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Latin America: Terrorism Issues

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Order Code RS21049 Updated October 13, 2001January 14, 2005 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Latin America: Terrorism Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy Mark P. Sullivan Specialist in Latin American Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Summary Latin American nations strongly condemned the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and WashingtonIn the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C., U.S. attention to terrorism in Latin America intensified, with an increase in bilateral and regional cooperation. Latin American nations strongly condemned the attacks, and took action through the Organization of American States and the Rio Treaty to strengthen hemispheric cooperation against terrorism and express solidarity with the United States. Many nations are taking actions to investigate possible regional linkages with the Osama bin Laden terrorist network, and to ensure that their financial sectors are not being used by terrorists. In the aftermath of the attacks, U.S. policy toward the region will likely include a re-invigorated security agenda, with the development of new cooperative mechanisms against terrorism. The terrorist attacks will have implications in several areas, including the extent of hemispheric cooperation against terrorism, anti-money laundering efforts, Andean counter-narcotics strategy, the trade agenda, regional economic stability, and policy toward Mexico and Cuba. Background As in other parts of the world, the United States has assisted Latin American and Caribbean nations in their struggle against terrorist or insurgent groups indigenous to the region. These groups generally attempt to influence or overthrow elected governments, and may use terrorist methods (the killing of noncombatants) to achieve their political objectives. The Department of State has designated five groups in the region as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs): three in Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the paramilitary United SelfDefense Forces of Colombia (AUC); and two in Peru, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path or SL) and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). The Peruvian government significantly weakened the forces of the Shining Path and MRTA in the 1990s, so that these groups no longer pose a threat to the elected government. In Colombia, the FARC and to a lesser degree the ELN, do pose threats to the government, and both have been involved in attacks against the police and military as well as the civilian population. The paramilitary AUC, which was designated by Secretary of State Colin Powell as a FTO on September 10, 2001, has carried out numerous acts of terrorism, including the massacre Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress CRS-2 of hundreds of civilians.1 Official designation of such groups as FTOs triggers a number of sanctions, including visa restrictions and the blocking of any funds of these groups in U.S. financial institutions. Of the five designated FTOs in Latin America, only the FARC is reported to have links with terrorist groups outside the region. In August 2001, the Colombian government arrested three suspected members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) who were reported to be training FARC guerrillas, but both the IRA and Sinn Fein, the political affiliate of the IRA, have denied involvement with the FARC.2 At least one report speculates that the FARC also is a logistics partner of the radical Islamic group Lebanon-based Hizballah (Party of God) that also is reported to operate out of the tri-border region of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay.3 Allegations have linked Hizballah to two bombings in Argentina: the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy that killed 30 people, and the 1994 bombing of the Jewish cultural center (AMIA) in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people. In recent years, U.S. concerns have grown over illicit activities in the tri-border area and the potential link to terrorism. According to the State Department’s April 2001 Patterns of Global Terrorism, the tri-border region is “a focal point for Islamic extremism in Latin America.” The Department of State includes Cuba on its list of states sponsoring terrorism which consists primarily of Middle Eastern countries. According to the April 2001 Patterns of Global Terrorism, Cuba continues to provide safehaven to several terrorists and U.S. fugitives and maintains ties to other state sponsors of terrorism and Latin American insurgents, including Colombia’s FARC and ELN (see “Cuba” section below). In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, attention has focused on potential links in the region to the Osama bin Laden terrorist network. In 1999, press reports indicated that U.S. intelligence analysts believed that bin Laden was planning attacks against a U.S. target in Latin America; an attack against the U.S. Embassy in Uruguay also was reportedly thwarted.4 After the September 2001 attacks, several nations in the region were investigating potential links to the Al-Qaeda network and also the potential use of their financial sectors by the terrorist network. U.S. Policy Before the September attacks, major U.S. policy initiatives toward Latin America included negotiations for a hemispheric free trade agreement, and substantial assistance to Colombia and its Andean neighbors to combat drug trafficking. Relations with Mexico also were elevated under the Bush Administration, with the two countries vowing to work 1 For further information on the FARC, ELN, and AUC, see CRS Report RL30330, Colombia: Conditions and U.S. Policy Options, by Nina Serafino. 2 Shawn Pogatchnik, “Sinn Fein Leader Denies Ties to Trio,” Sun Sentinel (Fort Lauderdale), August 30, 2001; and Linus Gregoriadis and Melissa Kite, Times of London, September 20, 2001. 3 4 “FARC and Hezbollah Behind Embassy Closures?,” Stratfor Intelligence, April 9, 2001. Juan O. Tamayo, “U.S. Suspects Mideast Group Planning Attacks in Americas, Arrested Pair Tied to Figure in Bombings,” Miami Herald, February 10, 1999, p. 4A.; “Nation in Brief Report: U.S. Foils 7 Bin Laden Attacks,” Atlanta Journal, February 24, 1999, p. A10. CRS-3 toward a migration agreement on the status of undocumented Mexicans in the United States. Although terrorism has not traditionally been the main focus of U.S. policy in the region, U.S. efforts to combat it have included anti-terrorism assistance, law enforcement cooperation, and multilateral efforts through the Organization of American States (OAS). Through the Department of State, the United States has provided Anti-Terrorism Assistance training and equipment to Latin American countries to help improve their capabilities in such areas as airport security management and bomb detection and deactivation. Such training was expanded to Argentina in the aftermath of the two bombings allegedly linked to Hizballah. Assistance was also stepped up in 1997 to Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay in light of increased U.S. concern over illicit activities in the tri-border area of those countries. Since the 1994 Summit of the Americas, the United States has worked multilaterally to increase cooperation on anti-terrorism efforts in the region. An Inter-American Committee on Terrorism (CICTE), which held its first meeting in 1999, was established within the OAS as a mechanism for greater cooperation against terrorism in the hemisphere. Although current U.S. military and economic support for Colombia and other Andean nations is focused on efforts to combat drug traffickers, the U.S. strategy also affects the Colombian insurgents and paramilitaries because it contributes to cutting off a major source of revenue that helps fund those groups’ violent activities. At the same time, U.S. policy toward Colombia has been supportive of the Colombian government’s efforts to negotiate with the insurgents for a resolution to the civil conflict in that country. Policy Implications of the September 11 Attacks In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, U.S. policy toward the region will likely include a re-invigorated security agenda, with the development of new cooperation mechanisms to combat terrorism in the region. Some observers fear that other U.S.-Latin American policy issues will receive considerably less attention as the security agenda receives priority. Others believe that the new focus on terrorism is vital to U.S. security and could solidify U.S. ties with the region. Some also fear that human rights and democracy conditions on U.S. assistance to the region could be lifted or amended without consideration of the influence such conditions give the United States in promoting respect for human rights and the rule of law. Others believe that U.S. support for democracy and the rule of law in the region has broad acceptance, and see no sign that it will be sacrificed. Enhanced Hemispheric Cooperation. The OAS, which happened to be meeting in Peru on September 11, 2001, swiftly condemned the attacks, reiterated the need to strengthen hemispheric cooperation to combat terrorism, and expressed full solidarity with the United States. At a special session on September 19, 2001, OAS members invoked the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the Rio Treaty, which obligates signatories of the treaty to come to one another’s defense in case of outside attack. Another resolution approved on September 21, 2001, called on Rio Treaty signatories to “use all legally available measures to pursue, capture, extradite, and punish those individuals” involved in the attacks and to “render additional assistance and support to the United States, as appropriate, to address the September 11 attacks, and also to prevent future terrorist acts.” Although Canada and most Englishspeaking Caribbean nations are not parties to the Rio Treaty, it is expected that they will CRS-4 participate in efforts to coordinate hemispheric action. In another resolution, the OAS called on the Inter-American Committee on Terrorism to identify urgent actions aimed at strengthening inter-American cooperation in order to combat and eliminate terrorism in the hemisphere. Some observers maintain that the OAS actions, although important symbolically, remain vague. They assert that concrete actions such as stronger border controls and enforcement against money laundering and other illicit activities are needed. Speaking at the OAS on September 21, 2001, Secretary of State Powell urged concrete collective and individual steps in the region “to tighten border controls, enhance air and seaport security, improve financial controls and increase the effectiveness of our counter-terrorism forces.”5 According to some analyses, the unanimous invocation of the Rio Treaty masks underlying tensions in the region over the extent of Latin American solidarity with the United States. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez reportedly was persuaded only at the last minute by Brazil to agree to invoke the treaty. Concerns about the concept of nonintervention remain strong in many Latin American countries. As evidence, several Latin American nations, while pledging solidarity with the United States, also announced that they would not offer military support to the United States against Afghanistan. Moreover, polls in Mexico and Brazil reflect public opposition to a U.S. military response to the September attacks.6 Money Laundering. In light of the attacks, Latin American and Caribbean cooperation with the United States on money laundering will likely become a litmus test for solidarity with the United States against terrorism. Money laundering in the region has been a major U.S. concern for some 20 years, largely because of its association with drug traffickers, but terrorist organizations may also be involved in money laundering as a means of hiding their financial assets. There already have been some reports of Middle East terrorist groups engaging in financial activities in Latin America, particularly in the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. According to the Department of State’s March 2001 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 15 nations in the region are countries of primary concern to the United States because of their vulnerability to money laundering: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Brazil, Cayman Islands, Colombia, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In the aftermath of the attacks, many nations in the region are searching for assets of the bin Laden network that might be hidden in their financial sectors and moving to adopt more stringent anti-money laundering measures.7 Andean Regional Strategy. It is unlikely that the Administration will diverge from its support of Colombia and its Andean neighbors through the “Andean Regional 5 “U.S. Secretary of State, at OAS, Cites Need for Action Against Terrorism,” U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs, Washington File, September 21, 2001. 6 “War on Terrorism, Mexicans and Brazilians Are Neutral,” U.S. Department of State, Office of Research, Latin America Opinion Alert, September 26, 2001. 7 Michael M. Phillips, “Global Allies Answer U.S.’s Call to Freeze Assets of Suspected Terrorist Operations,” Wall Street Journal, October 1, 2001. CRS-5 Initiative” (the successor to Plan Colombia) that will provide substantial military, economic, and counter-narcotics assistance to the region.8 Current U.S. policy toward Colombia supports the Pastrana government’s efforts to resolve the civil conflict peacefully, and only indirectly addresses the insurgency issue by helping Colombia to cut off drug production, one of the insurgents’ major sources of revenue. In the aftermath of the September 2001 attacks, however, increasingly violent actions by the FARC terrorist group, such as the killing of a popular former Minister of Culture in late September 2001, could ultimately result in more explicit U.S. support for stronger action against the FARC. Such a policy change, however, would depend on the Colombian government’s stance, the reaction of Colombia’s neighbors, and whether the U.S. Congress would approve of direct support to Colombia against the insurgents. Moreover, it is not clear that the Bush Administration would want to expand the U.S. role in Colombia when most efforts will be centered on dealing with the threat from radical Islamic groups in the Near East. Trade Agenda. With U.S. policy now focused on terrorism threats emanating from the Near East, some fear that the Administration‘s trade agenda for the region could loose steam. While the Administration has urged Congress to complete action on trade promotion authority, also known as fast track authority, strong differences remain between Democrats and Republicans in Congress over labor and environment provisions. United States Trade Representative Robert Zoellick has argued that Congress should move forward with approving fast track and other pending trade measures as a tool in the battle against terrorism. He argues that such measures would help build an alliance against terrorism through the advancement of such values as the rule of law and economic openness.9 Others, however, have questioned the Administration’s linkage of trade measures with the war on terrorism, and believe that such attempts to spur legislative passage of fast track could backfire. Fast track authority is closely related to the Administration’s success in negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which hemispheric leaders have agreed to create by 2005. Some believe that it will be difficult to conduct serious FTAA negotiations until the Administration secures fast track authority. Another issue on the trade agenda this year is the reauthorization, and potential expansion, of the Andean Trade Preference Act, a preferential trade program for imports from four Andean countries. The pact expires on December 4, 2001, and some are concerned that efforts to expand the program will not receive adequate consideration. Regional Economic Decline. The economic slowdown in the United States, exacerbated by the September terrorist attacks, will undoubtedly intensify economic problems that Latin American nations were already facing. Economic growth prospects for much of the region will be severely affected by the U.S. slowdown, particularly in those countries dependent on the U.S. market for export growth. Before the attacks, Argentina was facing its fourth year of recession, and it will continue to have problems making payments on its $130 billion in foreign debt. Brazil’s currency continued to depreciate this year and sank further after the attacks. Mexico has been hard hit by a free fall in the number of U.S. tourists after September 11, and by the significant slowdown in border crossings. Caribbean nations, many dependent on tourism, have faced dramatic declines in U.S. visitors. Although economic prospects for much of the region will depend on the 8 For more information, see CRS Report RL31016, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002 Assistance for Colombia and Its Neighbors, by K. Larry Storrs and Nina Serafino. 9 Robert B. Zoellick, “Countering Terror with Trade,” Washington Post, September 20, 2001. CRS-6 U.S. economy, some observers believe that the Bush Administration needs to take a proactive approach, such as engaging the region’s finance ministers and financial institutions in order “to forestall further economic deterioration and prevent financial crisis.”10 Mexico. Before the crisis, Mexico’s new president, Vicente Fox, had forged a high profile relationship with the United States, but changed U.S. priorities raise questions about key items on President Fox’s agenda. In an effort to thwart criticism that Mexico has not expressed its support strongly enough for the United States in the aftermath of the attacks, President Fox visited President Bush in Washington on October 4, 2001. The two leaders declared their solidarity on anti-terrorism issues and vowed to continue cooperating on bilateral issues that were discussed during President Fox’s state visit to Washington in early September 2001, such as border security and safety and migration issues. Because of its shared border with the United States, Mexico’s cooperation on tighter border controls will be key to the U.S. homeland defense strategy, and in this regard, close cooperation with Mexico could be an integral part of the new U.S. security agenda. But the new security environment has diminished prospects for President Fox’s proposal to provide legal rights to millions of undocumented Mexicans in the United States. Progress on the issue seems unlikely while U.S. attention is focused on security concerns. Moreover, the new security environment will most likely increase pressure in the United States to delay implementation of NAFTA provisions that would give Mexico truckers access to U.S. highways.11 Cuba. Cuba was added to the State Department’s list of states sponsoring international terrorism in 1982 for its complicity with the M-19 insurgent group in Colombia. The Communist government led by Fidel Castro had a history of supporting revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa, but in 1992 Castro said that his country’s support for insurgents abroad was a thing of the past. Most analysts accept that Cuba’s policy did indeed change, largely because the breakup of the Soviet Union resulted in the loss of billions in annual subsidies to Cuba. Cuba remains on the terrorism list today because it provides safehaven to several Basque ETA terrorists from Spain as well as U.S. fugitives from justice, according to the State Department’s April 2001 Patterns of Global Terrorism report. Moreover, the report asserts that Cuba maintains ties to other state sponsors of terrorism and to two Colombian insurgent groups, the FARC and the ELN. Some observers believe that Cuba should no longer be on the terrorism list since it does not actively support foreign terrorism, while others maintain that Cuba should stay on the list for the reasons cited by the State Department. Whether Cuba remains on the terrorism list or not, the change in congressional priorities in the aftermath of the attack could diminish legislative support that had been building for a change in the sanctions-based policy toward Cuba. Fidel Castro’s remark that the attacks were in part a consequence of the United States having applied “terrorist methods” for years may also influence congressional attitudes.12 10 Peter Hakim, “Don’t Forget Latin America,” Christian Science Monitor, October 2, 2001. 11 See CRS Issue Brief IB10070, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for the 107th Congress, by K. Larry Storrs. 12 Andrew Cawthorne, “Cuba’s Castro Urges U.S. to Keep Calm,” Reuters, September 11, 2001(OAS) to strengthen hemispheric cooperation. In June 2002, OAS members signed an Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism. President Bush submitted the convention to the Senate in November 2002 for its advice and consent, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a public hearing on June 17, 2004. In its annual report on worldwide terrorism, the State Department highlights threats in Colombia, Peru, and the tri-border region of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. The State Department also has designated four terrorist groups (three in Colombia and one in Peru) as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and Cuba has been listed as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1982. Terrorism in Latin America: U.S. Concerns Over the years, the United States has been concerned about threats to Latin American and Caribbean nations from various terrorist or insurgent groups that have attempted to influence or overthrow elected governments. While Latin America has not been the focal point in the war on terrorism, countries in the region have struggled with domestic terrorism for decades and international terrorist groups have at times used the region as a battleground to advance their causes. The State Department’s annual report, Patterns of Global Terrorism, highlights U.S. concerns about terrorist threats around the world, including in Latin America. The most recent Patterns report, issued in April 2004, notes that the international terrorist threat in the Western Hemisphere remained low in 2003, compared to other regions of the world. The report describes terrorist activities in the region in 2003, most notably in Colombia, Peru, and the tri-border region of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. The report also examines activity by Cuba, which has been designated by the State Department as a state-sponsor of terrorism since 1982. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in September 2001, U.S. attention focused on potential links in the region to the Al Qaeda terrorist network, especially in the tri-border region. The Patterns report maintained that although there continued to be reports in Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress CRS-2 2003 of an al-Qaeda presence in the tri-border region, “these reports remain uncorroborated by intelligence and law-enforcement officials.” There were increased concerns in 2004 about Al Qaeda threats in Latin America. Honduras declared a terror alert on August 23, 2004, after receiving information that Al Qaeda reportedly was attempting to recruit Hondurans to attack U.S. and other embassies.1 In June, Honduran officials said that a suspected terrorist cell leader, Adman G. El Shukrijumah had been spotted at an Internet café. In August, El Salvador received threats from an Islamic extremist group to carry out attacks in the country if it did not pull its troops out of Iraq. Some press reports have alleged that Al-Qaeda may be attempting to use a Salvadoran criminal gang, the Mara Salvatrucha, to infiltrate the U.S.-Mexico border, although Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge maintained on September 27, 2004, that there was no indication of such infiltration along the border.2 Colombia. Colombia remains of paramount concern to the United States because of the threat to democracy posed by three groups that have been designated by the Secretary of State as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs): two leftist guerrilla groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), and a rightist paramilitary group, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). The three groups target elected government officials and civilians with their attacks, with international human rights groups denouncing the massacres, assassinations, political kidnappings, forced displacements, and forced recruitment of minors by all three groups. While the Patterns report noted that Colombia suffered many large and small domestic terrorist attacks in 2003, it noted that the government’s security strategy provided substantial achievements by decreasing murders by 16% and kidnappings by 30%. The FARC and AUC have been heavily involved in drug trafficking, which has been the key to their growth over past decade. In February 2003, a U.S. civilian contractor and a Colombian national were murdered by the FARC after their plane crashed. The FARC is also holding hostage three U.S. contractors from that plane crash. (For more on Colombia, see CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Issues for Congress.) Peru. Peru is another country of concern. The Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso or SL) insurgency, which the Department of State has designated a FTO, was significantly weakened in the 1990s with the capture of its leader Abimael Guzman, but in 2001 and 2002 terrorist acts committed by the group increased from previous years. The group was allegedly responsible for a March 2002 car bomb across from the U.S. Embassy, in which ten Peruvians were killed, including security personnel protecting the embassy. Eight SL members remain in custody for the bombing. In 2003, however, the Patterns report noted that there was a 15% reduction in terrorist acts committed by the Shining Path. Tri-Border Region. In recent years, U.S. concerns have increased over activities of the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group Hizballah (Party of God) and the Sunni Muslim Palestinian group Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) in the tri-border region of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, which has a large Muslim population. According to 1 2 “Honduras: Terror Alert Issued After Al-Qaida Tip-Off,” Latinnews-Daily, August 24, 2004. “U.S. Officials Dispute Al Qaeda Role in Hemisphere,” Homeland Security Monitor (Intellibridge), September 30, 2004; Jerry Seper, “Al Qaeda Seeks Tie to Local Gangs.” Washington Times, September 28, 2004. CRS-3 the Patterns report, the tri-border region “has long been characterized as a regional hub for Hizballah and Hamas fundraising activities, but it is also used for arms and drug trafficking, contraband smuggling, document and currency fraud, money laundering, and the manufacture and movement of pirated goods.” As noted above, the Patterns report maintained that reports of an al-Qaeda presence in the tri-border region remain uncorroborated. Allegations have linked Hizballah to two bombings in Argentina: the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 30 people and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires that killed 86 people. The Patterns report noted that investigations into the two bombings continued in 2003 and that the trial of suspects in the AMIA bombing was nearing an end. On September 2, 2004, however, five suspects (including four Argentine police officers) were acquitted as accessories in the AMIA bombing. The acquittal prompted protests by Argentina’s large Jewish community. (For additional information on Argentina, see CRS Report RS21113, Argentina: Political Conditions and U.S. Relations.) Cuba. The Department of State includes Cuba among its list of six states sponsoring terrorism (the other six states are Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria). Cuba was added to the list in 1982 for its complicity with the M-19 insurgent group in Colombia. The Communist government led by Fidel Castro had a history of supporting revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa, but in 1992, Castro said that his country’s support for insurgents abroad was a thing of the past. Most analysts accept that Cuba’s policy generally did change, largely because the breakup of the Soviet Union resulted in the loss of billions in subsidies. According to the April 2004 Patterns report, although Cuba ratified all 12 international counterterrorism conventions in 2001, it has remained opposed to the U.S.led global coalition against terrorism and “actively condemned many associated U.S. policies and actions throughout 2003.” The State Department report also noted that Cuba continued to host several members of FTOs as well as some U.S. fugitives from justice. The report maintained that Cuba provides safehaven to up to 20 Basque ETA terrorists from Spain and has provided “some degree of safehaven and support” to members of two Colombian insurgent groups, the FARC and the ELN. The report acknowledged, however, that Colombia acquiesced to having the two groups in Cuba; it also noted that Colombia has publicly said that it wants Cuba’s continued mediation with the ELN in Cuba. With regard to the ETA members, the report cited a Cuban declaration in May 2003 that maintained that the ETA presence in Cuba stemmed from a request from Spain and Panama and that the issue is a bilateral matter between Cuba and Spain. In general, those who support keeping Cuba on the terrorism list argue that there is ample evidence that Cuba supports terrorism. They point to the government’s history of supporting terrorist acts and armed insurgencies in Latin America and Africa. They point to the government’s continued hosting of members of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice. Critics of retaining Cuba on the terrorism list maintain that it is a holdover of the Cold War. They argue that domestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list and maintain that Cuba’s presence on the list diverts U.S. attention from struggles against serious terrorist threats. For further information, see CRS Report RL3225, Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, and CRS Report RL31740, Cuba: Issues for the 108th Congress. CRS-4 U.S. Policy As in other parts of the world, the United States has assisted Latin American and Caribbean nations over the years in their struggle against terrorist or insurgent groups indigenous to the region. For example, in the 1980s, the United States supported the government of El Salvador with significant economic and military assistance in its struggle against a leftist guerrilla insurgency. In recent years, the United States has employed various policy tools to combat terrorism in the Latin America and Caribbean region, including sanctions, anti-terrorism assistance and training, law enforcement cooperation, and multilateral cooperation through the OAS. Moreover, given the nexus between terrorism and drug trafficking, one can argue that assistance aimed at combating drug trafficking organizations in the region has also been a means of combating terrorism by cutting off a source of revenue for terrorist organizations. The same argument can be made regarding efforts to combat money laundering in the region. Although terrorism was not the main focus of U.S. policy toward the region in recent years, attention increased in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. Anti-terrorism assistance has increased along with bilateral and regional cooperation against terrorism. In 2002, Congress approved the Bush Administration’s request to expand the scope of U.S. assistance to Colombia beyond a counternarcotics focus to also include counter-terrorism assistance to the government in its military efforts against drug-financed leftist guerrillas and rightist paramilitaries. As noted above, the United States has imposed sanctions on three groups in Colombia (ELN, FARC, and AUC) and one group in Peru (SL) designated by the Department of State as Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTOs). Official designation of such groups as FTOs triggers a number of sanctions, including visa restrictions and the blocking of any funds of these groups in U.S. financial institutions. The designation also has the effect of increasing public awareness about these terrorist organizations and the concerns that the United States has about them. Through the Department of State (Diplomatic Security Office, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance), the United States provides Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) training and equipment to Latin American countries to help improve their capabilities in such areas as airport security management, hostage negotiations, bomb detection and deactivation, and countering terrorism financing. Such training was expanded to Argentina in the aftermath of the two bombings in 1992 and 1994. Assistance was also stepped up in 1997 to Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay in light of increased U.S. concern over illicit activities in the tri-border area of those countries. ATA funding is generally provided through the annual foreign operations appropriations measure. For FY2001, $4.7 million in ATA training was provided to Western Hemisphere countries. In FY2002, a total of $27.5 million was provided for the region, with $25 million for an anti-kidnapping program in Colombia (appropriated through an FY2002 supplemental appropriations measure, P.L. 107-206) and $2.5 million for the regular Western Hemisphere program. For FY2003, the Administration’s $3.6 million in ATA assistance was provided for the region, with $3.3 million of that for Colombia. For FY2004, an estimated $2.6 million in ATA assistance was provided for the Western Hemisphere, while the Administration requested $5.2 million for FY2005, including $1 million for the tri-border region and $3.9 million for Colombia. CRS-5 The United States also works closely with the governments of the tri-border region — Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay — through the “3 + 1 regional cooperation mechanism,” which serves as a forum for counterterrorism cooperation and prevention among all four countries. Money laundering in the region has been a major U.S. concern for some 20 years, largely because of its association with drug traffickers, but terrorist organizations may also be involved in money laundering as a means of hiding their financial assets. The United States works through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a multilateral antimoney laundering body, to help develop and promote policies to combat money laundering worldwide. According to the Department of State’s March 2004 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 13 nations in the region are jurisdictions of primary concern to the United States because of their vulnerability to money laundering. These are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Brazil, Cayman Islands, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Increased Regional Cooperation Since 9/11. Latin American nations strongly condemned the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington and took action through the OAS and the Rio Treaty to strengthen hemispheric cooperation against terrorism. The OAS, which happened to be meeting in Peru at the time, swiftly condemned the attacks, reiterated the need to strengthen hemispheric cooperation to combat terrorism, and expressed full solidarity with the United States. At a special session on September 19, 2001, OAS members invoked the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the Rio Treaty, which obligates signatories to the treaty to come to one another’s defense in case of outside attack. Another resolution approved on September 21, 2001, called on Rio Treaty signatories to “use all legally available measures to pursue, capture, extradite, and punish those individuals” involved in the attacks and to “render additional assistance and support to the United States, as appropriate, to address the September 11 attacks, and also to prevent future terrorist acts.” In another resolution, the OAS called on the Inter-American Committee on Terrorism (CICTE) to identify urgent actions aimed at strengthening inter-American cooperation in order to combat and eliminate terrorism in the hemisphere. The CICTE was reinvigorated in the aftermath of 9/11, and has cooperated on border security mechanisms, controls to prevent funding of terrorist organizations, and law enforcement and counterterrorism intelligence and information. At a January 2003 CICTE meeting in El Salvador, OAS members issued the Declaration of San Salvador, which condemned terrorism and pledged to strengthen hemispheric cooperation through a variety of border, customs, and financial control measures. At the conference, the United States pledged $1 million to the OAS to help the growth of CICTE “as a technical body devoted to increasing counterterrorism expertise in the Americas.”3 In June 2002, OAS members signed a newly completed Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism. Signing the treaty for the United States, Secretary of State Powell said that the OAS had “produced the first new international treaty since September 11 targeted 3 U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs, “U.S. Donates $1 Million to Combat Terrorism in Western Hemisphere,” Washington File, January 22, 2003. CRS-6 at improving our ability to combat terrorism.”4 The Convention, among other measures, would improve regional cooperation against terrorism, commit parties to sign and ratify U.N. anti-terrorism instruments and take actions against the financing of terrorism, and deny safe haven to suspected terrorists. On October 27-28, 2003, the OAS held a Special Conference on Security in Mexico City that focused on identifying new threats, concerns, and challenges facing the hemisphere and agreed on a cooperative approach toward addressing them. Among the threats identified in the adopted Declaration on Security in the Americas were “terrorism, transnational organized crime, the global drug problem, corruption, asset laundering, illicit trafficking in weapons and the connections among these activities.”5 Congressional Action. President Bush submitted the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism to the Senate on November 12, 2002, for its advice and consent, and the treaty was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Treaty Doc. 107-18). The committee held a public hearing on the treaty on June 17, 2004. The 108th Congress called for two reports from the Administration regarding terrorist activities in Latin America. The FY2005 Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-375), enacted into law October 28, 2004, required a report within 180 days from the Secretary of Defense on the activities of Al Qaeda and associated groups in Latin America and the Caribbean (Section 1047) and a report within 60 days from the Secretary of State regarding any relationships between foreign governments or organizations and terrorist groups in Colombia (Section 1021). The 108th Congress also expressed concern regarding the continuing investigation into the July 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires. Both the House and the Senate approved similar resolutions — H.Con.Res. 469 (Ros-Lehtinen) and S.Con.Res. 126 (Coleman) — on July 22, 2004, that, among other provisions, urge Argentina to provide resources to investigate all areas of the AMIA case, encourage U.S. law enforcement support, and encourage the establishment of an OAS task force to assist in the investigation. 4 U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs, “Transcript: Powell Stresses Security at OAS General Assembly,” Washington File, June 3, 2002. 5 Organization of American States. Declaration on Security in the Americas. October 28, 2003.