Activities, One
Hundred First Congress (concerning Representative Donald E. Lukens), and 12-13
(concerning Representative Robert Garcia); H.R. Rpt. No. 96-856, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., In
the Matter of Representative Daniel J. Flood (1980). Since no recommendation was made
by the Committee, it can not be said with certainty what, if any, discipline would have been
recommended by the Committee, or approved by the House.
The House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct has found that since it will “lose
jurisdiction” over a Member who has been defeated in an election, proceedings which could
not be completed prior to the January end-of-term be suspended. Note, for example, H.R.
Rpt. No. 105-848, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1999), Summary of Activities, One Hundred
Fifth Congress (concerning Representative Jay C. Kim); H.R. Rpt. No. 104-886, supra at
21 (concerning Representative Barbara-Rose Collins); see also H.R. Rpt. No. 100-1125,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1989), Summary of Activities, One Hundredth Congress
(concerning Rep. Patrick L. Swindall); H.R. Rpt. No. 95-1818, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978),
Summary of Activities, Ninety-Fifth Congress (concerning Rep. Joshua Eilberg).
Madison. The Federalist Papers, No. 57: “All these sanctions, however, would be found
very insufficient without the restraint of frequent elections ... as to support in the members
an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people.”
to questions of
, have generally restrained the House in exercising the authority
to expel a Member when the conduct complained of occurred prior to the time the
individual was elected to
be a Member of the House,27 or when the conduct
occurred in a prior Congress when the electorate knew of the conduct
but still re-elected the Member
to the current Congress. On occasion, this
has been characterized
, such as in dicta
by the Supreme Court
as the House
“distrusting” its own “power”
to expel for past misconduct.
While there has, in
fact, in the past been some division of opinion on the subject of the House
constitutional “authority” or “right” to do so,29
in modern congressional practice it
would appear to be more accurate to say that such restraint has arisen from a
questioning by the House of the wisdom of such a
, rather than a formal
recognition of an absence of constitutional
to expel for past misconduct.
The reticence of the House to expel a Member for past misconduct after the
Member has been re-elected by his or her constituents, with knowledge of the
Member's conduct, appears to reflect the deference traditionally paid in our heritage
to the popular will and election choice of the people.
Justice Story, while noting
the necessity of expulsion of one who
disgrace[d] the house by the grossness of his
noted that such power of the institution of the House to expel a
representative of the people is
“at the same time so subversive of the rights
Deschler’s Precedents, supra at Ch. 12, § 13, p. 176. See H.R. Rpt. No. 94-1477, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, In the Matter of Representative Andrew J. Hinshaw (1976). The House
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct recommended against expulsion of a Member,
since the Member’s conviction “while reflecting on his moral turpitude, does not relate to
his official conduct while a Member of Congress.”
The Court in Powell v. McCormack, supra, in distinguishing the exclusion of Powell from
an expulsion, noted that the House has “distrusted” its right to expel Members for prior
conduct after they have been reelected (395 U.S. at 508), and that congressional precedents
have shown that “the House will not expel a member for misconduct committed during an
earlier Congress.” 395 U.S. at 509, noting expulsion case of John W. Langley, H.R. Rpt. No.
30, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1925). The Court noted specifically, however, that it was not
ruling on Congress’ authority to expel for past misconduct (395 U.S. at 507, n. 27; 510,
n.30), and, in fact, Justice Douglas, in his concurrence noted specifically that “if this were
an expulsion case I would think that no justiciable controversy were presented” (395 U.S.
at 553), since Douglas agreed with Senator Murdock of Utah in a 1940 exclusion case that
each House may “expel anyone it designates by a two-thirds vote.” 395 U.S. at 558-559.
Note conflicting opinions of two House committees in the Credit Mobilier investigations
on the discipline of Representatives Ames and Brooks in the 42nd Congress, H.R. Rpt. No.
77, 42nd Cong., 3rd Sess. (1872) and H.R. Rpt. No. 82, 42d Cong., 3rd Sess. (1872). The
House specifically refused, however, to accept a preamble to the substitute resolution for
censure expressly questioning its authority to expel for past misconduct. See Committee
Print, House of Representatives Exclusion, Censure and Expulsion Cases from 1789 to
1973, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 125 (1973); note also majority and minority opinions in expulsion
cases of William S. King and John Schumaker, H.R. Rpt. No. 815, 44th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1876), II Hinds’ Precedents, supra at §1283, and in expulsion case of Orsamus B.
Matteson, H.R. Rpt. No. 179, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. (1858), II Hinds’ Precedents § 1285.
See footnote 5, supra. Note also discussion of the infamous Wilkes case in England,
shortly before the time of the drafting of the United States Constitution. Powell v.
McCormack, supra at 532-535; May, supra at 107.
of the people,”
as to require that it be used sparingly and to be
a two-thirds requirement.
Similarly, Cushing noted that the power to expel
be governed by the strictest justice,
since in expelling a duly
without just cause
a power of control would thus be assumed by the representative
body over the constituent, wholly inconsistent with the freedom of election.
The distinction between the
of the House to expel, and the judicious
use of that power as a
of the House, was cogently explained in a House
Judiciary Committee report in 1914:
In the judgment of your committee, the power of the House to expel or
punish by censure a Member for misconduct occurring before his election or in
a preceding or former Congress is sustained by the practice of the House,
sanctioned by reason and sound policy and in extreme cases is absolutely
essential to enable the House to exclude from its deliberations and councils
notoriously corrupt men, who have unexpectedly and suddenly dishonored
themselves and betrayed the public by acts and conduct rendering them unworthy
of the high position of honor and trust reposed in them. ...
But in considering this question and in arriving at the conclusions we have
reached, we would not have you unmindful of the fact that we have been dealing
with the question merely as one of
, and it should not be confused with the
also involved. As a matter of sound policy, this extraordinary
prerogative of the House, in our judgment, should be exercised only in extreme
cases and always with great caution and after due circumspection, and should be
invoked with greatest caution where the acts of misconduct complained of had
become public previous to and were generally known at the time of the Member's
election. To exercise such power in that instance the House might abuse its high
prerogative, and in our opinion might exceed the just limitations of its
constitutional authority by seeking to substitute its standards and ideals for the
standards and ideals of the constituency of the member who had deliberately
chosen him to be their Representative. The effect of such a policy would tend
not to preserve but to undermine and destroy representative government.
The power to expel is thus used cautiously when the institution of Congress might
be seen as usurping or supplanting its own institutional judgment for the judgment
of the electorate as to the character or fitness for office of an individual whom the
people have chosen to represent them in Congress.
As noted, the principal manner
of dealing with ethical improprieties or misconduct of a Representative was intended
by the Framers to be, and has historically been, reliance upon the voters to keep their
“restraint of frequent elections.”35
Story, supra at § 835.
Cushing, supra at § 625; Deschler’s Precedents, supra at Ch. 12, §13, p. 175.
H.R. Rpt. No. 570, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1914), at VI Cannon's Precedents, supra at §
398. Emphasis added.
“Congress has demonstrated a clear reluctance to expel when to do so would impinge ...
on the electoral process.” Bowman and Bowman, supra at 1101.
Madison, The Federalist Papers, No. 57.
Consequences of Expulsion
Expulsion from the House of Representatives carries with it no further
penalties or disabilities beyond removal from Congress. Although the
constitutions of some
provide that members expelled from their
legislatures are ineligible to be re-elected to that legislature, no such disability was
included in the United States Constitution for Members of Congress. An individual
who has been expelled from Congress is
ineligible to run again for that seat, or
for another position in Congress. The three qualifications for congressional office
age, citizenship, and inhabitancy in the
are established and fixed in the
United States Constitution; are the
qualifications to congressional office;
and may not be added to or altered by
Congress via a statute or internal
congressional rule, or by a state unilaterally.
A Member who has been expelled
from Congress and subsequently re-elected may, therefore, not be
being seated in Congress based merely on the past misconduct and subsequent
Although in theory, a previously expelled Member
to Congress could, after having been seated, be expelled by a two-thirds vote
for misconduct, even past misconduct, both the House and the Senate have not, as
discussed above, as a practice expelled a Member for past misconduct when the
electorate knew of the conduct and still elected or re-elected the Member.
A Member who has been expelled from the House does not lose his or her
pension automatically by virtue of the expulsion. Rather,
pensions earned, vested
or accumulated by officers and
employees, including Members of Congress, are forfeited
upon the conviction
of certain federal offenses that relate to espionage, treason, or other specific national
security offenses expressly designated in the so-called “Hiss Act.”38
The Supreme Court has also recognized a very broad discretion and authority
of Congress to discipline its Members under its own chosen
standards, generally without
established right to judicial review. The act
of disciplining Members is carried out through the
authority of the
House, and the
Supreme Court in describing the congressional disciplinary process
in United States v. Brewster
, has noted in dicta:
Powell v. McCormack, supra; U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995);
Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001).
See Powell v. McCormack, supra at 522, 547-550, 537 n. 69. Note discussion by the Court
(at 527-536) of the Wilkes case concerning English parliamentary practice at the time of the
Constitution’s drafting. If, however, there is alleged disloyalty to the Union, after having
taken an oath of office to defend the Constitution, the disqualification provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment may come into play. See pre-Powell, House of Representatives case
of Victor Berger, excluded even after re-election. VI Cannon's Precedents, §§ 56, 58, 59.
See now 5 U.S.C. § 8311 et seq. The President is not covered by the retirement laws
applicable to other officers and employees of the federal government, and forfeiture of
retired pay applies in case of impeachment, conviction and removal of the President. See
P.L. 85-745, as amended, 3 U.S.C. § 102, note.
The process of disciplining a Member in the Congress ... is not surrounded with
the panoply of protective shields that are present in a criminal case. An accused
Member is judged by no specifically articulated standards, and is at the mercy of
an almost unbridled discretion of the charging body ... from whose decision there
is no established right of review.39
Currently in the House of Representatives, a resolution to expel a Member
would most likely be referred to the House Committee on Standards of Official
Conduct, the standing Committee in the House with jurisdiction over congressional
conduct and “ethics,” although such a resolution is considered to raise a question of
the “privileges” of the House, and could be called up as a privileged resolution with
notice by its sponsor according to House Rules.40 The House Committee on
Standards of Official Conduct is also authorized to receive “complaints” concerning
a Member’s conduct from any other Member of the House (or from outside of the
House when certified by a Member), or may initiate on its own accord an
investigation of a Member.41 Furthermore, the House of Representatives may also,
and from time-to-time has, instructed the Committee by resolution to investigate a
particular matter or Member.
While it had been a common practice in the past to wait until all appeals were
exhausted in a criminal conviction of a Member before the House would proceed on
a matter concerning that Member,42 the more modern practice has been for the House
to take cognizance of the underlying factual findings regarding the conduct that was
the basis for the Member’s conviction, regardless of the potential legal or procedural
issues which might be resolved on appeal.43 The rules of the House Committee on
Standards of Official Conduct specifically provide, in fact, for automatic jurisdiction
of the Committee when a Member has been convicted in a Federal, State, or local
court of a felony.44 Moreover, in one instance, a committee disciplinary proceeding
408 U.S. 501, 519 (1972). Matters “textually committed” to Congress in the Constitution,
such as rules for internal proceedings, might not generally be subject to judicial review
unless another, express provision of the Constitution is violated. Note, e.g., Nixon v. United
States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-229, 236-238 (1993); United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5
(1892); Powell v. McCormack, supra at 519, and 553 (Douglas, J. concurring).
House Rule IX. Deschler’s Precedents, supra, Ch. 12, § 13, at 176-177; Brown, supra,
“Misconduct,” § 21. Note also H.R. Rpt. No. 94-1477, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 6, In the
Matter of Representative Andrew J. Hinshaw (1976). Prior to 1968 when the Committee
on Standards of Official Conduct was created as a standing committee of the House, such
resolutions would be referred to either ad hoc select committees, or to standing committees
with other jurisdiction, often the Judiciary Committee.
House Rule XI, para. 3(b)(2). Rules of the Committee on Standards, supra Rules 14, 15.
Deschler’s Precedents, supra, Ch. 12, § 13, at 176.
Note discussion in H.R. Rpt. No. 96-1387, supra at 4-5; see also, generally, CRS Rpt. 88197A, “House Discipline of Members After Conviction But Before Final Appeal,” March
1, 1988 (archived). A Member convicted of a felony for which the penalty may be two years
or more imprisonment, “should refrain” from voting on the floor or in committee until his
or her presumption of innocence is restored. House Rule XXIII (10).
Rules of the Committee on Standards, supra Rule 14(a)(4), 18(e).
concerning a Member indicted for bribery was begun after the Member's trial, even
though it ended in a hung jury, and before a second trial was to commence.45
The current Rules of the House of Representatives provide that the House
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct is authorized to investigate allegations
of violations of “any law, rule, regulation, or other standard of conduct applicable to
the conduct of such Member ... in the performance of his duties or the discharge of
his responsibilities,” and after such investigation the Committee is to “report to the
House its finding of fact and recommendations, if any ....”46 The Standards
Committee has promulgated detailed procedural rules to implement fairness in the
disciplinary process, specifically providing the requirements of notice, the
specification of charges, and by providing opportunities for the charged Member to
be heard and to examine witnesses and evidence. After an investigation by an
investigatory subcommittee, the taking of evidence and an adjudicatory hearing, if
the Member is found by the majority of the Committee members to have committed
the specific offenses charged, the full Committee will then consider the appropriate
discipline.47 If the Committee finds that expulsion is warranted, a recommendation
for such discipline is made in a report to the full House of Representatives, which
may be, after debate, accepted, modified or rejected by the House.
The term “censure,” unlike the term “expel,” does not appear in the
Constitution, although the authority is derived from the same clause – Article I,
Section 5, clause 2, concerning the authority of each House of Congress to “punish
its Members for disorderly Behaviour.” Censure, reprimand, or admonition are
traditional ways in which parliamentary bodies have disciplined their members and
maintained order and dignity in their proceedings.48 In the House of Representatives,
a “censure” is a formal vote by the majority of Members present and voting on a
resolution disapproving a Member’s conduct, with generally the additional
requirement that the Member stand at the “well” of the House chamber to receive a
verbal rebuke and reading of the censure resolution by the Speaker of the House.
H.R. Rpt. No. 96-856, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., In the Matter of Representative Daniel J. Flood
House Rule XI, cl. 3(a)(2).
Investigations subcommittees are 4 Members of the House, and may be made up of
Committee Members, as well as Members of the House not on the Committee who are
appointed at the beginning of the Congress as a reserve “pool” available to be on
investigations subcommittees if needed. Adjudications are held before a panel of the
Committee who did not serve on the investigations subcommittee, and if any charges drafted
by the investigations subcommittee are proven before the adjudications panel, a “sanctions”
hearing to determine the sanctions to be recommended to the House is conducted before the
full membership of the Standards Committee. House Rule X, cl. 5(a)(3) and (4), XI, cl.
3(b)(1)(B)(i), Rules of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, supra.
May, The Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, supra at 103; Black’s
Law Dictionary, at 224, 6th Edition (1990), defines “censure” as: “The formal resolution of
a legislative, administrative, or other body reprimanding a person, normally one of its own
members, for specified conduct.”
The Constitution, in providing that either House of Congress may “expel” a
Member by a two-thirds majority, does not specify the reasons for such expulsion,
but does in that same provision state that either House of Congress may punish its
Members for “disorderly Behaviour.” Some early commentators thus felt that the
authority to “punish” a Member by way of censure or some other condemnation was
thus expressly limited, unlike expulsion, to cases concerning “disorderly” or unruly
behavior or conduct in Congress, that is, conduct which disrupts the institution.49
The authority to discipline by way of censure, reprimand or other such rebuke,
however, has come to be recognized and accepted in congressional practice as
extending to cases of “misconduct,” even outside of Congress, which the House finds
to be reprehensible, and/or to reflect discredit on the institution, and which is,
therefore, worthy of condemnation or rebuke.
The House of Representatives has taken a broad view of its authority to
discipline its Members. In the 63rd Congress, for example, the House Judiciary
Committee described the power of the House to punish for disorderly behavior as a
power which is “full and plenary and may be enforced by summary proceedings. It
is discretionary in character ... restricted by no limitation except in case of expulsion
the requirement of the concurrence of a two-thirds vote.”50 Similarly, in its report on
a Member, a House Select Committee in 1967 stated:
Censure of a Member has been deemed appropriate in cases of a breach of
the privileges of the House. There are two classes of privilege, the one, affecting
the rights of the House collectively, its safety, dignity, and the integrity of its
proceedings; and the other, affecting the rights, reputation, and conduct of
Most cases of censure have involved the use of unparliamentary language,
assaults upon a Member or insults to the House by introductions of offensive
resolutions, but in five cases in the House and one in the Senate [as of 1967]
censure was based on corrupt acts by a Member, and in another Senate case
censure was based upon noncooperation with and abuse of Senate committees.
* * *
This discretionary power to punish for disorderly behavior is vested by the
Constitution in the House of Representatives and its exercise is appropriate
where a Member has been guilty of misconduct relating to his official duties,
noncooperation with committees of this House, or nonofficial acts of a kind
likely to bring this House into disrepute.51
Note, for example, discussion in Bowman and Bowman, supra at 1089 - 1091, citing
Rawle, View of the Constitution of United States 46-47 (2nd ed. 1829).
H.R. Rpt. No. 570, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
H.R. Rpt. No. 27, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 24-26, 29, In re Adam Clayton Powell (1967).
The Select Committee recommended to the full House in the 90th Congress to seat Mr.
Powell, and then to censure him. The House rejected that recommendation, however, and
voted to “exclude” Powell, which was ultimately found unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court in Powell v. McCormack, supra, because the House’s action went beyond judging the
While the House has stated and demonstrated in precedents its reticence to expel
a Member for past misconduct, that is, misconduct in a previous Congress which was
known to the electorate, the House has had no similar compunction nor has it
exercised similar restraint in expressing a formal “censure” of such past misconduct.
Thus, a House Select Committee in the 90th Congress noted that “the right to censure
a Member for such prior acts is supported by clear precedent in both Houses of
Congress ....”52 In more recent years the House has adopted in its Rules a “statute of
limitations” on actions, restricting the Standards Committee from investigating
alleged violations of conduct standards when such violations go back more than the
last three Congresses, “unless the Committee determines that the alleged violation
is directly related to an alleged violation that occurred in a more recent Congress.”53
In the House of Representatives there have been 22 “censures” of Members (21
Members and 1 Delegate), including two censures of former Members who, in 1870,
had resigned just prior to the House’s consideration of expulsion motions against
those Members for selling military academy appointments.54 While the majority of
the censures in the House occurred in the 19th century and concerned issues of
decorum, that is, the use of unparliamentary or insulting language on the floor of the
House or acts of violence towards other Members, in more recent years instances of
financial misconduct have appeared to have been a major issue.
have been censured for various conduct, including insulting or other unparliamentary
language on the floor
assaulting another Member
supporting recognition of the
the selling of military academy appointments
where inflated staff salaries were used to pay a Member
s personal expenses
of improper gifts and improper use of campaign funds
sexual misconduct with
three constitutional “qualifications” or the “election” of the Member-elect. Representative
Powell was re-elected to and then seated in the 91st Congress, but was fined and had his
seniority reduced by the House (H.Res. 2, 115 Congr. Rec. 29, 34 (January 3, 1969)).
H.R. Rpt. No. 27, supra at 27; see also censure of Representatives Ames and Brooks in the
“Credit Mobilier” bribery matter (1872), for conduct that took place at least five years
before their election to the House, and about which the electorate apparently knew, II Hinds’
Precedents, supra at § 1286; Deschler’s Precedents, supra at Ch. 12, §16, pp. 194-195; and
H.R. Rpt. No. 96-351, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5, In the Matter of Representative Charles C.
Diggs, Jr. (1979).
House Rule XI, cl. 3(b)(3).
See censures of Representatives Whittemore and DeWeese, II Hinds’ Precedents, supra
at §§ 1273, 1239.
See Appendix; also, House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, “Historical
Summary of Conduct Cases in the House of Representatives” (November 2004); House of
Representatives Exclusion, Censure and Expulsion Case from 1789 to 1973, supra; and
Maskell, “Discipline of Members,” in The Encyclopedia of the United State Congress, 641646 (Simon and Schuster 1993).
Consequence of Censures.
There is no specific disqualification or express consequence provided in the
House Rules after a Member has been
The political ignominy of being
admonished and deprecated by one
s colleagues, however,
some Members of Congress who face a potential censure or other formal
House discipline for certain misconduct to resign before any official recommendation
or other action is taken.
While there are no House Rules regarding the consequences of a
two political parties in the House themselves have adopted their own internal party
in recent years
have generally barred from
the chairmanship of
committees and subcommittees
those Members who have been censured during that
Political party rules of the parties in the House may be changed by the
particular party caucus or conference itself according to its own rules.
Prior to the
in the House of Representatives, although there were some
“reprimand” and “censure”
were often considered
synonymous and used together in a resolution. In 1921, for example, a resolution
adopted by the House instructed the Speaker to summon Representative Blanton of
to the bar of the House
and deliver to him its reprimand and censure.
The more formalized distinction in the House whereby it is considered that a
expressly involves a lesser level of disapproval of the conduct of a
Member than that of a
and is thus a less severe rebuke by the institution,
is of relatively recent origin. The term
was used to explicitly indicate
a less severe rebuke by the House in 1976 in the reprimand of a Member for his
failure to disclose certain personal interests in official matters, and for the apparent
use of his office to further his own personal financial interests.
61 Procedurally in the
See footnote 22, supra. Other Members have also lost their next election before any House
action is completed. See footnote 23, supra. As noted, since no recommendation is made
by the House Committee on Standards or other committee investigating these matters, it can
not be said with certainty what, if any, discipline would have been recommended by the
committees, or approved by the House.
See, for example, House Democratic Caucus Rule 51 (1997); House Republican
Conference Rule 27 (1997).
Note II Hinds' Precedents, supra at § 1257 (47th Cong., 1st Sess. (1882)); II Hinds’
Precedents, supra at § 1666 (39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866)).
VI Cannon's Precedents, supra at §236 (67th Cong., 1st Sess.).
Deschler's Precedents, supra at Ch. 12, § 16, p. 196 (“a somewhat lesser punitive measure
than censure”); see also Cushing, supra at pp. 266-269, for historical context. See now
House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct Rules, supra at Rule 24(g).
H.R. Rpt. No. 94-1364, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., In the Matter of Representative Robert L.F.
Sikes (1976). No recommendation for punishment was made for an “obvious and significant
House, a “censure”
resolution will generally involve a verbal admonition, such as a
reading of the resolution, to be administered by the Speaker of the House to the
Member at the bar of the House. In the case of a
resolution is merely adopted by a vote of the House with the Member
or is merely implemented by the adoption of the committee
House Members have been
by the full House for a
of misconduct, including failure to disclose certain personal interests in official
matters and using one's office to further
personal financial interests;
misrepresentations to investigating committees; failure to report campaign
contributions; conversion of campaign contributions to personal use and false
statements before the investigating committee; false statements on financial
disclosure forms; ghost voting and maintaining persons on the official payroll not
performing official duties commensurate with pay; the misuse of one's political
influence in administrative matters to help a personal associate;
the failure to
insure that a Member-affiliated tax-exempt organization was not improperly involved
in partisan politics, and for providing inaccurate, incomplete and unreliable
information to the investigating committee
Upon making a report recommending to the House a “censure” or a
“reprimand,” the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct may also
include in that report a recommendation for an additional action such as a fine, a
restitution or payment of funds, or recommendations for the loss of seniority or
privileges, when such actions are deemed appropriate.
Fines; Monetary Assessments
In addition to more traditional disciplines of censure, reprimand
the House of Representatives as an institution has the authority to levy a fine against
a Member of the House concerning a disciplinary matter. This authority appears to
be incidental to the express constitutional grant of power to the House to determine
the rules of its proceedings and to punish its Members for misconduct. Deschler's
states expressly that under the constitutional authority of the House at
Article I, Section 5, clause 2:
A fine may be levied by the House against a Member
pursuant to its constitutional authority to punish its Members.
notes expressly in its Committee Rules that sanctions that
it may recommend to the House concerning a Member may include expulsion,
censure, reprimand, denial or limitation of any right, privilege or immunity of the
conflict of interest” – a significant ownership interest in land directly impacted by
legislation the Member sponsored, since the “events occurred approximately 15 years ago
and ... appear to have been known to [his] constituency ....” Id. at 4-5.
Deschler's Precedents, supra at Ch. 12, § 16, p. 196.
Deschler's Precedents, supra at Ch. 12, § 17, p. 203. Note, Cushing, supra at § 675.
Member, or a
The authority for each
of Congress to fine one of its
own Members was recognized by the Supreme Court in
in Kilbourn v.
where the Court noted that
of Congress has
of punishment ... by fine or imprisonment,
relating to areas where Congress has
been expressly granted authority, such as where the
empowers each House to punish its own Members for disorderly behavior.
Fines for disciplinary purposes in the House, as well as in the Senate,
been relatively infrequent occurrences.
The precedents in the House have
demonstrated that the House fined a Member in 1969 the sum of $25,000 to be repaid
by automatically withdrawing a certain amount regularly from his pay, for various
conduct offenses, including the misuse of official committee appropriations, payroll,
A Member of the House who was censured in 1979 was required to
make restitution of substantial amounts by which he was unjustly enriched,
the Member was expressly ordered within the resolution of censure to pay to the
House a specific amount by executing an interest-bearing demand promissory note
for $40,031.66, made payable to the Treasury of the United States.71
At other times the House pursuant to disciplinary actions required certain
monetary assessments of Members of Congress which were not expressly or
necessarily characterized as “fines.” A Member of Congress, pursuant to a formal
“reprimand” was required to make restitution to the District of Columbia of certain
monies and fines, concerning which he had improperly used his influence to have
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, Rule 24(e)(4).
103 U.S. 168 (1880).
103 U.S. at 189, 190. There is no known case of a congressional imprisonment of a
Member in the history of Congress. See discussion in United States v. Traficant, 368 F.3d
646, 651 (6th Cir. 2004): “Congress has not done so, even once, dating back to the year
In the Senate, in a 1990 disciplinary matter in which a Senator was “denounced” by the full
Senate, for example, the Senator was ordered to “reimburse” the Senate a specified amount
in connection with questionable expense reimbursements received from the Senate, and “to
pay to charities with which he has no affiliation” an amount equal to that which was
considered as “excess honoraria” over and above that which the Senator was permitted to
accept. S. Rpt. No. 101-382, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 14-15 (1990).
Studies have noted that prior to 1969, no Members of the House had ever been fined for
disciplinary reasons. McLaughlin, “Congressional Self-Discipline: The Power to Expel,
Exclude and to Punish,” 41 Fordham L.R. 43, 61 (Oct. 1972). There had in the 1800's been
a few instances noted in precedents where the House authorized fines for absences, or as a
condition for discharge. Note, IV Hinds’ Precedents, supra at §§ 3011-3014.
H. Res. 2, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., In the Matter of Representative Adam Clayton Powell
(1969), note Deschler's Precedents, supra at Ch. 12, §17, pp. 203-204. The Sergeant at
Arms was directed to deduct $1,150 a month from the Member's salary.
H.R. Rpt. No. 96-351, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20, In the Matter of Representative Charles
Diggs, Jr. (1979).
“fixed” or reduced.72 In 1997, a monetary assessment or penalty, which was not
characterized by the Committee as a “fine,” was imposed upon the Speaker of the
House to pay “for some of the costs” of an ethics investigation which resulted in the
reprimand of the Speaker.73
The “fines” and/or monetary assessments ordered in the disciplinary cases
appear to involve the repayment or restitution of funds misused or wrongfully
received, as opposed to fines merely or strictly for “punishment” purposes and not
necessarily connected to the wrongful conduct. This is consistent with the current
guidance in the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct Rules
concerning the recommendation of a “fine,” which the Committee notes, “is
appropriate in a case in which it is likely that the violation was committed to secure
a personal financial benefit.”74 There does not appear to be, however, a constitutional
or institutional requirement for such fines to be so connected with unjust enrichments
or misuse of funds, and the Committee on Standards has noted in its Rules that the
guidance concerning fines and other sanctions recommended to the House “sets forth
general guidelines and does not limit the authority of the Committee to recommend
Although a temporary “suspension” is traditionally listed as one of the possible
disciplinary actions that a legislative body may take against one of its members,76 the
House of Representatives has in recent years questioned its authority to disqualify or
mandatorily suspend a Member by a simple majority vote.77 Such a “suspension”
would most likely involve a prohibition on a Member of the House from voting on
or working on legislative or representational matters for a particular time. Although
not addressing a “suspension” specifically, the House has generally considered a
decision of a Member not to vote on a matter as within the discretionary purview of
the Member individually under House Rule III(1), even when a legislative matter may
involve possible conflicting personal interests. As noted by the House, its authority
to require a Member to disqualify himself or herself from voting has traditionally
been questioned, and such “recusal” has therefore been traditionally left to the
discretion of the Member. Jefferson's Manual and Rules of the House of
Representatives, at §658, states:
H.R. Rpt. No. 101-610, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., In the Matter of Representative Barney
H.R. Rpt. No. 105 - 1, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, In the Matter of Representative Newt
House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, Rule 24(g).
Cushing, supra, at section 627, p. 251.
Jefferson's Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives, §658. Deschler’s
Precedents, supra at Ch. 12, § 15, p. 187.
[T]he weight of authority also favors the idea that there is no authority in the
House to deprive a Member of the right to vote (V, 5937, 5952, 5959, 5966,
5967; VIII, 3072). In one or two early instances the Speaker has decided that
because of a personal interest, a Member should not vote (V, 5955, 5958); but
on all other occasions and in the later practice the Speaker has held that the
Member himself and not the Chair should determine this question (V, 5950,
5951; VIII, 3071; Speaker Albert, Dec. 2, 1975, p. 38135; Speaker O'Neill, Mar.
1, 1979, p. 3748), and the Speaker has denied his own power to deprive a
Member of the constitutional right to vote (V, 5956; Speaker Albert, Dec. 2,
1975, p. 38135; Speaker O'Neill, Mar. 1, 1979, p. 3748).
As to refraining from voting and committee work specifically, the House of
Representatives in the
Congress adopted a rule which stated a sense of the
House that Members who have been convicted of a crime for which a sentence of two
or more years may be imposed
should refrain from participation in the business of
each committee of which he is then a member and should refrain from voting on any
question at a meeting of the House, or of the Committee of the Whole House ...
there has been a judicial or administrative reinstatement of his or her presumption of
innocence, or until the Member is re-elected.
The supporters of the provision noted
that the rule was worded in
the discretionary way it was
because, they believed, that
were mandatory, then
it would have been unconstitutional [because]
[i]t would have deprived the district, which the Member was elected to represent, of
Although the Rule on refraining from voting is couched in what can be
considered advisory terms of guidance to Members, the Rules of the House also
provide, in the Code of Official Conduct, that Members of the House
to the spirit and the letter of the Rules of the House.
Members are thus expected
to conform to and abide by the abstention provision.82
Citations are to volumes of Hinds’ and Cannon’s Precedents of the United States House
of Representatives, and to the relevant sections.
See now, House Rule XXIII (10); note H.R. Rpt. No. 93-616, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
121 Congressional Record 10341, April 16, 1975, colloquy between Representatives
Robert Eckhardt and John J. Flynt of Texas.
House Rule XXIII(2); note comments on passage of abstention rule by Representatives
Edwards and Drinan, 121 Congressional Record, supra at 10343-10345, and discussion in
Deschler's Precedents, Ch. 12, § 15 (1977).
The Committee in 1993 noted in its report that although there is no “specific enforcement
capability” expressed in the proposed rule, “any Member subject to its provisions at the time
of the resolution’s adoption, or thereafter, who violates the clear principles it expresses, will
do so at the risk of subjecting himself to the introduction of a privileged resolution relating
to his conduct ....” H.R. Rpt. No. 93-616, supra at 4. Note, Washington Post, “Under
Colleagues’ Pressure, Biaggi Refrains from Voting,” October 22, 1987. See also House
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, “Dear Colleague” letter from the Chairman
and Vice Chairman, April 15, 2002, warning Member convicted of felony violations that “by
voting in the House – you risk subjecting yourself to action by this Committee, and by the
House, in addition to any other disciplinary action that may be initiated in connection with
your criminal conviction.”
Letters of Reproval and Other Committee Actions
In the House of Representatives
Letter of Reproval
is an administrative
action of the House Committee on
Standards of Official Conduct
, authorized under
the Rules of the House of Representatives
to establish or enforce standards of
official conduct for members, officers, and employees of the House.
of a Letter of Reproval by the
is made public, as it is issued as part of a
public report from the
to the House on an
that the House
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct has undertaken.84
A Letter of Reproval may be sent by the Committee on
Standards of Official
on its own accord by majority vote of the
, without any approval
or action by the full House of Representatives.
As such, a Letter of Reproval is
clearly distinguishable from legislative
” “punishment” or “sanctions” that
the full House may invoke against a Member, such as censure, reprimand, fine, or
It appears that a Letter of Reproval is intended to be an action by the
which is an alternative to the recommendation of sanctions to the House,
and is an action which is used for infractions of Rules or standards which, because
of the nature of the infractions or because of mitigating circumstances, do not rise to
the level of requiring action by the full House of Representatives. The
on Standards of Official Conduct Rules
provide, after setting out procedures when
a majority of the Committee does not vote in favor of the recommendation that the
House of Representatives take action,
Committee may also, by majority
vote, adopt a motion to issue a Letter of Reproval or take other appropriate
”87 The Committee
may issue such Letter
[i]f the Committee
determines a Letter of Reproval constitutes sufficient action
”88 The Committee
procedural rules appear to indicate that such a
Letter of Reproval
may be sent only
after an investigation by
an investigatory subcommittee has
resulted in the issuance
a Statement of Alleged Violations, at least one count of which has been proved by
an adjudicatory subcommittee, and upon completion of a sanction hearing.89
House Rule XI, para. 3(a)(1).
House Rule XI, para. 3(a)(1) provides that a “letter of reproval or other administrative
action of the committee pursuant to an investigation ... shall only be issued ... as part of a
report required” under subparagraph (2) of the Rule. Subparagraph (2) states that the
Committee on Standards “shall report to the House its findings of fact and
recommendations, if any, upon the final disposition of any such investigation, and such
action as the committee may deem appropriate in the circumstances.” House Rule XI, para.
House Rule XI, para.3(a)(1); Committee on Standards Rule 24(c).
A Letter of Reproval is not one of the “sanctions” recommended to the House, listed in the
Committee Rules at Rule 24(e).
Committee Rule 24(c).
Committee Rule 24(d).
Committee Rule 24(b),(c) and (d).
A Letter of Reproval was characterized by the House Committee on Standards
as a “rebuke of a Member’
s conduct issued by a body of that Member
s peers acting,
as the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, on behalf of the House of
”90 The Committee on Standards of Official Conduct has issued
several Letters of Reproval to Members of the House, including Letters of Reproval
for the improper use of campaign accounts for personal loans;
for a Member
borrowing of campaign funds for personal use, and a subsequent
disclosure of such transaction;
and concerning allegations of sexual harassment of
a female employee, and the use of one
s office for political campaign activity.
October of 2000, after a lengthy investigation of a Member, the
Letter of Reproval for actions for which the Member was found to have
discredit to the House of Representatives,
including a relationship with a former
chief of staff which gave the appearance that official decisions might have been
improperly affected, violations of the House gift rule, misuse of official
congressional resources, misuse of official congressional staff for campaign
purposes, and the appearance that certain expenditures of the Member
committee were not for bona fide campaign or political purposes.
In June of 2001
issued a Letter of Reproval to a Member for the improper expenditure
of campaign funds to benefit businesses in which the Member and his family had a
personal stake, and for the improper conversion of campaign funds to personal uses.
In addition to a formal, public
Letter of Reproval,
” the Committee has
addressed ethical issues
concerning allegations of misconduct by Members
by way of
other appropriate Committee action,
upon agreement of a majority of the
, when an investigation is undertaken by a subcommittee but the
H.R. Rpt. No. 106-979, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., at p. 3J, In the Matter of Representative E.G.
“Bud” Shuster (2000).
H.R. Rpt. No. 100-382, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at 5, 6, In the Matter of Representative
Richard H. Stallings (1987). The Committee recommended against sanctions by the full
House because of several “mitigating” factors, including “no evidence of improper intent”
of the Member either to conceal the activity or to violate the provisions of the Rule as the
loans were fully reported on required disclosures, and the voluntary “corrective action” on
the Member's own initiative once the Member became aware of the violations.
H.R. Rpt. No. 100-526, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., In the Matter of Representative Charles G.
Rose III (1988). The Committee cited “mitigating circumstances which prevent these
violations from rising to the level of a recommendation of sanction to the full House,” and
commended the “positive action taken” by the Member. Id. at 26.
H.R. Rpt. No. 101-293, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., In the Matter of Representative Jim Bates
(1989). The Committee initiated a Preliminary Inquiry and the Member waived his rights
to a Statement of Alleged Violations and a disciplinary hearing. The Committee noted that
since the Member had taken steps to assure no repeat of the offending conduct, was being
directed to specifically issue apologies to the affected employees, and that since any
inappropriate campaign activities were “sporadic” and not on-going, that “the better course
is to formally and publicly reprove” the Member. Id. at 13-14.
H.R. Rpt. No. 106-979, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., at pp. 3D-3E, In the Matter of
Representative E.G. “Bud” Shuster (2000).
H.R. Rpt. No. 107-130, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., In the Matter of Representative Earl F.
recommendation of sanctions to the full House is not made.96 Such actions by the
full Committee have included writing a letter to a Member concerning “necessary
corrective action” that should be taken by the Member, or by noting “poor judgment”
and the creation of an “appearance of impropriety.”97 The Committee has also noted
violations of House Rules or standards, has “so notified” the Member, and found that
no further action by the Committee will be taken.98 In 1990 the Committee made a
public report concerning a Member’s conduct, noting that the “Committee clearly
disapproves” of the Member’s conduct.99 In 2004, after an investigation by an
investigatory subcommittee, the full Committee issued a report which “will serve as
a public admonishment by the Committee” of three Members.100
The House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct has characterized
actions such as these generally by stating that the Committee “has noted infractions
not meriting sanctions ....”101 Such informal notifications, public reports, public
admonishments, or letters for corrective action, thus may be distinguished from those
instances when the Committee “formally and publicly reproved” a Member by way
of a formal “Letter of Reproval,”102 although it may be argued that these other
Committee actions are to some degree comparable since they are all “administrative
action[s]” taken by the Committee itself “pursuant to an investigation” that had been
conducted by an investigative subcommittee of the Committee on Standards of
Committee Rule 24(c).
See H.R. Rpt. No. 101-995, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. at 8, Summary of Activities, One Hundred
First Congress (1990); H.R. Rpt. No. 106-1044, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (2001).
H.R. Rpt. No. 104-401, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2, 4-5, Inquiry Into Various Complaints
Filed Against Representative Newt Gingrich (1995).
H.R. Rpt. No.101-397, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 2, 14, In the Matter of Representative Gus
H. R. Rpt. No. 108-722, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (2004) 2, “Investigation of Allegations
Related to Voting on the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
of 2003,” concerning allegations of trading votes on a Medicare measure in return for
political support of a Member’s relative.
House Ethics Manual, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 11 (1992).
Compare Committee descriptions at H.R. Rpt. No. 101-995, supra at 8, and 9; note House
Ethics Manual, supra at 11.
As noted, House Rules provide that a “letter of reproval or other administrative action of
the Committee” may be invoked “pursuant to an investigation.” House Rule XI, para.
3(a)(1); Committee Rule 24(c), (d). These other actions, however, do not necessarily
require the adoption or proof of a Statement of Alleged Violations. See, for example,
Committee Rule 19(g).
The Committee has also sent a so-called “letter of admonition” to a Member
against whom a complaint was filed by another Member of the House,104 which was
apparently different from, and was not technically, an action to provide a “Letter of
Reproval” or even any other “administrative” action “pursuant to an investigation”
by an investigatory subcommittee of the Committee.105 The “letter of admonition”
in this case was rather a method of disposing of a complaint by the Committee upon
the recommendation of the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the
Committee for a “resolution of the complaint by a letter to the Member ... against
whom the complaint is made,”106 without moving forward with an investigation by
an investigatory subcommittee.
See Statement of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, October 6, 2004;
Memorandum to the Members of the Committee, from the Chairman and Ranking Minority
Member, “Recommendations for disposition of the complaint filed against Representative
DeLay,” and “Dear Colleague” letter to Member, October 6, 2004.
As noted, a “Letter of Reproval” or other Committee action would appear to come only
after an investigative subcommittee had been convened and had issued a report to the full
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct. A Letter of Reproval could follow when a
Statement of Alleged Violations is adopted and proved or admitted, and the full Committee
had then decided by majority vote to “adopt a motion to issue a Letter of Reproval” as
sufficient action in lieu of House action (Committee Rule 24(b),(c)), while other
administrative action could apparently be provided by the Committee pursuant to an
Committee Rule 16(b), (c).
APPENDIX: Disciplinary Actions Taken by the Full House
Against a Member
Table I. Censure
1. July 11, 1832
2. March 22, 1842
Member of Congress
William Stanberry (Ohio)
Joshua R. Giddings (Ohio)
3. July 15, 1856
4. April 9, 1864
Lawrence M. Keitt (S.C.)
Benjamin G. Harris (Md.)
5. April 14, 1864
6. May 14, 1866
Alexander Long (Ohio)
John W. Chanler (N.Y.)
7. July 24, 1866
8. Jan. 26, 1867
9. Jan. 15, 1868
10. Feb. 14, 1869
11. Feb. 24, 1870
Lovell H. Rousseau (Ky.)
John W. Hunter (N.Y.)
Fernando Wood (N.Y.)
Edward D. Holbrook (Idaho)
Benjamin Whittemore (S.C.)
12. March 1, 1870
John T. DeWeese (S.C.)
13. March 16, 1870
Roderick R. Butler (Tenn.)
14. Feb. 27, 1873
Oakes Ames (Mass.)
15. Feb. 27, 1873
James Brooks (N.Y.)
16. Feb. 4, 1875
17. May 17, 1890
18. Oct. 27, 1921
19. July 31, 1979
20. June 6, 1980
John Y. Brown (Ky.)
William D. Bynum (Ind.)
Thomas L. Blanton (Tex.)
Charles C. Diggs (Mich.)
Charles H. Wilson (Cal.)
21. July 20, 1983
22. July 20, 1983
Gerry E. Studds (Mass.)
Daniel B. Crane (Ill.)
Insulting the Speaker of the House.
Resolution introduced by Member relating to
delicate international negotiations deemed
Assisting in assault on a Member.
Treasonous conduct in opposing subjugation
of the South.
Supporting recognition of the Confederacy.
Insulting the House by introduction of
resolution containing unparliamentary
Assault of another Member.
Selling military academy appointments
(Member had resigned before expulsion, and
was “condemned” by House).
Selling military academy appointments
(Member had resigned before expulsion, and
was “condemned” by House).
Accepting money for “political purposes” in
return for Academy appointment.
Bribery in “Credit Mobilier” case. (Conduct
prior to election to House.)
Bribery in “Credit Mobilier” case. (Conduct
prior to election to House.)
Payroll fraud, 18 U.S.C. §1001 conviction.
Receipt of improper gifts; “ghost”
employees; improper personal use of
Sexual misconduct with House page.
Sexual misconduct with House page.
Table II. Reprimand
1. July 29, 1976
Member of Congress
Robert L.F. Sykes (Fla.)
2. Oct. 13, 1978
Charles H. Wilson (Cal.)
3. October 13, 1978
John J. McFall (Cal.)
4. October 13, 1978
Edward J. Roybal (Cal.)
5. July 31, 1984
George V. Hansen (Idaho)
6. Dec. 18, 1987
Austin J. Murphy (Pa.)
7. July 26, 1990
Barney Frank (Mass.)
8. January 21, 1997
Newt Gingrich (Ga.)
Use of office for personal gain; failure to
disclose interest in legislation.
False statement before Standards of Official
Conduct Committee investigating Korean
Failure to report campaign contributions
from Korean lobbyist.
Failure to report campaign contributions;
false sworn statement before Standards of
Official Conduct Committee investigating
Korean influence matter.
False statements on financial disclosure
form; conviction under 18 U.S.C. §1001 for
such false statements.
Ghost voting (allowing another person to
cast his vote); maintaining on his payroll
persons not performing official duties
commensurate with pay.
Using political influence to fix parking
tickets, and to influence probation officers
for personal friend.
Allowing a Member-affiliated tax-exempt
organization to be used for political
purposes; providing inaccurate, and
unreliable information to the ethics
Table III. Expulsion
1. July 13, 1861
2. December 2, 1861
3. December 3, 1861
4. October 2, 1980
5. July 24, 2002
Member of Congress
John B. Clark (Mo.)
Disloyalty to the Union - taking up arms
against the United States.
John W. Reid (Mo.)
Disloyalty to the Union - taking up arms
against the United States.
Henry C. Burnett (Ky.)
Disloyalty to the Union - taking up arms
against the United States.
Michael J. Myers (Pa.)
Bribery conviction for accepting money in
return for promise to use influence in
James A. Traficant (Ohio) Conviction of conspiracy to commit bribery
and to defraud U.S., receipt of illegal
gratuities, obstruction of justice, filing false
tax returns and racketeering, in connection
with receipt of favors and money in return for
official acts, and receipt of salary kickbacks