Order Code RL30588
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Afghanistan: Current Issues and
and U.S. Policy Concerns
Updated December 12, 2001May 20, 2002
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Afghanistan: Current Issues and
and U.S. Policy Concerns
Summary
Even beforeU.S. and international officials are hopeful that Afghanistan is emerging from
more than 22 years of warfare and instability, although substantial risk to Afghan
stability remains. Before the U.S. military campaign against the orthodox Islamist
Taliban movement began on
October 7, 2001, Afghanistan had been mired in conflict for about 22 years, including
the Soviet occupation during 1979-1989. The orthodox Islamic movement called the
since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Taliban ruled most of
Afghanistan during 1996 until its collapse at the hands of the U.S. and Afghan
opposition military campaign in November - in November December 2001. During that time, itits rule, the
Taliban was opposed primarily by the Northern
Alliance, a coalition of minority ethnic groups. Following the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks in the United States, the Taliban became almost completely isolated
internationally for its
ethnic groups. During 1998 until its rule ended, the Taliban had come under
increasing international pressure to cease hosting of terrorist leader Osama bin Ladin andLaden
and members of his Al Qaeda
organization, the prime suspect in those attacks. The U.S. military campaign against
the Taliban, coupled with U.S. support for the Northern Alliance, enabled opposition
groups to gain control of all of Afghanistan by early December.
The collapse of the Taliban has enabled the United States to send in special
forces to southern and eastern Afghanistan to search for Taliban and Al Qaeda
leaders, including bin Ladin himself. Citizens in areas now under opposition control,
although wary of the opposition groups, are also enjoying new personal freedoms that
were forbidden under the Taliban. With the Taliban defeated, the United States and
organization, the prime suspect in the September 11
terrorist attacks on the United States.
The collapse of the Taliban has enabled the United States and its coalition
partners to send forces throughout Afghanistan to search for Taliban and Al Qaeda
fighters and leaders that remain at large, including bin Laden himself. Afghan
citizens are enjoying new personal freedoms that were forbidden under the Taliban;
women are returning to schools and their jobs. With the Taliban defeated, the United
States and its coalition partners are distributing additional humanitarian aid through newly
opened routes, and are beginning to plan a
newly opened routes and, in conjunction with international agencies, beginning a
major reconstruction effort.
Although the Northern Alliance has emerged as the dominant force in the
country, controlling about 70% of Afghanistan, the United States, Pakistan, other
countries, and the the United States and United Nations urged the Alliance to negotiate with Pashtun
representatives, including those of the former King Mohammad Zahir Shah, to form
a broad-based government. On mediators persuaded the Alliance to
share power with Pashtun representatives in a broad-based interim government. On
December 5, 2001, major Afghan factions, meeting
under U.N. auspices in Bonn,
signed an agreement to form an interim government that
will run Afghanistan for at least the next 6 months. The interim government will be
chaired by a Pashtun leader, Hamid Karzai, but the Northern Alliance will hold 17 out
of the 30 cabinet until
a traditional national assembly (“loya jirga”) takes place during June 10-16, 2002.
The interim government, which took office on December 22, 2001, is chaired by a
Pashtun leader, Hamid Karzai. The Northern Alliance holds 17 out of the 30 cabinet
positions, including the three key posts responsible for foreign
policy, defense, and internal security
internal security.
As the war against remaining Al Qaeda and Taliban elements continues, the
United States is working to stabilize the interim government, arrange humanitarian
and reconstruction assistance, expand a new Afghan national army, and support the
international security force (ISAF) that is helping the new government provide
security. The United States has reopened its embassy in Kabul and allowed the
interim Afghan administration to reopen Afghanistan’s embassy in Washington.
Contents
Background to Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Rise of The Taliban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Mullah Muhammad Umar/Taliban Leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Coalescence of the Northern Alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Political Settlement Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Pre-September 11 Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The War and Its Political Aftermath
1
4
4
5
.................................................
The “Six Plus Two” and Geneva Contact Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
King Zahir Shah and the Loya Jirga Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Post-September 11 U.N. Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Bonn Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Interim Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
International Security Force/Afghan National Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Diplomatic and Governmental Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6
7
7
8
Regional Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8. 11
Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9. 11
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10. . . 13
Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11. . . 14
Central Asian States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
China. . 15
China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14. 16
Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14. . . 17
U.S. Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Harboring of Osama Bin Ladin/Radical Islamic Fundamentalists . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Harboring of Al Qaeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Human Rights/Treatment of Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Destruction of Buddha Statues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hindu Badges . . 21
Hindu Badges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Counternarcotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Retrieval of U.S. Stingers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Landmine Eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Assistance and Reconstruction .
Alleviating Human Suffering/Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
U.S. Assistance Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Reconstruction Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Promoting Long-Term Economic Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
U.S. and International Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15
16
18
19
19
20
20
21
22
22
25
27
Map of Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Map of Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
List of Tables
Table 1. Major Factions in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Table 2. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan in FY1999-FY2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan FY1978-1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Afghanistan: Current Issues and
U.S. Policy Concerns
Background to Recent Developments
Afghanistan became unstable in the 1970s as both its Communist Party and its Islamic
parties grew in strength and in opposition to one another, polarizing the political
system. A Communist coup in 1978 overthrew the military regime of Mohammad
Daoud, who had overthrown his cousin, King Zahir Shah, in 1973. Zahir Shah, the
only surviving son of King Nadir Shah, had ruled Afghanistan since 1933. His rule
followed that of King Amanullah (1921-1929), who was considered a modernizer and
who presided over a government in which all ethnic minorities participated.
After taking power in 1978 upon the overthrow of Daoud, the Communists, first
under Amin Taraki and then under Hafizullah Amin (who overthrew Taraki in 1979)
attempted to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society, spurring
recruitment and backing for Islamic parties opposed to Communist ideology. The
Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979 to prevent a
takeover by the Islamic-oriented militias that later became known as “mujahedin”1
(Islamic fighters) and thereby keep Afghanistan pro-Soviet. Upon their invasion, the
Soviets ousted Hafizullah Amin and installed Babrak Karmal as Afghan president.
After the Soviets occupied Afghanistan, the U.S.-backed mujahedin fought them
fiercely, and Soviet occupation forces were never able to pacify all areas of the
country. The Soviets occupied major cities, but the outlying mountainous regions
remained largely under mujahedin control. The mujahedin benefitted by hiding and
storing
Islamic movement grew in strength and became increasingly bitter opponents of each
other.1 The instability shattered the relative peace and progress that characterized the
rule of King Mohammad Zahir Shah, who reigned during 1933 - 1973. Zahir Shah
was the last King in Afghanistan’s monarchy, which was founded in 1747 by Ahmad
Shah Durrani. Prior to the founding of the monarchy, Afghanistan did not exist as
a distinct political entity, but was a territory inhabited by tribes and tribal
confederations often linked to neighboring nations. Zahir Shah was the only
surviving son of King Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933), whose rule followed
(after a brief rule in 1919 by a Tajik strongman named Bacha-i-Saqqo) that of King
Amanullah Khan (1919-1929), who was considered a secular modernizer and who
presided over a government in which all ethnic minorities participated. Zahir Shah
promulgated a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature, and he
promoted freedoms for women, including freeing them from the veil. However,
possibly believing that doing so would enable him to limit Soviet support for
communist factions in Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also entered into a significant
political and arms purchase relationship with the Soviet Union.
While undergoing medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his
cousin, Mohammad Daoud, a military leader. Daoud established a dictatorship
characterized by strong state control over the economy. After taking power in 1978
by overthrowing Daoud, the communists, first under Nur Mohammad Taraki and
then under Hafizullah Amin (leader of a rival communist faction who overthrew
Taraki in 1979), attempted to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society.
The communists tried to redistribute land and bring more women into government
positions. These moves spurred recruitment for Islamic parties and their militias
opposed to communist ideology. The Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan on
December 27, 1979 to prevent a seizure of power by the Islamic-oriented militias
that later became known as “mujahedin”2 (Islamic fighters), and thereby keep
Afghanistan pro-Soviet. Upon their invasion, the Soviets ousted Hafizullah Amin
and installed its local ally, Babrak Karmal, as Afghan president.
1
For more information, see CRS Report RL31389, Afghanistan: Challenges and Options
for Reconstructing a Stable and Moderate State, by Richard Cronin; and RL31355,
Afghanistan’s Path to Reconstruction: Obstacles, Challenges, and Issues for Congress, by
Rhoda Margesson.
2
The term refers to an Islamic guerrilla; literally “one who fights in the cause of Islam.”
CRS-2
After the Soviets occupied Afghanistan, the U.S.-backed mujahedin fought
them effectively, and Soviet occupation forces were never able to pacify all areas of
the country. The Soviets held major cities, but the outlying mountainous regions
remained largely under mujahedin control. The mujahedin benefitted from U.S.
weapons and assistance, provided through the Central Intelligence Agency, working
closely with Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence directorate (ISI). That weaponry
included man-portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems called “Stingers,” which
proved highly effective against Soviet aircraft. The Islamic guerrillas also hid and
stored weaponry in a large network of natural and manmade tunnels and caves
throughout Afghanistan. The Soviet Union’s losses mounted, and domestic opinion
shifted against the war. In 1986, perhaps in an effort to signal some flexibility on a
possible political settlement, the Soviets replaced Babrak Karmal with the more
pliable former director of Afghan intelligence (Khad), Najibullah Ahmedzai (who went
went by the name Najibullah or, on some occasions, the abbreviated Najib).
On April 14, 1988, the Soviet Union, led by reformist leader Mikhail
Gorbachev,
agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva Accords) requiring it to
withdraw.
The Soviet Union completed the withdrawal on February 15, 1989,
leaving in place
a weak Communistcommunist government facing a determined U.S. backed
mujahedin. A
warming of superpower relations moved the United States and Soviet
Union to try
for a political settlement to the internal conflict. From late 1989, the
United States
pressed the Soviet Union to agree to a mutual cutoff of military aid to
the combatants.
The failed August 1991 coup in the Soviet Union reduced Moscow’s capability for
1
The term refers to an Islamic guerrilla; literally “one who fights in the cause of Islam.”
CRS-2
capability for and interest in supporting communist regimes in the Third World,
leading Moscow
to agree with Washington on September 13, 1991, to a joint cutoff
of military aid to
the Afghan combatants.
The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and covert
covert military assistance was provided by the U.S. to Afghanistan from the Afghan mujahedin from
1980 until the end
of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1989. Press reports
and independent
experts believe the covert aid program grew from about $20 million
per year in
FY1980 to about $300 million per year during fiscal years 1986 - 1990.
Even before
the 1991 U.S.-Soviet agreement on Afghanistan, the Soviet withdrawal
had decreased
the strategic and political value of Afghanistan and made the
Administration and
Congress less forthcoming with funding. For FY1991, Congress
reportedly cut
covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from $300 million the
previous year to
$250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second half of the
fiscal year.
Although the intelligence authorization bill was not signed until late
1991, Congress
abided by the aid figures contained in the bill.23
3
See “Country Fact Sheet: Afghanistan,” in U.S. Department of State Dispatch. Volume
5, No. 23, June 6, 1994. Page 377.
CRS-3
With Soviet backing
withdrawn, on March 18, 1992,
Afghan President Najibullah
publicly agreed to step down
once an interim government was
was formed. His announcement set
set off a wave of regime
defections,
primarily by Uzbek
and Tajik
ethnic militias that had
had previously been allied with the
Kabul government, including
the Kabul gov ernment,
including that of Uzbek commander
militia
commander Abdul Rashid
Dostam (see
below).
Population:
25.8 million
Ethnic Groups:
Pashtun 38%; Tajik 25%;
Uzbek 6%; Hazara 19%; others
12%
Religions:
Sunni Muslim 84%; Shiite
Muslim 15%; other 1%
Per Capita Income:
$280/yr (World Bank figure)
External Debt:
$5.5 billion (1996 est.)
Major Exports:
fruits, nuts, carpets
Major Imports:
food, petroleum
Source: CIA World Factbook, 2000.
Joining with the defectors,
prominent mujahedin
commander Ahmad Shah Masud
Masud (of the Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani)
sent his
fighters into Kabul, paving the way for the installation of a mujahedin regime
on April
18, 1992. Masud, nicknamed “Lion of the Panjshir,” had earned a
reputation as a
brilliant strategist by successfully fighting the Soviet occupation forces in his power
preventing the Soviets from
occupying his power base in the Panjshir Valley of northeastern Afghanistan. Two
days earlier, as the
mujahedin approached Kabul, Najibullah failed in an attempt to
flee Afghanistan. He,
his brother, and a few aides remained at a U.N. facility in
Kabul until the day in
September 1996 that the Taliban movement seized control of
the city – Taliban
fighters entered the U.N. compound, captured Najibullah and his
brother, and hanged
them.
2
See “Country Fact Sheet: Afghanistan,” in U.S. Department of State Dispatch. Volume
5, No. 23, June 6, 1994. Page 377.
CRS-3
them.
The victory over Najibullah brought the mujahedin parties to power in
Afghanistan but also exposed the serious differences among them. Under an
agreement among all the major mujahedin parties, Rabbani became President in June
1992, with the understanding that he would leave office in December 1994. His
refusal to step down at the end of that time period–on the grounds that political
authority would disintegrate in the absence of a clear successor–led many of the other
parties to accuse him of attempting to monopolize power. His government faced
daily shelling from another mujahedin commander, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who was
nominally the Prime Minister. Pakistan-backed Gulbuddin
Hikmatyar, a radical Islamic fundamentalist who
headed a faction of Hizb-e-Islami
(Islamic Party), who was nominally the Prime Minister. Hikmatyar was later ousted
by the Taliban
from his powerbase around Jalalabad- despite similar ideologies and
Pashtun ethnicity
- and he later fled to Iran. Two more yearsFour years (1992-1996) of civil war among
the mujahedin
resulted, destroying much of Kabul and creating popular support for
the Taliban. In
addition, the dominant Pashtun ethnic group accused the Rabbani
government of
failing to represent all of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups, and many
Pashtuns allied with
the Taliban.
Table 1. Major Factions in Afghanistan
Party/Commander
Leader
Ideology/
Ethnicity
Areas of Control
Taliban
Mullah
ultra-orthodox
(Islamic cleric)
Islamic,
Muhammad Umar Pashtun
Pockets of fighters
around Qandahar and
parts of northern
Afghanistan
Northern
Alliance/Islamic Society
(dominant party in the
Northern Alliance)
Burhannudin
moderate
Rabbani (political Islamic, Tajik
leader),
Muhammad
Fahim (military
leader)
Most of northern and
western Afghanistan,
including Kabul
Forces of Ismail Khan
(part of Northern
Alliance)
Ismail Khan
Herat Province and
environs
Eastern Shura (loosely
allied with Northern
Alliance)
Hajji Abdul Qadir moderate
Islamic,
Pashtun
Abdul Rashid
National Islamic
Movement of Afghanistan Dostam
(part of Northern
Alliance)
Tajik
Jalalabad and
environs
socialist, Uzbek Mazar Sharif and
environs
Independent Pashtun
Commanders
Hamid Karzai and mostly orthodox southern Afghanistan,
other tribal
Islamic,
including Qandahar
leaders
Pashtun,
Hizb-e-Wahdat
(part of Northern
Alliance)
Abd al-Karim
Khalili
Shiite, Hazara
tribes
Bamiyan province
CRS-4
the Taliban.
The Rise of The Taliban
The Taliban movement was formed in 1993-1994 by Afghan Islamic clerics and
students, many of them former mujahedin who had moved into the western areas of
CRS-4
Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries (“madrassas”). They are mostly ultraorthodox Sunni Muslims who practice a form of Islam, “Wahhabism” similar to that
practiced in Saudi Arabia. The Taliban are overwhelmingly ethnic was composed overwhelmingly of ethnic
Pashtuns (Pathans)
from rural areas of Afghanistan. Pashtuns constitute a plurality
in Afghanistan,
accounting for about 38% of Afghanistan’s population of about 26
million. Taliban
leaders viewed the Rabbani government as corrupt and responsible
for continued civil
war in Afghanistan and the deterioration of security in the major
cities. With the help
of defections by sympathetic mujahedin fighters, the movement
seized control of the
southeastern city of Qandahar in November 1994 and continued
to gather strength.
The Taliban’s early successes encouraged further defections by
local leaders, andand, by February 1995,
it reached the gates of Kabul, after which an 18-month18month stalemate around the capital
ensued. In September 1995, the Taliban captured
Herat province, on the border with
Iran, and expelled the pro-Iranian governor of the
province, Ismail Khan. In
September 1996, a string of Taliban victories east of
Kabul led Rabbani/Masud’s
outer defenses to crumble, and the Rabbani government
withdrew to the Panjshir Valley north
of Kabul with most of its heavy weapons
intact. The Taliban took control of Kabul
on September 27, 1996.
The Taliban lost much of its international support as its policies unfolded.34 It
imposed strict adherence to Islamic customs in areas it controls, and used harsh
punishments, including executions, on transgressors. The Taliban regime established
a Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice, a force of police
officers to enforce its laws and moral rules.45 It banned television, popular music, and
dancing, and required that male beards remain untrimmed. Immediately after
capturing Kabul, the Taliban curbed freedoms for women there, including their ability
ability to work outside the home (except in health care) and it closed schools for
girls.
Mullah Muhammad Umar/Taliban Leaders. During the war against the
Soviet Union, Taliban founder Mullah Muhammad Umar fought in the Hizb-e-Islam
(Islamic Party) mujahedin party led by Yunis Khalis. During Taliban rule, Mullah
Umar held the title of Head of State and Commander of the Faithful. He lost an eye
during the anti-Soviet war, rarely appeared in public even before U.S. airstrikes
began, and did not take an active role in the day-to-day affairs of governing.
However, in times of crisis or to discuss pressing issues, he summoned Taliban leaders
leaders to meet with him in Qandahar. Considered a hardliner within the Taliban
regime,
Mullah Umar forged a close personal bond with bin LadinLaden and was adamantly
adamantly opposed to handing him over to another country to face justice. Born near
Qandahar,
Umar is about 49 years old. His ten year old son, as well as his stepfather, reportedly
3
reportedly died at the hands of U.S. airstrikes in early October 2001. Umar, having
reportedly fled Qandahar city when the Taliban surrendered the city on December 9,
4
See U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000. Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, February 2001. Available online through the State
State Department’s web site at [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/sa].
45
Testimony of Zalmay Khalilzad, Director of RAND’s Strategy and Doctrine Program, before
before the Subcommittee on Near East and South Asia of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations. October 22, 1997.
CRS-5
died at the hands of U.S. airstrikes in early October. As of December 12, 2001, Umar
was last reported to have fled Qandahar city and possibly been injured in the course
of the Taliban surrender of that city on December 92001, is still at large, and he is believed to still be in the country, possibly in Uruzgan
Province where he grew up.
Coalescence of the Northern Alliance
The rise of the Taliban movement caused other power centers to make common
cause with ousted President Rabbani and his military chief, Ahmad Shah Masud. The
The individual groups allied with Rabbani and Masud’s Islamic Society party in a
in a “Northern Alliance” sometimes called the “United Front,”
headed by Rabbani and his party, the Islamic Society. The Islamic Society itself is
.” Rabbani’s Islamic Society
faction is composed mostly of Tajiks, which constitute about 25% of the Afghan
population.
Islamic Society adherents are also located in Persian-speaking western Afghanistan
Afghanistan near the Iranian border. TheseThe fighters in the west are generally loyal to the
charismatic former Herat governor Ismail Khan, who regained his former stronghold
the charismatic militia leader Ismail Khan, who regained the governorship of his
former stronghold in Herat and surrounding provinces after the Taliban collapse of
mid-November 2001.
One non-Tajik component.
One power center that is part of the Northern Alliance is the Uzbek militia force
(the Junbush-Melli, or National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) of General Abdul
Rashid Dostam.
Uzbeks constitute about 6% of the population. Dostam’s break with
Najibullah in
early 1992 helped pave the way for the overthrow of the Communist regime. Prior
to the August 1998 capture of his bases in Mazar-e-Sharif and Shebergan, Dostam
commanded about communist
regime. He subsequently fought against Rabbani during his presidency in an effort
to persuade him to yield power, but then allied with Rabbani and the Northern
Alliance when the Taliban took power in Kabul. Dostam once commanded about
25,000 troops and significant amounts of armor and combat
aircraft. However, infighting aircraft, but infighting
within his faction left him unable to hold off Taliban
forces, and, until the Taliban collapse of mid-November, he controlled only small
areas of northern forces. The Taliban captured
his power base in August 1998, leaving him in control of only small areas of northern
Afghanistan near the border with Uzbekistan. In November, he, in
During the U.S.-led war against the
Taliban, he, in concert with a Tajik commander Atta Mohammad and a Shiite Hazara commander
commander Mohammad Mohaqqiq, recaptured Mazar-e-Sharif from the Taliban.
There have been tensions among the three in governing the city and its environs
since, sometimes resulting in minor clashes.
Shiite Muslim parties, generally less active against the Soviet occupation than
were the Sunni parties, also are loosely allied with Rabbani. In June 1992, Iranianbackedconstituted another part of the Northern Alliance. In June
1992, Iranian-backed Hizb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party, an alliance of eight Hazara tribe
Shiite Muslim
groups), agreed to join the Rabbani regimegovernment in exchange for a
share of power. Its
exact armed strength is unknown. Hizb-e-Wahdat receiveshas traditionally received some material support
from Iran, which practices Shiism and has an affinity for the Hazaras. On September
. On September 13, 1998, Taliban forces captured the Hazara Shiite
stronghold of Bamiyan city, capital of
Bamiyan province, raising fears in Iran and
elsewhere that Taliban forces would
massacre Shiitethe Hazara civilians. This contributed to the
movement of Iran and the
Taliban militia to the brink of armed conflict that month.
Since then, Hizb-e-Wahdat After that time, Hizb-eWahdat forces occasionally recapturedretook Bamiyan city, most recently
in February 2001, but were unable to hold it. They
recaptured Bamiyan during the
Taliban collapse of mid-November 2001.
Another mujahedin party leader, Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, heads a faction called
the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan. Sayyaf lived many years in and
is politically close to Saudi Arabia, which shares his puritanical interpretation of Sunni
Sunni Islam. This interpretation is also shared by the Taliban, which partly explains why
why many of Sayyaf’s fighters defectoriginally defected to the Taliban movement when
CRS-6
that movement was taking power. Sayyaf himself remained
allied with the Northern
Alliance and has placed his remaining forces at Alliance
disposal.
CRS-6
The political rivalries among opposition groups long hindered their ability to
shake the Taliban’s grip on power, even with the assistance of air strikes. Prior to the
. In the few years prior to the beginning of the U.S. strikes
war against the Taliban, the opposition had steadily lost ground, even in areas
outside outside
Taliban’s Pashtun ethnic base,. The losses extended to the point thatat which the Taliban
controlled at least
75% of the country and almost all major provincial capitals.
The Northern Alliance suffered a major setback on September 9, 2001, when
Ahmad Shah Masud, the undisputed and charismatic military leader of the alliance,
Northern
Alliance forces, was assassinated by suicide bombers at his headquarters. His
successor iswas his
intelligence chief, Muhammad Fahim, who is a veteran
commander but is said to lack
lacked the overarching authority of Masud. However, Fahim’s prestige was
enhanced by the
Northern Alliance’s defeat of the Taliban in the U.S.-backed military
campaign. Northern Alliance forces
now control about 70% of Afghanistan,
including Kabul, which they captured on
November 12, 2001. Other senior political officers in the Alliance include Dr.
Abdullah Abdullah, who is its Foreign Minister, and Yunus Qanuni, who is Interior
Minister. All three – Fahim, Abdullah, and Qanuni – will assume those positions in
the interim government that takes office on December 22, 2001.
The War and Its Political Aftermath
As noted above, many of the Northern Alliance commanders have regained their
former strongholds, and Rabbani has returned to Kabul as a caretaker. Groups of
Pashtun commanders are in control of cities and provinces east and south of Kabul,
and Taliban remnants continue to hold out outside of Qandahar and in pockets in
northern Afghanistan. As the war against remaining Al Qaida guerrillas and the
Taliban continues, a longstanding U.N. effort to form a broad-based Afghan
government accelerated and appears to have borne some fruit.
For the past 8 years, the United States worked primarily through the United
Nations to end the Afghan civil conflict because the international body is viewed as
a credible mediator by all sides. It was the forum used for ending the Soviet
occupation. Since the fall of Najibullah, a succession of U.N. mediators – former
Tunisian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Mestiri, (March 1994-July 1996); German
diplomat Norbert Holl (July 1996-December 1997); and Algeria’s former Foreign
Minister Lakhdar Brahimi (August 1997-October 1999) – have sought to arrange a
ceasefire, and ultimately a peaceful transition to a broad-based government. The
proposed process for arranging a transition incorporated many ideas advanced by
former King Zahir Shah and outside experts, in which a permanent government is to
be chosen through a traditional Afghan selection process, the loya jirga, a grand
assembly of notable Afghans.
These U.N. efforts, at times, appeared to make significant progress, but
ceasefires and other agreements between the warring factions have always broken
down over conflicting demands. Brahimi suspended his activities in frustration in
October 1999, and another U.N. mediator, Spanish diplomat Fransesc Vendrell, was
appointed.
The September 11 attacks and the start of U.S. military action against the
Taliban injected new urgency into the search for a government that might replace the
CRS-7
Taliban. In late September, Brahimi was brought back as the U.N. point person to
help arrange an alternative government to the Taliban; Vendrell became his deputy.
The State Department appointed Policy Planning Director Richard Haass to be the
U.S. liaison with Brahimi and to assist in the search for an alternative regime that
might hasten the demise of the Taliban and keep order in the event the Taliban
collapses. A U.S. envoy to the Northern Alliance, Ambassador James Dobbins, was
appointed in early November 2001. On November 14, 2001, the U.N. Security
Council adopted Resolution 1378, calling for a “central” U.N. role in establishing a
transitional administration and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces to
promote stability and secure the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
The “Six Plus Two” and Geneva Contact Groups. Reflecting the
common concerns about Afghan-inspired regional instability, the “Six Plus Two”
contact group (the United States, Russia, and the six states bordering Afghanistan –
Iran, China, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan), has been meeting
under since early 1997 to discuss ways of bringing peace to Afghanistan. The
process was conducted in coordination with U.N. peace efforts for Afghanistan. The
Six Plus Two process was inaugurated after several informal meetings of some of the
key outside parties in which the United States and others agreed not to provide
weapons to the warring factions. (In June 1996, the Administration formally imposed
a ban on U.S. sales of arms to all factions in Afghanistan, a policy already in force
informally.5) November 12, 2001. Groups of Pashtun
commanders took control of cities and provinces east and south of Kabul. One
example is Ghul Agha Shirzai, the new governor of Qandahar province and environs.
Despite the overwhelming defeat of the Taliban, small Taliban and Al Qaeda
contingents continue to hold out in small pockets in Afghanistan. The United States
and its Afghan allies conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-i-Kot Valley
south of Gardez during March 2 - 19, 2002, to eliminate a pocket of as many as 800
Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. Some less intense military operations by the United
States and its coalition partners have been conducted since, particularly in eastern
Afghanistan. Some pockets are said to straddle the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and
press reports indicate that Pakistan has been allowing the United States to conduct
low-level military or military support operations inside Pakistan since April 2002.
Political Settlement Efforts
As the war against remaining Al Qaeda guerrillas and Taliban remnants
continues, a longstanding U.N. effort to form a broad-based Afghan government has
borne some fruit.
Pre-September 11 Efforts. For the 8 years prior to the war, the United
States worked primarily through the United Nations to end the Afghan civil conflict,
because the international body is viewed as a credible mediator by all sides. It was
the forum used for ending the Soviet occupation. However, during this time, some
observers criticized U.S. policy as being insufficiently engaged in Afghan conflict
mediation to bring about a settlement. Since the fall of Najibullah, a succession of
U.N. mediators – former Tunisian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Mestiri (March 1994July 1996); German diplomat Norbert Holl (July 1996-December 1997); and
Algeria’s former Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi (August 1997-October 1999) –
sought to arrange a ceasefire, and ultimately a peaceful transition to a broad-based
government. The proposed process for arranging a transition incorporated many
ideas advanced by former King Zahir Shah and outside experts, in which a permanent
government was to be chosen through a traditional Afghan selection process, the
CRS-7
hallmark of which is the holding of a loya jirga, a grand assembly of notable
Afghans.
These U.N. efforts, at times, appeared to make significant progress, but
ceasefires and other agreements between the warring factions always broke down.
Brahimi suspended his activities in frustration in October 1999, and another U.N.
mediator, Spanish diplomat Fransesc Vendrell, was appointed.
The “Six Plus Two” and Geneva Contact Groups. In parallel with
direct U.N. mediation efforts, the “Six Plus Two” contact group consisted of the
United States, Russia, and the six states bordering Afghanistan: Iran, China,
Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Reflecting the common
concerns about Afghan-inspired regional instability, the “Six Plus Two ” contact
group met since early 1997 to discuss ways of bringing peace to Afghanistan. The
Six Plus Two process was created after several informal meetings of some of the key
outside parties in which the United States and others agreed not to provide weapons
to the warring factions. (In June 1996, the Administration formally imposed a ban
on U.S. sales of arms to all factions in Afghanistan, a policy already in force
informally.6) The process was conducted in coordination with U.N. peace efforts for
Afghanistan.
In 2000, possibly because of the lack of progress in the Six Plus Two process,
another contact group began meeting in Geneva, and with more frequency than the
Six Plus Two. The Geneva grouping includes Italy, Germany, Iran, and the United
States. Another Afghan-related grouping multilateral mediating grouping consistsconsisted
of some Islamic countries operating under the an ad-hoc “Committee on Afghanistan
under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The countries
in that ad-hoc committee include Pakistan, Iran, Guinea, and Tunisia.
King Zahir Shah and the Loya Jirga Processes. The United States also
supported initiatives coming from parties inside and outside Afghanistan. During
1997, Afghans
not linked to any of the warring factions began a new peace initiative
called the Intra
Afghan Dialogue. This grouping, consisting of former mujahedin
commanders and
clan leaders, held meetings during 1997 and 1998 in Bonn,
Frankfurt, Istanbul, and
Ankara. Another group, based on the participation of former
King Zahir Shah, was
centered in Rome (“Rome Grouping”), where the former King is based (“Rome Grouping). A third
lived after his ouster in 1973. A third grouping, calling itself the “Cyprus Process,” consists
consisted of former Afghan officials and
other Afghan exiles generally sympathetic to Iran.
Many of the hopes for a post-Taliban
to Iran.
Post-September 11 U.N. Efforts. The September 11 attacks and the start
of U.S. military action against the Taliban injected new urgency into the search for
a government that might replace the Taliban. Many of the hopes for a post-Taliban
government at first appeared to center on
the former King. In the aftermath of the
September 11 attacks, Members of
Congress and U.S. and U.N. officials visited him
in Rome in the course of discussing
a new Afghan government. A 2-day (October
25-26, 2001) meeting of more than
700 Afghan tribal elders in Peshawar, Pakistan
6
Federal Register, Volume 61, No. 125, June 27, 1996. Page 33313.
CRS-8
(“Peshawar Grouping”) issued a
concluding statement calling for the return of the
former King. However, even
5
Federal Register, Volume 61, No. 125, June 27, 1996. Page 33313.
CRS-8
though the gathering was supportive of the former
King, neither the King’s
representatives nor those of the Northern Alliance actually
attended the gathering
because of their suspicions that the meeting was orchestrated
by Pakistan for its own
ends.
Bonn Conference.
As the U.S. war against the Taliban and Al Qaida
continued, delegates of the various groupings discussed above gathered in Bonn,
Germany, at the invitation of Brahimi and the United Nations. The Taliban was not
represented. On December 5, 2001, the factions signed an agreement to form a 30member interim administration, to govern until March ends.
In late September 2001, Brahimi was brought back as the U.N. point person to
help arrange an alternative government to the Taliban; Vendrell became his deputy,
although he retired shortly thereafter. The State Department appointed Policy
Planning Director Richard Haass to be the U.S. liaison with Brahimi and to assist in
the search for an alternative regime that might hasten the demise of the Taliban and
keep order in the event the Taliban collapses. A U.S. envoy to the Northern Alliance,
Ambassador James Dobbins, was appointed in early November 2001 and, until April
2002, coordinated U.S. reconstruction assistance efforts. On November 14, 2001, the
U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1378, calling for a “central” U.N. role in
establishing a transitional administration and inviting member states to send
peacekeeping forces to promote stability and secure the delivery of humanitarian
assistance.
Bonn Conference. As the U.S. war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda began
to achieve success, delegates of the various major Afghan factions – most
prominently the Northern Alliance and representatives of the former King – gathered
in Bonn, Germany, at the invitation of Brahimi and the United Nations. The Taliban
was not invited. On December 5, 2001, the factions signed an agreement to form a
30-member interim administration, to govern until June 2002. At that time, a loya
jirga, to be opened by the former King, would choose a new government to run
Afghanistan for the next 2 years until a new constitution is drafted and elections held.
A slim majority of the 30 positions in the new cabinet went to the Northern Alliance,
with this block holding the key posts of Defense (Mohammad Fahim), Foreign Affairs
(Dr. Abdullah Abdullah), and Interior (Yunus Qanuni). However, Rabbani agreed
to step aside under pressure from several neighboring governments and rival factions,
and the post of provisional prime minster went to Pashtun tribal leader Hamid Karzai.
Karzai, leader of the powerful Popolzai tribe of Pashtuns, had entered Afghanistan
in October 2001 to organize resistance to the Taliban, and he was supported in that
effort by U.S. special forces. He has relatives in and close ties to the United States.
It is not clear whether the former King or his relatives will play a role in a more
permanent Afghan government.
The Bonn conferees also agreed to invite an international peace keeping force
to maintain security at least in Kabul. The exact composition and mission of the
force has not yet been determined. The conference’s conclusions were endorsed by
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1385 (December 6, 2001). Some Afghan factions
complained initially that their ethnic or party groupings were not sufficiently
represented in the interim cabinet, but most have since pledged to cooperate with it.
The United States is in the process of reopening its embassy in Kabul, closed since the
Soviet withdrawal in 1989.
Regional Context 6
Even before September 11, the Taliban’s policies made several of Afghanistan’s
neighbors increasingly concerned about threats to their own security interests
emanating from that country. All of these governments have endorsed the Bonn
agreement and most, apparently including Pakistan, have expressed a sense of relief
that the Taliban regime has been defeated. Some experts believe that future stability
in Afghanistan will depend on the ability of the United States and other governments
to prevent Afghanistan’s neighbors from attempting to manipulate Afghanistan’s
factions and its political structure to their advantage.
6
For further information, see CRS Report RS20411, Afghanistan: Connections to Islamic
Movements in Central and South Asia and Southern Russia. December 7, 1999, by Kenneth
Katzman.
CRS-9
Pakistan7
Pakistan, which hosted almost 2 million Afghan refugees before U.S. air strikes
began and now hosts tens of thousands more, was the most public defender of the
Taliban movement and was one of only three countries (Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates are the others) to formally recognize it as the legitimate government.
Pakistan has always sought an Afghan central government strong enough to prevent
calls for unity between ethnic Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan, while at the same
time sufficiently friendly and pliable to give Pakistan strategic depth against rival
India. In the wake of the Soviet pullout, Pakistan was also troubled by continued
political infighting in Afghanistan that was enabling drug trafficking to flourish and
to which Afghan refugees did not want to return. Pakistan saw Afghanistan as
essential to opening up trade relations and energy routes with the Muslim states of the
former Soviet Union and believed the Taliban movement had the potential to fulfill
these goals.
The government of General Pervez Musharraf, who took power in an October
1999 coup – a coup inspired in part by events in Kashmir – previously resisted U.S.
pressure to forcefully intercede with the Taliban leadership to achieve bin Ladin’s
extradition. Pakistan’s links to the Taliban were a major focus of a visit to Pakistan
by Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering in May 2000, although Pakistan made
no commitments to help the United States on bin Ladin. U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1333, of December 19, 2000, was partly an effort by the United States and
Russia to drive a wedge between the Taliban and Pakistan and to persuade Pakistan
to cease military advice and aid to the Taliban. Although Pakistan did not cease
military assistance, it tried to abide by some provisions of the resolution. Pakistan did
order the Taliban to cut the staff at its embassy in Pakistan.8 Prior to the September
11 terrorist attacks in the United States, Pakistan had said it would cooperate with a
follow-on U.N. Security Council Resolution (1363 of July 30, 2001) that provided for
U.N. border monitors to ensure that no neighboring state was providing military
equipment or advice to the Taliban.
Pakistan’s pre-September 11 steps toward cooperation with the United States
reflected increasing wariness that the Taliban movement was radicalizing existing
Islamic movements inside Pakistan. Pakistan also feared that its position on the
Taliban was propelling the United States into a closer relationship with Pakistan’s
arch-rival, India. Some Islamic movements in Pakistan were seeking to emulate the
Taliban, according to press reports and Pakistani terrorist groups, such as the Harakat
al-Mujahedin (HUM),9 are allied with Al Qaida, according to the State Department’s
report on international terrorism for 2000 (“Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000").
HUM and other Pakistani Islamist groups are seeking to challenge India’s control
over its portion of Kashmir and, according to some observers, could drag Pakistan
7
For further discussion, see Rashid, Ahmed. “The Taliban: Exporting Extremism.” Foreign
Affairs, November - December 1999.
8
Constable, Pamela. New Sanctions Strain Taliban-Pakistan Ties. Washington Post, January
19, 2001.
9
The State Department has designated HUM as a foreign terrorist organization.
CRS-10
into a war with India over Kashmir. HUM leaders have signed some of Al Qaida’s
anti-U.S. pronouncements and some HUM fighters were killed in the August 20,
1998 U.S. missile strikes on bin Ladin camps in Afghanistan, according to Patterns
of Global Terrorism: 2000.
These considerations, coupled with U.S. pressure as well as offers of economic
benefit, prompted Pakistan to cooperate with the U.S. response to the September 11
attacks. Pakistan has provided the United States with requested access to Pakistani
airspace, ports, airfields. The U.S. military presence in Pakistan placed the
government under increased political threat from pro-Taliban Islamist groups in
Pakistan that sympathize with the Taliban and bin Ladin, although the collapse of the
Taliban appears to have alleviated that pressure. In return for Pakistan’s cooperation,
the Administration, in some cases with new congressional authority enacted after
September 11, has waived most of the U.S. sanctions on Pakistan and has begun
providing foreign aid that will total about $1 billion, according to U.S.
announcements.10
At the same time, Pakistan has sought to protect its interests by fashioning a
strong Pashtun-based component for a post-Taliban government. Pakistan is wary
that a post-Taliban government dominated by the Northern Alliance, which is backed
by India, would amount to Indian encirclement of Pakistan. To counter that
perceived threat, Pakistan was instrumental in ensuring that Northern Alliance leader
Rabbani would not be chairman of the interim government. Pakistan also succeeded
in building a role for the former King in selecting a permanent government, although
the former King’s role appears to be limited.
Iran
Iran’s key national interests in Afghanistan are to exert influence over western
Afghanistan, which Iran borders, and to protect the Shiite minority. Iran strongly
supports the Northern Alliance and its Tajik (Persian-speaking) leaders. Rabbani’s
Islamic Society party has traditionally been strong in western Afghanistan as well as
in its stronghold in the Panjshir Valley, which borders Tajikistan. Since Taliban forces
ousted a pro-Rabbani governor, Ismail Khan, from Herat (the western province that
borders Iran) in September 1995, Iran has seen the Taliban movement as a threat to
all its interests in Afghanistan. Iran has provided fuel, funds, and ammunition to the
Northern Alliance11 and hosted fighters loyal to Ismail Khan. Khan had been
captured by the Taliban in 1998 but escaped and fled to Iran in March 2000 and has
now recaptured Herat.
Iran is said to be deeply relieved that the Taliban has fallen. In September
1998, Iranian and Taliban forces nearly came into direct conflict when Iran discovered
that nine of its diplomats were killed in the course of Taliban’s offensive in northern
Afghanistan. Iran massed forces at the border and threatened military action. Taliban
10
For more information on U.S. sanctions on Pakistan, see CRS Report RS20995, India and
Pakistan: Current U.S. Economic Sanctions. Dianne E. Rennack.
11
Steele, Jonathon, “America Includes Iran In Talks On Ending War In Afghanistan.”
Washington Times, December 15, 1997. A14.
CRS-11
rebuffed Iran’s demands to extradite to Iran those responsible for the killing of the
Iranian diplomats, but it returned their bodies to Iran and sought direct talks with Iran,
leading to a cooling of the crisis.
The United States and Iran have long had common positions on Afghanistan,
despite deep U.S.-Iran differences on other issues. U.S. officials have long
acknowledged working with Tehran, under the auspices of the Six Plus Two contact
group and Geneva group. Secretary of State Powell shook hands with Iran’s Foreign
Minister Kamal Kharrazi on November 12 during a Six Plus Two meeting on
prospects for a new government in Afghanistan.
U.S. and Iranian common interests on Afghanistan might explain why Iran has
generally expressed support for the U.S. effort to forge a global coalition against
terrorism, although it has publicly opposed U.S. military action against Afghanistan.
Iran has confirmed that it has offered search and rescue assistance in Afghanistan
should the United States need it, and it has also agreed to allow U.S. humanitarian aid
to the Afghan people to transit Iran. However, the United States and Iran are too far
apart in general for tacit cooperation on Afghanistan to lead to a dramatic
breakthrough in U.S.-Iran relations. Some Iranian leaders have been harshly critical
of U.S. military action against the Taliban; in late September Supreme Leader Ali
Khamene’i compared that action to the September 11 terrorist attacks themselves.
About 1.5 million Afghan refugees are still in Iran; most of these have been
permitted to integrate into Iranian society.12 In mid-1994, Iran reportedly began
forcing Afghan refugees to leave Iran and return home, although Iran denies it has
forcibly repatriated any Afghans and some repatriation reportedly is voluntary. After
the September 11 terrorist attacks, Iran closed its border with Afghanistan primarily
to prevent a flood of new refugees into Iran.
Russia
A number of considerations might explain why Russia has supported U.S. efforts
to build an international coalition against the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks
and the states that support them. Russia’s main objective in Afghanistan has been to
prevent the further strengthening of Islamic or nationalist movements in the Central
Asian states or Islamic enclaves in Russia itself, including Chechnya. For Russian
leaders, instability in Afghanistan also reminds the Russian public that the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan failed to pacify or stabilize that country.
Russia’s fear became acute following an August 1999 incursion into Russia’s
Dagestan region by Islamic guerrillas from neighboring Chechnya. Some reports link
at least one faction of the guerrillas to bin Ladin.13 This faction is led by a Chechen
of Arab origin who is referred to by the name “Hattab” (full name is Ibn al-Khattab).
In January 2000, the Taliban became the only government in the world to recognize
12
Crossette, Barbara, “U.S. and Iran Cooperating on Ways to End the Afghan War.” New
York Times, December 15, 1997.
13
Whittell, Giles. “Bin Laden Link To Dagestan Rebel Fightback.” London Times, September
6, 1999.
CRS-12
Chechnya’s independence, and some Chechen fighters integrated into Taliban forces
were captured or killed during the October - November 2001 war.
The U.S. and Russian positions on Afghanistan became coincident well before
the September 11 attacks.14 Even before the October-November war, Russia was
supporting the Northern Alliance with some military equipment and technical
assistance.15 U.S.-Russian cooperation led to the passage of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1267 on October 15, 1999. That resolution, adopted in response to the
Taliban’s harboring of bin Ladin, banned commercial flights by the Afghan national
airline and directed U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets abroad (see section
on Sanctions, below). When the Taliban repeatedly refused to turn over bin Ladin,
the two co-sponsored a follow-on – Security Council Resolution 1333 – that banned
arms sales and military advice to the Taliban, among other provisions, but did not ban
such aid to the Northern Alliance or other opposition factions. Russia is opposed to
allowing any Taliban members to become part of a post-Taliban government.
On the other hand, the United States has not blindly supported Russia’s apparent
attempts to place a large share of the blame for the rebellion in Chechnya on the
Taliban and Al Qaida. The Clinton Administration did not endorse Russian threats,
issued by President Vladimir Putin in May 2000, to conduct airstrikes against training
camps in Afghanistan that Russia alleges are for Chechen rebels. President Bush has
been highly critical of Russian tactics in Chechnya, although that position has
softened substantially after September 11, apparently in exchange for Russia’s support
for the U.S. anti-terrorism effort. Some outside experts believe that Russia
exaggerated the threat emanating from Afghanistan in an effort to persuade the
Central Asian states to rebuild closer defense ties to Moscow.
Central Asian States 16
Former Communist elites still in power in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan
have grown increasingly concerned that Central Asian radical Islamic movements are
receiving safe haven in Afghanistan. In 1996, several of them banded together with
Russia and China into a regional grouping now called the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization to discuss the threat emanating from Afghanistan’s Taliban regime.
The organization now groups China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and
Kyrgyzstan. Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, two of them –
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan – had seen themselves as particularly vulnerable to militants
harbored by the Taliban. Uzbekistan saw its ally, Abdul Rashid Dostam, the Uzbek
commander in northern Afghanistan, lose most of his influence in 1998, although he
has now regained power in Mazar-e-Sharif. Prior to the U.S. war on the Taliban and
Al Qaida, Uzbek officials had previously said that Dostam was an ineffective
14
Constable, Pamela. “Russia, U.S. Converge on Warnings to Taliban.” Washington Post,
June 4, 2000.
15
Risen, James. “Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels.” New York Times, July
27, 1998.
16
For further information, see CRS Report RL30294. Central Asia’s Security: Issues and
Implications for U.S. Interests. December 7, 1999.
CRS-13
commander and that Uzbekistan’s support would not have allowed his militia to
overturn Taliban control of the north.17
Uzbekistan has long asserted that the group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU), allegedly responsible for four simultaneous February 1999 bombings in
Tashkent that nearly killed President Islam Karimov, is linked to Al Qaida.18 One of
its leaders, Juma Namangani, reportedly was killed while commanding Taliban/Al
Qaeda forces in the battle for Mazar-e-Sharif in November 2001, although Uzbekistan
is demanding proof that he has died. Uzbekistan’s fears of continuing Afghan
instability contributed to its decision in 1999 to engage the Taliban diplomatically and
to host a July 1999 meeting of the Six Plus Two grouping in which representatives
of the warring Afghan factions participated. Uzbekistan has been highly supportive
of the United States in the wake of the September 11 attacks and has placed military
facilities at U.S. disposal for use in the combat against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
About 1,000 U.S. troops from the 10th Mountain Division, as well as U.S. aircraft, are
reportedly based there. Now that the Taliban no longer control the other side of the
Uzbekistan-Afghanistan border, Uzbekistan, on December 9, 2001, reopened the
Soviet-built “Friendship Bridge” over the Amu Darya river in order to facilitate the
flow of aid into Uzbekistan.
Over the past few years, Tajikistan has feared that its buffer with Afghanistan
would disappear if the Taliban defeated the Northern Alliance, whose territorial base
borders Tajikistan. Some of the IMU members based in Afghanistan, including
Namangani, fought alongside the Islamic opposition United Tajik Opposition (UTO)
during the 1994-1997 civil war in that country. On May 24, 2000, a U.N. Special
Representative to Tajikistan appeared to support Tajikistan’s concerns by saying that
continued instability in Afghanistan threatened a fragile 3-year old peace process for
Tajikistan. Tajikistan, heavily influenced by Russia, whose 25,000 troops guards the
border with Afghanistan, initially sent mixed signals on the question of whether it
would give the United States the use of military facilities in Tajikistan. However, on
September 26, 2001, Moscow officially endorsed the use by the United States of
military facilities in Tajikistan, paving the way for Tajikistan to open facilities for U.S.
use. In early November, following a visit by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld,
Tajikistan agreed to allow the U.S. the use of three air bases in that country.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan do not directly border Afghanistan. However, IMU
guerrillas have transited Kyrgyzstan during past incursions into Uzbekistan.19
Kazakhstan had begun to diplomatically engage the Taliban over the past year, but
it publicly supported the U.S. war effort against the Taliban. In early December
2001, Kyrgyzstan offered to host some U.S. warplanes at least temporarily.
Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, only Turkmenistan was not
alarmed at Taliban gains and chose to seek close relations with the Taliban leadership.
17
CRS conversations with Uzbek government officials in Tashkent. April 1999.
18
The IMU was named a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in September
2000.
19
Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999, pp. 14, 92.
CRS-14
An alternate interpretation is that Turkmenistan viewed engagement with the Taliban
as a more effective means of preventing spillover of radical Islamic activity from
Afghanistan. Turkmenistan played a key role in brokering reconciliation talks
between the warring factions in early 1999, talks that were perceived as attempting
to persuade the Northern Alliance to accede to Taliban domination of Afghanistan.
Turkmenistan’s leadership also saw Taliban control as bringing the peace and stability
that would permit construction of a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through
Afghanistan. That pipeline would help Turkmenistan bring its large gas reserves to
world markets. However, the September 11 events stoked Turkmenistan’s fears of
the Taliban and its Al Qaida guests and the country is supporting the U.S. antiterrorism effort. There are no indications the United States has requested basing
rights in Turkmenistan.
China
China has a small border with a sliver of Afghanistan known as the “Wakhan
corridor” (see map) and had become increasingly concerned about the potential for
the Al Qaida to promote Islamic fundamentalism among Muslims (Uighurs) in
northwestern China. A number of Uighurs fought in Taliban and Al Qaida ranks in
the U.S.-led war. China has expressed its concern through active membership in a
regional grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which stepped up
its security coordination activities over the past two years in response to increasing
Islamic activism in Central Asia and the perceived Taliban threat. In December 2000,
sensing China’s increasing concern about Taliban policies, a Chinese official
delegation met with Mullah Umar at the Taliban’s invitation.
Although it has been concerned about the threat from the Taliban and bin Ladin,
China did not immediately support U.S. military action against the Taliban. Many
experts believe this is because China, as a result of strategic considerations, was wary
of a U.S. military buildup on its doorstep. China is an ally with Pakistan, in part to
balance out India, which China sees as a rival. Pakistani cooperation with the United
States appears to have allayed China’s opposition to U.S. military action, and
President Bush praised China’s cooperation with the anti-terrorism effort during his
visit to China in October 2001.
Saudi Arabia
During the Soviet occupation, Saudi Arabia channeled hundreds of millions of
dollars to the Afghan resistance, and particularly to hardline Sunni Muslim
fundamentalist resistance leaders. Saudi Arabia, which itself practices the strict
Wahhabi brand of Islam practiced by the Taliban, was one of three countries to
formally recognize the Taliban government. (The others are Pakistan and the United
Arab Emirates.) The Taliban initially served Saudi Arabia as a potential counter to
Iran, with which Saudi Arabia has been at odds since Iran’s 1979 revolution.
However, Iranian-Saudi relations have improved significantly since 1997, and
balancing Iranian power has ebbed as a factor motivating Saudi policy toward
Afghanistan. Instead, drawing on its intelligence ties to Afghanistan during the antiSoviet war, Saudi Arabia has worked in parallel with the United States to try to
persuade Taliban leaders to suppress anti-Saudi activities by Osama bin Ladin. Some
CRS-15
press reports indicate that, in late 1998, Saudi and Taliban leaders discussed, but did
not agree on, a plan for a panel of Saudi and Afghan Islamic scholars to decide bin
Ladin’s fate. In March 2000 and again in May 2000, the Saudi-based Organization
of Islamic Conference (OIC) sponsored indirect peace talks in Saudi Arabia between
the warring factions. However, the two sides reached only minor agreements to
exchange prisoners, according to press reports.
Saudi Arabia has offered the United States full cooperation with any effort to
bring the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks to justice. Along with the UAE,
Saudi Arabia broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban in late September. It has
quietly permitted the United States to use a Saudi base for command of U.S. air
operations over Afghanistan, although it has not allowed U.S. aircraft to launch
strikes on Afghanistan from Saudi bases. The Saudi position has generally been to
allow the United States the use of its facilities as long as doing so is not publicly
requested or highly publicized.
U.S. Policy Issues
U.S. policy objectives in Afghanistan have long been multifaceted, although in
recent years U.S. goals had largely narrowed to ending the presence of the leadership
of the Al Qaida leadership and infrastructure there. Since the Soviet withdrawal,
returning peace and stability to Afghanistan has been a U.S. goal, pursued with
varying degrees of intensity. Other goals have included an end to discrimination
against women and girls, the eradication of narcotics production, and alleviating
severe humanitarian difficulties.
The United States attributed most of these concerns to Taliban rule, although
drug production flourished under Rabbani’s 1992-1996 government. U.S. relations
with the Taliban progressively deteriorated over the 5 years that the Taliban were in
power in Kabul. The United States had withheld recognition of Taliban as the
legitimate government of Afghanistan and formally recognized no faction as the
government, although it has had a dialogue with all the different factions, including
the Taliban. The United Nations, based on the lack of broad international recognition
of Taliban, continued to allow representatives of the former Rabbani government to
occupy Afghanistan’s seat at the United Nations. The United States closed its
embassy in Kabul in January 1989, and the State Department ordered the Afghan
embassy in Washington, D.C. closed in August 1997 because of a power struggle
within the embassy between Rabbani and Taliban supporters.
The Bush Administration initially continued the previous Administration’s policy
of maintaining a dialogue with the Taliban. During the Clinton Administration,
Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Karl Inderfurth and other U.S.
officials met periodically with Taliban officials. In April 1998, then Ambassador Bill
Richardson met with Taliban officials and the opposition during his visit to
Afghanistan, in an effort to demonstrate presidential commitment to peace in
Afghanistan and to discuss bin Ladin (see below). In compliance with U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1333, in February 2001 the State Department ordered the closing
of a Taliban representative office in New York. The Taliban complied with the
CRS-16
directive, but its representative, Abdul Hakim Mujahid, continued to operate
informally. In March 2001, Bush Administration officials received a Taliban envoy,
Rahmatullah Hashemi, to discuss bilateral issues. Three State Department officers
visited Afghanistan in April 2001, the first U.S. visit since the August 1998 bombings
of Afghan camps, although the visit was primarily to assess humanitarian needs and
not to conduct U.S.-Taliban relations.
As did the executive branch, Congress had become increasingly critical of the
Taliban, even before the September 11 attacks. Congress’ views have generally been
expressed in non-binding legislation. A sense of the Senate resolution (S.Res. 275)
that resolving the Afghan civil war should be a top U.S. priority passed that chamber
by unanimous consent on September 24, 1996. H.Con.Res. 218, which was similar
to this resolution, passed the House on April 28, 1998. In the 107th Congress,
H.Con.Res. 26 was introduced on February 8, 2001. The resolution expresses the
sense of Congress that the United States should seek to prevent the Taliban from
obtaining Afghanistan’s U.N. seat and should not recognize any government in
Afghanistan that does not restore women’s rights. Despite the criticism, some
Members engaged in direct talks with the Taliban.
Since September 11, legislative proposals on Afghanistan appear to have become
even more adversarial toward the Taliban. One bill, H.R. 3088, states that it should
be the policy of the United States to remove the Taliban from power and authorizes
a drawdown of up to $300 million worth of U.S. military supplies and services for the
anti-Taliban opposition. The bill, as well as another bill (H.R. 2998, introduced
October 2, 2001), would establish a “Radio Free Afghanistan” broadcasting service
under RFE/RL and fund it with $14 million for FY2002 and FY2003, collectively.
That bill was passed by the House on November 7, 2001, by a vote of 405-2.
Harboring of Osama
Fundamentalists
Bin
Ladin/Radical
Islamic
Even before the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Taliban’s refusal to yield bin
Ladin to the United States (or a U.S. ally) for trial – and its protection of radical
Islamic movements more broadly – had become the overriding bilateral agenda item
in U.S. policy toward Afghanistan.20 Osama bin Ladin, who has been indicted in the
United States for past acts of terrorism against the United States, reportedly remains
in Afghanistan, attempting to avoid U.S. air strikes and special forces possibly by
hiding in caves or tunnels, according to press reports. A key financier and recruiter
of Arab volunteers for the war against the Soviet occupation, he returned to
Afghanistan after being expelled from Sudan in June 1996, where he financed training
camps for terrorists operating throughout the Islamic world. U.S. military officials
believe that the Taliban collapse has greatly improved the chances of finding bin Ladin
who, as of December 12, 2001, was believed by fighters of the Eastern Shura to be
hiding in the mountainous Tora Bora area south of Jalalabad.
20
For more information on bin Ladin and his Al Qaeda organization, see CRS Report
RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2001, September 10, 2001.
See also CRS Report RS20411, Afghanistan: Connections to Islamic Movements in Central
and South Asia and Southern Russia.
CRS-17
Over the past few years, the United States has placed progressively more
pressure on the Taliban to extradite bin Ladin, adding sanctions, military action, and
the threat of further punishments to ongoing diplomatic efforts.
! During his April 1998 visit, Ambassador Richardson asked Taliban to hand bin
Ladin over to U.S. authorities, but he was rebuffed.
! On August 20, 1998, the United States fired cruise missiles at alleged bin
Ladin-controlled terrorist training camps in retaliation for the August 7, 1998
bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
! On July 4, 1999, because of the Taliban’s hosting of bin Ladin, President
Clinton issued Executive Order 13129, imposing a ban on U.S. trade with
Taliban-controlled portions of Afghanistan and blocking Taliban assets in U.S.
financial institutions. The Taliban was not designated as a terrorist group, nor
was Afghanistan named a state sponsor of terrorism. On August 10, 1999, the
Clinton Administration determined that Ariana Airlines represents Talibancontrolled property, thereby preventing Americans from using the airline and
triggering the blocking of about $500,000 in Ariana assets identified in the
United States. As of January 2001, $254 million in Taliban-controlled assets
in U.S. financial institutions had been discovered and blocked.
! On October 15, 1999, with Russian support, the United States achieved
adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267, the first U.N. resolution
sanctioning the Taliban regime. The resolution bans flights outside
Afghanistan by Ariana airlines and directed U.N. member states to freeze
Taliban assets. According to U.S. officials, the resolution succeeded in
grounding virtually all external flights by Ariana, although, aside from the
United States, very few other governments blocked Taliban assets. The
resolution was in response to the Taliban’s refusal to hand bin Ladin over to
justice, and it threatened further sanctions if it did not do so.
On December 19, 2000, again by combining diplomatic forces with Russia, the
United States achieved adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, a followon to Resolution 1267, imposing even stricter sanctions against the Taliban. The
major additional provisions of the Resolution include the following:
! a worldwide prohibition against the provision of arms or military advice to the
Taliban, and a requirement (directed against Pakistan) that all countries
withdraw any military advisers that are helping the Taliban;
! a call for all countries that recognize the Taliban to reduce the size or Taliban
representative missions in their countries; and for all other countries to close
completely all Taliban offices and Ariana Afghan airline offices and ban all
nonhumanitarian assistance flights into or out of Taliban-controlled
Afghanistan;
! a requirement that all countries freeze any bin Ladin/Al Qaeda assets that can
be identified;
CRS-18
! a prohibition on any supply to areas under Taliban control of the chemical
acetic anhydride, which is used to produce heroin; and
! a ban on foreign travel by all Taliban officials at or above the rank of Deputy
Minister, except for the purposes of participation in peace negotiations,
compliance with the resolution or 1267, or humanitarian reasons, including
religious obligations.
On July 30, 2001, the U.N. Security Council adopted an implementing
Resolution 1363. The resolution provided for the stationing of monitors in Pakistan,
to ensure that no weapons or military advice is being provided by the Taliban.
Pakistan’s pledge to cooperate with the U.S. response to the September 11, 2001
attacks led to the virtual end of Pakistan’s supply of arms and military advice to the
Taliban.
Other options to dissuade the Taliban from harboring radical Islamic movements
have been suggested for several years. One option, supported in the past by some
Members of Congress and endorsed in a June 7, 2000 report by the bipartisan
National Commission on Terrorism, has been to place Afghanistan on the U.S. list of
state sponsors of terrorism. However, the Clinton and Bush Administrations opposed
doing so on the grounds that the move would have implied U.S. recognition of
Taliban as the legitimate Afghan government.
Human Rights/Treatment of Women
The groups that have assumed power from the Taliban are widely considered
far less repressive of women than was the Taliban, although some of the factions now
ruling the country have been accused of other major human rights abuses in the past.
Taliban human rights practices, and especially its treatment of women, received U.S.
and international condemnation. Seeking to enforce its brand of puritan Islam, the
Taliban subjected women to limitations on social participation, working, and
education. Women were forced to wear a head-to-toe veil in public, and they could
not ride in vehicles unless accompanied by a male relative. Following the Taliban
collapse, women in Kabul are said to be reverting to the less restrictive behavior
practiced before the Taliban fled. Two women will hold positions in the new interim
cabinet to take office on December 22, 2001.
At various times in the past, the Taliban’s treatment of women had forced many
United Nations and other aid organizations, including the U.N. High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR), UNICEF, Save the Children, and Oxfam, to cut back or cease
operations, either in protest or for lack of available (female) staff.21 In September
1999, a U.N. investigator on women’s rights in Afghanistan, Radhika
Coomaraswamy, called for international pressure on Taliban to abolish its Department
to Propagate Virtue and Prevent Vice, which was considered the Taliban’s main
instrument for depriving women of their rights. The headquarters of that agency in
Qandahar has been destroyed by U.S. bombardment, according to press accounts.
21
Cooper, Kenneth, “Kabul Women Under Virtual House Arrest.” Washington Post, October
7, 1996. A1.
CRS-19
On the other hand, U.N. human rights rapporteur for Afghanistan Kamal Hossain in
his recent reports and the U.S. human rights report for 2000 noted increasing
flexibility on this issue on the part of the Taliban.
Even before the war, there was significant U.S. and U.N. pressure on the Taliban
regime to moderate its treatment of women. Several U.N. Security Council
resolutions, including 1193 (August 28, 1998), and 1214 (December 8, 1998), urge
the Taliban to end discrimination against women. During a November 1997 visit to
Pakistan, then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright attacked Taliban policies as
despicable and intolerable. U.S. women’s rights groups like Feminist Majority and
the National Organization for Women (NOW) mobilized to stop the Clinton
Administration from recognizing the Taliban government unless it alters its treatment
of women. Former First Lady and now Senator Hillary Clinton and several
Hollywood celebrities, particularly Mavis Leno (wife of late-night comedian Jay
Leno) have spoken out strongly against Taliban policies toward women and girls. On
May 5, 1999, the Senate passed S.Res.68, a resolution calling on the President not
to recognize any Afghan government that refuses to end discrimination against
women. On November 27, 2001, the House unanimously adopted S.1573, the
Afghan Women and Children Relief Act, which had earlier passed the Senate. The
law (signed December 12, 2001) calls for the use of supplemental funding
(appropriated by P.L. 107-38) to fund educational and health programs for Afghan
women and children.
In August 2001, the Taliban arrested 8 workers for a German relief agency,
including two Americans, Dana Curry and Heather Mercer, on charges of preaching
Christianity to Afghans. Their trial had begun, although it proceeded sporadically
after the start of the U.S. military action. Before the bombing, the Taliban allowed
the two American women’s parents, as well as U.S. consular officials based in
Pakistan, to visit the two women in Kabul. The workers were freed in the chaos
surrounding the Taliban collapse and spirited out of Afghanistan by U.S. special
forces on November 14.
Destruction of Buddha Statues. The Taliban’s critics pointed to its March
2001 destruction of two large Buddha statues, dating to the 7th century, as evidence
of the Taliban’s excesses. The Taliban claimed it ordered the destruction of the
statues, which it considered un-Islamic, after representatives of the United Nations
Economic, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) offered to fund preservation
of the statues. The Taliban said this offer angered it on the grounds that UNESCO
was offering money for cultural preservation at a time when Afghans lacked sufficient
food. Others believe the move was a reaction to new U.N. sanctions imposed in
December 2000 (see below). The destruction provoked widespread condemnation,
even among other Islamic states, including Pakistan.
Hindu Badges. In May 2001, the Taliban said it was considering requiring
non-Muslims to wear identity labels on their clothing to distinguish them from
Muslims. The Taliban explained the move as an effort to prevent non-Muslims from
being harassed by Taliban security forces for not attending Muslim prayer, which is
compulsory for Muslims. The announcement received worldwide condemnation.
Responding to the criticism, the Taliban subsequently said that the leaders of the
Hindu community in Afghanistan would be consulted before the order was
CRS-20
implemented. There are believed to be only two Jews left in Afghanistan, so the move
was not viewed as being directed against Jews, even though the policy evoked
memories of the treatment of Jews in Nazi Germany. Although largely irrelevant now
that the Taliban has collapsed, a final decision was pending before the Taliban’s
Council of Ministers, according to U.N. Secretary General Annan’s report on
Afghanistan of August 17, 2001.
On the other hand, many say that the Taliban brought order and peace to the
areas it captured by disarming independent militiamen. By imposing central authority
and cracking down on banditry, it opened some roads to free commerce leading to a
greater availability of food in many areas under its control. Press accounts say that
the streets were safer, fewer people carried guns, and there were very few murders
during Taliban rule.22 Others add that Taliban rule approximated the traditional
practice of Islam found in those parts of Afghanistan dominated by Pashtuns and did
not represent a radical departure for Afghanistan.
Counternarcotics
Since late 2000, international observers have been reporting substantial progress
in curbing drug production and trafficking in Afghanistan as the Taliban appeared to
be enforcing its July 2000 ban on poppy cultivation. The Northern Alliance did not
issue a similar ban in areas it controlled. In February 2001, U.N. International Drug
Control Program (UNDCP) officials said that surveys showed a dramatic drop in
poppy cultivation in the areas surveyed.23 In April 2001, following the release of this
information, the Bush Administration sent two U.S. drug officials to participate in a
UNDCP mission to assess how to help farmers who have abandoned poppy growing.
Responding to the Taliban cooperation on this issue, the United States began funding
a UNDCP program to assist former poppy cultivators in Afghanistan. The United
States contributed $1.5 million to that crop substitution program in FY2001. The
Bonn agreement mentions the need for a post-Taliban Afghanistan government to
prevent Afghanistan’s re-emergence as a haven for drug cultivation.
The new information came after several years of frustration. The U.S. annual
report on narcotics for 2000, which covered the period January-December 2000,
repeated previous criticism of the Taliban’s failure to curb poppy cultivation. In
March 2001, Afghanistan was again listed by the United States, as it has been every
year since 1987, as a state that is uncooperative with U.S. efforts to eliminate drug
trafficking or has failed to take sufficient steps on its own to curb trafficking.
Retrieval of U.S. Stingers
Beginning in late 1985 and following an internal debate, the Reagan
Administration provided “hundreds” of man-portable “Stinger” anti-aircraft missiles
22
Schork, Kurt, “Taleban Admits To Problem Of Image, Not Substance.” Reuters, November
25, 1997.
23
Crossette, Barbara. “Taliban Seem to Be Making Good on Opium Ban, U.N. Says.” New
York Times, February 7, 2001.
CRS-21
to the mujahedin for use against Soviet combat helicopters and aircraft. Prior to the
U.S.-led war against the Taliban and Al Qaida, common estimates among experts
suggested that 200-300 Stingers remained at large in Afghanistan out of about 1,000
provided during the war against the Soviet Union.24 U.S. pilots reported that the
Taliban fired some Stingers at U.S. aircraft during the war, but they recorded no hits.
It is not known how many Stingers might still remain, but any remaining Stingers are
likely controlled by Afghans now allied to the United States and would presumably
pose less of a threat.
In the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States
had tried to retrieve the at-large Stingers.25 The United States feared that the missiles
could fall into the hands of terrorist groups for possible use against civilian airliners.
Iran bought 16 of the missiles in 1987 and fired one against U.S. helicopters. India
claimed that it was a Stinger, supplied to Islamic rebels in Kashmir probably by
sympathizers in Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian helicopter over Kashmir in
May 1999.26
The practical difficulties of retrieving the weapons had caused this issue to fade
from the U.S. agenda for Afghanistan. In 1992, the United States reportedly spent
about $10 million to buy the Stingers back, at a premium, from individual mujahedin
commanders. The New York Times reported on July 24, 1993, that the buy back
effort failed because the United States was competing with other buyers, including
Iran and North Korea, and that the CIA would spend about $55 million in FY1994
in a renewed Stinger buy-back effort. On March 7, 1994, the Washington Post
reported that the CIA had recovered only a fraction of the at-large Stingers. Many
observers speculate that the CIA program retrieved perhaps 50 or 100 Stingers.
According to Defense Intelligence Agency testimony in 1996,27 an unspecified
number of man-portable surface-to-air missiles (Stingers) remain in Afghanistan.28
There have been no recent reports of any U.S. efforts to recover remaining Stingers.
Landmine Eradication
Landmines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute one of the principal
dangers to the Afghan people. The United Nations estimates that 5 -7 million mines
remain scattered throughout the country, although some estimates by outside
organizations are significantly lower. An estimated 400,000 Afghans have been killed
or wounded by landmines. U.N. teams have succeeded in destroying one million
mines and are now focusing on de-mining priority-use, residential and commercial
property, including land surrounding Kabul. As shown in the U.S. aid table for
24
Saleem, Farrukh. Where Are the Missing Stinger Missiles? Pakistan, Friday Times.
August 17-23, 2001.
25
Gertz, Bill. Stinger Bite Feared in CIA. Washington Times, October 9, 2000.
26
“U.S.-Made Stinger Missiles – Mobile and Lethal.” Reuters, May 28, 1999.
27
John Moore, before the House International Relations Committee. May 9, 1996.
28
Common estimates in a variety of press reports suggest that 200-300 Stingers may remain
at large in Afghanistan.
CRS-22
FY1999-FY2002, the United States Humanitarian Demining Program provides about
$3 million per year for Afghanistan demining activities. Most of the funds go to the
HALO Trust, a British organization, and the U.N. Mine Action Program for
Afghanistan.
Alleviating Human Suffering/Reconstruction
Afghanistan faces major humanitarian problems, some of which have deteriorated
further since Taliban came to power. In addition to 3.6 million Afghan refugees,29
another 500,000 Afghans were displaced internally even before U.S. military action
began, according to Secretary General Annan’s April 19, 2001 report. Many of the
displaced persons had fled the effects of a major drought that have affected the 85%
of the population that directly depends on agriculture. Of the internally displaced
persons, about 140,000 went to Herat, site of the February 2001 death of 150
Afghans who were exposed to freezing weather. The conflicts in Afghanistan,
including the war against the Soviet Union, have reportedly left about 2 million dead,
700,000 widows and orphans and about one million Afghan children who were born
and raised in refugee camps outside Afghanistan. Some refugees are now members
of a third generation to live outside Afghanistan, although many are beginning to
return now that the Taliban has fallen from power in Kabul, and repatriation is
expected to accelerate in spring 2002.
Since the U.S. military action began, the humanitarian situation has become more
acute. By some accounts, as many as 70% of the 500,000 residents of Qandahar fled
the city on some nights of U.S. bombing, although many filtered are now filtering
back now that the Taliban have surrendered that city. As part of its military
operations, the United States has air-dropped food rations to help alleviate suffering.
In light of the Taliban collapse, aid routes via Uzbekistan and Pakistan have now
opened or reopened.
Women who were impeded from working with relief
organizations during Taliban rule are now resuming their work with these agencies.
The United Nations continues to coordinate humanitarian relief efforts through
the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC), and UNOCHA. UNHCR supervises Afghan refugee camps
in Pakistan and Afghan repatriation.
U.S. Aid. To address humanitarian concerns, the United States became the
largest single provider of assistance to the Afghan people, even before the crisis
triggered by the September 11 attacks. However, there has been no USAID mission
for Afghanistan since the end of FY1994, and U.S. aid is provided through various
channels, mostly U.N. agencies and NGO’s. In 1985, the United States began a
cross-border aid program for Afghanistan, through which aid was distributed in
Afghanistan, via U.S. aid workers in Pakistan. However, citing budgetary constraints
and the difficulty of administering a cross-border program, that program closed at the
end of FY1994, and no cross-border aid money has been requested since then.
29
There are about 1.4 million Afghan refugees in Iran; 1.2 million in Pakistan; 20,000 in
Russia; 17,000 in India, and 9,000 in the Central Asian states.
CRS-23
U.S. aid to the Afghan people in FY2001 greatly exceeded that provided in
FY2000 or FY1999. Table 2 breaks down FY1999-FY2001 aid by program.
According to the USAID fact sheet issued September 27, 2001, the United States
provided about $183 million in assistance to the Afghan people in FY2001. For a
history of U.S. aid to Afghanistan (FY1978-FY1998), see Table 3.
On October 4, 2001, President Bush announced that aid to the Afghan people
would total about $320 million for FY2002. This will include food, blankets,
medicine, and shelter for Afghan refugees in states bordering Afghanistan and the
people inside Afghanistan. The amounts provided thus far in FY2002 are listed in the
table.
The United States has also indicated it will provide substantial reconstruction
assistance for a post-Taliban Afghanistan. Common estimates of reconstruction
needs run up to about $10 billion. The Senate version of the FY2002 foreign aid
appropriation (H,R. 2506) contains a sense of the Senate provision that the U.S.
should contribute long- term reconstruction and development assistance to the people
of Afghanistan, although no dollar figures are mentioned. A separate bill (H.R. 3427)
would authorize at least $875 million in FY2002-FY2005 for Afghan rehabilitation
and reconstruction, and additional funds for related purposes.
CRS-24
Table 2. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan in FY1999-FY2002
($ in millions)
FY1999
FY2000
FY2001
FY2002
(as of
12/7)
Demining
Program
U.S.Department of
Agriculture (DOA)
and USAID Food
For Peace, via
World Food
Program(WFP)
$2.615
$3.0
$2.8
$42.0 worth of wheat
(100,000 metric
tons) under DOA’s
“416(b)” program.
$68.875 for
165,000 metric
tons. Of this,
60,000 tons were
for May 2000
drought relief.
$131.0
(300,000
metric tons
under
P.L.480,
Title II,
and 416(b)
$40.55
(Food for
Peace)
WFP and the Aga
Khan Foundation
$2.6 for Afghan
refugees inside
Afghanistan
$16.95 for Afghan
refugees in Pakistan
and Iran, and to
assist their
repatriation
$14.0 for the same
purpose
$14.03 for the
same purposes
$22.03 for
similar
purposes
$32.26
$7.0 to various
NGO’s to aid
Afghans inside
Afghanistan
$6.68 for drought
relief and health,
water, and
sanitation
programs for
Afghans
$0.5 in response to
a May 2000 U.N.
appeal to help
Afghan drought
victims
$6.169, of which
$3.82 went to
similar purposes
$18.934 for
similar
programs
$59.32
State/Bureau of
Population,
Refugees and
Migration (PRM)
via UNHCR and
ICRC
State Department/
Office of Foreign
Disaster
Assistance
(OFDA)
Afghanistan
Emergency Trust
—
Aid to Afghan
Refugees in
Pakistan (through
various NGO’s)
$5.44, of which
$2.789 went to
health and training
for Afghan women
and girls in Pakistan
U.N. Drug Control
Program
USAID
(democracy and
governance)
$5.31 for
similar
purposes
$1.50
$0.45 for
Afghan
women in
Pakistan
Dept. of Defense
Center for Disease
Control
Totals
$47.9
(aidrop of
2 million
rations)
$76.6
$113.2
$0.57 polio
eradication
$182.6
$180.05
CRS-25
Promoting Long-Term Economic Development
In an effort to find a long-term solution to Afghanistan’s acute humanitarian
problems, the United States has, when feasible, tried to promote major development
projects as a means of improving Afghan living standards and political stability over
the long term. During 1996-98, the Administration supported proposed natural gas
and oil pipelines through western Afghanistan as an incentive for the warring factions
to cooperate. One proposal by a consortium led by Los Angeles-based Unocal
Corporation30 was for a Central Asia Oil Pipeline (CAOP) that would originate at the
Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan border and extend through the western region of
Afghanistan to Pakistan. A $2.5 billion Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CentGas) would
originate in southern Turkmenistan and pass through Afghanistan to Pakistan, with
possible extensions into India.
However, the deterioration in U.S.-Taliban relations since 1998 largely ended
hopes for the pipeline projects while the Taliban was in power. Immediately after the
August 20,1998 U.S. strikes on bin Ladin’s bases in Afghanistan, Unocal suspended
all its Afghan pipeline-related activities, including a U.S.-based training program for
Afghans who were expected to work on the project. With few prospects of improved
U.S. relations with Taliban, Unocal withdrew from its consortium in December 1998.
Saudi Delta Oil was made interim project leader, although Delta lacks the financing
and technology to make the consortium viable. The rival consortium led by Bridas
of Argentina reportedly continues to try to win approval for its proposal to undertake
the project, although virtually no new developments on this project have been
announced over the past few years. Many experts believe this project might be
revived if a stable, internationally-recognized government takes hold in Afghanistan.
30
Other participants in the Unocal consortium include: Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of
South Korea, Crescent Steel of Pakistan, Itochu Corporation and INPEX of Japan, and the
government of Turkmenistan. Some accounts say Russia’s Gazprom would probably receive
a stake in the project. Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 30, 1997. Page 3.
CRS-26
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan FY1978-1998
($ in millions)
Fiscal
Year
Devel.
Assist.
Econ.
P.L. 480
Supp.
(Title I and II)
(ESF)
–
5.742
1978
4.989
1979
3.074
1980
–
1981
–
–
–
1982
–
–
1983
–
1984
–
7.195
Military
.269
Other
(Incl. regional
refugee aid)
.789
–
(Soviet invasion - December 1979)
.347
Total
11.789
10.616
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
1985
3.369
–
–
–
–
3.369
1986
–
–
8.9
–
–
8.9
1987
17.8
12.1
2.6
–
–
32.5
1988
22.5
22.5
29.9
–
–
74.9
1989
22.5
22.5
32.6
–
–
77.6
1990
35.0
35.0
18.1
–
–
88.1
1991
30.0
30.0
20.1
–
–
80.1
1992
25.0
25.0
31.4
–
–
81.4
1993
10.0
10.0
18.0
–
30.2
68.2
1994
3.4
2.0
9.0
–
27.9
42.3
1995
1.8
–
12.4
–
31.6
45.8
1996
–
–
16.1
–
26.4
42.5
1997
–
–
18.0
–
31.9**
49.9
1998
–
–
3.6
–
49.14***
52.74
Source: U.S. Department of State.
** Includes $3 million for demining and $1.2 million for counternarcotics.
*** Includes $3.3 million in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, $7 million in earthquake
relief aid, 100,000 tons of 416B wheat worth about $15 million, $2 million for demining, and $1.54
for counternarcotics.
CRS-27
U.S. and International Sanctions
According to U.S. diplomats, shoring up a post-Taliban government of
Afghanistan will likely require adjustments to U.S. and U.N. sanctions imposed on
Afghanistan. Many of these sanctions were imposed during Taliban rule, including
a new set of U.S. sanctions imposed in July 1999 and U.N. sanctions imposed in
October 1999. Some believe the sanctions give the United States leverage that can
help bring stable peace to Afghanistan. As currently constituted, these sanctions
prevent the Afghan government from receiving U.S. aid and trade preferences in the
form of Most Favored Nation status or benefits awarded under the Generalized
System of Preferences. U.S. trade with Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan has
been banned since July 1999, although this sanction appears to no longer be operative
now that the Taliban has disintegrated. Sanctions in place include the following:
! On May 2, 1980, Afghanistan was deleted from the list of designated
beneficiary countries under the U.S. GSP, denying Afghanistan’s exports duty
free treatment, by Executive Order 12204 (45 F.R. 20740). This was done
under the authority of Section 504 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended [P.L.
93-618; 19 U.S.C. 2464].
! On June 3, 1980, as part of the sanctions against the Soviet Union for the
invasion of Afghanistan, the United States imposed controls on exports to
Afghanistan of agricultural products, oil and gas exploration and production
equipment, and phosphates. This was implemented at 15 CFR Part 373 et seq
(45 F.R. 37415) under the authority of Sections 5 and 6 of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405]. On
April 24, 1981, these sanctions were modified to terminate controls on U.S.
exports to Afghanistan of agricultural products and phosphates.
! In mid-1992, the Bush Administration determined that Afghanistan no longer
had a “Soviet-controlled government.” This opened Afghanistan to the use of
U.S. funds made available for the U.S. share of U.N. organizations that
provide assistance to Afghanistan.
! On October 7, 1992, President Bush issued Presidential Determination 93-3
that Afghanistan is no longer a Marxist-Leninist country. The designation as
such a country had prohibited Afghanistan from receiving Export-Import Bank
guarantees, insurance, or credits for purchases under Sec. 8 of the 1986
Export-Import Bank Act, which amended Section 2(b)(2) of the ExportImport Bank Act of 1945 (P.L. 79-173, 12 U.S.C. 635). However, President
Bush’s determination was not implemented before he left office. The Clinton
Administration is said to be unlikely to implement the determination because
of the continuing instability in Afghanistan.
! President Bush’s October 7, 1992 determination (93-3) also found that
assistance to Afghanistan under Section 620D of the Foreign Assistance Act
is in the national interest of the United States because of the change of regime
in Afghanistan. The presidential determination, had it been implemented in
regulations, would have waived restrictions on assistance to Afghanistan
CRS-28
provided for in the Act, as amended [P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2374]; as added
by Section 505 of the International Development Cooperation Act of 1979
[P.L. 96-53]. These provisions prohibit foreign assistance to Afghanistan until
it apologizes for the death of U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph Dubs,
who was kidnapped in Kabul in 1979 and killed when Afghan police stormed
the hideout where he was held, unless the President determines that such
assistance is in the national interest because of changed circumstances in
Afghanistan.
! President Bush’s October 7, 1992 determination, had it been implemented,
would have restored nondiscriminatory trade treatment (most favored nation
status, MFN) to the products of Afghanistan. In the spring of 1996, as part of
increased efforts to try to help Afghanistan, the Clinton Administration began
considering restoring MFN to Afghanistan. However, some executive bodies,
particularly the National Security Council, appeared to oppose Afghan MFN
on the grounds that restoration of MFN would put the United States in the
unwanted position of publicly siding with individual factions in power at the
time. Section 552 of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations for FY1986 [P.L.
99-190], which appeared in the FY1986 Continuing Resolution, authorized the
President to deny any U.S. credits or most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff status
for Afghanistan. On February 18, 1986, President Reagan had issued
Presidential Proclamation 5437, suspending (MFN) tariff status for
Afghanistan (51 F.R. 4287).
! On March 31, 1993, President Clinton waived restrictions provided for in
Section 481 (h) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended [P.L. 87195]; as amended and restated by Section 2005(a) of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1986 [P.L. 99-570]. The waiver was renewed in 1994 but it has not been
renewed since then. Mandatory sanctions include aid cuts and suspensions, the
casting of negative U.S. votes for multilateral development bank loans, and a
non-allocation of a U.S. sugar quota. Discretionary sanctions included denial
of Generalized System of Preferences (GSP); additional duties on country
exports to the United States; and curtailment of air transportation with the
United States. The 1993 and 1994 waivers were on the grounds that aiding
Afghanistan was in the U.S. national interest. The waiver, when it was in
effect, would have opened Afghanistan to bilateral assistance and Ex-Im Bank
credits if there were no other sanctions barring such assistance.
! On June 14, 1996, Afghanistan was formally added to the list of countries
prohibited from receiving exports or licenses for exports of U.S. defense
articles and services. This amended the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (22 CFR Part 121 et seq.) under the authority of Section 38 of the
Arms Export Control Act, as amended (P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2778) by
adding Afghanistan at Section 126.1 of 22 CFR Part 126.
! In a ruling largely redundant with the one above, on May 15, 1997, the State
Department designated Afghanistan under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132), as a state that is not cooperating
with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. The designation, made primarily because of
Taliban’s harboring of bin Ladin, makes Afghanistan ineligible to receive U.S.
CRS-29
exports of items on the U.S. Munitions List. The designation was repeated
every year since 1997 and is likely to continue to be repeated until Taliban
expels or extradites bin Ladin.
! On July 4, 1999, the President declared a national emergency with respect to
Taliban because of its hosting of bin Ladin, and issued Executive order 13129
that imposed sanctions. The sanctions include the blocking of Taliban assets
and property in the United States, and a ban on U.S. trade with Talibancontrolled areas of Afghanistan. On August 10, 1999, the Administration
determined that Ariana Afghan Airlines was a Taliban entity. That
determination triggered a blocking of Ariana assets (about $500,000) in the
United States and a ban on U.S. citizens’ flying on the airline. Now that the
Taliban controls virtually no territory, the practical effects of the trade ban
apparently will end.
! On October 15, 1999, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1267.
See section on the harboring of bin Ladin for the sanctions imposed under this
resolution.
! As noted above, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333 of December 19,
2000, imposed a number of new sanctions against the Taliban. For the
provisions, see the section on the harboring of bin Ladin.
CRS-30
Map of Afghanistan
Uzbekistan
China
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Andkhvoy
Aqcheh
Konduz
Skazar
Warsaj
Samangan
Bala
Morghab
Kushka
Tokzar
Dowshi
Sayghan
Qal'eh-ye Now
Karokh
Rowzanak
Baghlan
Belcheragh
Qeysar
Towraghondi
Koshkekohneh
Charikar
Bamian
Chaghcharan
Dowlat Yar
Herat
Shahrak
Bahárak
Taloqan
Sheberghan
Meymaneh
Panjab
Kowt-e
Ashrow
Asadabad
Raqi
Mehtarlam
Kabul
Garghareh
B araki
Teywarah
Shindand
Anar
Darreh
Ghazni
Mushaki
Badam
Mazar
Tarin
Kowt
Shab Juy
Gardeyz
Zareh
Sharan
Farah
Delaram
Shorawak
Lash-e-Joveyn
Lashkar
Gah
Khash
Zaranj
Qal'eh-ye Fath
Sinjiri
Qalat
Jaldak
Darwazgai
Qandahar
Hauz Qala
Deshu
Langar
Faizabad
Mazar
Balkh Sharif
Kholm
Khannan
Pulalak
Pakistan
Iran
Map adapted by CRS from Magellan Geographix.
Jalalabad
Khyber
Pass
Indiaby another loya
jirga and elections held. The loya jirga, which is to be held June 10-16, 2002, will
also establish a 111-member parliament. The loya jirga might elect to confirm the
interim government in power until the elections are held, or it might select another
interim government. The last loya jirga that was widely recognized as legitimate was
held in 1964 to ratify a constitution. Communist leader Najibullah convened a loya
jirga in 1987 largely to approve his policies; that gathering was widely viewed by
Afghans as illegitimate.
As of May 2002, preparations are under way for the convening of the loya jirga.
In late January 2002, the 21 members of the commission, including two women, were
chosen to prepare for the assembly. They initially traveled around Afghanistan to
solicit opinions on how to convene it. By the end of May, the 362 districts of
Afghanistan are to have chosen the 1,500 delegates to the loya jirga. After several
delays due to security concerns, the former King returned to Afghanistan on April
18, 2002, and he has been meeting with Afghan notables and local leaders since. The
King’s long-term role in Afghan politics, if any, has not yet been determined.
The Interim Government. The interim administration began operations on
December 22, 2001. In the interim administration, a slight majority (17 out of 30)
of the positions in the new cabinet are held by the Northern Alliance, with this block
holding the key posts of Defense (Mohammad Fahim), Foreign Affairs (Dr. Abdullah
Abdullah), and Interior (Yunus Qanuni). The three are ethnic Tajiks, with the
exception of Dr. Abdullah, who is half Tajik and half Pashtun. This trio, all of whom
CRS-9
are in their mid-40s and were close aides to Ahmad Shah Masud, is considered
generally well disposed toward the United States, although they also have ties to Iran
and Russia, and all three are suspicious of Pakistan.
Northern Alliance leader Rabbani was not given a role in the interim
administration, on the grounds that doing so would have weighted the interim
administration too heavily to the Northern Alliance. Instead, the post of chairman of
the interim administration went to Pashtun tribal leader Hamid Karzai, who is about
45 years old. Karzai, leader of the powerful Popolzai tribe of Pashtuns, had entered
Afghanistan in October 2001 to organize resistance to the Taliban, and he was
supported in that effort by U.S. special forces. He has relatives in and close ties to
the United States. Other notables in the new cabinet include:
!
!
!
!
!
!
Finance Minister Hedayat Amin Arsala, a Pashtun affiliated with
Zahir Shah. He was a foreign minister in the Rabbani government
that preceded the Taliban (1992-1996).
Minister of Women’s Affairs Sima Samar, a Hazara who was an
Afghan women’s rights activist from her exile in Pakistan.
Minister of Communications Abdul Rahim, an ethnic Tajik who is
the former Ambassador of Afghanistan to the United States during
the Rabbani government.
Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Mir Wais Sadeq, a Tajik, who
is the son of Herat Province governor Ismail Khan.
Minister of Urban Development Hajji Abdul Qadir, a Pashtun, who
is also governor of Nangahar Province, the capital of which is
Jalalabad. Abdul Qadir has been criticized in some press accounts
for agreeing to bin Laden’s relocation to the Jalalabad area in 1996
after bin Ladin’s expulsion from Sudan. Abdul Qadir, a member of
the Northern Alliance delegation to the Bonn Conference, had
walked out of the conference to protest what he said was
underrepresentation of Pashtuns at the meeting.
Deputy Defense Minister Abdul Rashid Dostam, appointed in late
December 2001 in response to Dostam’s calls for more Uzbek
representation in the transitional government
International Security Force/Afghan National Army. The Bonn
conferees agreed to establish an international peace keeping force to maintain
security, at least in Kabul. The force (International Security Assistance Force, ISAF),
which has reached its agreed strength of about 5,000, is led by Britain but will be
headed by Turkey as of June 2002. The force is operating in conjunction with
Afghan security forces in Kabul and is coordinating, to an extent, with the
approximately 7,000 U.S. military forces in and immediately around Afghanistan.
In an effort to assuage Turkish concerns about the costs of heading the force, the
United States offered Turkey $228 million in new U.S. aid to compensate for those
costs. Because of several threats to Afghanistan’s internal security since the interim
government was constituted, the interim government wants the force to eventually
be expanded and deploy to other major cities. However, the Bush Administration has
decided instead to help build an Afghan national army rather than expand ISAF.
Training by U.S. special forces has begun, and the first 2,500 recruits (three ground
combat battalions and two border patrol battalions) will complete their training by
CRS-10
July 2002. The exact size of the army has not yet been decided, but common
estimates say that the new army will need to number about 60,000 - 80,000 to be
effective. It will take several years to build a force that large. On May 3, President
Bush pledged to Karzai an additional $2 million in U.S. aid to help equip the new
army. Some analysts have expressed concern that the national army will likely not
be ready in a timely enough manner to deal with the security threats now facing the
country, although the Administration and others indicate that U.S. forces will be
engaged in Afghanistan for a long enough period to ensure security until the Afghan
army can assume its full mission.
At this time, ISAF has forces from the following 18 countries: Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and
the United Kingdom (leader). The Bonn conference’s conclusions were endorsed by
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1385 (December 6, 2001), and the international
peacekeeping force was authorized by Security Council Resolution 1386 (December
20, 2001).
Diplomatic and Governmental Activity. Since the constitution of the
interim government, several countries have reopened embassies in Kabul, including
the United States. In conjunction with the formation of the interim administration,
career diplomat Ryan Crocker was appointed Charge D’Affaires and NSC official
Zalmay Khalilzad was appointed a special envoy to Afghanistan in December 2001
and has made a few extended visits there. In late March 2002, the new U.S.
Ambassador to Afghanistan, Robert Finn, was confirmed by the Senate and sworn
in in Kabul. The United States has permitted the interim administration to reopen the
Afghan embassy in Washington and Northern Alliance spokesman Harun Amin was
appointed Charge D’Affaires on January 14, 2002. A new Afghan ambassador, U.S.educated and U.S.-based energy entrepreneur Ishaq Shahryar, has been designated.
He previously was an adviser to former King Zahir Shah.
The priorities of the new government thus far have been expanding
governmental capabilities, guiding reconstruction efforts, and attempting to bring
security to all parts of Afghanistan. Karzai has sought and received some
international funds to pay government workers who had not been paid in many
months. The national airline, Ariana, is also in the process of resuming operations,
although its fleet is very small. In a major setback to the new government’s efforts
to achieve stability, the Aviation Minister, Abdul Rahman, was killed on February
14, 2002, by what some reports said was a mob of Afghans angry that their flight to
the Hajj in Saudi Arabia had been severely delayed. Karzai said the killing was the
result of a plot by other interim administration officials, an assertion later
contradicted by Foreign Minister Abdullah. Since then, there have been isolated
clashes among rival factions and a failed attempt on the life of Defense Minister
Fahim. However, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said in late April that the security
situation has been improving.
On March 23, 2002, schools reopened following the Persian/Afghan new year
(Nowruz). Girls returned to the schools for the first time since the Taliban came to
power.
CRS-11
Regional Context 7
Even before September 11, several of Afghanistan’s neighbors were becoming
alarmed about threats to their own security interests emanating from Afghanistan.
All of these governments endorsed the Bonn agreement, but some experts believe
that the neighboring governments will likely attempt to manipulate Afghanistan’s
factions and its political structure to their advantage.
Pakistan8
Pakistan reversed course on Afghanistan in the aftermath of the September 11
attacks. Pakistan initially saw the Taliban movement as an instrument with which
to fulfill its goals. Pakistan has always sought an Afghan central government strong
enough to prevent calls for unity between ethnic Pashtuns in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, while at the same time sufficiently friendly and pliable to give Pakistan
strategic depth against rival India. In the wake of the Soviet pullout in 1989, Pakistan
was troubled by continued political infighting in Afghanistan that was enabling drug
trafficking to flourish and to which Afghan refugees did not want to return. Pakistan
saw Afghanistan as essential to opening up trade relations and energy routes with the
Muslim states of the former Soviet Union.
Pakistan was the most public defender of the Taliban movement and was one
of only three countries (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the others)
to formally recognize it as the legitimate government. Prior to September 11, the
government of General Pervez Musharraf, who took power in an October 1999 coup,
previously resisted U.S. pressure to forcefully intercede with the Taliban leadership
to achieve bin Laden’s extradition. Pakistan’s links to the Taliban were a major
focus of a visit to Pakistan by Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering in May
2000, although Pakistan made no commitments to help the United States on bin
Laden. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, of December 19, 2000, was partly
an effort by the United States and Russia to drive a wedge between the Taliban and
Pakistan and to persuade Pakistan to cease military advice and aid to the Taliban.
Pakistan did not completely cease military assistance, but it abided by some
provisions of the resolution, for example by ordering the Taliban to cut the staff at
its embassy in Pakistan.9 Prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United
States, Pakistan had said it would cooperate with a follow-on U.N. Security Council
Resolution (1363 of July 30, 2001) that provided for U.N. border monitors to ensure
that no neighboring state was providing military equipment or advice to the Taliban.
7
For further information, see CRS Report RS20411, Afghanistan: Connections to Islamic
Movements in Central and South Asia and Southern Russia. December 7, 1999, by Kenneth
Katzman.
8
For further discussion, see Rashid, Ahmed. “The Taliban: Exporting Extremism.” Foreign
Affairs, November - December 1999.
9
Constable, Pamela. New Sanctions Strain Taliban-Pakistan Ties. Washington Post,
January 19, 2001.
CRS-12
Pakistan’s modest pre-September 11 steps toward cooperation with the United
States reflected increasing wariness that the Taliban movement was radicalizing
existing Islamic movements inside Pakistan and was becoming an increasing
embarrassment to Pakistan itself. Pakistan also feared that its position on the Taliban
was propelling the United States into a closer relationship with Pakistan’s arch-rival,
India. Some Islamic movements in Pakistan were seeking to emulate the Taliban,
according to press reports, and Pakistani terrorist groups, such as the Harakat alMujahedin (HUM), Jaish e-Mohammad, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba,10 are allied with Al
Qaeda, according to the State Department’s report on international terrorism for 2000
(“Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000"). HUM and other Pakistani Islamist groups
are seeking to challenge India’s control over its portion of Kashmir and, according
to some observers, could provoke a war with India over Kashmir, as has nearly
happened following the Pakistani Islamist attack on India’s parliament on December
13, 2001.
These considerations, coupled with U.S. pressure as well as offers of economic
benefit, prompted Pakistan to cooperate with the U.S. response to the September 11
attacks. Pakistan provided the United States with requested access to Pakistani
airspace, ports, airfields. Pakistan has also arrested hundreds of Al Qaeda fighters
fleeing Afghanistan and turned them over to the United States and deployed
substantial forces to the Afghan border to capture Al Qaeda fighters attempting to
flee into Pakistan. Pakistani authorities helped the United States track and capture
top bin Laden aide Abu Zubaydah in early April 2002, and Pakistani forces
reportedly are helping the United States track and fight Al Qaeda forces along the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Some reports say bin Laden might have escaped into
Pakistan but U.S. officials have expressed confidence that he will be captured
eventually by Pakistan if he is there. Many feared that the U.S. military presence in
Pakistan would place the government under increased political threat from proTaliban Islamist groups in Pakistan that sympathize with the Taliban and bin Laden.
However, those fears did not materialize and the collapse of the Taliban appears to
have alleviated that pressure. In return for Pakistan’s cooperation, the
Administration, in some cases with new congressional authority enacted after
September 11, has waived most of the U.S. sanctions on Pakistan and has begun
providing foreign aid that will total about $1 billion, according to U.S.
announcements.11
At the same time, Pakistan has sought to protect its interests by fashioning a
strong Pashtun-based component for a post-Taliban government. Pakistan is wary
that a post-Taliban government dominated by the Northern Alliance, which is
backed by India, would amount to Indian encirclement of Pakistan. To counter that
perceived threat, Pakistan was instrumental in ensuring that Northern Alliance leader
Rabbani would not be chairman of the interim government. Pakistan also succeeded
in building a role for the former King in selecting a permanent government, although
the former King’s role appears to be limited. Karzai visited Pakistan in late January
10
11
The State Department has designated HUM as a foreign terrorist organization.
For more information on U.S. sanctions on Pakistan, see CRS Report RS20995, India and
Pakistan: Current U.S. Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E. Rennack.
CRS-13
2002, and the two countries pledged to look to the future rather than to the recent
history of strains.
Iran
Iran’s key national interests in Afghanistan are to exert influence over western
Afghanistan, which Iran borders and was once part of the Persian empire, and to
protect Afghanistan’s Shiite minority. Iran strongly supported the Northern Alliance
and its Tajik (Persian-speaking) leaders who have traditionally been strong in western
Afghanistan as well as northern Afghanistan. Since Taliban forces ousted Ismail
Khan from Herat (the western province that borders Iran) in September 1995, Iran
has seen the Taliban movement as a threat to its interests in Afghanistan. Iran
provided fuel, funds, and ammunition to the Northern Alliance12 and hosted fighters
loyal to Khan, who was captured by the Taliban in 1998 but escaped and fled to Iran
in March 2000. In September 1998, Iranian and Taliban forces nearly came into
direct conflict when Iran discovered that nine of its diplomats were killed in the
course of Taliban’s offensive in northern Afghanistan. Iran massed forces at the
border and threatened military action, but the crisis cooled without a major clash,
possibly because Iran lacked confidence in its military capabilities.
The United States and Iran have long had common positions on Afghanistan,
despite deep U.S.-Iran differences on other issues. U.S. officials have long
acknowledged working with Tehran, under the auspices of the Six Plus Two contact
group and Geneva group. Secretary of State Powell shook hands with Iran’s Foreign
Minister Kamal Kharrazi on November 12, 2001 during a Six Plus Two meeting on
prospects for a new government in Afghanistan.
U.S. and Iranian common interests on Afghanistan might explain why Iran
generally expressed support for the U.S. effort to forge a global coalition against
terrorism, although it has publicly opposed U.S. military action against Afghanistan.
Iran has confirmed that it offered search and rescue assistance in Afghanistan should
the United States need it, and it has also agreed to allow U.S. humanitarian aid to the
Afghan people to transit Iran. However, the United States and Iran are too far apart
in general for tacit cooperation on Afghanistan to lead to a dramatic breakthrough in
U.S.-Iran relations. Some Iranian leaders have been harshly critical of U.S. military
action against the Taliban; in late September Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i
compared that action to the September 11 terrorist attacks themselves.
Amid reports Iran is seeking to exert influence over the new government by
arming pro-Iranian Afghan factions, in early January 2002 President Bush warned
Iran against meddling in Afghanistan. The President listed Iran as part of an “axis
of evil” in his January 29, 2002 State of the Union message, partly because of Iran’s
actions in Afghanistan. Since then, the Bush Administration has continued to accuse
Iran of trying to build influence over the interim government and of failing to attempt
to locate or arrest Al Qaeda fighters who have fled to Iran from Afghanistan. Partly
in response to the U.S. criticism, in February 2002 Iran reportedly expelled a major
12
Steele, Jonathon, “America Includes Iran In Talks On Ending War In Afghanistan.”
Washington Times, December 15, 1997. A14.
CRS-14
critic of the interim administration, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, from Iran. Hikmatyar
subsequently returned to Afghanistan but escaped an early May 2002 U.S. strike by
a CIA-controlled Predator-launched missile. For his part, Karzai has said that Iran
is an important neighbor of Afghanistan and visited Iran in late February 2002,
pledging to build ties with the Islamic republic.
About 1.5 million Afghan refugees are still in Iran; most of these have been
permitted to integrate into Iranian society.13 In mid-1994, Iran reportedly began
forcing Afghan refugees to leave Iran and return home, although Iran denies it has
forcibly repatriated any Afghans and some repatriation reportedly is voluntary.
Russia
A number of considerations might explain why Russia has supported the U.S.
effort against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, including the use of bases in Central Asia
to conduct the war. Russia’s main objective in Afghanistan has been to prevent the
further strengthening of Islamic or nationalist movements in the Central Asian states
or Islamic enclaves in Russia itself, including Chechnya. For Russian leaders,
instability in Afghanistan also reminds the Russian public that the Soviet occupation
of Afghanistan failed to pacify or stabilize that country.
Russia’s fear became acute following an August 1999 incursion into Russia’s
Dagestan region by Islamic guerrillas from neighboring Chechnya. Some reports link
at least one faction of the guerrillas to bin Laden.14 This faction is led by a Chechen
of Arab origin who is referred to by the name “Hattab” (full name is Ibn al-Khattab);
Russia claimed to have killed Hattab in April 2002. In January 2000, the Taliban
became the only government in the world to recognize Chechnya’s independence,
and some Chechen fighters integrated into Taliban forces were captured or killed
during the October - November 2001 war.
The U.S. and Russian positions on Afghanistan became coincident well before
the September 11 attacks.15 Even before the U.S.-led war, Russia was supporting the
Northern Alliance with some military equipment and technical assistance.16 U.S.Russian cooperation led to the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267 on
October 15, 1999. That resolution, adopted in response to the Taliban’s harboring
of bin Laden, banned commercial flights by the Afghan national airline and directed
U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets abroad (see section on Sanctions,
below). When the Taliban repeatedly refused to turn over bin Laden, the two cosponsored a follow-on – Security Council Resolution 1333 – that banned arms sales
13
Crossette, Barbara, “U.S. and Iran Cooperating on Ways to End the Afghan War.” New
York Times, December 15, 1997.
14
Whittell, Giles. “Bin Laden Link To Dagestan Rebel Fightback.” London Times,
September 6, 1999.
15
Constable, Pamela. “Russia, U.S. Converge on Warnings to Taliban.” Washington Post,
June 4, 2000.
16
Risen, James. “Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels.” New York Times, July
27, 1998.
CRS-15
and military advice to the Taliban, among other provisions, but did not ban such aid
to the Northern Alliance or other opposition factions.
On the other hand, the United States has not blindly supported Russia’s apparent
attempts to place a large share of the blame for the rebellion in Chechnya on the
Taliban and Al Qaeda. The Clinton Administration did not endorse Russian threats,
issued by President Vladimir Putin in May 2000, to conduct airstrikes against training
camps in Afghanistan that Russia alleges are for Chechen rebels. President Bush has
been highly critical of Russian tactics in Chechnya, although that position has
softened substantially after September 11. Some outside experts believe that Russia
exaggerated the threat emanating from Afghanistan in an effort to persuade the
Central Asian states to rebuild closer defense ties to Moscow.
At the same time, some are wary that Russia might again seek influence in
Afghanistan. It has offered humanitarian and some military aid to the new
government. Several members of the interim administration, including Karzai and
Defense Minister Fahim, have visited Moscow since the administration took over.
Central Asian States 17
Former communist elites still in power in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgyzstan have grown increasingly concerned that Central Asian radical Islamic
movements are receiving safe haven in Afghanistan. In 1996, several of them banded
together with Russia and China into a regional grouping called the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization to discuss the threat emanating from Afghanistan’s
Taliban regime. The organization groups China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,
Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan,
two of them – Uzbekistan and Tajikistan – had seen themselves as particularly
vulnerable to militants harbored by the Taliban. Uzbekistan saw its ally, Abdul
Rashid Dostam, the Uzbek commander in northern Afghanistan, lose most of his
influence in 1998, although he has now regained power in the north. Prior to the U.S.
war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda, Uzbek officials had previously said that more
active support from Uzbekistan would not have enabled Dostam to overturn Taliban
control of the north.18
Uzbekistan has long asserted that the group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU), allegedly responsible for four simultaneous February 1999 bombings in
Tashkent that nearly killed President Islam Karimov, is linked to Al Qaeda.19 One
of its leaders, Juma Namangani, reportedly was killed while commanding Taliban/Al
Qaeda forces in the battle for Mazar-e-Sharif in November 2001. Uzbekistan has
been highly supportive of the United States in the wake of the September 11 attacks
and has placed military facilities at U.S. disposal for use in the combat against the
17
For further information, see CRS Report RL30294. Central Asia’s Security: Issues and
Implications for U.S. Interests. December 7, 1999.
18
19
CRS conversations with Uzbek government officials in Tashkent. April 1999.
The IMU was named a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in
September 2000.
CRS-16
Taliban and Al Qaeda. About 1,000 U.S. troops from the 10th Mountain Division,
as well as U.S. aircraft, have been based at the Khanabad air base there. Following
the fall of the Taliban, in December 2001 Uzbekistan reopened the Soviet-built
“Friendship Bridge” over the Amu Darya river in order to facilitate the flow of aid
into Uzbekistan.
Over the past few years, Tajikistan has feared that its buffer with Afghanistan
would disappear if the Taliban defeated the Northern Alliance, whose territorial base
borders Tajikistan. Some of the IMU members based in Afghanistan, including
Namangani, fought alongside the Islamic opposition United Tajik Opposition (UTO)
during the 1994-1997 civil war in that country. Tajikistan, heavily influenced by
Russia, whose 25,000 troops guards the border with Afghanistan, initially sent mixed
signals on the question of whether it would give the United States the use of military
facilities in Tajikistan. However, on September 26, 2001, Moscow officially
endorsed the use by the United States of military facilities in Tajikistan, paving the
way for Tajikistan to open facilities for U.S. use. In early November 2001, following
a visit by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Tajikistan agreed to allow the U.S. the use
of three air bases in that country.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan do not directly border Afghanistan. However, IMU
guerrillas have transited Kyrgyzstan during past incursions into Uzbekistan.20
Kazakhstan had begun to diplomatically engage the Taliban over the past year, but
it publicly supported the U.S. war effort against the Taliban. In early December
2001, Kyrgyzstan offered to host some U.S. warplanes, and U.S. forces have begun
using the Manas air base there. Kyrgyzstan said in March 2002 that there is no time
limit on the U.S. use of military facilities there.
Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, only Turkmenistan was not
alarmed at Taliban gains and chose to seek close relations with the Taliban
leadership. An alternate interpretation is that Turkmenistan viewed engagement with
the Taliban as a more effective means of preventing spillover of radical Islamic
activity from Afghanistan. Turkmenistan’s leadership also saw Taliban control as
bringing the peace and stability that would permit construction of a natural gas
pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan. That pipeline would help
Turkmenistan bring its large gas reserves to world markets. However, the September
11 events stoked Turkmenistan’s fears of the Taliban and its Al Qaeda guests and the
country supported the U.S. anti-terrorism effort. There are no indications the United
States requested basing rights in Turkmenistan.
China
China has a small border with a sliver of Afghanistan known as the “Wakhan
corridor” (see map) and had become increasingly concerned about the potential for
Al Qaeda to promote Islamic fundamentalism among Muslims (Uighurs) in
northwestern China. A number of Uighurs fought in Taliban and Al Qaeda ranks in
the U.S.-led war. China expressed its concern through active membership in the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as noted above. In December 2000, sensing
20
Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999, pp. 14, 92.
CRS-17
China’s increasing concern about Taliban policies, a Chinese official delegation met
with Mullah Umar at the Taliban’s invitation.
Although it has long been concerned about the threat from the Taliban and bin
Laden, China did not enthusiastically support U.S. military action against the
Taliban. Many experts believe this is because China, as a result of strategic
considerations, was wary of a U.S. military buildup on its doorstep. China is an ally
with Pakistan, in part to balance out India, which China sees as a rival. Pakistan’s
cooperation with the United States appears to have allayed China’s opposition to U.S.
military action, and President Bush praised China’s cooperation with the antiterrorism effort during his visit to China in October 2001. There were no indications
of U.S.-China strains on this issue during President Bush’s visit to Beijing in late
February 2002.
Saudi Arabia
During the Soviet occupation, Saudi Arabia channeled hundreds of millions of
dollars to the Afghan resistance, and particularly to hardline Sunni Muslim
fundamentalist resistance leaders. Saudi Arabia, which itself practices the strict
Wahhabi brand of Islam practiced by the Taliban, was one of three countries to
formally recognize the Taliban government. (The others are Pakistan and the United
Arab Emirates.) The Taliban initially served Saudi Arabia as a potential counter to
Iran, with which Saudi Arabia has been at odds since Iran’s 1979 revolution.
However, Iranian-Saudi relations have improved significantly since 1997, and
balancing Iranian power has ebbed as a factor motivating Saudi policy toward
Afghanistan. Instead, drawing on its intelligence ties to Afghanistan during the antiSoviet war, Saudi Arabia worked with Taliban leaders to persuade them to suppress
anti-Saudi activities by Al Qaeda. Saudi Arabia apparently believed that Al Qaeda’s
presence in Afghanistan drew Saudi Islamic radicals away from Saudi Arabia itself
and thereby reduced their opportunity to destabilize the Saudi regime. Some press
reports indicate that, in late 1998, Saudi and Taliban leaders discussed, but did not
agree on, a plan for a panel of Saudi and Afghan Islamic scholars to decide bin
Laden’s fate. In March 2000 and again in May 2000, the Saudi-based Organization
of Islamic Conference (OIC) sponsored indirect peace talks in Saudi Arabia between
the warring factions, but the talks were not productive.
According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia has generally cooperated with the U.S.
war effort. Along with the UAE, Saudi Arabia broke diplomatic relations with the
Taliban in late September. It quietly permitted the United States to use a Saudi base
for command of U.S. air operations over Afghanistan. It did not serve as a staging
point for U.S. aircraft to launch strikes on Afghanistan from Saudi bases, although,
among the Gulf states, Oman served as a better staging point due to its closer
proximity to Afghanistan. The Saudi position has generally been to allow the United
States the use of its facilities as long as doing so is not publicly requested or highly
publicized.
CRS-18
U.S. Policy Issues
U.S. policy objectives in Afghanistan have long been multifaceted, although in
recent years U.S. goals had largely narrowed to ending the presence of the leadership
of the Al Qaeda leadership and infrastructure there. Since the Soviet withdrawal,
returning peace and stability to Afghanistan has been a U.S. goal, pursued with
varying degrees of intensity. Other goals have included an end to discrimination
against women and girls, the eradication of narcotics production, and alleviating
severe humanitarian difficulties.
The United States attributed most of these concerns to Taliban rule, although
drug production flourished in regions under Northern Alliance control and there
were some restrictions on women’s rights under Rabbani’s 1992-1996 government.
U.S. relations with the Taliban progressively deteriorated during the 5 years that the
Taliban were in power in Kabul. The United States had withheld recognition of
Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan and formally recognized no
faction as the government, although it had a dialogue with all the different factions,
including the Taliban. During the period of Taliban rule, the United Nations, based
on the lack of broad international recognition of Taliban, continued to seat
representatives of the former Rabbani government, not the Taliban. The United
States closed its embassy in Kabul in January 1989, and the State Department
ordered the Afghan embassy in Washington, D.C. closed in August 1997 because of
a power struggle within the embassy between Rabbani and Taliban supporters.
Although press reports in May 2002 said the Bush Administration was
considering a plan to give military aid to the Northern Alliance prior to the
September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration continued the previous
Administration’s policy of maintaining a dialogue with the Taliban. During the
Clinton Administration, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Karl
Inderfurth and other U.S. officials met periodically with Taliban officials. In April
1998, then Ambassador Bill Richardson met with Taliban officials and the opposition
during his visit to Afghanistan, in an effort to demonstrate presidential commitment
to peace in Afghanistan and to discuss bin Laden. In compliance with U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1333, in February 2001 the State Department ordered the closing
of a Taliban representative office in New York. The Taliban complied with the
directive, but its representative, Abdul Hakim Mujahid, continued to operate
informally. In March 2001, Bush Administration officials received a Taliban envoy,
Rahmatullah Hashemi, to discuss bilateral issues. Three State Department officers
visited Afghanistan in April 2001, the first U.S. visit since the August 1998
bombings of Afghan camps, although the visit was primarily to assess humanitarian
needs and not to further U.S.-Taliban relations.
As did the executive branch, Congress became highly critical of the Taliban well
before the September 11 attacks. Congress’ views were generally expressed in nonbinding legislation. A sense of the Senate resolution (S.Res. 275) that resolving the
Afghan civil war should be a top U.S. priority passed that chamber by unanimous
consent on September 24, 1996. H.Con.Res. 218, which was similar to this
resolution, passed the House on April 28, 1998. In the 107th Congress, H.Con.Res.
26 was introduced on February 8, 2001. The resolution expressed the sense of
CRS-19
Congress that the United States should seek to prevent the Taliban from obtaining
Afghanistan’s U.N. seat and should not recognize any government in Afghanistan
that does not restore women’s rights.
After September 11, legislative proposals on Afghanistan became significantly
more adversarial toward the Taliban. One bill, H.R. 3088, stated that it should be the
policy of the United States to remove the Taliban from power and authorized a
drawdown of up to $300 million worth of U.S. military supplies and services for the
anti-Taliban opposition. The bill, as well as another bill (H.R. 2998, introduced
October 2, 2001), would establish a “Radio Free Afghanistan” broadcasting service
under RFE/RL. On February 12, 2002, the House passed the Senate version of H.R.
2998 providing $17 million funding for the radio broadcasts for FY2002. President
Bush signed the bill into law on March 11, 2002 (P.L. 107-148).
Harboring of Al Qaeda
Even before the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Taliban’s refusal to yield Al
Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden to the United States (or a U.S. ally) for trial – and its
protection of radical Islamic movements more broadly – had become the overriding
bilateral agenda item in U.S. policy toward Afghanistan.21 Bin Laden, identified by
the Bush Administration as the main organizer of the September 11 attacks,
reportedly remains alive in Afghanistan or Pakistan, attempting to avoid U.S. efforts
to locate him and his associates.
Over the past few years, the United States had placed progressively more
pressure on the Taliban to extradite bin Laden, adding sanctions, military action, and
the threat of further punishments to ongoing diplomatic efforts.
21
!
During his April 1998 visit, Ambassador Richardson asked Taliban
to hand bin Laden over to U.S. authorities, but he was rebuffed.
!
On August 20, 1998, the United States fired cruise missiles at
alleged bin Laden-controlled terrorist training camps in retaliation
for the August 7, 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania.
!
On July 4, 1999, because of the Taliban’s hosting of bin Laden,
President Clinton issued Executive Order 13129, imposing a ban on
U.S. trade with Taliban-controlled portions of Afghanistan and
blocking Taliban assets in U.S. financial institutions. The Taliban
was not designated as a terrorist group, nor was Afghanistan named
a state sponsor of terrorism. On August 10, 1999, the Clinton
Administration determined that Ariana Airlines represents Talibancontrolled property, thereby preventing Americans from using the
For more information on bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization, see CRS Report
RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2001, September 10, 2001.
See also CRS Report RS20411, Afghanistan: Connections to Islamic Movements in Central
and South Asia and Southern Russia.
CRS-20
airline and triggering the blocking of about $500,000 in Ariana
assets identified in the United States.
!
On October 15, 1999, with Russian support, the United States
achieved adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267, the
first U.N. resolution sanctioning the Taliban regime. The resolution
banned flights outside Afghanistan by Ariana airlines and directed
U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets. The resolution was in
response to the Taliban’s refusal to hand bin Laden over to justice,
and it threatened further sanctions if it did not do so.
On December 19, 2000, again by combining diplomatic forces with Russia, the
United States achieved adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, a followon to Resolution 1267, imposing even stricter sanctions against the Taliban. The
major additional provisions of the Resolution included: (1) a worldwide prohibition
against the provision of arms or military advice to the Taliban, and a requirement
(directed against Pakistan) that all countries withdraw any military advisers that are
helping the Taliban; (2) a call for all countries that recognize the Taliban to reduce
the size of Taliban representative missions in their countries, and for all other
countries to close completely all Taliban offices and Ariana Afghan airline offices
and ban all nonhumanitarian assistance flights into or out of Taliban-controlled
Afghanistan; (3) a requirement that all countries freeze any bin Laden/Al Qaeda
assets that can be identified; (4) a prohibition on any supply to areas under Taliban
control of the chemical acetic anhydride, which is used to produce heroin; and (5) a
ban on foreign travel by all Taliban officials at or above the rank of Deputy Minister,
except for the purposes of participation in peace negotiations, compliance with the
resolution or 1267, or humanitarian reasons, including religious obligations.
On July 30, 2001, the U.N. Security Council adopted an implementing
Resolution 1363. The resolution provided for the stationing of monitors in Pakistan,
to ensure that no weapons or military advice was being provided by the Taliban.
Pakistan’s pledge to cooperate with the U.S. response to the September 11, 2001
attacks led to the virtual end of Pakistan’s supply of arms and military advice to the
Taliban. In the aftermath of the Taliban’s ouster from power, these provisions were
narrowed to focus on Al Qaeda, and not the Taliban, by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1390 of January 17, 2002. Ariana has resumed some international
service, limited mainly by its lack of equipment and resources.
Human Rights/Treatment of Women
The groups that have assumed power from the Taliban are widely considered
far less repressive of women than was the Taliban, although some of the factions now
ruling the country have been accused of other major human rights abuses in the past.
Taliban human rights practices, and especially its treatment of women, received U.S.
and international condemnation. Seeking to enforce its brand of puritan Islam, the
Taliban subjected women to limitations on social participation, working, and
education. At various times in the past, the Taliban’s treatment of women had forced
many United Nations and other aid organizations, including the U.N. High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), UNICEF, Save the Children, and Oxfam, to
CRS-21
cut back or cease operations, either in protest or for lack of available (female) staff.22
Women were forced to wear a head-to-toe veil (burqa) in public, and they could not
ride in vehicles unless accompanied by a male relative.
Following the Taliban collapse, women in Kabul are said to be reverting to the
less restrictive behavior practiced before the Taliban fled. The burqa is no longer
obligatory, although many women continue to wear it by tradition or because of fear
or uncertainty of the new government’s attitudes on the issue. Two women hold
positions in the new interim cabinet that took office on December 22, 2001, and
many women are returning to the jobs they held before the Taliban came to power.
As noted above, girls returned to school March 23, 2002, for the first time since the
Taliban took over, and many female teachers have resumed their teaching jobs.
Before the war, there was significant U.S. and U.N. pressure on the Taliban
regime to moderate its treatment of women. Several U.N. Security Council
resolutions, including 1193 (August 28, 1998), and 1214 (December 8, 1998), urged
the Taliban to end discrimination against women. During a November 1997 visit to
Pakistan, then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright attacked Taliban policies as
despicable and intolerable. U.S. women’s rights groups like Feminist Majority and
the National Organization for Women (NOW) mobilized to stop the Clinton
Administration from recognizing the Taliban government unless it alters its treatment
of women. On May 5, 1999, the Senate passed S.Res. 68, a resolution calling on the
President not to recognize any Afghan government that refuses to end discrimination
against women. On November 27, 2001, the House unanimously adopted S. 1573,
the Afghan Women and Children Relief Act, which had earlier passed the Senate.
The law (signed December 12, 2001) calls for the use of supplemental funding
(appropriated by P.L. 107-38) to fund educational and health programs for Afghan
women and children.
Destruction of Buddha Statues. The Taliban’s critics pointed to its March
2001 destruction of two large Buddha statues, dating to the 7th century, as evidence
of the Taliban’s excesses. The Taliban claimed it ordered the destruction of the
statues, which it considered un-Islamic, after representatives of the United Nations
Economic, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) offered to fund
preservation of the statues. Others believe the move was a reaction to new U.N.
sanctions imposed in December 2000 (see below). The destruction provoked
widespread condemnation, even among other Islamic states, including Pakistan.
Some international groups are looking at the possibility of rebuilding the statues,
although at least one group has said doing so will be extremely difficult technically.
Hindu Badges. In May 2001, the Taliban said it was considering requiring
non-Muslims to wear identity labels on their clothing to distinguish them from
Muslims. The Taliban explained the move as an effort to prevent non-Muslims from
being harassed by Taliban security forces for not attending Muslim prayer, which is
compulsory for Muslims. The announcement received worldwide condemnation and
was not implemented before the Taliban was ousted. There are believed to be only
22
Cooper, Kenneth, “Kabul Women Under Virtual House Arrest.” Washington Post,
October 7, 1996. A1.
CRS-22
two Jews left in Afghanistan, so the move was not viewed as being directed against
Jews, even though the policy evoked memories of the treatment of Jews in Nazi
Germany.
On the other hand, many say that the Taliban brought order and peace to the
areas it captured by disarming independent militiamen. By imposing central
authority and cracking down on banditry, it opened some roads to free commerce
leading to a greater availability of food in many areas under its control. Press
accounts say that the streets were safer, fewer people carried guns, and there were
very few murders during Taliban rule.23 Others add that Taliban rule approximated
the traditional practice of Islam found in those parts of Afghanistan dominated by
Pashtuns and did not represent a radical departure for Afghanistan.
Since the interim administration took office, there have been some reports of
reprisals and other abuses based on ethnicity in certain parts of Afghanistan,
particularly against Pashtuns living in largely Tajik and Uzbek northern Afghanistan.
Virtually all observers agree that Afghans are freer than they were under the Taliban,
although the interim administration is relatively young, and many want to evaluate
its human rights practices over a longer period of time.
Counternarcotics
One issue on which the Taliban apparently satisfied much of the international
community was counternarcotics. The Taliban apparently enforced its July 2000 ban
on poppy cultivation. In February 2001, U.N. International Drug Control Program
(UNDCP) officials said that surveys showed a dramatic drop in poppy cultivation in
the areas surveyed.24 The Northern Alliance did not issue a similar ban in areas it
controlled. Despite the Taliban’s performance on drug issues, in March 2002,
Afghanistan was determined by the Bush Administration to have “failed
demonstrably to make substantial efforts” during the past 12 months to adhere to
international counternarcotics agreements and take certain counternarcotics measures
set forth in U.S. law. (This is equivalent to the listing by the United States, as
Afghanistan has been listed every year since 1987, as a state that is uncooperative
with U.S. efforts to eliminate drug trafficking or has failed to take sufficient steps on
its own to curb trafficking.) With the Taliban defeated, President Bush waived
sanctions resulting from this listing on the grounds that providing assistance is in the
vital national interest of the United States (see section on sanctions, below).
In April 2001, amid signs the Taliban was enforcing its poppy ban, the United
States began funding a UNDCP program to assist former poppy cultivators in
Afghanistan. The United States contributed $1.5 million to that crop substitution
program in FY2001. The Bonn agreement mentions the need for a post-Taliban
Afghanistan government to prevent Afghanistan’s re-emergence as a haven for drug
cultivation, and the Bush Administration is focusing some post-Taliban resources on
23
Schork, Kurt, “Taleban Admits To Problem Of Image, Not Substance.” Reuters,
November 25, 1997.
24
Crossette, Barbara. “Taliban Seem to Be Making Good on Opium Ban, U.N. Says.” New
York Times, February 7, 2001.
CRS-23
counter-narcotics. In early February 2002, the U.S. military exerted pressure on
Afghan opium dealers in Qandahar to close the operations of their market. This came
amid Bush Administration warnings that opium trafficking and heroin processing had
continued unabated in 2001, suggesting substantial stockpiling despite the Taliban
ban. In addition, preliminary estimates indicated that the spring 2002 opium poppy
crop might return to levels reached before the Taliban ban. The U.N. Drug Control
Program estimated in February 2002 that 111,000 - 160,000 acres of opium poppy
had been planted, which could yield 2,000 - 3,000 tons of crop, restoring Afghanistan
to its previous place as the world’s top opium producer.25 On the other hand, the U.S.
military is opposed to its conducting poppy crop eradication in Afghanistan, as some
in the Bush Administration are proposing.26
Retrieval of U.S. Stingers
Beginning in late 1985 and following an internal debate, the Reagan
Administration provided “hundreds” of man-portable “Stinger” anti-aircraft missiles
to the mujahedin for use against Soviet combat helicopters and aircraft. Prior to the
U.S.-led war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, common estimates among experts
suggested that 200-300 Stingers remained at large in Afghanistan out of about 1,000
provided during the war against the Soviet Union.27 In the aftermath of the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States had tried to retrieve the at-large
Stingers.28 The United States feared that the missiles could fall into the hands of
terrorist groups for possible use against civilian airliners. Iran bought 16 of the
missiles in 1987 and fired one against U.S. helicopters; some reportedly were
transferred to Lebanese Hizballah, according to press reports in January 2002. India
claimed that it was a Stinger, supplied to Islamic rebels in Kashmir probably by
sympathizers in Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian helicopter over Kashmir in
May 1999.29
The practical difficulties of retrieving the weapons had caused this issue to fade
from the U.S. agenda for Afghanistan. In 1992, the United States reportedly spent
about $10 million to buy the Stingers back, at a premium, from individual mujahedin
commanders. The New York Times reported on July 24, 1993, that the buy back
effort failed because the United States was competing with other buyers, including
Iran and North Korea, and that the CIA would spend about $55 million in FY1994
in a renewed Stinger buy-back effort. On March 7, 1994, the Washington Post
reported that the CIA had recovered only a fraction of the at-large Stingers. Many
observers speculate that the CIA program retrieved perhaps 50 or 100 Stingers.
25
Armitage, Tom. U.N. Sees Afghan Opium Cultivation Soaring in 2002. Reuters, February
28, 2002.
26
Gertz, Bill. Military Opposes Spraying Poppies. Washington Times, March 25, 2002.
27
Saleem, Farrukh. Where Are the Missing Stinger Missiles? Pakistan, Friday Times.
August 17-23, 2001.
28
Gertz, Bill. Stinger Bite Feared in CIA. Washington Times, October 9, 2000.
29
“U.S.-Made Stinger Missiles – Mobile and Lethal.” Reuters, May 28, 1999.
CRS-24
According to Defense Intelligence Agency testimony in 1996,30 an unspecified
number of man-portable surface-to-air missiles (Stingers) remain in Afghanistan.31
The Stinger issue resurfaced in conjunction with the U.S. war effort. U.S. pilots
reported that the Taliban fired some Stingers at U.S. aircraft during the war, but they
recorded no hits. Any Stingers that survived the anti-Taliban war are likely
controlled by Afghans now allied to the United States and would presumably pose
less of a threat. In early February 2002, the interim government collected and
returned to the United States “dozens” of Stingers and said it would continue to try
to find and return additional Stingers.32
Landmine Eradication
Landmines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute one of the principal
dangers to the Afghan people. The United Nations estimates that 5 -7 million mines
remain scattered throughout the country, although some estimates by outside
organizations are significantly lower. An estimated 400,000 Afghans have been
killed or wounded by landmines. U.N. teams have succeeded in destroying one
million mines and are now focusing on de-mining priority-use, residential and
commercial property, including land surrounding Kabul. As shown in the U.S. aid
table for FY1999-FY2002, the United States Humanitarian Demining Program
provides about $3 million per year for Afghanistan demining activities. Most of the
funds go to the HALO Trust, a British organization, and the U.N. Mine Action
Program for Afghanistan.
Assistance and Reconstruction
Since the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan has faced major humanitarian problems,
some of which deteriorated further under Taliban rule. In addition to 3.6 million
Afghan refugees at the start of the U.S.-led war,33 another 500,000 Afghans were
displaced internally even before U.S. military action began, according to Secretary
General Annan’s April 19, 2001 report on Afghanistan. Many of the displaced
persons had fled the effects of a major drought that affected the 85% of the
population that directly depends on agriculture. Some Afghan refugees are now
members of a third generation to live outside Afghanistan, although many are
beginning to return now that the Taliban has fallen from power in Kabul, and
repatriation has accelerated in spring 2002.
The conflicts in Afghanistan, including the war against the Soviet Union, have
reportedly left about 2 million dead, 700,000 widows and orphans and about one
30
John Moore, before the House International Relations Committee. May 9, 1996.
31
Common estimates in a variety of press reports suggest that 200-300 Stingers may remain
at large in Afghanistan.
32
Fullerton, John. “Afghan Authorities Hand in Stinger Missiles to U.S.” Reuters,
February 4, 2002.
33
About 1.4 million Afghan refugees are in Iran; 1.2 million in Pakistan; 20,000 in Russia;
17,000 in India, and 9,000 in the Central Asian states.
CRS-25
million Afghan children who were born and raised in refugee camps outside
Afghanistan.
Casualties. No reliable Afghan casualty figures for the U.S.-led war on the
Taliban and Al Qaeda have been announced, but estimates by researchers of Afghan
civilian deaths generally cite figures of “several hundred” civilian deaths. (U.S.
Central Command said in April 2002 that there had been 41 deaths involving U.S.
and allied military personnel in the war as of that time. The 22 “hostile deaths” –
which include friendly fire – are 17 U.S., 4 Canadian, and 1 Australian. All 19 “nonhostile” deaths – accidents – have been Americans.
As part of its military operations, the United States air-dropped food rations to
help alleviate suffering. Following the Taliban collapse, aid routes via Uzbekistan
and Pakistan reopened, largely eliminating the need for the airdrops. The United
Nations continues to coordinate humanitarian relief efforts through the U.N. High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), and UNOCHA (U.N. Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs in
Afghanistan). UNHCR supervises Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and Afghan
repatriation.
U.S. Assistance Issues. To address humanitarian concerns, the United
States had become the largest single provider of assistance to the Afghan people,
even before the crisis triggered by the September 11 attacks. In 1985, the United
States began a cross-border aid program for Afghanistan, through which aid was
distributed in Afghanistan, via U.S. aid workers in Pakistan. However, citing
budgetary constraints and the difficulty of administering a cross-border program,
there was no USAID mission for Afghanistan after the end of FY1994, and U.S. aid
has been provided through various channels, mostly U.N. agencies and NGO’s.
Primarily because of a drought and the widely publicized suffering of the
Afghan people, U.S. aid to the Afghan people in FY2001 greatly exceeded that
provided in FY2000 or FY1999. No U.S. assistance went directly to the Taliban
government. Table 2 breaks down FY1999-FY2002 aid by program. According to
the USAID fact sheet issued September 27, 2001, the United States provided about
$183 million in assistance to the Afghan people in FY2001. For a history of U.S. aid
to Afghanistan (FY1978-FY1998), see Table 3.
On October 4, 2001, in an effort to demonstrate that the United States has an
interest in the welfare of the Afghan people and not just the defeat of the Taliban,
President Bush announced that aid to the Afghan people would total about $320
million for FY2002. This includes food, blankets, medicine, and shelter for Afghan
refugees in states bordering Afghanistan and the people inside Afghanistan. The
amounts provided thus far in FY2002 are listed in the table.
The United States also pledged substantial reconstruction assistance for a postTaliban Afghanistan. Common estimates of reconstruction needs run up to about $10
billion. The conference report on the FY2002 foreign aid appropriation (H. Rept.
107-354, P.L. 107-115) contains a sense of Congress provision that the United States
should contribute substantial humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, although no
dollar figures are mentioned. A separate bill (H.R. 3427) would authorize at least
CRS-26
$875 million in FY2002-FY2005 for Afghan rehabilitation and reconstruction, and
additional funds for related purposes.
Another bill, H.R. 3994, which was marked up by the House International
Relations Committee on March 19, 2002 and was prepared for floor action as of
April 25, authorizes $1.05 billion in U.S. reconstruction assistance during FY2002 FY2005 ($200 million in FY2002; $300 million in each of FY2003 and FY2004, and
$250 million in FY2005). The bill also authorizes $15 million per year for FY20022005 for counternarcotics, and $10 million per year for FY2002-2005 for the loya
jirga and local political development. The House Appropriations Committee has
developed a FY2002 supplemental appropriation that would provide $370 million in
additional aid to Afghanistan, $120 million more than the FY2002 supplemental
funding requested by the Bush Administration in March 2002. These funds would
likely be used for U.S. aid to Afghanistan, humanitarian and reconstruction, during
FY2003.
Reconstruction Aid. In conjunction with a donors’ conference in Tokyo
during January 20-21, 2002, the United States pledged $296 million in reconstruction
aid for Afghanistan for FY2002. That amount is drawn from existing FY2002
appropriations and the emergency September 11-related supplemental appropriation
enacted in September 2001.
U.S. reconstruction funds have been used for various “quick impact” programs.
These programs included $6.5 million for 9.7 million school textbooks; $7 million
for agricultural rehabilitation, programs for women, and support to the interim
administration; $5 million for health services infrastructure; $1 million for the
rehabilitation of landmine victims and other disabled persons (Leahy War Victims
Fund); and funding to rebuild the Ministry of Women’s Affairs building and to
distribute radios to localities to disseminate information on humanitarian aid. The
United States is forwarding donations from American citizens for the rebuilding of
Kabul University.
At the donors’ conference, the following additional reconstruction pledges were
announced: European Union - $500 million in 2002; Japan - $500 million over the
next 30 months; Germany - $362 million over the next 4 years; Saudi Arabia - $220
million over the next 3 years; Iran - $560 million over the next 5 years; Pakistan $100 million over the next 5 years; India - a $100 million line of credit; South Korea
- $45 million over 30 months; and United Kingdom - $86 million in 2002. Total
pledges in Tokyo for reconstruction amounted to $1.8 billion to be spent in 2002 and
$4.5 billion over the next 5 years.
In addition, the U.S. Treasury Department (Office of Foreign Assets Control,
OFAC) has unblocked over $145 million in assets of Afghan government owned
banking entities that were frozen under U.S. sanctions imposed on the Taliban in
1999 (see below). These funds are to be used by the new government for currency
stabilization, not for recurring costs of the interim government. Most of the funds
consist of gold that will be held in Afghanistan’s name in the United States to back
up Afghanistan’s currency. In January 2002, the United States also has agreed to
provide $50 million in credit for U.S. investment in Afghanistan, provided by the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). The United States also has
CRS-27
successfully pressed the International Air Transport Association to pay Afghanistan
$20 million in overflight fees that were withheld because of U.N. sanctions on the
Taliban. In April 2002, OFAC unblocked $17 million in privately-owned Afghan
assets. In May 2002, the World Bank reopened its office in Afghanistan after twenty
years.
Promoting Long-Term Economic Development
In an effort to find a long-term solution to Afghanistan’s acute humanitarian
problems, the United States has, when feasible, tried to promote major development
projects as a means of improving Afghan living standards and political stability over
the long term. During 1996-98, the Administration supported proposed natural gas
and oil pipelines through western Afghanistan as an incentive for the warring factions
to cooperate. One proposal by a consortium led by Los Angeles-based Unocal
Corporation34 was for a Central Asia Oil Pipeline (CAOP) that would originate at the
Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan border and extend through the western region of
Afghanistan to Pakistan. A $2.5 billion Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CentGas) would
originate in southern Turkmenistan and pass through Afghanistan to Pakistan, with
possible extensions into India.
However, the deterioration in U.S.-Taliban relations since 1998 largely ended
hopes for the pipeline projects while the Taliban was in power. Immediately after the
August 20,1998 U.S. strikes on bin Laden’s bases in Afghanistan, Unocal suspended
all its Afghan pipeline-related activities, including a U.S.-based training program for
Afghans who were expected to work on the project. With few prospects of improved
U.S. relations with Taliban, Unocal withdrew from its consortium in December 1998.
Saudi Delta Oil was made interim project leader, although Delta lacks the financing
and technology to make the consortium viable. The rival consortium led by Bridas
of Argentina reportedly continues to try to win approval for its proposal to undertake
the project, although virtually no new developments on this project have been
announced over the past few years. Many experts believe this project might be
revived if a stable, internationally-recognized government takes hold in Afghanistan.
34
Other participants in the Unocal consortium include: Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of
South Korea, Crescent Steel of Pakistan, Itochu Corporation and INPEX of Japan, and the
government of Turkmenistan. Some accounts say Russia’s Gazprom would probably
receive a stake in the project. Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 30, 1997. Page 3.
CRS-28
Table 1. Major Factions in Afghanistan
Party/Commander
Leader
Ideology/
Ethnicity
ultra-orthodox
Islamic, Pashtun
Areas of Control
Taliban
Mullah
(Islamic cleric)
Muhammad Umar
Small pockets
throughout
Afghanistan; no
representation in
interim government.
Northern Alliance/Islamic
Society (dominant party in
the Northern Alliance)
Burhannudin
moderate Islamic,
Rabbani (political mostly Tajik
leader),
Muhammad Fahim
(military leader)
Most of northern and
western Afghanistan,
including Kabul; 17 out
of 30 cabinet seats in
interim administration,
including defense,
foreign ministry, and
interior ministry.
Rabbani holds no
official position.
Forces of Ismail Khan (part
of Northern Alliance)
Ismail Khan
Tajik
Herat Province and
environs; Khan’s son in
interim cabinet.
Eastern Shura (loosely allied
with Northern Alliance)
Hajji Abdul Qadir
moderate Islamic, Jalalabad and environs;
Pashtun
Qadir is in interim
administration.
National Islamic Movement
of Afghanistan (part of
Northern Alliance)
Abdul Rashid
Dostam
secular, Uzbek
Mazar Sharif and
environs; Dostam is
deputy defense minister
in interim government.
Hizb-e-Wahdat
(part of Northern Alliance)
Abd al-Karim
Khalili
Shiite, Hazara
tribes
Bamiyan province.
Independent Pashtun
Commanders
Ghul Agha Shirzai, mostly orthodox
and other tribal
Islamic, Pashtun
leaders
Southern Afghanistan,
including Qandahar;
CRS-29
Table 2. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan in FY1999-FY2002
($ in millions)
FY1999
FY2000
FY2001
FY2002
(as of 5/3)
Demining Program
U.S.Department of
Agriculture (DOA)
and USAID Food
For Peace, via World
Food Program(WFP)
$2.615
$42.0 worth of wheat
(100,000 metric tons)
under DOA’s “416(b)”
program.
$3.0
$68.875 for 165,000
metric tons. Of this,
60,000 tons were for
May 2000 drought
relief.
WFP and the Aga
Khan Foundation
$2.6 for Afghan
refugees inside
Afghanistan
$16.95 for Afghan
refugees in Pakistan
and Iran, and to assist
their repatriation
$14.0 for the same
purpose
State/Bureau of
Population, Refugees
and Migration
(PRM) via UNHCR
and ICRC
State Department/
Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance
(OFDA)
$2.8
$131.0
(300,000
metric tons
under
P.L.480, Title
II, and
416(b)
$123.0
(Food for
Peace), for
72,700
metric tons
of
foodstuffs
$14.03 for the same
purposes
$22.03 for
similar
purposes
$86.8 to
U.N.
agencies
$7.0 to various NGO’s
to aid Afghans inside
Afghanistan
$6.68 for drought
relief and health,
water, and sanitation
programs for
Afghans
$18.934 for
similar
programs
$89.9 to
various
U.N.
agencies
and NGO’s
7.0 to Halo
Trust and
other
demining
programs
$5.44, of which $2.789
went to health and
training for Afghan
women and girls in
Pakistan
$6.169, of which
$3.82 went to similar
purposes
$5.31 for
similar
purposes
State
Department/HDP
(Humanitarian
Demining Program)
Aid to Afghan
Refugees in Pakistan
(through various
NGO’s)
U.N. Drug Control
Program
USAID
Office of Transition
Initiatives
$1.50
$0.45 for
Afghan
women in
Pakistan
Dept. of Defense
Center for Disease
Control
Totals
$14.3 for
broadcasts
and UNDP
trust to
support
interim
gov’t
$50.9
(aidrop of
2.4 million
rations)
$0.57 polio
eradication
$76.6
$113.2
$182.6
$367.8
CRS-30
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan FY1978-1998
($ in millions)
Fiscal
Year
Devel.
Assist.
Econ.
P.L. 480
Supp.
(Title I and II)
(ESF)
–
5.742
1978
4.989
1979
3.074
1980
–
1981
–
–
–
1982
–
–
1983
–
1984
–
7.195
Military
.269
Other
(Incl. regional
refugee aid)
.789
–
(Soviet invasion - December 1979)
.347
Total
11.789
10.616
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
1985
3.369
–
–
–
–
3.369
1986
–
–
8.9
–
–
8.9
1987
17.8
12.1
2.6
–
–
32.5
1988
22.5
22.5
29.9
–
–
74.9
1989
22.5
22.5
32.6
–
–
77.6
1990
35.0
35.0
18.1
–
–
88.1
1991
30.0
30.0
20.1
–
–
80.1
1992
25.0
25.0
31.4
–
–
81.4
1993
10.0
10.0
18.0
–
30.2
68.2
1994
3.4
2.0
9.0
–
27.9
42.3
1995
1.8
–
12.4
–
31.6
45.8
1996
–
–
16.1
–
26.4
42.5
1997
–
–
18.0
–
31.9**
49.9
1998
–
–
3.6
–
49.14***
52.74
Source: U.S. Department of State.
** Includes $3 million for demining and $1.2 million for counternarcotics.
*** Includes $3.3 million in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, $7 million in earthquake
relief aid, 100,000 tons of 416B wheat worth about $15 million, $2 million for demining, and $1.54
for counternarcotics.
CRS-31
U.S. and International Sanctions
Shoring up a post-Taliban government of Afghanistan with financial and other
assistance requires waivers of restrictions or the permanent modification of U.S. and
U.N. sanctions previously imposed on Afghanistan. Some of these modifications or
waivers are in progress. Sanctions in place include the following:
!
On May 2, 1980, Afghanistan was deleted from the list of designated
beneficiary countries under the U.S. GSP, denying Afghanistan’s
exports duty free treatment, by Executive Order 12204 (45 F.R.
20740). This was done under the authority of Section 504 of the
Trade Act of 1974, as amended [P.L. 93-618; 19 U.S.C. 2464].
!
On June 3, 1980, as part of the sanctions against the Soviet Union
for the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States imposed controls
on exports to Afghanistan of agricultural products, oil and gas
exploration and production equipment, and phosphates. This was
implemented at 15 CFR Part 373 et seq (45 F.R. 37415) under the
authority of Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration Act of
1979 [P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405]. On April 24,
1981, these sanctions were modified to terminate controls on U.S.
exports to Afghanistan of agricultural products and phosphates.
!
In mid-1992, the Bush Administration determined that Afghanistan
no longer had a “Soviet-controlled government.” This opened
Afghanistan to the use of U.S. funds made available for the U.S.
share of U.N. organizations that provide assistance to Afghanistan.
!
On October 7, 1992, President George H.W. Bush issued
Presidential Determination 93-3 that Afghanistan is no longer a
Marxist-Leninist country. The designation as such a country had
prohibited Afghanistan from receiving Export-Import Bank
guarantees, insurance, or credits for purchases under Sec. 8 of the
1986 Export-Import Bank Act, which amended Section 2(b)(2) of
the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 (P.L. 79-173, 12 U.S.C. 635).
However, President George H.W. Bush’s determination was not
implemented before he left office.
!
President Bush’s October 7, 1992 determination (93-3) also found
that assistance to Afghanistan under Section 620D of the Foreign
Assistance Act is in the national interest of the United States because
of the change of regime in Afghanistan. The presidential
determination, had it been implemented in regulations, would have
waived restrictions on assistance to Afghanistan provided for in the
Act, as amended [P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2374]; as added by Section
505 of the International Development Cooperation Act of 1979 [P.L.
96-53]. These provisions prohibit foreign assistance to Afghanistan
until it apologizes for the death of U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan
Adolph Dubs, who was kidnapped in Kabul in 1979 and killed when
Afghan police stormed the hideout where he was held, unless the
CRS-32
President determines that such assistance is in the national interest
because of changed circumstances in Afghanistan.
!
On May 3, 2002, President Bush restored normal trade treatment to
the products of Afghanistan. Section 552 of the Foreign Assistance
Appropriations for FY1986 [P.L. 99-190] authorized the President
to deny any U.S. credits or most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff status
for Afghanistan. Under that law, on February 18, 1986, the height
of the Soviet occupation, President Reagan had issued Presidential
Proclamation 5437, suspending (MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan
(51 F.R. 4287).
!
On March 31, 1993, President Clinton, on national interest grounds,
waived restrictions provided for in Section 481 (h) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended [P.L. 87-195]; as amended and
restated by Section 2005(a) of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
[P.L. 99-570]. The waiver was renewed in 1994. Mandatory
sanctions include bilateral aid cuts and suspensions, including denial
of Ex-Im Bank credits; the casting of negative U.S. votes for
multilateral development bank loans; and a non-allocation of a U.S.
sugar quota. Discretionary sanctions included denial of Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP); additional duties on country exports
to the United States; and curtailment of air transportation with the
United States. On February 25, 2002, President Bush waived
restrictions on FY2002 aid to Afghanistan under this Act.
!
On June 14, 1996, Afghanistan was formally added to the list of
countries prohibited from receiving exports or licenses for exports
of U.S. defense articles and services. This amended the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 CFR Part 121 et seq.) under the
authority of Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended
(P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2778) by adding Afghanistan at Section
126.1 of 22 CFR Part 126.
!
In a ruling largely redundant with the one above, on May 15, 1997,
the State Department designated Afghanistan under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104132), as a state that is not cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism
efforts. The designation, made primarily because of Taliban’s
harboring of bin Laden, makes Afghanistan ineligible to receive U.S.
exports of items on the U.S. Munitions List. The designation was
repeated every year since 1997.
!
On July 4, 1999, the President declared a national emergency with
respect to Taliban because of its hosting of bin Laden, and issued
Executive order 13129 that imposed sanctions. The sanctions
include the blocking of Taliban assets and property in the United
States, and a ban on U.S. trade with Taliban-controlled areas of
Afghanistan. On August 10, 1999, the Administration determined
that Ariana Afghan Airlines was a Taliban entity.
That
CRS-33
determination triggered a blocking of Ariana assets (about $500,000)
in the United States and a ban on U.S. citizens’ flying on the airline.
Now that the Taliban has lost power, this ban has ended
!
On October 15, 1999, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution
1267. See section on the harboring of bin Laden for the sanctions
imposed under this resolution.
!
As noted above, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333 of
December 19, 2000, imposed a number of new sanctions against the
Taliban. For the provisions, see the section on the harboring of bin
Laden. As noted, this sanction was narrowed to penalize only Al
Qaeda by virtue of the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution
1390 of January 17, 2002.
Zaranj
Deshu
Sinjiri
Qalat
Shab Juy
Jaldak
Darwazgai
Qandahar
Tarin
Kowt
Ghazni
Skazar
Warsaj
Bahárak
Faizabad
Kabul
Pakistan
Zareh
Sharan
Gardeyz
Jalalabad
Khyber
Pass
Tajikistan
Asadabad
Raqi
Mehtarlam
Baraki
Charikar
Kowt-e
Ashrow
Taloqan
Baghlan
Konduz
Dowshi
Mushaki
Panjab
Bamian
Sayghan
Samangan
Mazar
Balkh Sharif
Kholm
Dowlat Yar
Garghareh
Khannan
Hauz Qala
Shorawak
Lashkar
Gah
Delaram
Badam
Mazar
Teywarah
Shahrak
Chaghcharan
Belcheragh
Qeysar
Meymaneh Tokzar
Sheberghan
Andkhvoy
Aqcheh
Map adapted by CRS from Magellan Geographix.
Iran
Bala
Morghab
Qal'eh-ye Now
Pulalak
Khash
Lash-e-Joveyn
Farah
Herat
Karokh
Qal'eh-ye Fath
Anar
Darreh
Shindand
Rowzanak
Koshkekohneh
Towraghondi
Kushka
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Map of Afghanistan
CRS-34
Langar
India
China