Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview,
January 11, 2024
U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress
Jim Zanotti
On October 7, 2023, the Palestinian Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated foreign
Specialist in Middle
terrorist organization, or FTO) led surprise attacks against Israel from the Gaza Strip. The
Eastern Affairs
stunning nature, scope, and lethality of the attacks and apparent intelligence failures have become

a subject of analysis for Israeli and U.S. officials. Iran reportedly provides material support to
Jeremy M. Sharp
Hamas, and according to U.S. officials may be complicit in a broad sense, but President Joe
Specialist in Middle
Biden said in October “there is no evidence” that Iran helped plan the attack.
Eastern Affairs

In response to the October 7 attacks, Israel declared war on Hamas and launched aerial
bombardment and ground operations in Gaza. Reportedly, more than 1,200 Israelis and foreign

nationals (including 35 U.S. citizens in Israel) and more than 23,000 Palestinians in Gaza have
been killed as of January 10, 2024. Hamas and other groups also seized around 240 hostages on October 7. Israel and Hamas
agreed to a multiday pause in fighting in late November. During the pause, 110 hostages held in Gaza and 250 Palestinian
prisoners held by Israel were released. Hamas and others reportedly hold some 130 persons, including about eight Americans.
The United Nations has stated that the situation in Gaza, with an estimated 1.9 million Gazans displaced (out of a population
of approximately 2.1 million people) constitutes a major humanitarian crisis—having already faced dire economic and
humanitarian conditions before the conflict. Some goods are entering Gaza via Egypt and Israel, and U.S. and U.N. officials
have sought to boost this aid. More than 60% of the housing units in Gaza have reportedly been destroyed or damaged.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu initially announced that Israel’s military objectives were “To destroy the military
and governmental capabilities of Hamas and bring the hostages home.” As of early January, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
seems to control much of northern Gaza above ground, while it engages in operations farther south targeting Hamas,
including its top leaders. Hamas’s tunnels make urban warfare more challenging. Israeli officials reportedly have withdrawn
several thousand troops and seek to complete a transition to lower-intensity operations in Gaza by the end of January. The
Biden Administration has stated that Israel has the right to defend itself, and has resisted calls from other international actors
for an indefinite cease-fire. However, U.S. leaders have urged Israel to minimize casualties and reduce the intensity of their
operations, amid debate regarding how the prosecution of the conflict may affect long-term outcomes. While ultra-
nationalists in the Israeli government have advocated resettling Palestinians outside of Gaza, U.S. officials have said that
Palestinians “must not be pressed to leave Gaza” and “must be able to return home as soon as conditions allow.”
There are risks that the conflict could expand geographically, and U.S. officials have sought to reduce these risks. For
example, the Iran-backed Shia Islamist group Lebanese Hezbollah (another FTO) has exchanged fire with Israel and could
create a second front at the Israel-Lebanon border. U.S. officials are reportedly seeking to help facilitate the withdrawal of
Hezbollah forces from border areas to alleviate obstacles to the return of around 80,000 evacuated Israelis to their homes in
the north. Israeli officials have threatened possible military action if the issue is not resolved diplomatically. In the Red Sea,
the Iran-supported Houthi militia in Yemen has attacked commercial vessels transiting the Bab al Mandab strait, leading
several major shipping companies to suspend or reroute cargoes at considerable cost. To counter threats the Houthis pose, the
United States is reportedly considering various military options. Additionally, amid violence and tensions between
Palestinians and Israelis in the West Bank that could affect stability there, the Administration has imposed visa bans on some
extremist Israeli settlers, delayed a firearms shipment to Israel, and made efforts to persuade Israel to ease or end measures
that have precipitously decreased the revenues of the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority (PA).
Differences between U.S., Israeli, and PA officials on post-conflict security and governance for Gaza may intensify the
challenges involved. Netanyahu has insisted that only Israel can demilitarize Gaza, and openly opposes a PA return to power
there. U.S. officials have expressed support for a resumption of PA administration in Gaza after the PA undertakes certain
reforms, as part of efforts to move toward a two-state solution; PA and other Arab leaders insist on progress toward a
Palestinian state for them to cooperate with this transition.
In October 2023, President Biden asked Congress to appropriate more than $8 billion in U.S. security assistance for Israel,
and more than $9 billion in global humanitarian assistance amounts that could partly be allocated for Gaza, the West Bank,
and Israel. Members of Congress have expressed differing views on the request and its various elements, with the House
passing H.R. 6126 and the Senate Appropriations Committee introducing S.Amdt. 1371 to H.R. 815.
Congressional Research Service

link to page 5 Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

Conflict Overview
Background
On October 7, 2023, the Palestinian Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated foreign
terrorist organization, or FTO) led a series of surprise attacks from the Gaza Strip by land, sea,
and air against Israel (see Figure 1). Palestine Islamic Jihad (or PIJ, another FTO) claimed that its
forces also participated in the attacks, and other militants outside of Hamas and PIJ may also have
joined. The assault targeted Israeli military bases and civilian areas during the final Jewish high
holiday, just over 50 years after the Egypt-Syria surprise attack on Israel that sparked the 1973
Yom Kippur War (known in the Arab world as the October War). The October 7 attacks’ scope
and lethality have no precedent in the 16 years Hamas has controlled Gaza. The nature of the
violence stunned Israelis and many others, and includes allegations of sexual violence.1
The apparent intelligence and operational failures in preventing the assault or limiting its impact
have become a subject of debate in Israel and elsewhere. Some analysts have said that Israel may
have missed signals, over-relied on technological solutions, and/or misread Hamas’s intentions.2
Whether or not Iran had a role in the attack remains a question. Iran reportedly provides material
support to Hamas, and according to U.S. officials may be complicit in a broad sense, but
President Joe Biden said in October “there is no evidence” that Iran helped plan the attack.3
In response to the attacks, Israel’s cabinet formally declared war on Hamas, and Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu formed an emergency unity government with one opposition party. Israel
also halted supplies from Israeli territory to Gaza of electricity, food, and fuel; it resumed some
shipments from the Kerem Shalom crossing in late December. Since the outbreak of conflict,
Egypt, via consultations with U.S., Israeli, and U.N. officials, has coordinated the use of its Rafah
crossing with Gaza to bring some international aid into the territory, in a way that seeks to prevent
diversion by Hamas.
Israel’s military mobilized hundreds of thousands of troops, and has conducted major air and
artillery bombardments in Gaza, and undertaken ground operations in both northern and southern
Gaza. Most Palestinians in Gaza have been displaced from their homes and face profound
humanitarian challenges (discussed further below). At various points in the conflict, Hamas and
other Gaza-based militants have fired rockets indiscriminately into Israel. As of early January, the
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) seems to control much of northern Gaza above ground, while it
engages in operations farther south in an effort to target Hamas and its top leaders—including in
Hamas’s vast network of tunnels. Reportedly as of January 10, 2024, more than 1,200 Israelis and

1 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “President Herzog reveals Hamas ‘Captive Taking Handbook’ in CNN interview,”
October 15, 2023; “Blinken calls sexual violence inflicted by Hamas ‘beyond anything I’ve seen,’” CNN, December
10, 2023.
2 Ronen Bergman and Adam Goldman, “Israel Knew Hamas’s Attack Plan More Than a Year Ago,” New York Times,
November 30, 2023; Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Experts React: Assessing the Israeli Intelligence
and Potential Policy Failure,” October 25, 2023.
3 Scott Pelley, “President Joe Biden: The 2023 60 Minutes interview transcript,” CBS News, October 15, 2023; White
House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” October
10, 2023. For more information on Hamas, its possible reasons for the attacks, and Iranian material support for Hamas,
see CRS In Focus IF12549, Hamas: Background, Current Status, and U.S. Policy, by Jim Zanotti.
Congressional Research Service

1

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

foreign nationals (including 35 U.S. citizens in Israel) and more than 23,000 Palestinians in Gaza
had been killed, and over 60% of Gaza’s housing units have been destroyed or damaged.4
Figure 1. Israel and Gaza: Conflict Map

Hamas and other groups reportedly seized around 240 Israeli and foreign national hostages on
October 7, including some Americans. Recovering hostages has been a major Israeli and U.S.
concern. Qatar, Egypt, and the United States facilitated a multiday pause in fighting between
Israel and Hamas in the final week of November. During the pause, 110 hostages held in Gaza
(including two U.S.-Israeli dual citizens) and 250 Palestinian prisoners held by Israel were
released.5 Hamas and other groups reportedly still hold around 130 persons in Gaza, including
about eight Americans, but reports suggest that some of these hostages could be dead.6 As of early

4 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA), “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and
Israel | Flash Update #89,” January 10, 2024; “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel - reported impact | Day 95,”
January 10, 2024; Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” Tel Aviv, Israel,
November 3, 2023. Palestinian casualty figures and housing damage figures come from the Hamas-controlled health
ministry and government media office in Gaza, respectively. Additionally, Israel reported that the bodies of around
1,500 dead militants had been found as of October 10 in southern Israeli areas recaptured by its military. More than 180
Israeli soldiers have been killed since Israel’s military began ground operations in Gaza.
5 Erin Banco, “Gaza hostage talks hit roadblock, raising fears of prolonged captivity” Politico, December 7, 2023. Four
hostages (including two Americans) were released before the late November pause.
6 “Israeli defense chief resists pressure to halt Gaza offensive, says campaign will ‘take time,’” Associated Press,
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service

2

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

January, negotiations are reportedly ongoing for more hostage-prisoner exchanges that could
pause the fighting. Hamas may be bargaining for a cessation of hostilities and full release of the
approximately 7,000 Palestinian prisoners in Israel’s custody.7 On January 2, senior Hamas
official Saleh al Arouri was assassinated in Beirut, reportedly by Israel; Qatari officials have
signaled that Arouri’s killing could make a new hostage-prisoner deal more difficult.8
The conflict’s impact on civilians has generated a humanitarian crisis. An estimated 1.9 million
Gazans (out of a population of approximately 2.1 million people)9 were reportedly displaced from
their homes as of January 8, many on multiple occasions.10 Roughly 1 million people reportedly
fled south after the IDF “call[ed] for” the evacuation of civilians in northern Gaza in mid-
October.11 As of early January, there is major overcrowding in Gaza’s Rafah governorate near the
Egyptian border because of IDF operations in other parts of southern Gaza.12
Observers debate how to apportion blame between Israel and Hamas for dangers to civilians and
the worsening of already dire humanitarian conditions in Gaza. While those faulting Israel argue
that Israeli actions have inflicted casualties and limited life-sustaining supplies, those blaming
Hamas assert that Hamas personnel in Gaza and other militants reportedly contribute to making
civilian areas and facilities unsafe by operating in or near them.13
Key Developments
Israel has formed an emergency unity government and “war management cabinet” that includes
key opposition figure Benny Gantz (a former defense minister and chief IDF commander)
alongside Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant.14 Netanyahu’s initial
stated objectives in Gaza were “To destroy the military and governmental capabilities of Hamas
and bring the hostages home.”15 The conflict may be moving toward a new phase: Israeli officials
reportedly have withdrawn tens of thousands of troops and seek to complete a transition to lower-
intensity operations in Gaza by the end of January.16 Netanyahu has reportedly said that Israel

December 11, 2023; “‘This Week’ Transcript 12-3-23: White House NSC Coordinator for Strategic Communications
John Kirby, Israeli Minister of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer and Sen. James Lankford,” ABC News. “Gallant’s post-
war Gaza plan: Palestinians to run civil affairs with global task force,” Times of Israel, January 4, 2024. On December
15, Israeli forces killed three unarmed Israeli hostages who were attempting to surrender to them.
7 Rory Jones et al., “Hamas Leader Studied His Enemy,” Wall Street Journal, December 11, 2023.
8 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Qatar tells hostages’ families that getting deal harder after Hamas leader’s killing,” Axios,
January 6, 2024.
9 Figures for Gaza’s total population per Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook.
10 UN-OCHA, “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #89,” January 10, 2024.
11 Israel Defense Forces, “IDF Announcement Sent to the Civilians of Gaza City,” October 13, 2023; Isabel Kershner et
al., “Israel Vows to Keep Up the Fight in Gaza as a Third Month of War Concludes,” New York Times, January 8,
2024.
12 UN-OCHA, “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #89,” January 10, 2024.
13 See, for example, Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, “Under Scrutiny Over Gaza, Israel Points to Civilian Toll of
U.S. Wars,” New York Times, November 7, 2023.
14 Barak Ravid, “Israel’s Netanyahu forms unity government with ex-Defense Minister Gantz,” Axios, October 11,
2023; and Jeremy Sharon, “Netanyahu, Gantz agree to form emergency unity government,” Times of Israel, October
11, 2023.
15 “Netanyahu says the Gaza war has entered a new stage and will be ‘long and difficult,’” Associated Press, October
28, 2023.
16 Gordon Fairclough, “Israeli Defense Chief Defends War Conduct,” Wall Street Journal, January 8, 2024; Patrick
Kingsley et al., “Israel Says Its Military Is Starting to Shift to a More Targeted Gaza Campaign,” New York Times,
January 8, 2024.
Congressional Research Service

3

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

might accept the expulsion, rather than the killing or capture, of Hamas’s top leaders.17 Ultra-
nationalists in the Israeli government have advocated resettling Palestinians outside of Gaza amid
strong opposition from Arab states and U.S. officials; Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said
that displaced Palestinians “must not be pressed to leave Gaza” and “must be able to return home
as soon as conditions allow.”18
U.S. and U.N. officials have sought to increase the provision of international assistance into
Gaza. U.N. and World Health Organization officials have raised many public health concerns
associated with water, food, and fuel shortages, overcrowding, poor sanitation, and challenges to
hospitals’ safety and functionality. As of early January, some international and humanitarian
organizations have warned of “acute malnutrition and mortality breaching famine thresholds” in
Gaza amid “intense conflict and restricted humanitarian access.”19
Since the October 7 attacks, Israel has exchanged fire with the Iran-backed Shia Islamist group
Lebanese Hezbollah (an FTO) and Palestinian militants across Israel’s northern border with
Lebanon. If these clashes escalate, Hezbollah’s arsenal of some 150,000 missiles and rockets
could pose a grave threat to Israeli strategic sites and population centers.20 U.S. officials are
reportedly seeking to help facilitate the withdrawal of Hezbollah forces from border areas to
alleviate obstacles to the return of around 80,000 evacuated Israelis to their homes in the north.21
Israeli officials have threatened wider military action to address the issue absent a diplomatic
resolution, and the Arouri assassination and other January cross-border strikes by the two sides
could affect their calculations regarding whether or not to escalate.22
In the Red Sea, the Iran-supported Houthi militia in Yemen has fired several missiles and drones
toward Israel, and has carried out at least 26 attacks on shipping lanes that transit the Bab al
Mandab strait.23 Despite repeated international warnings, the Houthis have continued such
attacks, forcing, in many cases, the rerouting of commercial shipping around the Cape of Good
Hope and away from the Red Sea and Suez Canal.
Tensions and violence have continued between Palestinians and Israelis in the West Bank since
October 7. West Bank-based officials from the Palestinian Authority/Palestine Liberation
Organization (PA/PLO) appear to be in a difficult position. While they do not endorse Hamas,
they have refrained from publicly condemning it, perhaps because of a perceived spike in West
Bank Palestinian support for Hamas that may stem from Hamas’s military actions, the prisoner
releases it has secured, and civilian suffering in Gaza.24 U.S. officials and lawmakers have
signaled concerns related to Israeli actions in the West Bank that may affect stable living

17 Michael Horovitz, “Expulsion of Hamas leaders from Gaza on the table, PM said to tell hostage families,” Times of
Israel, January 3, 2024.
18 Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Qatari Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani at a Joint Press Availability,” January 7, 2024.
19 UN-OCHA, “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #88,” January 9, 2024; UNICEF, “Intensifying
conflict, malnutrition and disease in the Gaza Strip creates a deadly cycle that threatens over 1.1 million children,”
January 5, 2024.
20 Yehoshua Kalisky, “Precision Missiles, UAVs, and Tens of Thousands of Fighters: Hezbollah’s Order of Battle,”
Institute for National Security Studies, October 19, 2023.
21 U.S. officials also have said they hope that an easing of tensions could allow a return of displaced people from
southern Lebanon (reportedly around 76,000) to their homes. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a
Press Availability,” January 9, 2024.
22 Euan Ward et al., “Israel says it killed another Hezbollah commander after back-and-forth attacks,” New York Times,
January 9, 2024.
23 “US, UK forces repel ‘largest attack’ by Houthis in Red Sea,” Reuters, January 10, 2024.
24 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, “Public Opinion Poll No. 90,” published December 13, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

4

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

conditions for Palestinians. The Administration has imposed visa bans on some extremist Israeli
settlers,25 delayed a firearms shipment to Israel,26 and has called on Israel to ease or end measures
that have precipitously decreased PA revenues since October 7.27
As civilian casualties have mounted in Gaza, some regional actors have grown more publicly
critical of Israeli and U.S. policy. Popular sentiment in Arab states has placed pressure on their
governments to oppose Israeli actions in Gaza,28 even though many Arab leaders might welcome
an end to Hamas rule there.29 Together with other members of the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation, Arab countries have called for an end to “Israeli aggression against Gaza,” more
humanitarian aid, and a freeze on international arms exports to Israel.30
On November 15, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2712, which called for “urgent
and extended humanitarian pauses” and the “immediate and unconditional release of all hostages
held by Hamas and other groups,” and urged all parties to refrain from depriving civilians in Gaza
of “basic services and humanitarian assistance indispensable to their survival.” On December 22,
the Security Council adopted Resolution 2720, which called for “urgent steps to immediately
allow safe, unhindered, and expanded humanitarian access and to create the conditions for a
sustainable cessation of hostilities.”
U.S. Policy
Israeli Military Operations and Pauses
The U.S. government has stated its support for military operations by Israel to defend itself in line
with international law, including in Gaza. President Biden, Secretary of State Blinken, Secretary
of Defense Lloyd Austin, and other Administration officials have visited Israel and other
countries in the region since the outbreak of conflict. U.S. officials have publicly opposed calls
for an indefinite cease-fire, citing Israel’s right to defend itself.31 Nevertheless, U.S. officials have
voiced support for “humanitarian pauses,” and additional hostage-prisoner exchanges.
While President Biden appears to broadly support Israel’s stated objectives of ending Hamas rule
in Gaza, he and Administration officials have sought to convince their Israeli counterparts to take
steps to minimize casualties, reduce the intensity of their operations, and step up humanitarian
aid. In December, President Biden said, “We continue to provide military assistance to Israel …
until they get rid of Hamas,”32 while also warning that Israel has started to lose international

25 Department of State, “Announcement of Visa Restriction Policy to Promote Peace, Security, and Stability in the
West Bank,” December 5, 2023.
26 Nancy A. Youssef and Vivian Salama, “Washington Is Blocking Shipment of Rifles to Israel,” Wall Street Journal,
December 14, 2023.
27 Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” January 9, 2024; “In ‘frustrating’ call,
Biden said to tell PM to resolve Palestinian tax funds issue,” Times of Israel, December 29, 2023; Polina Ivanova and
James Shotter, “Israel is pushing Palestinian governance to ‘edge of the edge’, PM warns,” Financial Times, January 4,
2023.
28 Cathrin Schaer, “Gaza conflict: Arab attitudes are hardening against Israel,” Deutsche Welle, December 20, 2023.
29 “Many Arab governments would like to see Hamas gone,” Economist, November 16, 2023.
30 “Arab-Islamic summit adopts resolution on Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people,” Arab News, November
12, 2023.
31 Biden, “The U.S. won’t back down from the challenge of Putin and Hamas.”
32 White House, “Remarks by President Biden at a Hanukkah Holiday Reception,” December 11, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

5

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

support “by the indiscriminate bombing that takes place.”33 In early January, a National Security
Council spokesperson said the Israeli goal of degrading Hamas’s ability to carry out attacks inside
Israel is attainable, but it is unlikely that Israel can eliminate the group and its ideology.34
Potential Post-Conflict Scenarios
The Administration has been conferring with Israeli and PA officials on security and governance
for Gaza after conflict ends or abates. Tensions between supporting domestically legitimate
Palestinian self-rule and safeguarding Israel’s capacity to monitor and stifle potential threats may
intensify the challenges involved. In November, President Biden articulated the following
principles:
To start, Gaza must never again be used as a platform for terrorism. There must be no
forcible displacement of Palestinians from Gaza, no reoccupation, no siege or blockade,
and no reduction in territory…. As we strive for peace, Gaza and the West Bank should be
reunited under a single governance structure, ultimately under a revitalized Palestinian
Authority, as we all work toward a two-state solution…. The international community must
commit resources to support the people of Gaza in the immediate aftermath of this crisis,
including interim security measures, and establish a reconstruction mechanism to
sustainably meet Gaza’s long-term needs.35
PA President Mahmoud Abbas has indicated that the PA would only govern Gaza—which Hamas
forcibly seized from the PA in 2007—in the context of significant progress toward establishing a
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, with a capital in East Jerusalem.36 Secretary Blinken
has indicated that such progress is unlikely to be easy or “happen overnight.”37 U.S. and PA
officials have reportedly discussed possible mechanisms for improving PA institutions,
leadership, and domestic legitimacy. Some leading Palestinian figures argue that the PA cannot be
strengthened via reforms without Israel granting it greater control over its revenues and security.38
Prime Minister Netanyahu has insisted that only Israel can demilitarize Gaza, and openly opposes
the PA returning, purportedly because of rhetorical and financial support the PA provides for
terrorism.39 Netanyahu’s position may stem partly from concerns that a return to PA governance
in both the West Bank and Gaza could increase international pressure on Israel to accept a two-
state solution. He also may calculate that his opposition to PA rule might rally domestic support
for him and the ultra-nationalist figures in his government. The significant dip in Netanyahu’s
public approval rating since the October 7 attack could lead to his government’s collapse and new
Knesset elections sometime in 2024.40 Some of Netanyahu’s advisers may be signaling openness
to the possibility of a future role in Gaza for a reformed PA.41 Prospects for any Hamas role in

33 White House, “Remarks by President Biden at a Campaign Reception,” December 12, 2023.
34 White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and NSC Coordinator for Strategic
Communications John Kirby,” January 3, 2024.
35 Joe Biden, “The U.S. won’t back down from the challenge of Putin and Hamas,” Washington Post, November 18,
2023.
36 Additionally, PA Prime Minister Muhammad Shtayyeh has reportedly said that the PA would be prepared to govern
Gaza only if there is a complete Israeli military withdrawal. David S. Cloud, “Israel Eases Opposition to Palestinian
Rule,” Wall Street Journal, December 22, 2023.
37 Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Remarks to the Press,” January 10, 2023.
38 “US wants shakeup of Palestinian Authority to run Gaza after Hamas,” Reuters, December 16, 2023.
39 Benjamin Netanyahu, “Israel’s Three Prerequisites for Peace,” Wall Street Journal, December 26, 2023.
40 See, for example, Anshel Pfeffer, “Israel Is at War, and Netanyahu Just Launched His Re-election Campaign,”
Haaretz, December 12, 2023.
41 Cloud, “Israel Eases Opposition to Palestinian Rule.”
Congressional Research Service

6

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

post-conflict PA governance, which some leading PA figures appear to be discussing, would
likely encounter U.S. and Israeli opposition.42
Major U.S. policy issues related to post-conflict scenarios in Gaza could include the following:
• Resolving potential differences between U.S., Israeli, and PA officials. It is
unclear whether or not the parties can move from the starting points discussed
above to compromises on fundamental aspects of post-conflict governance and
security. In early January, Defense Minister Gallant proposed a plan for eventual
Palestinian civil administration in Gaza that would (1) maintain existing
Palestinian administrative mechanisms, with officials and local clans unaffiliated
with Hamas; (2) give Israel broad responsibility to prevent security threats
against Israel, including via coordination with Egypt at its border with Gaza; and
(3) empower a multinational task force (featuring the United States and some
European and Arab states) on aspects of civil affairs and economic recovery.43
• Role of PA security forces. Reportedly, “U.S. and Palestinian officials have
discussed a plan to retrain 1,000 former [PA] security forces officers in Gaza and
a further 3,000 to 5,000 in the West Bank who would work in Gaza after the
war,”44 with training presumably under the auspices of the U.S. Security
Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC).45
• Arab states’ role. Egypt, Jordan, and Arab Gulf states may be reluctant to help
with efforts to transition Gaza (by contributing troops, advisers, or funding)
toward PA self-rule or help with reconstruction if doing so might be perceived
domestically and internationally as enabling indefinite Israeli occupation. Thus,
Arab state participation may depend on diplomatic progress toward Palestinian
statehood.46
U.S. Military Deployments
Since October 7, President Biden has positioned additional U.S. military assets and personnel to
the Middle East in an apparent effort to bolster Israel’s defense, deter Iran and Iranian-supported
groups from widening the war, support select Arab partners, and prepare for contingencies, such
as an evacuation of U.S. citizens in Israel and Gaza. As of early January 2024, the USS Dwight D.
Eisenhower carrier strike group is positioned in the Red Sea, and the USS Bataan Amphibious
Ready Group (ARG) is positioned in the eastern Mediterranean.47 The USS Gerald R. Ford
carrier strike group is returning home after eight months at sea, the last three of which were spent
positioned in the Middle East to deter Iranian-supported groups.

42 Benoit Faucon et al., “Hamas Starts Planning for End of Gaza War,” Wall Street Journal, December 20, 2023.
43 “Gallant’s post-war Gaza plan: Palestinians to run civil affairs with global task force,” Times of Israel, January 4,
2024. Israel and Egypt are reportedly negotiating the future parameters of their coordination at the Egypt-Gaza border,
based on Israeli allegations that this border has been the “main avenue” for Hamas to smuggle weapons and illicit
goods into Gaza. Summer Said and Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Israel Presses Egypt over Its Gaza Border,” Wall Street
Journal, January 8, 2024.
44 Benoit Faucon et al., “U.S. Presses Palestinians to Plan for Postwar Security,” Wall Street Journal, December 16,
2023.
45 For more on the USSC and U.S. security assistance for the PA, see archived CRS Report RL34074, The
Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
46 “US officials discuss post-war Gaza governance plans with Palestinian Authority and Arab nations,” CNN,
December 8, 2023.
47 “USNI News Fleet and Marine Tracker,” USNI News, January 4, 2024.
Congressional Research Service

7

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

U.S. Military Response to Iranian-Supported Groups
Iran supports several proxy non-state actors across the Middle East, and armed groups in Iraq,
Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen have expressed support for the Hamas attacks. To date, attacks
against Israel have emanated from Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, while Iran-supported groups in
Iraq and Syria have repeatedly targeted U.S. forces stationed there. Since mid-October, there have
been at least 120 attacks against U.S. forces stationed in Iraq and Syria. The United States has
conducted several air strikes in retaliation; in early January, a precision U.S. strike killed a senior
commander from the Iran-backed Harakat al Nujaba (HaN), a U.S. Specially Designated Global
Terrorist group based in Iraq.48
In response to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, the U.S. Navy has positioned multiple warships to
intercept those attacks and formed “Operation Prosperity Guardian,” a multinational coalition to
safeguard freedom of navigation in the Red Sea area. On January 3, 2024, the White House, along
with various U.S. partners, issued a formal warning to the Houthis, stating that “The Houthis will
bear the responsibility of the consequences should they continue to threaten lives, the global
economy, and free flow of commerce in the region’s critical waterways.”49 Some Members of
Congress have called on the Biden Administration to redesignate the Houthis as an FTO.50
According to one report, the Administration is reviewing whether to do so.51
U.S. Expedited Arms Deliveries to Israel
Since October 7, the Biden Administration has expedited the provision of U.S. military and
security assistance to Israel. As of late December 2023, one report indicates that since October 7,
the United States has dispatched 240 transport planes and 20 ships to deliver more than 10,000
tons of armaments and equipment to Israel; the same report notes that Israel also has ordered $2.8
billion in additional purchases from the United States.52 Since early December 2023, U.S.
munition deliveries have included: about 15,000 bombs and 57,000 artillery shells.53
Emergency Arms Sale to Israel
In December, the Biden Administration notified Congress of proposed sales to Israel of tank cartridges ($106.5
mil ion on 12/8) and artil ery shells ($147.5 mil ion on 12/29). In both instances, the Administration said it was
invoking emergency authorities codified in the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776) that allow the President
to waive congressional review of an arms sale if the President states in a formal notification to Congress that “an
emergency exists” requiring an immediate sale “in the national security interests of the United States.”54
According to the Department of Defense (DOD), both sales wil be from U.S. Army inventory or U.S. Army
stock, a possible reference to the U.S.-maintained stockpile in Israel, known as War Reserve Stocks for Allies-
Israel (WRSA-I). Amendments to the authorization of WRSA-I in a Senate-introduced version of the supplemental
appropriations bil for Israel (see below) would waive congressional notification of sales to Israel from WRSA-I, by
replacing 30-day congressional notification with “or as far in advance of such transfer as is practicable as

48 Department of Defense, “Self-Defense Strike in Iraq Kills Terrorist Leader,” DOD News, January 4, 2024.
49 White House, “A Joint Statement from the Governments of the United States, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and the United Kingdom,”
January 3, 2024.
50 House Foreign Affairs Committee, “Chairman McCaul Issues Statement on Houthi Threat,” December 4, 2023.
51 Jennifer Jacobs, “US to Review Terrorist Label for Houthis After Ship Seized,” Bloomberg, November 21, 2023.
52 “244 US cargo planes, 20 ships deliver over 10,000 tons of military equipment to Israel — report,” Times of Israel,
December 25, 2023.
53 Jared Malsin and Nancy A. Youssef, “U.S. Provides Bunker-Buster Bombs to Israel—A surge in arms includes
15,000 bombs and 57,000 artillery shells,” Wall Street Journal, December 2, 2023.
54 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Israel—M830a1 120mm Tank Cartridges,” December 9, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

8

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

determined by the President on a case-by-case basis during extraordinary circumstances impacting the national
security of the United States.” The House version of a supplemental appropriations bil would shorten
congressional review to 15 days. Several Members of Congress have objected to the Administration’s use of
emergency authority to bypass congressional review.55
Humanitarian Assistance for Palestinians
During President Biden’s October 18 visit to Israel, he announced $100 million in U.S.
humanitarian assistance for Gaza and the West Bank, to “help support over a million displaced
and conflict-affected people with clean water, food, hygiene support, medical care, and other
essential needs” via “trusted partners including UN agencies and international NGOs.”56
According to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), for FY2024, USAID’s
Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance has so far committed $43.3 million in assistance for Gaza and
the West Bank, and the Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration has
committed $66 million for the region via the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and another implementing partner.57
Some lawmakers have sponsored legislation or written letters calling for a halt to humanitarian
aid in Gaza and/or greater monitoring of whether or not any U.S. assistance to Gaza and the West
Bank may previously have been diverted—or be at risk of future diversion—by Hamas or other
groups.58 Other lawmakers have called for additional humanitarian aid for the Palestinians.59
Supplemental Appropriations Legislation
In an October 19 Oval Office speech, President Biden announced an emergency supplemental
budget request to support U.S. partners, including Ukraine, Israel, and others, and address other
domestic and global issues.60 In sum, the President seeks over $14 billion in Israel-related
funding. On November 2, the House passed H.R. 6126, the Israel Security Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2024, (by a vote of 226-196). The bill would provide $14.3 billion in Israel-
related supplemental appropriations, but would offset the proposed additional appropriations for
Israel by rescinding $14.3 billion for the Internal Revenue Service. The bill does not include
appropriations for Ukraine or humanitarian assistance.
In early December, the Senate Appropriations Committee released its version of the supplemental
bill in an amendment (S.Amdt. 1371 to H.R. 815). Like the House-passed bill and the President’s
request, the Senate-introduced base bill would provide:
• $5.4 billion for the Department of Defense (DOD)’s response to the Israel-
Hamas war in Gaza and related expenses, including (1) $4.4 billion that could be

55 Alex Gangitano, “Senate Democrats scoff at Biden’s Israel arms sale,” The Hill, January 3, 2024.
56 White House, “U.S. Announcement of Humanitarian Assistance to the Palestinian People,” October 18, 2023.
57 USAID, Levant Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #2, December 7, 2023.
58 Text of October 24 letter from 24 Representatives to USAID Director Samantha Power available at
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/24080806-23-10-23-letter-to-usaid-re-gaza-west-bank-funding-copy.
Lawmakers in both chambers have introduced bills during the 118th Congress that would prohibit any U.S. funding for
Palestinians in Gaza absent a presidential certification that (among other things) the assistance would not benefit
Hamas or other terrorist organizations or affiliates. Senate version: S. 489; House version: H.R. 5996.
59 Text of November 8 letter from 26 Senators to President Biden available at https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/letter_to_president_biden_on_gaza.pdf.
60 The request is available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Letter-regarding-critical-
national-security-funding-needs-for-FY-2024.pdf.
Congressional Research Service

9

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

transferred among several defense appropriations accounts for various purposes
(including the replenishment of U.S. defense equipment; reimbursement of DOD
for defense services provided to Israel; expansion of munitions production; and
production of unspecified critical defense articles); (2) $801.4 million for
ammunition procurement; and (3) $198.6 million “to mitigate industrial base
constraints” through Defense Production Act purchases.
• $4 billion in DOD funding for Iron Dome and David’s Sling defense systems.
• $3.5 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), all of which may be made
available for Israel to spend in-country in local currency (known as off-shore
procurement). The bill also would waive congressional notification for any FMF
funds appropriated in the bill for Israel if the President determines that to do so is
in the national security interest of the United States.
• $1.2 billion in DOD funding for the Iron Beam laser-based defense system being
developed by Israel.
In addition, and like the House bill and the President’s request, the Senate-introduced base bill
also includes proposed provisions that would amend the Department of Defense Appropriations
Act, 2005 (P.L. 108-287, §12001) to permit the transfer of previously prohibited categories of
defense articles to the Government of Israel, and temporarily waive limitations on the total value
of defense stockpiles located in Israel and set aside for Israel’s use per 22 U.S.C. §2321h(b). As
previously mentioned, H.R. 6126 would shorten the congressional review period for such
transfers to 15 days; the Senate-introduced bill specifies that congressional review take place “as
far in advance of such transfer as is practicable as determined by the President on a case-by-case
basis during extraordinary circumstances impacting the national security of the United States.”
There are several other differences between the House and Senate-introduced Israel-related
supplemental appropriations bills. In addition to aid to Israel, the President also requested over
$9 billion in funding via global humanitarian accounts that could be partly allocated to address
the needs of those affected by the crisis in Gaza and Israel (including in neighboring countries):
$5.65 billion in International Disaster Assistance (IDA) and $3.495 billion in Migration and
Refugee Assistance (MRA). The House bill does not include these funds. The Senate-introduced
bill would increase funding levels beyond the President’s request to a total of $10 billion ($5.65
billion in IDA and $4.34 billion in MRA).
The House bill mandates a reporting requirement describing all security assistance provided to
Israel since the October 7 attacks; the Senate-introduced bill does not. The Senate-introduced bill
includes $120 million in additional appropriations for other entities, including $75 million in
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding for Jordan and Lebanon
to enhance border security; $10 million in INCLE for programs administered by the USSC; $10
million in Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) for a U.S. contribution to the Multinational Force
and Observers mission in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula to enhance force protection capabilities; and
$25 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for reconciliation programs in the Middle East,
including between Israelis and Palestinians.
13 Senators Announce Amendment to Supplemental Appropriations Bill for Israel
On December 7, 13 Senators published a “discussion draft” of an amendment to H.R. 815 that would (1) require
that the weapons received by any country under this bil are used in accordance with U.S. law, international
humanitarian law, and the law of armed conflict; (2) require that, per existing law (Section 620i(a) of the Foreign
Assistance Act), the President obtain assurances that any country receiving weapons via this bil cooperate ful y
with U.S.-supported efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to those in need; and (3) require that the President
Congressional Research Service

10

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

report to the Congress within 30 days on whether each country receiving U.S. security assistance through this bil
is, among other things, using U.S.-funded military equipment in accordance with their intended purposes.61
Possible Options for Congress
Additional U.S. Assistance for Israel and Possible Conditions
Lawmakers may consider whether to increase, maintain, decrease, or condition existing U.S.
support for Israel. Some (see text box above) have publicly signaled their support for specific
legislative language that would potentially condition U.S. security assistance.62 Other Members
have voiced opposition to efforts to “tie the hands of Israel” or condition assistance.63 One report
suggests that some lawmakers object to the Administration’s proposed elimination of
congressional reporting requirements on the use of FMF for Israel and that the Administration
may have to accept more oversight.64
Senator Bernie Sanders has introduced S.Res. 504, a privileged resolution, which, if passed by the
Senate by a simple majority vote, would mandate that within 30 days of passage, the State
Department must provide Congress with information on Israel’s human rights practices pursuant
to section 502B(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. After receiving the report, Congress, by
joint resolution, may act to terminate, restrict, or continue security assistance to Israel.
Humanitarian Assistance for Palestinians and Israel
As mentioned above, the President’s October supplemental budget request includes more than $9
billion in humanitarian assistance potentially usable for needs in and around Gaza, the West
Bank, and Israel from the MRA and IDA accounts. In a separate October request, the President
asked for $1.05 billion in “Food for Peace” grants for global emergency food needs via the
Department of Agriculture.65 Members of Congress are debating the scope and conditions under
which humanitarian assistance should be appropriated or allocated. Some strongly support
boosting humanitarian aid for Palestinians and facilitating its provision,66 while others have
expressed concerns that Hamas or other militants could divert aid shipments for their own use.67

61 Senator Chris Van Hollen, “Van Hollen, Durbin, Kaine, Schatz & Colleagues Announce Amendment Requiring that
Use of U.S. Supplemental Aid Comply with U.S., International Law,” December 7, 2023.
62 For example, see Sarah Fortinsky, “Turner says ‘conditional aid’ to Israel ‘accurately’ reflects US policy,” The Hill,
November 26, 2023; “Sen. Murphy open to placing conditions on aid to Israel, calls civilian death toll in Gaza
‘unacceptable,’” CNN, November 26, 2023.
63 Senate Minority Leader, Congressional Record, November 28, 2023; Adrian Adragna, “Senate Foreign Relations
chair does not support conditions on U.S. aid to Israel,” Politico, November 27, 2023.
64 Rachel Oswald, “Push to arm Israel reveals more Democrats urging conditions,” CQ News, December 4, 2023.
65 See https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Summary-of-Funding-Request-to-Meet-Critical-
Needs.pdf.
66 See text of October 18 letter from 33 Senators to Secretary Blinken at https://www.murphy.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/un_humanitarian_appeal.pdf; and text of October 20 letter from 130 Representatives to President Biden at
https://connolly.house.gov/uploadedfiles/letter_to_president_biden_on_israel.pdf.
67 Jeff Stein and Jacob Bogage, “GOP targets Gaza’s biggest relief group, clashing with the White House,” Washington
Post, November 11, 2023; Marc Rod, “Republicans signal concerns about aid to Palestinians, Ukraine in Israel funding
request,” Jewish Insider, October 23, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

11

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

Monitoring U.S. Security Assistance for Human Rights Purposes
Since the IDF began its operations in Gaza, some critics have accused Israel of causing excessive
civilian casualties and possible misuse of U.S. defense equipment.68 Biden Administration
officials also have become more vocal in their call for Israeli attentiveness to civilian casualties.69
In an early January press conference, a State Department spokesperson remarked that while the
United States has seen Israel “take additional measures to deconflict sites,” the “results continue
to be – to not match where the Israeli intentions are.”70 In mid-December 2023, CNN reported
that a U.S. intelligence assessment compiled by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
concluded that “40-45% of the 29,000 air-to-ground munitions Israel has used [in Gaza since
October 7] have been unguided.”71 A Wall Street Journal report from late December investigating
a bombing in which Israel killed a senior Hamas commander and 126 other individuals,
concluded that while Israeli commanders attempted to limit collateral damage, the bombing of
underground tunnels also brought down buildings standing above.72 In a December video, Israel
Air Force (IAF) Chief of Staff Brig. Gen. Omer Tischler described the principles IAF officers are
instructed to follow when planning potential air strikes.73
Congress may debate end-use monitoring (EUM) requirements for U.S. defense articles in the
context of the conflict. U.S. aid and arms sales—including to Israel—are subject to laws such as
the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). The AECA requires the
Departments of State and Defense to conduct EUM to ensure that recipients of U.S. defense
articles use such items solely for their intended purposes.74 In addition, in February 2023, the
Administration revised the U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, which states:
United States foreign policy and national security objectives are best advanced by
facilitating arms transfers to trusted actors who will use them responsibly and who share
United States interests. This policy recognizes that, when not employed responsibly,
defense materiel can be used to violate human rights and international humanitarian law,
increase the risk of civilian harm, and otherwise damage United States interests.75
One report from mid-December indicated that the Biden Administration is withholding the
delivery of 27,000 M4 and M16 rifles for Israel’s national police due to concerns that such
armaments may be transferred to civilians under an initiative led by Israel’s ultra-nationalist
National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir.76

68 See, for example, Brian Finucane, “Is Washington Responsible for What Israel Does with American Weapons?”
Foreign Affairs, November 17, 2023.
69 Department of Defense, “‘A Time for American Leadership’: Remarks by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III at
the Reagan National Defense Forum (As Delivered),” Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, December 2, 2023.
70 Department of State Press Briefing, January 4, 2024.
71 Natasha Bertrand and Katie Bo Lillis, “US intelligence assessment finds nearly half of Israeli munitions dropped on
Gaza are imprecise ‘dumb bombs,’” CNN, December 13, 2023.
72 David S. Cloud, Dov Lieber and Omar Abdel-Baqui, “How an Israeli Airstrike on a Hamas Commander Also Killed
Scores of Civilians,” Wall Street Journal, December 28, 2023.
73 Emanuel Fabian, “IAF: Gaza strikes precise, there’s no indiscriminate bombing, but mistakes can happen,” Times of
Israel, December 28, 2023.
74 CRS In Focus IF11197, U.S. Arms Sales and Human Rights: Legislative Basis and Frequently Asked Questions, by
Paul K. Kerr and Michael A. Weber; CRS Report R46814, The U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control
Reform Act of 2018, by Paul K. Kerr and Christopher A. Casey.
75 White House, Memorandum on United States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, February 23, 2023.
76 Nancy A. Youssef and Vivian Salama, “Washington Is Blocking Shipment of Rifles to Israel,” Wall Street Journal,
December 14, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

12

Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress

Author Information

Jim Zanotti
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Acknowledgments
Former Research Assistant Michael H. Memari, CRS Geospatial Information Systems Analysts Molly Cox
and Cassandra Higgins, and Visual Information Specialists Amber Wilhelm and Brion Long contributed to
this report.

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R47828 · VERSION 15 · UPDATED
13