Expulsion, Censure, Reprimand, and Fine: Legislative Discipline in the House of Representatives

Summary

The House of Representatives—in the same manner as the United States Senate—is expressly authorized within the United States Constitution (Article I, Section 5, clause 2) to discipline or "punish" its own Members. This authority of the House to discipline a Member for "disorderly Behaviour" is in addition to any criminal or civil liability that a Member of the House may incur for particular misconduct, and is used not merely to punish an individual Member, but to protect the institutional integrity of the House of Representatives, its proceedings, and its reputation.

The House may discipline its Members without the necessity of Senate concurrence. The most common forms of discipline in the House are now "expulsion," "censure," or "reprimand"; although the House may also discipline its Members in other ways, including fine or monetary restitution, loss of seniority, and suspension or loss of certain privileges. In addition to such sanctions imposed by the full House of Representatives, the standing committee in the House which deals with ethics and official conduct matters, the House Committee on Ethics—formerly called the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct—is authorized by House Rules to issue a formal "Letter of Reproval" for misconduct which does not rise to the level of consideration or sanction by the entire House of Representatives. Additionally, the Committee on Ethics has also expressed its disapproval of certain conduct in informal letters and communications to Members.

The House may generally discipline its Members for violations of statutory law, including crimes; for violations of internal congressional rules; or for any conduct which the House of Representatives finds has reflected discredit upon the institution. Thus, each house of Congress has disciplined its own Members for conduct which has not necessarily violated any specific rule or law, but which was found to breach its privileges, demonstrate contempt for the institution, or reflect discredit on the House or Senate. When the most severe sanction of expulsion has been employed in the House of Representatives, however, the underlying conduct deemed by the House to have merited removal from office has historically involved either disloyalty to the United States Government, or the violation of a criminal law involving the abuse of one's official position, such as bribery. The House of Representatives has actually expelled only five Members in its history, but a number of Members, facing likely congressional discipline for various forms of misconduct, have resigned from Congress prior to any formal House action or leave office after election defeat.

This report has been updated from earlier versions and will be revised as events and changes in Rules or laws may warrant.

Background

Each house of the United States Congress is expressly authorized within the Constitution to "punish" its own Members for misconduct. In imposing legislative discipline against its Members, the House operates through its rulemaking powers,¹ and the express provision for legislative discipline is set out along with Congress' rulemaking authority in Article I, Section 5, clause 2, of the Constitution:

Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.

Internal, congressional discipline of a Member may take several forms. The most common forms of discipline in the House of Representatives are now "expulsion," "censure," or "reprimand," although the House may also discipline its Members in other ways, including fine or monetary assessment, loss of seniority, or loss of certain privileges.⁷ An "expulsion" is a removal of a Member from the House of Representatives by a two-thirds vote of the House. A "censure" or a "reprimand" is a legislative procedure where the full House, by majority vote on a simple resolution, expresses a formal disapproval of the conduct of a Member. In addition to these punishments or disciplines by the entire House of Representatives, the House Committee on Ethics—formerly called the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct—is authorized to issue, on its own accord, a "Letter of Reproval" to a Member when that committee disapproves of conduct but makes no recommendation for legislative sanctions to the full House of Representatives. The committee has also from time-to-time expressed its disapproval of particular conduct in informal letters and other communications to Members.

There is no precise listing or description in the Rules of the House of Representatives of the specific types of misconduct or ethical improprieties which might subject a Member to the various potential disciplines. The Rules adopted by the House Committee on Ethics provide simply that:

With respect to the sanctions that the Committee may recommend, reprimand is appropriate for serious violations, censure is appropriate for more serious violations, and expulsion of a Member or dismissal of an officer or employee is appropriate for the most serious violations. A recommendation of a fine is appropriate in a case in which it is likely that the violation was committed to secure a personal financial benefit; and a recommendation of a denial or limitation of a right, power, privilege, or immunity of a Member is appropriate when the violation bears upon the exercise or holding of such right, power, privilege, or immunity.⁸

The House may discipline its Members for violations of statutory law, including crimes; for violations of internal congressional rules; or for any conduct which the House of Representatives finds has reflected discredit upon the institution.⁹ Each house of Congress has disciplined its own Members for conduct which has not necessarily violated any specific rule or law, but which was found to breach its privileges, demonstrate contempt for the institution, or which was found to discredit the House or Senate.¹⁰ When the most severe sanction of expulsion has been employed or recommended in the House, however, the conduct has historically involved either disloyalty to the United States Government, or the violation of a criminal law involving the abuse of one's official position, such as bribery.

The process of disciplining a Member in the Congress ... is not surrounded with the panoply of protective shields that are present in a criminal case. An accused Member is judged by no specifically articulated standards, and is at the mercy of an almost unbridled discretion of the charging body ... from whose decision there is no established right of review.⁴⁰

Currently in the House of Representatives, a resolution to expel a Member would usually be referred to the House Committee on Ethics, the standing committee in the House with jurisdiction over congressional conduct and ethics, although such a resolution is considered to raise a question of the "privileges" of the House, and could be called up as a privileged resolution with notice by its sponsor according to House Rules.⁴¹ The House Committee on Ethics is also authorized to receive "complaints" concerning a Member's conduct from any other Member of the House (or from outside of the House when certified by a Member),⁴² may initiate on its own accord an investigation of a Member,⁴³ and may also be instructed by a resolution adopted by the House of Representatives to investigate a particular matter or Member. Under House Rule changes adopted in 2008, the House established an independent Office of Congressional Ethics for the House of Representatives, made up of non-Members of the House, which may initiate inquiries into allegations of misconduct by Members and staff, and may then refer matters to the standing House Committee on Ethics for further investigation and disciplinary recommendations.⁴⁴

While it was a common practice in the past to wait until all appeals were exhausted in a criminal conviction of a Member before the House would proceed on a matter concerning that Member,⁴⁵ the more modern practice is for the House to take cognizance of the underlying factual findings regarding the conduct that was the basis for the Member's conviction, regardless of the potential legal or procedural issues which might be resolved on appeal.⁴⁶ The rules of the House Committee on Ethics specifically provide, in fact, for automatic jurisdiction of the committee when a Member has been convicted in a federal, state, or local court of a felony.⁴⁷ Moreover, in one instance, a committee disciplinary proceeding concerning a Member who had been indicted for bribery was begun after the Member's trial, even though the trial ended in a hung jury, and before a second trial was to commence.⁴⁸

The current Rules of the House of Representatives authorize the House Committee on Ethics to investigate allegations of violations of "any law, rule, regulation, or other standard of conduct applicable to the conduct of such Member ... in the performance of his duties or the discharge of his responsibilities," and after such investigation the committee is to "report to the House its finding of fact and recommendations, if any...."⁴⁹ The committee has promulgated detailed procedural rules to implement fairness in the disciplinary process, specifically providing the requirements of notice, the specification of charges, and opportunities for the charged Member to be heard and to examine witnesses and evidence. After proceedings by an investigatory subcommittee, the taking of evidence and an adjudicatory hearing, if the Member is found by the majority of the committee members to have committed the specific offenses charged, the full committee will then consider the appropriate discipline.⁵⁰ If the committee finds that expulsion is warranted, a recommendation for such discipline is made in a report to the full House of Representatives, which may be, after debate, accepted, modified, or rejected by the House.

The term "censure," unlike the term "expel," does not appear in the Constitution, although the authority is derived from the same clause – Article I, Section 5, clause 2, concerning the authority of each house of Congress to "punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour." Censure, reprimand, or admonition are traditional ways in which parliamentary bodies have disciplined their members and maintained order and dignity in their proceedings.⁵¹ In the House of Representatives, a "censure" is a formal vote by the majority of Members present and voting on a resolution disapproving a Member's conduct, generally with the additional requirement that the Member stand at the "well" of the House chamber to receive a verbal rebuke and reading of the censure resolution by the Speaker of the House.

The Constitution, in providing that either house of Congress may "expel" a Member by a two-thirds majority, does not specify the reasons for such expulsion, but does in that same provision state that either house of Congress may punish its Members for "disorderly Behaviour." Some early commentators believed that the authority to "punish" a Member by way of censure or some other condemnation was thus expressly limited, unlike expulsion, to cases concerning "disorderly" or unruly behavior or conduct in Congress, that is, conduct which disrupts the institution.⁵² The authority to discipline by way of censure, reprimand, or other such rebuke, however, has come to be recognized and accepted in congressional practice as extending to cases of "misconduct," even outside of Congress, which the House finds to be reprehensible, and/or to reflect discredit on the institution, and therefore, worthy of condemnation or rebuke.

The House of Representatives has taken a broad view of its authority to discipline its Members. In the 63^rd Congress, for example, the House Judiciary Committee described the power of the House to punish for disorderly behavior as a power which is "full and plenary and may be enforced by summary proceedings. It is discretionary in character ... restricted by no limitation except in case of expulsion the requirement of the concurrence of a two-thirds vote."⁵³ Similarly, in its report on a Member, a House Select Committee in 1967 stated:

Censure of a Member has been deemed appropriate in cases of a breach of the privileges of the House. There are two classes of privilege, the one, affecting the rights of the House collectively, its safety, dignity, and the integrity of its proceedings; and the other, affecting the rights, reputation, and conduct of Members, individually.

Most cases of censure have involved the use of unparliamentary language, assaults upon a Member or insults to the House by introductions of offensive resolutions, but in five cases in the House and one in the Senate [as of 1967] censure was based on corrupt acts by a Member, and in another Senate case censure was based upon noncooperation with and abuse of Senate committees.

* * *

This discretionary power to punish for disorderly behavior is vested by the Constitution in the House of Representatives and its exercise is appropriate where a Member has been guilty of misconduct relating to his official duties, noncooperation with committees of this House, or nonofficial acts of a kind likely to bring this House into disrepute.⁵⁴

Although the House has stated and demonstrated in precedents its reticence to expel a Member for misconduct in a previous Congress which was known to the electorate, the House has had no similar compunction nor has it exercised similar restraint in expressing a formal "censure" of such past misconduct. Thus, a House Select Committee in the 90^th Congress noted that "the right to censure a Member for such prior acts is supported by clear precedent in both Houses of Congress.... "⁵⁵ In more recent years the House has adopted in its Rules a "statute of limitations" on actions, restricting the Ethics Committee from investigating alleged violations of conduct standards when such violations go back more than the last three Congresses, "unless the Committee determines that the alleged violation is directly related to an alleged violation that occurred in a more recent Congress."⁵⁶

At other times the House pursuant to disciplinary actions required certain monetary assessments of Members of Congress which were not expressly or necessarily characterized as "fines." A Member of Congress, pursuant to a formal "reprimand" was required to make restitution to the District of Columbia of certain monies and fines, concerning which he had improperly used his influence to have "fixed" or reduced.⁸⁰ In 1997, a monetary assessment or penalty, which was not characterized by the committee as a "fine," was imposed upon the Speaker of the House to pay "for some of the costs" of an ethics investigation which resulted in the reprimand of the Speaker.⁸¹

The "fines" and/or monetary assessments ordered in the disciplinary cases appear to involve the repayment or restitution of funds misused or wrongfully received, as opposed to fines merely or strictly for "punishment" purposes and not necessarily connected to the wrongful conduct. This is consistent with the current guidance in the House Committee on Ethics Rules concerning the recommendation of a "fine," which the committee notes, "is appropriate in a case in which it is likely that the violation was committed to secure a personal financial benefit."⁸² There does not appear to be, however, a constitutional or institutional requirement for such fines to be so connected with unjust enrichments or misuse of funds; and the Committee on Ethics has noted in its Rules that the guidance concerning fines and other sanctions recommended to the House "sets forth general guidelines and does not limit the authority of the Committee to recommend other sanctions."⁸³

The Ethics Committee in the House has characterized past actions such as these generally by stating that the committee "has publicly admonished several other Members for their conduct."¹¹³ Such informal notifications, public reports, public admonishments, or letters for corrective action, thus may be distinguished from those instances when the committee "formally and publicly reproved" a Member by way of a formal "Letter of Reproval,"¹¹⁴ although it may be argued that these other committee actions are to some degree comparable since they are all "administrative action[s]" taken by the committee itself "pursuant to an investigation" that had been conducted by an investigative subcommittee of the Committee on Ethics.¹¹⁵

The committee has also sent a so-called "letter of admonition" to a Member against whom a complaint was filed by another Member of the House,¹¹⁶ which was apparently different from, and was not technically, a "Letter of Reproval" or even any other "administrative" action "pursuant to an investigation" by an investigatory subcommittee of the committee.¹¹⁷ The "letter of admonition" in this case was a method of disposing of a complaint by the committee upon the recommendation of the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the committee for a "resolution of the complaint by a letter to the Member ... against whom the complaint is made,"¹¹⁸ without moving forward with a subcommittee investigation.

Footnotes

Deschler's Precedents of the United States House of Representatives, H. Doc. 94-661, 94^th Cong., 2d Sess., Volume 3, Ch. 12, §12, p. 168 (1979); Justice Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. II, §835 (Boston 1883).

Cushing, The Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, pp.250-251, 257-259, 268-270 (Boston 1874). Internal disciplinary action is "rooted in the judgment of the House as to what was necessary or appropriate for it to do to assure the integrity of its legislative performance and its institutional acceptability to the people at large as a serious and responsible instrument of government." Deschler's Precedents, supra at 174, citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577, McGowan concurring, at 607 (D.C.Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Story, supra at §835. Note British Parliamentary practice: "The practice of expulsion is not so much disciplinary as remedial, not so much to punish Members as to rid the House of persons who are unfit for membership." Erskine May, Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, at 105 (London 1964).

House ethics action does not foreclose a criminal prosecution on the same matter. United States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181, 189-190 (D.C.Cir. 1994); 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 655 (1834); United States v. Traficant, 368 F.3d 646 (6^th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1055 (2005).

Under the "Speech or Debate" clause of the Constitution (Article I, Section 6, cl. 1), Members of Congress may not be questioned outside of Congress "for any Speech or Debate in either House," that is, they are immune from criminal or civil proceedings only for their official conduct or activities which are deemed to be "an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings." Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972). The constitutional bar to the "Arrest" of Members during their attendance of, or "going to and returning from" a session of Congress for other than a felony or "Breach of the Peace" (Article I, Section 6, cl. 1), is an "obsolete" provision which applies only to arrests in civil suits, common in the 18^th century, but does not apply to criminal arrests. Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 446 (1908); Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76 (1934); Gravel, supra at 614; Deschler's Precedents, supra at Ch. 12, §3.1; see discussion in The Constitution of the United States, Analysis and Interpretation, S. Doc. 103-6, 103^rd Cong., 1^st Sess., at 127 (1996). Contrary to popular myth and misunderstanding, Members of Congress are not constitutionally immune from arrest for traffic violations under this clause.

Alexander Hamilton, II Eliot's Debates 257; note also James Madison, 2 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 249-250, and The Federalist Papers, No. 57; Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 508, 509, 531 (1969).

See footnote 2, supra; Story, supra at §§835-836. Note also Senator John Quincy Adams' arguments in 1807 on Senate's authority to expel a Member even after re-election, II Hinds' Precedents of the House of Representatives, §1264, p. 817 (1907).

Rules of the House Committee on Ethics, Rule 24(e) (February 5, 2013, 113^th Congress); Deschler's Precedents, supra at Ch. 12, §12.

House Committee on Ethics, Rule 24(g).

In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 669-670 (1897); H.Rept. 570, 63^rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1914) (Judiciary Committee), at VI Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives, §398, p. 558; Brown, House Practice, Guide to the Rules, Precedents and Procedures of the House, 104^th Cong., 2d Sess. "Misconduct; Sanctions," at 581-582 (1996). Note authority of Committee on Ethics, Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule XI, para. 3(a)(2), and Code of Official Conduct, Rule XXIII(1).

Brown, supra, "Voting," at p. 908: "A two-thirds vote ordinarily means two-thirds of those voting, a quorum being present, and not two-thirds of the entire membership."

Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522 (1969). Deschler's Precedents, supra at Ch. 12, §12, p. 169, n. 21.

See case of Senator William Blount of Tennessee, expelled on July 8, 1797; and found not subject to impeachment. III Hinds' Precedents, supra at §§2294-2318.

II Hinds' Precedents, supra at §1275.

Bowman and Bowman, Article I, Section 5: Congress' Power to Expel - An Exercise in Self Restraint, 29 Syracuse Law Review 1071, 1089-1090 (1978).

Story, supra at §836.

II Hinds' Precedents, supra at §1263. See footnote 12, supra.

166 U.S. 661, 669-670 (1897).

House Committee on Ethics, Rule 24(g).

See House expulsions of Representative-elect John B. Clark of Missouri (1861), Representative John W. Reid of Missouri (1861), and Representative Henry C. Burnett of Kentucky (1861), for disloyalty to the Union. II Hinds' Precedents, supra at §§1261, 1262.

H.Rept. 96-1387 (1980), In the Matter of Representative Michael J. Myers, 126 Cong. Rec. 28,978 (October 2, 1980). Representative Myers was expelled after conviction for bribery, conspiracy and violation of the Travel Act.

H.Rept. 107-594 (2002), In the Matter of Representative James A. Traficant, Jr., 148 Cong. Rec. 14318-14319 (July 24, 2002). Representative Traficant was expelled after conviction of conspiracy to violate federal bribery laws, receipt of illegal gratuities, obstruction of justice, conspiracy to defraud the United States, filing false income tax returns, and racketeering.

Note, e.g., H.Rept. 97-110 (1981), In the Matter of Representative Raymond F. Lederer, and House Committee on Standards recommendation of expulsion for bribery; and H.Rept. 100-506 (1988), In the Matter of Representative Mario Biaggi, recommendation of expulsion after conviction for illegal gratuities, Travel Act violations, and obstruction of justice. Note case of Rep. B.F. Whittemore, recommended for expulsion by Military Affairs Committee for sale of Military Academy appointments, who subsequently resigned in 1870, and who was then censured in absentia by the House (II Hinds' Precedents, supra at §1273); and House censure of John DeWeese after his resignation (also for the sale of Academy appointments), but before the committee reported the resolution of expulsion. II Hinds' Precedents, supra at §1239. See also expulsion resolutions, reported from an ad hoc committee, for bribery, and subsequent resignations during House consideration of resolutions, by Representatives William Gilbert, Frances Edwards, and Orasmus Matteson, in 1857 (II Hinds' Precedents, supra at §1275).

H.Rept. 96-1537, at 10-11 (1980), In the Matter of Representative John W. Jenrette, Jr.; H.Rept. 104-886, at 19 (1997), Summary of Activities, One Hundred Fourth Congress (concerning Representative Mel Reynolds); H.Rept. 101-995, at 10-11 (1990), Summary of Activities, One Hundred First Congress (concerning Representative Donald E. Lukens), and at 12-13 (concerning Representative Robert Garcia); H.Rept. 96-856, (1980), In the Matter of Representative Daniel J. Flood (1980); H.Rept. 109-744 (2007), Summary of Activities, One Hundred Ninth Congress (concerning Representative Robert Ney), and at 17-18 (concerning representative Tom DeLay). Representative Randy "Duke" Cunningham resigned from the House on December 1, 2005, after pleading guilty to a criminal conspiracy to commit bribery and tax evasion. Since no recommendations were made by the committee regarding these Members, it cannot be said with certainty what, if any, discipline would have been recommended by the committee, or approved by the House.

The House Committee on Ethics (formerly the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct) has found that since it will "lose jurisdiction" over a Member who has been defeated in an election, proceedings which could not be completed prior to the January end-of-term be suspended. Note, for example, H.Rept. 110-938, at 18 (2009), Summary of Activities, One Hundred Tenth Congress (concerning Representative William Jefferson); H.Rept. 105-848, at 14 (1999), Summary of Activities, One Hundred Fifth Congress (concerning Representative Jay C. Kim); H.Rept. 104-886, supra at 21 (concerning Representative Barbara-Rose Collins); see also H.Rept. 100-1125, at 17 (1989), Summary of Activities, One Hundredth Congress (concerning Rep. Patrick L. Swindall); H.Rept. 95-1818, at 3 (1978), Summary of Activities, Ninety-Fifth Congress (concerning Rep. Joshua Eilberg).

Madison. The Federalist Papers, No. 57: "All these sanctions, however, would be found very insufficient without the restraint of frequent elections ... as to support in the members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people."

Deschler's Precedents, supra at Ch. 12, §13, p. 176. See H.Rept. 94-1477, at 2 (1976), In the Matter of Representative Andrew J. Hinshaw, where the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct recommended against expulsion of a Member, since the Member's conviction "while reflecting on his moral turpitude, does not relate to his official conduct while a Member of Congress."

The Court in Powell v. McCormack, supra, in distinguishing the exclusion of Powell from an expulsion, noted that the House has "distrusted" its right to expel Members for prior conduct after they have been reelected (395 U.S. at 508), and that congressional precedents have shown that "the House will not expel a member for misconduct committed during an earlier Congress." 395 U.S. at 509, noting expulsion case of John W. Langley, H.Rept. 30, 69^th Cong., 1^st Sess., 1-2 (1925). The Court noted specifically, however, that it was not ruling on Congress' authority to expel for past misconduct (395 U.S. at 507, n. 27; 510, n.30), and, in fact, Justice Douglas, in his concurrence noted specifically that "if this were an expulsion case I would think that no justiciable controversy were presented" (395 U.S. at 553), since Douglas agreed with Senator Murdock of Utah in a 1940 exclusion case that each House may "expel anyone it designates by a two-thirds vote." 395 U.S. at 558-559.

Note conflicting opinions of two House committees in the Credit Mobilier investigations on the discipline of Representatives Ames and Brooks in the 42^nd Congress, H.Rept. 77, 42^nd Cong., 3^rd Sess. (1872) and H.Rept. 82, 42d Cong., 3^rd Sess. (1872). The House specifically refused, however, to accept a preamble to the substitute resolution for censure expressly questioning its authority to expel for past misconduct. See Committee Print, House of Representatives Exclusion, Censure and Expulsion Cases from 1789 to 1973, 93^rd Cong., 1^st Sess. 125 (1973); note also majority and minority opinions in expulsion cases of William S. King and John Schumaker, H.Rept. 815, 44^th Cong., 1^st Sess. (1876), II Hinds' Precedents, supra at §1283, and in expulsion case of Orsamus B. Matteson, H.Rept. 179, 35^th Cong., 1^st Sess. (1858), II Hinds' Precedents §1285.

See footnote 5, supra. Note also discussion of the infamous Wilkes case in England, shortly before the time of the drafting of the United States Constitution. Powell v. McCormack, supra at 532-535; May, supra at 107.

Story, supra at §835.

Cushing, supra at §625; Deschler's Precedents, supra at Ch. 12, §13, p. 175.

H.Rept. 570, 63^rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1914), at VI Cannon's Precedents, supra at §398. Emphasis added.

"Congress has demonstrated a clear reluctance to expel when to do so would impinge ... on the electoral process." Bowman and Bowman, supra at 1101.

Madison, The Federalist Papers, No. 57.

Powell v. McCormack, supra; U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995); Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001).

See Powell v. McCormack, supra at 522, 547-550, 537 n. 69. Note discussion by the Court (at 527-536) of the Wilkes case concerning English parliamentary practice at the time of the Constitution's drafting. If, however, there is alleged disloyalty to the Union, after having taken an oath of office to defend the Constitution, the disqualification provision of the Fourteenth Amendment may come into play. See pre-Powell, House of Representatives case of Victor Berger, excluded even after re-election. VI Cannon's Precedents, §§56, 58, 59.

See now 5 U.S.C. §8311 et seq. The President is not covered by the retirement laws applicable to other officers and employees of the federal government, and forfeiture of retired pay applies in case of impeachment, conviction, and removal of the President. See P.L. 85-745, as amended, 3 U.S.C. §102, note.

P.L. 110-81, the "Honest Leadership and Open Government Act," Sections 401(a) and 401(b), and P.L. 112-105, the "STOCK Act," Section 15, amending 5 U.S.C. §8332 (CSRS) and 5 U.S.C. §8411 (FERS).

408 U.S. 501, 519 (1972). Matters "textually committed" to Congress in the Constitution, such as rules for internal proceedings, might not generally be subject to judicial review unless another, express provision of the Constitution is violated. Note, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-229, 236-238 (1993); United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892); Powell v. McCormack, supra at 519, and 553 (Douglas, J. concurring).

House Rule IX. Deschler's Precedents, supra, Ch. 12, §13, at 176-177; Brown, supra, "Misconduct," §21. Note also H.Rept. 94-1477, at 6 (1976), In the Matter of Representative Andrew J. Hinshaw. Prior to 1968 when the standing ethics committee, then called the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, was created, such resolutions were referred to either ad hoc select committees, or to standing committees with other jurisdiction, such as Judiciary.

House Rule XI, para. 3(b)(2).

House Rule XI, para. 3(b)(2); House Committee on Ethics, Rules 14(a)(3), 15.

H.Res. 895, 110^th Congress. See CRS Report R40760, House Office of Congressional Ethics: History, Authority, and Procedures, by [author name scrubbed].

Deschler's Precedents, supra, Ch. 12, §13, at 176.

Note discussion in H.Rept. 96-1387, supra at 4-5; see also, generally, CRS Rpt. 88-197A, "House Discipline of Members After Conviction But Before Final Appeal," March 1, 1988 (archived). A Member convicted of a felony for which the penalty may be two years or more imprisonment, "should refrain" from voting on the floor or in committee until his or her presumption of innocence is restored. House Rule XXIII (10).

House Committee on Ethics, Rule 14(a)(4), 18(e).

H.Rept. 96-856 (1980), In the Matter of Representative Daniel J. Flood (1980).

House Rule XI, cl. 3(a)(2).

Investigations subcommittees are four Members of the House, and may be made up of committee Members, as well as Members of the House not on the committee who are appointed at the beginning of the Congress as a reserve "pool" available to be on investigations subcommittees if needed. Adjudications are held before a panel of the committee who did not serve on the investigations subcommittee, and if any charges drafted by the investigations subcommittee are proven before the adjudications panel, a "sanctions" hearing to determine the sanctions to be recommended to the House is conducted before the full membership of the Ethics Committee. House Rule X, cl. 5(a)(3) and (4), XI, cl. 3(b)(1)(B)(i), Rules of the Committee on Ethics, supra.

May, The Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, supra at 103; Black's Law Dictionary, at 224, 6^th Edition (1990), defines "censure" as: "The formal resolution of a legislative, administrative, or other body reprimanding a person, normally one of its own members, for specified conduct."

Note, for example, discussion in Bowman and Bowman, supra at 1089 - 1091, citing Rawle, View of the Constitution of United States 46-47 (2^nd ed. 1829).

H.Rept. 570, 63^rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).

H.Rept. 27, 90^th Cong., 1^st Sess., at 24-26, 29 (1967), In re Adam Clayton Powell. The Select Committee recommended to the full House in the 90^th Congress to seat Mr. Powell, and then to censure him. The House rejected that recommendation, however, and voted to "exclude" Powell, which was ultimately found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Powell v. McCormack, supra, because the House's exclusion action went beyond judging the three constitutional "qualifications" or the "election" of the Member-elect. Representative Powell was re-elected to and then seated in the 91^st Congress, but was fined and had his seniority reduced by the House (H.Res. 2, 115 Cong. Rec. 29, 34 (January 3, 1969)).

H.Rept. 27, supra at 27; see also censure of Representatives Ames and Brooks in the "Credit Mobilier" bribery matter (1872), for conduct that took place at least five years before their election to the House, and about which the electorate apparently knew, II Hinds' Precedents, supra at §1286; Deschler's Precedents, supra at Ch. 12, §16, pp. 194-195; and H.Rept. 96-351, at 3-5 (1979), In the Matter of Representative Charles C. Diggs, Jr.

House Rule XI, cl. 3(b)(3).

See censures of Representatives Whittemore and DeWeese, II Hinds' Precedents, supra at §§1273, 1239.

H. Rept. 96-351, In the Matter Representative Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (1979); 125 Cong. Rec. 21584-21592 (July 31, 1979).

H. Rept. 96-930, In the Matter of Representative Charles H. Wilson (1980), H.Res. 660, 96^th Cong., 126 Cong. Rec. 13801-13820 (June 10, 1980).

H. Rept. 98-295, In the Matter of Representative Gerry E. Studds (1983), 129 Cong. Rec. 20030-20037 (July 20, 1983); and H. Rept. 98- 296, In the Matter of Representative Daniel B. Crane (1983), 129 Cong. Rec. 20021-20030 (July 20, 1983).

H.Rept. 111-661, In the Matter of Representative Charles B. Rangel (2010), H.Res. 1737, 111^th Cong., 156 Cong. Rec. H7891-H7899 (daily ed. December 2, 2010).

See footnote 24 supra. Other Members have also lost their next election before any House action is completed. See footnote 25 supra. As noted, since no recommendation is made by the committees investigating these matters, it cannot be said with certainty what, if any, discipline would have been recommended by the committees, or approved by the House.

Note II Hinds' Precedents, supra at §1257 (47^th Cong., 1^st Sess. (1882)); II Hinds' Precedents, supra at §1666 (39^th Cong., 1^st Sess. (1866)).

VI Cannon's Precedents, supra at §236 (67^th Cong., 1^st Sess.).

Deschler's Precedents, supra at Ch. 12, §16, p. 196 ("a somewhat lesser punitive measure than censure"); see also Cushing, supra at pp. 266-269, for historical context. See now House Committee on Ethics, supra at Rule 24(g).

H.Rept. 94-1364 (1976), In the Matter of Representative Robert L.F. Sikes. No recommendation for punishment was made for an "obvious and significant conflict of interest" – a significant ownership interest in land directly impacted by legislation the Member sponsored, since the "events occurred approximately 15 years ago and ... appear to have been known to [his] constituency.... " Id. at 4-5.

Deschler's Precedents, supra at Ch. 12, §16, p. 196.

H.Res. 744, 111^th Congress, adopted by the House, September 15, 2009, 155 Cong. Rec. H9529-H9534 (daily ed.). The matter was raised by another Member as a privileged resolution.

Deschler's Precedents, supra at Ch. 12, §17, p. 203. Note, Cushing, supra at §675.

House Committee on Ethics, Rule 24(e)(4).

103 U.S. 168 (1880).

103 U.S. at 189, 190. There is no known case of a congressional imprisonment of a Member in the history of Congress. See discussion in United States v. Traficant, 368 F.3d 646, 651 (6^th Cir. 2004): "Congress has not done so, even once, dating back to the year 1787."

In the Senate, in a 1990 disciplinary matter in which a Senator was "denounced" by the full Senate, for example, the Senator was ordered to "reimburse" the Senate a specified amount in connection with questionable expense reimbursements received from the Senate, and "to pay to charities with which he has no affiliation" an amount equal to that which was considered as "excess honoraria" over and above that which the Senator was permitted to accept. S. Rept. 101-382, at 14-15 (1990).

Studies have noted that prior to 1969, no Members of the House had ever been fined for disciplinary reasons. McLaughlin, "Congressional Self-Discipline: The Power to Expel, Exclude and to Punish," 41 Fordham L.R. 43, 61 (Oct. 1972). There had in the 1800's been a few instances noted in precedents where the House authorized fines for absences, or as a condition for discharge. Note, IV Hinds' Precedents, supra at §§3011-3014.

H. Res. 2, 91^st Cong., 1^st Sess., In the Matter of Representative Adam Clayton Powell (1969), note Deschler's Precedents, supra at Ch. 12, §17, pp. 203-204. The Sergeant at Arms was directed to deduct $1,150 a month from the Member's salary.

H.Rept. 96-351, at 20 (1979), In the Matter of Representative Charles Diggs, Jr.

H.Rept. 112-642 (2012), In the Matter of Allegations Relating to Representative Laura Richardson; see adoption of Committee Report and House reprimand, at 158 Cong. Rec. H5635- H3639 (daily ed. August 2, 2012).

H.Rept. 101-610, (1990), In the Matter of Representative Barney Frank.

H.Rept. 105-1, at 3 (1997), In the Matter of Representative Newt Gingrich.

House Committee on Ethics, Rule 24(g).

Id.

Cushing, supra, at Section 627, p. 251.

Jefferson's Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives, §658. Deschler's Precedents, supra at Ch. 12, §15, p. 187.

Citations are to volumes of Hinds' and Cannon's Precedents of the United States House of Representatives, and to the relevant sections.

See now, House Rule XXIII (10); note H.Rept. 93-616, (1973).

121 Cong. Rec. 10341, April 16, 1975, colloquy between Representatives Robert Eckhardt and John J. Flynt of Texas.

House Rule XXIII(2); note comments on passage of abstention rule by Representatives Edwards and Drinan, 121 Cong. Rec., supra at 10343-10345, and discussion in Deschler's Precedents, Ch. 12, §15 (1977).

The committee in 1993 noted in its report that although there is no "specific enforcement capability" expressed in the proposed rule, "any Member subject to its provisions at the time of the resolution's adoption, or thereafter, who violates the clear principles it expresses, will do so at the risk of subjecting himself to the introduction of a privileged resolution relating to his conduct.... " H.Rept. 93-616, supra at 4. Note, Washington Post, "Under Colleagues' Pressure, Biaggi Refrains from Voting," October 22, 1987. See also House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, "Dear Colleague" letter from the Chairman and Vice Chairman, April 15, 2002, warning Member convicted of felony violations that "by voting in the House – you risk subjecting yourself to action by this Committee, and by the House, in addition to any other disciplinary action that may be initiated in connection with your criminal conviction."

House Rule XI, para. 3(a)(1).

House Rule XI, para. 3(a)(1) provides that a "letter of reproval or other administrative action of the committee pursuant to an investigation ... shall only be issued ... as part of a report required" under subparagraph (2) of the Rule. Subparagraph (2) states that the Committee on Ethics "shall report to the House its findings of fact and recommendations, if any, upon the final disposition of any such investigation, and such action as the committee may deem appropriate in the circumstances." House Rule XI, para. 3(a)(2).

House Rule XI, para.3(a)(1); House Committee on Ethics, Rule 24(c).

A Letter of Reproval is not one of the "sanctions" recommended to the House, listed in the Committee Rules at Rule 24(e).

House Committee on Ethics, Rule 24(c).

House Committee on Ethics, Rule 24(d).

House Committee on Ethics, Rule 24(b), (c) and (d). See also Committee Rule 26(b), waiver of procedural steps by respondent.

H.Rept. 106-979, at 3J, (2000), In the Matter of Representative E.G. "Bud" Shuster.

H.Rept. 100-382, at 5, 6, (1987), In the Matter of Representative Richard H. Stallings. The committee recommended against sanctions by the full House because of several "mitigating" factors, including "no evidence of improper intent" of the Member either to conceal the activity or to violate the provisions of the Rule as the loans were fully reported on required disclosures, and the voluntary "corrective action" on the Member's own initiative once the Member became aware of the violations.

H.Rept. 100-526, (1988), In the Matter of Representative Charles G. Rose III. The committee cited "mitigating circumstances which prevent these violations from rising to the level of a recommendation of sanction to the full House," and commended the "positive action taken" by the Member. Id. at 26.

H.Rept. 101-293, (1989), In the Matter of Representative Jim Bates. The committee initiated a Preliminary Inquiry and the Member waived his rights to a Statement of Alleged Violations and a disciplinary hearing. The committee noted that since the Member had taken steps to assure no repeat of the offending conduct, was being directed to specifically issue apologies to the affected employees, and that since any inappropriate campaign activities were "sporadic" and not on-going, that "the better course is to formally and publicly reprove" the Member. Id. at 13-14.

H.Rept. 106-979, at 3D-3E (2000), In the Matter of Representative E.G. "Bud" Shuster.

H.Rept. 107-130, (2001), In the Matter of Representative Earl F. Hilliard.

House Committee on Ethics, Rule 24(c).

See H.Rept. 101-995, at 8 (1990), Summary of Activities, One Hundred First Congress; H.Rept. 106-1044, at 11-12 (2001).

H.Rept. 104-401, at 2, 4-5 (1995), Inquiry Into Various Complaints Filed Against Representative Newt Gingrich.

H.Rept. 101-397, at 2, 14 (1990), In the Matter of Representative Gus Savage.

H.Rept. 108-722, at 2 (2004), "Investigation of Allegations Related to Voting on the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003," concerning allegations of trading votes on a Medicare measure in return for political support of a Member's relative.

The committee made public the report on December 8, 2006 (109^th Cong., 2d Sess.). See H.Rept. 109-744, at 15-16 (2007). The committee also issued a press release concerning a misdemeanor assault charge against a Member towards an airline employee, noting that the investigative subcommittee found that the Member "demonstrated poor judgment," and that such conduct "implicated the reputation of the House of Representatives." H.Rept. 110-938, at 189 (2007).

House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, Report, "Investigation into Officially Connected Travel of House Members to Attend the Carib News Foundation Multi-National Business Conferences in 2007 and 2008," at p. V (February 25, 2010).

Report Adopted by the Committee on Ethics, December 20, 2012, 112^th Cong., 2^nd Sess., at 1.

Report, supra at p. 51.

House Ethics Manual, 110^th Cong., 2d Sess., at 12 (2008).

Compare committee descriptions at H.Rept. 101-995, supra at 8, and 9; note House Ethics Manual, supra at 11.

As noted, House Rules provide that a "letter of reproval or other administrative action of the Committee" may be invoked "pursuant to an investigation." House Rule XI, para. 3(a)(1); House Committee on Ethics, Rule 24(c), (d). These other actions, however, do not necessarily require the adoption or proof of a Statement of Alleged Violations. See, for example, Committee Rule 19(g).

See Statement of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, October 6, 2004; Memorandum to the Members of the Committee, from the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, "Recommendations for disposition of the complaint filed against Representative DeLay," and "Dear Colleague" letter to Members, October 6, 2004.

As noted, a "Letter of Reproval" or other committee action would appear to come only after an investigative subcommittee had been convened and had issued a report to the full Committee on Ethics. A Letter of Reproval could follow when a Statement of Alleged Violations is adopted and proved or admitted, and the full committee had then decided by majority vote to "adopt a motion to issue a Letter of Reproval" as sufficient action in lieu of House action (House Committee on Ethics, Rule 24(b), (c)), while other administrative action could apparently be provided by the committee pursuant to an investigation.

House Committee on Ethics, Rule 16(b), (c).