Bahrain: Issues for U.S. Policy
Updated March 12, 2024
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
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Bahrain: Issues for U.S. Policy

Summary
The Kingdom of Bahrain is an island nation connected by a causeway to Saudi Arabia (15.5 miles
away) and once claimed by Iran (124 miles away). Though small geographically and wedged
between these two larger regional powers, Bahrain has outsized importance for U.S. policy in the
Persian Gulf. U.S.-Bahraini ties have deepened over the past four decades as the Gulf region has
faced increasing threats from the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Bahrain has hosted
a U.S. naval command headquarters since 1948; the United States and Bahrain have had a formal
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) since 1991; and Bahrain is the only Arab member of the
22-nation Operation Prosperity Guardian to defend against Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping.
Bahrain is ruled by a hereditary monarchy and is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman); its politics have
been restive, though the monarchy’s control has not been threatened. With a population of 1.5
million people, a little over half of whom are Bahraini citizens, Bahrain has a history of sectarian
tensions between Sunni and Shia Muslims. Bahrain is the only GCC state to have a Shia majority
population, and Bahrain’s politics have been unsettled since a 2011 uprising by a mostly Shia
opposition to the Sunni-minority-led government of Bahrain’s Al Khalifa ruling family. Since
2014, the unrest has been relatively low-level. Several senior opposition leaders remain
imprisoned.
Bahrain closely aligns with de facto GCC leader Saudi Arabia, which provides Bahrain with
substantial financial support and which intervened in 2011 to help Bahrain’s government repress
protests. Bahrain, like some other GCC states, has been building ties to Israel and, in September
2020, Bahrain signed agreements at the White House to fully normalize its relations with Israel as
part of the “Abraham Accords.” Since the outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas in October
2023, Bahrain and Israel have each withdrawn their ambassadors but have not severed relations;
the ongoing conflict and post-conflict developments may further affect relations.
Bahrain has fewer financial resources than most of the other GCC states. Bahrain’s oil revenues
emanate primarily from a Saudi oil field whose proceeds go partly to Bahrain. In 2004, the United
States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement (FTA). In 2005, bilateral trade was about $780
million, and U.S.-Bahrain trade has since increased fourfold. In 2023, the total volume of bilateral
trade stood at $2.8 billion.
Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain, the U.S. Navy base in Manama, Bahrain, is the
headquarters of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth fleet, which oversees all Navy operations in the U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). As of 2023, there were over 8,000
U.S. military personnel and civilian employees assigned to NSA Bahrain. In FY2023, the U.S.
Department of Defense estimated that it would spend $539.5 million on personnel, operations,
maintenance, and family housing costs for U.S. personnel stationed in Bahrain.
Members of Congress travel with some frequency to Bahrain to visit U.S. armed services
personnel and provide oversight over the U.S. bilateral relationship and defense presence in the
kingdom. During the 118th Congress, P.L. 118-31, the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2024, requires the Secretary of State to submit to Congress a review of the legal
protections afforded by bilateral agreements between the United States and Bahrain. Section 2204
extends a $26.3 million authorization of Navy Military Construction Funds for U.S. facilities in
Bahrain through FY2024. Section 7338 of the Act mandates that the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency submit to Congress an assessment of the “current effects on the intelligence
community of the agreements between Israel and 4 other foreign countries, including Bahrain,
collectively known as the Abraham Accords.”
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Contents
Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1
Historical Background ..................................................................................................................... 1
Domestic Politics ............................................................................................................................. 2
The Al Khalifa Dynasty ............................................................................................................ 2
The National Assembly ............................................................................................................. 3
Human Rights .................................................................................................................................. 4
Women’s Rights ........................................................................................................................ 6
Religious Freedom .............................................................................................................. 6
The Economy .................................................................................................................................. 7
Foreign Policy Issues ....................................................................................................................... 8
Iran ............................................................................................................................................ 8
Israel .......................................................................................................................................... 9
Yemen........................................................................................................................................ 9
U.S. Relations ................................................................................................................................ 10
U.S. Defense Presence in Bahrain ........................................................................................... 10
2023 U.S.-Bahraini Cooperation Agreement ..................................................................... 11
Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) .................................................................................. 12
U.S. Arms Sales and Foreign Assistance to Bahrain ............................................................... 14
Major Non-NATO Ally Designation and Excess Defense Articles................................... 15
U.S. Trade and Investment ...................................................................................................... 16
Recent Legislation ......................................................................................................................... 17

Figures
Figure 1. King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa ........................................................................................ 2
Figure 2. Prominent Members of the Al Khalifa Family ................................................................. 3
Figure 3. Map of Bahrain ................................................................................................................ 7
Figure 4. Combined Maritime Forces ........................................................................................... 13
Figure 5. Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa visits NAVCENT ................................... 14
Figure 6. U.S.-Bahrain Annual Volume of Trade .......................................................................... 16

Tables
Table 1. Democracy, Human Rights, and Development Indicators ................................................. 5

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 17

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Overview
As the smallest, least oil-endowed member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the island
Kingdom of Bahrain has established close partnerships with its larger Gulf neighbors, most
notably Saudi Arabia, as well as Western powers, such as the United States and United Kingdom.
U.S.-Bahraini ties are long-standing and have deepened over the past four decades as the Arab
Gulf states have faced threats from Iran. Bahrain is the only GCC state to have a Shia Muslim
majority population, and Bahrain’s Shias have long asserted they are discriminated against by the
Sunni Muslim Al Khalifa family-led government and that Shias have been accused by Sunnis of
loyalty to predominantly Shia Muslim Iran. Bahrain has hosted a U.S. naval command
headquarters for the Gulf region since 1948, and there are several thousand U.S. military forces
serving at the naval facility.
Historical Background
The Al Khalifa family, a branch of the Sunni Muslim Bani Utbah tribe, has ruled Bahrain since
1783, when it left the Arabian Peninsula and captured a Persian garrison controlling the main
island of Bahrain (the Persian Safavid dynasty had an intermittent presence in Bahrain from
1602-1782). During the 19th century, Bahrain’s Al Khalifa rulers signed various treaties with the
United Kingdom, which was then the dominant foreign naval power in the Gulf. In the late 19th
century, the British Empire entered into additional treaties with Bahrain, making the island
kingdom a British protectorate. For over a century, the British exercised control over Bahrain’s
foreign and defense policies in exchange for recognizing the Al Khalifa dynasty as the rulers of
the kingdom.
Prior to the discovery of oil, Bahrain’s economy centered on trade and pearl diving. Oil
exploration began in the 1920s and production followed a decade later. In the 1930s, Iran
unsuccessfully sought to deny Bahrain the right to grant oil concessions to the United States and
Britain.
By 1968, as Britain reduced its military presence in the Gulf, Bahrain and the other smaller
Persian Gulf emirates (principalities) sought a permanent status. At the time, Iran also claimed
sovereignty over Bahrain and refused at first to recognize its independence.1 A 1970 U.N. survey
(“referendum”) determined that Bahrain’s inhabitants wanted independence, a finding that was
endorsed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 278 and recognized by Iran’s then-parliament.
Bahrain negotiated with eight other Persian Gulf emirates during 1970-1971 on federating with
them, but Bahrain and Qatar each became independent (Bahrain on August 15, 1971), and the
other seven emirates federated into the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
In fifty years as an independent nation, Bahrain has become a high-income country as defined by
the World Bank. The kingdom’s rulers have used the nation’s limited oil wealth, with aid from its
larger GCC neighbors, to construct a financial services and tourism-centered economy in which
Bahraini per capita income is equivalent to some Western European nations, such as Spain,
Portugal, and the Czech Republic. Nevertheless, structural inequalities and sectarian tensions
persist, as many Shia citizens contend that the state suppresses Shia political identity and denies
Shia citizens access to high positions of governmental authority. A 2011 uprising by a mostly Shia
opposition against the Sunni monarchy is the most recent episode of unrest in the kingdom; since
then, the government has suppressed organized opposition political activities.

1 Ahisha Ghafoor and Paul Mitchell, “Secret deals ending Britain's control in Gulf revealed,” BBC, August 30, 2022.
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Domestic Politics
The Al Khalifa Dynasty
King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa (74 years old) is the 14th ruling Al Khalifa monarch and the
second ruler since the island kingdom’s independence in 1971 (until 2002 Bahrain’s heads of state
were first referred to as “Hakims” then “Emirs”). Educated at Sandhurst Military Academy in
Britain, King Hamad (see Figure 1) was previously commander of the Bahraini Defense Forces
(BDF) and has ruled Bahrain since 1999. The constitution gives the king broad powers, including
appointing all ministers and judges and amending the constitution. Nevertheless, during his first
two decades of rule, King Hamad’s late uncle, the longtime Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa bin
Salman Al Khalifa, exercised widespread executive authority over the government, particularly
its internal security services. According to one account, though King Hamad had early in his reign
attempted to liberalize Bahrain’s political system, “Khalifa frustrated that process.”2 At the time
of his death in November 2020, Khalifa bin Salman had been the longest serving prime minister
in the world.
Since his uncle’s death, King Hamad has
appeared to focus on consolidating power
Figure 1. King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa
amongst his direct descendants, accelerating
Bahrain’s economic diversification, and
incorporating younger Bahrainis into the
political system.3 His eldest son, 54-year-old
Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa,4
is the prime minister and the de facto face of
the country’s attempt to modernize its
institutions. In 2022, King Hamad reshuffled
the cabinet, which the Crown Prince
expressed hope would “bring in new ideas

and a renewed drive to continue advancing
Source: Government of Bahrain.
the public sector.”5 Another of the king’s sons, 36-year-old Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad Al Khalifa,
serves as national security advisor (appointed in October 2019) and royal guard commander.
Sheikh Nasser also holds the title of major general and routinely meets with U.S. and other
foreign defense officials. According to one account, Sheikh Nasser’s role is growing increasingly
prominent, as he and the crown prince vie for power amongst the next generation of Al Khalifa
royals.6 The Economist notes that Sheikh Nasser is “reportedly the king’s favourite son.”7

2 “Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa,” The Times, December 16, 2020.
3 Kristin Smith Diwan, “Death of Bahrain’s Prime Minister Promotes Reformer, But Perhaps Not Reforms,” The Arab
Gulf States Institute in Washington, November 18, 2020.
4 According to Bahrain’s constitution, royal succession is determined by agnatic (male only) primogeniture amongst the
descendants of King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa. The constitution does grant the king the power to appoint any of his
other sons as his successor.
5 “Bahrain's king orders cabinet reshuffle, names new oil minister -state media,” Reuters, June 13, 2022.
6 Simon Henderson, “Bennett’s Bahrain Visit Further Invigorates Israel-Gulf Diplomacy,” The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, February 14, 2022.
7 “Sunnis and Shias in Bahrain remain as far apart as ever,” The Economist, January 22, 2022.
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Figure 2. Prominent Members of the Al Khalifa Family
As of April 2023

Source: Tesla Government Inc.
The National Assembly
Bahrain’s legislative branch of government consists of a bicameral National Assembly: the
directly elected, 40-seat Council of Representatives (COR or Majlis al Nuwab in Arabic) and the
royal-appointed, 40-seat Consultative Council (Majlis al Shura in Arabic). Enactment of any
legislation requires concurrence by the king, but a veto can be overridden by a two-thirds
majority vote of both chambers. In implementation of an agreement with the Shia opposition in
2012, King Hamad amended the constitution to designate the COR as the presiding chamber and
give it the power to remove individual ministers by two-thirds majority. Still, the Shura Council’s
concurrence is needed to enact legislation, and King Hamad has tended to appoint only
government supporters, including former high-ranking government officials, to that body. King
Hamad also has typically appointed to the Shura Council several women and members of
minority communities (Jewish and Christian) that have difficulty winning seats in the COR.
In the aftermath of Bahrain’s 2011 uprising, the government has banned political parties and
dissolved various political societies that were legally able to operate before 2011. In 2016,
Bahraini courts approved government requests to dissolve Al Wifaq (Accord National Islamic
Society, alt. sp. Wefaq), the most prominent Shia political society. Its officials had engaged with
the government in and outside of formal “national dialogues” after the 2011 uprising.



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Political Currents in Bahrain
Within the GCC, Bahrain’s political life is unique and has been influenced by Sunni-Shia sectarian tensions, labor
unrest, and its geography. Though Bahrain’s constitution identifies the nation as an “Islamic Arab State,” over time,
Bahrain has been influenced by the presence of different ethnicities (Arab, Persian, South Asian, Western) and
religions (Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism), creating a less religiously conservative culture than exists in
neighboring Saudi Arabia and Qatar. For example, alcohol is legal in Bahrain. Saudi tourists frequently visit using
the 15.5 mile King Fahd causeway that connects Bahrain to the Arabian Peninsula.
Existing alongside its reputation for openness is a long history of Sunni-Shia sectarian tension.8 Though at times,
Sunnis and Shias have protested together, particularly during periods of labor unrest in the oil industry in the mid-
20th century, the 1979 Iranian revolution ushered in a period of Shia political activism and concomitant Sunni
suspicion.9 According to one account, “Since the Islamic revolution of 1979 that convulsed Iran and threatened the
thrones of Sunni Arab monarchs across the Gulf, Bahrain has been on the fault line of the Sunni-Shia division.”10
Today, though many Bahraini Shia have risen to positions of power in the public and private sectors, Bahraini
human rights organizations stil report that the community is subjected to state-sponsored discrimination.
According to the UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, “Despite the constitutional prohibition
of discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation, members of the Shia community and stateless persons ...
reportedly face discrimination in education, employment and the exercise of their cultural rights.”11
Foreign influence, particularly from neighboring Saudi Arabia, is a major factor in maintaining the political status
quo in Bahrain. The island kingdom is dependent on the financial largesse of its Saudi neighbor, as Saudi Arabia
seeks to keep Bahrain in its orbit, lest the Shia of Bahrain influence Saudi Arabia’s own Shia population in its oil-
rich Eastern Province. Some critics also assert that the U.S. naval presence in Bahrain legitimizes and bolsters
Bahrain’s unequal political structure.12
During the November 2022 COR elections, which some Shia groups had called on citizens to
boycott, 73% of registered voters elected 40 members to the COR, of whom eight were women.
One report suggests that since the pool of eligible voters in 2022 was actually smaller than in
previous years (despite a population increase) that significant numbers of Bahraini citizens have
been deemed ineligible to vote.13 With banned opposition parties unable to field candidates, most
candidates were independents. According to one analysis, “Official figures claim a record turnout
of 73%. However, a broad lack of enthusiasm about the candidates, few of which obtained the
requisite 50% vote share in their constituencies in the first round, reflects broad disillusionment
with the chamber’s limited powers and the repressive political climate.”14 The next elections are
slated for November 2026.
Human Rights
U.S. and global criticism of Bahrain’s human rights practices focuses on the government response
to political opposition, including lack of accountability of security forces, suppression of free
expression, and treatment of prisoners. According to the latest U.S. Department of State Country

8 According to an older, but still relevant study from 1955, Bahrain’s Shia population are “the oldest group among the
present inhabitants of the shaykhdom and have been subjected through the centuries to successive conquests, so that
although at present they equal or exceed the Sunnis in number - as the 1941 census indicates- they constitute the poorer
and lower classes of society and manifest all the markings of a minority group.” See, Fahim I. Qubain, “Social Classes
and Tensions in Bahrain, Middle East Journal, Vol. 9, No. 3, Summer, 1955, pp. 269-280.
9 Louay Bahry, “The opposition in Bahrain: a bellwether for the Gulf?” Middle East Policy, Vol. 5, Issue 2, May 1997.
10 “Can Bahrain’s division between Sunnis and Shias be healed?” The Economist, November 24, 2022.
11 United Nations Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding observations on the initial report of
Bahrain, E/C.12/BHR/CO/1, August 4, 2022.
12 Thérèse Postel, “Here's One Way to Stop the Brutal Repression in Bahrain,” The Atlantic, March 13, 2013.
13 Dominic Dudley, “The Curious Case of Bahrain's Disappearing Voters,” Forbes, November 19, 2022.
14 Economist Intelligence Unit, Bahrain Country Report, Updated February 8, 2023.
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Report on Human Rights Practices, “Significant human rights issues include, among other things
credible reports of: inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by the government; political
prisoners; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious restrictions on freedom of
expression and media, including censorship and enforcement or threat to enforce criminal libel
laws; serious restrictions on internet freedom; [and] interference with the freedom of peaceful
assembly and freedom of association.”15
Table 1. Democracy, Human Rights, and Development Indicators
Issue
Index
Ranking
Democracy
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023
“Not Free”
Press Freedom
Reporters Without Borders, World Press Freedom Index 2023
171/180 Countries
Corruption
Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2023
76/180 Countries
Human Development United Nations Human Development Programme, Human
35/191 Countries
Development Index 2021/2022
Source: Freedom House, Reporters Without Borders, Transparency International, and United Nations Human
Development Programme.
In a joint statement accompanying the 2023 U.S.-Bahrain Strategic Dialogue, the U.S. and
Bahraini governments recounted how the governments discussed “the importance of universal
values, human rights, and fundamental freedoms, building on the ongoing cooperation in the
Human Rights Dialogue between the two countries.”16
Congressional Action in Support of Human Rights in Bahrain
In 2011, the “Arab Spring” spread to Bahrain resulting in mass demonstrations led by mostly
Shia opponents of the Sunni-minority-led government. In response, the Bahraini government’s
use of force, with assistance from Saudi Arabia and other GCC states to quell the protest
movement, led some Members of Congress to question U.S.-Bahraini security ties.17 In 2011,
the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) issued a report that contained 26
recommendations to hold accountable those government personnel responsible for abuses
during the 2011 uprising.18 Since 2011, the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission has held
several hearings and public briefings on Bahrain’s human rights practices, particularly its
treatment of the Shia opposition.19 In the 112th Congress, two joint resolutions (S.J.Res. 28 and
H.J.Res. 80) would have withheld the sale of 44 “Humvee” (M115A1B2) armored vehicles
and several hundred TOW missiles of various models pending Obama Administration
certification that Bahrain had improved its human rights practices. In January 2012, the Obama
Administration put the sale on hold, but in June 2015, the State Department announced that the
sale would proceed because the government had “made some meaningful progress” in its
human rights practices.”20 In 2017, the Trump Administration agreed to sell Bahrain 221 TOW
missiles of various types, with an estimated valued of $27 million. Also in the 112th and 114th

15 U.S. Department of State, 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bahrain, March 20, 2023.
16 U.S. Department of State, Joint Statement on the U.S.-Bahrain Strategic Dialogue, July 21, 2023.
17 Josh Rogin, “Congress Gears Up to Fight Arms Sales to Bahrain,” Foreign Policy, October 5, 2011.
18 For more information, see https://www.bici.org.bh/.
19 For example, see https://humanrightscommission.house.gov/events/hearings/bahrain-2022-elections.
20 Statement by State Department spokesperson John Kirby, “Lifting Holds on Security Assistance to the Government
of Bahrain,” June 29, 2015.
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Congresses, some Members introduced legislation titled the Bahrain Independent Commission
of Inquiry (BICI) Accountability Act, which would have prohibited U.S. sales to Bahrain of
tear gas, small arms, Humvees, and crowd control items until the State Department certified
that Bahrain had fully implemented all 2011 BICI recommendations. Congress did not
consider successive versions of the bill.
Women’s Rights
Though Bahraini leaders have sought to promote the role of women in government and society,
Bahrain scores relatively low on international rankings of overall gender equality globally. The
World Economic Forum’s 2023 Global Gender Gap report ranks Bahrain 113 out of 146 countries
overall, though it is one of the three highest scoring countries in the Middle East and North
Africa. Bahrain improved from 131st in 2022, an advancement driven by increased women’s
political empowerment.21 The cabinet regularly has several female ministers (currently four), and,
after the 2018 election, the COR elected its first woman speaker. Bahrain also consistently scores
among the highest in the Middle East and North Africa countries for women’s educational
attainment (globally, 57th in 2023).22 International organizations have noted that Bahraini women
are becoming better represented in the private sector. According to the World Bank Women,
Business and the Law 2023 Index, Bahrain’s score improved due to legal reforms that “equalized
the ages at which men and women can retire with full pension benefits.”23 There are several
women’s advocacy organizations in Bahrain, including the Supreme Council for Women, backed
by the wife of the king.
Still, traditional customs and some laws tend to limit women’s rights in practice. Women can
drive, own and inherit property, and initiate divorce cases. However, the children of Bahraini men
who are married to foreigners automatically are granted citizenship; Bahraini women married to
non-nationals must petition the state to confer citizenship to their children.
Religious Freedom
The State Department’s 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom notes that Shia activists,
nongovernmental organizations, and the political opposition continue to report Bahraini
government targeting of Shia religious leaders, anti-Shia commentary on social media, and
continued discrimination against Shia citizens.24
Bahrain’s constitution declares Islam the official religion, but the government allows freedom of
worship for Christians, Jews, and Hindus, although non-Muslim groups must register with the
Ministry of Social Development to operate, and Muslim groups must register with the Ministry of
Justice and Islamic Affairs. There are 19 registered non-Muslim religious groups and institutions,
including Christian churches of many denominations, and Hindu and Sikh groups. In 2022, Pope
Francis visited Bahrain as part of a conference of religious leaders on “East-West peaceful
coexistence;”25 the kingdom is home to an estimated 80,000 Catholics and was the first Gulf
country to open a Catholic Church (1939). A small Jewish community—mostly from families of
Iraqi Jews who settled in Bahrain in the 19th century or from southern Iran—remains in Bahrain

21 World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report 2023, June 20, 2023.
22 Ibid.
23 The World Bank, Women, Business and the Law 2023.
24 U.S. Department of State, 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Bahrain, May 15, 2023.
25 Ibid.
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and is integrated into Bahraini society, including serving in appointed seats in the National
Assembly and in diplomatic posts.26
The Economy
Bahrain has fewer financial resources than do
most of the other GCC states and runs
Figure 3. Map of Bahrain
chronically high budget deficits. As of the end
of 2023, public debt is approximately 124%
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the
highest level of indebtedness in the GCC.27
Bahrain’s oil revenues emanate primarily
from a Saudi oil field whose proceeds go
partly to Bahrain. Other GCC states also
provide various forms of financial assistance.
In 2018, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE
provided Bahrain with a $10 billion grants
and loans aid package.
Recovery in the tourism sector following the
COVID-19 pandemic and increases in
earnings on oil and non-oil exports (mainly
iron and aluminum products) contributed
economic growth over the last two years, and
government investment projects under the
2021 Economic Recovery Plan are expected
to continue boosting non-oil sectors.28
Though Bahrain has implemented measures
to reduce public debt, the International

Monetary Fund (IMF) projects public debt of
nearly 120% of GDP in 2024.
Source: Map created by CRS using State
29
Department and Esri data.
Bahrain’s overall economy has been
diversified away from hydrocarbon production, but the government remains dependent on oil and
gas for 70%-80% of revenue. In 2024, Bahrain’s energy industry is at a crossroads. Existing
natural gas reserves are dwindling, and the country may become a net importer in the years ahead.
Though two new off-shore reservoirs were discovered in 2022, development of the reservoirs has
not been publicly announced. Four years earlier, significant deposits of off-shore shale oil also
were revealed, though the government continues to evaluate the costs of extraction and
production.
In February 2024, the board of the Export–Import Bank of the United States voted to notify
Congress of plans to provide more than $100 million in financing to underwrite the drilling of
more than 400 oil wells and 30 gas wells in what is known as the Bahrain Field, one of the oldest

26 “Jews have lived in Bahrain for 140 years; the Israel deal changes their lives,” Times of Israel, September 18, 2020.
27 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), “Country Forecast: Bahrain,” January 2024.
28 EIU Viewpoint, “One-click report: Bahrain,” January 1, 2024.
29 International Monetary Fund, “IMF Executive Board Concluded 2023 Article IV Consultation with The Kingdom of
Bahrain,” July 11, 2023.
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oil and gas fields in the Middle East.30 Two climate advisors on Ex-Im’s advisory board resigned
in protest over the decision, citing President Biden’s 2021 pledge to curb federal financing of
foreign fossil fuel projects.31
Foreign Policy Issues
Bahrain’s regional and broader foreign policy generally mirrors that of its closest ally in the GCC,
Saudi Arabia. The closeness of Bahraini-Saudi relations was demonstrated by the Saudi-led GCC
intervention to help the government suppress the uprising in 2011, and Bahrain’s joining of the
June 2017 Saudi-led move to isolate Qatar and its dispatch of Bahraini military personnel to serve
as part of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. Bahrain is also politically close to Kuwait, in part
because of historic ties between their two ruling families. Both families hail from the Anizah tribe
that settled in Bahrain and Kuwait.
Iran
With the smallest armed forces of any Gulf state, Bahraini leaders have long apparently feared
that Iran seeks to destabilize the kingdom, given the centuries-long Iranian contestation of
Bahrain’s sovereignty.32 Since 1979, as Iran’s theocratic rulers have sought to export their model
of religious governance to parts of the Arab world, Bahrain has publicly accused Iran of trying to
organize coups by pro-Iranian Bahraini Shias.33 Bahraini officials have also accused Iran of
backing violent Shia groups in Bahrain. In 2016, Bahrain supported Saudi Arabia in a dispute
with Iran over the Saudi execution of a dissident Shia cleric and attacks by Iranian protestors on
two Saudi diplomatic facilities. Bahrain broke diplomatic relations with Iran at that time and
diplomatic ties have not been restored. After Iran and Saudi Arabia restored ties in 2023, there
was some speculation that Bahrain would follow suit;34 the regional conflict that has ensued since
Hamas’ October 7, 2023 attack against Israel may have slowed or tabled some further Iranian-
Arab rapprochement.
On March 12, 2024, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC), in coordination with the Kingdom of Bahrain, sanctioned Iran-based operatives for the
U.S. designated terrorist group Al Ashtar Brigades.35 According to OFAC, these designations
“highlight the critical role that the Iranian regime plays in providing support to Al-Ashtar
Brigades.”36

30 Lisa Friedman and Hiroko Tabuchi, “Two Climate Advisers Quit U.S. Export-Import Bank Over Fossil Fuel Plans,”
New York Times, February 5, 2024.
31 Jennifer A. Dlouhy, “US Trade Bank Defies Biden to Expand Oil Drilling in Bahrain,” Bloomberg, February 8,
2024.
32 Even before the formation of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran contested Bahrain's sovereignty throughout the 19th
and 20th centuries. In 1957, the Shah of Iran designated Bahrain as the country’s fourteenth province (“Mishmahig
Island” in Farsi).
33 In 1981, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, a Bahraini Shia revolutionary group backed by Iran,
attempted to carry out a coup in Bahrain. See John Vinocur, “1981 Plot in Bahrain Linked to Iranians,” New York
Times, July 25, 1982. See also, “Bahrain Coup Suspects Say They Trained in Iran,” Reuters, June 6, 1996.
34 “Bahrain, Iran likely to restore diplomatic ties soon -US diplomat,” Reuters, June 13, 2023.
35 The United States designated the Al Ashtar Brigades as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and a Specially
Designated Global Terrorist in 2018.
36 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “U.S. Targets Al-Ashtar Brigades Operatives,” March 12, 2024.
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Israel
On September 16, 2020, Israel and Bahrain signed the Declaration of Peace, Cooperation, and
Constructive Diplomatic and Friendly Relations, a diplomatic normalization agreement
commonly referred to as one of the “Abraham Accords.”37 For the next three years, Israel and
Bahrain slowly advanced bilateral relations. In February 2022, Bahrain signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) with Israel on security cooperation.38 In September 2023, Israel
inaugurated a new embassy in the capital Manama, and foreign ministers from both countries
agreed to cooperate to increase the number of direct flights, tourism, trade volume, and
investments.39
However, the Hamas-led October 7, 2023 attack against Israel and Israel’s ensuing counter-attack
in Gaza have largely disrupted momentum toward closer Israeli-Bahrain ties. As conflict
continues not only in Gaza, but in the wider Middle East region between Iran-supported groups
and the United States, the Bahraini government appears to be in a difficult position; it is
attempting to retain relations with Israel while avoiding antagonizing the Bahraini public, which
is largely supportive of the Palestinians.40 In November 2023, the Crown Prince “unequivocally”
condemned Hamas, but also called the situation in Gaza “intolerable.”41 Also in November 2023,
Bahrain’s lower house of parliament (which has no authority over foreign policy) announced that
the ambassadors of Bahrain and Israel had each left the other’s country.42 Israel immediately
claimed that relations were stable and that it had received no official demarche from Bahrain
recalling its ambassador.43 Since October 2023, there have been periodic protests in Bahrain in
support of the plight of the Palestinian in Gaza; at times, the government has granted licenses for
public marches, perhaps in order to provide a safety valve for the expression of discontent over
the war.44
Yemen
Since Saudi Arabia led an international coalition to intervene in Yemen’s civil war, Bahrain has
participated in the coalition and has suffered several notable losses. In 2015, five Bahraini
soldiers were killed along the Saudi-Yemeni border while on patrol. Several months later, a
Bahraini F-16 fighter crashed near the Saudi-Yemeni border. In September 2023, a Houthi drone
strike near the Saudi-Yemeni border killed five additional Bahraini soldiers. In December 2023,
in response to Houthi attacks against commercial shipping, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command
(NAVCENT) launched Operation Prosperity Guardian, a 22-nation coalition aimed at protecting
maritime commerce in the Red Sea. Bahrain, where NAVCENT is headquartered, is the only Arab
member of the coalition. U.S. military statements have repeatedly noted how Bahrain has

37U.S. Department of State, “The Abraham Accords,” accessed February 16, 2023.
38 Rina Bassist, “Israel Signs Security Cooperation Agreement with Bahrain,” Al Monitor, February 3, 2022.
39 “Israel Opens Embassy in Bahrain Three Years After Historic Abraham Accords,” Reuters, September 4, 2023.
40 “Bahrain seeks to balance anger over Gaza with ties to Israel, US,” Reuters, November 24, 2023.
41 “Bahrain leader condemns Hamas Oct. 7onslaught, calls for release of hostages,” Times of Israel, November 20,
2023.
42 “Will America pull the plug on Israel’s invasion of Gaza?” The Economist, November 7, 2023.
43 “Bahrain says envoy to Israel returned home, Israel says ties stable,” Reuters, November 2, 2023.
44 Susannah George, “Gaza war complicates U.S. efforts to normalize Arab relations with Israel,” Washington Post,
November 29, 2023.
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supported U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) forces in conducting air strikes against Houthi
targets.45
U.S. Relations
U.S. Defense Presence in Bahrain
A hallmark of the U.S.-Bahrain relationship is U.S. access to Bahrain’s naval facilities. The
United States has had a U.S. naval command presence in Bahrain since 1948: MIDEASTFOR
(U.S. Middle East Force); its successor, NAVCENT; and the U.S. Fifth Fleet (reconstituted in
1995), have been headquartered at a sprawling facility called “Naval Support Activity (NSA)-
Bahrain,” identified as the only permanent U.S. military base in the region. Also headquartered at
NSA are the forward-deployed U.S. Marine Corps 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and Marine
Positioning Force, and the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Arabian Peninsula. The Khalifa
bin Salman Port is one of the few facilities in the Gulf that accommodates U.S. aircraft carriers
and amphibious ships.46
Naval Support Activity Bahrain
NSA Bahrain, the Navy port in Manama, Bahrain, is the headquarters of the U.S. Navy’s 5th fleet, which oversees
all Navy operation in the U.S. Central Command region. According to the Department of Defense, the U.S. 5th
Fleet includes 8,000 American personnel and families.47 Bahrain is the only country in the U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) region to host military spouses and families.”48 In FY2023, the U.S. Department of Defense
estimated that it would spend $539.5 mil ion on personnel, operations, maintenance, and family housing costs for
U.S. personnel stationed in Bahrain.49 The U.S. Navy has homeported several ships—most of them smaller
vessels—at Manama, Bahrain for many years. Navy ships homeported at Manama as of December 2022, included
one Expeditionary Support Base (ESB) ship, four mine countermeasures ships (MCMs), and one fleet tug (TATF).50
The USS Lewis B. Puller ESB-3 ship in Bahrain is designed as an afloat forward staging base. Its hul design is based
on an oil tanker and it includes a flight deck that can accommodate large helicopters. It is designed for use to
support Special Operations missions in littoral regions. In addition to the Navy ships, six of the Coast Guard’s Fast
Response Cutters (FRCs), which are large patrol craft, are stationed in Bahrain.51 Patrol Forces Southwest Asia
(PATFORSWA), which is stationed in Bahrain, is the Coast Guard's largest unit outside of the United States.
As part of the U.S.-led coalition that ousted Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, Bahrain hosted U.S. troops
and combat aircraft that participated in the 1991 Desert Storm offensive against Iraqi forces.
Bahraini pilots flew strikes during the war, and Iraq fired nine Scud missiles at Bahrain, hitting
three facilities. After that war, Bahrain and the United States institutionalized their defense

45 U.S. Department of Defense, “U.S. Forces, Allies Conduct Joint Strikes in Yemen,” February 26, 2024.
46 Ibid.
47 U.S. Department of Defense, “His Majesty the King of Bahrain Visits U.S. 5th Fleet Headquarters,” April 17, 2023.
48 The White House, FACT SHEET: Biden-⁠Harris Administration Strengthens Partnership with Kingdom of Bahrain
and Launches “Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement,” September 13, 2023.
49 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer,
Defense Operation & Maintenance Overview Book, Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request, May 2023. Overseas costs are
funded by the following appropriations: Military Personnel; Operation and Maintenance; Family Housing Operation
and Maintenance; Family Housing Construction; and Military Construction to support all DoD activities located
outside the United States that are being performed on a permanent basis at U.S. military bases and other locations (U.S.
Embassy, U.S. Consulates, U.S. Mission, etc.). Overseas costs also include the cost of transporting personnel, material,
and equipment to and from overseas locations. The overseas amounts do not include incremental costs associated with
contingency operations.
50 Navy ship location data current as of the end of FY2022; information provided to CRS by the U.S. Navy.
51 See CRS Report R42567, Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress.
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relationship by signing a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) on October 28, 1991. It was
renewed in 2017 for 15 years.52 Under the DCA, Bahrain provides access, basing, and overflight
privileges to facilitate U.S. regional military operations.53 Since 1971, the United States and
Bahrain have maintained a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which grants the U.S.
government criminal jurisdiction over U.S. armed forces members stationed in Bahrain; the
SOFA grants the Bahraini government civil jurisdiction over U.S. forces, “except for those
matters arising in the course of the performance of their official duties.”54
2023 U.S.-Bahraini Cooperation Agreement
In September 2023, during Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa’s visit to Washington,
D.C., the United States and Bahrain signed a new bilateral agreement called the “Comprehensive
Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA).55 The C-SIPA, which is not formally a
treaty and therefore requires congressional notification but not approval, addresses defense, trade,
and scientific-technical cooperation. While the C-SIPA reaffirms robust and ongoing U.S.-
Bahraini defense and trade cooperation, for the first time, it formally commits both sides, subject
to further agreement, to share digital network security standards in order to prevent inappropriate
access to sensitive information on a party’s digital information and communications network.
According to one assessment, the C-SIPA “codifies a U.S. commitment to support the growth of
Bahrain's technology sector … intended from a US perspective to limit Chinese involvement in
the region’s technology architecture.”56
During the signing of the C-SIPA, U.S. officials highlighted other aspects of the bilateral
relationship with Bahrain, including:
• Human Rights. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken highlighted that
“Bahrain continues to make important headway” in combating trafficking in
persons.57 In Congress, however, Senator Chris Murphy met with Bahraini
Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid al Zayani and expressed concern
regarding the imprisonment of prisoners of conscience, including Abdulhadi al
Khawaja, a Bahraini human rights activist who was imprisoned during the 2011
uprising.58
• Commercial Air Flights. During the Crown Prince’s visit, the United States and
Bahrain agreed to relaunch direct flights between the United States and Bahrain
in 2024.59
The United States and Bahrain signed the C-SIPA at a time of reportedly intense U.S.-Saudi
diplomacy aimed at potentially expanding the Abraham Accords and, at the time, U.S. officials

52 “US, Bahrain Extend Defense Cooperation for 15 Years.” Al Defaiya, April 12, 2017.
53 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Security Cooperation with Bahrain, Fact Sheet, June 14, 2021.
54 See, 1971: Agreement for the Deployment in Bahrain of the United States Middle East Force (22 U.S.T. 2184) -
modified by 1975 agreement for the Deployment in Bahrain of the United States Middle East Force (26 U.S.T. 3027)
and 1977 agreement on the Status of Administrative Support Unit Personnel (28 U.S.T. 5312) 1991: Agreement
concerning the deployment of United States forces (T.I.A.S. 12236).
55 U.S. Department of State, “Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement,” September 13, 2023.
The C-SIPA entered into force on October 20, 2023.
56 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Bahrain and US sign symbolic security pact,” September 19, 2023.
57 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Bahraini Crown Prince and Prime Minister Salman bin
Hamad Al Khalifa at a Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement Signing Ceremony,” September 13, 2023.
58 Senator Chris Murphy, “Murphy Statement on Meeting with Foreign Minister of Bahrain,” September 13, 2023.
59 The White House, FACT SHEET: Biden-⁠Harris Administration Strengthens Partnership, September 13, 2023.
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appeared to be touting the C-SPIA as a potential model for additional agreements with other U.S.
partners.60 The deal did not contain a formal mutual defense guarantee, but rather commits the
parties to consult on defense and security threats. Saudi Arabia reportedly has sought a security
guarantee from the United States. After the October 7 Hamas attacks against Israel and ensuing
Israeli military operations in Gaza, the possibility of Saudi normalization with Israel has become
more overtly linked to Saudi requirements for steps related to the Palestinians. Nevertheless, U.S.
officials have maintained the significance of the C-SIPA for U.S.-Bahraini relations in public
statements, and may inform U.S. decisions in seeking a comprehensive multilateral post-war
peace agreement to end the fighting in Gaza.61
Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)
NSA-Bahrain also hosts and coordinates the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) partnership (see
Figure 4 below), which brings together naval forces from 41 countries to operate a series of task
forces (currently five) that target threats to maritime security in waters near the Arabian
Peninsula. U.S.-Bahrain naval cooperation reportedly helped facilitate Bahrain’s August 2019
decision to join and headquarter a U.S.-led maritime security operation (“International Maritime
Security Construct,” IMSC, formerly called “Operation Sentinel”) to secure the Gulf against
Iranian attacks on commercial shipping.62

60 Karen DeYoung, “U.S. pact with Bahrain seen as model for strengthening Persian Gulf ties,” Washington Post,
September 13, 2023.
61 The White House, “Readout of Vice President Harris’s Call with Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa of
Bahrain,” November 6, 2023.
62 Rebecca Kheel, “Bahrain Joins U.S.-led Coalition to Protect Gulf Shipping,” thehill.com, August 19, 2019.
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Figure 4. Combined Maritime Forces

Source: NAVCENT
CMF, which was formed in 2001, counters piracy and bolsters maritime security across a vast
area stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Suez Canal (over 4,300 miles of coastline). In order
to counter weapons and drug trafficking in the Gulf of Oman, U.S. Naval forces, in conjunction
with regional partners in the CENTCOM AOR, patrol coastal waters and routinely interdict
suspected smuggling operations. In 2023 and 2024, CMF reported several large drug (heroin,
hashish) and weapons (rifles, explosives, and ammunition rounds) seizures in the Gulf of Oman
and nearby waters.63
The Biden Administration has reemphasized U.S. support for Bahrain’s defense. During their
2023 U.S.-Bahrain Strategic Dialogue, the United States and Bahrain “reiterated their shared
commitment to deterring and confronting threats to the Kingdom of Bahrain and enhancing
regional peace and security.”64 On an annual basis, the United States military and Bahrain
Defense Forces conduct a maritime exercise known as “Diamond Defender” designed to enhance

63 For examples of drug seizures, see U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs, “U.S. Coast Guard Seizes
$30 Million in Drugs with International Task Force,” May 8, 2023, “U.S. Seizes $80 Million Heroin Shipment in Gulf
of Oman,” May 10, 2023, “French Warship Seizes $108 Million in Drugs during Indian Ocean Seizures,” May 24,
2023, “French-led Combined Task Force 150 seized more illegal narcotics in the Arabian Sea,” September 20, 2023,
and “First Drug Interdiction of the Year for CMF French-led Combined Task Force 150,” January 8, 2024. For
examples of weapons seizures, see USCENTCOM, “CENTCOM Forces Intercept More than 2,000 Assault Rifles
Shipped from Iran,” January 10, 2023, and “U.S. Central Command Supports Partner Forces in Major Iranian Weapons
Seizure,” February 1, 2023.
64 U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement on the U.S.-Bahrain Strategic Dialogue,” July 21, 2023.
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regional maritime security and stability. In February 2024, CENTCOM commander General
Michael Kurilla visited Bahrain to discuss various issues with his Bahraini counterparts,
including the implementation of C-SIPA. He also thanked Bahrain for supporting operations to
protect freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.65 The Royal Bahraini Air Force is expected to
receive its first batch of upgraded F-16 Block 70 aircraft this year (see below).
As the Biden Administration works to integrate the naval capabilities of the United States with
GCC partner navies, Bahrain has become an operational hub for new U.S. naval technologies
aimed at increasing domain awareness in the Persian Gulf. In 2021, NAVCENT established Task
Force 59, which aims to use artificial intelligence technology in directing a fleet of Unmanned
Surface Vessels (USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) in the CENTCOM AOR.66
The Royal Bahrain Naval Force, in conjunction with U.S. and other international forces, has
already participated in maritime exercises which combine manned and unmanned vessels
working together to patrol the Persian Gulf.67
Figure 5. Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa visits NAVCENT

Source: U.S. 5th Fleet Public Affairs, March 4, 2020.
U.S. Arms Sales and Foreign Assistance to Bahrain
The Bahrain Defense Force (BDF)—Bahrain’s regular military force—has about 10,000 active
duty personnel, including Bahraini Air Force and Navy personnel. There are another 2,000

65 USCENTCOM, “CENTCOM Commander Visits Regional Partners,” February 9, 2024.
66 U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs, NAVCENT Expands Unmanned Integration, Operates
Saildrone in Arabian Gulf, January 27, 2022.
67 U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Posture of United States Central Command and United States
Africa Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for FY2024 and the Future Years Defense Program,
118th Congress, 1st sess., March 16, 2023.
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personnel in Bahrain’s National Guard—a unit that is separate from both the BDF and the
Ministry of Interior. Bahrain’s small national budget allows for modest amounts of national funds
to be used for purchases of U.S. major combat systems, offset partly by U.S. security assistance
credits. As previously mentioned, the Bahraini government’s response to the 2011 political unrest
caused the Obama Administration to put on hold U.S. sales to Bahrain of arms that could easily
be used against protesters, such as High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV; alt:
Humvee), until Bahrain had met U.S. conditions for improving its human rights record.68 The
Trump Administration maintained restrictions on security cooperation with Bahrain’s Interior
Ministry, which supervises Bahrain’s internal security forces, while dropping conditions or holds
on sales of most major combat systems, including F-16s.69 The Biden Administration has not
announced any policy changes on cooperation with Bahrain’s internal security agencies; whether
the implementation of C-SIPA would include any internal security measures is unclear.
F-16 Sale to Bahrain
In 1998, Bahrain purchased 22 U.S.-made F-16 Block 40 aircraft. In 2016, the Obama Administration conditioned
the sale of an additional 19 F-16s on an improvement in Bahrain’s human rights record.70 The Trump
Administration dropped that condition, and in September 2017, notified Congress of the possible sale to Bahrain
of 19 F-16s and upgrading of Bahrain’s existing F-16s, at an estimated value of nearly $4 bil ion (if all options would
have been exercised).71 In 2018, Lockheed Martin received a $1.1 bil ion contract to produce 16 F-16 Block 70
fighters for Bahrain to be delivered in four batches of four starting in 2024. Bahrain is to become one of the first
international customers to receive the most advanced F-16 Block 70 variant. In March 2023, Lockheed Martin
rol ed out the first F-16 Block 70 Fighting Falcon for Bahrain at a ceremony at Lockheed Martin’s Greenvil e, South
Carolina F-16 production line.
About 85% of Bahrain’s military equipment is of U.S.-origin. As of January 2021, the United
States has $5.8 billion in active government-to-government sales cases with Bahrain under the
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system, and U.S. agencies perform end-use monitoring of how
Bahrain uses its U.S.-supplied weaponry.72 According to the U.S. Department of State (as of
2021), the United States has provided Bahrain with $22.5 million in Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) since 2014.73 The State Department notes that “U.S. assistance strengthens Bahrain’s
interoperability for regional security and counterterrorism cooperation, boosts Bahrain’s maritime
defenses against smuggling and terrorism, and improves Bahrain’s ability to counter terrorism in
a manner consistent with Bahrain’s international human rights obligations and commitments.”74
Major Non-NATO Ally Designation and Excess Defense Articles
In March 2002, President George W. Bush designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally”
(MNNA) in Presidential Determination 2002-10. The designation qualifies Bahrain to purchase
certain U.S. arms, receive excess defense articles (EDA), and engage in defense research
cooperation with the United States for which it would not otherwise be eligible. Between 2010

68 Statement by Department of State spokesperson John Kirby, “Lifting Holds on Security Assistance to the
Government of Bahrain,” June 29, 2015.
69 “Trump administration drops human rights conditions to sell fighter jets to Bahrain,” The Guardian, March 30, 2017.
70 Anthony Capaccio, “Bahrain’s Lockheed F-16 Buy Said to Come with U.S. Strings,” Bloomberg News, September
30, 2016.
71 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Transmittal numbers 16-60 and 16-59.
72 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Security Cooperation with Bahrain, Fact Sheet, June 14, 2021.
73 Ibid.
74 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Bahrain,” Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, May 11, 2022.
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and 2020, the United States provided Bahrain with $36 million in EDA grant assistance.75 Among
the major military equipment transferred to Bahrain as EDA are armored personnel carriers and
Mark V Special Operations Craft.
U.S. Trade and Investment
To encourage economic reform and signal U.S. appreciation for Bahrain’s security support, the
United States and Bahrain signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on September 14, 2004.
Implementing legislation was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). In 2005, bilateral trade was
about $780 million, and U.S.-Bahrain trade has increased fourfold since (see Figure 6). In 2023,
the total volume of bilateral trade stood at $2.856 billion with the United States running a trade
surplus with Bahrain slightly under $500 million.76 Bahrain’s other major trading partners include
China, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
Figure 6. U.S.-Bahrain Annual Volume of Trade

Source: U.S. Census Bureau. Chart, CRS.
The United States buys very small volumes of oil and petroleum products from Bahrain: 2,000
barrels per day in November 2023, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.77
The major U.S. import from the country is aluminum. In 2019, the United States and Bahrain
signed a memorandum of understanding for a “U.S. Trade Zone,” located on land near the Khalifa
bin Salman Port, to facilitate U.S. direct investment in Bahrain and U.S.-Bahrain trade.78 The first
phase of a buildout of the zone was inaugurated in February 2022.

75 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, EDA Database Tool, accessed on February 14,
2023.
76 U.S. Census Bureau, 2023: U.S. trade in goods with Bahrain, available at https://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/balance/c5250.html.
77 U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Net Imports from Bahrain of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products,
available at https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MTTNT_NUS-NBA_2&f=M.
78 Hudhaifa Ebrahim, “Bahrain Begins Construction of US Trade Zone,” Jerusalem Post, February 24, 2022.
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Recent Legislation
The following is a compilation of legislation in the 118th Congress concerning U.S.-Bahraini
relations:
FY2023 Omnibus: In Division K of the Explanatory Statement accompanying P.L. 117-328, the
FY2023 Omnibus Appropriations Act, lawmakers required the Secretary of State to report to the
Committees on Appropriations “detailing efforts made on behalf of political prisoners in Bahrain
and the Government of Bahrain's response.”
FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA): Section 1229 of P.L. 118-31, the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, requires the Secretary of State to submit
to Congress a review of the legal protections afforded by bilateral agreements between the United
States and Bahrain, amongst other countries. Section 2204 extends a $26.3 million authorization
of Navy Military Construction Funds for U.S. facilities in Bahrain through FY2024. Section 7338
of the Act mandates that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency submit to Congress an
assessment of the “current effects on the intelligence community of the agreements between Israel
and 4 other foreign countries, including Bahrain, collectively known as the Abraham Accords.”

Author Information

Jeremy M. Sharp

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs




Disclaimer
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Congressional Research Service
95-1013 · VERSION 184 · UPDATED
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