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Updated March 27, 2024
U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council: Background and Issues
The U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) is a
Table 1. TTC Working Groups
high-level forum between the United States and European
1. Technology standards
Union (EU) that aims to enhance cooperation on global
2. Climate and clean technology
technology, economic, and trade issues; promote shared
3. Secure supply chains
prosperity and competitiveness; and support democratic,
4. Information and communications technology and services
market-oriented values. The partners cast the TTC as “the
(ICTS) security and competitiveness
key forum for our cooperation on trade and technology
5. Data governance and technology platform regulation
matters.” The Biden Administration has not pursued
6. Misuse of technology threatening security and human rights
negotiations for a comprehensive free trade agreement
7. Cooperation on export controls of dual use items
(FTA) with the EU that would include the removal or
8. Investment screening cooperation
9. Promoting small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) access
reduction of tariffs and nontariff barriers. Congress has
to and use of digital technologies
lacked a formal role in approving TTC outcomes, as with a
10. Global trade challenges
host of other economic initiatives with other U.S. trading
Source: CRS, based on U.S. Department of State, TTC web page.
partners. Given the TTC’s prominence in U.S.-EU trade
relations, Congress may have an interest in oversight of the
TTC Developments and Select Issues
TTC and potential legislative action to shape its outcomes.
The TTC has risen in prominence on both bilateral trade
TTC Origins and Context
and technology issues and shared economic and
geopolitical concerns. In particular, the TTC emerged as a
Upon entering into office, President Biden pledged “to
key tool for U.S.-EU coordination on export controls in
repair and revitalize the U.S.-EU partnership,” after what
response to Russia’s war on Ukraine. Other outcomes have
some commentators assess as especially fraught U.S.-EU
focused on areas such as artificial intelligence (AI), supply
trade relations during the Trump Administration. The
chains, digital connectivity and infrastructure, investment
United States and EU announced the TTC at their June
screening, sustainability, nonmarket concerns (e.g., China’s
2021 summit. That same year, they also reached interim
trade practices), and economic coercion.
resolutions on some bilateral trade irritants (e.g., tariffs).
Through the TTC, the partners largely have avoided
The TTC is led on the U.S. side by the U.S. Trade
rehashing long-standing differences, opting instead to work
Representative (USTR) and Secretaries of Commerce and
to “update the rules of the road for the 21st century” (e.g.,
State and on the EU side by the Commissioners for Trade
regulatory cooperation on new technologies). On some
and Competition of the European Commission (the EU’s
issues (e.g., China’s global influence), the United States and
executive body). At a ministerial level, the TTC has met
EU share concerns but may vary in some approaches,
five times (September 2021, May and December 2022, May
potentially limiting TTC responses to these issues. Further,
2023, and January 2024) at alternating U.S. and EU venues.
reflecting U.S. and EU industrial policies (e.g., in clean
All of these meetings have yielded Joint Statements on
energy), the partners have sought to use the TTC to ensure
cooperation, save the January 2024 fifth ministerial, which
their regulatory approaches are “mutually reinforcing” and
yielded separate U.S. and EU readouts.
policies avoid a subsidy “race to the bottom.”
The TTC is structured as 10 working groups with agendas
At the fifth ministerial, the parties discussed cooperation on
on technology, supply chains, trade and investment, and
economic security, emerging technologies, and sustainable
other topics (Table 1). Working groups are chaired by
trade. Per the U.S. readout, U.S. co-chairs stressed
relevant U.S. government agencies and European
“fortifying our collective economic security,” including
Commission departments (e.g., the global trade challenges
through economic de-risking and diversification, building
working group is led by USTR and the commission’s
resilient supply chains, using outbound investment review
Directorate-General for Trade). Cooperation includes issue-
mechanisms, and coordinating export controls. Shortly
specific coordination, information sharing, and dialogue,
before the ministerial, the EU introduced new initiatives to
with input from industry, labor, and other stakeholders.
advance some of these priorities, as called for in its 2023
Outside of the TTC, the United States and EU are engaging
European Economic Security Strategy. The EU readout
on other trade issues. These include ongoing talks on steel
described the ministerial as a stocktaking ahead of the sixth
and aluminum global overcapacity and carbon issues and a
ministerial, scheduled for April 2024, which Secretary of
long-term solution to U.S. Section 232 tariffs; a U.S.-EU
State Blinken said would be the “capstone TTC.”
critical minerals agreement (CMA) to enable EU electric
Supply Chains. The TTC’s initial focus on supply chain
vehicles (EVs) to qualify for certain tax credit benefits in
cooperation was on identifying and addressing shared
P.L. 117-169 (the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, IRA);
vulnerabilities, including diversification efforts and R&D
and various issues in the World Trade Organization (WTO).
priorities, in areas such as semiconductors, solar energy,
critical minerals, and pharmaceuticals. In May 2023, the
https://crsreports.congress.gov
U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council: Background and Issues
United States and EU announced an early warning and
Members and European Parliament (EP) counterparts or to
monitoring mechanism for the semiconductors value chain,
use the ongoing Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue
which aims to anticipate shortages and alleviate bottlenecks
(between U.S. House Members and the EP) to shape and
and outlines response measures. After China’s summer
boost the durability of the TTC. Among other possible
2023 imposition of export controls for gallium and
options, one think tank, for example, proposed a U.S.-EU
germanium (key inputs for semiconductors), the United
trade agreement framework on the TTC to add more
States and EU activated the mechanism and, at the January
structure and legitimacy across U.S. Administrations.
2024 ministerial, agreed to intensify cooperation on critical
Focus Areas. Congress may assess how the TTC aligns
raw material sourcing for semiconductors. They also have
with congressional priorities. It may weigh in on the TTC’s
sought to promote sustainable and responsible supply
prioritization of some geopolitical issues (e.g., responses to
chains with strong labor protections. The TTC’s Trade and
Russia’s aggression in Ukraine), compared to other bilateral
Labor Dialogue (TALD) has convened stakeholders to
trade and technology issues. Digital economy issues may be
address the risk of forced labor in supply chains.
of particular congressional interest; some Members have
Digital Policy and Emerging Technologies. At the
called for the TTC to address key U.S. concerns on the
fifth ministerial, the United States and EU noted progress
EU’s digital policies. Congress also could consider whether
on a Joint Roadmap on AI and emphasized the TTC’s role
TTC cooperation may interact with U.S. efforts to regulate
in developing rules for and trustworthiness in digital
the digital economy, given USTR’s decision to end support
systems. In 2023, the TTC’s technology standards working
for some digital trade positions in IPEF and the WTO in
group issued a list of 65 AI terms key to understanding risk-
2023, citing the need for space to “come up with new
based approaches to AI and identified some areas for U.S.-
positions” on domestic technology regulation.
EU standardization. The partners also continued to develop
Congress also could explore options for modifying the
a common vision on 6G wireless communication systems
TTC, such as by adding more working groups on other
and discussed expanding cooperation to counter the misuse
bilateral issues. Additionally, it could legislate explicitly on
of technology (e.g., foreign information manipulation and
the TTC or on TTC-related issues (e.g., H.R. 6571 directs
interference). Differences on issues not explicitly covered
U.S. consultations with allies or partners on supply chains).
in the TTC, such as the implementation of the EU’s Digital
Markets Act (DMA) and Digital Services Act (DSA), may
Effectiveness. Congress may examine whether the TTC is
continue to pose challenges in U.S.-EU relations. Some
effective in advancing U.S.-EU trade cooperation and U.S.
U.S. technology companies have voiced concern that these
competitiveness in EU markets. Some Members and
regulations unfairly discriminate against U.S. companies.
stakeholders welcomed the TTC’s creation. Some also have
Sustainability.
urged for more concrete deliverables, potentially wary of
TTC sustainability initiatives aim to
more “talk” rather than “action” on difficult issues and of
support transitions to low-carbon economies and the digital
the TTC losing momentum. Others assert that the TTC
economy. On the margins of the January 2024 ministerial,
dialogue process is important for relationship building and
the United States and EU agreed to continue to cooperate
that meaningful progress may take time, potentially across
on trade facilitation of green goods and technology,
several ministerial meetings. Regular high-level meetings
including on conformity assessments, per the EU readout.
may ensure political focus on the TTC, yet if too frequent,
The TTC’s Transatlantic Initiative on Sustainable Trade
they may not give working groups enough time for
(TIST) has workstreams to support a transatlantic “green”
technical cooperation to contribute to substantive outcomes.
marketplace that benefits businesses, workers, and
consumers. The partners have sought stakeholder input
Congress may examine other ways to advance U.S. trade
through the TIST and TALD. Other cooperation focuses on
policy interests, such as through comprehensive U.S.-EU
clean energy technology and critical minerals. Broader U.S.
FTA negotiations. Political support may be limited, given
and EU climate policy frameworks, varying approaches,
the Biden Administration’s stated preference for executive
and other considerations (e.g., energy security) could
economic initiatives to address “21st century” issues and
complicate cooperation on sustainability.
advance “worker-centered” policies and the EU’s stated
Issues Facing Congress
interest in avoiding a repeat of the now-defunct
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP)
Key issues facing Congress regarding the TTC include the
FTA negotiations that took place during the Obama
following.
Administration. Congress also may assess the impact of
Congressional Role. Congress could assess its role in
greater trade liberalization on the U.S. economy; the role of
shaping the TTC’s structure, priorities, and outcomes. It
any negotiated U.S.-EU trade outcomes on global rules
also could consider whether the TTC’s executive-led
setting; and what role the TTC might play in laying the
approach limits the durability and enforceability of
groundwork for any comprehensive FTA talks in the future.
outcomes not enacted into U.S. law. Congress may consider
whether or not to seek a more formal role in the approval
Shayerah I. Akhtar, Coordinator, Specialist in
of, or consultation on, TTC outcomes (e.g., P.L. 118-31,
International Trade and Finance
§6706, sets a sense of Congress on consultations by the
Andres B. Schwarzenberg, Specialist in International
Department of State). Issues about the role of Congress in
Trade and Finance
trade initiatives generally have arisen in the context of the
Danielle M. Trachtenberg, Analyst in International Trade
Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF).
and Finance
Congress also could consider whether or not to add a TTC
IF12575
parliamentary component for bilateral sessions between
https://crsreports.congress.gov
U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council: Background and Issues
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