Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier
Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Updated April 15, 2024
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
RS20643

Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Summary
The aircraft carriers CVN-78, CVN-79, CVN-80, CVN-81, and CVN-82 are the first five ships in
the Navy’s new Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs). The
Navy’s proposed FY2025 budget requests $2,143.9 million (i.e., about $2.1 billion) in
procurement funding for Ford-class ships, including $236.0 million for CVN-79, $1,186.9 million
for CVN-80, and $721.0 million for CVN-81. The Navy’s FY2025 budget submission proposes
deferring the procurement of the fifth ship in the class, CVN-82, by two years, from FY2028 to
FY2030, with advance procurement (AP) for the ship beginning in FY2027.
CVN-78 (Gerald R. Ford) was procured in FY2008. The ship was commissioned into service on
July 22, 2017, and achieved initial operational capability in December 2021. The ship’s first
deployment began in October 2022, more than five years after the ship was commissioned into
service.
CVN-79 (John F. Kennedy) was procured in FY2013. The Navy’s FY2025 budget submission
states that the ship is scheduled for delivery in July 2025.
CVN-80 (Enterprise) was procured in FY2018. On April 2, 2024, the Navy announced delays in
the scheduled deliveries of several of its shipbuilding programs, including CVN-80, whose
delivery, the Navy stated, will be delayed approximately 18 to 26 months. The Navy’s FY2025
budget submission, which was submitted to Congress in March 2024, shows the ship’s scheduled
delivery date as September 2029, or 18 months later than the March 2028 date shown in the
Navy’s FY2024 budget submission, which was submitted to Congress in March 2023.
CVN-81 (Doris Miller) is treated in this report as a ship that was procured in FY2019, consistent
with congressional action on the Navy’s FY2019 budget. (The Navy’s FY2025 budget
submission, like its FY2021-FY2024 submissions, shows CVN-81 as a ship that was procured in
FY2020.) The ship is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in February 2032.
CVN-82, as noted above, is programmed for procurement in FY2030 under the Navy’s FY2025
budget submission. Procuring CVN-82 two years earlier, in FY2028, could involve providing
roughly $550 million in AP funding for the ship in FY2025.
CVN-80 and CVN-81 were procured under a two-ship block buy contract that was authorized by
Section 121(a)(2) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019
(H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232 of August 13, 2018). The use of the two-ship block buy contract reduced
the combined estimated procurement cost of the two ships.
Oversight issues for Congress for the CVN-78 program include the following:
• whether to procure CVN-82 in FY2030 (as proposed in the Navy’s FY2025
budget submission), in FY2028 (as scheduled in prior-year Navy budget
submissions), or in FY2029;
• whether to procure CVN-82 and a subsequent aircraft carrier (which would be
CVN-83) as a two-ship buy that would similar to the two-ship buy that was used
for procuring CVN-80 and CVN-81;
• the future aircraft carrier force level;
• CVN-78 program issues that were raised in a January 2024 report from the
Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
(DOT&E) and a June 2023 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on
DOD weapon systems; and
• the procurement of aircraft carriers after CVN-81 or CVN-82.
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Introduction
This report provides background information and potential oversight issues for Congress on the
Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) aircraft carrier program.
The Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget requests $2,143.9 million (i.e., about $2.1 billion) in
procurement funding for the program. Congress’s decisions on the CVN-78 program could
substantially affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements and the shipbuilding industrial
base.
Background
Current Navy Aircraft Carrier Force
The Navy’s current aircraft carrier force consists of 11 CVNs,1 including 10 Nimitz-class ships
(CVNs 68 through 77) that entered service between 1975 and 2009, and one Gerald R. Ford
(CVN-78) class ship that was commissioned into service on July 22, 2017.2
Statutory Requirements for Carriers and Carrier Air Wings
Requirement to Maintain Not Less Than 11 Carriers
10 U.S.C. 8062(b) requires the Navy to maintain a force of not less than 11 operational aircraft
carriers.3 The requirement for the Navy to maintain not less than a certain number of operational
aircraft carriers was established by Section 126 of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization
Act (H.R. 1815/P.L. 109-163 of January 6, 2006), which set the number at 12 carriers. The
requirement was changed from 12 carriers to 11 carriers by Section 1011(a) of the FY2007 John
Warner National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17, 2006).4
Prohibition on Retiring Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carriers Prior to Refueling
Section 1054 of the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (H.R. 6395/P.L. 116-
283) amended 10 U.S.C. 8062 to create a new subsection (which is now subsection [g]) stating:
“A nuclear powered aircraft carrier may not be retired before its first refueling.’’

1 The Navy’s last remaining conventionally powered carrier (CV), Kitty Hawk (CV-63), was decommissioned on
January 31, 2009.
2 The commissioning into service of CVN-78 on July 22, 2017, ended a period during which the carrier force had
declined to 10 ships—a period that began on December 1, 2012, with the inactivation of the one-of-a-kind nuclear-
powered aircraft carrier Enterprise (CVN-65), a ship that entered service in 1961.
3 10 U.S.C. 8062 was previously numbered as 10 U.S.C. 5062. It was renumbered as 10 U.S.C. 8062 by Section 807 of
the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232 of August 13,
2018), which directed a renumbering of sections and titles of Title 10 relating to the Navy and Marine Corps. (Sections
806 and 808 of P.L. 115-232 directed a similar renumbering of sections and titles relating to the Air Force and Army,
respectively.)
4 As mentioned in footnote 2, the carrier force dropped from 11 ships to 10 ships between December 1, 2012, when
Enterprise (CVN-65) was inactivated, and July 22, 2017, when CVN-78 was commissioned into service. Anticipating
the gap between the inactivation of CVN-65 and the commissioning of CVN-78, the Navy asked Congress for a
temporary waiver of 10 U.S.C. 8062(b) to accommodate the period between the two events. Section 1023 of the
FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) authorized the waiver,
permitting the Navy to have 10 operational carriers between the inactivation of CVN-65 and the commissioning of
CVN-78.
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Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Requirement to Maintain a Minimum of Carrier Air Wings
10 U.S.C. 8062(e), which was added by Section 1042 of the FY2017 National Defense
Authorization Act (S. 2943/P.L. 114-328 of December 23, 2016), requires the Navy to maintain a
certain minimum number of carrier air wings.5

5 10 U.S.C. 8062(e) states:
(e) The Secretary of the Navy shall ensure that-
(1) the Navy maintains a minimum of 9 carrier air wings until the earlier of-
(A) the date on which additional operationally deployable aircraft carriers can fully support a 10th
carrier air wing; or
(B) October 1, 2025;
(2) after the earlier of the two dates referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1), the
Navy maintains a minimum of 10 carrier air wings; and
(3) for each such carrier air wing, the Navy maintains a dedicated and fully staffed headquarters.
Section 121 of the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2670/P.L. 118-31 of December 22, 2023) states:
SEC. 121. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR MINIMUM NUMBER OF CARRIER
AIR WINGS OF THE NAVY.
(a) Modification of Requirements.--
(1) In general.--Subsection (e) of section 8062 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as
follows--
``(e) The Secretary of the Navy shall ensure that--
``(1) the Navy maintains a minimum of 9 carrier air wings; and
``(2) for each such carrier air wing, the Navy maintains a dedicated and fully staffed headquarters.' .
(2) Effective date.--
The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect one year after the date on which the
Secretary of the Navy submits to Congress the report required under subsection (b)(3).
The Secretary of the Navy shall notify the Law Revision Counsel of the House of Representatives
of the submission of the report so that the Law Revision Counsel may execute the amendment
made by paragraph (1) in accordance with the preceding sentence.
(b) Analysis and Report.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of the Navy shall conduct an analysis of potential approaches to the
manning, operation, and deployment of a 10th aircraft carrier and associated carrier air wing to
determine how the Navy can mobilize such a carrier and air wing if required by operational needs.
(2) Elements.--The analysis under paragraph (1) shall address the following:
(A) The timeline associated with removing an aircraft carrier from each the following maintenance
availability types:
(i) Complex Overhaul.
(ii) Selected Restricted Availability.
(iii) Docking Selected Restricted Availability.
(iv) Planned Incremental Availability.
(v) Docking Planned Incremental Availability.
(B) The potential for establishing a reserve component air wing capable of mobilization as a 10th
carrier air wing.
(C) The timeline for activation of such a reserve component carrier air wing.
(D) The costs associated with establishing and maintaining a 10th active carrier air wing versus
establishing and maintaining a reserve component air wing as described in subparagraph (B).
(E) The potential for deployment of a 10th aircraft carrier without a fully manned carrier air wing
in the event the Navy only operates and crews 9 carrier air wings at the time deployment of a 10th
aircraft carrier is required.
(continued...)
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Navy’s Aircraft Carrier Force-Level Goal
Current Aircraft Carrier Force-Level Goal
The Navy wants to achieve and maintain in coming years a fleet of 381 manned battle force ships,
including 12 aircraft carriers. The Biden Administration has not explicitly endorsed the Navy’s
desired 381-ship force-level objective or any other ship force-level objective for the Navy as a
whole.6
Projected Number of Aircraft Carriers
The Navy’s FY2025 30-year (FY2025-FY2054) shipbuilding plan, which is designed to support
the eventual attainment of a fleet of about 381 ships, projects that, if the plan were implemented,
the Navy’s carrier force would include a total of 12 carriers in only three years within the 30-year
period, with the force including
• 11 carriers in FY2025-FY2036 (except for FY2025, FY2029, and FY2032, when
it would include 12 carriers),
• 10 or 11 carriers in FY2037-FY2046, and
• 9 carriers in FY2047-FY2054 (except for FY2052, when it would include 10
carriers).
Incremental Funding Authority for Aircraft Carriers
Congress since the 1990s has authorized DOD to use incremental funding for procuring certain
Navy ships, most notably aircraft carriers.7 Under incremental funding, some of the funding

(F) The potential for additional forward deployed squadrons that could support an aircraft carrier
during theater operations that may not have a fully embarked air wing at the time of embarkation.
(3) Report.--Following completion of the analysis required under paragraph (1), Secretary of the
Navy shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the results of the analysis.
6 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
7 The provisions providing authority for using incremental funding for procuring Ford-class carriers are as follows:
Section 121 of the FY2007 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17,
2006) granted the Navy the authority to use four-year incremental funding for CVNs 78, 79, and 80. Under this
authority, the Navy could fully fund each of these ships over a four-year period that includes the ship’s year of
procurement and three subsequent years.
Section 124 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1540/P.L. 112-81 of December 31, 2011)
amended Section 121 of P.L. 109-364 to grant the Navy the authority to use five-year incremental funding for CVNs
78, 79, and 80. Since CVN-78 was fully funded in FY2008-FY2011, the provision in practice originally applied to
CVNs 79 and 80, although as discussed in the footnote to Table 1, the Navy made use of the authority in connection
with an FY2020 reprogramming action that reprogrammed $86.0 million of funding into FY2012 for CVN-78.
Section 121 of the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310/P.L. 112-239 of January 2, 2013) amended
Section 121 of P.L. 109-364 to grant the Navy the authority to use six-year incremental funding for CVNs 78, 79, and
80. Since CVN-78 was fully funded in FY2008-FY2011, the provision in practice applies to CVNs 79 and 80.
Section 121(c) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-
232 of August 13, 2018) authorized incremental funding to be used for making payments under the two-ship block buy
contract for the construction of CVN-80 and CVN-81. This provision does not limit the total number of years across
which incremental funding may be used to procure either ship.
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needed to fully fund a ship is provided in one or more years after the year in which the ship is
procured.8
Aircraft Carrier Construction Industrial Base
All U.S. aircraft carriers procured since FY1958 have been built by Huntington Ingalls
Industries/Newport News Shipbuilding (HII/NNS), of Newport News, VA. HII/NNS is the only
U.S. shipyard that can build large-deck, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. The aircraft carrier
construction industrial base as of 2019 also included roughly 2,000 supplier firms in 46 states.9
Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) Class Program
Overview
The Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class carrier design (Figure 1 and Figure 2) is the successor to the
Nimitz-class carrier design. The Ford-class design uses the basic Nimitz-class hull form but
incorporates several improvements, including features permitting the ship to generate more
aircraft sorties per day, more electrical power for supporting ship systems, and features permitting
the ship to be operated by several hundred fewer sailors than a Nimitz-class ship, reducing 50-
year life-cycle operating and support (O&S) costs for each ship by about $4 billion compared to
the Nimitz-class design, the Navy estimates. Navy plans call for procuring at least five Ford-class
carriers—CVN-78, CVN-79, CVN-80, CVN-81, and CVN-82.
CVN-78 (Gerald R. Ford)
CVN-78, which was named Gerald R. Ford in 2007,10 was procured in FY2008. The ship’s final
procurement cost was $13,316.5 million (i.e., about $13.3 billion) in then-year dollars. The ship
was commissioned into service on July 22, 2017, and achieved initial operational capability
(IOC) in December 2021.11 The ship’s first deployment, which was delayed by a need to complete
work on the ship’s weapons elevators and correct other technical problems aboard the ship, began
in October 2022, more than five years after the ship was commissioned into service.12 The ship
reportedly began its first full-length deployment on May 2, 2023.13

8 For more on full funding and incremental funding, see CRS Report RL31404, Defense Procurement: Full Funding
Policy—Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Stephen Daggett, and CRS Report
RL32776, Navy Ship Procurement: Alternative Funding Approaches—Background and Options for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
9 Source: Jennifer Boykin, president of HII/NNS, as quoted in Marcus Weisgerber, “US Navy Places First 2-Carrier
Order in Three Decades,” Defense One, January 31, 2019.
10 §1012 of the FY2007 defense authorization act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17, 2006) expressed the sense of
Congress that CVN-78 should be named for President Gerald R. Ford. On January 16, 2007, the Navy announced that
CVN-78 would be so named. CVN-78 and other carriers built to the same design are consequently referred to as Ford
(CVN-78) class carriers. For more on Navy ship names, see CRS Report RS22478, Navy Ship Names: Background for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
11 See, for example, Marcus Weisgerber, “Surprise! The Navy Declared Its Newest Carrier Battle-Ready Last Year,”
Defense One, April 5, 2022.
12 See, for example, Nick Wilson, “First-in-Class Ford Aircraft Carrier Completes Inaugural Deployment,” Inside
Defense, November 29, 2022; Sam LaGrone, “Video: USS Gerald R. Ford Back in Norfolk After Two Months in the
Atlantic,” USNI News, November 26 (updated November 27), 2022; Diana Stancy Correll, “USS Gerald R Ford Slated
to Wrap Up First Deployment,” Navy Times, November 23, 2022.
13 See, for example, Diana Stancy Correll, “USS Gerald R Ford Leaves Norfolk for First Full-Length Deployment,”
(continued...)
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Figure 1. USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78)

Source: Cropped version of U.S. Navy photograph 240105-N-HJ055-1591, showing CVN-78 transiting the
Strait of Gibraltar on January 5, 2024. Accessed April 15, 2024, at https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Photo-
Gallery/igphoto/2003370046/.
CVN-79 (John F. Kennedy)
CVN-79, which was named John F. Kennedy on May 29, 2011,14 was procured in FY2013. The
Navy’s proposed FY2025 budget estimates the ship’s procurement cost at $12,936.0 million (i.e.,
$12.9 billion) in then-year dollars. On August 10, 2023, the Navy notified the congressional
defense committees that, using authority granted by Section 121 of the FY2020 National Defense
Authorization Act (S. 1790/P.L. 116-92 of December 20, 2019), the Navy was increasing the cost
limitation baseline (aka cost cap) for CVN-79 by $236 million, to $12,936 million, to support full
ship delivery efforts. (For further information on procurement cost caps for the CVN-78 program,
see “Program Procurement Cost Cap” below.) CVN-79 is being built with an improved shipyard
fabrication and assembly process that incorporates lessons learned from the construction of CVN-
78. The Navy’s FY2025 budget submission states that the ship is scheduled for delivery in July
2025.

Navy Times, May 2, 2023; Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, “Aircraft Carrier USS Gerald R. Ford Departs Norfolk for
Worldwide Deployment,” USNI News, May 2, 2023.
14 See “Navy Names Next Aircraft Carrier USS John F. Kennedy,” Navy News Service, May 29, 2011, accessed online
on June 1, 2011, at http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=60686. See also Peter Frost, “U.S. Navy’s Next
Aircraft Carrier Will Be Named After The Late John F. Kennedy,” Newport News Daily Press, May 30, 2011. CVN-79
is the second ship to be named for President John F. Kennedy. The first, CV-67, was the last conventionally powered
carrier procured for the Navy. CV-67 was procured in FY1963, entered service in 1968, and was decommissioned in
2007.
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Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Figure 2. USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78)

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Megan Eckstein, “Navy Removes Ford Carrier Program
Manager, Citing Performance Over Time,” USNI News, July 2, 2020. The caption credits the photograph to the
U.S. Navy and states that it shows CVN-78 on June 4, 2020.
CVN-80 (Enterprise)
CVN-80, which was named Enterprise on December 1, 2012,15 was procured in FY2018. The
Navy’s proposed FY2025 budget estimates the ship’s procurement cost at $13,719.9 million (i.e.,
about $13.7 billion) in then-year dollars. On April 2, 2024, the Navy announced delays in the
scheduled deliveries of several of its shipbuilding programs due to shipyard workforce and supply
chain challenges and other issues, including CVN-80, whose delivery, the Navy stated, will be
delayed approximately 18 to 26 months.16 The Navy’s FY2025 budget submission, which was

15 The Navy made the announcement of CVN-80’s name on the same day that it deactivated the 51-year-old aircraft
carrier CVN-65, also named Enterprise. (“Enterprise, Navy’s First Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carrier, Inactivated,”
Navy News Service, December 1, 2012; Hugh Lessig, “Navy Retires One Enterprise, Will Welcome Another,” Newport
News Daily Press, December 2, 2012.) CVN-65 was the eighth Navy ship named Enterprise; CVN-80 is to be the
ninth.
16 See, for example, Megan Eckstein, “US Navy Ship Programs Face Years-Long Delays amid Labor, Supply Woes,”
(continued...)
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submitted to Congress in March 2024, shows the ship’s scheduled delivery date as September
2029, or 18 months later than the March 2028 date shown in the Navy’s FY2024 budget
submission, which was submitted to Congress in March 2023.
CVN-81 (Doris Miller)
CVN-81, which was named Doris Miller on January 20, 2020,17 is treated in this report as a ship
that was procured in FY2019, consistent with congressional action on the Navy’s FY2019 budget.
(The Navy’s FY2025 budget submission, like its FY2021-FY2024 submissions, shows CVN-81
as a ship that was procured in FY2020.) The Navy’s FY2025 budget submission estimates the
ship’s procurement cost at $14,015.6 million (i.e., about $14.0 billion) in then-year dollars. The
ship is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in February 2032.
CVN-82
Prior to the Navy’s FY2025 budget submission, Navy budget submissions showed CVN-82 as
programmed for procurement in FY2028. The Navy’s FY2025 budget submission proposes
deferring the procurement of the ship by two years, from FY2028 to FY2030, with advance
procurement (AP) for the ship beginning in FY2027. Procuring CVN-82 in FY2028, as
previously scheduled, could involve providing roughly $550 million in AP funding for the ship in
FY2025.18
Two-Ship Block Buy Contract for CVN-80 and CVN-81
CVN-80 and CVN-81 were procured under a two-ship block buy contract that was authorized by
Section 121(a)(2) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019
(H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232 of August 13, 2018). The provision permitted the Navy to add CVN-81
to the existing contract for building CVN-80 after DOD made certain certifications to Congress.
DOD made the certifications on December 31, 2018, and the Navy announced the award of the
contract on January 31, 2019. Prior to the awarding of the two-ship block buy contract, CVN-81
was scheduled to be procured in FY2023. The use of the two-ship block buy contract reduced the
combined estimated procurement cost of the two ships.19

Defense News, April 2, 2024; Justin Katz, “Navy Lays Out Major Shipbuilding Delays, in Rare Public Accounting,”
Breaking Defense, April 2, 2024; Nick Wilson, “Navy Shipbuilding Review Details Delays across Submarine and Ship
Acquisition Portfolio,” Inside Defense, April 2, 2024; Cal Biesecker, “Navy Confirms Delays In Shipbuilding
Programs As Part Of Ongoing Review,” Defense Daily, April 3, 2024.
17 Doris Miller was an African American enlisted sailor who received the Navy Cross for his actions during the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. For further discussion of the naming of CVN-81 for Doris
Miller, see CRS Report RS22478, Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
18 Source: CRS estimate. As shown in Table 1, the Navy has programmed $580.7 million in AP funding for CVN-82 in
FY2027 to support the procurement of the ship in FY2030. Accelerating this AP funding by two years, to FY2025, to
support the procurement of CVN-82 in FY2028, and deflating the amount into FY2025 dollars produces an adjusted
figure of roughly $550 million.
19 Compared to the estimated procurement costs for CVN-80 and CVN-81 in the Navy’s FY2019 budget submission,
the Navy estimated under its FY2020 budget submission that the two-ship block buy contract will reduce the cost of
CVN-80 by $246.6 million and the cost of CVN-81 by $2,637.3 million, for a combined reduction of $2,883.9 million
(i.e., about $2.9 billion). (DOD characterized the combined reduction as “nearly $3 billion.”) Using higher estimated
baseline costs for CVN-80 and CVN-81 taken from a December 2017 Navy business case analysis, the Navy estimated
under its FY2020 budget submission that the two-ship contract will reduce the cost of CVN-80 by about $900 million
and the cost of CVN-81 by about $3.1 billion, for a combined reduction of about $4.0 billion. These figures are all
expressed in then-year dollars, meaning dollars that are not adjusted for inflation. For additional background
information on the two-ship block buy contract, see the Appendix.
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Interest in Potential Two-Ship Block Buy Contract for CVN-82 and CVN-83
and “2-3-4” Approach for Procuring Aircraft Carriers
Some observers reportedly are interested in the option of using another two-ship block buy
contract to procure CVN-82 and a sixth Ford-class carrier, which would be CVN-83.20 More
broadly, some observers have argued in favor of a “2-3-4” approach for procuring carriers that
would include two-carrier buys, three years (rather than two years) of advanced procurement
funding for each carrier, and four-year centers for building carriers (i.e., starting construction of
each carrier four years after the start of the previous carrier’s construction). In association with
the 2-3-4 approach, these observers have argued that delaying the procurement of CVN-82
beyond FY2028 could damage the CVN construction industrial base.21
Section 132 of the FY2023 NDAA (H.R. 7776/P.L. 117-263 of December 23, 2022) required the
Navy to submit a report to the congressional defense committees not later than March 1, 2023, on
advance procurement funding for CVN-82 and CVN-83 under single-carrier and two-carrier
acquisition strategies.
Program Procurement Cost Cap
Congress established and subsequently amended procurement cost caps for Ford-class aircraft
carriers.22

20 See, for example, Megan Eckstein, “US Navy Mulls Timing of New Double-Carrier Award Amid Enterprise Delay,”
Defense News, October 26, 2023; Loren Thompson, “The Right Way To Buy The U.S. Navy’s New Generation Of
Supercarriers,” Forbes, September 30, 2022; Mike Gooding, “Block-Buy for New Aircraft Carriers Will Save
Taxpayers Billions of Dollars,” 13 News Now, August 30 (updated August 31), 2022; Megan Eckstein, “Navy, HII
Pitch Congress for Another Two-Carrier Contract,” Defense News, August 29, 2022; Sam LaGrone, “HII Argues for
Aircraft Carrier Block Buy as New Enterprise Takes Shape,” USNI News, August 28, 2022; Justin Katz, “Ahead of
Shipyard Ceremony, Navy and Industry Advocate for Another Aircraft Carrier ‘Block Buy,’” Breaking Defense,
August 26, 2022.
21 Rich Abott, “HII Argues For Two Carrier Block Buys With Three Years Advance Work, Warns If CVN-82
Delayed,” Defense Daily, January 8, 2024; Audrey Decker, “Delaying Aircraft Carrier Order Would Hurt Supply
Chain, Shipbuilder Says,” Defense Daily, January 8, 2024; Megan Eckstein, “HII Warns of Potential Carrier, Amphib
Issues in Fy25 Budget Request,” Defense News, January 8, 2024; Brett Davis, “Delay to CVN 82 Buy Could Endanger
Industrial Base, New Industry Report Says,” Seapower, January 17, 2024.
22 The provisions that established and later amended the cost caps are as follows:
Section 122 of the FY2007 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17,
2006) established a procurement cost cap for CVN-78 of $10.5 billion, plus adjustments for inflation and other factors,
and a procurement cost cap for subsequent Ford-class carriers of $8.1 billion each, plus adjustments for inflation and
other factors. The conference report (H.Rept. 109-702 of September 29, 2006) on P.L. 109-364 discusses Section 122
on pages 551-552.
Section 121 of the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 3304/P.L. 113-66 of December 26, 2013)
amended the procurement cost cap for the CVN-78 program to provide a revised cap of $12,887.0 million for CVN-78
and a revised cap of $11,498.0 million for each follow-on ship in the program, plus adjustments for inflation and other
factors (including an additional factor not included in original cost cap).
Section 122 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1356/P.L. 114-92 of November 25, 2015) further
amended the cost cap for the CVN-78 program to provide a revised cap of $11,398.0 million for each follow-on ship in
the program, plus adjustment for inflation and other factors, and with a new provision stating that, if during
construction of CVN-79, the Chief of Naval Operations determines that measures required to complete the ship within
the revised cost cap shall result in an unacceptable reduction to the ship’s operational capability, the Secretary of the
Navy may increase the CVN-79 cost cap by up to $100 million (i.e., to $11.498 billion). If such an action is taken, the
Navy is to adhere to the notification requirements specified in the cost cap legislation.
Section 121(a) of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115-91 of December 12, 2017)
further amended the cost cap for the CVN-78 program to provide a revised cap of $12,568.0 million for CVN-80 and
(continued...)
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Program Procurement Funding
Table 1 shows procurement funding for CVNs 78, 79, 80, and 81 through FY2028, the final year
of funding programmed for CVN-81, under the Navy’s FY2024 budget submission. As shown in
the table, the Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget requests $2,540.4 million (i.e., about $2.5 billion)
in procurement funding for Ford-class ships, including $624.6 million for CVN-79, $1,115.3
million for CVN-80, and $800.5 million for CVN-81.
Changes in Estimated Unit Procurement Costs Since FY2008 Budget
Table 2 shows changes in the estimated procurement costs of CVNs 78, 79, 80, and 81 since the
budget submission for FY2008—the year of procurement for CVN-78.
Table 1. Procurement Funding for CVNs 78, 79, 80, and 81 Through FY2028
(Millions of then-year dollars, rounded to nearest tenth)
FY
CVN-78
CVN-79
CVN-80
CVN-81
CVN-82
Total
FY01
21.7 (AP)
0
0
0
0
21.7
FY02
135.3 (AP)
0
0
0
0
135.3
FY03
395.5 (AP)
0
0
0
0
395.5
FY04
1,162.9 (AP)
0
0
0
0
1,162.9
FY05
623.1 (AP)
0
0
0
0
623.1
FY06
618.9 (AP)
0
0
0
0
618.9
FY07
735.8 (AP)
52.8 (AP)
0
0
0
788.6
FY08
2,685.0 (FF)
123.5 (AP)
0
0
0
2,808.5
FY09
2,687.0 (FF)
1,210.6 (AP)
0
0
0
3,897.6
FY10
851.3 (FF)
482.9 (AP)
0
0
0
1,334.2
FY11
1,848.1 (FF)
902.5 (AP)
0
0
0
2,750.6
FY12
86.0 (FF)**
554.8 (AP)
0
0
0
640.8
FY13
0
491.0 (FF)
0
0
0
491.0
FY14
588.1 (CC)
917.6 (FF)
0
0
0
1,505.7
FY15
663.0 (CC)
1,219.4 (FF)
0
0
0
1,882.4
FY16
123.8 (CC)
1,569.5 (FF)
862.4 (AP)
0
0
2,555.7
FY17
0
1,241.8 (FF)
1,370.8 (AP)
0
0
2,612.6
FY18
20.0 (CC)
2,556.4 (FF)
1,569.6 (FF)
0
0
4,146.0
FY19
0
0
929.1 (FF)
643.0 (FF)
0
1,572.1
FY20
0
0
1,062.0 (FF)
1,214.5 (FF)
0
2,276.5
FY21
71.0 (CC)
0
958.9 (FF)
1,606.4 (FF)
0
2,636.3
FY22
0
291.0 (CC)
1,062.0 (FF)
1,287.7 (FF)
0
2,640.7
FY23
0
461.7 (CC)
1,465.9 (FF)
1,052.0 (FF)
0
2,995.2

subsequent ships in the program, plus adjustment for inflation and other factors. (The cap for CVN-79 was kept at
$11,398.0 million, plus adjustment for inflation and other factors.) The provision also amended the basis for adjusting
the caps for inflation, and excluded certain costs from being counted against the caps.
Section 121 of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1790/P.L. 116-92 of December 20, 2019) further
amended the cost cap for the CVN-78 program to provide revised caps of $13,224.0 million for CVN-78, $11,398.0
million for CVN–79, $12,202.0 million for CVN–80, and $12,451.0 million for CVN–81. The provision directs the
Navy to exclude from these figures costs for CVN–78 class battle spares, interim spares, and increases attributable to
economic inflation after December 1, 2018.
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FY
CVN-78
CVN-79
CVN-80
CVN-81
CVN-82
Total
FY24
0
624.6 (CC)
1,104.4 (FF)*
800.5 (FF)
0
2,529.5*
FY25 (requested)
0
236.0 (CC)
1,186.9 (FF)
721.0 (FF)
0
2,143.9
FY26 (programmed)
0
0
1,135.4 (FF)
2,052.7 (FF)
0
3,188.1
FY27 (programmed)
0
0
1,001.4 (FF)
2,569.1 (FF)
580.7 (AP)
4,151.2
FY28 (programmed)
0
0
0
2,068.6 (FF)
2,574.2 (AP)
4,642.8
FY29 (programmed)
0
0
0
0
2,744.2 (AP)

Total
13,316.5
12,936.0
13,719.9*
14,015.6
n/a
n/a
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2025 budget submission and prior-year submissions.
Notes: Figures may not add due to rounding. * In addition, the total for CVN-80 does not add because the Navy
used requested FY2024 funding figures in preparing the FY2025 budget submission, and the enacted figure for
FY2024 for CVN-80 ($1,104.4 mil ion) differs from the requested figure ($1,115.3 mil ion). AP is advance
procurement funding; FF is ful funding; CC is cost-to-complete funding (i.e., funding to cover cost growth),
which is sometimes abbreviated in Navy documents as CTC. Regarding the ** notation for the FY2012 funding
figure for CVN-78, even though FY2012 is after FY2011 (CVN-78’s original final year of ful funding), the Navy
characterizes the $86.0 mil ion reprogrammed into FY2012 as ful funding rather than cost-to-complete funding
on the grounds that in the years since FY2011, as discussed earlier in this report (see footnote 7), the authority
to use incremental funding for procuring aircraft carriers has been expanded by Congress to permit more than
the four years of incremental funding that were permitted at the time that CVN-78 was initially funded.
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Table 2. Changes in Estimated Procurement Costs of CVNs 78, 79, 80, and 81
(As shown in FY2008-FY2024 budgets, in millions of then-year dollars)
CVN-78
CVN-79
CVN-80
CVN-81
Est.
Scheduled/
Est.
Scheduled/
Est.
Scheduled/
Est.
Scheduled/
proc.
actual FY
proc.
actual FY
proc.
actual FY
proc.
actual FY
Budget
cost
of proc.
cost
of proc.
cost
of proc.
cost
of proc.
FY08
10,488.9
FY08
9,192.0
FY12
10,716.8
FY16
n/a
FY21
FY09
10,457.9
FY08
9,191.6
FY12
10,716.8
FY16
n/a
FY21
FY10
10,845.8
FY08
n/a
FY13
n/a
FY18
n/a
FY23
FY11
11,531.0
FY08
10,413.1
FY13
13,577.0
FY18
n/a
FY23
FY12
11,531.0
FY08
10,253.0
FY13
13,494.9
FY18
n/a
FY23
FY13
12,323.2
FY08
11,411.0
FY13
13,874.2
FY18
n/a
FY23
FY14
12,829.3
FY08
11,338.4
FY13
13,874.2
FY18
n/a
FY23
FY15
12,887.2
FY08
11,498.0
FY13
13,874.2
FY18
n/a
FY23
FY16
12,887.0
FY08
11,347.6
FY13
13,472.0
FY18
n/a
FY23
FY17
12,887.0
FY08
11,398.0
FY13
12,900.0
FY18
n/a
FY23
FY18
12,907.0
FY08
11,377.4
FY13
12,997.6
FY18
n/a
FY23
FY19
12,964.0
FY08
11,341.4
FY13
12,601.7
FY18
15,088.0
FY19
FY20
13,084.0
FY08
11,327.4
FY13
12,335.1
FY18
12,450.7
FY19
FY21
13,316.5
FY08
11,397.7
FY13
12,321.3
FY18
12,450.7
FY19
FY22
13,316.5
FY08
11,929.7
FY13
12,405.5
FY18
12,483.6
FY19
FY23
13,316.5
FY08
12,700.0
FY13
12,832.9
FY18
12,930.0
FY19
FY24
13,316.5
FY08
12,700.0
FY13
12,812.9
FY18
12,929.1
FY19
FY25
13,316.5
FY08
12,936.0
FY13
13,719.9
FY18
14,015.6
FY19
Annual % change
FY08 to FY09
-0.3

0%

0%

n/a

FY09 to FY10
+3.7

n/a

n/a

n/a

FY10 to FY11
+6.3

n/a

n/a

n/a

FY09 to FY11

+26.7%

FY11 to FY12
0%

-1.5%

-0.1%

n/a

FY12 to FY13
+6.9%

+11.3%

+2.8%

n/a

FY13 to FY14
+4.1%

-0.6%

0%

n/a

FY14 to FY15
+0.5%

+1.4%

0%

n/a

FY15 to FY16
0%

-1.3%

-2.9%

n/a

FY16 to FY17
0%

+0.4%

-4.2%

n/a

FY17 to FY18
+0.2%

-0.2%

+0.7%

n/a

FY18 to FY19
+0.4%

-0.3%

-3.0%

n/a

FY19 to FY20
+0.9%

-0.1%

-2.1%

-17.5%

FY20 to FY21
+1.8%

+0.6%

-0.1%

0%

FY21 to FY22
0%

+4.7%

+0.7%

+0.3%

FY22 to FY23
0%

+6.5%

+3.4%

+3.6%

FY23 to FY24
0%

0%

-0.2%

-0.007%

FY24 to FY25
0%

+1.9%

+7.1%

+8.4%

Cumulative % change through FY24 from actual procurement dates of FY08, FY13, FY18, and FY19
Since FY08
+27.0%

+40.7%

+28.0%

n/a

Since FY13

+13.4%

Since FY18

+5.6%

Since FY19

-7.1%

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2025 budget submission and prior-year submissions.
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Notes: n/a means not available. The FY2010 budget submission did not show estimated procurement costs or
scheduled years of procurement for CVNs 79 and 80. The scheduled years of procurement for CVNs 79 and 80
shown here for the FY2010 budget submission are inferred from the shift to five-year intervals for procuring
carriers that was announced by Secretary of Defense Gates in his April 6, 2009, news conference regarding
recommendations for the FY2010 defense budget.
Issues for Congress
Procurement Date for CVN-82
One issue for Congress is whether to procure CVN-82 in FY2030 (as proposed in the Navy’s
FY2025 budget submission), in FY2028 (as scheduled in prior-year Navy budget submissions), or
in FY2029. As noted earlier, procuring CVN-82 in FY2028 could involve providing roughly $550
million in advance procurement (AP) funding for the ship in FY2025.
The Navy argues that its proposal to defer procurement of CVN-82 by two years, from FY2028 to
FY030, was made necessary by limits on the Navy’s budget topline and competing Navy program
priorities, and that providing AP funding for CVN-82 starting in FY2025 could reduce funding
available for those other program priorities.23 Supporters of procuring CVN-82 in FY2028, as
previously scheduled, could argue that deferring the ship’s procurement will pose challenges for
firms in the aircraft carrier supplier base due to the lengthened interval between the procurement
of CVN-81 (procured in FY2019) and CVN-82,24 and increase the ship’s cost in real terms for
both that reason and due to loss of production learning curve benefits at the shipbuilder, HII/NNS.
Procuring CVN-82 and CVN-83 as a Two-Ship Buy
Another issue for Congress is whether to procure CVN-82 and a subsequent aircraft carrier
(which would be CVN-83) as a two-ship buy that would similar to the two-ship buy that was used
for procuring CVN-80 and CVN-81. Such a two-ship buy could take place in FY2030 (the Navy’s
programmed year for procuring CVN-82 under its FY2025 budget submission), FY2028 (the
Navy’s programmed year for procuring CVN-82 under its prior-year budget submissions), or
FY2029. Procuring CVN-82 and CVN-83 as a two-ship buy in FY2028 could involve increasing
the amount of advance procurement (AP) funding provided for the aircraft program in FY2025 to
something more than the figure of roughly $550 million discussed in the previous section.
Opponents of procuring CVN-82 and CVN-83 as a two-ship buy could argue that it could be
premature to commit to the procurement of another Ford-class carrier after CVN-81, given
ongoing changes in military technologies and concepts of operation, and that the additional near-
term procurement funding requirements of a two-ship buy could crowd out funding available for
other Navy program priorities.
Supporters of procuring CVN-82 and CVN-83 as a two-ship buy could argue that Ford-class
carriers will continue to be needed, notwithstanding changes in military technologies and
concepts of operation, and that a two-ship buy would help support the aircraft carrier industrial
base by providing a known quantity of carrier-construction work for years to come, and

23 Source: Navy briefing for CBO and CRS on the Navy’s proposed FY2025 budget, March 12, 2024.
24 See, for example, Bryan McGrath, “The US Is Not Serious about Aircraft Carriers—or Their Industrial Base,”
Defense One, March 12, 2024; Abby Shepherd, “Carrier Delays Concern Industry Members, Congress,” Inside
Defense, March 20, 2024.
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substantially reduce the combined procurement cost of the two ships, releasing Navy funding for
use in meeting other program priorities.
Future Aircraft Carrier Force Level
Another issue for Congress concerns the future aircraft carrier force level. Decisions on this issue
could have implications for the service lives of existing aircraft carriers and/or plans for procuring
new aircraft carriers. The future aircraft carrier force level has been a frequent matter of
discussion over the years, and (correctly or not) is often the starting point or the center of broader
discussions over the future size and composition of the Navy. Factors involved in discussions
about the future aircraft carrier force level include but are not limited to the following:
• the capabilities and costs (including procurement costs and life-cycle operation
and support [O&S] costs) of aircraft carriers and their embarked air wings, and
how those capabilities and costs compare to those of other U.S. military forces;
• the prospective survivability of aircraft carriers in conflicts against adversaries
(such as China) with highly capable anti-ship missiles;
• the numbers of carriers needed to support policymaker-desired levels of day-to-
day aircraft carrier forward presence in various regions around the world; and
• the utility of carriers for purposes other than high-end combat, including
deterrence of potential regional adversaries, reassurance of allies and partners,
signaling U.S. commitment and resolve, and noncombat operations such as
humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) operations.
As noted earlier:
• 10 U.S.C. 8062(b) requires the Navy to maintain a force of not less than 11
operational aircraft carriers.
• The Navy wants to achieve and maintain in coming years a fleet of 381 manned
battle force ships, including 12 aircraft carriers. The Biden Administration has
not explicitly endorsed the Navy’s desired 381-ship force-level objective or any
other ship force-level objective for the Navy as a whole.
• The Navy’s FY2025 30-year (FY2025-FY2054) shipbuilding plan, which is
designed to support the eventual attainment of a fleet of about 381 ships, projects
that, if the plan were implemented, the Navy’s carrier force would include fewer
than 12 carriers in all but three years within the 30-year period.
Issues Raised in DOT&E and GAO Reports
Another oversight issue for Congress concerns CVN-78 program issues raised in a January 2024
report from DOD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)—DOT&E’s annual
report for FY2023—and in the 2023 edition of the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO’s)
annual report surveying selected DOD weapon acquisition programs, which was published in
June 2023.
January 2024 DOT&E Report
Regarding the CVN-78 program, the January 2024 DOT&E report stated the following in part:
TEST ADEQUACY
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The Navy began CVN 78 IOT&E [Initial Operational Test & Evaluation] in September
2022 and is conducting it in accordance with TEMP [Test and Evaluation Master Plan]
Revision E and the DOT&E-approved portions of the IOT&E test plan. However, analysis
of the data provided to DOT&E to date revealed gaps in data collection, which, if not
rectified, could result in insufficient data to inform conclusive assessments of reliability,
maintainability, logistics and/or availability (RMLA) for some key subsystems. In addition
to affecting suitability assessments, these data gaps could also affect effectiveness
assessments due to the on-demand nature of many key subsystems and the reliance upon
accurate RMLA data in both the self-defense and SGR models. The Navy has
acknowledged these shortcomings, committed to improve data collection, and will update
the IOT&E test plan for the major remaining tests such as SGR [sortie generation rate] ,
self-defense, and cyber survivability tests. In April 2023, DOT&E submitted a classified
CVN 78 Ford-class Aircraft Carrier EFR [early fielding report] to Congress, detailing
operational and live fire test results to date.
Prior to deployment, CVN 78 conducted two significant underway periods during IOT&E
that included fixed-wing flight operations, both of which were in accordance with the
DOT&E-approved test plan and observed by DOT&E. A brief summary is below, and
detailed results of the underway periods can be found in DOT&E’s classified EFR.
In the first significant underway period of IOT&E, CVN 78 executed a service-retained
early employment from October 4 to November 26, 2022, as part of CSG 12 [Carrier Strike
Group 12] that included Tailored Ship’s Training Availability (first deployment work-up
integrated with CSG); port calls in Halifax, Canada and Portsmouth, England; and multiple
operations with allies and partners. The early employment was the first time the air wing,
destroyer squadron staff, and CSG staff embarked on the ship together, and the first period
of consistent cyclic flight operations for the Ford class, which resulted in 896 arrested
landings (not including carrier qualifications). During the early employment, the maximum
air wing compliment was approximately 75 percent of the full air wing.
In the second significant underway period of IOT&E, CVN 78 completed its first
COMPTUEX [Composite Training Unit Exercise] (final pre-deployment workup) from
March 2 to April 2, 2023, off the U.S. east coast. Administered by CSG 4, COMPTUEX
was the first time CVN 78 operated with an operationally representative air wing
embarked, conducting consistent, combat-representative scenarios. During COMPTUEX,
CVN 78 executed 1,600 total arrested landings, including 1,185 arrested landings during
cyclic and alert flight operations. At the end of COMPTUEX, CVN 78 had conducted a
total of 14,177 catapult launches and arrested landings since its commissioning. In July
2023, the second of three planned CVN 78 land-based cyber survivability operational tests
was completed on SSDS, CEC, and SEWIP [Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement
Program]. The test was conducted in accordance with the DOT&E-approved test plan and
observed by DOT&E. These land-based tests are intended both to inform planning for
shipboard testing and to perform testing deemed too risky to conduct during shipboard
cyber survivability tests prescribed by TEMP Revision E.
Many systems specific to CVN 78 have yet to undergo any operational cyber survivability
assessments. In June 2023, the Navy updated its cyber survivability testing strategy by
replacing the third land-based cyber survivability test with additional testing during
shipboard cyber assessments after deployment. The third land-based test was scheduled for
late FY23, and its focus was on hull, mechanical, and electrical systems. This change in
strategy was primarily due to a lack of existing, robust cyber survivability testing facilities
for shipboard industrial control systems. The Navy needs to conduct the shipboard tests to
assess CVN 78’s overall cyber survivability and enable post hoc accreditation of the test
facilities used in completed land-based cyber survivability tests. The Navy is still
developing these shipboard cyber survivability test plans.
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Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress

The CVN 78 Total Ship Survivability Trial (TSST) has been delayed by approximately one
year, until 4QFY24 [fourth quarter of FY2024], due to the ship’s deployment being earlier
than planned. The TSST is an onboard, extensive damage-control test to demonstrate how
the ship design enables the crew to perform its recoverability-related procedures. For the
CVN 78 TSST to be adequate, the testing will require at-sea execution with participation
of an embarked air wing. Planning is ongoing to ensure that this adequacy requirement is
met.
In 1QFY24, the Navy intends to publish two vulnerability assessment reports (VARs)
examining the class’s survivability against above-water and underwater kinetic threats.
These reports will include findings from survivability testing and modeling of the ship
conducted since 2007. However, these reports as drafted do not accurately model the ship
as built and do not include findings from more recent testing. Without updating the models,
the analysis in the VARs will not support conclusions on the survivability of the CVN 78
class against threat weapons. The Navy intends to issue a final survivability assessment
report that will include the findings from recent testing and update model-based
survivability analysis by 4QFY25. If the survivability modeling and simulation (M&S) is
updated to accurately model the ship as built, this assessment will support DOT&E’s report
on the survivability of the class against threat weapons.
Together the CVN 78 TEMP Revision E and the Capstone Enterprise Air Warfare Ship
Self-Defense (AW SSD) TEMP 1714 of March 2008 provide for a series of live missile
fire events aboard CVN 78 against specific types of ASCM threat surrogates to assess the
ship’s anti-air warfare capabilities. The Navy intends to execute these tests in FY25. These
live tests are necessary to assess ship self-defense capability of the as-built, deployed
combat system, and to provide validation data for the M&S suite of the CVN 78 combat
system. While these live fire tests, as planned, are adequate, DOT&E has concerns with
the Navy’s ability to adequately resource them. The M&S is intended to assess the Navy’s
PRA KPP [Probability of Raid Annihilation Key Performance Parameter]. These tests,
combined with those conducted on the self-defense test ship, and the PRA model runs are
required to determine CVN 78’s operational effectiveness against specific types of ASCM
[anti-ship cruise missile] threats. In FY23, the Navy continued to develop a draft new
Enterprise TEMP in support of SSDS Mk 2 Baseline 12 and SPY-6 V(2) and V(3)
platforms [ships equipped with SPY-6 V(2) and V(3) radars] (TEMP 1910) that includes
FOT&E [Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation] on CVN 79. While CVN 79 self-
defense test design will mature during the TEMP 1910 development, any delay in the
current timeline for testing the CVN 79 combat systems will be challenged by the planned
deactivation timeline for the self-defense test ship, the ex-USS Paul F. Foster. The Navy
should maintain the capability of the self-defense test ship, currently provided by the ex-
USS Paul F. Foster.
The CVN 78 SGR evaluation comprises M&S (for both Ford and Nimitz class), a four-day
sustained test on CVN 78, a one-day surge test on CVN 78, and flight operations
observations on a Nimitz-class carrier. Development of the M&S suite intended to evaluate
the SGR, the Sea Strike/Sea Basing Aviation Model (SSAM), is ongoing. The CVN 78
SGR tests are incomplete. The CVN 78 sustained SGR test was originally scheduled for
the first COMPTUEX; however, due to COMPTUEX syllabus changes, ship and air wing
schedule changes, and resourcing, it was deferred to the second COMPTUEX, now
expected to occur in FY25. The Navy plans to apply lessons from the CVN 78 sustained
SGR test to the surge SGR test which is currently unscheduled. A Nimitz-class
COMPTUEX to collect flight operations data to support a Nimitz-class SGR M&S suite
(part of SSAM) for comparative analysis is planned for FY24. DOT&E approved these
deferments in Revision 1 to the IOT&E test plan. The Navy needs to provide an updated
test plan prior to conducting these events.
PERFORMANCE
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EFFECTIVENESS
Insufficient data are available to determine CVN 78’s operational effectiveness due to
IOT&E being incomplete. Observations based on testing to date are below.
Combat System
Self-defense testing against unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and high-speed
maneuvering surface targets (small boats) was conducted in July 2022. Details can be
found in DOT&E’s classified EFR. The Navy is developing fixes to combat system
deficiencies identified in DOT&E’s classified USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) Self-Defense
Interim Assessment report dated April 2022. However, to date the fixes remain largely
unfunded.
Sortie Generation
In FY23, CVN 78 conducted almost as many flight operations (as measured by the number
of aircraft launch and recoveries) as it had in the previous five years combined since
commissioning. From the first arrested landing on CVN 78 in July 2017 until the end of
FY22, CVN 78 had conducted 10,826 arrested landings. In FY23 alone, CVN 78 conducted
9,266 arrested landings. The reliability and maintainability of CVN 78’s EMALS and AAG
continue to adversely affect sortie generation and flight operations, which remains the
greatest risk to demonstrating operational effectiveness and suitability in IOT&E. Despite
these continuing reliability challenges, DOT&E observed general increases in crew
proficiency and decreases in some repair times. While this has improved sortie generation
compared to previous years, SGR tests have not been completed yet nor have training sortie
rates flown to date approached that of the KPP requirement. CVN 78 earned the flight
operations efficiency portion of its Blue Water Certification as part of the Navy’s
deployment certification process. Observations during COMPTUEX suggests that the
Ford-class flight deck design improves the efficiency of aircraft turnarounds compared to
that of a Nimitz-class flight deck. Additional details on sortie generation effectiveness can
be found in DOT&E’s classified EFR. Executing the planned SGR testing, as outlined in
TEMP Revision E, will be crucial to evaluating the ship’s combat effectiveness and
accrediting the high-fidelity SSAM which is an essential tool for evaluating the SGR KPP
and supporting life-of-class upgrades.
Electromagnetic Spectrum Compatibility
Developmental testing identified significant electromagnetic radiation hazard and
interference problems. The Navy implemented some mitigation measures and conducted
follow-on characterization testing during independent steaming events in developmental
test, but some operational limitations and restrictions are expected to persist into IOT&E
and deployment. The Navy should verify developmental test electromagnetic spectrum
compatibility during operational test, particularly when integrated with CSG operations in
an advanced electronic attack environment. This will enable capability assessments at
differing levels of system use to inform decisions on system employment.
SUITABILITY
Insufficient data are available to determine CVN 78’s operational suitability. However, the
following four new CVN 78 systems have shown low or unproven reliability and are
highlighted as the most significant challenge to flight operations.
AAG
During FY23, DOT&E observed AAG reliability similar to recent developmental testing
(115 mean cycles between operational mission failures [MCBOMF] in FY21 and 460
MCBOMF in FY22). Despite some software and hardware improvements in AAG,
reliability has not appreciably changed because the FY23 data reflects many short-duration
failures that were unreported in developmental test, as well as system-of-systems
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degradations, all of which would have prevented landing. Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR) delivered hardware updates after early employment and before COMPTUEX,
along with a software update before deployment. NAVAIR continues to work on short-
and long-term improvements to address AAG reliability degraders. However, difficulties
such as obtaining replacement parts and the reliance on off-ship technical support remain
a challenge. The Navy is also using IOT&E to inform the decision of whether to retrofit
the fourth AAG engine on Ford-class aircraft carriers (as designed, which would make it
similar to the arresting gear engine/wire configuration on CVN 76 and CVN 77). The fourth
AAG engine was not installed as a cost savings measure. In a 2016 requirements review
board, the Navy committed to informing a potential retrofit decision with the results of
IOT&E. The criteria on which to base a potential retrofit decision were not specified, and
with changes to the IOT&E schedule, more data will be available before the end of IOT&E.
The fourth engine would improve the reliability and availability of AAG, improve pilot
boarding rate, and restore barricade redundancy. Additional details on AAG suitability can
be found in DOT&E’s classified EFR.
EMALS
During FY23, DOT&E observed EMALS reliability remained consistent with recent
developmental test (460 MCBOMF in FY21 and 614 MCBOMF in FY22). Despite
engineering upgrades to hardware and software, reliability has not appreciably changed
from prior years and reliance on off-ship technical support remains a challenge. As part of
an effort to provide short- and long-term improvements to address EMALS reliability
degraders, NAVAIR delivered a software update and upgraded all catapult position sensor
blocks prior to CVN 78’s deployment and is continuing development on further
improvements. Furthermore, a situational awareness display was added in the EMALS
Maintenance Workstation that facilitates troubleshooting during operations. Additional
details can be found in DOT&E’s classified EFR.
Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWEs)
The early employment and COMPTUEX provided CVN 78’s first operationally
representative opportunities to demonstrate ordnance movement during cyclic flight
operations. The AWEs met operational mission needs during these underway periods, but
preliminary data suggest AWE is unlikely to meet its operational availability requirement
of 99.7 percent. Of note, the crew is reliant on off-ship technical support for correction of
hardware and software failures. As of the end of COMPTUEX, the ship had conducted
23,042 total AWE cycles. The Navy has yet to build and transfer ordnance to the flight
deck at combat-representative rates. DOT&E expects the SGR tests to be the first
operationally representative demonstration of high ordnance throughput. Additional details
can be found in DOT&E’s classified EFR.
DBR
During COMPTUEX, DBR availability was observed to be lower than that during
developmental testing. This is in part due to the operational expectation of continuous radar
coverage. Reliability concerns are amplified due to the one-of-a-kind nature of the DBR.
The radar relies on embarked contractor support and there is uncertainty on sourcing
replacement parts as the system ages. The Navy should ensure replacement parts are
manufactured and available for the life of the system or develop a timeline and strategy for
replacing DBR with EASR [Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar25] on CVN 78 to bring it in
line with CVN 79’s radar configuration. Additional details on DBR suitability can be found
in DOT&E’s classified EFR.
Manning and Berthing

25 The term Enterprise in this instance is not a reference to CVN-80; it instead means a piece of equipment that is to be
installed on multiple types of ships across the Navy (i.e., across the naval enterprise).
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Per the Navy’s Shipboard Habitability Program, all new ships are required to have a growth
allowance of 10 percent of ship’s company when the ship delivers. This Service Life
Allowance provides both empty bunks to allow for changes in the crew composition over
the ship’s life and berthing to support crew turnover, visitors, and personnel temporarily
assigned to the ship for repairs, inspections, test, and training. However, sufficient berthing
is not installed for CVN 78 to conduct combat operations with all hands assigned a bed.
While the ship’s company manning is reduced from Nimitz-class carriers by approximately
500 personnel, the lack of berthing capacity is driven by embarked units. Based on the
composition of the ship and embarked units during COMPTUEX and their respective
manning documents, if each was at 100 percent manning, the ship would have a shortfall
of 159 beds. These berthing shortfalls will affect quality of life onboard and could reduce
the Navy’s operational flexibility in employing the ship across its full spectrum of missions
and logistical support roles for the CSG. Furthermore, there is potential that the berthing
shortfalls could increase as the air wing diversifies to include CMV-22, F-35, and MQ-25,
none of which are on CVN 78 today. Additional details on manning and berthing can be
found in DOT&E’s classified EFR.
SURVIVABILITY
An adequate survivability assessment of the CVN 78 class depends upon a combination of
FSST, TSST, and related modeling of the class supported by component and surrogate
testing. To date, the Navy has completed all planned LFT&E [Live Fire Test and
Evaluation], with the exception of TSST, the VARs, and the final survivability assessment.
From June to August 2021, the Navy conducted FSST on CVN 78, including three shock
events of increasing severity. In December 2022, DOT&E published a classified FSST
report that details findings from the trial, and in July 2023, the Navy published its own
FSST report. Both reports identify deficiencies that, if addressed, will improve the class’s
survivability against weapon events.
The survivability of CVN 78 in a cyber-contested environment has not yet been fully
evaluated. Results from the land-based cyber survivability tests will inform the shipboard
cyber survivability tests. Some systems specific to CVN 78 have yet to undergo any
operational cyber survivability assessments.
The survivability of CVN 78 in contested and congested electromagnetic spectrum
environments has not been evaluated. Discussions on how to evaluate CVN 78
survivability in these environments are ongoing with the Navy.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Navy should:
1. Improve the suitability of AAG, EMALS, AWE, and DBR while minimizing the
requirement for off-ship and/or contractor technical support.
2. Reevaluate the timeline and better define the criteria for a decision to retrofit the fourth
AAG engine.
3. Collect data in accordance with the test plan for the remainder of IOT&E.
4. Resource and execute the testing per Enterprise AW SSD TEMP 1714 and CVN 78
TEMP, including the planned SGR testing, along with completing, verifying, and
validating the SGR M&S suite; shipboard cyber survivability testing; and self-defense tests
and PRA modeling.
5. Address the recommendations in DOT&E’s classified self-defense interim assessment
report from April 2022, and the additional recommendations in DOT&E’s classified EFR
from April 2023.
6. Develop a plan to sustain DBR on CVN 78 or replace it as soon as possible with the
EASR configuration on CVN 79 and subsequent Ford-class carriers.
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7. Re-examine manning and berthing for future ships of the class to ensure sufficient
berthing is available and that 10 percent Service Life Allowance is allocated to allow future
growth.
8. Submit for DOT&E approval a test plan revision to update the test plan schedule.
9. Continue to develop more robust capabilities to test the cyber survivability of
shipboard industrial control systems.
10. Execute the TSST with an embarked air wing in FY24.
11. Prioritize and correct deficiencies identified in DOT&E’s classified FSST report of
December 2022.
12. Produce a project schedule to complete required updates to the vulnerability modeling
and simulation by 4QFY24 to support accurate vulnerability reporting in the CVN 78 final
survivability assessment report in 4QFY25.
13. Submit for DOT&E approval in 1QFY25 an update of the CVN 78 TEMP, aligned
with the new Enterprise TEMP 1910, that provides the test strategy and test resources to
determine operational effectiveness of new and/or upgraded capabilities on CVN 79.
14. Ensure the availability of the capability provided by ex-USS Paul F. Foster, the Navy’s
self-defense test ship, to support combat system testing.
15. To better inform effectiveness and survivability, verify developmental test
electromagnetic spectrum compatibility during operational test, particularly when
integrated with CSG operations in an advanced electronic attack environment.26
June 2023 GAO Report
A June 2023 GAO report—the 2023 edition of GAO’s annual report assessing selected major
weapon acquisition programs—stated the following about the CVN-78 program:
Technology Maturity, Design Stability, and Production Readiness
The Navy continues to face challenges with demonstrating the reliability of key systems,
and the CVN 78 program remains about a decade away from demonstrating their reliability.
Consequently, the ship may not meet a key performance requirement by the planned end
of operational testing in November 2023.
Metrics used to assess system reliability for the electromagnetic aircraft launch system
(EMALS) and advanced arresting gear (AAG) are slowly increasing. CVN 78 completed
multiple at-sea events, including thousands of aircraft launches and recoveries or landings.
These launch and recovery cycles help the program demonstrate system reliability, conduct
testing, and certify aircraft on the systems. However, the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, continues to highlight reliability as a risk to CVN 78’s ability to rapidly launch
and recover aircraft.
The Navy expects to install the first Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar (EASR) on CVN
79, which it is currently developing for other ship classes. EASR, along with other systems,
will replace the program’s original Dual Band Radar. The Navy has delivered EASR to the
shipyard as it continues testing. However, CVN 79 delivery, planned for late in fiscal year
2024, could be delayed if EASR problems discovered during testing require rework.
The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, approved the April 2022 CVN 78 Test and
Evaluation Master Plan, after the program implemented changes to the test strategy. The
Navy subsequently began operational testing in August 2022. Given that operational
testing is ongoing, CVN 78 has yet to demonstrate that it is operationally effective and

26 Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, FY 2023 Annual Report, January 2024, pp. 177-182.
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suitable for combat. Any deficiencies discovered during operational testing may lead to a
backlog of maintenance issues that the fleet will need to address during future maintenance
periods.
Software and Cybersecurity
The CVN 78 program’s software and cybersecurity approach has not changed since last
year. According to program officials, the program conducted an evaluation of potential
cybersecurity vulnerability for EMALS and AAG in June 2022. They stated that other ship
systems will undergo cybersecurity assessments in fiscal years 2023 through 2025.
Other Program Issues
Since our report last year, program costs increased by $3.8 billion. Some of the main drivers
are CVN 79 contract overruns and EMALS and AAG configuration changes on CVN 80
and CVN 81.
The Navy reported final CVN 78 construction costs of $13.2 billion. Maintenance or other
funding categories will cover any additional costs. For example, according to program
officials, the Navy is considering replacing the Dual Band Radar with EASR during a
maintenance period to ensure a more reliable supply chain for maintenance. The Navy only
has one operational Dual Band Radar unit—installed on CVN 78—which makes sourcing
and procuring spare parts more expensive, according to program officials.
In August 2021, the Navy increased CVN 79’s cost baseline by $1.3 billion to $12.7 billion,
primarily due to contract overruns. At over 88 percent complete, CVN 79 is in the complex,
final phases of construction when cost growth is most likely. Program officials stated that
they do not expect CVN 79 would require additional funding. However, our analysis shows
that, based on current performance, the shipbuilder is unlikely to achieve its cost estimate
at completion.
The Navy reported saving $4 billion by concurrently awarding contracts for CVN 80 and
CVN 81, compared with buying the ships individually. CVN 80 is 25 percent complete,
and the Navy requested additional funding to complete the transition from using paper
drawings for construction to a digital model. The Navy estimated the new model would
reduce production labor hours by 5 to 7 percent. However, program officials indicated that
it is too early to determine if the shipbuilder will achieve this target. Additionally, program
officials reported that industrial base issues, including supply chain delays and inflation of
material costs, could contribute to the unlikelihood of it achieving anticipated savings.
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The
program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
According to the program office, CVN 78 completed ship construction at a total cost of
$13.2 billion. It stated that from October to November 2022, CVN 78 conducted an at-sea
deployment and completed more than 1,250 aircraft flights, expended 78 tons of weaponry,
and completed 13 resupply efforts at sea. The program office noted that CVN 79 costs
increased due to the transition to a new delivery schedule in January 2022 to enable
delivery of the ship with its complete warfare systems. It added that costs also increased
due to modifications to ensure CVN 79 will be capable of operating and deploying F-35C
aircraft upon the completion of the next maintenance period. CVN 80 conducted its keel
laying ceremony in August 2022 and the CVN 81 keel laying is scheduled for fiscal year
2026. The program office stated that it expects that the two-ship acquisition strategy for
CVN 80 and CVN 81 will deliver significant savings to the government compared with the
Navy’s cost estimate to procure these ships separately.27

27 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] Programs Are Not Consistently
Implementing Practices That Can Help Accelerate Acquisitions, GAO-23-106059, June 2023, p. 142.
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Procurement of Aircraft Carriers After CVN-81 of CVN-82
Another issue for Congress concerns the procurement of aircraft carriers after CVN-81 or CVN-
82. The question of whether the Navy should shift at some point from procuring CVNs like the
Ford-class carriers to procuring smaller and perhaps nonnuclear-powered aircraft carriers has
been a recurrent matter of discussion and Navy study over the years.
Although the Navy wants to achieve and maintain in coming years a fleet of 381 manned battle
force ships, including 12 aircraft carriers, force-structure studies done by the Navy that eventually
led to the 381-ship goal showed future Navy force structures that included 8 to 12 carriers, to be
supplemented (in the case of the lower end of that range) by up to 6 light aircraft carriers (CVLs).
The Navy does not currently operate CVLs. The Navy in recent years has experimented with the
concept of using an LHA-type amphibious assault ship with an embarked group of F-35B Joint
Strike Fighters as a CVL.28
Advocates of smaller carriers traditionally have argued that they are individually less expensive
to procure, that the Navy might be able to employ competition between shipyards in their
procurement (something that the Navy cannot do with large-deck, nuclear-powered carriers like
the Ford-class carrier, because only one U.S. shipyard, HII/NNS, can build aircraft carriers of that
size), and that today’s aircraft carriers concentrate much of the Navy’s striking power into a
relatively small number of expensive platforms that adversaries could focus on attacking in time
of war.
Supporters of CVNs traditionally have argued that smaller carriers, though individually less
expensive to procure, are less cost-effective in terms of dollars spent per aircraft embarked or
aircraft sorties that can be generated; that it might be possible to use competition in procuring
certain materials and components for large-deck, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers; and that
smaller carriers, though perhaps affordable in larger numbers, would be individually less
survivable in time of war than CVNs.29
Section 128(d) of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1356/P.L. 114-92 of
November 25, 2015) required the Navy to submit a report on potential requirements, capabilities,
and alternatives for the future development of aircraft carriers that would replace or supplement
the Ford-class aircraft carrier. The report, which was conducted for the Navy by the RAND
Corporation, was delivered to the congressional defense committees in classified form in July
2016. An unclassified version of the report was then prepared and issued in 2017 as a publicly
released RAND report.30 The question of whether to shift to smaller aircraft carriers was also
addressed in three studies on future fleet architecture that were required by Section 1067 of the
FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1356/P.L. 114-92 of November 25, 2015).

28 See CRS Report R43543, Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke; Megan Eckstein, “Light Carrier Studies Already Underway As Navy Considers Role
for CVLs in Future Fleet,” USNI News, February 1, 2021. See also Joseph Trevithick, “Navy Looking At America And
Ford Class Derivatives In New Light Aircraft Carrier Studies,” The Drive, February 2, 2021.
29 See, for example, Talbot Manvel, “The Lightning Carrier Isn’t Either,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 2023.
30 Bradley Martin and Michael McMahon, Future Aircraft Carrier Options, Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation,
2017, 87 pp.
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Legislative Activity for FY2024 and FY2025
Summary of Congressional Action on FY2024 Funding Request
Table 3 summarizes congressional action on the FY2024 procurement funding request for the
CVN-78 program. The request for CVN-79 is for cost-to-complete (CC) funding to cover cost
growth on CVN-79 following the completion in FY2018 of the ship’s original full funding.
Table 3. Congressional Action on FY2024 Procurement Funding Request
(Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth)
Authorization
Appropriation

Request
HASC
5ASC
Enacted
HAC
SAC
Enacted
CVN-79
624.6
624.6
624.6
624.6
624.6
624.6
624.6
CVN-80
1,115.3
1,275.3
1,115.3
1,115.3
1,104.4
1,115.3
1,104.4
CVN-81
800.5
800.5
800.5
800.5
800.5
800.5
800.5
Total
2,540.4
2,700.4
2,540.4
2,540.4
2529.5
2,540.4
2,529.5
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2024 budget submission, committee and conference
reports, and explanatory statements on FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2024 DOD
Appropriations Act.
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee; HAC is
House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee. The request for CVN-79 is for
cost-to-complete (CC) funding to cover cost growth on CVN-79 fol owing the completion in FY2018 of the
ship’s original ful funding.
Summary of Congressional Action on FY2025 Funding Request
Table 4 summarizes congressional action on the FY2025 procurement funding request for the
CVN-78 program. The request for CVN-79 is for cost-to-complete (CC) funding to cover cost
growth on CVN-79 following the completion in FY2018 of the ship’s original full funding.
Table 4. Congressional Action on FY2025 Procurement Funding Request
(Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth)
Authorization
Appropriation

Request
HASC
5ASC
Enacted
HAC
SAC
Enacted
CVN-79
236.0

CVN-80
1,186.9

CVN-81
721.0

CVN-82
0

Total
2,143.9

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2025 budget submission, committee and conference
reports, and explanatory statements on FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2025 DOD
Appropriations Act.
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee; HAC is
House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee. The request for CVN-79 is for
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cost-to-complete (CC) funding to cover cost growth on CVN-79 fol owing the completion in FY2018 of the
ship’s original ful funding.
FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2670/S. 2226/P.L.
118-31)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 118-125 of June 30, 2023) on H.R.
2670, recommended the funding levels shown in the HASC column of Table 3. The
recommended increase of $160.0 million for CVN-80 is for “Navy [FY2024] UPL [Unfunded
Priorities List]—CVN 75 and CVN 80 SEWIP [Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement
Program] BLK III.” (Page 445)
Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 118-58 of July 12, 2023) on S.
2226, recommended the funding levels shown in the SASC column of Table 3.
Section 121 of S. 2226 would amend 10 U.S.C. 8062(e) to require the Navy to maintain a
minimum of nine carrier air wings until the date on which additional operationally deployable
aircraft carriers can fully support a 10th carrier air wing, after which point the Navy is to maintain
a minimum of 10 carrier air wings.
Regarding Section 121, S.Rept. 118-58 states
Reduction in the minimum number of Navy carrier air wings and carrier air wing
headquarters required to be maintained (sec. 121)
The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 8062(e) of title 10,
United States Code, to relieve the Navy of a requirement to maintain 10 carrier air wings.
The Department of Defense has asked for relief from the requirements of this section,
which directs the Secretary of the Navy to ensure that the Navy maintains 9 carrier air
wings until additional deployable aircraft carriers can fully support 10 carrier air wings, or
October 1, 2025, whichever is earlier. Thereafter, the Navy would be required to maintain
10 carrier air wings.
The Navy intends to maintain 9 carrier air wings as the fleet returns to 11 operational
aircraft carriers. The Navy argues that even with 11 operational aircraft carriers, two of
those carriers are regularly unavailable for worldwide deployment due to routine or
scheduled maintenance or repair to include refueling and complex overhauls, docking
planned incremental availabilities, or planned incremental availabilities. Thus, the Navy
believes that maintaining 9 carrier air wings is sufficient to support 11 operational aircraft
carriers and that maintaining 10 carrier air wings is unnecessary. (Page 7)
Enacted
The conference report (H.Rept. 118-301 of December 6, 2023) on H.R. 2670/P.L. 118-31 of
December 22, 2023, recommended the funding levels shown in the authorization final column of
Table 3.
Section 121 of H.R. 2670/P.L. 118-31 amends 10 U.S.C. 8062(e) to require the Navy to maintain
a minimum of nine carrier air wings, each with a dedicated and fully staffed headquarters, with
the amendment to take effect one year after the Navy submits to Congress a report on potential
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approaches to the manning, operation, and deployment of a 10th aircraft carrier and associated
carrier air wing to determine how the Navy can mobilize such a carrier and air wing if required by
operational needs. H.Rept. 118-301 states
Sec. 121—Modification of requirements for minimum number of carrier air wings of the
Navy
The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 121) that would amend section 8062(e)
of title 10, United States Code, to relieve the Navy of a requirement to maintain 10 carrier
air wings.
The House bill contained no similar provision.
The House recedes with an amendment that would provide a sunset for the requirement to
maintain 10 carrier air wings 12 months after the Secretary of the Navy submits a report
on potential approaches to manning, operating, and deploying a 10th aircraft carrier and
associated carrier air wing to determine how the Navy could mobilize such a carrier air
wing if required by operational needs. (Page 995)
FY2024 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 4365/S. 2587/Division A of H.R. 2882/P.L. 118-47)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 118-121 of June 27, 2023) on H.R.
4365, recommended the funding levels shown in the HAC column of Table 3. The recommended
reduction of $10.876 million for CVN-80 is for “Joint precision aircraft landing system early to
need.” (Page 145)
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 118-81 of July 27, 2023) on S. 2587,
recommended the funding levels shown in the SAC column of Table 3.
Enacted
The explanatory statement for Division A of H.R. 2882/P.L. 118-47 of March 23, 2024, provides
the funding levels shown in the appropriation enacted column of Table 3. The reduction of
$10.875 million in procurement funding for CVN-80 is for “Joint precision aircraft landing
system [JPALS] early to need” (PDF page 143 of 314).

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Appendix. Background Information on Two-Ship
Block Buy for CVN-80 and CVN-81
This appendix presents additional background information on the two-ship block buy contract for
CVN-80 and CVN-81.
The option for procuring two Ford-class carriers under a two-ship block buy contract had been
discussed in this CRS report since April 2012.31 In earlier years, the discussion focused on the
option of using a block buy contract for procuring CVN-79 and CVN-80. In subsequent years,
interest among policymakers focused on the option of using a block buy contract for procuring
CVN-80 and CVN-81.
On March 19, 2018, the Navy released a request for proposal (RFP) to Huntington Ingalls
Industries/Newport News Shipbuilding (HII/NNS) regarding a two-ship buy of some kind for
CVN-80 and CVN-81. A March 20, 2018, Navy News Service report stated the following:
The Navy released a CVN 80/81 two-ship buy Request for Proposal (RFP) to Huntington
Ingalls Industries—Newport News Shipbuilding (HII-NNS) March 19 to further define the
cost savings achievable with a two-ship buy.
With lethality and affordability a top priority, the Navy has been working with HII-NNS
over the last several months to estimate the total savings associated with procuring CVN
80 and CVN 81 as a two-ship buy.
“In keeping with the National Defense Strategy, the Navy developed an acquisition strategy
to combine the CVN 80 and CVN 81 procurements to better achieve the Department’s
objectives of building a more lethal force with greater performance and affordability,” said
James F. Geurts, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research Development and Acquisition.
“This opportunity for a two-ship contract is dependent on significant savings that the
shipbuilding industry and government must demonstrate. The Navy is requesting a
proposal from HII-NNS in order to evaluate whether we can achieve significant savings.”
The two-ship buy is a contracting strategy the Navy has effectively used in the 1980s to
procure Nimitz-class aircraft carriers and achieved significant acquisition cost savings
compared to contracting for the ships individually. While the CVN 80/81 two-ship buy
negotiations transpire, the Navy is pursuing contracting actions necessary to continue CVN
80 fabrication in fiscal year (FY) 2018 and preserve the current schedule. The Navy plans
to award the CVN 80 construction contract in early FY 2019 as a two-ship buy pending
Congressional approval and achieving significant savings.32
Section 121(a)(2) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019
(H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232 of August 13, 2018) permitted the Navy, after DOD made certain
certifications to Congress, to add CVN-81 to the existing contract for building CVN-80. DOD
provided the required certification on December 31, 2018. On January 31, 2019, the Navy

31 See the section entitled “Potential Two-Ship Block Buy on CVN-79 and CVN-80” in the April 4, 2012, version of
CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke. In more recent years, this section was modified to discuss the option in connection with CVN-80 and
CVN-81.
32 Naval Sea Systems Command Public Affairs, “Navy Seeks Savings, Releases Two-Carrier RFP,” Navy News, March
20, 2018. See also Megan Eckstein, “UPDATED: Navy, Newport News Taking Steps Towards Two-Carrier Buy,”
USNI News, March 19, 2018.
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Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress

announced that it had awarded a two-ship fixed-price incentive (firm target) (FPIF) contract for
CVN-80 and CVN-81 to HII/NNS.33
The two-ship contract for CVN-80 and CVN-81 can be viewed as a block buy contract because
the two ships were procured in different fiscal years (CVN-80 was procured in FY2018 and
CVN-81 was procured in FY2019 [or, according to the Navy’s FY2021-FY2024 budget
submissions, in FY2020]).34 The Navy’s previous two-ship aircraft carrier procurements occurred
in FY1983 (for CVN-72 and CVN-73) and FY1988 (for CVN-74 and CVN-75). In each of those
two earlier cases, however, the two ships were fully funded within a single fiscal year, making
each of these cases a simple two-ship purchase (akin, for example, to procuring two Virginia-
class attack submarines or two DDG-51 class destroyers in a given fiscal year) rather than a two-
ship block buy (i.e., a contract spanning the procurement of end items procured across more than
one fiscal year).
Compared to DOD’s estimate that the two-ship block buy contract for CVN-80 and CVN-81
would produce savings of $3.9 billion (as measured from estimated costs for the two ships in the
December 2017 Navy business case analysis), DOD states that “the Department of Defense’s
Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) developed an Independent Estimate
of Savings for the two-ship procurement and forecast savings of $3.1 billion ([in] Then-Year
[dollars]), or approximately 11 percent.... The primary differences between [the] CAPE and Navy
estimates of savings are in Government Furnished Equipment35 and production change orders.”36
Within the total estimated combined reduction in cost, HII/NNS reportedly expects to save up to
$1.6 billion in contractor-furnished equipment.37
A November 2018 DOD report to Congress that was submitted as an attachment to DOD’s
December 31, 2018, certification stated the following regarding the sources of cost reduction for
the two-ship contract:
The CVN 80 and CVN 81 two-ship buy expands and improves upon the affordability
initiatives identified in the Annual Report on Cost Reduction Efforts for JOHN F.
KENNEDY (CVN 79) and ENTERPRISE (CVN 80) as required by section 126(c) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (P.L. 114-328). Production
saving initiatives for single-ship buys included use of unit families in construction, pre-
outfitting and complex assemblies which move work to a more efficient workspace
environment, reduction in the number of superlifts,38 and facility investments which
improve the shipbuilder trade effectiveness. A two-ship buy assumes four years between

33 See Office of the Navy Chief of Information, “Navy Awards Contract for Construction of Two Carriers,” Navy News
Service, January 31, 2019; Megan Eckstein, “UPDATED: Navy Awards 2-Carrier Contract to Newport News
Shipbuilding,” USNI News, January 31, 2019; Marcus Weisgerber, “US Navy Places First 2-Carrier Order in Three
Decades,” Defense One, January 31, 2019; David B. Larter, “US Navy Signs Mammoth Contract with Huntington
Ingalls for Two Aircraft Carriers,” Defense News, January 31, 2019; Rich Abott, “Navy Awards HII $15 Billion In
Two Carrier Buy,” Defense Daily, February 1, 2019.
34 For more on block buy contracting, see CRS Report R41909, Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy
Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
35 Government-furnished equipment (GFE) is equipment that the government purchases from supplier firms and then
provides to the shipbuilder for incorporation into the ships.
36 Department of Defense, FORD Class Aircraft Carrier Certification, CVN 80 and CVN 81 Two Ship Procurement
Authority, as Required by Section 121(b) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2019 (P.L. 115-232), November 2018, pp. 8-9.
37 Rich Abott, “Navy Awards HII $15 Billion In Two Carrier Buy,” Defense Daily, February 1, 2019. Contractor-
furnished equipment (CFE) is equipment that the contractor (in this case, HII/NNS) purchases from supplier firms for
incorporation into the ships.
38 A superlift is the use of a crane to move a very large section of the ship from the land into its final position on the
ship.
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Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress

ship deliveries which allows more schedule overlap, and therefore more shop-level and
assembly-level production efficiencies than two single-ship buys.
Procuring two ships to a single technical baseline reduces the requirement for engineering
labor hours when compared to single-ship estimates. The ability to rollover production
support engineering and planning products maximizes savings while recognizing the
minimum amount of engineering labor necessary to address obsolescence and regulatory
changes on CVN 81. The two-ship agreement with the shipbuilder achieves a 55 percent
reduction in construction support engineering hours on CVN 81 and greater than 18 percent
reduction in production support and planning hours compared to single ship procurements.
The two-ship procurement strategy allows for serial production opportunities that promote
tangible learning and reduced shop and machine set-up times. It allows for efficient use of
production facilities, re-use of production jigs and fixtures, and level loading of key trades.
The continuity of work allows for reductions in supervision, services and support costs.
The result of these efficiencies is a production man-hours step down that is equivalent to
an 82 percent learning curve since CVN 79.
Key to achieving these production efficiencies is Integrated Digital Shipbuilding (iDS).
The Navy’s Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and the shipbuilder’s
investment in iDS, totaling $631 million, will reduce the amount of production effort
required to build FORD Class carriers. The two-ship buy will accelerate the benefits of this
approach. The ability to immediately use the capability on CVN 81 would lead to a further
reduction in touch labor and services in affected value streams. The two-ship agreement
with the shipbuilder represents a production man-hours reduction of over seven percent
based on iDS efficiencies. Contractual authority for two ships allows the shipbuilder to
maximize economic order quantity material procurement. This allows more efficient
ordering and scheduling of material deliveries and will promote efficiencies through earlier
ordering, single negotiations, vendor quotes, and cross program purchase orders. These
efficiencies are expected to reduce material costs by about six percent more when
compared to single-ship estimates. Improved material management and flexibility will
prevent costly production delays. Furthermore, this provides stability within the nuclear
industrial base, de-risking the COLUMBIA and VIRGINIA Class programs. The two-ship
buy would provide economic stability to approximately 130,000 workers across 46 States
within the industrial base.
Change order requirements are likewise reduced as Government Furnished Equipment
(GFE) providers will employ planning and procurement strategies based on the common
technical baseline that minimize configuration changes that must be incorporated on the
follow ship. Change order budget allocations have been reduced over 25 percent based on
two-ship strategies.
In addition to the discrete savings achieved with the shipbuilder, the two-ship procurement
authority provides our partner GFE providers a similar opportunity to negotiate economic
order quantity savings and achieve cross program savings when compared to single-ship
estimates.39
An April 16, 2018, press report stated the following:
If the Navy decides to buy aircraft carriers CVN-80 and 81 together, Newport News
Shipbuilding will be able to maintain a steady workload that supports between 23,000 and
25,000 workers at the Virginia yard for the next decade or so, the shipyard president told
reporters last week.

39 Department of Defense, FORD Class Aircraft Carrier Certification, CVN 80 and CVN 81 Two Ship Procurement
Authority, as Required by Section 121(b) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2019 (P.L. 115-232), November 2018, pp. 6-7.
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Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Part of the appeal of buying the two carriers together is that the Navy would also buy them
a bit closer together: the ships would be centered about three-and-a-half or four years apart,
instead of the five-year centers for recent carrier acquisition, Newport News Shipbuilding
President Jennifer Boykin told reporters.
Boykin said the closer ship construction centers would allow her to avoid a “labor valley”
where the workforce levels would dip down after one ship and then have to come back up,
which is disruptive for employees and costly for the company.
If this two-carrier buy goes through, the company would avoid the labor valley altogether
and ensure stability in its workforce, Boykin said in a company media briefing at the Navy
League’s Sea Air Space 2018 symposium. That workforce stability contributes to an
expected $1.6 billion in savings on the two-carrier buy from Newport News Shipbuilding’s
portion of the work alone, not including government-furnished equipment....
Boykin said four main things contribute to the expected $1.6 billion in savings from the
two-carrier buy. First, “if you don’t have the workforce valley, there’s a labor efficiency
that represents savings.”
Second, “if you buy two at once, my engineering team doesn’t have to produce two
technical baselines, two sets of technical products; they only have to produce one, and the
applicability is to both, so there’s savings there. When we come through the planning, the
build plan of how we plan to build the ship, the planning organization only has to put out
one plan and the applicability is to both, so there’s savings there.”
The third savings is a value of money over time issue, she said, and fourth is economic
order quantity savings throughout the entire supply chain.40

Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
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40 Megan Eckstein, “Newport News Would Save $1.6 Billion, Maintain Stable Workforce of 25,000 Under 2 Proposed
Carrier Buy,” USNI News, April 16, 2018. See also Rich Abott, “HII Sees Two Carrier Buy Saving $1.6 Billion Before
GFE,” Defense Daily, April 11, 2018: 10-11.
Congressional Research Service
RS20643 · VERSION 284 · UPDATED
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