Freight Rail Safety Legislation in the 118th
February 6, 2024
Congress
Ben Goldman
The February 3, 2023, train derailment and chemical spill in East Palestine, OH, raised the profile
Analyst in Transportation
of rail safety issues. Railroad labor organizations and some state and local governments have
Policy
voiced concerns about railroad business practices that, in their view, put employees and

communities at unnecessary risk. Railroad companies, meanwhile, have characterized more
stringent safety requirements as unnecessary given the industry’s decades-long record of safety

improvement. Bills introduced in the 118th Congress concern hazardous materials transportation
by rail, derailment prevention, train length, crew size, and blocked crossings, among other issues. Some of the proposed
legislation aligns with indicators that show a decline in rail safety.
Freight rail safety bills in the 118th Congress include the following:
• S. 576 (as introduced and as reported to the Senate)/H.R. 1674, Railway Safety Act of 2023
• H.R. 1633, Reducing Accidents In Locomotives (RAIL) Act of 2023
• H.R. 1238, Decreasing Emergency Railroad Accident Instances Locally (DERAIL) Act of 2023
• S. 1044, Railway Accountability Act of 2023
• H.R. 1347, Don’t Block Our Communities (D-BLOC) Act of 2023
• H.R. 5871, Rail Worker and Community Safety Act of 2023
Hazardous Materials Transportation by Rail
Since 2015, a category of trains known as High Hazard Flammable Trains has been subject to additional federal safety
requirements concerning advance notification of emergency responders, lower maximum speeds, and restrictions on using
older, less crashworthy rail cars. The train that derailed in East Palestine did not qualify as such due to the type and quantity
of cargo it carried. Several legislative proposals would create new designations of trains carrying a greater variety of cargo
types and quantities in order to extend those safety requirements to more trains.
Preventing Derailments
Because the East Palestine derailment was said to be likely caused by a defective wheel bearing that overheated, causing a
wheel and axle to come loose, several legislative proposals have focused on preventing this type of derailment in the future.
Some proposals concern wayside devices known as defect detectors that can identify a bearing in danger of failing; others
involve mandating more rigorous physical inspection of train cars before they depart from a yard or terminal. Train length
has also been identified as a potential factor in some derailments, as the unequal distribution of weight on a long train could
put excessive strain on freight cars and couplers when braking. Several technologies exist that could improve the reliability of
train brakes.
Other Issues
Legislation has been introduced that would create a federal nationwide limit on how long a train may occupy or block a
highway-rail crossing. State and local laws that forbid this practice repeatedly have been found to be preempted by federal
law and unenforceable, even though no federal statute or regulation directly forbids the practice. Other issues under
consideration include labor protections, such as minimum train crew size requirements and compulsory participation in a
Confidential Close Call Reporting System (C3RS) for all railroads.

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Introduction
The February 3, 2023, train derailment and chemical spill in East Palestine, OH, raised the profile
of rail safety issues. Railroad labor organizations and state and local governments have voiced
concerns about railroad business practices that, in their view, put employees and communities at
unnecessary risk. Railroad companies, meanwhile, have characterized more stringent safety
requirements as unnecessary given the industry’s record.1 Bills introduced in the 118th Congress
concern hazardous materials (hazmat) transportation by rail, derailment prevention, train length,
crew size, and blocked crossings, among other issues. Some of the proposed legislation aligns
with indicators that show a decline in rail safety. The bills discussed in this report are as follows:
• S. 576 (as introduced [IS] and as reported to the Senate [RS])/H.R. 1674,
Railway Safety Act of 2023
• H.R. 1633, Reducing Accidents In Locomotives (RAIL) Act of 2023
• H.R. 1238, Decreasing Emergency Railroad Accident Instances Locally
(DERAIL) Act of 2023
• S. 1044, Railway Accountability Act of 2023
• H.R. 1347, Don’t Block Our Communities (D-BLOC) Act of 2023
• H.R. 5871, Rail Worker and Community Safety Act of 2023
Starting in the late 2010s, some railway safety indicators began trending worse after a decades-
long trend of continuous improvement. In 2022, there were 950 fatalities and 6,364 injuries on
America’s railroads.2 Although the number of injuries was the third-lowest in 20 years, the
number of fatalities was the highest in at least that long. Trespassers and road-rail crossing
incidents accounted for the majority of rail fatalities in 2022, and on-duty employees accounted
for roughly half of all injuries. Per-train-mile rates of train incidents have remained comparatively
low, and rates of injuries or fatalities have held steady; grade crossing incident rates have risen
and erased earlier safety gains. Trespassing deaths, in particular, have nearly doubled on a per-
train-mile basis since 2015 after over a decade of stability (see Figure 1).
The number of railroad hazmat spills has remained low, both in comparison to railroad
performance in past years and to other modes; no hazmat-by-rail spill has resulted in a fatality in
over a decade. However, hazmat-by-rail releases tend to result in more damage (as measured in
dollars) per incident than highway or pipeline spills.3

1 See Government Accountability Office, Information on Precision-Scheduled Railroading, GAO-23-105420,
December 2022, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-105420.pdf.
2 U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Office of Safety Analysis, “Ten
Year Accident/Incident Overview,” https://safetydata.fra.dot.gov/OfficeofSafety/publicsite/Query/
TenYearAccidentIncidentOverview.aspx.
3 DOT, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), “10 Year Incident Summary Reports,”
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=
%2Fshared%2FPublic%20Website%20Pages%2F_portal%2F10%20Year%20Incident%20Summary%20Reports.
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Figure 1. Change in Rail Safety Incident Rates, CY2003-CY2022 (Index)
1 = 2003 rate per train-mile

Source: CRS analysis of U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), Federal Railroad Administration (FRA),
Office of Safety Analysis, “Ten Year Accident/Incident Overview,” https://safetydata.fra.dot.gov/OfficeofSafety/
publicsite/Query/TenYearAccidentIncidentOverview.aspx.
Note: Data exclude suicides and suicide attempts.
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), part of the Department of Transportation (DOT),
issues and enforces rail safety regulations. FRA’s authority originates in the Federal Rail Safety
Act of 1970 (FRSA; P.L. 91-458), which gives the agency power to “prescribe regulations and
issue orders for every area of railroad safety […].” Since FRSA became law, the number of
derailments, collisions, and railroad injuries have all decreased by 80%-90%, even as the number
of train-miles operated decreased by 25%.4
Hazardous Materials Transportation by Rail
The East Palestine derailment focused attention on the safety of hazmat moved by rail. According
to the quintennial economic census, hazmat accounted for roughly 7.2% of the total tons hauled
by freight railroads in 2017 and roughly 7.5% of railroad ton-miles.5 These percentages are
closely in line with the two previous censuses, but the volume of hazmat moved by rail has
decreased in raw terms over the 10-year period from 2007 to 2017 (Table 1).

4 DOT, Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), National Transportation Statistics, Table 2-43: Railroad System
Safety and Property Damage Data (excludes highway-rail grade-crossing accidents).
5 U.S. Census Bureau, The 2017 Commodity Flow Survey Final Tables, November 4, 2022, https://www.census.gov/
data/tables/2017/econ/cfs/aff-2017.html.
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Table 1. Volume of Hazardous Materials Transported by Rail in 2007, 2012, and 2017
Year
2007 2012 2017
Hazmat tons by rail (mil ions)
129.7 111.0
90.4
… as % of all freight tons
1.0%
1.0%
0.7%
… as % of all rail tons
7.0%
6.8%
7.2%
Hazmat ton-miles by rail (bil ions)
92.2
84.9
61.7
… as % of all freight ton-miles
2.8%
2.9%
2.0%
… as % of all rail ton-miles
6.9%
7.0%
7.5%
Sources: DOT, Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), “Freight Activity in the United States: 1993, 1997,
2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017,” https://www.bts.gov/content/freight-activity-united-states-1993-1997-2002-and-
2007; BTS, “U.S. Hazardous Materials Shipments by Transportation Mode, 2017,” https://www.bts.gov/content/
us-hazardous-materials-shipments-transportation-mode-2007; and BTS, “Table 1b. Hazardous Material Shipment
Characteristics by Mode of Transportation for the United States: 2012 and 2007,” July 15, 2015,
https://www.bts.gov/archive/publications/commodity_flow_survey/2012/hazardous_materials/table1b.
Notes: Hazmat = hazardous materials. Figures are for the “rail alone” mode only and do not include multimodal
shipments, such as by rail and truck or rail and barge.
Congress and the public have shown increased interest in hazmat-by-rail safety in the past. A
surge of crude oil production in the mid-2010s and a series of high-profile spills led to increased
regulatory scrutiny of the transportation of flammable liquids by rail. Flammable liquids made up
roughly half of all hazmat shipments by rail in 2018.6 Since then, the number of incidents,
incident rate per train-mile, and severity of hazmat releases has remained fairly steady.
Nevertheless, the high-profile nature of the East Palestine derailment and spill has led to calls for
further legislation around hazmat-by-rail safety, in many cases building on crude-by-rail
regulations put in place in 2015.7
High-Hazard Flammable Trains
The 2015 rule created a new official classification for high-hazard flammable trains (HHFTs),
defined as any train carrying 20 or more carloads of Class 3 flammable liquids in a continuous
block or 35 or more carloads of Class 3 flammable liquids in any order throughout the train.8
Under the rule, rail carriers operating HHFTs must complete periodic routing analysis to reduce
risks to populated areas, notify state emergency response commissions of the volume of HHFTs
passing through given areas, and operate at a lower top speed than might otherwise be permitted.
The rail industry had its own voluntary standards at the time of the 2015 rule, known as AAR
Circular OT-55, which apply to a wider set of trains—including all HHFTs—but do not require
proactive local notification.
Certain bills in the 118th Congress contain provisions that would expand the definition of HHFT
or create new classifications that would apply to commodities beyond flammable liquids (a

6 Railway Supply Institute, “Hazmat shipments by class – U.S. and Canada 2018,” at
https://tankcarresourcecenter.com/tankcar101/#1499694206621-d3e6b712-ac21.
7PHMSA, DOT, “Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard
Flammable Trains,” 80 Federal Register 71952, November 18, 2015.
8 49 C.F.R. §171.8. A subset of high-hazard flammable trains (HHFTs), designated high-hazard flammable unit trains
(HHFUTs), is defined as any train carrying 70 or more carloads of Class 3 flammable liquids. These trains were briefly
required to be equipped with electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) braking systems, discussed later in this report.
Class 3 flammable liquids, one of nine classes of hazardous materials, are defined as liquids that give off a flammable
vapor within certain temperature thresholds.
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comparison of these provisions alongside current law and industry standards is in Table 2,
below). As introduced, S. 576/H.R. 1674 would direct FRA to issue new requirements for
hazmat-by-rail shipments not already covered by the HHFT rules. The bill as introduced did not
specify a threshold in terms of the number of loaded cars, which would effectively allow FRA to
establish those thresholds when it issues the new regulations. The version of S. 576 reported by
the Senate Commerce Committee would establish a new category of trains, high-hazard trains
(HHTs), which would include some trains carrying hazmat other than flammable liquids. HHTs
would be held to a set of requirements similar to those applicable to HHFTs.
Table 2. Current and Proposed High-Hazard Train Categories
S. 576 (IS)/
AAR Circular
H.R. 1674/

Current Law
OT-55
H.R. 1633
S. 576 (RS)
Designation
High-Hazard
Key Train
n/a
High-Hazard Train
Flammable Train
(HHT)
(HHFT)
Threshold
35+ carloads of
20+ carloads or
Hazmat other than
20+ carloads of
any Class 3
intermodal portable
HHFTs
flammable liquid; or
flammable liquid;
tank loads of any
1+ carload of Poison
or
combination of
or Toxic Inhalation
20+ carloads of
hazardous materials
Hazard (PIH or
any Class 3
(hazmat); or
TIH), Spent Nuclear
flammable liquid in
1+ carload of Poison
Fuel (SNF), High-
a continuous block or Toxic Inhalation
Level Radioactive
of cars
Hazard (PIH or TIH)
Waste (HLRW); or
(Hazard Zone A, B,
10+ carloads of
C, or D), anhydrous
explosives; or
ammonia (UN1005),
ammonia solutions
5+ carloads of
(UN3318), Spent
flammable gas; or
Nuclear Fuel (SNF),
20+ combined
or High-Level
carloads of
Radioactive Waste
flammable liquid,
(HLRW)
flammable gas,
and/or explosives
Local
Routing analysis
n/a
Advance notice of
Availability of real-
Notification
Disclosures to
hazmat shipments to
time train consist
state/tribal
state/tribal emergency
information
emergency
response commissions,
Disclosures to state
response
including a written gas
emergency response
commissions
discharge plan
commissions
Emergency response
plans
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S. 576 (IS)/
AAR Circular
H.R. 1674/

Current Law
OT-55
H.R. 1633
S. 576 (RS)
Maximum
50 miles per hour
50 mph
As determined to be
50 mph
Speed
(mph)
30 mph if a wayside
necessary by the
40 mph in high-
40 mph in high-
detector reports a
Secretary of
threat urban areas*
threat urban
defective bearing,
Transportation
if carrying 20+
areas* unless all
until next detector
carloads of
tank cars meet or
or mechanical
flammable liquids,
exceed
inspection
unless all tank cars
Department of
meet or exceed
Transportation
DOT-
(DOT)-
117/117P/117R
117/117P/117R
standards
standards
Other
Brakes must use a
Sidings and auxiliary
Reduce or eliminate
n/a
Requirements two-way end-of-
tracks must meet
blocked crossings
train device or
Federal Railroad
Additional requirements
distributed power
Administration Class
regarding train length

2 standards (able to
and weight; train
support 25 mph) or
consist; route analysis
better
and selection; track
Cars must be
standards; track, bridge,
equipped with rol er
and rail car
bearings
maintenance; signaling
and train control;
response plans; and any
other requirements that
the Secretary
determines necessary
Source: Ful text for indicated bil (s) on Congress.gov, https://www.congress.gov/.
Notes: IS = introduced in Senate; RS = reported to Senate; n/a = not applicable; AAR = Association of
American Railroads.
* High threat urban areas (HTUAs), as designated by the Transportation Security Administration based on
various risk factors, consist of a city limit or combined adjacent city limits plus a 10-mile buffer zone extending
from the city border(s). For the ful list of HTUAs, see Appendix A to 49 C.F.R. Part 1580, https://www.ecfr.gov/
current/title-49/subtitle-B/chapter-XII/subchapter-D/part-1580/appendix-Appendix%20A%20to%20Part%201580.
Tank Car Crashworthiness
Section 7304 of the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act of 2015 (FAST Act; P.L. 114-
94) mandated a commodity-specific phaseout of older tank cars used to transport Class 3
flammable liquids. Under the corresponding regulations issued by DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), certain commodities and certain older tank car
specifications were to be phased out faster than others. PHMSA assigned the most aggressive
deadlines to crude oil (all tank cars are required to meet the newest specifications by May 1,
2025); other types of flammable liquid can be transported in older specifications of tank cars until
May 1, 2029, with the possibility of extensions into 2031 if the Secretary of Transportation were
to find that shop capacity is insufficient to retrofit old cars or manufacture new ones in time.
Newer cars have thicker shells and other features that make them less likely to rupture. These
requirements apply only to unpressurized tank cars that carry flammable liquids; flammable gas
of the type that was vented and burned in East Palestine is transported in pressurized tank cars
that are required to be equipped with more robust crashworthiness features.
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A 2023 report from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics found that most crude oil and ethanol
cars are in compliance with FAST Act mandates, but a majority of cars used to carry other
flammable liquids are not (Figure 2).
Figure 2. FAST Act Compliant and Noncompliant Tank Cars Operating, 2018-2022
Color-coded by statutory phaseout date

Source: DOT, BTS (special analysis based on data provided by the Association of American Railroads), Fleet
Composition of Rail Tank Cars Carrying Flammable Liquids: 2023 Report, https://www.bts.gov/sites/bts.dot.gov/files/
2023-09/BTS_Tank_Car_Report_To_Congress_9_13_2023.pdf.
Several cars in the East Palestine train were (lawfully) carrying flammable liquids in tank cars
built to specifications that are to be phased out, and some of these cars ruptured and spilled their
contents. As introduced, the Railway Safety Act of 2023 would accelerate the phaseout date for
all non-ethanol, non-crude cars from May 1, 2029, to May 1, 2025. The version approved by the
Senate Commerce Committee would accelerate that phaseout process to December 31, 2027, with
the possibility of a one-year extension similar to existing law. A similar bill (H.R. 1633) would
accelerate the phaseout date by a single year to May 1, 2028 (Table 3). The updated deadline
would affect some 25,000 tank cars currently in service.
Table 3. Current and Proposed Tank Car Phaseout Deadlines
For DOT-111 and CPC-1232 tank cars carrying flammable liquids in Packing Group II/III
Current Law S.576 (IS) S.576 (RS) H.R. 1633
5/1/2029**
5/1/2025
12/31/2027* 5/1/2028
Source: Ful text for indicated bil (s) on Congress.gov, https://www.congress.gov/.
Notes: Packing Group II/III refers to a subset of flammable liquids other than crude oil or ethanol. Deadlines for
phasing out DOT-111 or CPC-1232 tank cars carrying crude oil, ethanol, or other flammable liquids in Packing
Group I have passed or would remain unchanged. If the Secretary finds that a shortage of capacity exists for
retrofit or replacement of noncompliant tank cars, an extension may be granted for one (*) or two (**) years.
Train Braking
Trains generally use compressed air to lift brakes away from train wheels while a train is in
motion. When pressure in the main compressed air hose drops (whether commanded by the train
driver or in a derailment), the brakes will engage. On a long train, this loss of air pressure can
take several seconds to reach cars at the far end(s). This is one reason why, as noted in Table 2
under “Other Requirements,” HHFTs are required to be equipped with a device capable of
engaging the brakes from the rear of the train as well as the front. A provision of S. 1044 would
require FRA to update its regulations to require more frequent communication between
locomotives and end-of-train devices. A provision of S. 576, as reported, would instead direct the
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Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) to review those regulations and submit
recommendations if it were found that requiring more frequent communication would improve
safety during braking.
Another technology, electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) braking, uses electrical signals
instead of air pressure to engage brakes simultaneously, potentially reducing the distance needed
to fully stop a moving train and reducing the “in-train” forces caused by some cars braking before
others. Longer trains may be more susceptible to dangerous in-train forces due to being heavy and
in situations when one part of the train might be moving uphill and decelerating while another
part of the same train might be moving downhill and accelerating.
Opposition to ECP brakes in freight rail service generally stems from costs associated with
implementation, especially the transition from compressed air brakes to ECP brakes. For any car
equipped with ECP brakes to function properly, all locomotives and cars on the train must also be
equipped with ECP brakes. Because railroads regularly interchange railcars between and among
themselves and railcars can have relatively long service lives, all railcars would either need to be
retrofitted to work with ECP brakes or traditional compressed air brakes to function properly.
Once the entire railcar fleet is ECP-equipped, traditional air brakes can be phased out without
affecting the ability to interchange cars.
In their 2015 crude-by-rail safety rulemaking, PHMSA and FRA initially required all HHFUTs to
be equipped with ECP brakes. HHFUTs generally shuttle loads between one point of origin and
one destination without transferring cars to other trains, which could make ECP implementation
more straightforward. However, later in 2015, a provision in Section 7311 of the FAST Act (P.L.
114-94) required DOT to conduct additional testing and analysis of the costs and benefits of the
ECP brake rule. When the rule’s costs were found to exceed its benefits, the ECP requirement was
removed in 2018 in fulfillment of the FAST Act provision.9
Emergency Response Training
State or local emergency services are usually the first to respond to a hazmat release.10 Local first
responders may not know exactly what hazmat release to prepare for until it occurs, as railroads
generally do not share specific information about the contents and schedules of individual freight
trains with the communities along their routes. PHMSA has several emergency response planning
and training grant programs authorized under 49 U.S.C. §5116. One such program, the Alert
Grant Program authorized under Section 5116(j), is specifically worded to support the creation of
training materials for responding to railroad chemical and oil spills. These grants are generally
issued from a fund that holds fees and fines collected by PHMSA; several bills introduced in the
118th Congress would add or increase those fees to make more such grant funding available.
Section 7302 of the FAST Act originally directed FRA to issue regulations requiring Class I
railroads transporting hazmat to generate accurate, real-time information about the train’s
contents for distribution to first responders in case of an emergency within a year of enactment
(i.e., December 2016).11 Section 26003 of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021

9 PHMSA, DOT, “Hazardous Materials: Removal of Electronically Controlled Pneumatic Brake System Requirements
for High Hazard Flammable Unit Trains,” 83 Federal Register 48393, September 25, 2018,
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/09/25/2018-20647/hazardous-materials-removal-of-electronically-
controlled-pneumatic-brake-system-requirements-for.
10 For the federal role in responding to oil and chemical spills, see CRS Report R43251, Oil and Chemical Spills:
Federal Emergency Response Framework, by David M. Bearden and Jonathan L. Ramseur.
11 The largest freight rail carriers, as measured by operating revenue, are termed “Class I” railroads. These railroads
(continued...)
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(IIJA; P.L. 117-58) later extended this deadline to December 5, 2022, and PHMSA published a
notice of proposed rulemaking in June 2023.12 Since 2014, the Association of American Railroads
(AAR), the International Association of Fire Chiefs, the Operation Respond Institute, and others
have voluntarily maintained an app-based system, AskRail, which satisfies some—but not all—of
the real-time information requirements in the FAST Act.
Prevention of Train Derailments
Derailments account for roughly two-thirds of rail safety incidents (not including grade crossing
incidents). In raw terms and on a per-train-mile basis, most derailments tend to occur on yard,
siding, or industry tracks, as opposed to occurrences on main line tracks like in the East Palestine
derailment. (See Table 4, below.)
Table 4. Number of Derailments and Other Rail Safety Incidents, Excluding Grade
Crossing Incidents, 2013-2022

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Derailments
1,311 1,322 1,351 1,213 1,273 1,376 1,340 1,115 1,093 1,174
On main line tracks
399
361
325
275
336
320
342
312
295
284
On yard, siding, or
919
970 1,032
946
945 1,063 1,003
806
808
892
industrial tracks
Other Incidents
541
563
577
511
514
621
656
556
559
581
Source: CRS analysis of DOT, FRA, “Accident Data as reported by Railroads,” form 6180.54,
https://safetydata.fra.dot.gov/OfficeofSafety/publicsite/on_the_fly_download.aspx.
Note: On- and off-mainline derailments may add to more than total derailments due to cases where multiple
reports were filed for the same incident.
The rate of train derailments, measured in derailments per 100 million train-miles, decreased by
roughly 30%-40% between 2004 and 2010 and has remained relatively steady since then (Figure
3). This is far below the historical high, as the derailment rate in 1980 was over four times higher
than in 2022.13 The rate of derailments per train-mile has tended to increase or decrease in close
proportion to the change in the overall number of derailments. However, those two figures began
diverging around 2020, when both the number of train-miles and derailments fell (likely due to
changes in traffic volume during the Coronavirus Disease 2019 [COVID-19] pandemic), and the
derailment rate per train-mile did not.

own roughly two-thirds of the country’s railroad tracks and account for over 90% of industry revenue. As of the
publication of this report, six Class I railroads serve the United States: Union Pacific, BNSF Railway, Norfolk
Southern, CSX Transportation, Canadian National, and Canadian Pacific Kansas City. Since 2021, a Class I railroad
has been defined as one with operating revenues exceeding $900 million in 2019 dollars. See Surface Transportation
Board, “Surface Transportation Board Adopts Final Rule Amending Thresholds for Classifying Rail Carriers,” press
release, April 5, 2021, https://www.stb.gov/news-communications/latest-news/pr-21-16/.
12 PHMSA, DOT, “Hazardous Materials: FAST Act Requirements for Real-Time Train Consist Information,” 88
Federal Register 41541, June 27, 2023, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/06/27/2023-13467/
hazardous-materials-fast-act-requirements-for-real-time-train-consist-information.
13 CRS analysis of DOT, BTS, Table 2-41: Train Fatalities, Injuries, and Accidents by Type of Accident,
https://www.bts.gov/archive/publications/national_transportation_statistics/table_02_41; and DOT, BTS, Table 2-43:
Railroad System Safety and Property Damage Data (Excludes highway-rail grade-crossing accidents),
https://www.bts.gov/archive/publications/national_transportation_statistics/table_02_43.
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Figure 3. Change in Derailments, Train-Miles, and Derailment Rate per Train-Mile,
CY2003-CY2022 (Index)
1 = 2003 value

Source: CRS analysis of DOT, FRA, Office of Safety Analysis, “Ten Year Accident/Incident Overview,”
https://safetydata.fra.dot.gov/OfficeofSafety/publicsite/Query/TenYearAccidentIncidentOverview.aspx.
An increase in the overall derailment rate since 2014 appears to be driven largely by derailments
on yard, siding, or industrial tracks, as the rate of all derailments on mainline tracks—such as the
East Palestine derailment—has remained close to or below 2013 levels (Figure 4).
Figure 4. Change in Derailment Rate per Train-Mile by Track Type, CY2013-CY2022
(Index)
1 = 2013 value

Source: CRS analysis of DOT, FRA, Office of Safety Analysis, “Accident Data as reported by Railroads,” form
6180.54, https://safetydata.fra.dot.gov/OfficeofSafety/publicsite/on_the_fly_download.aspx; and DOT, FRA, Office
of Safety Analysis, “Ten Year Accident/Incident Overview,” https://safetydata.fra.dot.gov/OfficeofSafety/publicsite/
Query/TenYearAccidentIncidentOverview.aspx.
Note: Mainline and non-mainline derailment rates calculated using mainline and non-mainline train-miles,
respectively.
As discussed below, several legislative proposals have come before Congress with the aim of
reducing the risk of derailments. Some of these proposals aim to prevent derailments from
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occurring, such as by requiring trackside detectors that can identify damaged equipment before it
fails or additional inspections before a train can clear a yard. These requirements would primarily
affect derailments on mainline track, which is not where most derailments occur. Other proposals,
such as increased civil penalties for safety violations, are intended to affect all aspects of train
operations.
Wayside Defect Detectors
Axle failure is a relatively common cause of derailments. According to the National
Transportation Safety Board’s preliminary findings, a wheel bearing on one of the East Palestine
train’s freight cars was overheating, which may have led to the failure of one of the car’s axles.14
One analysis of Class I freight derailments on mainline track from 2006 to 2015 indicated that
defects in railcar wheels or axles were the second-leading cause of derailments, after track
defects.15
Railroads use sensors alongside the tracks called wayside bearing failure detectors, or “hot box”
detectors, to identify overheating bearings and address them before axle failure and resulting
derailments occur. If a detector locates an overheating bearing, it transmits a message to the
locomotive engineer, who can then slow the train to a safer speed or stop it to conduct a visual
inspection. Other sensors can detect cracked wheels or dragging equipment or can identify
defective bearings acoustically instead of by temperature. Federal regulations do not currently
require the use of wayside defect detectors or specify temperature thresholds for inspection or
removal of cars with overheating bearings. However, FRA has published guidance concerning
their placement and use.16 AAR publishes its own industry standards, one of which—AAR
Circular OT-55—calls for wayside detectors along tracks used by trains deemed particularly
hazardous (so-called “key trains”) or along tracks that carry large quantities of hazmat on an
annual basis (“key routes”).
Several bills introduced in the 118th Congress would require certain lines to be equipped with
defect detectors at prescribed intervals (Table 5). However, the number of defect detectors is not
the only factor in preventing derailments due to axle failure. Before reaching East Palestine, the
train that derailed passed several detectors measuring an increase in the bearing’s temperature
above normal levels but not above thresholds set by Norfolk Southern that would have required
stopping the train for inspection. A detector in East Palestine itself showed the bearing had risen
above a “critical” temperature threshold, requiring the car to be removed from the train; by then it
was too late to stop the train before it derailed.17
Table 5. Current and Proposed Hot Bearing Detector Requirements
Bill
Bearing Detector Frequency
AAR Circular OT-55
Every 40 miles on “Key Routes”*

14 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Norfolk Southern Railway Train Derailment with Subsequent
Hazardous Material Release and Fires, preliminary report RRD23MR005, February 23, 2023, https://www.ntsb.gov/
investigations/Documents/RRD23MR005%20East%20Palestine%20OH%20Prelim.pdf (hereinafter NTSB preliminary
report, February 2023).
15 Brandon Z. Wang, Christopher P.L. Barkan, and M. Rapik Saat, “Quantitative Analysis of Changes in Freight Train
Derailment Causes and Rates,” Journal of Transportation Engineering, Part A: Systems, vol. 146, no. 11 (November
2020). The study indicates that mainline freight derailments for U.S. Class I railroads declined 49% from 2006 to 2015.
16 DOT, FRA, An Implementation Guide for Wayside Detector Systems, May 2019, https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/
fra.dot.gov/files/fra_net/18667/Wayside%20Detector%20Implementation%20Guide.pdf.
17 NTSB preliminary report, February 2023.
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Bill
Bearing Detector Frequency
S. 576 (IS)/H.R. 1674
Every 10 miles on routes used by trains carrying hazardous materials (hazmat)
S. 576 (RS)
Every 20 miles on main lines** equipped with acoustic bearing detectors or similar
technology;
Every 15 miles on main lines** not equipped with acoustic bearing detectors or similar
technology; and
At least 10 miles before entering any urbanized area with a population of at least 75,000
OR
An alternative detection plan approved by the Secretary, subject to review at least
triennially
H.R. 1633
Every 10 miles on routes used by trains carrying hazmat
Placards on hazmat cars must withstand temperatures of 180 degrees.***
H.R. 5871
No minimum interval stipulated, but the Secretary is directed to include frequency of
detector placement in new regulations.
Source: Ful text for indicated bil (s) on Congress.gov, https://www.congress.gov/.
Notes: IS = introduced in Senate; RS = reported to Senate; AAR = Association of American Railroads.
S. 576 (RS) would authorize the appropriation of “such amounts as may be necessary” to be distributed by
formula to eligible commuter rail authorities in proportion to the number of detectors required for compliance
but would make no funding directly available to freight railroads.
* AAR Circular OT-55 defines “Key Routes” as any track with a combination of 10,000 carloads or intermodal
portable tank loads of hazmat, or a combination of 4,000 car loadings of PIH or TIH (Hazard zone A, B, C, or D),
anhydrous ammonia, flammable gas, Class 1.1 or 1.2 explosives, environmentally sensitive chemicals, Spent
Nuclear Fuel (SNF), and High-Level Radioactive Waste (HLRW) over a period of one year.
** S. 576 (RS) defines “main line” as any segment or route of railroad tracks with over 5 mil ion annual gross
tons of railroad traffic and a maximum allowable speed greater than 25 miles per hour (FRA Class 3 track or
higher) and any intercity or commuter passenger rail line over which high-hazard trains (HHTs) operate.
*** This provision is grouped with defect detector requirements in the bil text but is more closely related to
tank car safety standards.
Railcar Inspections and Inspector Qualifications
The danger of a defective bearing can be mitigated if the defect is found before a train departs
from its yard or terminal. FRA regulations require that “[a]t each location where a freight car is
placed in a train, the freight car shall be inspected before the train departs. This inspection may be
made before or after the car is placed in the train.”18 These inspections are conducted by railroad
employees who have satisfied the qualification requirements established by the railroads pursuant
to federal standards and guidelines.19 Some rail labor organizations have argued that reductions in
the railroad workforce, combined with aggressive performance targets, have resulted in
unrealistic workloads for certain personnel. This could in turn incentivize rushed inspections,
fewer removals of potentially defective cars so as not to delay a departing train, or both.
Multiple rail safety bills in the 118th Congress—S. 576 (IS)/H.R. 1674 and H.R. 1633—would
establish a minimum time requirement for each inspection of an individual railcar or locomotive
and would require additional inspections for equipment in trains carrying hazmat. S. 576, as
reported to the Senate, includes a less stringent measure; it would ban railroads from establishing
maximum car inspection times (as opposed to establishing a minimum; a similar provision

18 49 C.F.R. §215.13(a).
19 These standards and guidelines are codified in 49 C.F.R. Part 243, Training, Qualification, and Oversight for Safety-
Related Railroad Employees.
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appears in H.R. 5871) and commissioning several studies of worker protections and workforce
management among safety employees. It would also require drug testing of qualified railcar and
locomotive inspectors.
Railroad employees carry out most routine safety inspections required by law or regulation. FRA
also employs inspectors, who may verify that those inspections have been conducted and
documented correctly and may conduct their own inspections. H.R. 5871 contains provisions
related to FRA inspector hiring, which would address the need to attract and retain qualified
inspectors while adding inspector positions. Provisions in the bill would set minimum staffing
requirements for different inspection specialties, authorize additional funding to hire new
inspectors to meet those minimums, and allow the promotion of inspectors to higher pay scales to
make compensation more competitive. FRA employed roughly 350 inspectors in FY2023, down
from 390 in FY2018-FY2020.20
Civil Penalties
FRA has the authority to assess civil penalties for rail safety violations, as well as for violations of
PHMSA hazmat safety regulations occurring on the rail system. FRA collects between $10
million and $20 million in penalties annually, roughly one quarter of which comes from hazmat
violations. These penalties are primarily intended to serve as a deterrent rather than a revenue
source.21 The maximum civil penalty amounts for rail safety violations were last amended by the
Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-432, Div. A); hazmat safety penalty amounts
were last amended by the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act of 2012 (MAP-21;
P.L. 112-141). Several bills in the 118th Congress propose to raise the maximum amount of a civil
penalty FRA may assess, with some bills proposing a sliding cap based on the annual income of
the penalized party. As reported to the Senate, S. 576 no longer proposes a sliding cap but does
propose a lower maximum for “small business concerns,” which may encompass some shippers
and short-line railroads.
For a comparison of proposed increases to maximum civil penalties, see Table 6, below.
Table 6. Current and Proposed Civil Penalties
Maximum Penalties
(Current Law)
Maximum Penalties (Proposed)
49 U.S.C.
S. 576 (IS)/
S. 576 (RS)*
Section
Adjusted
H.R. 1674/
(Current)
Description
Statutory (FY2023)
H.R. 1633
§5123(a)(1)
Knowing violations of
$75,000
$96,624 The greater
No change to current
hazardous materials
of 0.5% of
law
regulations
annual
(operating)
income, or
$750,000

20 For budget estimates for FY2018-FY2024, see DOT, “Budget, Performance, and Finance,”
https://www.transportation.gov/budget.
21 FRA publishes agency guidelines, which are not considered regulations, recommending penalty amounts that may
fall somewhere between the statutory minimum and maximum for various violations. As noted in a March 2023
Federal Register notice, “To promote railroad safety by enhancing and maintaining the deterrent effect of the civil
penalty program, FRA is doubling its guideline penalties to account for inflation.” See FRA, “Notice of Updated Civil
Penalty Schedules and Guidelines,” 88 Federal Register 15116, March 10, 2023, https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2023/03/10/2023-04957/notice-of-updated-civil-penalty-schedules-and-guidelines.
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Maximum Penalties
(Current Law)
Maximum Penalties (Proposed)
49 U.S.C.
S. 576 (IS)/
S. 576 (RS)*
Section
Adjusted
H.R. 1674/
(Current)
Description
Statutory (FY2023)
H.R. 1633
§5123(a)(2)
Knowing violations of
$175,000
$225,455 The greater
No change to current
hazardous materials
of 1% of
law
regulations resulting in
annual
death, serious il ness, or
(operating)
severe injury to any
income, or
person or substantial
$1,750,000
destruction of property
§21301(a)(2)
Violations of railroad
$25,000
$34,401 The greater
$1,000,000, or
safety regulations issued
of 0.5% of
$200,000 if committed
under Title 49, Chapter
annual
by a small business
201 the Code of Federal
(operating)
concern. May be
Regulations (49 C.F.R.)
income, or
doubled if the violation
$250,000
fol ows a pattern of
repeated violations or
otherwise reflects a
deliberate indifference
or conscious disregard
to conduct. Applies to
regulations issued
under Chapters 201-
211 of 49 C.F.R.
§21301(a)(2)
Grossly negligent
$100,000
$137,603 The greater
$5,000,000, or
violations or a pattern of
of 1% of
$500,000 if committed
repeated violations of
(annual)
by a small business
general railroad safety
income or
concern. May be
regulations that have
$1,000,000
doubled if the violation
caused, or caused an
fol ows a pattern of
imminent hazard of, death
repeated violations or
or injury to individuals
otherwise reflects a
deliberate indifference
or conscious disregard
to conduct. Applies to
regulations issued
under Chapters 201-
211 of 49 C.F.R.
§21302(a)(2)
Violations of railroad
$25,000
$34,401 The greater
Repealed
safety regulations dealing
of 0.5% of
with safety appliances,
annual
signal systems,
(operating)
locomotives, or
income, or
accident/incident reporting
$250,000
(issued under Chapters
203-209 of 49 C.F.R.)
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Maximum Penalties
(Current Law)
Maximum Penalties (Proposed)
49 U.S.C.
S. 576 (IS)/
S. 576 (RS)*
Section
Adjusted
H.R. 1674/
(Current)
Description
Statutory (FY2023)
H.R. 1633
§21302(a)(2)
Grossly negligent
$100,000
$137,603 The greater
Repealed
violations or a pattern of
of 1% of
repeated violations of
(annual)
railroad safety regulations
income or
dealing with safety
$1,000,000
appliances, signal systems,
locomotives, or
accident/incident reporting
that have caused, or
caused an imminent hazard
of, death or injury to
individuals
§21303(a)(2)
Violations of railroad
$25,000
$34,401 The greater
Repealed
safety regulations dealing
of 0.5% of
with worker hours of
annual
service (issued under
(operating)
Chapter 211 of 49 C.F.R.)
income, or
$250,000
§21303(a)(2)
Grossly negligent
$100,000
$137,603 The greater
Repealed
violations or a pattern of
of 1% of
repeated violations of
(annual)
railroad safety regulations
income or
dealing with worker hours
$1,000,000
of service that have
caused, or caused an
imminent hazard of, death
or injury to individuals
Sources: S. 576, H.R. 1674, and H.R. 1633 bil text as introduced, available at Congress.gov,
https://www.congress.gov/; S. 576 as reported in the Senate; Title 49 of the U.S. Code; and DOT, “Revisions to
Civil Penalty Amounts,” 88 Federal Register 1114, January 6, 2023,.
Notes: IS = as introduced in the Senate; RS = as reported in the Senate.
The Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990 (FCPIAA; P.L. 101-410, as amended by the Federal
Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015 [2015 Act; P.L. 114-74, 129 Stat. 599, codified
at 28 U.S.C. 2461 note]) requires federal agencies to adjust minimum and maximum civil penalty amounts to
preserve their deterrent impact. The 2015 Act amended the formula and frequency of the adjustments.
Legislative and statutory text have been paraphrased for length and clarity.
Train Length
Train length has been a topic of recent studies by the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
and FRA. Although FRA does not collect data on the lengths of all operating trains, certain data
indicate that the number of long trains operating on the rail system is increasing. According to the
Bureau of Transportation Statistics, the average length of a Class I railroad train (as calculated by
dividing railcar-miles by train-miles, yielding railcars per train) increased by 7% over 2014-2020.
FRA safety data also reflect a growing proportion of derailments that involve trains hauling 125
or more cars (Table 7), though it is unclear whether these trains are derailing any more or less
frequently than the system as a whole on a per-train-mile basis.
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Table 7. Indicators of Increased Train Lengths, 2014-2022

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Avg. train length (cars)
71.8
72.5
71.9
73.2
73.5
74.8
77.1
n/a
n/a
% of derailments involving 125+ car
6%
7%
9%
10%
9%
12%
13%
16%
16%
trains
% of derailments involving 150+ car
1%
2%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
8%
7%
trains
Source: Compiled by CRS using data from DOT, BTS, “Rail Profile,” National Transportation Statistics,
https://www.bts.gov/content/rail-profile; and DOT, FRA, Office of Safety Analysis, “Accident Data as reported by
Railroads,” form 6180.54, https://safetydata.fra.dot.gov/OfficeofSafety/publicsite/on_the_fly_download.aspx.
Notes: n/a = railcar-miles for 2021 and 2022 not yet published by BTS.
Section 22422 of IIJA (P.L. 117-58) directed the Secretary of Transportation to conduct a study on
the operation of freight trains longer than 7,500 feet, roughly equivalent to 125 cars (there is some
variation in freight car lengths, but most are around 60 feet long). A provision of S. 576 (RS)
would require the Secretary to submit an additional report to Congress within three years of
completing the IIJA study explaining whether DOT has failed to address any of that study’s
recommendations.
FRA issued a safety advisory on May 2, 2023, finding that railroads and railroad employees “are
aware of the potential complexities associated with operating longer trains and to recommend that
they take appropriate measures to address those complexities to ensure the safe operation of such
trains.” On July 21, 2023, FRA followed up its previous advisory by proposing additional data
collection from Class I railroads on train length.
Longer trains also have been alleged to cause more and/or longer blockages of road-rail grade
crossings. The issue of blocked crossings is itself the subject of various policy proposals,
discussed in the next section.
Other Issues and Legislative Proposals
Although hazmat safety and derailment prevention were immediately germane to the East
Palestine crash—which drew media, public, and lawmakers’ attention—other, more long-standing
rail safety issues have risen in prominence as a result of additional attention being paid to the
industry. Many of these issues have little to no bearing on the East Palestine crash but have been
incorporated into bills that amend hazmat-by-rail policy.
Blocked Crossings
Many state, local, and federal officials have received complaints about slow-moving or stopped
trains blocking road traffic through a highway-rail crossing (also called a grade crossing). In
small towns and rural areas, a single crossing may be the only road connection from one side of
the tracks to the other for miles, if another one exists at all. This may incentivize drivers to
attempt to beat approaching trains, or pedestrians to cross over or through a stopped train, at great
personal risk. To assess the scale of the issue, FRA launched a website to collect blocked crossing
information from the public on a voluntary basis in 2019. IIJA directs FRA to establish a blocked
crossing portal to collect and analyze blocked crossing data for a period of three years. An earlier
proposal for IIJA passed by the House (H.R. 3684) contained measures, first introduced in the
Don’t Block Our Communities Act (D-BLOC, H.R. 3698), that would create permanent data
collection requirements for railroads and DOT, but these measures were not present in the Senate
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amendment that ultimately became law. The D-BLOC Act was first introduced in the 116th
Congress and reintroduced in the 117th and 118th Congresses.
No federal laws or regulations specifically ban or penalize trains that block highway-rail
crossings. Some state or local ordinances establish a time limit for trains that occupy crossings,
ranging from as little as five minutes to as much as 20 minutes. State and federal courts have
generally found that these laws are preempted by one or more federal laws, rendering them
unenforceable. The Federal Railway Safety Act of 1970, as amended, grants states the ability to
enact their own rail safety laws only if neither DOT nor the Department of Homeland Security
has issued regulations “covering the subject matter of” the state law. Grade crossing safety can be
considered “covered by” existing regulations, such as those in 49 C.F.R. Parts 222 and 234, even
if no federal time limit rule exists. The Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of
1995 further restricts states from enacting laws that regulate rail transportation. Railroad
companies have successfully argued in court that laws setting time limits at crossings are
functionally the same as regulating railroad business practices, such as train length and speed or
infrastructure construction, which states are not permitted to do. In a November 2023 brief in one
such case, the U.S. Solicitor General recommended against the Supreme Court hearing the case,
arguing that a lower court had correctly held that Ohio’s blocked crossing laws were preempted
by federal ones.22 The Supreme Court in January 2024 denied Ohio’s petition to review the case.23
The D-BLOC bill would create a nationwide 10-minute time limit for blocked crossings (with
exceptions), subject to civil penalties, and would require the creation of a central database for
blocked crossing incident reports. It would also direct rail carriers to publicly disclose a phone
number to which blocked crossings may be reported; a similar provision was included in S. 576
(RS). The data collection and reporting requirements proposed by D-BLOC could allow a more
objective assessment of where blocked crossings are most frequent and disruptive. Individual
railroads have been subject to similar reporting requirements in the past. For example, when a
Canadian-owned Class I railroad acquired a smaller carrier in the Chicago area, one of the
conditions imposed on the transaction by the Surface Transportation Board was that the railroad
would be required to report monthly on crossings blocked for longer than 10 minutes.24
Crew Size
Technological advances and cost-cutting pressures in railroading have led to smaller crews on
freight trains, to the point where it is not uncommon for a single train to have a crew of two (one
engineer and one conductor) aboard. Railroads have explored the use of one-person train crews to
further reduce costs, while unions and some lawmakers have sought to establish a two-person
crew minimum on safety grounds. FRA proposed a crew size rule in 2016 after several crashes
but withdrew it in 2019, stating that available data “d[o] not establish that one-person operations

22 State of Ohio, petitioner, v. CSX Transportation, Inc., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, November 21,
2023, https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22-459/290315/20231121140521279_22-
459%20Ohio%20v.%20CSX.pdf.
23 U.S. Supreme Court, Case No. 22-459, Proceedings and Orders, at https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/
docketfiles/html/public/22-459.html.
24 In 2010, the railroad was found to have knowingly failed to comply with this requirement and was fined $250,000.
See Surface Transportation Board (STB) decision, Canadian National Railway Company and Grand Trunk
Corporation—Control—EJ&E West Company, Decision No. 26, December 17, 2010. STB notes that auditors
discovered that many crossings are equipped with “Remote Terminal Units” (RTUs) capable of automatically notifying
a railroad dispatcher when crossing gates are engaged for longer than 10 minutes (p. 5).
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are less safe than multi-person train crews.”25 FRA subsequently proposed a new crew size rule in
July 2022 after its earlier withdrawal was vacated by a federal court.26
Several bills introduced in the 118th Congress would codify a two-person minimum crew in
statute, with limited exceptions for some short-distance operations such as switching and branch
line service. HHTs, as proposed to be defined by S. 576 (RS), and trains longer than 7,500 feet
would be ineligible for any such exceptions. This would not affect most long-haul trains currently
operating but could constrain railroads in their plans to redeploy staff to reduce costs. For
example, Class I railroad Union Pacific had proposed in 2022 to replace an onboard conductor
with an off-train “expediter” role, a move opposed by a union representing conductors. An
agreement was eventually reached that would preserve all conductor positions through the next
round of collective bargaining negotiations (beginning in 2025) and allow Union Pacific to
establish expediter positions in certain areas on a trial basis.27
Confidential Close Call Reporting System
FRA and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration cosponsor a voluntary program for
anonymously reporting close calls or safety lapses, modeled after a preexisting system in the
aviation industry. Although Class I railroads have generally chosen not to participate, all Class I
railroads signaled their intention to join the program following the East Palestine derailment.28
The Class I railroads received some necessary approvals from FRA, but their full participation in
the program stalled over a dispute about how many violations an employee may report while
remaining free from discipline.29 The first Class I railroad to join the program, Norfolk Southern,
did so in January 2024.30
Several bills have been introduced in recent years that would require carriers to establish
confidential close call reporting systems (C3RSs) according to a single set of federal standards. In
the 118th Congress, a provision of S. 1044 would require all Class I railroads that were assessed a
civil penalty for rail or hazmat safety violations within the past 15 years (i.e., all of them) to join
the program. A provision of H.R. 5871 would require all Class I railroads, as well as all intercity
or commuter passenger railroads and any railroads found by the Secretary of Transportation to
have “inadequate safety performance,” to establish their own C3RSs that comply with a set of
federal standards within two years.

25 FRA, DOT, “Train Crew Staffing,” 84 Federal Register 24735, May 29, 2019, https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2019/05/29/2019-11088/train-crew-staffing.
26 FRA, DOT, “Train Crew Size Safety Requirements,” 87 Federal Register 45564, July 28, 2022,
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/07/28/2022-15540/train-crew-size-safety-requirements.
27 Bill Stephens, “Union Pacific to Begin Industry-First Pilot Program Comparing Conductors to Ground-Based
Positions,” Trains, July 18, 2023, https://www.trains.com/trn/news-reviews/news-wire/union-pacific-to-begin-industry-
first-pilot-program-comparing-conductors-to-ground-based-positions/.
28 Letter from Ian N. Jefferies, President & CEO, American Association of Railroads, to Secretary of Transportation
Pete Buttigieg, March 2, 2023, https://www.aar.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Response-Letter-on-C3RS-
FINAL_.pdf.
29 Letter from Ian N. Jefferies, President & CEO, American Association of Railroads, to Secretary of Transportation
Pete Buttigieg and FRA Administrator Amit Bose, August 24, 2023, https://www.aar.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/
AAR-CEO-C3RS-DOT-Letter-82423.pdf.
30 DOT, “USDOT and FRA Continue Pressing on Rail Safety, Finalizes Norfolk Southern Railway Participation into
Confidential Close Call Reporting System,” press release, January 29, 2024, https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-
room/usdot-and-fra-continue-pressing-rail-safety-finalizes-norfolk-southern-railway.
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Author Information

Ben Goldman

Analyst in Transportation Policy

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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