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September 6, 2023
Central America: Expiration of Targeted Sanctions Authority
Central America (see Figure 1) has received considerable
September 2021, February 2022, March 2022, July 2022,
attention from U.S. policymakers over the past decade, as it
and July 2023). Those sanctions, as well as the authority to
has become a major transit corridor for illicit drugs and a
impose such sanctions, are scheduled to expire on
top source of irregular migration to the United States.
December 27, 2023, unless extended by Congress. There is
Congress appropriated nearly $5.1 billion of foreign
some uncertainty regarding the expiration, however,
assistance for Central America from FY2016 to FY2023 to
because the termination clause appears to erroneously
address the underlying economic, governance, and security
reference subsection (b), the reporting requirement, instead
challenges that have allowed illicit trafficking to flourish
of subsection (c), the sanctions authority.
and appear to have prompted millions of people to leave
their homes. Corruption and democratic backsliding have
Potential Implications
hindered U.S. objectives in the region by deterring
It is difficult to assess what, if any, impact Section 353
investment, siphoning scarce resources away from
sanctions have had on democracy and governance in
government agencies and programs, and facilitating
Central America. The threat of Section 353 sanctions
criminal co-optation of security and justice-sector
reportedly has deterred some Central American
institutions.
policymakers from engaging in corrupt or undemocratic
activities, at least in some instances. Civil society
Figure 1. Map of Central America
organizations also have welcomed the Section 353 list as a
“name and shame” tool to begin holding political and
economic elites accountable in a region characterized by
high levels of impunity and state capture.
Nevertheless, conditions have continued to deteriorate in
Central America and some individuals designated under
Section 353 have continued to erode the rule of law and
democratic institutions. For example, Rafael Curruchiche,
the head of Guatemala’s Special Prosecutor’s Office
Against Impunity, allegedly has continued to persecute anti-
corruption investigators and interfered in Guatemala’s 2023
electoral process since the State Department designated him
under Section 353 in June 2022.
Source: CRS Graphics.
Despite these mixed results, a congressional decision to
allow the Section 353 authority to expire may be perceived
Among other efforts to stem the erosion of the rule of law
in Central America as a sign the U.S. government is
in Central America, Congress enacted the United States-
deprioritizing democracy and governance concerns. That
Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act (P.L. 116-
perception, and the termination of sanctions leveled to date,
260, Division FF, Subtitle F; hereinafter, “the act”) in
could embolden those who had been designated under the
December 2020. Section 353(b) of the act, as amended by
act and their political allies. It also could have a
the Reinforcing Nicaragua’s Adherence to Conditions for
demoralizing effect on the public officials, civil society
Electoral Reform (RENACER) Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-54),
advocates, and investigative reporters who have sought to
requires the President to submit an annual report to
combat democratic backsliding, often under threat.
Congress on individuals in El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Nicaragua who have “knowingly engaged in
The executive branch could seek to counter those
actions that undermine democratic practices or institutions”
perceptions by using other authorities. The act appears to
or in “significant corruption or obstruction of investigations
require the President to continue producing an annual list of
into such acts of corruption.” This report is colloquially
corrupt and undemocratic actors in the region whether or
known as the Engel List, after the act’s sponsor, former
not the sanctions authority expires. Regarding those
Representative Eliot Engel.
involved in corruption, the executive branch could choose
to impose targeted sanctions pursuant to relevant global
Section 353(c) of the act directs the President to deny entry
authorities—the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
into the United States to, and impose visa restrictions on,
Accountability Act (P.L. 114-328, Title XII, Subtitle F; as
any individuals listed, with certain exceptions. The
implemented through Executive Order 13818) and/or
President delegated those functions to the State Department,
Section 7031(c) of annual Department of State, Foreign
which has publicly designated 170 individuals—including
Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations
five former presidents—pursuant to the act (in July 2021,
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link to page 2 Central America: Expiration of Targeted Sanctions Authority
legislation (P.L. 117-328, Division K for FY2023). For
Among other potential modifications, Congress could direct
example, Guatemalan Attorney General Maria Consuelo
the President to impose asset-blocking sanctions—in
Porras Argueta de Porres was publicly designated for
addition to the existing visa restrictions—on those
significant corruption under Section 353 of the act in
designated under Section 353. Such a change could
September 2021 and then publicly designated along with
potentially increase the deterrent and punitive effects of the
family members under Section 7031(c) of the FY2022
authority. However, it also could spark increased hostility
SFOPS legislation in May 2022.
among those designated, potentially reducing the
willingness of such individuals and their political allies to
The Section 353 authority to impose visa sanctions on
cooperate with the U.S. government on other issues.
individuals who undermine democratic practices or
institutions is more unique. To date, nearly half of the
Conversely, Congress could end the annual reporting
individuals sanctioned under the act have been designated
requirement and grant the President increased deference in
by the State Department for having engaged in
the application of sanctions. Increased flexibility could
undemocratic actions (see Table 1). The majority of those
allow the executive branch to apply sanctions in a more
individuals are Nicaraguans and could be subject to visa
strategic fashion—for example, by seeking to break up
and asset-blocking sanctions for “significant actions or
corrupt coalitions by isolating a few key individuals rather
policies that undermine democratic processes or
than producing long lists that may spur broad political
institutions” pursuant to the Nicaragua Investment
backlash. On the other hand, the act was originally drafted,
Conditionality Act of 2018 (NICA Act; P.L. 115-335, as
in part, due to congressional disagreement with then-
amended by P.L. 117-54) and Executive Order 14088. The
President Donald Trump over U.S. policy in Central
behavior for which the remaining individuals were
America, and the lack of a statutory requirement could have
designated may not fall within the scope of another existing
the effect of decreasing executive branch action on
sanctions program.
democracy and governance issues.
Table 1. Individuals Publicly Designated Under
Congress could enact a short-term extension of Section 353
Section 353, by Country and Sanctionable Behavior
authority while it continues to study the issue. H.Rept. 118-
(as of September 1, 2023)
146, accompanying the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
Undemocratic
2024 (H.R. 4665), would direct the Secretary of State to
Corruption
Actions
Total
submit a report to selected congressional committees within
90 days on how U.S. agencies coordinate sanctions policies
El
19
14
31
to influence the behavior of individuals in Central America
Salvador
involved in corruption, human rights abuses, and anti-
Guatemala
30
20
48
democratic actions and on challenges to sanctions
implementation in the region.
Honduras
44
2
46
Nicaragua
—
45
45
Should Congress allow the Section 353 sanctions authority
to expire, it could use other policy tools to advance U.S.
Total
93
81
170
democracy and governance objectives in Central America.
Source: CRS analysis of U.S. Department of State reports.
These policy tools may include global sanctions authorities,
Note: Some figures do not sum to totals because some individuals
foreign assistance appropriations, and/or legislative
have been designated for multiple sanctionable behaviors.
withholding requirements on such assistance. For example,
P.L. 117-328 appropriated $61.5 million in foreign
Nevertheless, the executive branch has broad authority to
assistance to support entities and activities to combat
restrict the entry of foreign nationals into the United States
corruption and impunity in Central America in FY2023.
under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
The legislation also required the State Department to
§1182). The President also could establish a new sanctions
withhold a portion of the aid appropriated for the central
program for Central America by declaring a national
governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras
emergency under the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
until the Secretary of State could certify those governments
§§1601 et seq.) and invoking the authorities granted in the
were combating corruption and impunity, implementing
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
reforms to strengthen the rule of law, and protecting the
§§1701 et seq.).
rights of civil society groups and opposition political
parties, among other conditions.
Options for Congress
Prior to December 27, 2023, Congress may consider
Peter J. Meyer, Specialist in Latin American and Canadian
whether to extend or modify the Section 353 sanctions
Affairs
authority or allow it to expire. Congress also could make
more limited technical corrections to the legislation to
IF12486
clarify congressional intent with regard to the termination
clause.
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Central America: Expiration of Targeted Sanctions Authority
Disclaimer
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