Qatar: Issues for the 118th Congress
November 3, 2023
The State of Qatar is a small, energy-rich emirate strategically located near the center of the
Persian Gulf. Defense and diplomatic cooperation anchor close-U.S. Qatari relations: Qatar hosts
Christopher M. Blanchard
thousands of U.S. troops, allows U.S. military use of Qatari facilities, and consults with U.S.
Specialist in Middle
officials on engagements with third parties in the Middle East region and beyond. In January
Eastern Affairs
2022, President Joseph Biden and Emir Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani reaffirmed the

multifaceted partnership between the United States and Qatar, and the Biden Administration
designated Qatar as a Major Non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Ally.

Qatar holds the third-largest proven natural gas reserves in the world, and is a major exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG):
LNG revenues have fueled change in Qatar and enabled Qatar’s active foreign policies. Qatar’s fewer than 300,000 citizens
enjoy one of the world’s highest per capita income levels, and, as with other Gulf states, a large expatriate population is
critical to Qatar’s domestic economy. Since the mid-1990s, Qatari leaders have overseen rapid, expansive economic growth;
transformed the global media environment through the founding of the Al Jazeera satellite networks; engaged in complex and
at times controversial diplomacy with U.S. partners and adversaries; and pursued a course of limited domestic political
liberalization.
While Qatar supports many U.S. priorities, its leaders’ pursuit of Qatar’s sovereign interests and initiatives have presented
both opportunities and challenges. Successive U.S. Administrations have sought to expand military, security, diplomatic, and
economic cooperation with Qatar. Issues of immediate priority for the United States in the fall of 2023 include coordinating
with Qatar to affect the release of hostages held by Palestinian groups in Gaza, sustaining and strengthening U.S.-Qatari
defense cooperation, encouraging stability in Qatar’s relationships with fellow members of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) and other Arab states, and leveraging Qatar’s diplomatic engagement with the Taliban government in Afghanistan and
with neighboring Iran. Prior to the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, Qatar had not joined the Abraham Accords between
some Arab states and Israel but had instead conditioned normalization of relations with Israel on substantial progress toward
resolving Israel-Palestinian disputes. Events since October 7 may make prospects of normalization more remote.
Qatar voted to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the United Nations, stated its “respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity,” and called for a ceasefire and a peaceful resolution to the conflict in accordance with
international law. Emir Tamim and People’s Republic of China (PRC) leader Xi Jinping met in Saudi Arabia in December
2022 in conjunction with the Arab States-China Summit and the GCC-China Summit. PRC state-owned firms have provided
infrastructure and construction services for some major projects in Qatar. Qatar exports oil products and LNG to China.
Since 2012, successive Administrations have proposed several major U.S. arms sales to Qatar, including items for air defense
and missile defense. Qatar is investing in its military facilities to meet current and potential future needs, with planned Qatar-
funded development projects at Al Udeid Air Base valued at $8.4 billion through 2033.
Qatar’s constitution provides for elections to a consultative Shura Council. The government limits freedom of assembly,
expression, religion, the press, and association. Labor and migrants’ rights concerns have long drawn public and official
attention as Qatar. The U.S. State Department notes reports of human rights violations in Qatar and credits Qatar with taking
some steps to improve human rights and labor conditions.
In Congress, foreign affairs, defense, and intelligence committees monitor Qatar’s foreign and domestic policies, while
Qatar’s resources, sovereign wealth, and associated geo-economic clout fuel congressional interest in Qatar’s energy and
investment policies and in U.S.-Qatari trade and investment ties. In the 118th Congress, a Congressional Caucus on Qatari-
American Strategic Relationships is active. Members of Congress and congressional staff frequently visit Qatar to attend
conferences, consult with U.S. civilian and military personnel, and conduct oversight of U.S. regional policy and U.S.
military operations.
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Overview and Bilateral Relations
The State of Qatar is a small, energy-rich monarchy, strategically located near the center of the
Persian Gulf (see Figure 1); its natural resources and active foreign policy give it global
influence. Qatar holds the third-largest proven natural gas reserves in the world, and is a major
exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG).1 From 2000 to 2021, Qatar’s gross domestic product
(GDP) increased tenfold from $17 billion to an estimated $179 billion. The country’s population,
including expatriates, more than quadrupled between 2000 and 2022, growing to over 2.7 million
in 2022.2 Its fewer than 300,000 citizens enjoy one of the world’s highest per capita income
levels, and, as with other Gulf states, a large expatriate population is critical to Qatar’s domestic
economy. Since the mid-1990s, Qatari leaders have overseen rapid, expansive economic growth;
transformed the global media environment through the founding of the Al Jazeera satellite
networks; engaged in complex and at times controversial diplomacy with U.S. partners and
adversaries; and introduced constitutional changes to formalize succession and limited
consultative governance. International attention focuses on Qatar’s roles as an energy exporter
and diplomatic catalyst.
U.S. officials recognized Qatar’s independence in September 1971 and established diplomatic
relations in 1972. Since the 1990s, successive U.S. Administrations have sought to expand
military, security, diplomatic, and economic cooperation with Qatar. Qatari leaders’ pursuit of
Qatar’s sovereign interests and initiatives have presented both opportunities and challenges over
time. Past U.S. Administrations have scrutinized Qatari policy with regard to some armed
conflicts and political unrest in the Middle East and North Africa region and some Qataris’
relationships with Islamist groups: at present Qatar supports many U.S. priorities and U.S.
officials welcome Qatar’s partnership (see below).
Issues of immediate priority for the U.S. government in the fall of 2023 include coordinating with
Qatar to affect the release of hostages held by Palestinian groups and leveraging Qatar’s
diplomatic engagement with neighboring Iran and actors in Lebanon to avoid widening of the
Israel-Hamas conflict. Prior to the October 2023 Hamas attacks on Israel, Qatar had not joined
the Abraham Accords that some other Arab states had signed with Israel beginning in 2020, but
has instead conditioned normalization of relations with Israel on substantial progress toward
resolving Israel-Palestinian disputes. Qatar hosts a political office of the Palestinian Islamist
armed group Hamas (a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization). Biden Administration
officials have thanked Qatar for its role as an intermediary to Hamas in the wake of the group’s
October 7 terrorist attacks and taking of hostages in Israel. On October 13, Secretary of State
Blinken said in Qatar that “there can be no more business as usual with Hamas,” and press reports
citing unidentified diplomats suggest the United States and Qatar “have agreed to revisit the
Persian Gulf state’s association with Hamas” following the resolution of the Hamas hostage
crisis.3 More than 100 Members of Congress wrote to President Biden on October 16 urging him

1 In 2015, Qatar National Bank estimated that at then-prevailing production rates, Qatar’s gas reserves could last 138
years. Sergio Chapa, “U.S. Holds World’s Top LNG Exporter Spot on European Energy Crisis,” Bloomberg, February
1, 2022; and, Agence France Presse, “Qatar vast gas reserves ‘to last 138 years’: report,” June 21, 2015.
2 Based on figures available from Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United
Nations Secretariat, “World Population Prospects: The 2022 Revision,” accessed February 2023.
3 John Hudson, “U.S., Qatar to revisit Doha’s ties to Hamas after Gaza hostage crisis,” Washington Post, October 26,
2023; and, Humeyra Pamuk, “Qatar open to reconsidering Hamas presence in Qatar, US official says,” Reuters,
October 27, 2023.
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to “put significant pressure on Qatar and Türkiye to cease their support for Hamas and expel
Hamas leadership that they host.”4
Figure 1. Qatar at-a-Glance

Area
11,586 sq. km (slightly smaller than Connecticut)
People
Population: ~2.7 mil ion, of which nearly ~90% are expatriates
Religions: Muslim 65.2%; Christian 13.7%; Hindu 15.9%; 3.8% Buddhist; and 1% other. Figures
include expatriates. (2020 est.)
Economy
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): $249 bil ion on purchasing power parity (PPP) basis (2021 est.)
GDP per capita: $92,900 on PPP basis
Inflation: 2.3% (2021)
GDP Growth Rate: 1.59% (2021)
Oil and Gas
Oil Exports: ~900,000 barrels per day (2022)
Gas (LNG) Exports: 127.9 bil ion cubic meters per year (2021)
Sources: Graphic created by CRS using data from Department of State and Esri. At-a-glance information from
CIA World Factbook (March 2023), U.N. Population Division (March 2023), International Monetary Fund, and
Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) Annual Statistics Bul etin (October 2022).
In January 2022, President Joseph Biden and Emir Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani
reaffirmed the multifaceted partnership between the United States and Qatar, and the Biden
Administration designated Qatar as a Major Non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

4 Marc Rod, “Lawmakers reject de-escalation, urge strong action against Iran, Qatar, Turkey,” Jewish Insider, October
17, 2023.
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Ally. A Biden Administration official said that the designation “reflects U.S. commitment to the
strategic partnership and the role that we envision for Qatar in the region.”5
U.S. priorities include sustaining and strengthening U.S.-Qatari defense cooperation, sustaining
and strengthening U.S.-Qatari defense cooperation, and encouraging stability in Qatar’s
relationships with fellow members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and other Arab states.
Qatar hosts U.S. military forces under the terms of a defense cooperation agreement, including
the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). U.S.-Qatar security ties have
deepened since the mid-1990s, and in May 2022, CENTCOM commander General Erik Kurilla
described U.S.-Qatar defense cooperation as “a critically important strategic partnership.”6
On several occasions, U.S. officials have acknowledged Qatar’s role in supporting U.S.
diplomatic efforts globally. In July 2022, Secretary of State Antony Blinken praised Qatar for its
role in supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces, assisting the United States with Afghanistan, and
holding indirect talks with Iran.7 In January 2023, Blinken again acknowledged Qatar for
diplomatically engaging on Ukraine, Afghanistan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.8 In
May 2023, Secretary Blinken thanked Qatar’s Prime Minister for Qatar’s “important efforts to de-
escalate violence” between Israel and Palestinian groups in Gaza and “reiterated his appreciation
for Qatar’s continued assistance on Afghanistan.”9
U.S.-Qatar Defense and Security Relations
In the late 1980s, the United States and Qatar engaged in a years-long diplomatic dispute
regarding Qatar’s black market procurement of U.S.-made Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.10 The
dispute froze then-planned economic and military cooperation, and Congress approved a ban on
arms sales to Qatar (§566(d), P.L. 100-461) that lasted until the months leading up to the 1991
Persian Gulf War, when Qatar allowed coalition forces to operate from Qatari territory and agreed
to destroy the missiles in question.11
Deep U.S. defense and security relations with Qatar did not begin until after the 1991 war. In
January 1991, Qatari armored forces helped coalition troops repel an Iraqi attack on the Saudi

5 U.S. Department of State, Special Online Briefing with Major General Matthew McFarlane, Commander, Combined
Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, and Dana Stroul, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, February 28,
2023.
6 U.S. CENTCOM, “CENTCOM Commander meets with Qatar Armed Forces Chief of Staff,” May 17, 2022.
7 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign
Affairs Al-Thani,” July 3, 2022.
8 In January 2023, Qatar had proposed hosting Democratic Republic of the Congo President Felix Tshisekedi and
Rwandan President Paul Kagame for talks over ongoing conflict in eastern Congo, but the talks did not materialize.
U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Al Thani,” January 21, 2023.
9 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Qatari Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Al
Thani,” May 13, 2023.
10 Qatar defended its procurement of the missiles in protest of the sale of similar missiles by the United States to
Bahrain, with which Qatar had an unresolved border dispute until 2001. Elaine Sciolino, “Qatar Rejects U.S. Demand
for Return of Illicit Stingers,” New York Times, June 28, 1988; Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. Drawn into Gulf Dispute—Stray
Stingers Tied to Qatar-Bahrain Tiff,” Washington Post, October 6, 1988.
11 The ban was formally repealed by the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act of 1991 (§568(b), P.L. 101-513). The conference report on H.R. 5114, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991 (H.Rept. 101-968) inserted Senate language (Amendment No. 144) that
repealed the ban based on information provided by the Secretary of Defense “that it is in the national interest to
reestablish United States-Qatari security relations because of their support for United States troops in the Middle East.”
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Arabian town of Kafji, on the coastal road leading south from Kuwait into Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich
Eastern Province.12
In June 1992, Qatar signed a defense cooperation agreement with the United States, opening a
period of close coordination in military affairs that has continued to the present. In June 1995,
Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa deposed his father and became Emir. The United States promptly
recognized Shaykh Hamad’s assumption of power, and welcomed his decision to subsequently
expand U.S.-Qatar defense cooperation. Shaykh Hamad faced a counter-coup attempt in 1996.
With its small territory and narrow citizen population base, Qatar relies to a large degree on
external cooperation and support for its security. With 16,500 personnel, Qatar’s armed forces are
the second smallest in the Middle East.13 Since 2013, the government has imposed mandatory
short-term (3-4 month) military training and service for Qatari males.
Qatari-U.S. defense relations have expanded since 2001 to include cooperative defense exercises,
equipment pre-positioning, and base access agreements. Qatar hosts the forward headquarters for
U.S. Central Command. In December 2013, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel visited
Doha, met with Emir Tamim, and signed a 10-year bilateral defense cooperation agreement. The
text of the agreement is classified.14 Qatar is a member of the Combined Maritime Forces
coalition, which operates Combined Task Forces (CTF) 150 (maritime security and counter-
terrorism), CTF 151 (counter piracy), CTF 152 (Gulf security and cooperation), and CTF 153
(Red Sea security). The Qatari military and the West Virginia National Guard cooperate under the
U.S. National Guard Bureau’s State Partnership Program.
Qatar’s 2022 designation as a Major Non-NATO Ally qualifies Qatar to purchase certain U.S.
arms, receive excess defense articles (EDA), and engage in defense research cooperation with the
United States, for which it would not otherwise be eligible.
Over the past several years, the number of U.S. military personnel who are deployed at the
various facilities in Qatar, including Al Udeid Air Base (see below), has ranged from about 8,000
to more than 10,000.15
Arms Sales
Since 2012, successive Administrations have proposed several major U.S. arms sales to Qatar,
marking a shift in Qatar’s defense planning toward the use of advanced U.S. attack and transport
helicopters and other weapons systems, including items for air defense and missile defense (see
Table A-1 in the Appendix). France previously had provided approximately 80% of Qatar’s arms

12 Thomas Ferraro, “Allies Retake Saudi City,” United Press International, January 31, 1991; and Joseph Albright,
“Marines Take Credit for Khafji Victory,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution, February 3, 1991.
13 Bahrain’s armed forces are the smallest. Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance
2022.
14 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Qatar,” Fact Sheet, July 30, 2021. In addition to this
agreement, as of 2021, the United States and Qatar had the following agreements for defense cooperation: 2012
General Security of Military Information Agreement, 2013 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, 2013 Basic
Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Intelligence, 2016 Communications Interoperability and Security
Memorandum of Agreement, and 2020 Maritime Implementing Agreement.
15 U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2021: Qatar,” February 2023, available at
https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2021/qatar; U.S. Department of State, “Coordinator for
Counterterrorism Ambassador Nathan A. Sales Travels to Qatar,” August 12, 2020; and Department of Defense, “U.S.
and Qatar Sign MOU Reaffirming Qatar’s Commitment to Supporting U.S. Military Activities at Al Udeid Air Base,”
January 14, 2019.
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inventory. Qatar collaborates with Italy and Turkey in support of its naval development efforts.16
Qatar’s purchase of U.S. weapons systems, including U.S. air and missile defense systems,
corresponds to increased interest in such systems from some other governments in the region,
ostensibly to defend against and respond to potential attacks from Iran. In 2021, the U.S.
Department of State reported
Qatar has over $26 billion in active government-to-government cases under the Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) system making Qatar the United States’ third largest FMS partner in
the world. Recent and significant FMS sales focused on integrated air and missile defense
and include the PATRIOT long-range air missile system, the National Advanced Surface
to Air Missile System, and the AN/FPS-132 Early Warning Radar; F-15QA fighter
aircraft—the most advanced F-15 in production; and AH-64E Apache attack helicopters.
Each of these programs includes facility construction and extended munitions, logistics,
and training support.17
Al Udeid Air Base and Military Construction
Qatar invested over $1 billion to construct the Al Udeid air base southwest of Doha during the
1990s. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also awarded over $100 million in Military
Construction Air Force (MCAF) contracts for the initial construction of U.S. storage, housing,
service, command, and communication facilities. Qatar’s financing and construction of the
runways and most of the facilities at Al Udeid and its granting of permission for the construction
of U.S.-funded facilities facilitated gradually deeper cooperation with U.S. military forces.
In April 2003, the U.S. military moved its Combat Air Operations Center for the Middle East
from Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia to Al Udeid. Al Udeid then served as a logistics,
command, and basing hub for U.S. operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other parts of the U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) AOR.18
Qatar has invested more than $8 billion to support U.S. and coalition operations at Al Udeid since
2003, expanding and enhancing the facility in conjunction with U.S. military construction
funding.19 From FY2003 to FY2011, Congress appropriated and authorized more than $457
million for U.S. military construction activities in Qatar.20
Qatar plans further investment in its military facilities to meet current and potential future needs.
Planned development projects under the Qatar Development of Al Udeid program are valued at
$8.4 billion with construction plans through 2033 set to adapt base facilities from an
expeditionary to an enduring nature and to enable them to house more than 15,000 personnel and
support additional fighter, transport, and helicopter aircraft.21
Nearby Camp As Sayliyah housed significant U.S. military equipment pre-positioning and
command facilities for the CENTCOM area of operations prior to its closure and a repositioning
of U.S. equipment in mid-2021.22 Facilities at As Sayliyah serve as the main operations center for
U.S. resettlement efforts in Qatar for evacuees from Afghanistan. Thousands of Afghans remain

16 Agnes Helou, “Qatari navy’s new amphibious ship to help fulfil nation’s ‘unique’ needs,” Breaking Defense,
February 2, 2023.
17 U.S. Department of State, Qatar Integrated Country Strategy, July 2022.
18 Rebecca Grant, “The Short, Strange Life of PSAB,” Air and Space Forces, July 1, 2012.
19 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Qatar,” Fact Sheet, July 30, 2021.
20 Specific legislative text available from CRS.
21 U.S. CENTCOM response to CRS Inquiry, January 2023.
22 Staff Sgt. Neil W. McCabe, “Curtain falls on ASG-Qatar after three decades supporting readiness, resilience,” U.S.
Army 310th Expeditionary Sustainment Command, June 24, 2021.
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in Qatar awaiting onward travel. U.S.-Qatar bilateral agreements provide terms for the hosting in
Qatar of evacuees from Afghanistan under U.S. auspices.23
Counterterrorism Issues
U.S. policymakers have considered alleged material support for terrorist groups by some Qataris,
including reported past support by members of the ruling family, over time alongside Qatar’s
counterterrorism efforts and its broader, long-term commitment to host and support U.S. military
forces.24 U.S. officials have described Qatar’s counterterrorism cooperation since 2001 as
significant, and the State Department report on terrorism for 2021 states that “Qatar has made
strides in addressing state-sourced internal support for educational and religious content
espousing intolerance, discrimination, sectarianism, and violence, although examples can still be
found in textbooks and disseminated through satellite television and other media.”25
Qatar and Hamas
Qatar hosts a political office of the Palestinian Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated
Foreign Terrorist Organization). The U.S. government and government of Israel have engaged
Qatari officials as interlocutors of Hamas prior to and in the wake of the October 7, 2023 Hamas-
led terrorist attacks in Israel. (See “Israel and the Palestinians” below.) In October 2023, the U.S.
Department of the Treasury named Muhammad Ahmad ‘Abd Al-Dayim Nasrallah as a Specially
Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224, describing Nasrallah as “a longtime
Hamas operative based in Qatar with close ties to Iranian elements,” who “in recent years ...was
involved in the transfer of tens of millions of dollars to Hamas, including Hamas’s military wing,
the Izz al-Din al-Qassim Brigades.”
U.S. Counterterrorism Assistance
Qatar uses its own funds to pay for participation of Qatari personnel in the U.S. State
Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) training program, including training that was
pertinent to Qatar’s preparations to host the 2022 International Federation of Association Football
(FIFA) soccer World Cup. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security reached cooperative
security agreements with Qatar related to the World Cup, and in July 2022 signed memoranda on
border and cyber security cooperation.26

23 U.S. State Department, Office of Treaty Affairs, Qatar (22-919)—Protocol Amending the Temporary Relocation
Transit Agreement of November 12, 2021, September 19, 2022; and, Qatar (21-1112)—Temporary Relocation Transit
Agreement, November 12, 2021.
24 In 2022, media reports described a lawsuit involving allegations of terrorist financing by Qatar Charity and Qatar
National Bank, and a reported investigation of similar allegations concerning the Emir’s half-brother. See Alan
Suderman, “Qatar, key US ally, faces new accusations of terror funding,” May 13, 2022; and, Sotloff et al v. Qatar
Charity et al, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, May 12, 2022. According to the 9/11 Commission
Report and former U.S. government officials, Qatari royal family member and later Interior Minister Shaykh Abdullah
bin Khalid Al Thani provided support to Al Qaeda figures, including the suspected mastermind of the September 11
attacks, Khalid Shaykh Mohammed. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States (The 9/11 Commission Report), pp. 73, 147-8, 488-9. See also, James Risen and David Johnston, “Qaeda Aide
Slipped Away Long Before September 11 Attack,” New York Times, March 8, 2003; Josh Meyer and John Goetz,
“Qatar’s Security Chief Suspected of Having Ties to Al Qaeda,” Los Angeles Times, March 28, 2003.
25 U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2021: Qatar,” February 2023, available at
https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2021/qatar.
26 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS to Expand Security Cooperation with Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates,” July 12, 2022.
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U.S. Security Assistance
The Administration of President George W. Bush requested $10,000 in International Military
Education and Training (IMET) assistance funds for Qatar in FY2010, and requested an
additional $10,000 for FY2011 but did not allocate funds for Qatar during that fiscal year. The
nominal IMET assistance had the administrative effect of making Qatar eligible to purchase other
U.S. military training at the reduced cost level available only to IMET recipients.27 The Obama,
Trump, and Biden Administrations have not requested IMET assistance for Qatar, though Qatari
personnel continue to participate in IMET and other U.S. training programs.
U.S.-Qatar Economic Relations
Qatar and the United States have not negotiated a Free Trade Agreement, but Qatar has used a
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) to undertake large investments in the United
States. The joint statement of a 2018 U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue “recognized” the Qatar
Investment Authority’s (Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund) commitment of $45 billion in future
investments in U.S. companies and real estate. U.S. exports to Qatar consist mainly of aerospace
equipment. U.S. imports from Qatar consist mainly of petroleum products. Total bilateral trade in
2022 was valued at $6.5 billion.28 Qatar Petroleum has jointly developed LNG export
infrastructure at the Golden Pass facility in Texas with ExxonMobil.29
Qatar’s airline, Qatar Airways (QA), has been a major buyer of U.S. commercial aircraft and in
January 2022 announced that it would purchase up to 50 cargo aircraft and up to 50 737 Max
passenger aircraft from Boeing.30 Qatar Airways and Airbus in 2023 announced they had reached
a settlement of their dispute over paint on QA-purchased Airbus aircraft.31 In the past, some U.S.
airlines challenged Qatar Airways’ benefits under a U.S.-Qatar “open skies” agreement based on
the Qatari government’s support for QA aircraft purchases.32 The United States and Qatar reached
a set of “understandings” on civil aviation on January 29, 2018, committing Qatar Airways to
financial transparency and containing some limitations on the airline’s ability to pick up
passengers in Europe for flights to the United States. European officials reached an open skies
agreement with Qatar in 2021, but not all European Union member states have ratified it.33
Several prominent U.S. universities have established satellite faculty campuses in Doha at Qatar’s
Education City, where Qatari, American, and other students pursue undergraduate and graduate
coursework across a broad range of subjects: Carnegie Mellon, Virginia Commonwealth
University, Georgetown University, Texas A&M University, Weill Cornell Medicine, and
Northwestern University.

27 The Senate version of the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 2467, 112th Congress) would have
amended existing law to make Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia eligible for such reduced
cost purchases without having to receive IMET. §1204 of S. 2467 would have amended Section 546(b) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. §2347e(b)).
28 U.S. Census Bureau data via U.S. International Trade Administration, TradeStatsExpress, February 2023.
29 ExxonMobil, “QatarEnergy and ExxonMobil to independently market Golden Pass LNG,” October 27, 2022; and, at
https://www.goldenpasslng.com/about/about-golden-pass.
30 “Boeing lands huge airplane order from Qatar Airways.” Associated Press, January 31, 2022.
31 Airbus, “Qatar Airways and Airbus reach amicable settlement in legal dispute,” February 1, 2023.
32 Frank Kane, “Open Skies Dispute Between US and Gulf Airlines Escalates,” The National, January 30, 2016.
33 European Commission, “Aviation: EU and Qatar sign landmark aviation agreement,” October 18, 2021.
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Congress and Qatar
In Congress, legislative action related to Qatar has been relatively limited with the exception of
appropriations and authorization legislation that affects U.S. defense programs and congressional
review of proposed foreign military sales to the Qatari military. Congressional foreign affairs,
defense, and intelligence committees monitor Qatar’s foreign and domestic policies, while
Qatar’s resources, sovereign wealth, and associated geo-economic clout fuel congressional
interest in Qatar’s energy and investment policies and in U.S.-Qatari trade and investment ties.
Congress has acknowledged Qatar’s support for U.S. military operations, including efforts to
evacuate U.S. personnel and third country nationals from Afghanistan. The Senate in 2022
adopted S.Res. 390, expressing appreciation for Qatar’s “pivotal role and support of Operation
Allies Refuge; and ... support to temporarily house thousands of evacuees [from Afghanistan]
until they are cleared for follow-on movement.” In 2022, Congress designated U.S. veterans who
served on active duty in Qatar and several other countries on or after August 2, 1990, as “covered
veterans” under the Honoring our Promise to Address Comprehensive Toxics (PACT) Act of 2022
(P.L. 117-168), which expands health care eligibility for veterans subject to toxic exposure. In the
118th Congress, S. 302 would provide for related cancer screening.
The FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act P.L. 117-81 did not include a provision from the
House-passed version of the bill (Section 1251 of H.R. 4350) on U.S.-Qatar relations, but the
joint explanatory statement accompanying the bill repeated that provision’s operative statement
that “the United States should continue to strengthen the relationship between the United States
and Qatar, including through security and economic cooperation.”
In the 118th Congress, a Congressional Caucus on Qatari-American Strategic Relationships is
active.
Qatari Politics and Government
Qatar declared its independence from the United Kingdom on September 3, 1971.34 It is a
constitutional monarchy governed by the Al Thani family; in an April 2003 referendum, Qatari
voters approved a new constitution that outlined plans to elect some members of the consultative
National Assembly (Majlis al Shura) and recognized women’s right to vote and run for national
office. The Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (age 42), began his rule in
June 2013 when his father, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa, abdicated, marking the first voluntary and
planned transition of power in Qatar since its independence.35 Al Thani family members lead
several government ministries and hold board seats on important state and private companies; the
ruling family retains ultimate political authority but its relationships with other leading families
appear cooperative. In March 2023, Emir Tamim bin Hamad announced a cabinet reshuffle and
named Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani as Prime Minister: Sheikh Mohammed has
served as Qatar’s Foreign Minister since 2016.36

34 Treaties signed in 1868 and 1916 between the Al Thani family and the United Kingdom recognized the Al Thani
family’s authority in Qatar but placed mutually agreed restrictions on Qatari sovereignty from 1868 through 1971.
35 The former emir, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa, raised Qatar’s global profile and influence after replacing his own
father in a palace coup in 1995. Qatar’s constitution reflects the previously contested principle that successors to the
throne will follow the hereditary line of Shaykh Hamad’s male offspring (Article 8).
36 Andrew Mills, “Qatar’s emir names top diplomat as premier, reappoints energy and finance ministers,” Reuters,
March 7, 2023.
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Qatari authorities delayed the holding of national elections envisioned in the 2003 constitution
until October 2021, when Qatari voters selected 30 members for the 45-seat National Assembly.
The onset of political unrest in other regional countries from 2011 onward, the 2013 transition
from former emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani to his son Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and
the 2017-2021 confrontation between Qatar and some neighboring states may have contributed to
Qatari decisions to delay the election. Turnout in the 2021 election exceeded 63% of eligible
voters. Citizens categorized as naturalized, including members of the numerous Al Murra tribe,
were ineligible to stand as candidates or vote, leading to some protests and arrests in the run up to
the election.37 Qatari officials argued that procedural remedies were available to challenge
election-related complaints and that the new Shura Council could review “any amendments to the
laws governing the elections process.”38 None of the female candidates who stood for office were
elected, but the Emir appointed two women among the 15 additional members whose
appointments he controls in accordance with the constitution. Qatar last held Central Municipal
Council elections in 2019. Qatar convicted four elections protestors on related charges in May
2022, sentencing two individuals to life terms.39
Although the constitution provides for an independent judiciary, the Emir appoints all judges.
Human Rights
The 2022 U.S. State Department Country Report on Human Rights in Qatar cites
credible reports of: serious restrictions on free expression, including the existence of
criminal libel laws; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and
freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws on the organization, funding, or
operation of nongovernmental organizations and civil society organizations; restrictions on
migrant workers’ freedom of movement, access to justice, and vulnerability to abuses,
including forced labor; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully in free
and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation, including
a complete prohibition on political parties; lack of investigation and accountability for
gender-based violence; existence of laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual
conduct; and prohibitions on independent trade unions.40
A National Human Rights Committee (NHRC) investigates allegations of human rights abuses
and appears to operate independently. It is funded largely by the Qatar Foundation that is run by
the Emir’s mother, Shaykha Moza bint Nasser Al Missned. The non-governmental organization
Freedom House classifies Qatar as “not free.”41

37 Some members of the Al Murra tribe have contested the leadership of Emir Tamim bin Hamad and his father, and
Qatari authorities have stripped some members of the tribe of their Qatari nationality in related disputes. In 2017, some
Al Murra tribal figures supported Saudi efforts to isolate Qatar. Human Rights Watch, “The Shura Council Elections,”
September 9, 2021; and Reuters, “Qatar’s new electoral law stirs up tribal sensitivities,” August 12, 2021. For more
background see Jill Crystal, “Tribes and Patronage Networks in Qatar” in Uzi Rabi (ed.), Tribes and States in a
Changing Middle East, Oxford University Press, June 2016, pp. 37-56.
38 Qatar Government Communications Office statement in response to HRW report regarding “The Shura Council
Elections,” September 9, 2021.
39 Reuters, “Qatar jails four election protesters, including three for life,” May 13, 2022.
40 U.S. Department of State, 2022 Country Report on Human Rights: Qatar, March 2023.
41 Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 2022.
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The European Parliament (EP) in December 2022 suspended consideration of Qatar-related
legislation pending resolution of allegations of corruption involving Qatari nationals, the NHRC,
and some EP Members.42
Women’s Rights
Women in Qatar drive and own property, and work in the government and private sector. Qatar’s
constitution recognizes the right of women to vote and hold office. According to the State
Department, social and legal discrimination against women continues, despite the constitutional
assertion of equality.43 The application of Islamic law, which is not gender-neutral on marriage,
divorce, child custody and guardianship, and inheritance, contributes to this gender inequality, as
does a lack of laws against domestic violence.44 Guardianship laws require young women to
obtain permission from their male guardians to travel alone, as well as “to marry, obtain a
government scholarship to pursue higher education, work in government, and obtain some
reproductive health care.”45 In the labor market, as of 2021, women (citizens and expatriates)
constituted nearly 57% of the workforce.46 The World Economic Forum’s 2023 Global Gender
Gap Report ranked Qatar 133 out of 146 countries assessed. The report ranked Qatar among
countries that have made the most progress in closing the gender wage gap and in women’s
educational attainment, but also found that health and survival outcomes in Qatar demonstrate a
5% or more gap between men and women based on Qatari men’s longer life expectancy.47 Qatar
is a member of the executive board of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the
Empowerment of Women (UN Women).
Labor Issues and Trafficking in Persons
Domestic and international observers and officials have raised labor and migrants’ rights concerns
for decades as Qatar has implemented large-scale infrastructure projects, including in preparation
for hosting the 2022 FIFA soccer World Cup. Press analysis citing government data from labor
source countries reported in 2021 that thousands of foreign workers had died while employed in
Qatar since 2011, but cited statistics that were not categorized “by occupation or place of work.”48
Amnesty International has said some labor conditions have amounted to the equivalent of “forced
labor”; Qatari officials have highlighted labor law changes, acknowledged some shortcomings,
and rejected some foreign criticism.49 Qatari officials emphasize their commitment to ending
abusive and exploitative labor practices and have established minimum wage rules and banned
some components of the kafala [migrant labor sponsorship] system. Official enforcement

42 Joshua Posaner, Mari Eccles and Hanne Cokelaere, “EU Parliament to stop work on Qatar airline, visa laws,”
Politico, December 15, 2022; and, Eddy Wax and Ana Fota, “How Qatar used a secret deal to bind itself to the EU
Parliament,” Politico, February 17, 2023.
43 U.S. Department of State, 2022 Country Report on Human Rights: Qatar, March 2023.
44 For more information and sources, see CRS Report R46423, Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Issues for
Congress, by Zoe Danon and Shannon L. Smith.
45 Human Rights Watch, Women and Qatar’s Male Guardianship Rules, March 29, 2021.
46 World Bank, Labor force participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+) (modeled International Labor
Organization estimate)—Qatar, December 2022.
47 World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report 2023, Tables 1.1 and 1.2, June 20, 2023.
48 “Revealed: 6,500 migrant workers have died in Qatar since World Cup awarded,” The Guardian, February 23, 2021.
49 Amnesty International, “Qatar: Security guards subjected to forced labour,” April 7, 2022; Reuters, “Qatar minister
slams hypocrisy of people calling for World Cup boycott,” November 4, 2022.
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reportedly has remained uneven and some reports suggest continuing abuses by private
employers, including firms that supported World Cup-related projects.50
According to the State Department’s 2021 human rights report, “the government made efforts to
prevent and eliminate forced labor but did not in all cases effectively enforce the law; the kafala
system left migrant workers vulnerable to exploitation.” The State Department’s 2023 Trafficking
in Persons report classifies Qatar as a Tier 2 country and describes increased prosecutions and
investigations, improved intra-government information sharing, and improved victim
identification measures. The report notes, “the government did not meet the minimum standards
in several key areas,” and cites observers’ reports that “prosecutors consistently used the Qatari
penal code to address trafficking crimes rather than the anti-trafficking law.”51 In November 2022,
the International Labour Organization (ILO) issued a report describing “significant progress” in
Qatar’s efforts to reform its labor system and noting “universal recognition that the work is not
complete.”52 In March 2023, the ILO rejected allegations that “lobbying” and financial support
from the government of Qatar had altered its reporting on conditions in the country.53
Religious Freedom
Qatar’s constitution guarantees the freedom to practice religious rites in accordance with “the
maintenance of public order and morality.” Islam is the state religion and sharia is “a main
source” of legislation. Most citizens are Sunni Muslims, and some citizens are Shia Muslims.
Non-Muslims comprise most of Qatar’s non-citizen expatriate population, including Hindus,
Buddhists, Catholics, Protestants, Copts, Orthodox Christians, Baha’i, and others. Expatriate non-
Muslim religious groups must register with the government. The law prohibits public worship or
proselytization by non-Muslims. The State Department’s report on religious freedom conditions
in Qatar during 2022 reported that Qatar
continued to host the headquarters of the IUMS, a group widely viewed in the press and
academia as being affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni transnational
organization that promotes political Islam. Although IUMS stated it was an independent
association of scholars, observers said its close relationship with the government helped it
to serve as an instrument of the country’s soft power.54
The report states that “members of the government-allied International Union of Muslim Scholars
(IUMS) publicly framed homosexuality as an affront to Islam.”
Qatar’s Foreign Policy
Qatar’s multidirectional foreign policy, financial resources, and unique international relationships
have raised its global diplomatic profile since the early 2000s, and appears to lead other
governments to view Qatari initiatives variously as useful or vexing depending on their discrete
perspectives and interests. Qatar’s 2011 deployment of military aircraft to support NATO-led

50 Migrant Rights, “Job mobility in Qatar is still a mirage despite reforms; domestic workers most affected,” October 5,
2021; and, Pramod Acharya, “Months before World Cup, workers forced to return home early and with pending dues,”
Migrant Rights, September 4, 2022.
51 U.S. Department of State, 2023 Trafficking in Persons Report: Qatar, June 2023.
52 ILO, Labour reforms in the State of Qatar: Coming together around a shared vision, November 3, 2022.
53 ILO, “Statement following the New York Times story on the ILO’s work in Qatar,” March 11, 2023; and, Rebecca
R. Ruiz and Sarah Hurtes, “In World Cup Run-Up, Qatar Pressed U.N. Agency Not to Investigate Abuses, New York
Times,” March 11, 2023.
54 U.S. State Department, 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Qatar, May 15, 2023.
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operations in Libya signaled a new assertiveness, as did reported Qatari support for armed
elements of the Syrian opposition during the height of Syria’s civil war. Some of Qatar’s positions
have drawn U.S. attention and have been scrutinized by some of Qatar’s Arab neighbors,
including its contacts with the government of Iran and groups such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the
Palestinian group Hamas, various other Islamist groups (including members of the Muslim
Brotherhood movement), and Afghanistan’s now-ruling Taliban.
Qatar and Russia’s War against Ukraine
In response to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Qatar has stated its “respect for Ukraine’s
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders”
and called for a ceasefire and a peaceful resolution to the conflict in accordance with international
law.55 Qatar also has provided $5 million to support humanitarian aid to Ukrainian refugees and
displaced persons and in December 2022 participated in a Ukraine solidarity conference
organized by the government of France.56 Qatar’s diplomatic statements on the Russia-Ukraine
war and related humanitarian crises outline the Qatari government’s “full readiness to contribute
to any international and regional effort aimed at alleviating the Russian-Ukrainian crisis and is in
line with its position supporting peaceful solutions through dialogue and mediation.”57 Qatar has
had close energy related ties to fellow natural gas exporter Russia, and has reportedly considered
closer security cooperation with Russia at times in the past.58
Qatar’s Foreign Minister visited Moscow in March 2022 to offer mediation, and, in October
2022, the Emir spoke with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky by telephone and separately
met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Kazakhstan during a meeting of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO).59 Qatar has signed a memorandum of understanding to become
a SCO Dialogue Partner, as have Egypt and Saudi Arabia.60
In October, Russia released four Ukrainian children through mediation by Qatari officials at the
request of the government of Ukraine.61
Qatar has voted in favor of U.N. General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine, but abstained, along with other GCC members, in the April 2022 vote on expelling
Russia from the U.N. Human Rights Council.
Qatar has committed to maintaining (and expanding as possible) its supplies of natural gas to
Europe during the crisis. However, Qatari officials have said they will not divert to Europe gas
already contracted for delivery to Asia, emphasizing that, “Qatar is absolutely committed to the

55 Qatar “calls for a ceasefire and the start of seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict, based on its keenness on the
Charter of the United Nations and the well-established principles of the international law, its obligations stipulated in
the Charter to settle international disputes by peaceful means, and its commitment to the sovereignty, independence,
and territorial integrity of states.” Qatar Foreign Ministry, “Qatar Participates in Humanitarian Meeting of Senior
Officials on Ukraine,” September 27, 2022.
56 Qatar Information Office, “Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Affirms Qatar’s Support for
UNHRC in Facing Global Challenges,” February 28, 2022; and, Gulf Times, “Ukraine’s envoy hails Qatar’s
humanitarian support,” August 18, 2022.
57 Qatar Foreign Ministry, “Qatar Participates in ‘Solidarity with Ukrainian People’ Conference in Paris,” December
13, 2022.
58 Al Jazeera, “Qatar FM: Doha buying S-400s ‘not anyone’s business,’” March 4, 2019.
59 “Foreign Minister meets Russian Foreign Minister.” The Peninsula, March 14, 2022.
60 Abhishek G Bhaya, “SCO to induct Egypt and Saudi Arabia as dialogue partners,” CGTN, July 15, 2021.
61 Siobhán O'Grady, “Russia releases four Ukrainian children after mediation by Qatar,” Washington Post, October 16,
2023.
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sanctity of contracts.”62 Entities purchasing Qatari gas may have discretion to divert gas to
Europe, which Qatari officials have not said they oppose. Qatari energy officials have stressed
that no combination of major gas exporters can supply enough natural gas to Europe, on short
notice, to completely compensate for a shutoff of gas supplies from Russia.
Qatar has announced plans to expand its gas output and exports in coming years and has
discussed new long-term purchase agreements with European customers.63 In October 2023,
Qatar announced 27-year natural gas sale and purchase agreements with TotalEnergies of France
and Shell of the Netherlands beginning in 2026.64 (See “Fiscal, Economic, and Energy Issues”
below.) In January 2023, Qatar announced it would replace a Russian firm in a joint natural gas
exploration venture in Lebanese waters in partnership with ENI of Italy and TotalEnergies.65
Qatari officials at times have observed that multilateral financial sanctions could motivate some
energy producers to develop alternative, non-U.S. dollar-based means of marketing oil and gas
exports.66
Qatar and China
Emir Tamim and People’s Republic of China leader Xi Jinping met in Saudi Arabia in December
2022 in conjunction with the Arab States-China Summit and the GCC-China Summit. PRC firm
China Railway Construction Corporation partnered with Qatari firms to build the Lusail stadium
that hosted the 2022 World Cup final. China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) played a
central role in Qatar’s Hamad Port and Emiri Naval Base construction projects.67 In 2015, Qatar
launched the first renminbi clearing hub in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region,
primarily to settle payments in China’s currency for exports of oil and gas.68 Oil, natural gas, and
petroleum products comprise most of Qatar’s exports to China. In November 2022, China’s
Sinopec and QatarEnergy agreed to a 27-year LNG supply deal. China National Petroleum Corp
(CNPC) and Qatar-Energy signed a similar 27-year deal in June 2023.69
Qatar and Afghanistan
Following the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover of Afghanistan, Qatari diplomats in Kabul helped
U.S. evacuation efforts, including by escorting small groups of Americans into the Kabul
airport.70 Since the completion of the U.S. withdrawal on August 30, 2021, Qatar Airways charter
flights have evacuated additional U.S. and other nationals. President Biden and senior U.S.
officials have thanked Qatar for its help in U.S. relocation efforts and for Qatar’s ongoing
engagement in talks with the Taliban on issues of mutual concern to Qatar and the United States.

62 QatarEnergy CEO Saad Al Kaabi quoted in Andrew Mills, “QatarEnergy expanding in LNG, won't divert supplies to
Europe,” Reuters, October 18, 2022.
63 “Germany agrees gas deal with Qatar to help end dependency on Russia,” The Guardian, March 20 2022.
64 “QatarEnergy, TotalEnergies sign 27-year LNG supply agreement,” Reuters, October 11, 2023; and, Yousef Saba,
“Qatar supplies gas to Europe, vying with US to replace Russia supply,” Reuters, October 18, 2023.
65 Bassem Mroue, “Qatar boosts influence in Lebanon amid multiple crises,” Associated Press, February 4, 2023.
66 “Ukraine-Russia crisis is driving countries to explore new ways of pricing oil, Qatar says,” CNC, March 26, 2022.
67 Qatar New Port Project at http://www.npp.com.qa/Construction.html.
68 SWIFT, “The United Arab Emirates and Qatar drive RMB adoption in the Middle East,” press release, January 28,
2016.
69 Andrew Mills and Maha El Dahan, “Qatar strikes second big LNG supply deal with China,” Reuters, June 20, 2023.
70 “Biden says safe zone around Kabul airport to expand, as Pentagon enlists commercial airlines to aid evacuations,”
Washington Post, August 22, 2021.
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U.S. Embassy Kabul closed in conjunction with the U.S. withdrawal and Taliban takeover, and its
diplomats transferred to Embassy Doha, where they operate an Afghan Affairs Unit. The Biden
Administration sought $41.9 million in FY2023 State Department funding to support the
Protecting Power Arrangement (PPA) between Qatar and the United States to protect certain U.S.
interests in Afghanistan.
Qatar has maintained contact with Taliban officials and in January 2023, Foreign Minister (and
then-Deputy Prime Minister) Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani described Taliban actions to
impose limits on the education and employment of girls and women as “very disappointing.”71 In
May 2023, in his capacity as Prime Minister, Sheikh Mohammed travelled to Kandahar,
Afghanistan for a direct meeting with Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada.
As noted above, Qatar and the United States have bilateral agreements regarding Qatar’s hosting
of Afghan nationals for a limited period to complete their vetting and processing for onward
migration.72 Qatar’s Camp As Sayliyah, a former pre-positioning site for U.S. military equipment,
has served as the main operations center in Qatar for U.S. resettlement efforts of evacuees from
Afghanistan.
Qatar and its Neighbors
Gulf Cooperation Council and other Arab States
The United States has encouraged intra-Arab rapprochement following a period from 2017
through 2020 in which Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt worked to
isolate Qatar diplomatically and economically in the hopes of changing Qatari officials’ policies
toward sensitive regional political issues.73 By 2019, having realized few benefits from the
blockade, Saudi Arabia and the UAE apparently began to look for a resolution—an outcome
urged by the Trump Administration.74 At the 41st GCC summit in Al Ula, Saudi Arabia, on
January 5, 2021, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt announced that they would restore
diplomatic relations with Qatar, though Qatar did not commit to meeting any of their demands.
Following the Al Ula summit, Qatar reengaged with its former antagonists, and Emir Tamim
visited Egypt in June 2022 and participated in the GCC+3 Summit in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,
where he met with President Biden. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi visited Doha in
September 2022. Qatari authorities reportedly requested that several Egyptian nationals affiliated
with Islamist groups relocate from Qatar in June 2023. Qatar joined other Gulf states in
announcing billions of dollars of planned investments in Egypt in 2022, as the Egyptian
government sought Gulf-state financial support in exchange for Egyptian state assets, including
Egyptian government-held stakes in several companies. In February 2023, Saudi Arabia hosted
officials from Qatar and Bahrain to launch talks to resolve a series of outstanding issues between

71 Reuters, “Davos 2023: Qatar says engagement with Taliban needed despite ‘disappointing’ actions,” January 17,
2023.
72 U.S. State Department, Office of Treaty Affairs, Qatar (22-919)—Protocol Amending the Temporary Relocation
Transit Agreement of November 12, 2021, September 19, 2022; and, Qatar (21-1112)—Temporary Relocation Transit
Agreement, November 12, 2021.
73 In June 2017, those countries cut diplomatic relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari
nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The group initially demanded that, as a condition for
ending the boycott, Qatar close the Al Jazeera satellite network, sever relations with Muslim Brotherhood
organizations, downgrade relations with Iran, and end the deployment of Turkish military personnel in Qatar. See “List
of demands on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, other Arab nations,” Associated Press, June 23, 2017.
74 “US Secretary of State in Qatar urges end to Gulf diplomatic rift,” Deutsche Welle, January 13, 2019.
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Qatar and Bahrain. Emir Tamim visited Saudi Arabia for the April 2023 Arab League summit, but
reportedly departed before Syrian President Bashar al Asad spoke following his government’s
reinstatement by the League.
Iran
Qatari leaders have pursued dialogue with Iran, while cooperating with U.S. efforts to counter
Iran strategically. Qatar hosted Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi in February 2022, and the two
sides signed several agreements.75 Qatar turned to Iran to help it cope with the GCC rift,
including by importing Iranian foodstuffs and by overflying Iranian airspace, a privilege for
which Qatar Airways paid Iran over $130 million per year in overflight fees.76 Qatar did not
support the May 8, 2018, U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear agreement, the
JCPOA, instead stating that efforts to “denuclearize” the region should not lead to “escalation.”77
Qatar and Iran exchanged mutual visits of high-ranking officials in 2019 in an initiative reported
as seeking to de-escalate U.S.-Iran tensions,78 and Qatar has encouraged dialogue between the
GCC countries and Iran to lower Gulf tensions.79 Qatar and Iran share the large North Field
natural gas reserve in the Persian Gulf.
Qatar has supported Biden Administration efforts to restore full Iranian and U.S. adherence to the
JCPOA; the Emir visited Iran in May 2022, and in June hosted U.S. negotiators for indirect talks.
In January 2023, Qatar’s Foreign Minister visited Iran and is reported to have said he shared a
message from the U.S. government “about a topic related to the [2015 nuclear] agreement that
may not be directly linked to it.”80 In February 2023, NBC News reported that Qatari officials had
served as intermediaries in U.S.-Iran talks about possible prisoner exchanges.81
In September 2023, the United States and Iran conducted a mutual prisoner exchange and the
U.S.-government waived the potential imposition of sanctions to facilitate the transfer of $6
billion in Iranian assets, accrued from petroleum sales to South Korea, to a financial institution in
Qatar. The actions by the governments of Iran and the United States occurred in the context of
broader diplomatic engagement to de-escalate tensions.82 A Treasury FAQ published September
18, 2023, reads
In partnership with the Government of Qatar and financial institutions operating the HC
[humanitarian channel] — all of which have committed to stringent due diligence measures
— the United States will closely monitor the HC and will take appropriate action should
Iran attempt to use these funds for purposes other than permitted humanitarian purchases.83
An October 12 press report said that Deputy Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo told legislators
that, in the wake of Hamas’s assault on Israel, U.S. and Qatari officials had agreed to prevent the

75 Anna L. Jacobs, Qatar and Iran Expand Ties Amid Broader Gulf De-escalation, Arab Gulf States Institute in
Washington, March 11, 2022.
76 “UN aviation ruling could deny Iran hundreds of millions of dollars,” Fox News, July 14, 2020.
77 Qatar Foreign Ministry Statement, May 9, 2018.
78 The Latest: Qatar trying to defuse tensions amid Iran crisis, Fox News, May 16, 2019.
79 Erin Cunningham, “Qatar urges dialogue between Persian Gulf states,” Washington Post, January 19, 2021.
80 Amwaj Media, “Qatar carries US ‘message’ to Tehran as IAEA chief set to visit Iran,” January 31, 2023.
81 Dan De Luce and Abigail Williams, “The U.S. and Iran are holding indirect talks on a possible prisoner exchange,
with the help of the U.K. and Qatar, sources say,” NBC News, February 15, 2023.
82 See, for example, Karen DeYoung et al., “U.S. and Iran in indirect talks over nuclear program and prisoners,”
Washington Post, June 20, 2023; Chase Winter et al., “What’s driving Biden’s Iran sanctions policy,” Energy
Intelligence, September 7, 2023.
83 Treasury FAQ 1134, https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1134.
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use of the funds to finance the purchase of humanitarian goods for export to Iran for an
unspecified period of time.84 Going forward, the United States could impose sanctions on any
foreign financial institution or entity involved in a transaction involving the funds, including
restricting access to the U.S. financial system.
The Qatari prime minister said, on October 13, that Qatar is “always committed to any
agreement” that Qatar has entered into, a likely reference to the Qatari government’s position that
it has made commitments both to the United States and Iran in relation to the transfer and
potential future use of the funds. On October 30, Secretary of State Blinken said in Senate
testimony:
The money in that South Korean account that accrued from the sale of these proceeds, for
technical reasons related to Korean banks, was unable to be used even though it lawfully
could be. So, it was moved to an account in Qatar where it could be used for humanitarian
purposes, just as the previous administration established another account in another country
for these very purposes. The money never goes and would never go to Iran. It can only be
used for authorized transactions overseen by our Treasury Department and only for things
like food, medicine, and other authorized humanitarian purposes. To date, not a single
dollar has been expended from that account. There are currently no plans to expend a single
dollar from that account. And in any event, that money never touches Iran directly.85
Some Members of Congress are urging or seeking to compel the Administration to act in a
demonstrable, transparent way to ensure the funds in Qatar are not used for Iran-related
transactions. Related legislative proposals are discussed below. (See “Israel and the
Palestinians”.) If Qatar or the United States act with regard to the funds in ways that the
government of Iran perceives as violating the understanding previously reached, Iran could
decide to no longer engage Qatar as an intermediary for the United States on issues such as Iran’s
nuclear program, U.S. nationals unjustly detained in Iran, negotiations with Hamas or other Iran-
backed groups, and/or other regional security matters.86
Israel and the Palestinians
Qatar’s policies toward Israel and the Palestinians are receiving additional international attention
following the October 7, 2023 terrorist attacks by the U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO) Hamas on Israel, the seizure by Hamas and other armed groups of hostages
from Israel, and Israel’s military campaign in the Gaza Strip, which Hamas has controlled since
2007.
Qatar has had high-level contacts with Israel since the mid-1990s, and has allowed some small-
scale direct Israel-Qatar trade and visits to Doha by Israeli security officials, athletes, doctors, and
other Israelis, in spite of abiding policy differences.87 Emir Tamim and other Qatari officials have
accused Israel of abuses against the Palestinians and express support for Palestinian efforts to

84 Jeff Stein and Jacob Bogage, “U.S., Qatar agree to stop Iran from tapping $6 billion fund after Hamas attack,”
Washington Post, October 12, 2023.
85 “Senate Appropriations Committee Holds Hearing on National Security Supplemental Request,” CQ Congressional
Transcripts, October 31, 2023.
86 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Qatari Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mohammad bin Abdulrahman Al Thani at a joint press availability,” October 13, 2023.
87 Uzi Rabi, “Qatar’s Relations with Israel: Challenging Arab and Gulf Norms,” Middle East Journal, vol. 63, no. 3
(Summer, 2009), pp. 443-459; and, Guy Azriel, “Qatar-Israel talks fail over Israeli demand to go public,” i24 News,
August 31, 2022.
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establish a state with East Jerusalem as its capital.88 Qatari officials say they have ruled out
joining other Arab states in normalizing relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords until
there is substantial progress toward resolving the Israel-Palestinian dispute.89
Since October 7, the Qatari government has been vocal in its calls for an immediate ceasefire,90
has criticized the Israeli military’s conduct,91 and has voiced opposition to attacks against
civilians.92 Qatar has not specifically condemned Hamas for the October 7 attacks, and said on
October 7 that it held “Israel solely responsible for the ongoing escalation.”93 On October 13, the
Qatari government rejected “the attempts to forcibly displace the brotherly Palestinian people
from Gaza Strip,” called for “lifting the blockade on the Strip and providing full protection to
civilians under international law and international humanitarian law,” and affirmed the Palestinian
right to statehood with East Jerusalem as its capital.94
For years, Qatari officials have asserted that their engagement with Hamas can help foster Israeli-
Palestinian peace and contribute to de-escalation of conflict, a view they have reiterated since
October 2023.95 In an October 13 press conference with Secretary Blinken, Qatar’s Prime
Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani said the
Hamas office in Doha “was started to be used as a way of communicating and bringing peace and
calm into the region, not to instigate any war. And this is the purpose of that office.”96 Hamas
leaders continue to meet in and operate from Doha, including the current leader of its political
bureau, Ismail Haniyeh.97 U.S. officials have not stated publicly whether they have formally
requested that Qatar close the Hamas political office in Doha or otherwise act to expel Hamas
figures from the country. Secretary of State Blinken has expressed U.S. gratitude for Qatari
efforts “to secure the exit of U.S. citizens and foreign nationals from Gaza, the release of hostages

88 See, for example, “Israel Doesn’t Want Peace: Emir,” The Peninsula, September 29, 2015. In March 2023, Qatar’s
permanent representative to the United Nations in Geneva stated Qatar’s position “supporting the Palestinian people
and their just cause until they reclaim all their legitimate rights, and establish full sovereignty as independent state
based on the borders of 1967 with East Jerusalem as the capital.” Qatar Foreign Ministry, “The State of Qatar
Reiterates Position of Supporting Palestine,” March 3, 2023.
89 “Interview: Qatar’s FM rules out normalization with Israel, Syria.” Axios, February 2, 2022.
90 On October 8, Qatar’s Foreign Ministry called for “all parties to halt the escalation to attain calm and entirely halt the
armed confrontations on all fronts.” Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Qatar Reiterates Call for Halting Escalation to
Protect Region from Danger of Descending into a Wider Cycle of Violence,” October 8, 2023.
91 On October 31, Qatar’s Foreign Ministry decried an Israeli attack that killed Palestinians in Jabaliya refugee camp in
Gaza as a “new massacre against the defenseless Palestinian people, especially children and women,” Israeli officials
stated the strikes targeted Hamas facilities and personnel. See Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Qatar Strongly
Condemns the Massacre at Jabalia Refugee Camp in Gaza,” October 31, 2023.
92 Qatar joined other Arab League members states in endorsing an October 11 resolution that condemned the killing
and targeting of civilians “by both sides” and acts contrary to international law. See League of Arab States Resolution
8987, “On Ways to take political action to stop Israeli aggression and achieve Peace and Security,” October 11, 2023.
93 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Qatar Expresses Concern over the Developments in Gaza Strip and Calls for
Deescalation,” October 7, 2023.
94 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Qatar Announces Its Categorical Rejection of the Attempts to Forcibly Displace
the Palestinian People from Gaza Strip,” October 13, 2023; and, Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Prime Minister
and Minister of Foreign Affairs Holds Phone Call with UN Secretary-General,” October 13, 2023.
95 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Press Conference of His Excellency Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris,” June
12, 2017.
96 U.S. State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Qatari Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mohammed Bin Abdulrahman Al Thani at a Joint Press Availability,” October 13, 2023.
97 “As Young Gazans Die at Sea, Anger Rises Over Leaders' Travel,” Associated Press, January 8, 2023.
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held by Hamas, including two American citizens, and continued efforts to prevent the conflict
from spreading.”98
Qatar’s relationships with Hamas and Iran have been subject to additional congressional attention
following the October 7 Hamas terrorist attacks in Israel. and the Biden Administration’s
September 2023 decision to exempt from U.S. sanctions the transfer of Iranian funds from South
Korea to Qatar for humanitarian purposes. (See “Iran” above.) Legislation introduced in the
House and Senate (H.R. 6000 and S. 3049) would direct the Secretary of the Treasury to act to
remove exemptions on transactions involving Iranian funds via Qatar and would rescind a related
September 2023 waiver. On October 19, the House Foreign Affairs Committee ordered reported
H.R. 5826, which would require executive branch reporting to Congress on the Iranian funds.
Other proposed bills would direct the President to confiscate any of the Iranian funds subject to
U.S. jurisdiction (S. 3081) or to reimpose the threat of U.S. sanctions on transactions involving
the funds (S. 3041).
Qatar’s main engagement with the Palestinians prior to the October 7 attacks and ensuing conflict
appeared to come through the substantial financial aid it has provided to the people of Gaza,
which Israeli officials supported as a means of promoting calm on the Israel-Gaza border.99 Aid
efforts have been provided through a “Gaza Reconstruction Committee” headed by Qatari official
Mohammad al Emadi, who serves informally as an envoy to Israel.
Qatar was a key mediator to end eleven days of clashes between Israel and Hamas in May 2021,
efforts that were reportedly facilitated, in part, by additional Qatari pledges of aid to Gaza.100
Before the 2021 conflict, Qatar had provided cash assistance for Gaza, but due to Israeli concerns
about the potential for its diversion, Qatar agreed to arrangements in late 2021 to provide money
transfers for needy families through the United Nations, and send fuel from Egypt into Gaza so it
can be sold to pay for civil servants’ salaries.101
In August 2022, Qatar supported Egyptian efforts to broker a ceasefire between Israel and
Palestine Islamic Jihad (another U.S.-designated terrorist group) militants in Gaza, while
expressing “strong condemnation and denunciation” of Israeli settlers’ actions at the Al Aqsa
mosque in Jerusalem.102 In December 2022, the Qatari government expressed “its strong
condemnation and denunciation of the Israeli government’s plans for settlement expansion, its
continued attempts to Judaize Al Quds [Jerusalem] and Al Aqsa mosque, considering them a
severe violation of the UN Charter, international law principles, related UN resolutions, and a
blatant assault on the rights of the brotherly Palestinian people.”103 The Qatari government made
similar statements in February and May 2023 in response to announced Israeli settlement plans
and the visit of Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir to the Al Aqsa mosque area in
Jerusalem. Qatar has called on international actors “to compel Israel to stop its settlement policy

98 U.S. State Department, Office of the Spokesperson “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Qatari Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs Al Thani,” Readout, October 30, 2023.
99 Neville Teller, “What Do You Make of Qatar?” The Jerusalem Post, September 19, 2019.
100 “Israel and Hamas Near Cease-Fire Amid Mounting Pressure,” Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2021.
101 Aaron Boxerman, “UN to begin dispensing Qatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday under new deal,” Times of
Israel, September 12, 2021; Ahmad Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas provides boost for Gaza
economy,” Al-Monitor, November 23, 2021.
102 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs (@MofaQatar_EN), “Qatar Strongly Condemns Settlers Storming Al-Aqsa
Mosque,” Twitter, August 7, 2022, 5:34 AM.
103 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs Media and Communication Department, “Qatar Condemns Israeli Government’s
Plans on Developing Settlements,” December 30, 2022.
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in the occupied Palestinian territories.”104 Qatar and Egypt again helped broker a ceasefire
following May 2023 fighting between Gaza-based groups and Israel. In June 2023, delays were
reported in Qatari financial transfers of assistance to Gaza-based households.105
Fiscal, Economic, and Energy Issues
Qatar’s active diplomacy is at least in part a result of its considerable financial resources and
economic influence. In June 2022, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) praised Qatar’s
response to the economic pressures of the COVID-19 pandemic, noted non-hydrocarbon growth
in Qatar’s economy, and projected that the planned large-scale expansion of natural gas
production and exports from Qatar’s North Field (Figure 2) would support state finances over the
medium term.106 The IMF describes the North Field project as “the largest single LNG expansion
ever” and expects the project to “further increase Qatar’s reliance on fossil fuel.”107 According to
the IMF, non-oil and gas revenues provide only roughly 20% of the government’s revenue.108
Qatar does not have a value added tax (VAT).

104 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs Media and Communication Department, “Qatar condemns in the strongest terms
the occupation government’s vote to legalize settlement outposts,” February 13, 2023.
105 Ahmad Abu Amer, “Delay in cashing Qatari aid slows Gaza economy,” Al Monitor, June 7, 2023.
106 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Qatar Article IV Consultation and Staff Report, IMF Country Report No.
22/175, June 2022.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
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Figure 2. Map of Qatari Energy Resources and Select Infrastructure, 2015

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Qatar Country Analysis Brief, October 2015.
New challenges have accompanied Qatar’s economic success in areas such as social cohesion;
education; labor; preservation of local traditions; national infrastructure; and energy, water, and
food supplies. To respond to these challenges, Qatari authorities have pursued a series of national
development strategies based on a comprehensive national vision document that seeks balanced,
sustainable growth by the year 2030.109 Emir Tamim bin Hamad chaired the implementation
oversight body for the Qatar National Vision 2030 project in his former role as heir apparent. The
national development strategy for 2018 through 2022 set targets for economic infrastructure
development and diversification, natural resource protection and use, performance management,
and international partnership informed by Qatar’s experiences in implementing its first national
development strategy from 2011 to 2016.110 Qatar’s isolation by neighboring Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates from 2017 through 2020 may contribute to Qatar’s pursuit
of greater self-sufficiency in some areas, and of extra-regional economic partnerships.

109 According to Qatari authorities, Qatar’s National Vision 2030 initiative “aims at transforming Qatar into an
advanced country capable of sustaining its own development and ensuring high living standards for its people for
generations to come by seeking to develop a diversified economy coupled with diminishing dependence on
hydrocarbons, where investment is moving towards a knowledge-based economy and the private sector is growing in
importance.... The QNV 2030 identifies five main challenges: modernization and preservation of traditions; balance
between the needs of this generation and those of future generations; managed growth and uncontrolled expansion; the
size and quality of the expatriate labor force and the selected path of development; and economic growth, social
development and environmental management.” For more information, see the Qatar Government Communications
Office at https://www.gco.gov.qa/en/about-qatar/national-vision2030/, and Qatar Planning and Statistics Authority
website at https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/qnv1/Pages/default.aspx.
110 For Qatar’s National Development Strategy documents see https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/nds1/Pages/default.aspx.
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Preparations for the 2022 World Cup and preservation of Qatari culture were core elements of the
2018-2022 strategy.
With proven oil reserves of 25.2 billion barrels, Qatar has far less oil than the major Persian Gulf
producers. QatarEnergy, the state-owned oil and natural gas company, increased crude oil output
from 593,000 barrels per day (b/d) in 1999 to approximately 1.3 million b/d in November
2022.111 Qatar withdrew from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as
of January 2019.112 Qatar also withdrew from the 25-member OPEC+ group in 2019. Qatar has
not coordinated its production decisions with OPEC or OPEC+ since, as Qatari officials have
prioritized LNG development and criticized both OPEC and OPEC+ as primarily reflecting the
influence of larger producers.113 Leading importers of Qatari oil include Japan, Taiwan, South
Korea, and Singapore.
Qatar has the third-largest natural gas reserves in the world, an estimated 23.86 trillion cubic
meters (tcm).114 Qatar borrowed internationally and invited foreign investment in order to expand
gas extraction and liquefied natural gas (LNG) production and export facilities in the late 1990s
and early 2000s.115 The Export-Import Bank of the United States provided more than $1 billion in
loan guarantees to support the early development of Qatar’s gas production facilities in
cooperation with a range of U.S., European, and Asian companies, banks, and export credit
agencies.116 Qatar expanded annual natural gas production from 29.6 billion cubic meters in 2002
to 167 billion cubic meters in 2019, and since 2020 has been the world’s top exporter of LNG
alongside the United States.117 South Korea, Japan, and China were the top importers of Qatari
LNG by volume in 2021.118 Qatar is a member of Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) and
hosts the GECF headquarters.
Following a pause in development of gas production and LNG export infrastructure in the 2010s,
Qatari authorities embarked in 2020 on a further expansion of North Field operations and LNG
facilities under a $30-$50 billion initiative that seeks to expand LNG export capacity by 60% to
126 million tons per year by 2027. Qatar in 2021 raised $12.5 billion for this expansion through a
series of international bonds.119 The North Field-East expansion project includes four LNG trains
and the North Field-South expansion project includes two LNG trains.120 U.S. companies,

111 U.S. International Trade Administration, Qatar—Country Commercial Guide, November 2022.
112 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Opinion: Why Is Qatar Leaving OPEC?” New York Times, December 10, 2018; and
Verity Ratcliffe and Simone Foxman, “Qatar Says Rejoining OPEC Would Not Fit with Its Strategy,” Bloomberg,
October 11, 2021.
113 In 2020, Qatari Minister of State for Energy Affairs Saad bin Sherida Al Kaabi said, “The big players make the
decisions in OPEC. We didn't see a place for us there because we are a gas producer, and we are really growing in gas.”
S&P Global, “INTERVIEW: Qatar thrives outside OPEC as minister warns over market flood legacy,” April 20, 2020.
114 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, 2021 estimate. Qatar’s supply of natural gas doubled in 2002,
when surveyors discovered new gas deposits in Qatar’s North Field.
115 See Kohei Hashirnoto, Jareer Elass and Stacy Eller, “Liquefied Natural Gas from Qatar: The Qatargas Project,”
Stanford University Program on Energy and Sustainable Development and Rice University James A. Baker III Institute
for Public Policy, December 2004.
116 See Export Import Bank of the United States, “Ex-Im Bank $930 Million Guarantee Supports U.S. Exports to Build
LNG Plant in Qatar,” November 18, 2004; and Export Import Bank of the United States, “Ex-Im Bank Finances
QatarGas 3 Liquid Natural Gas Complex, December 15, 2005.
117 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2022.
118 S&P Global Commodity Insights, “Infographic: Where do Qatar’s LNG exports go?” April 12, 2022.
119 Yousef Saba, “Qatar Petroleum grabs $12.5 bln in emerging market bonds record,” Reuters, June 30, 2021.
120 Andrew Mills and Maha El Dahan, “QatarEnergy signs deal with TotalEnergies for North Field South expansion,”
Reuters, September 24, 2022.
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particularly ExxonMobil, have long been partners in Qatar’s LNG operations: Qatari officials
chose ExxonMobil to participate in the North Field-East project along with ConocoPhillips.
In addition to its domestic expansion, QatarEnergy is increasing its presence globally, including
through marketing, liquefaction, regasification, and shipping.121
Outlook
Qatari-U.S. security cooperation appears likely to continue to anchor the bilateral relationship,
with U.S. officials paying close attention to Qatar’s energy exports and its multidirectional
foreign policy. Congress may continue to conduct oversight of the U.S. military’s presence and
programs in Qatar and may monitor Qatari foreign and domestic policies, especially concerning
Russia’s war on Ukraine, China, Iran, Afghanistan, and human rights. Qatari officials may
continue to seek defense, economic, and diplomatic coordination with the United States while
pursuing Qatar’s discrete interests and priorities.
Following the October 7, 2023 Hamas-led terrorist attacks in Israel and ensuing Israeli military
operations, developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Qatar’s role as a host to and
interlocutor with Hamas may play a more prominent role in U.S.-Qatar relations. U.S. and Qatari
leaders may reevaluate each other’s approaches to Israel and the Palestinians when considering
future cooperation, in parallel with other interests and goals.

121 Rafiq Latta, “QatarEnergy 2.0: The New LNG Industry Hegemon,” Energy Intelligence Group, February 28, 2023.
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Appendix. Proposed Major U.S.-Qatar Arms Sales
2012-2022
Table A-1. Proposed Major U.S.-Qatar Arms Sales 2012-2022
Estimated
Cost
Items
($ mil ion)
Notification Date
UH-60M BLACK HAWK Helicopters
$1,112
June 13, 2012
MH-60R and MH-60S SEAHAWK Helicopters
$2,500
June 26, 2012
AH-64D APACHE Block III Longbow Helicopters; Related Missiles
$3,000
July 12, 2012
HELLFIRE Missiles
$137
July 12, 2012
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Fire Units
$6,500
November 5, 2012
PATRIOT Configuration-3 Missile Fire Units and Missiles
$9,900
November 7, 2012
M142 High Mobility Artil ery Rocket System (HIMARS); M57 Army
$406
Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Block 1A T2K Rockets; M31A1
December 24, 2012
Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Rockets
Javelin Guided Missiles
$122
March 28, 2013
Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) Systems
$110
May 15, 2013
C-17 Globemaster III Equipment and Support
$35
June 27, 2013
A/N FPS-132 Block 5 Early Warning Radar
$1,100
July 29, 2013
RIM-116C and RIM-116C-2 Rol ing Airframe Missiles
$260
April 21, 2016
Javelin Guided Missiles
$20
May 24, 2016
Mk-V Fast Patrol Boats
$124
August 23, 2016
Logistics Support Services and Equipment Continuation
$700
December 8, 2016
Spare C-17 Engines
$81
December 8, 2016
F-15QA multirole fighter aircraft
$1,100
November 1, 2017
Upgrade of Qatar Air Operations Center
$197
March 7, 2018
Advanced Precision Kil Weapon Systems (APKWS) II Guidance
$300
April 9, 2018
Sections
Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) for National
$215
November 27, 2018
Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS)
AH-64E Apache Attack helicopters and related equipment
$3,000
May 9, 2019
AN/AAQ-24(V)N Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM)
$86
September 24, 2019
systems for Head of State Aircraft
Fixed Site-Low, Slow, Smal Unmanned Aircraft System Integrated
$1,000
November 29, 2022
Defeat System (FS-LIDS)
Source: U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Does not reflect Direct Commercial Sales approved by
U.S. Department of State.
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Author Information

Christopher M. Blanchard

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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Congressional Research Service
R47467 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED
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