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January 8, 2024
China and Sub-Saharan Africa
The People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) maintains
Cooperation also takes place via multilateral platforms such
relations with nearly every country in Sub-Saharan Africa
as U.N. bodies and groups of emerging economies. At a
(“Africa”). Often dating to the Cold War, these ties grew in
2023 China-Africa Leaders’ Dialogue, PRC leader Xi
scope and diversity after the launch in 2000 of the Forum
Jinping said China would launch initiatives supporting
on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), a channel for high-
industrialization, agricultural modernization, and talent
level contacts. Some Members of Congress have asserted
development in Africa.
that China’s geostrategic aims in Africa pose threats to U.S.
foreign policy and national security interests. The Biden
Economic Relations
Administration has emphasized strategic competition with
China’s goods trade with Africa totaled $243 billion in
the PRC in its national security and regional strategy; the
2022, up from $181 billion in 2013, per International
U.S. Secretary of Defense has labeled China’s activities in
Monetary Fund data. In comparison, U.S.-Africa trade
Africa as “destabilizing.”
totaled $50 billion in 2022, down from $63 billion in 2013
(see Figure 1). China’s top African trading partner in 2022
PRC interests in Africa center on expanding trade, finance,
was South Africa (accounting for ~$53 billion or 21% of
and investment ties and securing international support for
PRC trade with the region). Other top PRC trade partners
the PRC’s positions and policies. PRC industrial demand
include Angola, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of
for Africa’s commodities, including critical minerals, make
Congo (DRC). China’s top imports from Africa consist of
the region important for China’s manufacturing sector. PRC
fossil fuels and metals, including precious metals and
firms are active across Africa, where there is sizable
critical minerals, which are crucial in a range of strategic
demand for PRC goods and services, notably infrastructure
industries. China has a 2019 bilateral free trade agreement
construction. Much of China’s large-scale commercial
(FTA) with Mauritius, and China and the Southern African
activity in Africa is aided by PRC state-backed credit, often
Customs Union have a customs cooperation agreement and
tied to the use of PRC goods and services. PRC loans have
reportedly are negotiating a full FTA.
contributed to rising sovereign debt distress in Africa.
Figure 1. U.S. & China Total Goods Trade with Africa
In terms of African governments’ approaches to the PRC,
By Value ($USD Bil ions)
economic interests (e.g., export growth, capital, and access
to inexpensive goods), as well as geopolitical motivations
(either as a preference for some PRC policies or for diverse
international partnerships), may influence decisions. Public
opinion analysis in Africa shows a wide range of views.
Surveys from Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa indicate
more favorable views compared to non-African countries.
Other polling suggests generally positive views of China’s
economic and political influence, with the strongest
assessments of the PRC’s model of development in Benin,
Burkina Faso, and Mali.
Interstate Relations
The PRC has established diplomatic ties with all African
countries except Eswatini, which has diplomatic relations
Source: International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics
with Taiwan. The PRC claims multiple bilateral “strategic”
and other partnerships in Africa, maintains a mission to the
China’s economic activity in Africa is mediated, in part, by
African Union (AU), and has special representatives to
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a multifaceted
regional groups (e.g., the East African Community).
foreign economic policy and investment program. (See
CRS In Focus IF11735, China’s “One Belt, One Road”
FOCAC has a multi-level structure consisting of summits,
Initiative: Economic Issues.) Eswatini and Mauritius are the
ministerial conferences, and other senior official meetings
only African countries that have not joined the BRI. China
on thematic issues (e.g., trade, health, defense, law, and
has established a dominant position in many critical mineral
media). At triennial FOCAC summits, the PRC and
supply chains by investing in mining operations across
FOCAC’s African members set out PRC-African
Africa (e.g., cobalt mining in DRC) and importing a large
cooperation goals, as under the China-Africa Cooperation
share of Africa’s mineral production.
Vision 2035 adopted in 2021.
PRC entities provided roughly $90 billion in non-bond
investment to African countries between 2005 and 2022,
https://crsreports.congress.gov
China and Sub-Saharan Africa
with about three quarters going to the mining and energy
“would change the whole calculus of the geostrategic global
sectors, according to American Enterprise Institute China
campaign plans of protecting the homeland.”
Global Investment Tracker data. Top destinations included
DRC (18%), South Africa (13%), and Guinea (9%).
The PRC has carried out counterpiracy patrols off the Horn
of Africa since 2008, in coordination with similarly-tasked
Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center has
multinational naval operations, and is a top peacekeeping
documented $156.7 billion in loans from PRC lenders to
mission troop contributor, primarily in Africa. As of late
African state borrowers between 2000 and 2022; top loan
2023, per U.N. data, China was the eighth-largest U.N.
recipients included Angola (29%), Ethiopia (9%), and
peacekeeping mission troop contributing country (TCC),
Kenya (7%). The transport and energy sectors were the
with 2,275 personnel, and the largest TCC by far among the
targets of about 30% of such loans. PRC lending has
five permanent members of the Security Council.
contributed to growing African sovereign debt and, in some
cases (e.g., Zambia), debt distress. PRC loans reportedly
The PRC has provided police and military training and aid
account for about 12% of African public and private debts.
in Africa; developed relationships with senior leaders;
PRC lending to African countries has declined since 2017.
committed $100 million in military aid to the AU from
Amid concern over rising African indebtedness during the
2015-2020; set up a military training school in Tanzania in
outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the PRC joined the
2018; and in 2022, pledged ten additional “peace and
G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative, a temporary
security projects” in Africa in accordance with promises
suspension of debt service payments in 2020 and 2021.
made during that year’s FOCAC ministerial conference.
China is co-chairing creditor committees negotiating debt
PRC private security contractors operate in parts of Africa,
restructuring for Zambia and Ethiopia under the G20
primarily to protect PRC commercial interests.
Common Framework for Debt Treatments. Some experts
contend, however, that the PRC has not been transparent in
U.S. Policy Concerns
disclosing the terms of its loans to various African
The Biden Administration’s Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan
countries. Although China has canceled some African
Africa asserts that the PRC sees Africa “as an important
bilateral debt, delaying repayment and extending loan terms
arena to challenge the rules-based international order,
has been more common.
advance its own narrow commercial and geopolitical
interests, undermine transparency and openness, and
While African countries have accepted concessional and
weaken U.S. relations with African peoples and
interest-free loans, as well as foreign aid grants, from
governments.” At the same time, Administration officials
China, public data on PRC aid flows is neither authoritative
have emphasized that they will not force African countries
nor readily comparable to Western aid due to differing
to “choose” between the PRC and the United States, likely
definitions of “aid” and data gaps. Like Western donors,
in recognition of some African leaders’ and publics’
China has supported training and vocational exchanges in
sensitivity over state sovereignty and independence. Some
Africa, including via PRC enterprises and initiatives such as
U.S. officials also have accused China of so-called “debt
“Luban Workshops” that have trained locals in areas such
trap diplomacy” and/or “predatory lending.”
as agriculture and railway management.
Issues for Congress
Security Relations
Congressional hearings have examined growing China-
The PRC has long sold arms to Africa, and from 2016-2020
Africa ties, and Congress has established a range of
reportedly was Africa’s second-largest arms supplier after
assistance and financing tools to promote U.S. interests in
Russia. Data from the Stockholm International Peace
Africa and elsewhere. These include the U.S. International
Research Institute suggests that Nigeria, Ethiopia, and
Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the U.S.
Angola have been among the world’s top ten importers of
Countering PRC Influence Fund (CPIF), a foreign
PRC conventional arms since 2020. Other PRC military and
assistance appropriation. In the 118th Congress, the FY2024
security engagement in Africa is limited, but growing. PRC
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 118-31)
leaders have tasked the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
expanded U.S. monitoring of PRC activities in Africa. The
with developing the capacity to protect China’s global
extent to which China’s expanding presence and
economic interests and PRC nationals in Africa, and with
partnerships in Africa may inherently challenge or threaten
conducting regional military diplomacy and cooperation.
vital U.S. interests is a focus of ongoing congressional
consideration, as are U.S. responses. Issues of interest to
In 2017, the PLA established its first overseas military base
Congress may include PRC firms’ influence over critical
in Djibouti—at a chokepoint between the Red Sea and the
minerals and telecommunications in the region; the impact
Gulf of Aden. This base is located near Camp Lemonnier, a
of PRC influence on democratic governance in Africa; the
U.S. naval expeditionary base and the sole enduring U.S.
level and impact of CPIF allocations for Africa; and the
military base in Africa. In 2023, the Department of Defense
scope of U.S. trade and investment assistance to the region.
reported that China “probably ... has considered” pursuing
additional military logistics bases in East Africa or West
Ricardo Barrios, Analyst in Asian Affairs
Africa’s Atlantic coast. In March 2023, the Commander of
Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs
U.S. Africa Command testified to Congress that “[i]n itself,
Nicolas Cook, Specialist in African Affairs
Chinese basing in Djibouti–or any future basing project–
Michael D. Sutherland, Analyst in International Trade and
poses a marginal threat to U.S. interests on the continent,”
while also cautioning that a PRC base in West Africa
Finance
https://crsreports.congress.gov
China and Sub-Saharan Africa
IF12566
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12566 · VERSION 2 · NEW