Navy Medium Landing Ship (LSM) (Previously
April 24, 2024
Light Amphibious Warship [LAW]) Program:
Ronald O'Rourke
Background and Issues for Congress
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Navy’s Medium Landing Ship (LSM) program, previously called the Light Amphibious
Warship (LAW) program, envisions procuring a class of 18 to 35 new amphibious ships to

support the Marine Corps, particularly in implementing a new Marine Corps operational concept
called Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). The Navy’s proposed FY2025 budget requests $268.1 million to
procure the first ship in the program.
The EABO concept was developed with an eye toward potential conflict scenarios with China in the Western Pacific. Under
the concept, the Marine Corps envisions, among other things, having reinforced-platoon-sized Marine Corps units maneuver
around the theater, moving from island to island, to fire anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and perform other missions so as
to contribute, alongside Navy and other U.S. military forces, to U.S. operations to counter and deny sea control to Chinese
forces. The LSMs would be instrumental to these operations, with LSMs embarking, transporting, landing, and subsequently
reembarking these small Marine Corps units.
LSMs would be much smaller and individually much less expensive to procure and operate than the Navy’s current
amphibious ships. Under the Navy’s FY2025 budget submission, the first LSM would be procured in FY2025 at a cost of
$268.1 million, the second LSM would be procured in FY2026 at a cost of $200.0 million, the third and fourth LSMs would
be procured in FY2027 at a combined cost of $349.5 million (i.e., an average cost of about $174.7 million each), the fifth and
sixth LSMs would be procured in FY2028 at a combined cost of $305.1 million (i.e., an average of about $152.5 million
each), and the seventh and eighth LSMs would be procured in FY2029 at a combined cost of $311.5 million (i.e., an average
of about $155.7 million each). The first LSM would cost more than subsequent ships in the program because the procurement
cost of the first LSM would include much or all of the detailed design/nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) costs for the
class. (It is a traditional Navy budgeting practice to include much of all of the DD/NRE costs for a class of ship in the
procurement cost of the lead ship in the class.)
The LSM as outlined by the Navy could be built by any of several U.S. shipyards. The Navy’s baseline preference is to have
a single shipyard build all the ships, but the Navy is open to having them built in multiple yards to the same design if doing
so could permit the program to be implemented more quickly and/or less expensively. The Navy’s FY2025 budget
submission states that the contract for the construction of the first LSM would be awarded in March 2025, and that the ship
would be delivered in February 2029.
The LSM program poses a number of potential oversight matters for Congress. The issue for Congress is whether to approve,
reject, or modify the Navy’s annual funding requests and envisioned acquisition strategy for the program. Congress’s
decisions regarding the program could affect Navy and Marine Corps capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S.
shipbuilding industrial base.
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Navy Medium Landing Ship (LSM) Program

Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Navy’s Medium
Landing Ship (LSM) program, previously called the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) program.
The LSM program envisions procuring a class of 18 to 35 new amphibious ships to support the
Marine Corps, particularly in implementing a new Marine Corps operational concept called
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). The Navy’s proposed FY2025 budget
requests $268.1 million to procure the first ship in the program.
The LSM program poses a number of potential oversight matters for Congress. The issue for
Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s annual funding requests and
envisioned acquisition strategy for the program. Congress’s decisions regarding the program
could affect Navy and Marine Corps capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S.
shipbuilding industrial base.
A separate CRS report discusses the Navy’s programs for building much-larger LPD-17 Flight II
and LHA-class amphibious ships.1 Other CRS reports provide an overview of Navy force
structure and shipbuilding plans2 and the Marine Corps’ overall plan for redesigning its units and
equipment to meet future mission demands, called Force Design (previously called Force Design
2030),3 of which the LSM program is a part.4
Background
U.S. Navy Amphibious Ships
Roles and Missions
Navy amphibious ships are operated by the Navy, with crews consisting of Navy personnel. They
are battle force ships, meaning ships that count toward the quoted size of the Navy. The primary
function of Navy amphibious ships is to lift (i.e., transport) embarked U.S. Marines and their
weapons, equipment, and supplies to distant operating areas, and enable Marines to conduct
expeditionary operations ashore in those areas. Although amphibious ships can be used to support
Marine landings against opposing military forces, they are also used for operations in permissive
or benign situations where there are no opposing forces. Due to their large storage spaces and
their ability to use helicopters and landing craft to transfer people, equipment, and supplies from

1 CRS Report R43543, Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
2 CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
3 See, for example, Irene Loewenson, “Marine Leaders Drop ‘2030’ from Name of Ambitious Overhaul Plan,” Marine
Corps Times, February 1, 2024.
4 CRS Insight IN11281, New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiative: Force Design 2030, by Andrew Feickert.
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ship to shore without need for port facilities,5 amphibious ships are potentially useful for a range
of combat and noncombat operations.6
On any given day, some of the Navy’s amphibious ships, like some of the Navy’s other ships, are
forward-deployed to various overseas operating areas. Amphibious ships typically are forward-
deployed in multiship formations called amphibious groups (ARGs). Amphibious ships are also
sometimes forward-deployed on an individual basis, particularly for conducting peacetime
engagement activities with foreign countries or for responding to smaller-scale or noncombat
contingencies.
Current Types of Amphibious Ships
The Navy’s current amphibious-ship force consists entirely of large amphibious ships, including
the so-called “big-deck” amphibious assault ships, designated LHA and LHD, which look like
medium-sized aircraft carriers, and the smaller (but still quite sizeable) amphibious ships,
designated LPD or LSD, which are sometimes called “small-deck” amphibious ships.7 As
mentioned earlier, a separate CRS report discusses the Navy’s current programs for procuring
new LHA- and LPD-type ships.8 The LSMs discussed in this CRS report would be much smaller
than the Navy’s current amphibious ships.
Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goal Under Navy’s 381-Ship Plan
The Navy’s Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement (BFSAR) study, which was provided
to the congressional defense committees in June 2023, calls for achieving a future fleet of 381
manned battle force ships, including 31 larger amphibious ships (i.e., LHAs, LHDs, LPDs, and
LSDs) and 18 LSMs.9 A Navy table outlining the 381-ship goal, however, includes a table note
stating: “The [Department of the Navy’s] 2022 Amphibious Force Requirements Study
determined an initial capacity goal of 18 LSM[s], with a total requirements [sic] of 35.”10

5 Amphibious ships have berthing spaces for Marines; storage space for their wheeled vehicles, their other combat
equipment, and their supplies; flight decks and hangar decks for their helicopters and vertical take-off and landing
(VTOL) fixed-wing aircraft; and in many cases well decks for storing and launching their landing craft. (A well deck is
a large, garage-like space in the stern of the ship. It can be flooded with water so that landing craft can leave or return
to the ship. Access to the well deck is protected by a large stern gate that is somewhat like a garage door.)
6 Amphibious ships and their embarked Marine forces can be used for launching and conducting humanitarian-
assistance and disaster-response (HA/DR) operations; peacetime engagement and partnership-building activities, such
as exercises; other nation-building operations, such as reconstruction operations; operations to train, advise, and assist
foreign military forces; peace-enforcement operations; noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs); maritime-security
operations, such as anti-piracy operations; smaller-scale strike and counter-terrorism operations; and larger-scale
ground combat operations. Amphibious ships and their embarked Marine forces can also be used for maintaining
forward-deployed naval presence for purposes of deterrence, reassurance, and maintaining regional stability.
7 U.S. Navy amphibious ships have designations starting with the letter L, as in amphibious landing. LHA can be
translated as landing ship, helicopter-capable, assault; LHD can be translated as landing ship, helicopter-capable, well
deck; LPD can be translated as landing ship, helicopter platform, well deck; and LSD can be translated as landing ship,
well deck. Whether noted in the designation or not, almost all these ships have well decks. The exceptions are LHAs 6
and 7, which do not have well decks and instead have expanded aviation support capabilities. For an explanation of
well decks, see footnote 5. The terms “large-deck” and “small-deck” refer to the size of the ship’s flight deck.
8 CRS Report R43543, Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
9 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2025, March 2024, p. 4 (Table 1).
10 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2025, March 2024, p. 4 (Table 1, note 5).
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Increasing the LSM total from 18 to 35 would change the Navy’s overall force-level goal from
381 manned battle force ships to 398 manned battle force ships.
While the Biden Administration has not explicitly endorsed the Navy’s 381-ship goal or any other
force-level goal for the Navy, 10 U.S.C. 8062 requires the Navy to include not less than 31 larger
amphibious ships.11 The Marine Corps supports procuring a total of 35 LSMs and summarizes its
preferred amphibious ship force-level goal as “31+35,” meaning 31 larger amphibious ships and
35 LSMs. A total of 35 would include nine operational LSMs for each of three envisioned Marine
Littoral Regiments (MLRs),12 plus eight additional LSMs to account for factors such as a certain
number of LSMs being in maintenance at any given moment.13
Medium Landing Ship (LSM) Program
Overview
As discussed above, the LSM program is to include 18 to 35 ships. LSMs would be much smaller
and individually much less expensive to procure and operate than the Navy’s current amphibious
ships.
Procurement Schedule
The Navy wants to procure the first LSM in FY2025, the second in FY2026, the third and fourth
in FY2027, the fifth and sixth LSMs in FY2028, the seventh and eighth in FY2029, and at least
10 more in fiscal years beyond FY2029. On May 17, 2023, the Navy released a Request for
Information (RFI) regarding the LSM program asking interested firms to reply to the following
questions, among others:
Do you have the resources and production capacity available to be awarded four (4) [LSM]
ships per fiscal year?... If so, how can your shipyard support production of 4 [LSM] hulls
per year?... If not, what is the maximum number of [LSM] ships that can begin production
each year?... If not, are there investment or shipyard improvements that can be done to
enable increasing production capacity to 4 [LSM] hulls per year?14
The Navy’s FY2025 budget submission states that the contract for the construction of the first
LSM would be awarded in March 2025, and that the ship would be delivered in February 2029.
Procurement Cost
Under the Navy’s FY2025 budget submission, the first LSM would be procured in FY2025 at a
cost of $268.1 million, the second LSM would be procured in FY2026 at a cost of $200.0 million,
the third and fourth LSMs would be procured in FY2027 at a combined cost of $349.5 million

11 For more on the Navy’s 381-ship goal, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. For a review of earlier amphibious ship force structure
requirements, see Appendix A of archived CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement:
Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
12 For more on the MLRs, see CRS In Focus IF12200, The U.S. Marine Corps Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), by
Andrew Feickert, The U.S. Marine Corps Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), by Andrew Feickert.
13 See, for example, U.S. Marine Corps, Force Design 2030 Annual Update, June 23, p. 9.
14 Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Medium Landing Ship (LSM) Request for Information (RFI), undated,
attached to “Medium Landing Ship (LSM) Detail Design and Construction (DD&C) Request for Information (RFI),”
SAM.gov, May 17, 2023, posted at https://sam.gov/opp/20cdcdcb321b4f6e9571a3dc68e0b57c/view. See also Rich
Abott, “Navy Seeks Info From Potential LSM Amphib Builders, Wants Four Annually,” Defense Daily, May 23, 2023.
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(i.e., an average cost of about $174.7 million each), the fifth and sixth LSMs would be procured
in FY2028 at a combined cost of $305.1 million (i.e., an average of about $152.5 million each),
and the seventh and eighth LSMs would be procured in FY2029 at a combined cost of $311.5
million (i.e., an average of about $155.7 million each). The first LSM would cost more than
subsequent ships in the program because the procurement cost of the first LSM would include
much or all of the detailed design/nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) costs for the class. (It is a
traditional Navy budgeting practice to include much of all of the DD/NRE costs for a class of
ship in the procurement cost of the lead ship in the class.)
By way of comparison, the Navy’s most recently procured LHA-type amphibious ship has an
estimated unit procurement cost in the Navy’s FY2025 budget submission of about $3.8 billion,
and LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ships have unit procurement costs of about $2.0 billion.
Operational Rationale, Including EABO
To improve their ability to perform various missions in coming years, including a potential
mission of countering Chinese forces in a possible conflict in the Western Pacific, the Navy and
Marine Corps want to implement a new operational concept called Distributed Maritime
Operations (DMO).15 DMO calls for U.S. naval forces (meaning the Navy and Marine Corps)16 to
operate at sea in a less concentrated, more distributed manner, so as to complicate an adversary’s
task of detecting, identifying, tracking, and targeting U.S. naval forces, while still being able to
bring lethal force to bear against adversary forces.
In parallel with DMO, and with an eye toward potential conflict scenarios in the Western Pacific
against Chinese forces, the Marine Corps has developed two supporting operational concepts,
called Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) and Expeditionary Advanced
Base Operations (EABO). Under the EABO concept, the Marine Corps envisions, among other
things, having reinforced-platoon-sized Marine Corps units maneuver around the theater, moving
from island to island, to fire anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and perform other missions so as
to contribute, alongside Navy and other U.S. military forces, to U.S. operations to counter and
deny sea control to Chinese forces.
More specifically, the Marine Corps states that the EABO concept includes, among other things,
establishing and operating “multiple platoon-reinforced-size expeditionary advance base sites that
can host and enable a variety of missions such as long-range anti-ship fires, forward arming and
refueling of aircraft, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of key maritime terrain, and
air-defense and early warning,”17 The use of Marine Corps units to contribute to U.S. sea-denial

15 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for
U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
16 Although the term naval is often used to refer specifically to the Navy, it more properly refers to both the Navy and
Marine Corps, because both the Navy and Marine Corps are naval services. Even though the Marine Corps sometimes
operates for extended periods as a land fighting force (as it has done in recent years, for example, in Afghanistan and
Iraq), and is often thought of as the country’s second land army, it nevertheless is, by law, a naval service. 10 U.S.C.
§8001(a)(3) states, “The term ‘member of the naval service’ means a person appointed or enlisted in, or inducted or
conscripted into, the Navy or the Marine Corps.” DON officials sometimes refer to the two services as the Navy-
Marine Corps team. For additional discussion, see CRS In Focus IF10484, Defense Primer: Department of the Navy,
by Ronald O'Rourke.
17 Emailed statement from Marine Corps as quoted in Shawn Snow, “New Marine Littoral Regiment, Designed to Fight
in Contested Maritime Environment, Coming to Hawaii,” Marine Times, May 14, 2020. See also David H. Berger,
“Preparing for the Future, Marine Corps Support to Joint Operations in Contested Littorals,” Military Review, April
2021, 8 pp.
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operations against an opposing navy by shooting ASCMs would represent a new mission for the
Marine Corps.18
LSMs would be instrumental to these operations, with LSMs embarking, transporting, landing,
and subsequently reembarking these small Marine Corps units. An August 27, 2020, press report
states, “Maj. Gen. Tracy King, the director of expeditionary warfare on the chief of naval
operations’ staff (OPNAV N95), said today that LAW was perhaps the most important investment
the Marine Corps was making to optimize itself for expeditionary advance base operations
(EABO).”19 A February 2021 Marine Corps tentative manual on EABO states
Littoral maneuver will rely heavily on surface platforms such as the light amphibious
warship (LAW) and a range of surface connectors, as well as aviation assets. The LAW is
envisioned as the principal littoral maneuver vessel of the littoral force.…
The LAW supports the day-to-day maneuver of stand-in forces operating in the LOA
[littoral operations area]. It complements L-class amphibious ships20 and other surface
connectors. Utilizing the LAW to transport forces of the surface reduces the impacts of
tactical vehicles on the road network, increases deception, and allows for the sustainment
of forces during embarkation. The range, endurance, and austere access of LAWs enable
the littoral force to deliver personnel, equipment, and sustainment across a widely
distributed area. Shallow draft and beaching capability are keys to providing the volume
and agility to maneuver the required capabilities to key maritime terrain.
LAW employment requires reconnaissance and prior planning relating to the bathymetry
of the littoral environment. Effective LAW employment relies on knowledge of the beach
makeup, slope, currents, tidal effects, and other environment factors.
As envisioned and when properly postured, LAWs possess the range, endurance, speed,
sea-keeping, and C4ISR capabilities to support and conduct complementary operations
with, but not as part of, US Navy tactical groups, including an expeditionary strike group
(ESG) or amphibious ready group (ARG). Forward-positioned LAWs may augment the
capabilities of deploying ARG/MEUs during regional engagement and response to crises
or contingencies.
The LAW with embarked forces, generates and/or enables the following effects:
•
Rapidly maneuver forces from shore-to-shore in a contested environment
•
Sustain a combat-credible force ashore
•
Conduct enduring operations

18 For press articles discussing these envisioned operations, see, for example, Jeff Schogol, “Inside the US Military’s
Modern ‘Island Hopping’ Campaign to Take on China,” Task and Purpose, June 16, 2022; Justin Katz, “Marines’ New
Warfighting Concept Focuses on Small, Agile Forces with an Eye on China,” Breaking Defense, December 1, 2021;
Bill Gertz, “Marine Commandant Reveals New Mission Preparing for China Conflict,” Washington Times, April 21,
2021; Megan Eckstein, “CMC Berger Outlines How Marines Could Fight Submarines in the Future,” USNI News,
December 8, 2020; David Axe, “Meet Your New Island-Hopping, Missile-Slinging U.S. Marine Corps,” Forbes, May
14, 2020; Shawn Snow, “New Marine Littoral Regiment, Designed to Fight in Contested Maritime Environment,
Coming to Hawaii,” Marine Times, May 14, 2020; William Cole (Honolulu Star-Advertiser), “The Marine Corps Is
Forming a First-of-its-Kind Regiment in Hawaii,” Military.com, May 12, 2020; Joseph Trevithick, “Marines To
Radically Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles,” The Drive, March 23, 2020; Chris
“Ox” Harmer, “Marine Boss’s Audacious Plan To Transform The Corps By Giving Up Big Amphibious Ships,” The
Drive, September 5, 2019.
19 Megan Eckstein, “Marines Already In Industry Studies for Light Amphibious Warship, In Bid to Field Them
ASAP,” USNI News, August 27 (updated August 28), 2020. See also Paul McLeary, “‘If It Floats, It Fights:’ Navy’s
New Small Ship Strategy,” Breaking Defense, August 28, 2020.
20 The term L-class amphibious ships refers to the Navy’s LHA/LHD- and LPD-type amphibious ships, whose
designation begins with the letter L in reference to amphibious landing.
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•
Enable persistent joint-force operations and power projection
•
Provide increased and capable forward presence21
The survivability of LSMs would come from their ability to hide among islands and other sea
traffic, from defensive support they would receive from other U.S. Navy forces, and from the
ability of their associated Marine Corps units to fire missiles at Chinese ships and aircraft that
could attack them with their own missiles (which can be viewed as an application of the notion
that the best defense is a good offense).
As a key platform for implementing EABO, the LSM program forms a part of Force Design, the
Marine Corps’ overall plan for plan for redesigning its units and equipment to meet future
mission demands.22
Ship Design
Envisaged Design Features
The Navy and Marine Corps want LSMs to be relatively simple and relatively inexpensive ships
with the following design features:
• a length of 200 to 400 feet;
• a draft of 12 feet;
• a crew of about 70 sailors;
• a capacity for carrying 50 Marines and 648 short tons (about 579 long tons) of
equipment;
• 8,000 square feet of deck cargo space;
• a transit speed of 14 knots and a cruising range of 3,500 nautical miles;
• a roll-on/roll-off beaching capability for beaches with a 1:40 grade;23
• a helicopter landing pad;
• two 30 mm guns and six .50-caliber guns for self-defense; and
• a 20-year service life.24
A ship fitting the requirements listed above would be only a fraction as large as the Navy’s
current amphibious ships. The Navy’s LHA/LHD-type ships are 844 to 855 feet long and have a
full load displacements between 40,000 and 45,000 tons, while its and LPD-17 class ships are 684
feet long and have a full load displacement of 24,900 tons. Given the design features listed above,
an LSM might have a displacement of up to 4,000 tons, which would be about 1/10th or 1/11th the
displacement of an LHA/LHD-type ship, and about 1/6th the displacement of an LPD-17 class
ships.

21 Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base
Operations, February 2021, pp. 7-9 to 7-10.
22 For more on Force Design, see CRS Insight IN11281, New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiative: Force Design
2030, by Andrew Feickert.
23 A 1:40 grade means the surface of the beach rises 1 foot higher for every 40 feet closer that the ship gets to the shore.
24 Source: Navy brochure on the LSM released at an August 31, 2023, LSM industry day meeting, posted at Inside
Defense on September 11, 2023, and reprinted in Sam LaGrone, “Draft Proposal for ‘Affordable’ Medium Landing
Ship Out to Shipbuilders,” USNI News, October 16, 2023. See also Nick Wilson, “Navy to Open LSM Competition
within Calendar Year 2023,” Inside Defense, September 11, 2023.
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The above-listed draft of 12 feet is intended to permit the ship to transit shallow waters on its way
to and from landing beaches. The above-listed transit speed of about 14 knots would be less than
the approximate 22-knot maximum sustained speed of larger U.S. Navy amphibious ships, but
would be a relatively fuel-efficient speed for moving ships through water,25 which would permit
the ship to be equipped with a less powerful and consequently less expensive propulsion plant.
The above-listed 20-year expected service life is less than the 30- to 45-year expected service
lives of larger U.S. Navy amphibious ships—a difference that could reduce the LSM’s
construction cost for a ship of its type and size—and closer to the 25-year expected service life of
the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs).26
The Navy and Marine Corps reportedly discussed and debated some of LSM’s design features,
with a key issue being the amount of combat survivability to be incorporated into the LSM’s
design, and the impact this would have on the LSM’s unit procurement cost.27
Navy Notional LSM Design Concept
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show a Navy notional LSM design concept. The LSM design eventually
selected for procurement could differ from this notional concept.
Potential Builders
The LSM as outlined by the Navy could be built by any of several U.S. shipyards.
Acquisition Strategy
Overview
The Navy’s baseline preference is to have a single shipyard build all the ships in the LSM
program, but the Navy is open to having LSMs built in multiple yards to the same design if doing
so could permit the program to be implemented more quickly and/or less expensively.28 As noted

25 Due to the density of water, fuel consumption for moving monohull ships through the water tends to increase steeply
for speeds above 14 to 16 knots.
26 For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
27 See, for example, Megan Eckstein, “Landing Ship Medium Requirements in Final Approvals with Navy, Marines,”
Defense News, April 4, 2023; Jennifer Hlad, “Leased Ship Will Shape USMC Amphib Requirements,” Defense One,
February 28, 2023; Mallory Shelbourne, “Marines to Test Prototype Landing Ship to Support New Force Design,”
USNI News, February 27 (updated March 1), 2023; Rich Abott, “Navy And Marine Corps Compromised On Medium
Amphibs Requirements And Will Go Into Contested Environments, Officials Say,” Defense Daily, February 24, 2023;
Jennifer Hlad and Lauren C. Williams, “Marines to Begin Testing Leased Vessel for Pier-less Operations,” Defense
One, February 22, 2023; Rich Abott, “Marine Official Dismisses Medium Amphib Survivability Concerns,” Defense
Daily, February 17, 2023 Megan Eckstein, “Marines, Navy Near Agreement on Light Amphibious Warship Features,”
Navy Times, October 5, 2022; Mallory Shelbourne, “Marine Corps, Navy Remain Split Over Design, Number of Future
Light Amphibious Warship, Divide Risks Stalling Program,” USNI News, September 14 (updated September 15), 2022.
28 The Q&A document from the Navy’s April 9, 2020, industry day on the LAW program (see footnote 24) states
Q [from industry]: Once [the industry] studies are done, what is the likelihood of [the Navy
making] multiple [contract] awards [for the next stage]?
A [from Navy]: When the [industry] studies are done, there will be multiple [contract] awards for
preliminary design [work]. Then [the Navy will] down select for a [preferred] prototype. [There is]
No plan for [building the ships at] multiple [ship]yards and [building them to multiple] designs like
[the] LCS [Littoral Combat Ship program]. It’s too hard of a logistics tail [to provide lifecycle
support for ships built to multiple designs]. But options are open if it is cheaper/faster.
(continued...)
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earlier, the Navy’s FY2025 budget submission states that the contract for the construction of the
first LSM would be awarded in March 2025.
Figure 1. Navy Notional LSM Design Concept
Computer rendering

Source: Cropped version of screenshot at 5:08 from “Marine Corps Ship Requirements | Does the Marine
Corps Have Ships?” Video posted by Combat Development & Integration on February 14, 2023, at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=adl HQqLU-c.
Reported July 2020 Contract Awards
An October 6, 2020, press report stated that the Navy in July 2020 awarded contracts for LSM
concept design studies to 15 firms, with the studies due in November 2020. According to the
press report, the 15 companies awarded contracts included Austal USE, BMT Designers,
Bollinger Shipyards, Crescere Marine Engineering, Damen, Hyak Marine, Independent Maritime

Q [from industry]: Do you envision something similar to LCS variance [sic: variants]? Multiple
yards and designs?
A [from Navy]: No, it involves too much logistics and O&S [operation and support costs]. This
drives overall costs initially [i.e., locks higher life-cycle support costs into the program from the
outset of the program] and we’re not trying to go down that path. As we’ve said before, if studies
tell us we are wrong, if it’s affordable and fields faster, then we won’t ignore it. The data and cost
drivers will help us decide. The Government wants to field [the ships] as rapidly as possible, and
we believe that using multiple yards is not the best and most affordable path.
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Assessment Associates, Nichols Brothers Boat Builders, Sea Transport, Serco, St John
Shipbuilding, Swiftships, Technology Associates, Thoma-Sea, and VT Halter Marine. The studies
reportedly were intended to help inform concepts of operation, technical risk, and cost estimates
for the LSM program, in support of a planned lead-ship contract award in FY2022.
Figure 2. Navy Notional LSM Design Concept
Cutaway computer rendering

Source: Navy brochure on the LSM released at an August 31, 2023, LSM industry day meeting, posted at Inside
Defense on September 11, 2023, and reprinted in Sam LaGrone, “Draft Proposal for ‘Affordable’ Medium Landing
Ship Out to Shipbuilders,” USNI News, October 16, 2023.
An August 27, 2020, press report states
The Navy and Marine Corps’ new Light Amphibious Warship program is already in
industry studies, with the service pushing ahead as quickly as possible in an
acknowledgement that they’re already behind in their transformation of the force.
Maj. Gen. Tracy King, the director of expeditionary warfare on the chief of naval
operations’ staff (OPNAV N95), said today that LAW was perhaps the most important
investment the Marine Corps was making to optimize itself for expeditionary advance base
operations (EABO).
“Having these LAWs out there as an extension of the fleet, under the watchful eye of our
Navy, engaging with our partners and allies, building partner capacity, is what I think we
need to be doing right now. I think we’re late to need with building the Light Amphibious
Warship, which is why we’re trying to go so quickly,” he said, saying that N95 was copying
the surface warfare directorate’s playbook from the frigate program, which moved quickly
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from requirements-development to design to getting under contract thanks to the use of
mature technology and designs from industry.29
October 2020 Request for Information (RFI)
On October 16, 2020, the Navy released a request for information (RFI) to solicit industry input
on draft versions of documents relating to an eventual solicitation for conducting design work on
the ship.30
November 2020 Press Report About Concept Designs
A November 9, 2020, press report stated that, as part of its LSM industry studies, the Navy had
received nine LSM concept designs from 16 design firms and shipyards, some of which have
paired into teams. The report quoted a Navy official as stating that the following firms were
participating in the industry studies: Austal USA, BMT Designers, Bollinger Shipyards, Crescere
Marine Engineering, Damen, Hyak Marine, Independent Maritime Assessment Associates,
Nichols Brothers Boat Builders, Sea Transport, Serco, St. John Shipbuilding, Swiftships,
Technology Associates Inc., Thoma-Sea, VT Halter Marine and Fincantieri.31 A November 19,
2020, press report stated that “about six industry teams are working with the sea services [i.e., the
Navy and Marine Corps] after two industry days and industry studies over the summer.32
A January 11, 2021, press report stated
The Navy and Marine Corps are quickly seeking new ideas that allow Marines to support
the Navy in sea control and other maritime missions, including the rapid acquisition of a
light amphibious ship and a movement toward using Marine weapons while at sea.
Maj. Gen. Tracy King, the director of expeditionary warfare on the chief of naval
operations’ staff (OPNAV N95), told USNI News during a Jan. 8 media call that the
services are moving quickly to buy their first light amphibious warship (LAW) in Fiscal
Year 2022, as outlined in the recent long-range shipbuilding plan.
“We’re moving out at flank speed; I got a chance to brief the CNO and the commandant
recently, and they told me to maintain course and heading,” he said during the media call
ahead of the annual Surface Navy Association symposium.
“We’re going through the formal JCIDS (Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System) process right now. [Naval Sea Systems Command] has completed its second
industry studies, and we’re working on all those documents.”
For now, 10 or 11 industry teams remain involved in the NAVSEA competition, which
recently held a second round of industry studies. NAVSEA is working with those teams to
help iterate what King called “novel” designs, to ensure they were the right size and could
achieve cost and performance requirements. Mid next year, he said, NAVSEA would

29 Megan Eckstein, “Marines Already In Industry Studies for Light Amphibious Warship, In Bid to Field Them
ASAP,” USNI News, August 27 (updated August 28), 2020. See also Rich Abott, “Marine Corps In Industry Studies
For Light Amphibious Warship, Trying To Move Quickly,” Defense Daily, August 28, 2020.
30 See “RFI: DRAFT US Navy Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of Work,”
Beta.sam.gov, accessed November 23, 2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?
index=opp. See also Rich Abott, “Navy Issues RFI For Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design,” Defense
Daily, October 19, 2020; Aidan Quigley, “Navy Solicits Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary Designs,” Inside
Defense, October 19, 2020.
31 Aidan Quigley, “Nine Concept Designs Submitted for LAW Industry Studies,” Inside Defense, November 9, 2020.
32 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” USNI News,
November 19, 2020.
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downselect to three teams for full design, and then would downselect to just one to build
the first LAW in late FY2022.
“My suspicion is that we’ll begin [research, development, test and evaluation] next year,
and then we are aiming at lead ship construction in FY ’22, it’s going to be late in FY ’22,
but I still consider that pretty fast,” King said.
“We’re just going to build one, get that out and start playing with it. We’ll probably build
one the next year because we’ve got to get the doctrine right. The [Marine Littoral
Regiments] are going to start coming online at about the same time – first one’s in Hawaii,
we’ll get it out there and let them play with it. And then we’ll go into a build profile of, I
don’t know, probably four or five a year or something like that is what we’re going to aim
for.”33
June 2021 Contract Awards
A June 17, 2021, press report states
The Navy this week issued “concept design” contracts to five companies for the Light
Amphibious Warship ahead of the Fiscal Year 2023 design selection, a service spokesman
confirmed to USNI News.
Fincantieri, Austal USA, VT Halter Marine, Bollinger and TAI Engineers were selected
for the contracts, Naval Sea Systems Command spokesman Alan Baribeau said.
“A Concept Studies (CS) contract has been awarded to five offerors with a follow-on
option for Preliminary Design (PD),” Baribeau said in a statement. “The CS/PD efforts
include engineering analyses, tradeoff studies, and development of engineering and design
documentation defining concepts studies/preliminary designs.”
The Navy did not disclose the amount of money each company received to perform the
work, but Baribeau confirmed to USNI News that the total combined amount of the
contracts was less than $7.5 million.34
A February 10, 2022, press report states
Moving ahead, the services [i.e., the Navy and Marine Corps] expect a “full and open
competition” once they issue the request for proposals for the detail[ed] design and
construction phase, according to Tom Rivers, the executive director of the amphibious,
auxiliary and sealift office within the Program Executive Office for Ships.
After issuing five companies “concept design” contracts last year, those same five
companies recently received options for the preliminary design phase, Rivers said. The
companies working on the preliminary design are Fincantieri, Austal USA, VT Halter
Marine, Bollinger and TAI Engineers.
“So LAW—the initial thought process is based upon parent designs [i.e., existing ship
designs from which the design for LAW could be derived] that are already out there in the
world today to, again, to reduce our risks,” Rivers said at the conference. “As new
requirements are generated out of the Pentagon, we actually are sharing those with the
shipyards so they can kind of see what we’re thinking about how it evolves over time and
then they can kind of build that into the—and they come back to us and say, ‘hey here’s

33 Megan Eckstein, “Marines, Navy Moving Quickly on Light Amphib, Anti-Ship Missiles to Create More Warfighting
Options,” USNI News, January 11, 2021. Material in brackets as in original. See also Rich Abott, “Kilby Outlines
Factors Leading To Faster New Light Amphib Development,” Defense Daily, February 5, 2021.
34 Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy Awards 5 Companies Light Amphibious Warship ‘Concept Design’ Contracts,” USNI
News, June 17, 2021.
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the impact of that particular change on our configuration.’ Either it’s small or large and
then we take that in consideration into the final requirements.”
This type of process is helping the Navy determine what it can do with the various parent
designs, Rivers said.35
January 2024 Request for Proposals (RFP)
A January 10, 2024, press report stated:
The U.S. Navy is seeking proposals for its Landing Ship Medium program, which one
Marine Corps leader called a top priority for the Navy-Marine amphibious team.
The services are “on pace to procure in ’25, deliver it in 2029,” Maj. Gen. Marcus Annibale,
the director of expeditionary warfare on the chief of naval operations’ staff, said
Wednesday [January 10] at the Surface Navy Association’s annual conference.
The Navy released the request for proposals [RFP] on Jan. 5. The contract would cover up
to six vessels, according to the SAM.gov contracting website. Offers are due May 9.36
FY2025 Funding Request
The Navy’s proposed FY2025 budget requests $268.1 million to procure the first ship in the
program.
Issues for Congress
The LSM program poses a number of potential oversight matters for Congress, including those
discussed briefly in the sections below.
Accuracy of Unit Procurement Cost Estimate
One issue for Congress concerns the accuracy of the Navy’s unit procurement cost estimate for
the LSM. In considering this issue, points to consider include but are not necessarily limited to
the following:
• The table in the Navy’s FY2025 30-year (FY2035-FY2054) shipbuilding plan
that presents requested and programmed funding for the procurement of Navy
ships in FY2025-FY2029 includes a table note for two ship types, including the
LSM, that states: “These future platforms are under development. As the
platform and capabilities are further defined, the procurement costs will be
refined.”37
• The Navy’s FY2025 budget submission shows the estimated average unit
procurement cost of the 2nd through 8th ships in the program (i.e., the LSMs

35 Mallory Shelbourne and Sam LaGrone, “Navy, Marines Want the Light Amphibious Warship to Haul 75 Marines for
$150M or Less,” USNI News, February 10, 2022. See also Aidan Quigley, “Five Shipbuilders Emerge as Leading Light
Amphibious Warship Contenders,” Inside Defense, February 2, 2022.
36 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Accepting Landing Ship Medium Proposals for FY25 Contract Award,” Defense News,
January 10, 2024.
37 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2025, March 2024, p. 16 (Table A1-1, note 5). The other class included in this note is the Navy’s envisioned Light
Replenishment Oiler (TAOL). For more on the TAOL program, see CRS In Focus IF11674, Navy Light Replenishment
Oiler (TAOL) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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programmed for procurement in FY2026-FY2029) as about $166.6 million in
then-year dollars, and the estimated average unit procurement cost of the 9th
through 18th ships in the program (i.e., the LSMs to be procured in fiscal years
after FY2029) as about $242.5 million in then-year dollars,38 a figure that is
about 46% higher, or as about $298.7 million in then-year dollars,39 a figure that
is about 79% higher. Some of the 46%-79% difference is due to the impact of
inflation on the costs in then-year dollars of the LSMs to be procured in fiscal
years after FY2029. The remaining part of the 46%-79% difference could be
viewed as suggesting that the estimated costs of the 2nd through 8th ships might be
too low and/or the estimated costs of the 9th through 18th ships might be too high.
• As detailed by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)40 and the Government
Accountability Office (GAO),41 lead ships in Navy shipbuilding programs in
many cases have turned out to be more expensive to build than the Navy had
estimated.
• An April 2024 CBO report estimates the average procurement cost for 18 LSMs
as $340 million to $430 million per ship in constant (i.e., inflation-adjusted)
FY2024 dollars, compared to the Navy’s estimate for the first 8 LSMs of roughly
$150 million per ship in constant FY2024 dollars. CBO’s estimate is roughly
127% to 187% higher than the Navy’s estimate.42
Analysis of Alternatives (AOA)
Another issue for Congress concerns the analysis of alternatives (AOA) for the LSM program. An
AOA is a formal study that examines broad options for meeting a mission requirement,
determines whether that requirement would be best met through the procurement of a new
weapon system or platform (e.g., ship or aircraft), and if so, what the general features of that new
weapon system or platform should be. A June 2023 GAO report assessing selected DOD weapon
acquisition programs stated the following in its entry on the LSM program (which the GAO
report refers to as the LAW program):
Current Status
Since our last review, the Navy delayed the detail design and construction contract award
for LAW from fiscal year 2023 to fiscal year 2025. According to Navy officials, this change
was due to ongoing efforts to engage with industry and refine program requirements, as
well as delays in gaining approval of the program’s analysis of alternatives (AOA)—a key
document to help DOD and the Navy decide if a new ship class is needed. As of January
2023, the Office of the Secretary of Defense had yet to approve the AOA, which is at least
a 19-month delay in the planned approval since our last review.
Although an approved AOA has yet to confirm the need for LAW, the program continues
to work toward a detail design and construction contract award and is looking for

38 Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume 1 of 1,
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, March 2024, p. 329.
39 Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume 2 of 5, Research,
Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, Budget Activity 4, March 2024, p. 438.
40 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2024 Shipbuilding Plan, October 23, p. 34
(Figure 10).
41 Government Accountability Office, Navy Shipbuilding[:] Past Performance Provides Valuable Lessons for Future
Investments, GAO-18-238SP, June 2018, p. 8.
42 Congressional Budget Office, Acquisition Costs of the Navy’s Medium Landing Ship, April 2024, p. 1.
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opportunities to shorten LAW’s development time. For example, the program plans to
modify an existing parent ship design, instead of creating a new one, and has been assessing
potential designs with five companies since 2021. The program also plans to seek approval
to streamline its schedule by eliminating certain early acquisition oversight reviews. We
previously found that eliminating such reviews can increase the risk that senior acquisition
and warfighting leaders lack information needed for sound investment decisions.
Currently, several key program elements remain undefined. In particular, the Navy is still
determining LAW’s requirements. In alignment with leading principles for iterative
development, the Navy is making changes to draft requirements based on industry feedback
and ongoing AOA efforts. DOD has also yet to determine LAW’s total procurement
quantities. The Marine Corps suggested 35 ships, but the Navy proposed acquiring only
18. The Navy cannot estimate LAW’s costs until it defines requirements and quantities.
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The
program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. It
stated that the Navy is following a deliberate requirements process to determine its needs
for the LAW program. It noted that the Navy endorsed the AOA in March 2022 and is
awaiting the sufficiency review by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It added that it
is incorporating the analysis results and feedback from the five industry preliminary
designs into the upcoming Capabilities Development Document.43
Force Design and EABO Operational Concept
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the merits of Force Design and the
EABO operational concept that the LSM is intended to help implement. Debate on the merits of
Force Design and the EABO concept has been vigorous and concerns issues such as
• whether Force Design and the EABO concept are focused too exclusively on
potential conflict scenarios with China at the expense of other kinds of potential
Marine Corps missions;
• the ability of Marine forces to gain access to the islands from which they would
operate;
• the ability to resupply Marine forces that are operating on the islands;
• the survivability of Marine forces on the islands and in surrounding waters;
• how much of a contribution the envisioned operations by Marine forces would
make in contributing to overall U.S. sea-denial operations; and
• potential alternative ways of using the funding and personnel that would be
needed to implement EABO.44
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
• What are the potential benefits, costs, and risks of the EABO concept?

43 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] Programs Are Not Consistently
Implementing Practices That Can Help Accelerate Acquisitions, GAO-22-106059, June 2023, p. 171.
44 For a CRS report on Force Design, see CRS Insight IN11281, New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiative:
Force Design 2030, by Andrew Feickert. See also CRS In Focus IF12200, The U.S. Marine Corps Marine Littoral
Regiment (MLR), by Andrew Feickert, The U.S. Marine Corps Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), by Andrew Feickert.
For examples of articles published since April 2021 discussing the merits of Force Design and the EABO concept, see
the Appendix.
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• What work have the Navy and Marine Corps done in terms of analyses and war
games to develop and test the concept?
• Would EABO be more cost effective to implement than other potential uses of
the funding and personnel?
Potential Alternative of Adapting Existing Army LSVs
Another potential issue for Congress is whether at least some portion of the operational
requirements for the LSM program could be met cost effectively met by adapting existing U.S.
military ships rather than building new LSMs. Some observers, for example, argue that at least
some portion of the operational requirements for the LSM program could be met more cost-
effectively by transferring existing Army watercraft known as Logistics Support Vessels (LSVs)
(Figure 3) to the Navy and adapting these LSVs to the LSM mission.
Figure 3. Besson-Class Logistics Support Vessel (LSV)

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Walker D. Mil s and Joseph Hanacek, “The US Navy and
Marine Corps Should Acquire Army Watercraft,” Defense News, June 22, 2020. The caption to the photograph
credits the photograph to the U.S. Navy and states, “U.S. Navy sailors conduct a simulated disaster relief supply
offload from a General Frank S. Besson-class logistics support vessel at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam on July
10, 2016.”
A June 22, 2020, opinion piece discussing this idea states
The Navy intends to acquire up to 30 new light amphibious warships, or LAW, to support
new Marine Corps requirements.… Rather than accepting a new amphibious design built
from the ground up, however, decision-makers should take advantage of the fact that many
key requirements of the new vessels are very similar to the capabilities of vessels operated
by U.S. Army Transportation Command.
The Navy and Marine Corps should delay any new construction and immediately acquire
some of these existing vessels to drive experimentation and better inform their
requirements for the LAW program….
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U.S. Army Transportation Command has over 100 vessels, and dozens have similar
capabilities to those required of the LAW. The Army’s LCU-2000s, also called the
Runnymede-class large landing crafts, are smaller, with roughly half of the cargo space
designed for the LAW and slightly slower, but they boast nearly double the range. The
Runnymede-class vessels have nearly 4,000 square feet of cargo space and can travel 6,500
miles when loaded and at 12 knots; and they can unload at the beach with their bow ramp.
The Army’s General Frank S. Besson-class logistics support vessels are larger than the
future LAW, at 273 feet in length but can claim 10,500 square feet of cargo space and a
6,500-mile range loaded to match the LCU-2000. These vessels also have both a bow and
stern ramp for roll-on/roll-off capability at the beach or ship-to-ship docking at sea. The
version built for the Phillipine military also has a helipad.
Army Transportation Command has 32 Runnymede-class and eight General Frank S.
Besson-class vessels in service. Mostly built in the 1990s, both classes of vessel have many
years left in their life expectancy and more than meet the Navy’s 10-year life expectancy
for the LAW.
These vessels are operable today and could be transferred from the Army to the Navy or
Marine Corps tomorrow. In fact, the Army was attempting to divest itself of these
watercraft less than a year ago, which underscores the importance of this opportunity even
further. Congress is firmly set against the Army getting rid of valuable, seaworthy vessels
and has quashed all of the Army’s efforts to do so thus far, but transferring this equipment
to the Navy is a reasonable course of action that should satisfy all parties involved….
By acquiring a watercraft that meets most of their requirements from the Army, the Navy
and Marine Corps simultaneously fill current capability gaps and obtain an invaluable
series of assets they can use to support the evaluation and experimentation of new designs
and concepts. This will allow Navy and Marine leaders to give their units the maximum
amount of time to evaluate and experiment with new designs to get a better idea of what
they need both in future amphibious craft as well as operational and support equipment….
Often overlooked, the availability of surplus vessels is absolutely critical to the process of
developing new technologies, developing the tactics to employ them, conducting training,
and providing decision-makers the requisite capacity to remain flexible in the face of
unexpected challenges….
[The Navy and Marine Corps have] long been in need of a boost in their amphibious
capabilities so as to be better positioned to meet the demands of today and prepare for the
challenges of tomorrow, and taking possession of the Army’s Runnymede- and Frank S.
Benson-class vessels is a solution on a silver platter.45
In a May 2022 update to its Force Design plan, the Marine Corps stated that it would “Provide
and sustain bridging solutions for littoral mobility for MLR experimentation and training until the
LAW is fielded,” and that
While we await the delivery of LSM, which post-dates the planned operational readiness
of our MLRs, we will explore a family of systems bridging plan—including, Expeditionary
Transfer Dock (ESB), Expeditionary Fast Transport (T-EPF), Landing Craft Utility (LCU),
and leased hulls—that can provide a basic level of mobility. Although not optimal, such

45 Walker D. Mills and Joseph Hanacek, “The US Navy and Marine Corps Should Acquire Army Watercraft,” Defense
News, June 22, 2020. See also William Cole, “Army Vessels Could Be Transferred To Marines To Counter China
Threat,” Honolulu Star-Advertiser, February 7, 2022; Chris Bernotavicius, Michelle Macander, Danielle Ngo, and John
Schaus, “You Go to War with the Watercraft You Have,” War on the Rocks, July 26, 2022.
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vessels will provide both operational capability and a sound basis for live experimentation
and refining detailed requirements for the LSM program.46
In June 2022, the Marine Corps stated that pending the delivery of the first LSMs, it will likely
use three civilian stern landing vessels to inform the design of the LSM hull form and experiment
with and confirm operational concepts for the LSM program.47
Potential questions for Congress include the following:
• How many of these watercraft would be available for transfer to the Navy for use
in meeting the operational requirements of the LSM program?
• How do the capabilities of these watercraft compare with those required for the
LSM?
• How much remaining service life do these watercraft have?
• Given the number of these watercraft that would be available for transfer to the
Navy, their operational capabilities, and their remaining service life, what portion
of the LSM program’s operational requirements could transferred watercraft
meet? How many LSMs, if any, would still need to be built to fully or
substantially meet the LSM program’s operational requirements?
• How do the acquisition and operation and support (O&S) costs of these
watercraft compare to the estimated acquisition and O&S costs of the LSMs they
would replace?
• Taking into account capabilities, acquisition costs, and O&S costs, how does the
cost effectiveness of an approach involving the transfer of these watercraft
compare to that of the Navy’s baseline approach of meeting the LSM program’s
requirements through the acquisition of 24 to 35 new LSMs?
• What would be the potential industrial-base implications of using transferred
watercraft to meet at least some portion of the LSM program’s operational needs?
Industrial-Base Implications
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the potential industrial-base implications
of the LSM program. In recent years, all Navy amphibious ships have been built by the Ingalls
shipyard of Pascagoula, MS, a part of Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII/Ingalls). As noted
earlier, LSMs could be built by multiple U.S. shipyards.48 Potential oversight questions for
Congress include the following:

46 U.S. Marine Corps, Force Design 2030, Annual Update, May 2022, pp. 8 and 15. See also Megan Eckstein, “The
Light Amphibious Warship Is Delayed, but the Marine Corps Has a Temporary Solution,” Defense News, May 10,
2022; Mallory Shelbourne, “Marines Look to EPFs, ESBs as Interim Solution for Light Amphibious Warship,” USNI
News, May 10 (updated May 11), 2022.
47 Audrey Decker, “Smith: Marine Corps Likely to Contract Three Stern Landing Vessels,” Inside Defense, June 16,
2022.
48 10 U.S.C. §8679 requires that, subject to a presidential waiver for the national security interest, “no vessel to be
constructed for any of the armed forces, and no major component of the hull or superstructure of any such vessel, may
be constructed in a foreign shipyard.” In addition, the paragraph in the annual DOD appropriations act that makes
appropriations for the Navy’s shipbuilding account (the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy account) typically contains
these provisos: “ … Provided further, That none of the funds provided under this heading for the construction or
conversion of any naval vessel to be constructed in shipyards in the United States shall be expended in foreign facilities
for the construction of major components of such vessel: Provided further, That none of the funds provided under this
heading shall be used for the construction of any naval vessel in foreign shipyards….”
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• What implications might the LSM program have for the distribution of Navy
shipbuilding work among U.S. shipyards?
• How many jobs would the LSM program create at the shipyard that builds the
ships, at associated supplier firms, and indirectly in surrounding communities?
• In a situation of finite defense resources, what impact, if any, would funding the
procurement of LSMs have on funding available for procuring other types of
amphibious ships, and thus on workloads and employment levels at HII/Ingalls,
its associated supplier firms, and their surrounding communities?49
Legislative Activity for FY2024 and FY2025
Summary of Congressional Action on FY2024 Research and
Development Funding Request
Table 1 summarizes congressional action on the FY2024 research and development funding
request for the LSM program.
Table 1. Congressional Action on FY2024 Research and Development Funding
Request
Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth

Authorization
Appropriation

Request
HASC
SASC
Enacted
HAC
SAC
Enacted
Research and development
14.7
14.7
14.7
14.7
14.7
12.6
12.6
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2024 budget submission, committee and conference
reports, and explanatory statements on FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2024 DOD
Appropriations Act. The funding is requested in Project 4044 (Medium Landing Ship) of PE (Program Element)
0603564N (Ship Preliminary Design and Feasibility Studies), which is line 46 in the Navy’s FY2024 research and
development account.
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee; HAC is
House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee.
Summary of Congressional Action on FY2025 Procurement Funding
Request
Table 2 summarizes congressional action on the FY2025 procurement funding request for the
LSM program.

49 Two observers argue that shifting the Navy to a fleet architecture that includes a larger proportion of smaller ships
would have beneficial impacts on U.S. shipbuilding industry’s ability to support Navy shipbuilding needs. See Bryan
Clark and Timothy A. Walton, “Shipbuilding Suppliers Need More Than Market Forces to Stay Afloat,” Defense News,
May 20, 2020.
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Table 2. Congressional Action on FY2025 Procurement Funding Request
Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth

Authorization
Appropriation

Request
HASC
SASC
Enacted
HAC
SAC
Enacted
Procurement
268.1

(Quantity)
(1)

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2025 budget submission, committee and conference
reports, and explanatory statements on FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2025 DOD
Appropriations Act.
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee; HAC is
House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee.
FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2670/S. 2226/P.L.
118-31)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 118-125 of June 30, 2023) on H.R.
2670, recommended the funding level shown in the HASC column of Table 1.
H.Rept. 118-125 states
Study on Maneuver Support Vessel and Landing Ship Medium joint venture
The committee continues to support multiyear and block buy procurement authority, and
is interested in the feasibility, cost, and strategic benefits of combining the Army Maneuver
Support Vessel (MSV) and Navy/Marine Landing Ship Medium (LSM) programs into a
shared base platform contract to expedite production, provide cost savings from block buys
and higher quantity and guarantee contracts, and the series of options to make this possible
in the most efficient timeline to provide capability to forces in-theater faster.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the House
Committee on Armed Services not later than December 15, 2023, on the feasibility of a
joint venture between the Department of the Army and the Department of the Navy for
joint contracts, shared platform development, and block buys for the MSV and the LSM
programs. The report shall include the following information:
(1) the requirements for each program that can and cannot be met with a shared base
platform;
(2) the value and cost savings of contracting the shared base platform under the same
contract and builder;
(3) the value and cost savings of contracting the platforms as described in (2) as a block
buy;
(4) a series of options, approaches, and timelines to bidding these programs jointly,
including detailing service acquisitions authorities and divided financing; and
(5) the effect of a multiple platform (MSV/LSM) acquisition plan and block buy on force
development, and in-theater logistics and fleet capability. (Pages 22-23)
Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 118-58 of July 12, 2023) on S.
2226, recommended the funding level shown in the SASC column of Table 1.
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Section 1024 of S. 2226 states
SEC. 1024. REPORT ON THE POTENTIAL FOR AN ARMY AND NAVY JOINT
EFFORT FOR WATERCRAFT VESSELS.
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than February 29, 2024, the Secretary of the Navy,
in coordination with the Secretary of the Army, shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a report on the feasibility of conducting a joint Army and Navy effort to
develop and field a family of watercraft vessels to support the implementation of the
Marine Corps concept of expeditionary advanced base operations and Army operations in
maritime environments.
(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (a) shall include an assessment of
whether a shared base platform could meet requirements of the Department of the Navy
and the Department of the Army, and, if so, an assessment of the benefits and challenges
of procuring a technical data package to allow simultaneous construction of such platform
by multiple builders and using block buy authorities.
Enacted
The conference report (H.Rept. 118-301 of December 6, 2023) on H.R. 2670/P.L. 118-31 of
December 22, 2023, recommended the funding level shown in the authorization enacted column
of Table 1.
Section 1019 of H.R. 2670 amends 10 U.S.C. 8695(e), which sets forth the role of the
Commandant of the Marine Corps in the preparation of an annual Navy battle force ship
assessment and requirement, to state that the Commandant shall be specifically responsible not
only “for developing the requirements relating to amphibious warfare ships,” as previously stated
in 10 U.S.C. 8695(e), but also “for naval vessels with the primary mission of transporting
Marines.”
Regarding Section 1019, H.Rept. 118-301 states
Sec. 1019—Responsibility of Commandant of the Marine Corps with respect to naval battle
force ship assessment and requirement reporting
The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1015) that would provide the Commandant of
the Marine Corps the responsibility for developing requirements related to all naval vessels
with the primary mission of transporting Marines within the Naval Battle Force Ship
Requirements and Assessment.
The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.
The Senate recedes with a clarifying amendment to the provision’s title.
The conferees agree that the Commandant of the Marine Corps has not been provided an
adequate voice in the generation of requirements for naval vessels that support Marine
Corps missions. Section 1025 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263) provided that the Commandant of the Marine
Corps would have responsibility for preparation of amphibious warfare ship requirements.
The section did not deal with requirements for smaller vessels, such as the Landing Ship
Medium (LSM). However, the Commandant called for a program of 35 LSMs to support
operations of three Marine Littoral Regiments, with affordability and speed to delivery as
key considerations. However, the Navy’s program only includes 18 LSMs, a number
insufficient to provide continuous support for two Marine Littoral Regiments. (Page 1169)
H.Rept. 118-301 states
Report on the potential for an Army and Navy joint effort for watercraft vessels
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The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 1024) that would require the Secretary
of the Navy, in coordination with the Secretary of the Army, to submit a report to the
congressional defense committees, not later than February 29, 2024, on the feasibility of
conducting a joint Army and Navy effort to develop and field a family of watercraft vessels
to support the implementation of the Marine Corps’ concept of Expeditionary Advanced
Base Operations and Army’s operations in maritime environments.
The House bill contained no similar provision.
The Senate recedes.
The conferees direct the Secretary of the Navy, in coordination with the Secretary of the
Army and not later than February 29, 2024, to submit to the congressional defense
committees a report on the feasibility of conducting a joint Army and Navy effort to
develop and field a family of watercraft vessels to support the implementation of the
Marine Corps concept of expeditionary advanced base operations and Army operations in
maritime environments. The report shall include an assessment of whether a shared base
platform could meet requirements of the Department of the Navy and the Department of
the Army, and, if so, an assessment of the benefits and challenges of procuring a technical
data package to allow an acquisition strategy that could incorporate simultaneous
construction of such platform by multiple builders and using block buy authorities.
The House report accompanying H.R. 2670 (H. Rept. 118–125) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 contained a similar reporting requirement titled
‘‘Study on Maneuver Support Vessel and Landing Ship Medium joint venture.’’ The
conferees intend the language above to supersede that reporting requirement. (Pages 1189-
1190)
FY2024 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 4365/S. 2587/Division A of
H.R. 2882/P.L. 118-47)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 118-121 of June 27, 2023) on H.R.
4365, recommended the funding level shown in the HAC column of Table 1.
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 118-81 of July 27, 2023) on S. 2587,
recommended the funding level shown in the HAC column of Table 1. The recommended
reduction of $2.142 million is for “Medium landing ship DT&E [developmental test and
evaluation] ahead of need.” (Page 211)
Enacted
The explanatory statement for Division A of H.R. 2882 (P.L. 118-47 of March 23, 2024) provides
the funding level shown in the appropriation enacted column Table 1. The reduction of $2.142
million is for Medium landing ship DT&E [developmental test and evaluation] ahead of need.”
(PDF page 212 of 314)

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Appendix. Articles Regarding Debate on Merits of
Force Design and EABO
This appendix presents examples of articles published since April 2021 discussing the merits of
Force Design 2030 and the EABO concept, starting with the most recent on top.
Gary Anderson, “Biden Has Allowed the Marine Corps to Become Irrelevant,” American
Spectator, April 21, 2024.
Grant Newsham, “U.S. Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030. A Well-Intentioned Act of Self-Harm,”
Sunday Guardian, March 10, 2024.
Grant Newsham, “US Marine Force Design 2030: Hatred and Hubris,” Asia Times, March 5,
2024.
C. Travis Reese, Ian Brown, Zach Ota, Travis Hord, Leo Spaeder, and Brian Strom, “Trends in
Maritime Challenges Indicate Force Design 2030 Is the Proper Path,” War on the Rocks, January
29, 2024.
Charles Krulak, Charles Wilhelm, Anthony Zinni, and James Conway, “Four Retired Marine
Generals on How to Rebuild America’s Crisis Response Force,” The Hill, January 15, 2024.
Michael R. Gordon and Nancy A. Youssef, “The Marines Transformed to Take On China. Will
They Be Ready for Everything Else?” Wall Street Journal, December 28, 2023.
Bruce Stubbs, “Ten Challenges to Implementing Force Design 2030,” Atlantic Council,
November 25, 2023.
Bill Mullen, “Gen. Berger Knew What He Was Doing with His Transformation of the Marine
Corps,” Military.com, August 11, 2023.
Kenneth J. Braithwaite, “Braithwaite: Recognizing Gen. David Berger’s Faithful Career to the
Corps,” Military.com, August 9, 2023.
Gary Anderson, “The Games the Marine Corps Plays,” Military.com, June 16, 2023.
Jerry Hendrix and Mark Montgomery, “Marines Need to Move beyond Their Amphibious-
Assault Past,” National Review, June 15, 2023.
James Holmes, “Three Cheers For The New U.S. Marine Corps, None For The Old,”
19FortyFive, June 4, 2023.
Robert Work, “Marine Force Design: Changes Overdue Despite Critics’ Claims,” Texas National
Security Review, Summer 2023.
Christopher Owens, “The Radical Redesign and Restructuring of the United States Marine
Corps,” Real Clear Defense, May 13, 2023.
Christopher Owens, “Congress Must Restore Order to the Navy’s Amphibious Ship Program,”
Defense News, February 6, 2023.
Bryan McGrath, “The Navy Put Its Next Amphib on Hold. Good,” Defense One, January 20,
2023.
Martin Steele, “A better plan for the Marine Corps and the nation: Vision 2035,” Marine Corps
Times, January 4, 2023.
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J. Noel Williams, “What Force Design 2030 Really Does,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
January 2023.
Justin Katz, “The Year the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 Came into Its Own: 2022 in
Review,” Breaking Defense, December 22, 2022.
Terrence R. Dake and Charles E. Wilhelm, “Reduce the Risk to National Security: Abandon
‘Force Design 2030,’” The Hill, December 21, 2022.
Paul Van Riper, “This Is the Marine Corps Debate We Should Be Having,” Marine Corps Times,
December 7, 2022.
Harry W. Jenkins, “The Ugly Truth: Can the Light Amphibious Warship Survive War with
China?” The Hill, November 2, 2022.
Dakota Wood, “The U.S. Marine Corps Has a Choice: Transform or Die,” Defense One, October
16, 2022.
Stephen Baird and Timothy Wells, “Why Marine Corps Forces Are Becoming Less Relevant to
Combatant Commanders,” The Hill, October 13, 2022.
Paula Thornhill, “Civilians Will Choose the Marine Corps’ Future—and Soon, And They Will Do
It by Selecting the Next Commandant and Other Four- And Three-Star Generals,” Defense One,
October 13, 2022.
Gary Anderson, “Can Congress Save the Marine Corps from Itself?” Military.com, October 5,
2022.
John Sattely and Jason A. Paredes, “Sustainment of the Stand-In Force,” War on the Rocks,
September 12, 2022.
Jonathan Lehrfeld, “Former Marine Officials, Experts Praise Force Design 2030,” Defense News,
August 26, 2022.
Gary Anderson, “Creating a Real Deterrent to Defend Taiwan,” Military.com, August 25, 2022.
James A. Warren, “If the Marine Corps Isn’t Broken—and It Isn’t—Why Fix It?” Daily Beast,
August 20 (updated August 21), 2022.
Richard R. Burgess, “Navy’s Light Amphibious Warship Will Be A ‘Great Enabler’ for Marine
Littoral Regiments, General Says,” Seapower, August 19, 2022.
Franz J. Gayl, “The Marine Corps’ New Plan Will Not Beat China in a Fight for Taiwan,” Marine
Corps Times, August 4, 2022.
Gary “GI” Wilson, William A. Woods, and Michael D. Wyly, “Send in the Marines? Reconsider
Force Design 2030 Beforehand,” Defense News, August 4, 2022.
Michelle Macander Grace Hwang, “Marine Corps Force Design 2030: Examining the
Capabilities and Critiques,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), July 22, 2022.
Max Boot, “The Top Marine Faces Unprecedented Opposition. He Says That’s ‘Positive.’”
Washington Post, July 20, 2022.
Scott Cuomo, “On-the-Ground Truth and Force Design 2030 Reconciliation: A Way Forward,”
War on the Rocks, July 12, 2022.
John F. Schmitt, “The Marine Corps’ Latest Idea for Countering China Has Major Problems,”
Task and Purpose, July 7, 2022.
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Mark Cancian, “Analyzing the Biggest Changes in the Marine Corps Force Design 2030 Update,”
Breaking Defense, June 14, 2022.
Worth Parker, “How the Marine Corps Went to War with Itself over the Next War,” Task and
Purpose, June 10, 2022.
Jesse Schmitt, “When Only a Chisel Will Do: Marine Corps Force Design for the Modern Era,”
Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), June 2, 2022.
Stuart Scheller, “The Marine Corps’ Debate with Its Generals Is Amusing, but Dangerous,”
Marine Corps Times, June 1, 2022.
Brent Stricker, “Marine Corps Metamorphosis: Legal Considerations,” Center for International
Maritime Security (CIMSEC), May 31, 2022.
Charles C. Krulak, “Whose Marine Corps? Why a Force Design Battle Is Losing Sight of the
Basics,” Marine Corps Times, May 27, 2022.
Owen West, “Are the Marines Inventing the Edsel or the Mustang?” War on the Rocks, May 27,
2022.
David E. Johnson, “Ending the Civil War over the Future of the US Marine Corps,” Breaking
Defense, May 24, 2022.
Elliot Ackerman, “A Whole Age of Warfare Sank With the Moskva, A Fierce Debate Is Raging
within the U.S. Marine Corps about What Comes Next.” Atlantic, May 22, 2022.
CDR Salamander, “Force Design 2030: Futurism, Imbroglio, or Creative Friction?” CDR
Salamander, May 17, 2022.
Todd South, “Lethal and Survivable or Irrelevant and Vulnerable? Marine Redesign Debate
Rages,” Marine Corps Times, May 16, 2022.
Robert Work, “USMC Force Design 2030: Threat Or Opportunity?” 19FortyFive, May 15, 2022.
Tom Hanson, “Rather Than Wreck It, Berger’s Vision Will Save the Marine Corps from Itself,”
Marine Corps Times, May 10, 2022.
John Vandiver, “Marines Unveil Force Structure Update amid Opposition from Retired Generals
about Service’s Direction,” Stars and Stripes, May 10, 2022.
Will McGee, “Forcing Design or Designing Force? The Reinvention of the Marine Corps,” Small
Wars Journal, May 7, 2022.
Howard Altman, “Marines Based Inside China’s Striking Distance Key To Deterrence General
Says,” The Drive, May 5, 2022.
Audrey Decker, “Heckl: Force Design 2030 Will Make It ‘Damn Hard’ for China to Make a
Move,” Inside Defense, May 4, 2022.
Mallory Shelbourne, “Marines Committed to New Force Design, Despite Criticism From Retired
Generals,” USNI News, May 4, 2022.
Gary Anderson, “The Marine Corps’ Intellectual Civil War,” Military.com, April 28, 2022.
Charles Krulak, Jack Sheehan, and Anthony Zinni, “War Is a Dirty Business. Will the Marine
Corps Be Ready for the Next One?” Washington Post, April 22, 2022.
P. K. Van Riper, “The Marine Corps’ Plan to Redesign the Force Will Only End Up Breaking It,”
Task and Purpose, April 20, 2022.
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Anthony Zinni, “What Is the Role of the Marine Corps in Today’s Global Security Environment?”
Task and Purpose, April 19, 2022.
Philip Athey, “First to Fight: Is This the End of the Corps as America’s 911 Force?” Marine
Corps Times, April 12, 2022.
Otto Kreisher, “Controversial EABO Concept Has Potential but Will Be Vetted, Speakers Say,”
Seapower, April 5, 2022.
Konstantin Toropin, “After a Barrage of Editorials and Critiques, Marine Leaders Defend
Restructuring Plan,” Military.com, April 5, 2022.
Craig Hooper, “Let The Marine Corps Build The New Light Amphibious Warship,” Forbes, April
3, 2022.
Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy and Marines Divided Over the Amphibious Fleet’s Future as Delays
and Cancellations Mount in FY 2023 Budget Request,” USNI News, April 3, 2022.
Paul McLeary and Lee Hudson, “How Two Dozen Retired Generals Are Trying to Stop an
Overhaul of the Marines,” Politico, April 1, 2022.
Noel Williams, “Insights for Marine (and Beyond) Force Design from the Russo-Ukrainian War,”
War on the Rocks, March 31, 2022.
Jim Webb, “Momentous Changes in the U.S. Marine Corps’ Force Organization Deserve Debate,”
Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2022.
Paul K. Van Riper, “Jeopardizing National Security: What Is Happening to Our Marine Corps?”
Marine Corps Times, March 21, 2022.
John M. Doyle, “Navy, Marine Corps Labs Exploring How to Keep Advanced Bases Supplied
and Safe,” Seapower, February 10, 2022.
John M. Doyle, “Berger Says Supporting a Widely Distributed Maritime Force Will Be a
Challenge,” Seapower, May 14, 2021.
Yasmin Tadjdeh, “Light Amphibious Warships Face Survivability Questions,” National Defense,
April 23, 2021.

Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs

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Congressional Research Service
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