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Updated June 18, 2024
The U.S. Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW):
Dark Eagle
What Is the Army’s Long-Range
Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) system, which can be
Hypersonic Weapon?
fired from both surface vessels and submarines.
The Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW),
also known as Dark Eagle (Figure 1), with a reported range
Common Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB)
of 1,725 miles, consists of a ground-launched missile
The C-HGB is reportedly based on the Alternate Re-Entry
equipped with a hypersonic glide body and associated
System developed by the Army and Sandia National
transport, support, and fire control equipment. According to
Laboratories. Dynetics, a subsidiary of Leidos, is currently
the Army,
under contract to produce C-HGB prototypes for the Army
and Navy. The C-HGB uses a booster rocket motor to
This land-based, truck-launched system is armed
accelerate to well above hypersonic speeds and then
with hypersonic missiles that can travel well over
jettisons the expended rocket booster. The C-HGB, which
3,800 miles per hour. They can reach the top of the
can travel at Mach 5 or higher on its own, is planned to be
Earth’s atmosphere and remain just beyond the
maneuverable, potentially making it more difficult to detect
range of air and missile defense systems until they
and intercept.
are ready to strike, and by then it’s too late to react.
LRHW Organization and Units
Figure 1. Artist Rendition of a Notional LRHW Unit
The LRHW is organized into batteries. According to the
Army “a LRHW battery consists of four Transporter
Erector Launchers on modified M870A4 trailers, each
equipped with two AUR+Cs (eight in total), one Battery
Operations Center (BOC) for command and control, and a
BOC support vehicle.”
The 5th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment at Joint Base
Lewis-McChord, Washington, was designated to operate
the first battery of eight LRHW missiles. The battalion, also
referred to as a Strategic Long-Range Fires battalion, is part
of the Army’s 1st Multi Domain Task Force (MDTF), a unit
in the Indo Pacific-oriented I Corps stationed at Joint Base
Lewis-McChord, WA. Other LRHW batteries are planned
Source: https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/
for Strategic Long-Range Fires battalions in the remaining
a36421213/army-hypersonic-weapon-1700-mile-range/, accessed
MDTFs scheduled for activation.
November 18, 2021.
LRHW Testing and Program Activities
The Army further notes
According to a 2023 Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
The LRHW system provides the Army a strategic
Study, “U.S. Hypersonic Weapons and Alternatives,”
attack weapon system to defeat Anti-Access/Area
“Extensive flight testing is necessary to shield hypersonic
Denial (A2/AD) capabilities, suppress adversary
missiles’ sensitive electronics, to understand how various
long-range fires, and engage other high payoff/time
materials perform, and predict aerodynamics at sustained
temperatures as high as 3,000° Fahrenheit.”
critical targets. The Army is working closely with
The Army
the Navy in the development of the LRHW. LRHW
originally planned for three flight tests of the LRHW before
the first battery fielding in FY2023. On October 21, 2021,
is comprised of the Common Hypersonic Glide
the booster rocket carrying the C-HGB vehicle reportedly
Body (C-HGB), and the Navy 34.5-inch booster.
failed a test flight, resulting in what defense officials
LRHW Components
characterized as a “no test” as the C-HGB had no chance to
deploy. Reportedly, a June 2022 test of the entire LRHW
Missile
missile also resulted in failure.
The missile component of the LRHW is reportedly being
Flight Test Delays
developed by Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman.
In October 2022, it was reported the Department of Defense
When the hypersonic glide body is attached, it is referred to
(DOD) delayed a scheduled LRHW test in order to “assess
as the Navy-Army All Up Round plus Canister (AUR+C).
the root cause of the June [2022] failure.” Reportedly, the
The missile component serves as the common two-stage
booster for the Army’s LRHW and the Navy’s
https://crsreports.congress.gov
The U.S. Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW): Dark Eagle
delayed test would be rescheduled to the first quarter of
missile deliveries and the fielding of the first
FY2023.
operational LRHW system could be further
delayed.
March 2023 LRHW Test Scrubbed
FY2025 LRHW Budgetary Information
On March 10, 2023, it was reported
Table 1. FY2025 LRHW Budget Request
On March 5, DOD was preparing to execute Joint
Flight Campaign-2 featuring the Army version of
Total Request
the prototype weapon launched at Cape Canaveral
Funding Category
($M)
Space Force Station, FL, when the countdown was
RDT&E
$538
halted.... As a result of pre-flight checks during that
Procurement (Missiles)
$744
event, the test did not occur.
Source: Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and
Cancelled September 2023 LRHW Test and
Comptrol er), U.S. Army FY2025 Budget Highlights, March 2024, p. 33.
Program Delay
Notes: RDT&E = Research, Development, Test & Evaluation; $M =
On September 6, 2023, it was reported
U.S. dollars in mil ions.
The DOD planned to conduct a flight test at the
Considerations for Congress
Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, Florida, to
Possible oversight considerations for Congress could
inform hypersonic technology development. As a
include
result of pre-flight checks, the test did not occur.
LRHW Testing and Fielding Concerns
On September 14, 2023, in an Army statement to
The Army’s November 2023 decision to revise its LRHW
Bloomberg News, the Army reportedly acknowledged it
testing methodology seemingly suggests past testing
would not be able to meet its goal of deploying the LRHW
difficulties might have been more significant than
by the end of FY2023.
previously believed. GAO’s June 2024 report stated that
Change in LRHW Testing Pathway
LRHW fielding would again be delayed – contingent on the
Army successfully achieving a number performance goals
In late November 2023, Navy and Army acquisition
and tests. Another potential concern is, according to GAO,
executives reportedly decided to “revamp efforts to prepare
after a successful test flight “the first production missile
for [LRHW] flight test following three flight test attempts
will be delivered within approximately six weeks and the
this year that were scrubbed because of problems with the
first battery of eight missiles will be delivered within
Lockheed Martin-produced launcher.” The Army’s new
approximately 11 months,” which arguably could be
testing approach will feature subcomponent testing. It was
considered “aggressive” given past LRHW test
also noted the new testing effort was “definitely going to be
months, not weeks,”
performances. In consideration of the LRHW’s
and could possibly run into next
developmental and testing history, policymakers could
summer.
decide to further examine the Army’s LRHW flight test
LRHW Fielding Delayed Until FY2025
plans. One potential issue for examination could be the
Army’s rationale and technical justification for transitioning
According to a June 2024 Government Accountability
the LRHW into production within six weeks of a successful
Office (GAO) report to Congress
test flight. Another concern could be what are the Army’s
contingency plans if the LRHW is unable to overcome
The Army missed its goal of fielding its first LRHW
current “integration challenges.”
battery—including missiles— by fiscal year 2023
due to integration challenges. Based on current test
LRHW Missile Costs
and missile production plans, the Army will not
According to a January 2023 Congressional Budget Office
field its first complete LRHW battery until fiscal
study, “U.S. Hypersonic Weapons and Alternatives,”
year 2025. Before the Army can field an operational
purchasing 300 Intermediate-Range Hypersonic Boost-
system, it must conduct a successful end-to-end
Glide Missiles (similar to the LRHW) was estimated to cost
missile flight test using the Army’s launch system.
$41 million per missile (in 2023 dollars). A January 2023
GAO further notes
Center for Strategic and International Studies report, “The
First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese
Invasion of Taiwan,” noted when discussing hypersonic
The LRHW integration issues discovered during
weapons, contends “their high costs limits inventories, so
testing also affect missile production. The Army
they lack the volume needed to counter the immense
cannot complete the missiles for the first battery
numbers of Chinese air and naval platforms.”
until a successful test demonstrates that the current
design works. LRHW officials stated that once a
Given concerns about how LRHW missile costs could
successful flight test is achieved, the first
influence LRHW inventories, policymakers might decide to
production missile will be delivered within
further examine LRHW missile costs as well as quantities
approximately six weeks and the first battery of
of LRHW missiles needed to support potential combat
eight
missiles
will
be
delivered
within
operations in various theaters of operations.
approximately 11 months. If the Army discovers
issues with missile performance in flight testing,
Andrew Feickert, Specialist in Military Ground Forces
https://crsreports.congress.gov
The U.S. Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW): Dark Eagle
IF11991
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11991 · VERSION 19 · UPDATED