Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S.
May 21, 2024
Relations
Jim Zanotti
U.S. relations with Turkey take place within a complicated geopolitical environment, reflecting
Specialist in Middle
some shared and some divergent perceived national interests. Turkey and other “midsize powers”
Eastern Affairs
such as Saudi Arabia and India seek advantages in a global system with intensifying great-power

competition, thus partly explaining Turkey’s tendency to hedge between the United States and
Clayton Thomas
Russia. Some ongoing U.S.-Turkey disagreements stem from differences in the countries’
Specialist in Middle
respective policies in Syria, and from Turkey’s 2019 procurement of a Russian S-400 surface-to-
Eastern Affairs
air defense system. Nevertheless, U.S. and Turkish officials emphasize the importance of the

bilateral relationship on several foreign policy issues, and the significance of Turkey’s
membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Turkey’s future foreign policy

course could depend partly on the degree to which Turkish leaders feel either strengthened or
constrained by their traditional security and economic ties with Western powers, and how these perceptions drive Turkey’s
approach to its global relationships.
Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its neighboring countries could have implications for
bilateral ties and U.S. political-military options in the region. Congressional initiatives in the past decade have included
conditions on some U.S. arms sales to Turkey, as well as support for certain sanctions against Turkey.
Turkey’s proximity to conflicts in the Middle East and Eurasia has made the continuing availability of its territory valuable
for its allies. U.S. and NATO military personnel operate from several facilities in the country, including Incirlik Air Base in
southern Turkey. Turkey also controls access to and from the Black Sea through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits.
The question of U.S. sales of fighter aircraft and other arms to Turkey has been particularly prominent in executive-
legislative branch engagement since Turkey’s 2019 S-400 acquisition and consequent removal from the F-35 program. In
January 2024, three days after Turkey’s parliament approved NATO accession for Sweden, the Administration formally
notified Congress of a possible $23 billion Foreign Military Sale of 40 new F-16 aircraft, 79 modernization packages for
existing F-16s, and associated munitions—apparently, a major step forward for U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation. After
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s strategic significance for NATO amid an evolving European security crisis may
have contributed to the Administration decision to advance the F-16 transaction. Turkey uses F-16s in NATO missions based
in the Baltic and Mediterranean Sea regions. The advancement of the F-16 sale has prompted some renewed attention in
bilateral relations to the issue of Turkey’s potential acquisition of F-35s. U.S. officials have suggested that sanctions imposed
on Turkey in 2020 for the S-400 acquisition could go away and the F-35 “conversation” can resume if U.S. and Turkish
officials properly address the S-400 issue. While Turkish officials have reportedly placed the S-400 in a storage facility rather
than activating it and risking additional U.S. retaliatory measures, they also have expressed unwillingness to give it up.
Turkish policies on some other key foreign policy issues have relevance for U.S.-Turkey relations:
• Russia and Ukraine. While Turkey’s economic and energy ties with Russia remain a cause for U.S.
concern, its support for Ukraine’s defense after Russia’s 2022 invasion, limitation of Russian naval access
to and from the Black Sea, and emergence as a mediator during the war has arguably increased Turkey’s
importance for U.S. policy.
• Israel and the Palestinians. Since the outbreak of conflict on October 7, 2023 between Israel and the
Palestinian Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization, or FTO), Turkey-
Israel diplomatic and economic ties have come under strain. Turkey placed some restrictions on exports to
Israel in April 2024, and announced an end to all trade with Israel in May. Additionally, Turkey has
continued to provide political support to Hamas, and U.S. officials have imposed sanctions on some alleged
Hamas operatives or funding sources in Turkey.
• Syria. Sources of concern for Turkey include nearly four million Syrian refugees in Turkey and U.S.
efforts to counter the Islamic State by working with Syrian Kurds linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(Kurdish acronym PKK, an FTO). Turkey and allied Syrian armed opposition groups have occupied
various areas of northern Syria since 2016, and Turkey’s military continues to target Kurdish fighters in
Syria and Iraq—apparently also damaging some civilian infrastructure in Syria.
Domestically, many observers voice concerns about the largely authoritarian rule of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who
has led Turkey since 2003 and consolidated his control over time—including after a failed 2016 coup attempt. Despite a
serious electoral challenge in May 2023 during an economic crisis, Erdogan and his party retained power, though the
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government faces allegations of human rights and rule of law violations. With inflation near 70% despite measures over the
past year to counter it, Erdogan’s party lost in March 2024 local elections. Observers speculate about Erdogan’s potential
interest in and prospects for another presidential term in the next national elections, scheduled for 2028.
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Introduction: Bilateral Issues and Congress’s Role
This report provides background information and analysis on key issues affecting U.S.-Turkey
(Türkiye)1 relations, including domestic Turkish developments and various foreign policy and
defense matters. Turkey has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
since 1952. U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that cooperation on regional security matters
remains mutually important,2 despite Turkey’s 2019 acquisition of an S-400 surface-to-air defense
system from Russia and a number of other U.S.-Turkey differences (such as in Syria and on
Cyprus).
Members of Congress may consider legislative and oversight options regarding Turkey with
implications for bilateral ties and U.S. political-military engagement in the region. Congressional
actions in response to Turkish policy decisions diverging from U.S. stances have influenced U.S.-
Turkey relations. For example, Congress authorized sanctions against Turkey and placed
conditions on some arms sales in response to the Turkey-Russia S-400 transaction (see “Potential
F-16 Sale and Other Defense Procurement Issues” below). Future Turkish actions affecting major
issues discussed below could influence how Members approach existing sanctions, possible arms
sales, and other options regarding Turkey.
U.S.-Turkey relations are complex and reflect some shared and some divergent perceived national
interests. Turkey and other “midsize powers” such as Saudi Arabia and India seek advantages in a
global system with intensifying great-power competition, thus partly explaining their tendency to
hedge between the United States and other great powers.3
While Turkey’s continued or deepening ties with Russia in energy and other areas remain a cause
for concern for the Biden Administration and some Members of Congress, Turkey’s support for
Ukraine’s defense and rapprochement with Greece and some Arab states have somewhat
improved U.S.-Turkey relations. A significant sign of this improvement came in January 2024,
when the Administration formally notified Congress of a potential U.S. sale of F-16 aircraft to
Turkey.
The F-16 notification occurred shortly after Turkey’s parliament voted to admit Sweden into the
NATO. Turkey had delayed its approval of NATO membership for Sweden, and previously
Finland, partly because Turkey had demanded the two countries regarding individuals and groups
(including the Kurdistan Workers’ Party [Kurdish acronym PKK], a U.S.-designated foreign
terrorist organization, or FTO) it deems to be terrorists. The delay had fueled U.S.-Turkey
tensions, with some lawmakers expressing doubts about a possible F-16 sale until Turkey
approved the two countries’ NATO accession—first Finland in March 2023, then Sweden in
January 2024.
Turkey continues to conduct operations within Turkey to counter the PKK, which has fought an
on-and-off Kurdish nationalist insurgency with Turkish authorities since 1984, while also
targeting longtime PKK bases in northern Iraq and PKK-linked groups in northern Syria (see

1 In late 2021, President Erdogan directed the use of “Türkiye” (the country’s name in Turkish) in place of “Turkey” in
Turkish government documents and communications. In June 2022, the United Nations accepted the Turkish request to
change the country’s name at the body to “Türkiye.” In January 2023, the State Department spokesperson said that the
department would use the revised spelling “in most formal diplomatic and bilateral contexts” where appropriate. The
U.S. Board on Geographic Names retained both “Turkey” and “Republic of Turkey” as conventional names, and the
spokesperson said that the State Department could use those names if it is in furtherance of broader public
understanding. State Department Press Briefing, January 5, 2023.
2 State Department, “Joint Statement on the U.S.-Türkiye Strategic Mechanism,” March 9, 2024.
3 Stephen Kalin and Summer Said, “Saudi Prince Tests Nonaligned Policy,” Wall Street Journal, March 15, 2023.
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“Syria” below). The Turkish military’s approach to neutralizing the PKK has routinely been
criticized by Western governments and human rights organizations for being overly hard on
ethnic Kurds, who constitute about 19% of Turkey’s population (see Figure 1). Turkish
authorities have imprisoned thousands and displaced or disrupted the livelihoods of hundreds of
thousands of others for suspected PKK involvement or sympathies.4
Figure 1. Turkey at a Glance

Geography
Area: 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas
People
Population: 83,593,483 (2023). Most populous cities: Istanbul 15.8 mil, Ankara 5.4 mil, Izmir 3.1
mil, Bursa 2.1 mil, Adana 1.8 mil, Gaziantep 1.8 mil. (2023)
% of population 14 or younger: 22.1% (2023)
Ethnic groups: Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 6%-11% (2016)
Religion: Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2%
Literacy: 96.7% (male 99.1%, female 94.4%) (2019)
Economy
GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity): $41,841
Real GDP growth: 3.1%
Inflation: 69.8% (as of April 2024)
Unemployment: 9.1%
Budget deficit as % of GDP: 4.5%
Public debt as % of GDP: 34.7%
Current account deficit as % of GDP: 3.1%
Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using State
Department Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2024
projections unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database;

4 See, for example, Cengiz Candar, Turkey’s Mission Impossible: War and Peace with the Kurds, Blue Ridge Summit,
PA: Lexington Books, 2020. See also Amberin Zaman, “Turkey hands Kurdish leaders heavy sentences, dimming
hopes of democratic change,” Al-Monitor, May 16, 2024.
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Economist Intelligence Unit; and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook; and the Turkish
Statistical Institute.
After the outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas in October 2023, Turkey’s ties with Hamas,
Erdogan’s strong criticism of Israel, and some Turkish restrictions on exports to Israel have raised
additional concerns with the Administration and some Members.5 Following Iran’s first-ever
direct attack against Israel on April 13, 2024, Secretary of State Antony Blinken had a call with
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to thank him for his “ongoing engagement to prevent
further escalation in the region.” Reports suggest that Turkey mediated communications between
U.S. and Iranian officials as part of broader efforts to minimize the impact of direct Israel-Iran
conflict.6
For additional information, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S.
Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
Domestic Issues
Political Developments Under Erdogan’s Rule
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (pronounced air-doe-wan) has ruled Turkey since becoming
prime minister in 2003, and has steadily deepened his control over the country’s populace and
institutions. Many observers describe Erdogan as a polarizing figure, and elections have reflected
roughly equal portions of the country supporting and opposing his rule. U.S. and European Union
(EU) officials have expressed a number of concerns about authoritarian governance and erosion
of rule of law and civil liberties in Turkey.7
After Erdogan became president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular presidential
election, he claimed a mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a presidential system of
governance, which he cemented through victories in a 2017 constitutional referendum and 2018
presidential and parliamentary elections. In 2016, rogue military officers staged a coup attempt in
which hundreds were killed and thousands injured, after which the government detained tens of
thousands, enacted sweeping changes to military and civilian agencies, and took over or closed
various businesses, schools, and media outlets. Erdogan has argued, with considerable popular
support, that the Fethullah Gulen movement (see text box below) orchestrated the coup attempt,
which military forces and citizen groups loyal to the government ultimately thwarted.8 Some
leading opposition figures in Turkey have accused Erdogan of planning, controlling, and/or using
the failed coup to suppress dissent and consolidate power. Since the attempt, Erdogan and his
Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym AKP) have adopted more
nationalistic domestic and foreign policy approaches, perhaps partly because of their reliance on
parliamentary support from the Nationalist Movement Party (Turkish acronym MHP).

5 “Türkiye’s Erdogan Rejects US Pressure to Cut Hamas Ties,” Asharq Al-Awsat, December 3, 2023; Emily Jacobs et
al., “U.S. lawmakers call for possible sanctions against Turkey in response to new trade restrictions against Israel,”
Jewish Insider, April 9, 2024.
6 “Iran told Turkey in advance of its operation against Israel, Turkish source says,” Reuters, April 14, 2024.
7 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2023, Turkey; European Commission, Türkiye
2023 Report, November 8, 2023.
8 Gareth Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15: Erdogan’s New Turkey and the Myth of Its Immaculate
Conception,” Turkey Analyst, July 15, 2021; Dorian Jones, “Turkey Looks Back at Failed Coup,” Voice of America,
July 15, 2019. Partly because of Gulen’s residence in the United States, many Turks reportedly subscribe to conspiracy
theories about possible U.S. involvement.
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Fethullah Gulen and Hizmet
Gulen, who was born in Turkey between 1938 and 1941, is a former Turkish state-employed imam who left
Turkey for medical treatment in the United States in 1999 and has reportedly been a permanent U.S. resident
since 2008. Gulen lives in seclusion with some of his adherents at a retreat in Saylorsburg, Pennsylvania. The
Gulen movement or community (commonly known by supporters as Hizmet, or “service” in Turkish) is an array
of individuals, educational institutions, and other organizations in Turkey and abroad with a connection to Gulen
or his teachings. These teachings come from a distinctly Turkish brand of Islam. Over time, Gulen-inspired
schools, businesses, media enterprises, charitable organizations, and civil society groups came to exercise
considerable influence in Turkey. Many observers claim that the movement aligned itself with Erdogan during his
first decade in power, using its social connections, international reach, and media clout to bolster AKP rule at
home and abroad.9 In 2013, after prosecutors brought corruption charges against several people, including some
Turkish officials and others with apparent ties to Erdogan, Erdogan accused Gulen and his loyalists of an il egal
effort to oust elected officials via a “parallel structure” within key state institutions. The Turkish government
designated Gulen’s movement as a terrorist organization in May 2016 and accused it of perpetrating the
unsuccessful July 2016 coup attempt; Gulen and his movement have denied any involvement.10
Erdogan and the AKP have had a mixed electoral track record since his 2018 presidential victory.
In 2019, candidates from the secular-oriented Republican People’s Party (CHP) won the
mayoralties of some major Turkish cities, defeating the AKP, including in Istanbul, Turkey’s
largest city and economic hub, and Ankara, its capital.
With Turkey suffering through an economic crisis and major earthquakes in early 2023, Erdogan
and the AKP were challenged in presidential and parliamentary elections held that May by a
grouping of diverse opposition parties, led by the Republican People’s Party (CHP). Erdogan and
the AKP-led coalition prevailed.
Commenting on the election process for the presidential run-off, a joint Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)-Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
international election observation mission assessed that the election “offered voters a choice
between genuine political alternatives and voter participation remained high, however … biased
media coverage and the lack of a level playing field gave an unjustified advantage to the
incumbent…. In an environment with restrictions on freedom of expression, both private and
public media did not ensure editorial independence and impartiality in their coverage of the
campaign, detracting from the ability of voters to make an informed choice. Election day was
generally calm and well-administered. However, instances of deficient implementation of certain
procedures, particularly during the vote count, were noted.”11 Some analysts challenged whether
the elections could be characterized as free, given the government’s reported use of state
resources and allied media to boost its standing.12

9 Dexter Filkins, “The Deep State,” New Yorker, March 4, 2012.
10 Dylan Matthews, “Turkey’s coup: The Gulen Movement, explained,” Vox, September 13, 2016.
11 OSCE, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Republic of Türkiye—Presidential Election, Second
Round, 28 May 2023 (published May 29, 2023).
12 Soner Cagaptay, “Erdogan cements his power with a victory in Turkey’s presidential runoff election,” Foreign
Affairs, May 29, 2023; Gonul Tol, “Erdogan Won by Exploiting Fear,” Foreign Policy, May 31, 2023. The potential
CHP presidential candidate with possibly the best chance to unseat Erdogan, Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, may
have had his prospects to run in the election undermined by a criminal conviction (under broad laws prohibiting insults
against public officials, and pending final resolution on appeal) that he and other opposition figures claim is politically
motivated. Ben Hubbard and Safak Timur, “Conviction May Sideline Rival of Turkish Leader,” New York Times,
December 15, 2022.
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March 2024 Local Elections
The opposition coalition splintered in the wake of the 2023 defeat, but the CHP rebounded in
March 2024 local elections amid lower turnout and persistent inflation. CHP candidates defended
the Istanbul and Ankara mayoralties that they had won in 2019, and also won in some additional
areas while outpolling the AKP nationwide—the first time another party received more votes than
the AKP in an election it contested (going back to the 2002 national election).
It is unclear what kind of lasting impact the local elections will have on Turkish political
developments. President Erdogan’s five-year presidential term expires in 2028. He said in
advance of the 2024 local races that they would be his “last” election, but some have speculated
that he may seek to remain in office by getting a three-fifths majority of parliament to call early
national elections (which arguably would allow him to run again).13 Another route would be via
constitutional changes; Erdogan has previously talked of his desire to replace the 1982 military
government-era constitution. While Erdogan has come back from previous political reverses and
has four years until the next scheduled national elections, the 2024 local election results may
signal vulnerability in future campaigns.
Economic Issues
For more than a decade, Turkey’s currency (the lira) has been trending downward relative to the
dollar, with its decline probably driven in part by broader concerns by foreign investors about
Turkey’s rule of law and economy.14 It has lost more than 88% of its value against the dollar since
2018, with much of the decrease coming after major interest rate cuts that President Erdogan
backed from 2021 to 2023.15 Official annual inflation reached a 24-year peak of 86% in October
2022.16
The currency and inflation crisis in Turkey has dramatically affected consumers’ cost of living
and the cost of international borrowing (mostly conducted in U.S. dollars) for banks and private
sector companies. The government has sought to lessen the impact of inflation by providing tax
cuts, minimum wage increases, greater access to early retirement benefits, and subsidies for basic
expenses, along with protection for consumers who keep their bank accounts in liras, and
borrowing incentives for banks that hold liras.17 President Erdogan has insisted that Turkey will
not turn to international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for
assistance, after Turkey in 2013 paid off loans that—in the aggregate—had been outstanding for
52 years.18
In the wake of Erdogan’s May 2023 reelection, he named Mehmet Simsek—a prominent AKP
figure and professional economist—as Turkey’s finance minister (his second stint in the position,
after serving from 2009 to 2015). Under Simsek, Turkey’s central bank appears to have returned
to a more orthodox approach to monetary policy in an effort to attract more foreign capital,

13 “Justice minister says Erdoğan could run for presidency again if parliament calls early elections,” Turkish Minute,
March 12, 2024.
14 Mikolaj Rogalewicz, “Economic crisis in Turkey,” Warsaw Institute Review, April 25, 2022.
15 Rumeysa Koc, “Why is the Turkish lira’s value still falling?” Al Jazeera, June 18, 2023.
16 Jared Malsin and Elvan Kivilcim, “Erdogan Faces Big Vote Test as Turkish Economy Suffers,” Wall Street Journal,
April 26, 2023.
17 M. Murat Kubilay, “Already vulnerable, Turkey’s economy now faces massive earthquake recovery costs,” Middle
East Institute, February 13, 2023; “Erdogan offers free gas pre-election after first Black Sea field shipment,” Reuters,
April 23, 2023.
18 “Turkey pays off the last installment of its debt to IMF,” Anadolu Agency, May 14, 2013.
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raising its key interest rate from 8.5% to 50% since Simsek’s appointment. As of April 2024, the
rate remained 19.8% less than official year-on-year inflation of 69.8%.19 Turkey’s modest debt-to-
GDP ratio of around 35%20 may give it some space to increase government spending in efforts to
relieve the effects of inflation and economic slowdown.
Turkey’s manufacturing-based economy has remained relatively resilient and is anchored by its
customs union with the EU. Turkish officials also are continuing efforts to bolster trade and
foreign direct investment with several countries, including multiple Arab Gulf states.21
U.S.-Turkey Economic Cooperation22
Turkey’s economy—the 19th-largest in the world (according to World Bank data for 2022)—presents attractions
and challenges for potential U.S. trade and investment partners. The United States and Turkey have various
bilateral agreements to promote economic cooperation, though no free trade agreement. Bilateral trade volume
for 2022 (per the Department of Commerce) topped $34 bil ion; Turkey seeks to expand it to $100 bil ion.
U.S.-Turkey economic ties account for a small fraction of U.S. international trade and investment. Turkey has a far
closer economic relationship with the EU (with which it has had a customs union on manufactured goods since
1995). In 2023, for merchandise trade, the United States comprised 5.8% of Turkey’s exports and 4.4% of its
imports (per data from the Turkish Statistical Institute). For purposes of comparison, in the same year the EU bloc
comprised 40.8% of Turkey’s exports and 29.3% of its imports. From 2003 to 2021, EU countries provided more
than 50% of foreign direct investment in Turkey, and the United States supplied 8.1%.23
Selected Turkish Foreign Policy Issues
As a more multipolar global system has emerged in the past decade, Turkey has sought greater
independence of action.24 Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and
rivalries with other influential countries as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce
Turkey’s dependence on these actors and maintain its leverage with them.25 Turkey’s future
foreign policy course could depend partly on the degree to which Turkish leaders feel either
strengthened or constrained by their traditional security and economic ties with Western powers,
and how these perceptions drive Turkey’s approach to its global relationships.
The following are some key foreign policy issues with relevance for U.S.-Turkey relations.
U.S./NATO Strategic Relationship and Military Presence
The United States has valued Turkey’s geopolitical importance to and military strength within the
NATO alliance, while viewing Turkey’s NATO membership as helping anchor Turkey to the

19 Ezgi Akin, “Turkey’s annual inflation surges to almost 70% in April,” Al-Monitor, May 3, 2024.
20 Economist Intelligence Unit, Turkey, February 29, 2024.
21 Ezgi Akin, “Turkey, Iraq, UAE, Qatar ink $20B transportation deal during Erdogan visit,” Al-Monitor, April 22,
2024; Andrew England and Adam Samson, “UAE and Turkey sign multibillion-dollar agreements,” Financial Times,
July 19, 2023; Paul Iddon, “How Saudi Arabia and UAE learned to stop worrying and love Turkey’s Bayraktar
drones,” Business Insider, August 6, 2023.
22 See CRS In Focus IF10961, U.S.-Turkey Trade Relations, by Shayerah I. Akhtar.
23 Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, “FDI in Türkiye,” available at https://www.invest.gov.tr/en/whyturkey/pages/
fdi-in-turkey.aspx.
24 Remarks by James Jeffrey, Atlantic Council, “Post election transatlantic relations with Turkey,” May 31, 2023, at
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/post-election-transatlantic-relations-with-turkey/.
25 Nur Ozcan Erbay, “Ankara to use compartmentalization in managing relations,” Daily Sabah, June 24, 2021;
Stephen J. Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and the
U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, 2020.
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West. The State Department’s Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) for Turkey says that its sizable
military (the second-largest in NATO) and its geographic location at the southeastern flank of the
alliance give it a critical role in regional security.26 Turkey’s proximity to conflict in the Middle
East and Eurasia has made the continuing availability of its territory for the stationing and
transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and NATO. In addition to
Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key U.S./NATO sites include an
early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO ground forces command in
Izmir (see Figure 2). Turkey also controls access to and from the Black Sea through the
Bosphorus (alt. Bosporus) and Dardanelles Straits (the Straits).
Figure 2. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey

Sources: Created by CRS using data gathered from the Department of Defense, NATO, and various media
outlets since 2011.
Note: All locations are approximate.
For Turkey, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns about
encroachment by neighbors, such as the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World War II posturing
leading up to the Cold War. Additionally, NATO security guarantees compensate Turkey for a
general lack of nationally owned strategic defense and deterrence capabilities.27 In more recent or
ongoing arenas of conflict like Ukraine and Syria, Turkey’s possible interest in countering
Russian objectives may be partly motivating Turkey’s military operations and arms exports.28

26 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey, May 13, 2022.
27 Can Kasapoglu, “Turkey,” The Nations of NATO: Shaping the Alliance’s Relevance and Cohesion, Thierry Tardy,
ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022, p. 97.
28 Dimitar Bechev, “Russia, Turkey and the Spectre of Regional Instability,” Al Sharq Strategic Research, April 13,
2022; Mitch Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year,” Business Insider, October 22, 2020.
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Some of Turkey’s actions in the 2020s have arguably undermined NATO’s strength and unity. As
discussed above, it delayed approving NATO accession for Sweden and Finland. Additionally, in
2020, Turkey delayed a NATO defense plan for Poland and the Baltic states, before ultimately
agreeing to it. Turkey’s hesitation on the Poland-Baltic defense plan was reportedly related to
efforts to persuade other alliance members to distance themselves from PKK-linked Syrian Kurds
that Turkey views as adversaries.29
Tensions between Turkey and other NATO members during the 2020s have fueled internal
U.S./NATO discussions about the continued use of Turkish bases. Some reports suggest that
expanded or potentially expanded U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, and
Jordan might be connected with concerns about Turkey.30 In March 2022 congressional hearing
testimony, Turkey expert and former congressional committee staff member Alan Makovsky said
that while the United States should make efforts to keep Turkey in the “Western camp,” Turkish
“equivocation in recent years” justifies the United States building and expanding military
facilities in Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece to “hedge its bets.”31
Turkey’s eventual support for Swedish-Finnish NATO accession, and its willingness to join
certain alliance initiatives that appear focused on deterring Russia, may counterbalance the
possible tensions or cohesion issues mentioned above. In April 2024, Turkey suspended its
obligations under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, joining other NATO allies
who had previously taken this step.32
Potential F-16 Sale and Other Defense Procurement Issues
In January 2024, three days after Turkey’s parliament approved Sweden’s NATO accession, the
Biden Administration formally notified Congress of a possible $23 billion Foreign Military Sale
(FMS) that would provide Turkey with 40 new F-16 Block 70 aircraft, “modernize 79 existing F-
16 aircraft to V-Configuration,” and equip the aircraft with munitions.33 (The Administration
notified a possible $8.6 billion FMS of 40 F-35 aircraft to Greece on the same day.34) On
February 11, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake welcomed the end of the Arms Export
Control Act (AECA)-mandated 15-day notification period with a post on X (formerly Twitter):
“Congress’s decision this week to approve Turkiye’s acquisition of 40 new and 79 upgraded F-16
aircraft is a great step forward. Turkiye’s F-16 fleet is critical to NATO’s strength, ensuring future
interoperability among Allies.”35 After the prescribed AECA review period has passed, Congress
can use the regular legislative process to act at any time—up to the point of final delivery—to

29 “NATO puts defence plan for Poland, Baltics into action, officials say,” Reuters, July 2, 2020.
30 “Pentagon pushes back on claim that US to leave Turkey’s Incirlik base,” Al-Monitor, September 16, 2020.
31 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, “Opportunities and
Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation,” House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa and Global Counterterrorism; and Subcommittee on Europe, Energy,
the Environment and Cyber, March 31, 2022, at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/opportunities-and-
challenges-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-examining-u-s-interests-and-regional-cooperation/.
32 Selcan Hacaoglu, “Turkey Joins NATO Allies in Suspending Europe Arms Treaty,” Bloomberg, April 5, 2024.
33 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Türkiye – F-16 Aircraft Acquisition and Modernization,” Transmittal No.
23-07, January 26, 2024. For additional background on the possible sale and congressional views, see CRS Report
R47493, Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
34 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Greece – F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Conventional Take Off and Landing
(CTOL) Aircraft,” Transmittal No. 23-01, January 26, 2024.
35 X, U.S. Embassy Türkiye, February 11, 2024 – 1:25 AM, at
https://twitter.com/USEmbassyTurkey/status/1756565199203475570.
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block, condition, or otherwise influence an arms sale.36 On February 29, a motion to discharge a
proposed joint resolution of disapproval (S.J.Res. 60) regarding the possible F-16 sale from the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee failed in the Senate by a 13-79 vote.37
After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s strategic and military significance for NATO
amid an evolving European security crisis may have contributed to the Administration decision to
advance the F-16 transaction. Turkey uses F-16s in NATO missions based in the Baltic and
Mediterranean Sea regions.38
The advancement of the F-16 sale has prompted some renewed attention in bilateral relations to
the issue of Turkey’s potential acquisition of F-35s. Turkey was an original member of the U.S.-
led F-35 consortium, but was removed in July 2019 due to its procurement of the Russian S-400
surface-to-air defense system.39 Factors that may have influenced Turkey’s S-400 acquisition
include a desire to diversify Turkey’s foreign arms sources, Turkey’s interest in future technology
sharing and coproduction arrangements to bolster its domestic arms defense industry, and
potentially defending against U.S.-origin aircraft such as those used in the 2016 coup attempt.40
Turkey’s S-400 acquisition also led to the Trump Administration imposing some sanctions in
December 2020 on a Turkish defense procurement agency and associated officials for their role in
the transaction, under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
(CAATSA).41 During a January 2024 visit to Turkey, then-Acting Deputy Secretary of State
Victoria Nuland was quoted as saying, “If we can get through this issue, then the CAATSA issue
will go away, and we can get back into an F-35 conversation.”42 Despite this overture, Turkish
officials have indicated that they intend to keep the S-400.43 The FY2020 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92) includes a provision (Section 1245) prohibiting the
Defense Department from transferring F-35s to Turkey unless Turkey no longer possesses the S-
400. Turkish officials have reportedly placed the S-400 in a storage facility rather than activating
it and risking additional U.S. retaliatory measures.44
Turkish officials have expressed interest in acquiring 40 Eurofighter Typhoon fighter aircraft, in
addition to the F-16s.45 In doing so, Turkey would follow a practice that several other U.S.

36 CRS In Focus IF11533, Modifying or Ending Sales of U.S.-Origin Defense Articles, by Paul K. Kerr and Liana W.
Rosen.
37 For the roll call, see https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1182/vote_118_2_00062.htm. See
also Bryant Harris, “Turkey F-16 sale to proceed after Senate vote,” Defense News, February 29, 2024.
38 Ibid.; “U.S. Relations with Turkey (Türkiye),” Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, January 9, 2023; Gareth Jennings,
“Turkey joins NATO Baltic Air Policing for first time since 2006,” Janes Defence Weekly, July 7, 2021; NATO Allied
Air Command, “Turkish E-7T Provides Airborne Command and Control for Exercise Ramstein Alloy,” April 14, 2022.
39 CRS Report R47493, Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
40 Aaron Stein, “Putin's Victory: Why Turkey and America Made Each Other Weaker,” Foreign Policy Research
Institute, July 29, 2019; “Turkey is buying Russian missiles to diversify supply,” Oxford Analytica, January 26, 2018;
Nicholas Danforth, “Frustration, Fear, and the Fate of U.S.-Turkish Relations,” German Marshall Fund of the United
States, July 19, 2019.
41 Ibid.
42 Selcan Hacaoglu, “US Open to Turkey F-35 Talks if Dispute over Russian Air Defenses Is Resolved,” Bloomberg,
January 30, 2024.
43 Paul Iddon, “Greece and Turkey’s Strategic Russian Air Defense Missiles Briefly in Spotlight,” Forbes, February 15,
2024; Selcan Hacaoglu, “Turkey Signals Preference to Retain Russian S-400s in F-35 Row,” Bloomberg, February 4,
2024.
44 Abdullah Bozkurt, “Turkey put Russian S-400 missiles in a storage facility to avoid further clashes with the US,”
Nordic Monitor, December 8, 2022.
45 Barin Kayaoglu, “Can warmer Germany-Turkey ties bring Ankara Eurofighters along with Airbuses?” Al-Monitor,
May 5, 2024.
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partners in its region—including Greece and a number of Arab states—have established in
diversifying their Western suppliers of combat aircraft.46 Turkey also is moving forward with
efforts to build a domestically produced fighter with some stealth capabilities, but mass
production would reportedly—according to some estimates—begin at earliest in the mid-2030s.47
Russia and Ukraine
Turkey’s relations with Russia feature elements of cooperation and competition. Turkey has made
a number of foreign policy moves since 2016 toward closer ties with Russia. A combination of
factors may have motivated these decisions, including Turkey’s apparent desire to reduce
dependence on the West in certain security matters, economic opportunism, and chances to
increase its regional influence. Turkey retains significant differences with Russia, with which it
has a long history of discord, and has pursued closer ties to a number of countries surrounding
Russia (including Ukraine and Poland)—likely in part as a counterweight to Russian regional
power.48 Turkey continues to rely on Russia for around 40% of its natural gas imports,49 but
Turkey’s other domestic and foreign supply options—including some U.S. sources—may
gradually reduce this dependence.50

46 Paul Iddon, “Turkey Questions the Wisdom of Having an All-American Air Force,” Forbes, February 6, 2023.
47 Sebastien Roblin, “Turkey’s Very First Fighter Jet Made Its History-Shattering Flight,” Popular Mechanics,
February 29, 2024.
48 Can Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond,” Jamestown Foundation, October 12,
2022; Jeffrey Mankoff, “As Russia Reels, Eurasia Roils,” War on the Rocks, October 11, 2022.
49 Megan Byrne and James Cockayne, “Turkey Gas Imports: Russia Still Dominant,” MEES, March 3, 2023.
50 Francesco Siccardi, “Understanding the Energy Drivers of Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” Carnegie Europe, February 28,
2024; Jack Dutton, “Turkey eyes ExxonMobil LNG as country reduces dependence on Russian gas,” Al-Monitor, April
29, 2024.
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Turkey-Ukraine Defense Cooperation
Turkey and Ukraine have strengthened their relations since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014. In 2017, a Turkish
security analyst attributed these closer ties to growing mutual interests in countering Russian influence in the
Black Sea region and in sharing military technology to expand and increase the self-sufficiency of their respective
defense industries.51 Since 2020, the two countries have signed multiple agreements signifying closer cooperation,
and also signed a broader free trade agreement (pending ratification by both parliaments) in February 2022.52
In line with these agreements, Turkish and Ukrainian companies have engaged in or planned a significant expansion
of defense transactions, including a number of joint development or co-production initiatives.53 Turkish expertise
with drone and other aircraft and naval platforms complements Ukrainian skil s in designing and constructing
aerospace engines and missiles.54 As part of the deepening bilateral defense cooperation, Turkey has sold several
Turkish-origin armed drones to Ukraine since 2019,55 and Turkish drone manufacturer Baykar Technology has
started building a factory in Ukraine to produce some drone models.56 Additionally, Turkey is helping establish
Ukraine’s naval capabilities by producing corvettes (small warships) for export.57
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has heightened challenges Turkey faces in balancing its
relations with the two countries, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. Turkey’s links with
Russia—especially its 2019 acquisition of the Russian S-400 system—have fueled major U.S.-
Turkey tensions and triggered sanctions. However, following Russia’s invasion, U.S. and Turkish
interests in countering Russian revisionist aims—including along the Black Sea coast—appear to
have converged in some ways as Turkey has helped strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities in
parallel with other NATO countries. In addition to denouncing Russia’s invasion, Turkey has
closed the Straits to belligerent warships, opposed Russian claims to Ukrainian territory
(including Crimea), and served as a transit hub for natural gas to Europe.58 Turkey also has
supplied Ukraine with various types of military equipment—including armed drone aircraft and
mine-resistant ambush-resistant (MRAP) vehicles59—as well as humanitarian assistance. In
March 2024, a media source, citing unnamed officials, reported that the Defense Department has
purchased sizable amounts of ammunition for delivery to Ukraine from a Turkish supplier, and
that another Turkish contractor is expected to produce some 30% of U.S.-made 155mm artillery
shells at a Texas facility by 2025, as part of efforts to continue assisting Ukraine despite strain on

51 Metin Gurcan, “Turkey-Ukraine defense industry ties are booming,” Al-Monitor, May 1, 2017.
52 “Turkey, Ukraine Sign Military Cooperation Agreements,” Associated Press, October 16, 2020; Christopher Isajiw,
“Free trade and drones: Turkey and Ukraine strengthen strategic ties,” Atlantic Council, February 11, 2022.
53 Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond”; Pinar Dost, “The Ukraine-Turkey
defense partnership with the potential to transform Black Sea and Euro-Atlantic security,” Atlantic Council, March 5,
2024.
54 Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond.”
55 Dorian Jones, “Turkey Strengthens Defense Industry with Its Ukraine Partnership,” Voice of America, February 4,
2022.
56 “Turkey’s drone maker Baykar begins to build plant in Ukraine,” Reuters, February 7, 2024.
57 Kate Tringham, “Update: Turkey launches first Ada-class corvette for Ukraine and cuts steel for second,” Janes
Navy International, October 3, 2022.
58 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press
Availability,” February 20, 2023.
59 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey sends 50 mine-resistant vehicles to Ukraine, with more expected,” Defense News, August
22, 2022; Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, “The Stalwart Ally: Türkiye’s Arms Deliveries to Ukraine,” Oryx,
November 21, 2022.
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supply chains.60 Additionally, Turkish officials and their Ukrainian counterparts signed an
agreement for a “Turkish-Ukrainian Reconstruction Task Force” in January 2024.61
Turkey’s proximity to and ties with both Russia and Ukraine, and its ability to regulate access to
the Straits, have put it in a position to mediate between the parties on various issues of contention.
In July 2022, Turkey and the United Nations entered into parallel agreements with Russia and
Ukraine to provide a Black Sea corridor for Ukrainian grain exports that partly alleviated global
supply concerns.62 The arrangement lapsed in July 2023.63 Since then, Ukraine has established an
alternative grain corridor that traverses the territorial waters of Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey by
hugging their coastlines, thus facilitating Ukrainian grain export levels unseen since before
Russia’s 2022 invasion.64 Turkey has proposed establishing a new mechanism for Russia-Ukraine
agreement on safe passage for grain exports through the Black Sea and the Straits.65
Turkish officials have sought to minimize any negative economic impact Turkey might face from
the Russia-Ukraine war, partly through boosting various forms of economic and energy
cooperation with Russia (including at Turkey’s Russian-built nuclear power plant). The Turkish
government has not joined Western economic sanctions against Russia or closed its airspace to
Russian civilian flights.
Some of Turkey’s Russia-related dealings could potentially lead to Western secondary sanctions
against Turkey for facilitating Russian sanctions evasion. Turkey has said it does not consider
itself bound by other countries’ sanctions against Russia, but that it would prevent the use of its
jurisdiction to evade sanctions. After reports surfaced in early 2023 about the possibility that
Turkish businesses might have been exporting electronic or technological products with potential
defense applications to Russia,66 Turkey supposedly began to enforce curbs on sanctioned goods
transiting its territory to Russia.67 However, the Treasury Department has subsequently placed
sanctions on some Turkey-based companies and individuals for assisting Russia or Russian
entities.68 The Financial Times reported in November 2023, “In the first nine months of 2023,
Turkey reported $158mn of exports of 45 goods the US lists as ‘high-priority’ to Russia and five
former Soviet countries suspected of acting as intermediaries for Moscow [including microchips,

60 Natalia Drozdiak et al., “US Turns to Turkey for Explosives as War in Ukraine Saps Supply,” Bloomberg, March 27,
2024.
61 “Turkey, Ukraine sign document allowing Turkish firms to help Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction,” Reuters,
January 31, 2024.
62 “Ukraine, Russia agree to export grain, ending a standoff that threatened food supply,” Associated Press, July 22,
2022.
63 For background on Russian demands, see “Explainer: Have Western sanctions on Russia impacted its fertiliser
exports?” Reuters, May 11, 2023.
64 Noah Berman and Mariel Ferragamo, “How Ukraine Overcame Russia’s Grain Blockade,” Council on Foreign
Relations, February 27, 2024.
65 Ragip Soylu, “Why Russia may finally accept Turkey’s plans for Black Sea shipping,” Middle East Eye, March 6,
2024, at https://mailchi.mp/middleeasteye/why-russia-may-finally-accept-turkeys-plans-for-black-sea-
shipping?e=b82e8edad4.
66 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press
Availability.”
67 “Turkey Blocks Transit of Goods Sanctioned by EU, US to Russia,” Bloomberg, March 10, 2023.
68 Department of the Treasury, “U.S. Continues to Degrade Russia’s Military-Industrial Base and Target Third-Country
Support with Nearly 300 New Sanctions,” May 1, 2024.
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communications equipment, and telescopic sights]. That was three times the level recorded over
the same period in 2022, when the war in Ukraine began.”69
In December 2023, President Joe Biden issued an executive order aimed at strengthening “U.S.
sanctions authorities against financial facilitators of Russia’s war machine.”70 Facing the
possibility of secondary sanctions, Turkish banks appear to have been responsive, reportedly
cutting ties with most of their Russian counterparts (with the supposed exception of foreign
subsidiary banks in Russia).71 Turkish efforts to comply with the executive order also have
reportedly affected some Turkish payments for Russian oil imports and Russian payments for a
broader range of Turkish exports.72 In February 2024, the Administration placed additional
sanctions on some Turkish entities (as well as on individuals and entities from several other
countries) alleged to have engaged in sanctions evasion and/or circumvention.73
Israel and the Palestinians (including Hamas)
Since the outbreak of conflict on October 7, 2023 between Israel and the Palestinian Sunni
Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated FTO), Turkey-Israel ties have come under strain.
President Erdogan has strongly criticized Israel for its military actions in Gaza impacting
Palestinian civilians, calling it a “terror state” and labeling Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu the “butcher of Gaza” (and also comparing him to Hitler).74 Additionally, Erdogan has
criticized the U.S. role in the conflict, saying in April 2024 that U.S. “unconditional military and
diplomatic support” for Israel is “making the problem bigger.”75 Israel withdrew its diplomats
from Turkey in October, and Turkey withdrew its ambassador from Israel in November (the
countries’ ambassadors had arrived at their respective posts less than a year before, in December
2022, after having previously withdrawn on a reciprocal basis in 2018). In May 2024, Turkey
announced that it will apply to be a co-plaintiff in the case South Africa has brought in the
International Court of Justice accusing Israel of genocide in Gaza.76
Turkey and Erdogan had been improving relations with Israel prior to October 7, and Turkey had
said that the countries were contemplating closer energy cooperation.77 Despite maintaining
diplomatic relations to date, Turkey and Israel may face challenges in restoring bilateral ties to
their pre-October 7 status.78

69 Adam Samson et al., “Turkey’s exports of military-linked goods to Russia soar,” Financial Times, November 27,
2023.
70 White House, “FACT SHEET: Biden Administration Expands U.S. Sanctions Authorities to Target Financial
Facilitators of Russia’s War Machine,” December 22, 2023; “Executive Order 14114 of December 22, 2023: Taking
Additional Steps with Respect to the Russian Federation’s Harmful Activities,” Federal Register, Vol. 88, No. 246,
December 26, 2023, pp. 89271-89274.
71 Dimitar Bechev, “Closer Ties to the West Don’t Mean Turkey Will Give Up on Russia,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace (Carnegie), February 7, 2024.
72 “Exclusive: Turkish-Russian trade hit by fresh US sanctions threat,” Reuters, February 19, 2024.
73 Department of the Treasury, “Russia-related Designations; Issuance of Russia-related General Licenses and new and
amended Frequently Asked Questions,” February 23, 2024.
74 “Turkey’s Erdogan says Israeli PM Netanyahu no different from Hitler,” Reuters, December 27, 2023; “Turkey’s
Erdogan calls Netanyahu ‘butcher of Gaza,’” Agence France Presse, November 29, 2023.
75 Amberin Zaman, “Turkey postpones Erdogan White House visit,” Al-Monitor, April 26, 2024.
76 Ezgi Akin, “Turkey seeks to join South Africa as plaintiff against Israel at ICJ,” Al-Monitor, May 1, 2024.
77 “Erdogan says Turkey, Israel to take steps in energy drilling soon, media report,” Reuters, September 21, 2023.
78 Burak Ünveren, “Israel-Hamas war strains ties with Turkey,” Deutsche Welle, November 4, 2023.
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Turkish Suspension of Trade with Israel
Tension over the ongoing war is now affecting Turkey-Israel trade. On April 9, in apparent response to Israel’s
refusal to allow Turkey to conduct humanitarian airdrops in Gaza, the Turkish trade ministry announced export
restrictions on 54 product groups—mostly construction materials and jet fuel—to last until a cease-fire is
declared.79 Israel’s foreign minister pledged to implement parallel measures against Turkey. Some Members of
Congress suggested responsive U.S. measures against Turkey in support of Israel.80
On May 2, Turkey’s trade ministry announced that Turkey had stopped all import and export transactions with
Israel “until a permanent ceasefire is achieved (in Gaza) and humanitarian aid is allowed without interruption,”81
subject to a three-month phase-out period to allow some companies to “fulfil existing orders via third
countries.”82 For 2023, trade amounted to $5.4 bil ion in Turkish exports and $1.6 bil ion in Israeli imports.83
Israel reportedly has normally received around 40% of its oil from Azerbaijan via Turkey.84 Israel’s foreign minister
argued that Turkey’s actions contravene existing trade agreements; a Turkey-Israel free trade agreement has been
effective since 1997.85 On May 16, Israel’s finance minister reportedly proposed (subject to cabinet approval) to
retaliate by suspending the free trade agreement and imposing a 100% tariff on all Turkish imports during the
remainder of Erdogan’s presidency.86
Under Erdogan, Turkey has provided political support to Hamas (which President Erdogan has
defended as “a liberation group”),87 and Turkish officials have hosted Hamas political officials
from time to time.88 Some media outlets have presented evidence that Turkey-based or -linked
private entities have provided substantial material support to Hamas.89 A Treasury Department
official visited Turkey in November and raised concern about Hamas’s ability to operate in
Turkey to fund potential future attacks; Turkish officials reportedly responded that while they do
not consider Hamas to be a terrorist group, Turkey “would not tolerate violations of domestic
laws including money laundering and direct funding of violent acts.”90 Since October 2023,
Treasury has imposed sanctions on several Turkey-based Hamas operatives or Hamas-linked
companies.91

79 Ezgi Akin and Rina Bassist, “Turkey restricts exports of 54 products to Israel until Gaza cease-fire,” Al-Monitor,
April 9, 2024.
80 Jacobs et al., “U.S. lawmakers call for possible sanctions against Turkey in response to new trade restrictions against
Israel.”
81 “Turkey says Israel trade halted until permanent Gaza ceasefire,” Reuters, May 3, 2024.
82 Ezgi Akin and Rina Bassist, “Turkey, Israel tangle in fresh row over trade ban,” Al-Monitor, May 9, 2024.
83 “Turkey says Israel trade halted until permanent Gaza ceasefire,” Reuters, May 3, 2024.
84 “Turkey talks tough on Israel but resists calls to cut off oil,” Radio France Internationale, November 11, 2023.
85 Adam Samson and James Shotter, “Turkey halts trade with Israel over Gaza conflict,” Financial Times, May 2, 2024.
86 Rina Bassist, “Israel’s Smotrich will abolish free trade deal with Turkey, slap 100% tariff,” Al-Monitor, May 16,
2024.
87 “Turkey’s Erdogan says Hamas is not terrorist organisation, cancels trip to Israel,” Reuters, October 25, 2023.
88 Aslı Aydıntaşbaş and Kevin Huggard, “Understanding Turkey’s response to the Israel-Gaza crisis,” Brookings
Institution, December 7, 2023. An Israeli media source has reported, “While the country [Turkey] insisted that it only
hosted the group’s political wing, in 2020, Israel provided Turkish intelligence with evidence that members of Hamas’s
military wing operate in the office [that hosts Hamas political leaders], under the supervision of Beirut-based Saleh al-
Arouri, who was killed in an alleged Israeli strike in Lebanon in January.” “Erdogan says Turkey ‘firmly’ backs terror
group Hamas, compares Netanyahu to Hitler,” Times of Israel, March 9, 2024.
89 Jo Becker and Justine Scheck, “Israel Found the Hamas Money Machine Years Ago. Nobody Turned It Off,” New
York Times, December 16, 2023; Rory Jones et al., “Hamas ‘CEO’ Keeps Group Funded from Base in Turkey,” Wall
Street Journal, January 5, 2024.
90 “U.S. presses sceptical Turkey to curb Hamas fundraising,” Reuters, November 30, 2023.
91 Department of the Treasury, “U.S. and UK Target Additional Hamas Finance Officials and Representatives,”
December 13, 2023.
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One former U.S. official has argued that in the case of Israel and the Palestinians, Erdogan has
departed from his normal foreign policy practice of balancing between parties in conflict. The
former official explained that Erdogan’s actions may stem in part from domestic politics and an
appeal to the broader Arab and Muslim worlds, while also stating:
Yet the majority of the Turkish public supports a mediating or neutral role for Turkey in
the Israel-Hamas conflict, so there is no political profit from pushing the envelope so far
that Turkey is no longer a credible mediator… It seems fair to conclude that Erdoğan has
struggled with a personal attachment to the Palestinian cause that extends beyond his other
foreign-policy proclivities.92
Nevertheless, the same author wrote that Erdogan could conceivably reverse course toward a
more pragmatic position on Israeli-Palestinian issues.93 Erdogan’s positions may largely explain
why Turkey has not featured prominently in discussions regarding hostages and potential cease-
fires. According to one media account, Erdogan may hope to use Turkey’s good relations with
Hamas to help reconcile it with its domestic rival, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),
potentially boosting Turkey’s role in shaping potential Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic outcomes
like Palestinian statehood.94
In early 2024, Turkey arrested several people on suspicion of espionage for Israel’s Mossad, at
least some apparently in connection with the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.95 In light of a
public Israeli threat to assassinate Hamas leaders, Erdogan has warned of “serious consequences”
if any such operations were to take place on Turkish soil.96
Syria97
Turkey’s involvement in Syria since civil conflict broke out there in 2011 has been complicated
and costly, and has severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties. Turkey’s priorities in Syria have evolved:
while Turkey still opposes Syrian President Bashar al Asad, it has engaged in a mix of
coordination and competition with him and his main supporters Russia and Iran since Turkey
initiated military action against Syrian Kurdish forces in August 2016. Three significant Turkish
military operations (in 2016, 2018, and 2019) have left Turkey, in cooperation with Turkish-
supported Syrian armed opposition groups, in effective control of large swaths of northern Syria
and created tensions with U.S. forces operating in the country (see Figure 3).

92 Rich Outzen, “Where Erdoğan loses balance,” Atlantic Council, February 2, 2024.
93 Ibid.
94 Barin Kayaoglu, “As Qatar’s frustrations grow, can Turkey lead Gaza diplomacy between Hamas, Israel?” Al-
Monitor, April 21, 2024.
95 “Turkey detains 7 more people for allegedly selling information to Israel's spy agency,” Associated Press, March 5,
2024; “Seven detained in Turkey for allegedly selling information to Israel’s Mossad spy agency,” Associated Press,
February 2, 2024.
96 “Seven detained in Turkey,” Associated Press.
97 See CRS In Focus IF11930, Syria and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
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Figure 3. Syria Conflict Map

Source: CRS, using ESRI and U.S. State Department data.
Turkish military operations in Syria are largely focused on the Syrian Kurdish People’s Defense
Units (YPG). The YPG is linked with the PKK,98 and has a leading role within the Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF), an umbrella group including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements
that has been the main U.S. ground force partner against the Islamic State since 2015. Turkey has
actively sought to thwart the YPG from establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern
border with Turkey, likely reflecting concerns that YPG gains have bolstered the PKK in its
domestic conflict with Turkish authorities.99 President Erdogan has threatened additional military
ground operations in Syria amid continued cross-border and air strikes.
Looking ahead, Turkish priorities regarding Syria appear to focus on minimizing cross-border
risk. Turkish attacks in northern Syria have intensified after an October 2023 suicide bombing
claimed by the PKK near a government building in Ankara.100 According to some reports, these
attacks have caused severe damage to infrastructure in certain SDF-controlled areas of
northeastern Syria. Turkey has taken some limited steps toward rapprochement with the Asad
government (motivated at least in part by Turkey’s interest in the potential return of some of the
four million Syrian refugees living in Turkey), but significant obstacles remain.101 While the
Biden Administration is reportedly reviewing U.S. policy in Syria (where attacks by Iran-backed

98 Sources citing links between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include State Department, Country
Reports on Terrorism 2022, Syria; Berkay Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux,”
International Crisis Group, February 18, 2022; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the
Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”
February 13, 2018.
99 See, for example, Soner Cagaptay, “U.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and YPG,”
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 7, 2019.
100 Samer al Ahmed and Mohammed Hassan, “Turkish escalation in northeastern Syria amid changes in military
strategy,” Middle East Institute, October 11, 2023; Amberin Zaman, “Syria’s Kurds face ISIS threat, US indifference as
Turkey destroys critical infrastructure,” Al-Monitor, April 18, 2024.
101 Armenak Tokmajyan and Anais Al Wahibi, “The long road to rapprochement between Syria and Turkey,” Century
Foundation, August 15, 2023.
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groups against U.S. troops increased dramatically after October 2023),102 Turkish officials have
pledged to “eradicate the terrorism problem” in the coming months.103
Author Information

Jim Zanotti
Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
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copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

102 Amberin Zaman, “Pentagon floats plan for its Syrian Kurd allies to partner with Assad against ISIS,” January 22,
2024.
103 Selcan Hacaoglu, “Turkey to step up militant attack as Erdogan courts nationalists,” Bloomberg, March 11, 2024.
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