Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress
September 5, 2023
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
RL32665

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Summary
The current and planned size and composition of the Navy, the annual rate of Navy ship
procurement, the prospective affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans, the capacity of the
U.S. shipbuilding industry to execute the Navy’s shipbuilding plans, and Navy proposals for
retiring existing ships have been oversight matters for the congressional defense committees for
many years.
In December 2016, the Navy released a force-structure goal that calls for achieving and
maintaining a fleet of 355 ships of certain types and numbers. The 355-ship goal was made U.S.
policy by Section 1025 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115-
91 of December 12, 2017). The 355-ship goal predates the Trump and Biden Administrations’
national defense strategies and does not reflect the new, more distributed fleet architecture (i.e.,
new mix of ships) that the Navy wants to shift toward in coming years. The Navy and the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) have been working since 2019 to develop a successor for the
355-ship force-level goal that would reflect current national defense strategy and the new fleet
architecture, but have not been able to come to closure on a successor goal. A July 18, 2023, press
report stated that the Navy on June 20, 2023, had submitted to the congressional defense
committees a congressionally mandated Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement
(BFSAR) report that calls for a future fleet with 381 manned ships. It is not clear whether the
Administration endorses the 381-ship fleet as the new force-level goal for the Navy.
The Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget requests $32.8 billion in shipbuilding funding for, among
other things, the procurement of nine new ships, including one Columbia (SSBN-826) class
ballistic missile submarine, two Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines, two Arleigh Burke
(DDG-51) class destroyers, two Constellation (FFG-62) class frigates, one AS(X) submarine
tender, and one John Lewis (TAO-205) class oiler. The Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget also
proposes retiring 11 ships, including two relatively young Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs). The
Navy’s FY2024 five year (FY2024-FY2028) shipbuilding plan includes a total of 55 ships, or an
average of 11 per year. Given a 35-year average surface life for Navy ships (a planning factor that
assumes that all Navy ships would be kept in service to the end of their expected service lives), an
average shipbuilding rate of 11 ships per year, if sustained for 35 years, would increase the size of
the Navy to 385 ships over a 35-year period (i.e., by the 2060s).
The Navy fell below 300 battle force ships (the kind of ships that count toward the quoted size of
the Navy and the Navy’s 355-ship force-structure goal) in August 2003, and has generally
remained between 270 and 300 battle force ships since then. As of August 28, 2023, the Navy
included 297 battle force ships. The Navy projects that under its FY2024 budget submission, the
Navy would include 293 battle force ships at the end of FY2024 and 291 battle force ships at the
end of FY2028.
The FY2024 30-year (FY2024-FY2053) shipbuilding plan, similar to the FY2023 30-year
(FY2023-FY2052) shipbuilding plan, includes three potential 30-year shipbuilding profiles and
resulting 30-year force-level projections, referred to as PB2024 (President’s budget for FY2024),
Alternative 2, and Alternative 3. PB2024 and Alternative 2 assume no real (i.e., above-inflation)
growth in shipbuilding funding, while Alternative 3 assumes some amount of real growth in
shipbuilding funding. Under PB2024, the Navy would increase to a peak of 331 manned ships in
FY2039-FY2040 and then decrease to 319 manned ships in FY2053. Under Alternative 2, the
Navy would increase to a peak of 331 manned ships in FY2039, and then decrease to 328 manned
ships in FY2053. Under Alternative 3, the Navy would increase to 356 manned ships in FY2042
and continue increasing to 367 manned ships by FY2053.
Congressional Research Service

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
Issue for Congress
This report presents background information and issues for Congress concerning the Navy’s force
structure and shipbuilding plans. The current and planned size and composition of the Navy, the
annual rate of Navy ship procurement, the prospective affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding
plans, the capacity of the U.S. shipbuilding industry to execute the Navy’s shipbuilding plans, and
Navy proposals for retiring existing ships have been oversight matters for the congressional
defense committees for many years.
The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s force-level goal, its
proposed FY2024 shipbuilding program, and its longer-term shipbuilding plans. Decisions that
Congress makes on this issue can substantially affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements
and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.
CRS Reports on Individual Navy Shipbuilding Programs
Detailed coverage of certain individual Navy shipbuilding programs can be found in the
following CRS reports:
• CRS Report R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile
Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine
Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS In Focus IF11826, Navy Next-Generation Attack Submarine (SSN[X])
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS In Focus IF11679, Navy DDG(X) Next-Generation Destroyer Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS Report R44972, Navy Constellation (FFG-62) Class Frigate Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS Report R43543, Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship
Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS Report R46374, Navy Medium Landing Ship (LSM) (Previously Light
Amphibious Warship [LAW]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS Report R43546, Navy John Lewis (TAO-205) Class Oiler Shipbuilding
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS In Focus IF11674, Navy Next-Generation Logistics Ship (NGLS) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS In Focus IF11838, Navy TAGOS-25 (Previously TAGOS[X]) Ocean
Surveillance Shipbuilding Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service

1

link to page 6 link to page 6 link to page 53 link to page 41 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

• CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Background
Navy’s Force-Level Goal
Navy’s Existing (355-Ship) Force-Level Goal
355-Ship Goal Released in December 2016
The Navy’s existing force-level goal, which the Navy released on December 15, 2016, calls for
achieving and maintaining a fleet of 355 battle force ships of the types and numbers shown in
Table 1.1 (Battle force ships are the ships that count toward the quoted size of the Navy and the
Navy’s ship force-level goal.) The 355 ships shown in Table 1 are all manned ships.
Table 1. 355-Ship Force-Level Goal
Ship Category
Number of ships
Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)
12
Attack submarines (SSNs)
66
Aircraft carriers (CVNs)
12
Large surface combatants (i.e., cruisers [CGs] and destroyers [DDGs])
104
Small surface combatants (i.e., frigates [FFGs], Littoral Combat Ships, and mine warfare ships)
52
Amphibious ships
38
Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships (i.e., at-sea resupply ships)
32
Command and support ships
39
TOTAL
355
Source: U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2020, Table A-1, p. 10.
355-Ship Fleet Is a Goal to Be Attained in the Future
The 355-ship fleet is a goal to be attained in the future. As shown in Table G-1, the actual size of
the Navy in recent years has generally been between 270 and 300 ships. Increasing the numerical
size of the Navy from 300 ships to 355 ships would equate to an increase of about 18%.
355-Ship Goal Made U.S. Policy by FY2018 NDAA
Congress made the 355-ship goal U.S. policy via Section 1025 of the FY2018 National Defense
Authorization Act, or NDAA (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115-91 of December 12, 2017).2 The provision is
now included as a note to 10 U.S.C. 8661 (which was previously numbered 10 U.S.C. 7291).

1 For previous Navy force-level goals, see Appendix A.
2 Section 1025 of P.L. 115-91 states
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service

2

link to page 41 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Statutory Requirements for Certain Ship Types
In addition to the above provision from the FY2018 NDAA that made the 355-ship goal U.S.
policy, 10 U.S.C. 8062(b) requires the Navy to include not less than 11 operational aircraft
carriers and not less than 31 operational amphibious warfare ships. The 31 amphibious ships are
to include not less than 10 LHA/LHD-type “big deck” amphibious assault ships, with the
remaining amphibious ships within the total of not less than 31 amphibious ships being
LPD/LSD-type amphibious ships. The requirement regarding aircraft carriers was established by
Section 126 of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (H.R. 1815/P.L. 109-
163 of January 6, 2006), which set the number at 12 carriers. The requirement was changed from
12 carriers to 11 carriers by Section 1011(a) of the FY2007 NDAA (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of
October 17, 2006). The requirements regarding amphibious ships were added by Section 1023 of
the FY2023 (NDAA) (H.R. 7776/P.L. 117-263 of December 23, 2022).
355-Ship Goal Resulted from a Force Structure Assessment (FSA) Done in 2016
The 355-ship force-level goal is the result of a Force Structure Assessment (FSA) conducted by
the Navy in 2016. An FSA is an analysis in which the Navy solicits inputs from U.S. regional
combatant commanders (CCDRs) regarding the types and amounts of Navy capabilities that
CCDRs deem necessary for implementing the Navy’s portion of the national military strategy,
and then translates those CCDR inputs into required numbers of ships, using current and
projected Navy ship types. The analysis takes into account Navy capabilities for both warfighting
and day-to-day forward-deployed presence.3 The Navy in the past has conducted a new FSA or an
update to the existing FSA every few years, as circumstances required, to determine its force-
level goal.4 Previous Navy force-level goals that resulted from earlier FSA are shown in
Appendix A.

SEC. 1025. Policy of the United States on minimum number of battle force ships.
(a) Policy.—It shall be the policy of the United States to have available, as soon as practicable, not
fewer than 355 battle force ships, comprised of the optimal mix of platforms, with funding subject
to the availability of appropriations or other funds.
(b) Battle force ships defined.—In this section, the term “battle force ship” has the meaning given
the term in Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5030.8C.
The term battle force ships in the above provision refers to the ships that count toward the quoted size of the Navy in
public policy discussions about the Navy. The battle force ships method for counting the number of ships in the Navy
was established in 1981 by agreement between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense, and has been
modified somewhat over time, in part by Section 1021 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (H.R. 3979/P.L. 113-291 of December 19, 2014).
3 For further discussion, see U.S. Navy, Executive Summary, 2016 Navy Force Structure Assessment (FSA), December
15, 2016, pp. 1-2.
4 The Navy is also required by law (10 U.S.C. 8695) to submit to the congressional defense committees a battle force
ship assessment and requirement not later than 180 days after the date of occurrence of any of the following events:
•
strategic guidance that results in changes to theater campaign plans or warfighting scenarios;
•
a strategic laydown [i.e., homeporting and basing plan] of vessels or aircraft that affects sustainable
peacetime presence or warfighting response timelines;
•
operating concepts, including employment cycles, crewing constructs, or operational tempo limits, that affect
peacetime presence or warfighting response timelines; or
•
assigned missions that affect the type or quantity of force elements.
Congressional Research Service

3

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Navy’s Force-Level Goal Is Not Just a Single Number
Although the result of an FSA is often reduced for convenience to single number (e.g., 355 ships),
FSAs take into account a number of factors, including types and capabilities of Navy ships,
aircraft, unmanned vehicles, and weapons, as well as ship homeporting arrangements and
operational cycles. Thus, although the number of ships called for by an FSA might appear to be a
one-dimensional figure, it actually incorporates multiple aspects of Navy capability and capacity.
355-Ship Figure Includes Only Manned Ships
The 355-ship force-level goal, like previous Navy force-level goals, is a figure for traditional
manned ships only. The Navy has operated smaller unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and
unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) for many years, but because these unmanned vehicles
(UVs) are launched from manned ships to act essentially as extensions of the manned ships, they
have not been considered ships in their own right and consequently have not been included in the
top-level expression of the Navy’s force-level goal or the publicly cited figure for the number of
ships in the Navy.
In the years since the 2016 FSA, the Navy has developed plans to acquire large USVs and UUVs.
Because of their size and projected capabilities, these large UVs are to be deployed directly from
pier, rather than from manned ships, to perform missions that might otherwise be assigned to
manned ships and submarines.5 The Navy’s FY2024 30-year (FY2024-FY2053) shipbuilding plan
states that it categorizes these large UVs as nonbattle force ships.6
Navy’s Next Force-Level Goal
Release of Navy’s Next Force-Level Goal Delayed Since Late 2019
The 355-ship goal predates the Trump and Biden Administrations’ national defense strategies and
does not reflect the new, more distributed fleet architecture (i.e., new mix of ships) that the Navy
wants to shift toward in coming years. (This more distributed fleet architecture, which is expected
to feature a significant number of large surface and underwater unmanned vehicles [UVs], is
discussed in more detail later in this report.) The Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) have been working since 2019 on a successor to the 355-ship force-level goal that would
reflect current national defense strategy and the new fleet architecture, but have not been able to
come to closure on a successor goal that has been explicitly endorsed by the Administration.
Navy on June 20, 2023, Reportedly Submits Report Calling for 381-Ship Fleet
A July 18, 2023, press report stated that the Navy on June 20, 2023, had submitted to the
congressional defense committees a congressionally mandated Battle Force Ship Assessment and
Requirement (BFSAR) report that calls for a future fleet with 381 manned ships, including 31
larger (i.e., LHA/LHA-type and LPD/LSD-type) amphibious ships. No other details on the
composition of the 381-ship fleet were reported. The BFSAR report is classified and the Navy
does not plan to release an unclassified version.7 It is not clear whether the Administration

5 For further discussion of these large UVs, see CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea
Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
6 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2024, March 2023, with cover letters dated March 30, 2023, released April 18, 2023, pp. 6, 19.
7 Sam LaGrone, “Navy Raises Battle Force Goal to 381 Ships in Classified Report to Congress,” USNI News, July 18,
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service

4

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

endorses the 381-ship fleet reportedly called for in the BFSAR report as the new force-level goal
for the Navy.
Potential Navy Force-Level Goals in 2020-2022
Prior to the June 2023 BFSAR report, other potential Navy force-level goals in 2020-2022
included the following:
• On December 9, 2020, the Navy released a long-range Navy shipbuilding
document that presented the Trump Administration’s emerging successor to the
355-ship force-level goal. The document called for a Navy with a more
distributed fleet architecture, including 382 to 446 manned ships and 143 to 242
large UVs.8
• On June 17, 2021, the Navy released a long-range Navy shipbuilding document
that presented the Biden Administration’s emerging successor to the 355-ship
force-level goal. The document called for a Navy with a more distributed fleet
architecture, including 321 to 372 manned ships and 77 to 140 large UVs.9
• On February 18, 2022, in remarks at a conference, the Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Michael Gilday, reportedly stated that, based on analysis, he had
concluded that the Navy needs a fleet of 362 or more manned ships and about
150 large UVs to meet the Navy’s commitments under the Biden
Administration’s forthcoming national defense strategy.10
• A July 19, 2022, press report stated that the Navy earlier that month had
submitted to the defense committees a classified BFSAR report calling for a fleet
of 373 ships.11
• On July 26, 2022, the Navy released a document, Chief of Naval Operations
[CNO] Navigation Plan 2022, that, similar to the above-discussed July 2022
BFSAR report, called for a future fleet of 373 manned ships, as well as about 150
large unmanned surface and underwater vehicles, with the 373 manned ships to
include 12 ballistic missile submarines, 66 attack submarines, 12 nuclear-
powered aircraft carriers, 96 large surface combatants, 56 small surface
combatants, 31 larger amphibious ships, 18 smaller Light Amphibious Warships
(LAWs), and 83 combat logistics, command, and support ships.12

2023. See also Joseph Trevithick, “Navy’s New 381-Hull Fleet Plan Recommits To Big Amphibious Warfare Ships,”
The Drive, July 19, 2023.
8 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels, December 2020,
23 pp.
9 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2022, June 2021, 16 pp.
10 See Sam LaGrone and Mallory Shelbourne, “CNO Gilday: ‘We Need a Naval Force of Over 500 Ships,’” USNI
News, February 18, 2022; Justin Katz, “CNO Lays Out Future Fleet He Wants: 500 ships, 12 Carriers, 150 Unmanned
Vessels,” Breaking Defense, February 18, 2022; Richard R. Burgess, “CNO Is ‘Sighted on a Bigger, More Capable
Navy,’” Seapower, February 22, 2022.
11 Sam LaGrone, “New Navy Fleet Study Calls for 373 Ship Battle Force, Details are Classified,” USNI News, July 19,
2020.
12 U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations Navigation Plan 2022, undated, released July 26, 2022, p. 10.
Congressional Research Service

5

link to page 10 link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 11 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

355-Ship Goal Compared to Emerging New Force-Level Goals
Table 2 compares the 355-ship force-level goal to the emerging force-level goals discussed
above.
Table 2. 355-Ship Goal Compared to Emerging New Force-Level Goals
BFSAR
and
Trump
Biden
CNO
Adminis-
Adminis-
Reported
Naviga-
tration
tration
remarks
tion
355-
December
June 17,
of CNO,
Plan
Reported
ship
9, 2020,
2021,
February
July
BFSAR of
Ship type
goal
document document
18, 2022
2022
June 2023
Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)
12
12
12
12
12
n/a
Attack submarines (SSNs)
66
72 to 78
66 to 72a
70
66
n/a
Aircraft carriers
12
n/ab
9 to 11
12
12
n/a
Large aircraft carriers (CVNs)
12
8 to 11b
n/a
12
12
n/a
Light aircraft carriers (CVLs)
0
0 to 6 c
n/ad
0
0
n/a
Large surface combatants (cruisers and
104
73 to 88
63 to 65
60
96
n/a
destroyers)
Small surface combatants (frigates and
52
60 to 67
40 to 45
50
56
n/a
Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs])
Amphibious ships
38
61 to 67
48 to 63
58 or 59
49
n/a
(or more)
Large-deck (LHA/LHD)
12
9 to 10
8 to 9
9
31
31
LPD-type
26
n/a
16 to 19
19 or 20
Medium Landing Ships (LSMs)
0
n/a
24 to 35
30 (or
18
n/a
more)e
LPD-type and LAWs combined
26
52 to 57
40 to 44
49 or 50
n/a
n/a
(or more)
Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships
32
69 to 87f
56 to 75g
n/a
~100
82
Command and support ships
39
27 to 30
27 to 29
n/a
Subtotal manned ships
355
382 to 446
321 to 372
~362 or
373
381
~363
(or more)
Unmanned or optionally manned ships
0
143 to 242
77 to 140
~150
~150
n/a
Large and medium unmanned
0
119 to 166
59 to 89
n/a
n/a
n/a
surface vessels (LUSVs and MUSVs)
Extra-large unmanned underwater
0
24 to 76
18 to 51
n/a
n/a
n/a
vehicles (XLUUVs)
TOTAL manned and unmanned
355
525 to 688
398 to 512
~512 or
~523
n/a
ships
~513
(or more)
Sources: Table prepared by CRS based on U.S. Navy data and, for the final column, Sam LaGrone and Mallory
Shelbourne, “CNO Gilday: ‘We Need a Naval Force of Over 500 Ships,’” USNI News, February 18, 2022; Justin
Katz, “CNO Lays Out Future Fleet He Wants: 500 ships, 12 Carriers, 150 Unmanned Vessels,” Breaking Defense,
Congressional Research Service

6

link to page 10 link to page 12 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

February 18, 2022; Richard R. Burgess, “CNO Is ‘Sighted on a Bigger, More Capable Navy,’” Seapower, February
22, 2022; Sam LaGrone, “New Navy Fleet Study Calls for 373 Ship Battle Force, Details are Classified,” USNI
News, July 19, 2020; U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations Navigation Plan 2022, undated, released July 26, 2022,
p. 10.
Notes: n/a = not available. BFSAR is Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement.
a. The document states that the range of 66 to 72 includes Large Payload Submarines—the Navy’s planned
next-generation successor to its four current cruise missile submarines (SSGNs).
b. The document states: “Lower [end of the CVN] range may be enabled by acquisition of cost-effective CVL.”
c. The document states: “Further study of cost-effective CVL capabilities and capacity required.”
d. The document states: “New capability concepts like a light aircraft carrier continue to be studied and
analyzed to ful y il uminate their potential to execute key mission elements in a more distributed manner
and to inform the best mix of a future force.”
e. As reported in the USNI News article of February 18, 2022. The Breaking Defense article of February 18,
2022, reported the figure as 20 to 30.
f.
The document states: “Includes Next Generation Logistic Ships (NGLS). Logistics force size/mix subject to
on-going analysis.”
g. The document states: “Includes the future next generation logistics ship.”
April 2022 Navy Report on FY2023 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan Presents Results of
Studies on Potential New Force-Level Goals
In addition to the information presented in Table 2, the Navy’s FY2023 30-year (FY2023-
FY2052) shipbuilding plan13 presented the results of three studies on possibilities for the Navy’s
successor force-level goal. As shown in Figure 1, these studies call for a future Navy with 321 to
404 manned ships and 45 to 204 large UVs.
Next Navy Force-Level Goal Will Introduce More Distributed Fleet Architecture
Remarks from Navy and DOD officials since 2019 have indicated that the Navy’s next force-level
goal will introduce a once-in-a-generation change in fleet architecture, meaning basic the types of
ships that make up the Navy and how these ships are used in combination with one another to
perform Navy missions. This new fleet architecture is to be more distributed than the fleet
architecture reflected in the 355-ship goal or previous Navy force-level goals. In particular, the
new architecture is expected to include a significant number of large unmanned surface and
underwater unmanned vehicles (UVs).
Navy and DOD leaders believe that shifting to a more distributed fleet architecture is
• operationally necessary, to respond effectively to the improving maritime anti-
access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities of other countries, particularly China;14

13 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2023, April 2022 (released April 20, 2022), 28 pp.
14 Some observers have long urged the Navy to shift to a more distributed fleet architecture, on the grounds that the
Navy’s current architecture—which concentrates much of the fleet’s capability into a relatively limited number of
individually larger and more expensive surface ships—is increasingly vulnerable to attack by the improving A2/AD
capabilities (particularly anti-ship missiles and their supporting detection and targeting systems) of potential
adversaries, particularly China. Shifting to a more distributed architecture, these observers have argued, would
•
complicate an adversary’s targeting challenge by presenting the adversary with a larger number of Navy units
to detect, identify, and track;
•
reduce the loss in aggregate Navy capability that would result from the destruction of an individual Navy
platform;
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service

7

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

• technically feasible as a result of advances in technologies for UVs and for
networking widely distributed maritime forces that include significant numbers
of UVs; and
• affordable—no more expensive, and possibly less expensive, than the current
fleet architecture for a given level of overall fleet capability, so as to fit within
expected future Navy budgets.
Figure 1. Navy Table Summarizing Studies on Future Navy Force-Level Goal
As shown in Navy’s FY2023 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan

Source: U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2023, April 2022 (released April 20, 2022), p. 4.
Notes: INFSA = Integrated Naval Force Structure Assessment. FNFS = Future Naval Force Study. FFA = Future
Fleet Architecture.
Shifting to a more distributed force architecture, Navy and Marine Corps officials have indicated,
will support implementation of the Navy and Marine Corps’ new overarching operational
concept, called Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), and a supporting Marine Corps

•
give U.S. leaders the option of deploying USVs and UUVs in wartime to sea locations that would be
tactically advantageous but too risky for manned ships; and
•
increase the modularity and reconfigurability of the fleet for adapting to changing mission needs.
For more on China’s maritime A2/AD capabilities, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization:
Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service

8

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

operational concept called Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO).15 A key aim of
DMO and EABO is to improve the ability of the Navy and Marine Corps to counter China’s
improving maritime military capabilities. The Navy’s FY2024 30-year (FY2024-FY2053)
shipbuilding plan states
The concepts of DMO and Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) /
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) require a balanced and different mix of
traditional battle force ships as well as new unmanned, amphibious, and logistic platforms.
Previous warfighting analysis validated that a progressive evolution of existing platforms
combined with revolutionary introduction of new technologies results in a more survivable
and more lethal force than previous force structures. The Department is committed to
continually analyzing, testing, and experimenting with novel concepts and capabilities to
ensure they will provide an optimal mix of capability to the warfighters of tomorrow.
DMO addresses challenges to sea control and access in contested and “informationalized”
environments. This concept describes required capabilities to execute DMO with massed
effects. DMO provides the intellectual framework necessary to evolve our fleet to meet the
challenges of the future.
To realize these concepts, the Department continues to experiment and analyze a range of
solutions to provide lethal capability for sea control and power projection within the
framework of DMO. Study areas include, but are not limited to, aircraft carrier force
structure, DDG(X) [next-generation destroyer], SSN(X) [next-generation attack
submarine], T-AOL [next-generation logistics ships], LSM [medium landing ship],
amphibious ship mix and force structure, and expanded missions for developing unmanned
platforms. This analysis and experimentation, in support of warfighting concepts, is
informed by operationally relevant metrics including, but not limited to, capacity, lethality,
survivability, operational reach, and affordability.16
Commission on the Future of the Navy
Section 1092 of the FY2023 NDAA establishes an independent commission in the legislative
branch to be known as the Commission on the Future of the Navy. Section 1092 states that the
commission is to “undertake a comprehensive study of the structure of the Navy and policy
assumptions related to the size and force mixture of the Navy, in order... to make
recommendations on the size and force mixture of ships; and ... to make recommendations on the
size and force mixture of naval aviation.” The commission is to submit a report with its findings,
conclusions, and recommendations not later than July 1, 2024. As of August 2023, some of the
members of the commission had not yet been named.17

15 For more on DMO, see, for example, Barry Rosenberg, “Distributed Maritime Operations: Making Ships, Subs, And
Platforms Nodes On A Network,” Breaking Defense, August 3, 2021; Edward Lundquist, “DMO is Navy’s Operational
Approach to Winning the High-End Fight at Sea,” Seapower, February 2, 2021. For more on EABO, see CRS Report
R46374, Navy Medium Landing Ship (LSM) (Previously Light Amphibious Warship [LAW]) Program: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
16 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2024, March 2023, with cover letters dated March 30, 2023, released April 18, 2023, p. 7.
17 See, for example, Brent Sadler, “‘Lost at Sea’: The Future of the Navy Commission That Congress Created,”
Heritage Foundation, August 18, 2023. See also Justin Katz, “Congress Lags in Setting Up Its Own ‘Future Navy’
Panel,” Breaking Defense, May 10, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

9

link to page 14 link to page 14 link to page 15 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Navy’s FY2024 Five-Year and 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans
FY2024 Five-Year Shipbuilding Program
The Navy’s FY2024 five-year (FY2024-FY2028) shipbuilding plan (Table 3) includes a total of
55 ships, or an average of 11 per year. Given a 35-year average surface life for Navy ships (a
planning factor that assumes that all Navy ships would be kept in service to the end of their
expected service lives), an average shipbuilding rate of 11 ships per year, if sustained for 35
years, would increase the size of the Navy to 385 ships over a 35-year period (i.e., by the 2060s).
Table 3. FY2024 Five-Year (FY2024-FY2028) Shipbuilding Plan

FY24 FY25 FY26 FY27 FY28 Total
Columbia (SSBN-826) class ballistic missile submarine
1

1
1
1
4
Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarine
2
2
2
2
2
10
Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier

1
1
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer
2
2
2
2
2
10
FFG-62 frigate
2
1
2
1
2
8
LHA amphibious assault ship

1

1
LPD-17 Fight II amphibious ship

0
Medium Landing Ship (LSM)

1
1
2
2
6
John Lewis (TAO-205) class oiler
1

2
1
2
6
Next-Generation Logistics Ship (NGLS)

1
1
1
3
Submarine tender (AS[X])
1

1

2
TAGOS(X) ocean surveillance ship

1
1
1
1
4
TOTAL
9
7
13
12
14
55
Projected total size of Navy
293
286
285
285
291

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on FY2024 Navy budget submission.
The Navy fell below 300 battle force ships (the kind of ships that count toward the quoted size of
the Navy and the Navy’s 355-ship force-structure goal) in August 2003, and has generally
remained between 270 and 300 battle force ships since then. As of August 28, 2023, the Navy
included 297 battle force ships. As shown in Table 3, the Navy projects that under its FY2024
budget submission, the Navy would include 293 battle force ships at the end of FY2024 and 291
battle force ships at the end of FY2028.
FY2024 30-Year (FY2024-FY2053) Shipbuilding Plan
As shown in Figure 2, the FY2024 30-year (FY2024-FY2053) shipbuilding plan, released on
April 18, 2023, similar to the FY2023 30-year (FY2023-FY2052) shipbuilding plan that was
released on April 20, 2022, includes three potential 30-year shipbuilding profiles and resulting
30-year force-level projections, referred to as PB2024 (President’s budget for FY2024),
Alternative 2, and Alternative 3. PB2024 and Alternative 2 assume no real (i.e., above-inflation)
growth in shipbuilding funding, while Alternative 3 assumes some amount of real growth in
shipbuilding funding.

Congressional Research Service

10

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Figure 2. Alternative Shipbuilding Profiles in 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
As shown in Navy’s FY2024 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan

Source: U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2024, March 2023, with cover letters dated March 30, 2023, released April 18, 2023, pp. 15-16.
The Navy states that PB2024 and Alternative 2
do not procure all platforms at the desired rate (e.g., DDGs, SSNs, and FFGs at two ships
per year), which industry needs to demonstrate the ability to achieve, but does maximize
capability within projected resources, industrial factors, and technology constraints to build
the most capable force. Overall, this approach accepts risk in capacity in order to field a
more capable and ready force....
The primary differences between the baseline PB2024 and Alternative 2 is the focus [in
Alternative 2] on procuring more SSNs and unmanned vessels within the constrained [total
Congressional Research Service

11

link to page 16 link to page 16

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

amount of shipbuilding funding]... Alternative 2 also continues to procure DDG 51 Flt IIIs
longer than PB2024, delays the shift to DDG(X), and procures fewer of both.
Alternative 3 represents procuring to a larger Navy. This alternative shifts CVNs to 4-year
centers [i.e., procuring aircraft carriers at a rate of one every four years]and not only shifts
[procurement of attach submarines and destroyers to the future SSN(X) [next-generation
attack submarine] and DDG(X) [and next-generation destroyer] but also procures the [two
types of] platforms at a consistent rate of at least two per year.18
Projected Force Levels Under FY2024 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
As shown in Figure 3, under all three alternatives presented in the FY2024 30-year shipbuilding
plan, the Navy projects that the fleet would include 293 battle force ships at the end of FY2024
and 291 battle force ships at the end of FY2028.
Figure 3. Projected Force Levels Under Alternative Shipbuilding Profiles
As shown in Navy’s FY2024 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan

Source: U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2024, March 2023, with cover letters dated March 30, 2023, released April 18, 2023, p. 18.
As also shown in Figure 3, under PB2024, the Navy would increase to a peak of 331 manned
ships in FY2039-FY2040 and then decrease to 319 manned ships in FY2053; under Alternative 2,
the Navy would increase to a peak of 331 manned ships in FY2039, and then decrease to 328

18 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2024, March 2023, with cover letters dated March 30, 2023, released April 18, 2023, pp. 4, 6.
Congressional Research Service

12

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

manned ships in FY2053; and under Alternative 3, the Navy would increase to 356 manned ships
(i.e., one more than the 355 called for in the Navy’s current ship force-level goal) in FY2042 and
continue increasing to 367 manned ships by FY2053. The Navy states: “In addition [to these
manned ships], it is estimated that the Navy [under the three alternatives] could achieve 89-149
unmanned platforms by 2045.”19
Issues for Congress
Potential issues for Congress concerning Navy shipbuilding relating to the Navy’s proposed
FY2024 budget include but are not necessarily limited to those discussed below.
Force-Level Goal and Shipbuilding Profile
One issue for Congress concerns the ship force-level goal to replace the 355-ship goal of 2016
and the Navy’s presentation, for the second year in a row, of three 30-year shipbuilding profiles
rather than a single profile. Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
• Does the Administration endorse the 381-ship force-level goal presented in the
June 2023 BFSAR report, or is that report only a statement presenting the Navy’s
own view of what the future ship force-level goal should be?
• Should Congress require the Navy to prepare and release an unclassified version
of the June 2023 BFSAR report that would include the numbers and types of
ships included in the 381-ship force-level goal?
• In the absence of a clearly defined and definitive new Navy force-level goal that
has been explicitly endorsed by the Administration, as well as the presentation of
multiple 30-year shipbuilding profiles rather than a single profile, how well can
Congress
• understand the Biden Administration’s goals concerning the future size and
composition of the Navy, and
• assess the Navy’s proposed FY2024 shipbuilding budget, five-year (FY2024-
FY2028) shipbuilding plan, and 30-year (FY2024-FY2053) shipbuilding
plan?
• Is the continued absence of a clearly defined and definitive new force-level goal
that has been explicitly endorsed by the Administration, and the presentation for
the second year in a row of three 30-year shipbuilding profiles rather than a
single profile permitting the Administration to avoid stating its specific plans for
future Navy force levels and budgets?
• If the Administration does not release and explicitly endorse a clearly defined and
definitive new force-level goal to replace the 355-ship goal, should Congress
consider the option of legislating a replacement force-level goal of its own
devising (including both a total number of ships and, within that total number,
required numbers for each ship category), and require DOD to budget the
funding needed to achieve such a fleet in a timely manner and maintain it
thereafter? What role might the recommendations of the Commission on the
Future of the Navy play in such an effort?

19 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2024, March 2023, with cover letters dated March 30, 2023, released April 18, 2023, p. 7.
Congressional Research Service

13

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

• How many Navy ships of what types and numbers will be needed to adequately
perform the Navy’s projected missions in coming years, particularly in light of
great power competition with China and Russia?
Regarding the final question above, as discussed in the CRS report on China’s naval
modernization effort and its implications for U.S. Navy capabilities,20 China’s military
modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is the top focus of U.S. defense
planning and budgeting. China’s naval modernization effort has been underway for about 30
years, since the early to mid-1990s, and has transformed China’s navy into a much more modern
and capable force. China’s navy is, by far, the largest of any country in East Asia, and sometime
between 2015 and 2020 it surpassed the U.S. Navy in numbers of battle force ships (meaning the
types of ships that count toward the quoted size of the U.S. Navy). DOD states that China’s navy
“is the largest navy in the world with a battle force of approximately 340 platforms, including
major surface combatants, submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships,
aircraft carriers, and fleet auxiliaries.... This figure does not include approximately 85 patrol
combatants and craft that carry anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). The ... overall battle force [of
China’s navy] is expected to grow to 400 ships by 2025 and 440 ships by 2030.”21 U.S. military
officials and other observers are expressing concern or alarm regarding the pace of China’s naval
shipbuilding effort and resulting trend lines regarding the relative sizes and capabilities of China’s
navy and the U.S. Navy.22
A July 31, 2023, press report states:
The United States will rely on allies rather than a major expansion of its own forces to
counter any Chinese military risk in the Pacific, a US general has told AFP [Agence France-
Presse].
Beijing enjoys “very clear” advantages in the region, said Major General Joseph Ryan,
commander of the 12,000-strong 25th Infantry Division on Oahu, Hawaii.
He cited China's expanding military defences, its long-range rocket missile capability and
the ease with which it can position forces and equipment in the Pacific.
By contrast, in the event of conflict, the United States and its allies would have to traverse
international waters or the territories of multiple nations, requiring their permission as well
as the mobilisation of air, land and sea transport.
“I don't see a major expansion of US military presence in the region,” Ryan said while in
Darwin at the weekend for multinational military exercise Talisman Sabre.

20 CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
21 2022 DOD CMSD, p. 52. See also 2019 DIA CMP, p. 63.
22 See, for example, Chris Bradford, “Point of No Return, US Navy Faces Being Totally Outgunned by China in Just
Seven Years—We Need a Fleet Ready to Fight War Now, Says Expert,” U.S. Sun, March 1, 2023; Keith Griffith,
“China’s Naval Fleet Is Growing and the US ‘Can't Keep Up’ with the Warship Buildup as Beijing Uses Its Sea Power
to Project an ‘Increasingly Aggressive Military Posture Globally,’ Navy Secretary Warns,” Daily Mail (UK), February
23, 2023; Brad Lendon and Haley Britzky, “US Can’t Keep Up with China’s Warship Building, Navy Secretary Says,”
CNN, February 22, 2023; Meredith Roaten, “Shipyard Capacity, China’s Naval Buildup Worries U.S. Military
Leaders,” National Defense, January 26, 2023; Oliver Parken and Tyler Rogoway, “Extremely Ominous Warning
About China From US Strategic Command Chief, Admiral Richard Says ‘The Big One’ with China Is Coming and the
‘Ship Is Slowly Sinking’ in Terms of U.S. Deterrence,” The Drive, November 6, 2022; Xiaoshan Xue, “As China
Expands Its Fleets, US Analysts Call for Catch-up Efforts,” VOA, September 13, 2022.
For articles offering differing perspectives, see, for example, David Axe, “The Chinese Navy Can’t Grow Forever—
The Slowdown Might Start Soon,” Forbes, November 12, 2020; Mike Sweeney, Assessing Chinese Maritime Power,
Defense Priorities, October 2020, 14 pp.
Congressional Research Service

14

link to page 14 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

“What I do see is increased partnership, opportunities for partnership and perhaps some
increased growth in the region,” he said.23
Total Number of Ships Projected Through FY2028
Another issue for Congress concerns the total number of Navy ships projected through FY2028,
as shown in Table 3. Potential oversight issues for Congress include the following:
• Is the total number of Navy ships projected through FY2028 consistent with
increasing the size of the Navy substantially above 300 ships? If the goal is to
increase the Navy to something substantially more than 300 ships, why does the
projection show the total number of ships decreasing rather than increasing
through FY2028?
• Is the total number of Navy ships projected through FY2028 consistent with a
goal of countering China’s navy, which already has more ships than the U.S.
Navy and is projected to grow further in coming years?24
Affordability of Shipbuilding Plan and Budgetary Path for
Sustaining a Larger Navy
Overview
The prospective affordability of the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan has been a matter of
oversight focus for several years. Observers have been especially concerned about the prospective
affordability of Navy shipbuilding plans during the decade or so from the mid-2020s through the
mid-2030s, when the Navy wants to procure Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines as well
as replacements for large numbers of retiring attack submarines, cruisers, and destroyers.25
In the Navy’s FY2024 30-year (FY2024-FY2053) shipbuilding plan, PB2024 and Alternative 2
assume no real (i.e., above-inflation) growth in shipbuilding funding, while Alternative 3 assumes
some amount of real growth in shipbuilding funding. Under PB2024, the Navy would increase to
a peak of 331 manned ships in FY2039-FY2040 and then decrease to 319 manned ships in
FY2053. Under Alternative 2, the Navy would increase to a peak of 331 manned ships in
FY2039, and then decrease to 328 manned ships in FY2053. Under Alternative 3, the Navy would
increase to 356 manned ships in FY2042 and continue increasing to 367 manned ships by
FY2053.
Increasing the size of the Navy from about 300 ships to something substantially more than 300
ships (plus additional large UVs) would require increasing not only the Navy’s shipbuilding, but

23 Sharon Marris (Agence France-Presse), “US General Says Allies Key To Counter China In Pacific,” Barron’s, July
31, 2023.
24 For more on China’s Navy, including projected total numbers in coming years, see CRS Report RL33153, China
Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
25 The Navy’s 30-year plans in recent years have spotlighted for policymakers the substantial increase in Navy
shipbuilding funding that would be required to implement the 30-year plan during the decade or so from the mid-2020s
through the mid-2030s. As discussed in CRS testimony in 2011, a key function of the 30-year shipbuilding plan is to
alert policymakers well ahead of time to periods of potentially higher funding requirements for Navy shipbuilding. (See
Statement of Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional Research Service, before the House Armed
Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, hearing on the Department of Defense’s 30-Year
Aviation and Shipbuilding Plans, June 1, 2011, 8 pp.)
Congressional Research Service

15

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

the Navy’s budget as a whole, so as to provide funding for non-shipbuilding costs associated with
achieving and sustaining a larger fleet, including costs for additional ship crews, ship-embarked
aircraft, ship- and aircraft-launched weapons, ship and aircraft fuel and supplies, ship and aircraft
maintenance and repair, and shore support.
November 2022 CBO Report on FY2023 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
A November 2022 CBO report on the Navy’s FY2023 30-year shipbuilding plan states
The three alternatives in the Navy’s [FY]2023 [30-year shipbuilding] plan would require
average annual shipbuilding appropriations that were 23 percent to 35 percent more than
the average over the past five years. CBO estimates that total shipbuilding costs would
average about $30 billion to $33 billion (in [constant FY]2022 dollars) over the next 30
years, which is 14 percent to 18 percent more than the Navy estimates. The Navy’s total
budget would increase from $220 billion today to roughly $290 billion (in [constant
FY]2022 dollars) in 2052.26
The report also states
CBO’s estimates of new-ship construction costs are higher than the Navy’s because CBO
and the Navy made different assumptions about the design and capabilities of some future
ships, used different estimating methods, and treated growth in the costs of labor and
materials for shipbuilding differently. Some of the difference in the estimates stems from
uncertainty about the design and capabilities of large ships whose construction would begin
in 5 or 10 years—in particular, the next-generation destroyer that would start to replace the
Navy’s Arleigh Burke class destroyers and the next-generation attack submarine to follow
the service’s Virginia class submarines. The difference between the estimates also
increases over time, in part because the Navy’s method of developing constant-dollar
estimates (which reflect real costs—that is, costs adjusted to remove the effects of inflation)
for most of its shipbuilding programs uses a fixed average real cost per ship; it does not
account for the historically faster growth in the costs of labor and materials in the
shipbuilding industry than in the economy as a whole. As a result, the Navy’s estimates for
the future purchases of ships with the capabilities of today’s ships do not reflect the same
increase in real costs that CBO’s estimates reflect.27
The report also states
The cost of the Navy’s [FY]2023 [30-year] shipbuilding plan is not only high when
compared with recent funding, it is high by historical standards. In comparing the plan’s
costs with average recent funding, CBO is comparing funding during a period that saw the
largest appropriations for ship construction since the Reagan Administration’s defense
buildup in the 1980s. Since 2013, lawmakers have appropriated, on average, $2.2 billion
more per year for shipbuilding than the President has requested, partly because of concerns
that the fleet is too small to perform all of its missions.... And the most recent two years of
appropriations—2021 and 2022—saw two of the three largest increases by the Congress
in the past decade. As a point of comparison, shipbuilding appropriations averaged $28.9
billion (in 2022 dollars) during the Cold War years of 1955 to 1989, a period of intense
competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in which the Navy faced
challenges that look increasingly similar to those it expects to face over the next two

26 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2023 Shipbuilding Plan, November 2022, page
entitled “At a Glance” (PDF page 2 of 39).
27 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2023 Shipbuilding Plan, November 2022, pp. 2-
3.
Congressional Research Service

16

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

decades. The three alternatives in the Navy’s plan would cost between 3 percent and 13
percent more than that.28
Navy Statements
An August 26, 2022, press report quoted the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Gilday, as
stating on August 25, 2022, that the Navy would need an additional $9 billion to $10 billion per
year to build and maintain a fleet of 355 manned ships and 150 unmanned ships.29
A July 27, 2022, press report states
The U.S. Navy’s planned fleet of 2045 will require annual real [i.e., inflation-adjusted]
budget increases of 3 to 5 percent, according to the Navy’s top officer, who called that a
“realistic” schedule for amassing the 500 hyperconnected manned and unmanned vessels
that national security will require.
“I think it’s going to take a couple of decades to get us to yield that hybrid fleet that we
think that we ultimately need in order to fight the way we think we want to fight, which is
in a distributed manner,” Adm. Mike Gilday, chief of naval operations, told reporters on
Tuesday [July 26].
That budget growth goal “would be unprecedented if they were to be achieved by the
Navy,” based on historical statistics, said Travis Sharp, fellow and director of defense
budget studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments based in Washington,
D.C....
Historically speaking, the odds are against the Navy getting that kind of money.
“Over the last 75 years, only one-third of the time has the Department of the Navy’s budget
grown by 3 percent or more in real terms,” said CSBA’s Sharp. “If you think about those
outcomes as being…the odds, it’s like one-third of the time the Navy has gotten that level
of resourcing, and two-thirds of the time it has not gotten that level resourcing.”
Since World War II, Sharp said, the longest span of three-percent-or-more growth in the
Navy Department’s budget is three years, and that’s only happened twice, during general
military buildups: in the early 1980s, across the Carter and Reagan administrations and the
early 2000s after 9/11 and amid the buildup to the Iraq war.
Various defense and congressional officials have recommended 3 to 5 percent budget
growth since 2018, when both the National Defense Strategy and U.S. Institute of Peace’s
2018 report by the National Defense Strategy Commission called for it, Sharp said.30
As noted earlier, on July 26, 2022, the Navy released a document, Chief of Naval Operations
[CNO] Navigation Plan 2022, that calls for a future fleet of 373 manned ships, as well as about
150 large unmanned surface and underwater vehicles. Regarding the funding levels needed to
achieve this fleet, the document states (emphasis as in the original):
Our central challenge is balancing our investments in the future fleet while sustaining a
forward posture that keeps America safe and prosperous. Manpower, operations, and
maintenance costs continue to grow above the rate of inflation. Meanwhile, we face the
simultaneous task of recapitalizing our strategic nuclear deterrent, our century-old dry dock
and ship repair facilities, and our strategic sealift capacity. To simultaneously modernize
and grow the capacity of our fleet, the Navy will require 3-5% sustained budget

28 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2023 Shipbuilding Plan, November 2022, p. 5.
29 “The Big News,” Politico Pro Morning Defense, August 26, 2022.
30 Caitlin M. Kenney, “Navy Fleet Plan Needs 3-5% Annual Budget Increases for the Next Two Decades,” Defense
One, July 27, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

17

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

growth above actual inflation [i.e., real growth]. Short of that, we will prioritize
modernization [i.e., improving the capabilities of individual ships and aircraft] over
preserving force structure [i.e., preserving numbers of ships and aircraft]. This will
decrease the size of the fleet until we can deploy smaller, more cost-effective, and more
autonomous force packages at scale.31
A November 4, 2021, press report stated
The U.S. Navy needs annual budget increases of three to five percent over inflation if it is
to reach its shipbuilding goals and meet China’s “significant threat,” Navy Secretary Carlos
Del Toro said Thursday [November 4]....
If the U.S. Navy is to reach 355 ships—the goal service leaders put forth in 2016 and
Congress ratified two years later—it needs budget increases of three to five percent over
inflation, Del Toro said.32
A June 15, 2021, press report stated
The number of ships in the fleet, now at 296 ships, will decrease if the Navy continues to
have flat or declining budgets, the service’s top officer told Congress today.
Despite numerous evaluations showing the Navy needs more ships, Chief of Naval
Operations Adm. Mike Gilday told the House Armed Service Committee that without a
topline increase to the service’s budget, the fleet will only get smaller.
“As you all know, the results of analysis done over the past five years—whether inside the
Pentagon or outside—have been consistent and clear: America needs a larger, more capable
fleet,” Gilday said. “Our latest Future [Naval Force Structure] assessment provided the
headlights not only for the size of our future fleet, but importantly for the composition of
that fleet, the capabilities that it brings to the joint force. If the Navy’s [budget] top-line
remains flat or goes down further, the size of our fleet will definitely shrink.”…
Gilday told lawmakers that the service’s budget is trying to balance the need to pursue new
capabilities and technology with its readiness priorities. While the Navy has for years been
building toward a goal of 355 ships, Gilday said the service only has enough money for
300 vessels with its current budget.33
In February 2020, Navy officials testified that achieving and supporting a 355-ship fleet over the
next 10 years would require increasing the Navy’s budget by a cumulative total of $120 billion to
$130 billion over the next 10 years, or an average of $12 billion to $13 billion per year. This
figure, Navy officials stated, included not only the cost of procuring new ships, but costs
associated with crewing, arming, operating, and maintaining a 355-ship fleet.34
In January 2020, Admiral Gilday stated that fully funding the Navy’s program goals, including
the attainment of a 355-ship fleet, would require allocating a larger share of DOD’s budget to the
Navy.35

31 U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations Navigation Plan 2022, undated, released July 26, 2022, p. 12.
32 Caitlin M. Kenney, “Navy Secretary Seeks 3-5% Annual Budget Increases,” Defense One, November 4, 2021.
33 Mallory Shelbourne, “CNO Gilday: Flat or Declining Navy Budgets ‘Will Definitely Shrink’ the Fleet,” USNI News,
June 15, 2021.
34 See, for example, Ben Werner, “SECNAV Modly: Navy Needs Additional $120 Billion To Build 355-Ship Fleet By
2030,” USNI News, February 27, 2020.
35 See, for example, Marcus Weisgerber, “The US Navy Needs More Money, Its Top Admiral Bluntly Argues,”
Defense One, January 14, 2020; Sam LaGrone, “CNO Gilday Calls for Budget Increase to Reach 355 Ship Fleet; New
Battle Force Count Won’t Include Unmanned Ships,” USNI News, January 14, 2020; John M. Doyle, “CNO Wants
Larger Slice of Defense Budget to Modernize, Meet China Threat,” Seapower, January 15, 2020; Rich Abott, “CNO:
Ship Count Will Not Include Unmanned; Bigger Topline Needed For Fleet Goal,” Defense Daily, January 15, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

18

link to page 10 link to page 12 link to page 16 link to page 6 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

In September and October 2019, Navy officials stated that if Navy budgets in coming years
remain at current levels in real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) terms, the Navy would not be able to
properly maintain a fleet of more than 302 to 310 ships.36
Potential Oversight Questions for Congress
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
• Has a clear budgetary path been identified for financing a substantial increase in
the size of the Navy?
• Does the Biden Administration support increasing the size of the Navy’s total
budget to the level needed to increase the size of the Navy to figures like those
shown in Table 2 or Figure 1?
• In light of great power competition with China and Russia, how should funding
requirements for the Navy be balanced against funding requirements for other
parts of DOD?
Amphibious Ship Procurement and Force-Level
Another issue for Congress concerns the Navy’s plans for procuring amphibious ships and the
Navy’s projected numbers of amphibious ships. As noted earlier, 10 U.S.C. 8062(b) requires the
Navy to include not less than 31 operational amphibious warfare ships. The 31 amphibious ships
are to include not less than 10 LHA/LHD-type “big deck” amphibious assault ships, with the
remaining amphibious ships within the total of not less than 31 amphibious ships being
LPD/LSD-type amphibious ships. The requirements regarding amphibious ships were added to 10
U.S.C. 8062(b) by Section 1023 of the FY2023 (NDAA) (H.R. 7776/P.L. 117-263 of December
23, 2022).
As mentioned above, a July 18, 2023, press report stated that the Navy on June 20, 2023, had
submitted to the congressional defense committees a congressionally mandated Battle Force Ship
Assessment and Requirement (BFSAR) report that calls for a future fleet with 381 manned ships,
including 31 larger (i.e., LHA/LHA-type and LPD/LSD-type) amphibious ships.
As shown in Figure 3, the FY2024 30-year shipbuilding plan shows the projected number of
amphibious ships remaining below 31 ships throughout the 30-year period, with the figure
decreasing to 26 ships in FY2035 and decreasing further, to 19 ships (PB2024), 20 ships
(Alternative 2), or 23 ships (Alternative 3), in FY2053.
Under the 38-ship amphibious force-level goal that is included in the Navy’s current 355-ship
force-level objective (see Table 1), the Navy had planned to procure a total of 13 LPD-17 Flight
II class ships. Under the Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget, as under its proposed FY2023 budget,
the LPD-17 Flight II ship proposed for procurement (and funded by Congress)—the third LPD-17
Flight II ship—would be the final one to be procured. The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission,
like its FY2023 budget submission, would thus truncate the LPD-17 Flight II program from a
previously envisaged total of 13 ships to 3 ships. Ending LPD-17 Flight II procurement with the

36 Justin Katz, “Modly Acknowledges 355 Ships Won’t Happen in ‘Reasonable’ Amount of Time,” Inside Defense,
September 16, 2019; Otto Kreisher, “Modly Doubts Future Budgets Will Allow for 355-Ship Fleet,” Seapower,
October 27, 2019; Ben Werner, “Admiral: Navy Can Afford to Field a 310-Ship Fleet, Not 355,” USNI News, October
28, 2019. See also Rich Abott, “Navy Says Current Funding Only Supports 310 Ships,” Defense Daily, October 28,
2019; Paul McLeary, “Navy May Scrap Goal of 355 Ships; 310 Is Likely,” Breaking Defense, October 25, 2019.
Congressional Research Service

19

link to page 16 link to page 14 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

ship procured in FY2023 would make for a total of 16 LPD-17 Flight I and Flight II ships (13
LPD-17 Flight I ships procured in earlier years, and 3 LPD-17 Flight II ships).
A June 20, 2023, press report states:
In response to a terse letter from a group of lawmakers, Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro
recently said that he has “every intention to meet the legally mandated amphibious ship
requirements,” but balked at providing the new shipbuilding plan lawmakers requested.
In a three-paragraph-long June 19 letter…,37 Del Toro says he is “in constant consultation
with the Commandant of the Marine Corps and Chief of Naval Operations” to provide the
“right mix” of capabilities to the Navy’s fleet.
“The [Navy and Marine Corps] will continue to make investments to put us on course to
achieve and maintain a ready and capable amphibious warship fleet that meets the needs
of our joint force commanders,” says the letter, obtained by Breaking Defense.
Del Toro offered to brief the lawmakers in more detail but did not mention or include an
updated long-term shipbuilding plan in his response, an item the senators explicitly
requested in their June 13 letter,38 which gave Del Toro until Monday to comply.39
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
• Are the Navy’s plans for procuring amphibious ships and the Navy’s projected
numbers of amphibious ships consistent with the requirement in 10 U.S.C.
8062(b) for the Navy to include not less than 31 amphibious ships? If not, why
not?
• What are the potential operational consequences of the projected numbers of
amphibious shown in Figure 3?
• How much additional funding for procuring amphibious ships and for operating
and supporting amphibious ships would be needed to achieve and maintain a
force of not less than 31 amphibious ships, including not less than 10 LHA/LHD-
type “big deck” amphibious assault ships, as required by 10 U.S.C. 8062(b)?
• Is the Navy’s proposal to truncate the LPD-17 Flight II program to three ships,
and not procure any more such ships during the five-year period FY2024-
FY2028 (see Table 3), consistent with the requirement under 10 U.S.C. 8062(b)?
• What impact would the truncation of LPD-17 Flight II procurement to a total of
three ships have on the shipyard that builds LPD-17 Flight IIs (HII/Ingalls—the
Ingalls shipyard of Pascagoula, MS, which is part of Huntington Ingalls
Industries) in terms of workloads, employment levels, and costs for building
other Navy warships (including DDG-51 destroyers and LHA-type amphibious
assault ships) that are built at that yard? What impact would the truncation of

37 The June 20, 2023, press report at this point includes this live link to the June 19 letter:
https://sites.breakingmedia.com/uploads/sites/3/2023/06/Signed-SECNAV-Response-to-Amphib-ltr-dtd-19-JUN-
23.pdf.
38 The June 20, 2023, press report at this point includes a live link to a June 13, 2023 press report (Justin Katz, “‘Not a
Suggestion’: Senators Prod Navy’s Del Toro for Failure to Respond to Amphib Questions,” Breaking Defense, June 13,
2023) that in turn includes this live link to the June 13 letter:
https://sites.breakingmedia.com/uploads/sites/3/2023/06/20230613_Letter-to-Secretary-Del-Toro-re-31-
amphibs_FINAL.pdf. See also Connor O’Brien, “Bipartisan Senators Pressure Navy Secretary for Plan to Boost
Amphibious Ships,” Politico Pro, June 13, 2023.
39 Justin Katz, “Navy’s Del Toro Balks at Lawmakers’ Shipbuilding Plan Demand, Will ‘Meet’ Amphib Needs,”
Breaking Defense, June 20, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

20

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

LPD-17 Flight II procurement have on supplier firms associated with
construction of LPD-17 Flight II ships?
Industrial Base Capacity
Another issue for Congress concerns industrial base capacity at ship construction shipyards, ship
overhaul and repair shipyards, and supplier firms for building ships at annual rates needed to
substantially increase the size of the Navy, and for performing overhaul, repair, and
modernization work on a larger fleet. Potential capacity limits or bottlenecks that have been
identified include but are not necessarily limited to shipyard and supplier capacity for building
submarines at desired annual rates, and capacity at government-operated Naval Shipyards (NSYs)
for performing overhaul, repair, and modernization work on the Navy’s nuclear-powered ships
(i.e., its submarines and aircraft carriers).40
A March 21, 2023, press report stated
The Navy is keeping a two-ship-per-year cadence for its destroyer line because that’s a
realistic goal for industry to work toward, according to the Pentagon’s top budget officer.
Despite Congress’ push for the Navy to start buying three Arleigh Burke-class Flight III
destroyers per year, the Fiscal Year 2024 budget request unveiled last week showed the
service buying two destroyers. That’s because U.S. shipyards are not yet able to build two
destroyers per year, let alone three, Mike McCord said last week.
“I’m not hating on DDGs – my only point was that last year Congress added a third and
the reason we didn’t budget for three is, again, we don’t see the yards being able to produce
three a year. We don’t see them being able to produce two a year. And that’s just data. It’s
not what we wish to be true. But everybody’s struggling with skilled labor. Everybody’s
struggling with supply chain. So it’s not getting better very fast from the data that I’ve seen
– whether with submarines or DDGs. So two a year seems to be a reasonable place,”
McCord told USNI News at the McAleese Conference.
During the budget rollout last week, McCord said industry is currently building 1.5
destroyers per year, a number Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday has also cited
when arguing that the shipyards have limited capacity.
McCord also argued that asking for more destroyers than industry can build takes away
leverage from the Navy to negotiate with shipbuilders on price.
“If you keep sort of placing orders for things faster than they can be delivered, it’s good
for the books, the balance sheets of the companies. But are you really, as the buyer, are you
in the best place you’d like to be with any leverage or are you actually short of leverage

40 Regarding the delays and other difficulties the Navy has experienced in recent years in executing overhaul and repair
work on existing Navy ships, see, for example, Congressional Budget Office, The Capacity of the Navy’s Shipyards to
Maintain Its Submarines, March 2021, 21 pp.; Government Accountability Office, Navy Maintenance[:] Navy Report
Did Not Fully Address Causes of Delays or Results-Oriented Elements, GAO-21-66, October 2020, 29 pp; Government
Accountability Office, Navy Shipyards[:] Actions Needed to Address the Main Factors Causing Maintenance Delays
for Aircraft Carriers and Submarines, GAO-20-588, August 2020, 47 pp.; Government Accountability Office, Navy
Ship Maintenance[:] Evaluating Pilot Program Outcomes Could Inform Decisions to Address Persistent Schedule
Challenges, GAO-20-370, May 2020, 55 pp.; Government Accountability Office, Navy Ship Maintenance[:] Actions
Needed to Address Maintenance Delays for Surface Ships Based Overseas, GAO-20-86, February 2020, 63 pp.;
Government Accountability Office, Navy Maintenance[:] Persistent and Substantial Ship and Submarine Maintenance
Delays Hinder Efforts to Rebuild Readiness, GAO-20-257T, December 4, 2019 (Testimony Before the Subcommittees
on Seapower and Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Statement of
Diana C. Maurer Director Defense Capabilities and Management), 31 pp. GAO has reported and testified on this issue
numerous times in recent years.
Congressional Research Service

21

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

when, you produce on time or you don’t produce on time. It doesn’t matter to me – I’m
going to keep writing you checks,” McCord told USNI News.
The comptroller said both he and Susanna Blume, the director of the Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation (CAPE) Office of the Secretary of Defense, don’t think putting more
funding toward an extra destroyer is a wise use of resources that will help shipbuilders
deliver it to the Navy quicker.
“It’s just sort of piling up in the orders book and we’re still going to have the same problems
of the yards producing faster until we get through the supply chain and the workforce
issues,” McCord said. “It is not to say that we would not be interest[ed] in a more robust
production world where in having three DDGs or moving to three submarines, but it
doesn’t seem to be … realistic.”
General Dynamics Bath Iron Works, one of the yards that build the destroyers, has spent
the last several years digging through a backlog of work at its Maine yard that the COVID-
19 pandemic exacerbated. HII’s Ingalls Shipbuilding, the other yard that builds the Arleigh
Burke destroyers, has performed better. Ingalls is also winding down the Coast Guard’s
Legend-class National Security Cutter production line, which could open up more capacity
at its yard in Pascagoula, Miss.
A spokeswoman for Ingalls Shipbuilding told USNI New in a statement that the yard is
ready to support building three destroyers per year should the Navy go this route....
A spokesperson for Bath Iron Works told USNI News that it’s “working to aggressively
recover schedule” at the shipyard....
“We would love to live in a world where the yards could make three a year, or three
submarines a year, but we don’t live in that world,” McCord said last week at the budget
rollout.41
An August 25, 2022, press report stated
The biggest barrier to adding more ships to the Navy is industrial base capacity, Chief of
Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday said Thursday [August 25].
The service’s top officer said shipbuilders need indicators from the service before they’re
able to make the investments required to build, for example, three destroyers per year.
“We have an industrial capacity that’s limited. In other words, we can only get so many
ships off the production line a year. My goal would be to optimize those production lines
for destroyers, for frigates, for amphibious ships, for the light amphibious ships, for supply
ships,” Gilday said at a Heritage Foundation event.
“We need to give a signal to industry that we need to get to three destroyers a year, instead
of 1.5, that we need to maintain two submarines a year. And so part of this is on us to give
them a clear set of – a clear aim point so they can plan a work force and infrastructure that’s
going to be able to meet the demand. But again, no industry is going to make those kinds
of investments unless we give them a higher degree of confidence.”
Asked by USNI News after the event if the reason the Navy isn’t ready to send that signal
to industry is because of funding, Gilday said, “it depends on the class of ships. Sometimes
it’s affordability. Sometimes it’s industrial capacity.”42
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:

41 Mallory Shelbourne, “OSD Comptroller Says U.S. Shipyards Can’t Build 3 Destroyers a Year,” USNI News, March
21 (updated March 22), 2023.
42 Mallory Shelbourne, “CNO Gilday: Industrial Capacity Largest Barrier to Growing the Fleet,” USNI News, August
25, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

22

link to page 10 link to page 12 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

• Is there sufficient shipyard and supplier capacity to increase the size of the Navy
to the figures like those shown in Table 2 or Figure 1, and to sustain a fleet of
that general size? Where is there currently insufficient capacity?
• For areas where there currently is insufficient capacity, what is the Navy’s plan
for increasing capacity to required levels?
• Will implementing the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP)—
the Navy’s 20-year plan for investing in the modernization of facilities at the four
government-operated NSYs—provide enough capacity at the NSYs to meet the
overhaul, repair, and modernization needs for the nuclear-powered ships
(including, potentially, an increased number of attack submarines) in a larger
Navy?
Legislative Activity for FY2024
CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding
Programs
Detailed coverage of legislative activity on certain Navy shipbuilding programs (including
funding levels, legislative provisions, and report language) can be found in the following CRS
reports:
• CRS Report R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile
Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine
Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS In Focus IF11826, Navy Next-Generation Attack Submarine (SSN[X])
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS In Focus IF11679, Navy DDG(X) Next-Generation Destroyer Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS Report R44972, Navy Constellation (FFG-62) Class Frigate Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS Report R43543, Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship
Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS Report R46374, Navy Medium Landing Ship (LSM) (Previously Light
Amphibious Warship [LAW]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS Report R43546, Navy John Lewis (TAO-205) Class Oiler Shipbuilding
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS In Focus IF11674, Navy Next-Generation Logistics Ship (NGLS) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service

23

link to page 29 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

• CRS In Focus IF11838, Navy TAGOS-25 (Previously TAGOS[X]) Ocean
Surveillance Shipbuilding Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
• CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Legislative activity on individual Navy shipbuilding programs that are not covered in detail in the
above reports is covered below.
Summary of Congressional Action on FY2024 Shipbuilding
Funding Request
The Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget requests $32.8 billion in shipbuilding funding for, among
other things, the procurement of nine new ships, including one Columbia (SSBN-826) class
ballistic missile submarine, two Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines, two Arleigh Burke
(DDG-51) class destroyers, two Constellation (FFG-62) class frigates, one AS(X) submarine
tender, and one John Lewis (TAO-205) class oiler. The Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget also
proposes retiring 11 ships, including two relatively young Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs).43
Table 4 summarizes congressional action on the Navy’s FY2024 funding request for Navy
shipbuilding. The table shows the amounts requested and congressional changes to those
requested amounts. A blank cell in a filled-in column showing congressional changes to requested
amounts indicates no change from the requested amount.

43 For a press report about the 11 ships, including the two LCSs and six other ships that would be retired before the end
of their expected service lives, see Megan Eckstein, “Why the US Navy Wants to Retire Eight Ships Early,” Defense
News, March 13, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

24

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Table 4. Summary of Congressional Action on FY2024 Funding Request
Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding
Congressional changes to requested amounts
Line
Authorization
Appropriation
number
Program
Request
HASC
SASC
Final
HAC
SAC
Final
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation account
001
Columbia-class SSBN
2,443.6
88.0

002
Columbia-class SSBN (AP)
3,390.7

003
CVN 80 aircraft carrier
1,115.3
160.0

-10.9

004
CVN-81 aircraft carrier
800.5

005
Virginia-class SSN
7,130.0

006
Virginia-class SSN (AP)
3,215.5
-325.1

-56.8

007
CVN RCOH
0

008
CVN RCOH (AP)
817.6

-14.7
-329.2

009
DDG-1000
410.4

-91.7

010
DDG-51
4,199.2

300.0

011
DDG-51 (AP)
284.0
155.0

1,357.3

012
LCS
0

013
FFG-62
2,173.7
-10.0

-39.8
50.0

014
LPD-17 Flight II
0

1,863.0

015
LPD-17 Flight II (AP)
0

500.0

016
LPD-17 Flight I completion
0
750.0

017
Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB)
0

018
LHA amphibious assault ship
1,830.1

019
LHA amphibious assault ship (AP)
0

020
Expeditionary fast transport ship (EPF)
0
-5.0

021
AS(X) submarine tender
1,733.2
-1,485.2

-188.6
-1,733.2

022
TAO-205 oiler
815.4

023
TAGOS(X) ocean surveillance ship
0

513.5

024
TATS towing/salvage/rescue ship
0

025
LCU 1700 landing craft
62.5

026
Outfitting
557.4

-17.7
-43.4

027
Ship to shore connector (SSC)
0

400.0

028
Service craft
63.8
30.0

21.3
30.0

029
Auxiliary Personnel Lighter (APL)
0
72.0
72.0

72.0

030
LCAC landing craft SLEP
15.3

031
Auxiliary vessels (used sealift ships)
142.0

032
Completion of prior-year ships
1,648.6

-258.5

TOTAL
32,849.0
-560.3
1,935.0

57.9
401.7

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on original Navy FY2024 budget submission, committee reports, and
explanatory statements on the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2024 DOD Appropriations
Act.
Notes: Mil ions of dol ars, rounded to nearest tenth. A blank cell indicates no change to requested amount.
Totals may not add due to rounding. AP = advance procurement funding; HASC = House Armed Services
Committee; SASC = Senate Armed Services Committee; HAC = House Appropriations Committee; SAC =
Senate Appropriations Committee; SLEP = service life extension program.
Congressional Research Service

25

link to page 29 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2670/S. 2226)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 118-125 of June 30, 2023) on H.R.
2670, recommended the funding levels shown in the HASC column of Table 4. Compared with
the Navy’s proposed FY2024 shipbuilding program, the committee recommended the
procurement of
• one additional LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ship, and
• one additional auxiliary personnel lighter (APL).
Section 133 would provide authority for a block buy contract for up to six Auxiliary Personnel
Lighters (APLs).
Section 135 of H.R. 2670 would require a report on the status of the implementation of the Navy
shipbuilding workforce development special incentive under 10 U.S. C. 8696.
Section 136 would require a report on the Navy’s use of government docks for a ship repair and
maintenance availabilities when sufficient capacity was available in private docks during the
period in which such repairs and maintenance were expected to be performed.
Section 137 would direct the Navy to ensure that no government-operated drydock is eligible to
compete for the award of a contract for private sector nonnuclear surface ship maintenance unless
the Secretary determines, in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 2466, that there is not sufficient private
sector dock competition.
Section 344 would amend the requirement under 10 U.S.C. 8013 note to provide briefings on the
Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan (SIOP) to require that the briefings include certain
additional matters.
Section 1011 would amend the requirement under 10 U.S.C. 231 to provide a 30-year
shipbuilding plan to require
• the plan to include “the unaltered assessment of the Chief of Naval Operations and
the Commandant of the Marine Corps,”
• the Secretary of the Navy to “take into consideration the most recent biennial report
on shipbuilder training and the defense industrial base required by 10 U.S.C. 8693,”
and
• the Secretary of the Navy—if there is more than one 30-year shipbuilding profile
included in the plan—to ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that the first 10
years of each profile are consistent with one another.
Section 1013 would add a new section 2219 to Title 10 of the U.S. Code providing the Navy
authority to make grants to shipyards and other entities that provide ship repair or alteration for
nonnuclear ships for capital improvement projects or maritime training programs designed to
foster technical skills and operational productivity.
Section 1016 would amend Section 1025 of the FY2018 NDAA (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115-91 of
December 12, 2017)—the provision that makes the 355-ship goal a matter of U.S. policy, and
which is included as a note to 10 U.S. C. 8661 (previously numbered 10 U.S.C. 7291)—to read as
follows:
SEC. 1025. Policy of the United States on minimum number of battle force ships.
Congressional Research Service

26

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

(a) Policy.—It shall be the policy of the United States—
(1) to have available, as soon as practicable, not fewer than 355 battle force ships,
comprised of the optimal mix of platforms, with funding subject to the availability of
appropriations or other funds; and
(2) that the United States shipbuilding defense industrial base is fundamental to achieving
the shipbuilding requirements of the Navy and constitutes a unique national security
imperative that requires sustainment and support by the Navy and Congress.
(b) Battle force ships defined.—In this section, the term “battle force ship” has the meaning
given the term in Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5030.8C.
Section 1017 would prohibit the obligation and expenditure of FY2024 funds to retire, prepare to
retire, inactivate, or place in storage the amphibious ships USS Germantown (LSD-42), USS
Gunston Hall (LSD-44), and USS Tortuga (LSD-46); the cruisers USS Shiloh (CG-67) and USS
Cowpens (CG-63); or more than three other cruisers.
Section 1018 would prohibit the obligation and expenditure of FY2024 funds to place an
expeditionary fast transport vessel (EPF) into a reduced operating status, and require the Chief of
Naval Operations, in consultation with the Commander of the Military Sealift Command, to
develop and implement a strategy and concept of operations for the use of EPFs in support of
operational plans in the area of operations of United States Indo-Pacific Command, and to report
to the congressional defense committees on that strategy and concept of operations.
Section 1021 would provide authority to use FY2024 funds to enter into an incrementally funded
contract for the advance procurement and construction of a submarine tender (AS[X]).
Section 1022 would require the Secretary of Defense—for any ship or class of ship for which a
provision of the FY2024 NDAA limits the availability of funds authorized to be appropriated for
the purposes retiring, preparing to retire, inactivating, or placing in storage any such ship—to
include in the FY2025 budget submission a plan to resource and retain such ship or class of ships
until the end of FY2027 or the end of the expected service life of the ships.
Section 1023 would require the Navy to provide the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees, not later than 90 days before the retirement of any naval vessel that is a viable
candidate for artificial reefing, a notice of the pending retirement of that vessel.
Section 1026 would direct the Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the Commander of the
Special Operations Command, to conduct an operational performance study on alternative vessels
with M-shape hull designs for reduction of wave slap, mitigation of shock impact on special
operations forces, and improved operational and cost efficiencies, and to submit a report on the
results of the study.
Section 3522 would direct the Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command, in consultation
with the Administrator of the Maritime Administration, to conduct a market analysis to determine
the availability of used sealift vessels that meet military requirements and may be purchased
using the authority provided under 10 U.S.C. 2218 within five years following the enactment of
the FY2024 NDAA, and to submit a report on the results of the market analysis.
Section 3532, which concerns the recapitalization of National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF),
would amend Section 3546 of the FY2023 NDAA (H.R. 7776/P.L. 117-263 of December 23,
2022) and provide limitations on certain Navy expenditures until a report is submitted containing
a detailed description of the acquisition strategy for a domestic new build sealift program.
Section 3535 would require the Secretary of Transportation to consider the life-cycle cost
estimates of new National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) vessels during design and evaluation.
Congressional Research Service

27

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Section 3636 would require the Secretary of Defense to finalize the rule from the Federal
Register on September 29, 2020, titled ‘‘Source Restrictions on Auxiliary Ship Components.’’
Section 3537 would authorize $2.0 million for developing a national maritime strategy as
required by Section 3542 of the FY2023 NDAA (H.R. 7776/P.L. 117-263 of December 23, 2022).
Section 3539 would require briefings not less than twice annually on the status of establishing the
type of national maritime strategy required in 46 U.S.C. 50114.
H.Rept. 118-125 states:
U.S. Ship Design Capabilities
The committee recognizes the importance of maintaining vibrant national shipbuilding
infrastructure as our nation’s shipyards are a critical national security asset. The committee
also believes that ship design and maritime engineering capability in the United States has
not been adequately prioritized in recent years. This workforce is critical in solving
emerging maritime challenges, supporting our nation in time of national emergency, and
providing high quality STEM careers for both high school and college graduates. The
United States has enjoyed a long history of leadership in ship design and continued
advancement of this skillset is critical to our maritime future particularly in large volume
ship design. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination
with the Secretary of Transportation, to provide a briefing to the House Armed Services
Committee not later than March 1, 2024, detailing efforts to engage U.S. companies with
U.S. based workforces for design of future sealift and other vessels to ensure that the United
States maintains a robust and skilled ship design and engineering workforce. (Page 21)
H.Rept. 118-125 also states:
Laser Peening Application to Ship and Submarine Construction, Maintenance, and Repair
The committee notes that the Navy is facing challenges related to maintaining its aging
fleet and procuring new ships and submarines. To address some of these challenges, the
Navy continues to examine technologies that can extend the service life of newly
constructed ships and submarines, as well as maintain the current fleet. Laser shock
peening (laser peening) is a technology that has been proven to provide significant cost
savings over the past 35 years in the aerospace, transportation, and power generation
industries and will provide significant cost savings for the Navy and its shipbuilders as
well.
In ships and submarines, metal fatigue and resultant cracking can result in damage to key
metal components such as propulsion shafting, propellers, rudders, water jets, etc. Without
repairing these critical ship components, the damage can potentially lead to a part’s
unexpected failure. Material treated by laser peening is significantly more resistant to metal
fatigue failures, thus extending the system’s life. Laser peening has been supported in
Congress since at least 2014 as a proven technology that has the potential of saving
significant funding that would otherwise be necessary for future repairs or replacement of
critical shipboard and submarine components. Similar savings have been seen in
commercial industry and Department of Defense aviation.
Therefore, the committee directs the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation (DASN RDTE) to provide a briefing to the House
Committee on Armed Services by February 1, 2024, on the resources required for the U.S.
Navy to fully implement a coordinated laser peening program, particularly to support the
Columbia-class, to address the numerous metal fatigue related issues and costs rampant
throughout the aviation, surface, and submarine fleet. (Page 110)
H.Rept. 118-125 also states:
Large Medium-Speed Diesel Engines for Auxiliary Ships Briefing
Congressional Research Service

28

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

The Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 116–92, Section
853) included a provision that required large medium-speed diesel engines for most
auxiliary ships to be procured within the National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB).
The conferees included this provision based on a report from the Department of the Navy
that stated, given the large number of such engines in the Navy fleet and the limited demand
for such engines in the commercial sector, loss of this manufacturing and sustainment
capability could result in a ‘‘significant national security risk.’’
The committee is aware that a proposed rule was published in September 2020 to ensure
that an exception contained in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations allowing
commercial items to be exempt from this requirement (DFARS 212.504) would not apply
to these engines. However, the committee is also aware that this rule has never been
finalized and is concerned with the lack of urgency in implementing Congressional intent
in this matter. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing report
to the House Armed Services Committee by January 31, 2024, on the status of this rule and
the expected finalization. In the interim, the committee fully expects the Secretary of the
Navy to fulfill congressional intent by ensuring that large medium-speed diesel engines for
auxiliary ships are procured within the NTIB, subject to 10 USC 4864(a)(3). (Pages 239-
240)
H.Rept. 118-125 also states:
Foreign Ports Ship Repair
The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the Senate Committee
on Armed Services and House Committee on Armed Services by December 31, 2023, on
shipbuilding and ship repair operations conducted in foreign ports. The report shall include:
(1) name and location of foreign shipyards utilized by the Department of the Navy;
(2) types of shipbuilding and ship repair activities utilized by the Department of the Navy,
disaggregated by location and type of service;
(3) a discussion of why these activities were unable to be completed at domestic shipyards;
and
(4) a discussion of how these activities may be beneficial for operations in a contested
environment. (Page 271)
H.Rept. 118-125 also states:
Littoral Combat Ships Divestments
The committee is aware that there may be opportunities for littoral combat ships (LCS) that
are decommissioned before the end of their service life to support other missions globally
by leveraging the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program. The committee supports the
EDA process and encourages its use. In particular, the LCS may be a prime candidate for
other nations, including priority nations like the Philippines, to employ on missions such
as counternarcotic operations, or other operations where speed, maneuverability, and the
access to a helicopter hangar are necessary. Further, these vessels may be well suited for
areas where People’s Liberation Army presence and influence is expanding. (Page 273)
H.Rept. 118-125 also states:
Shipyard Cybersecurity
The committee notes that the shipbuilding and repair industrial base constitutes an essential
component of U.S. national security. As noted in the Navy’s report to Congress on the
Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2024, current
national security threats demonstrate ‘‘the need for a larger, more capable Navy . . .’’ and
that ‘‘[T]imely industrial base delivery of systems and platforms within cost estimates is a
Congressional Research Service

29

link to page 29 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

key consideration as it quickly enhances warfighting performance and controls cost
growth.’’
The committee is concerned that potential private and public shipyard vulnerability to
cyberattacks puts at risk the shipbuilding industrial base’s ability to construct and maintain
naval systems and platforms in a timely and efficient manner.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the House
Committee on Armed Services, not later than December 31, 2023, on the potential
vulnerability of U.S. private and public shipyards to cyberattacks. The report should
include:
(1) an analysis of current or potential cyber threats to the nation’s public and private
shipyards, including from both state and non-state actors;
(2) an analysis regarding potential vulnerabilities of the nation’s shipyards to cyber attack,
and any constraints or limitations encountered in the analysis of potential vulnerabilities;
(3) an analysis of the potential impact of a cyberattack upon public and private shipyards
to the Navy’s fleet maintenance and procurement requirements;
(4) a comparison of the Navy’s visibility into the networks and security posture of public
shipyards versus private shipyards;
(5) a comprehensive evaluation of the delineation in responsibilities for cybersecurity
between Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command, Naval Sea Systems Command, and
any localized shipyard cybersecurity elements separate from either of the aforementioned
commands; and
(6) identification of any gaps in coverage from the preceding evaluation of the delineation
in responsibilities.
The report should be submitted in an unclassified form but may include classified annex.
(Pages 328-329)
Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 118-58 of July 12, 2023) on S.
2226, recommended the funding levels shown in the SASC column of Table 4. Compared with
the Navy’s proposed FY2024 shipbuilding program, the committee recommended the
procurement of
• one additional LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ship, and
• one additional auxiliary personnel lighter (APL).
S.Rept. 118-58 states:
Auxiliary Personnel Lighter
The budget request did not include any funding in line number 29 of SCN for Auxiliary
Personnel Lighter (APL) procurement. APL barracks craft provide berthing and messing
facilities for sailors up to an aircraft carrier size ship. The Navy inventory includes 20
APLs, with 12 of those craft having been built from 1944–1946 that were not designed to
current safety standards. The committee recommends an increase of $72.0 million in SCN
line number 29 for an additional APL–67 class berthing barge. (Page 11)
S.Rept. 118-58 also states:
Shipbuilding and ship repair workforce development
The budget request included $1.0 billion in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation,
Defense-wide (RDDW) for PE 67210D8Z Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment
Congressional Research Service

30

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Support. The committee recognizes the shipbuilding industry faces a significant challenge
in achieving and sustaining required workforce levels, and the industrial base today lacks
the capacity to meet the required demand. Current efforts to establish, accelerate, and grow
the trades workforce are imperative to shipbuilding and ship repair, and must be adequately
resourced, prioritized, scaled, and maintained over the next 20 years or more.
Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $3.0 million in RDDW PE
67210D8Z to support initiatives that build a skilled and competent shipbuilding workforce.
(Page 61)
Section 332 of S. 2226 would direct the Secretary of Navy, in coordination with the Shipyard
Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP), to develop and implement a strategy to leverage
commercial best practices used in shipyards to make operations more efficient and demonstrate a
digital maintenance artificial intelligence platform that analyzes data on the maintenance and
health of shipboard assets of the Navy at shipyards, so as to improve readiness of the armed
forces, predict and diagnose issues before they occur, and lower maintenance costs. The provision
would also direct the Secretary of Navy to assess the costs of maintenance delays on shipboard
assets of the Navy and assess the potential cost savings of adopting artificial intelligence
predictive maintenance technology techniques that help determine the condition of in-service
equipment to estimate when maintenance should be performed rather than waiting until failure or
end of life. The provision would also require the Navy to provide a briefing on the strategy, the
assessment, and a plan to execute any measures pursuant to the assessment.
Regarding Section 332, S.Rept. 118-58 states:
Strategy and assessment on use of automation and artificial intelligence for shipyard
optimization (sec. 332)
The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of the Navy to
develop and implement a strategy to leverage commercial best practices used in shipyards
to make operations more efficient. The committee remains concerned at the current rate of
maintenance delays and increased costs at public shipyards. While the Navy’s Shipyard
Infrastructure Optimization Program is one critical and important component to the
modernization of the public shipyards through military construction projects, the
committee believes that public shipyard operations must be optimized for the future as
well. (Page 86)
Section 357 would limit the obligation and expenditure of funds from the Administration and
Servicewide Activities part of the Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OMN) appropriation
account until the Navy submits to the congressional defense committees a 30-year shipbuilding
plan that meets the statutory requirement in 10 U.S.C. 8062(b) to maintain 31 amphibious
warships.
Section 866 would amend U.S. content requirements for Navy shipbuilding programs by
requiring certain percentages of manufactured articles, materials, or supplies procured as part of a
Navy shipbuilding program to be manufactured substantially all from articles, materials, or
supplies mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States, with the percentage to exceed
65% of the cost for articles, materials, or supplies provided between January 1, 2026, and
December 31, 2027, to exceed 75% for articles, materials, or supplies provided between January
1, 2028, and December 31, 2032, and to equal 100% for articles, materials, or supplies provided
on or after January 1, 2033. The requirements would apply to contracts relating to Navy
shipbuilding programs entered into for carrying out research, development, test, and evaluation
activities. An exception to the requirements would be provided for manufactured articles that
consist wholly or predominantly of iron, steel, or a combination of iron and steel. The Secretary
of Defense would be permitted to request a waiver from the requirements under certain conditions
Congressional Research Service

31

link to page 29 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

so as to expand sourcing to members national technical industrial base, would be directed to issue
certain rules relating to the requirements, and would be directed to submit an annual report to
Congress on country of origin tracking and reporting as it relates to manufactured content
procured as part of Navy shipbuilding programs, including through primary contracts and
subcontracts at the second and third tiers.
Section 1021 would amend 10 U.S.C. 2218 to allow the Department of Defense to continue
modernizing the Ready Reserve Force and the Military Sealift Command surge sealift fleet.
Section 1023 would prohibit the obligation and expenditure of FY2024 funds to retire, prepare to
retire, or place in storage the amphibious ships USS Germantown (LSD-42), USS Gunston Hall
(LSD-44), and USS Tortuga (LSD-46), and the cruiser USS Shiloh (CG-67).
S.Rept. 118-58 also states:
Littoral Combat Ship retirements
The Navy plans to retire seven Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) vessels over the next 3 years.
The committee is concerned that proceeding with these LCS retirements without a plan in
place for future vessels to replace them will lead to uncertainty among our industry partners
that support the fleet.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit to the congressional
defense committees a 10-year plan for ship homeporting that would reflect proposed LCS
retirements, and how the Navy’s plan will ensure stability in industries supporting the fleet
concentration areas. That report should be submitted not later than April 1, 2024. (Page
231)
FY2024 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 4365/S. 2587)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 118-121 of June 27, 2023) on H.R.
4365, recommended the funding levels shown in the HAC column of Table 4. Compared with the
Navy’s proposed FY2024 shipbuilding program, the committee recommended the procurement of
• four additional Ship-to-Shore Connector (SSC) landing craft, and
• one additional service craft.
Section 8073 of H.R. 4365 would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds made available
by the act for the purpose of decommissioning any Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) or the amphibious
ships USS Germantown (LSD-42) and USS Tortuga (LSD-46).
Section 8087 states that of the amounts appropriated in the act for the Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy (SCN) account, $142.008 million may, with certain conditions, be used for the
purchase of two used sealift vessels for the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF).
Section 8094 would prohibit the use of funds made available in the act to award new contracts for
acquisition activities for TARC(X) cable laying and repair ships and TAGOS-25 oceanographic
surveillance ships unless the contracts include specifications that all auxiliary equipment,
including pumps and propulsion shafts, are manufactured in the United States.
H.Rept. 118-121 states:
NAVY LITTORAL COMBAT SHIPS
Congressional Research Service

32

link to page 29 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

The Committee is troubled that, despite repeated rejections by Congress, the Navy is once
again proposing to decommission several Littoral Combat Ships well before the end of
their expected service lives. The Committee strongly believes that these ships, though not
aligned with the Navy’s original plan, can provide operational value in support of
combatant commander initiatives. Further, it is noted that the Navy is studying platforms
that could be repurposed to serve as a mothership for a variety of future unmanned
capabilities. The Committee believes it is premature to divest these ships before the
completion of this study or a thorough review of combatant commander requirements for
such capability. Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit a
report to the congressional defense committees, not later than 30 days after the enactment
of this Act, on these proposed alternatives. Further, the Committee strongly urges the
Secretary of the Navy to abstain from further proposals to decommission any Littoral
Combat Ship. (Page 11)
H.Rept. 118-121 also states:
DIVESTMENTS AND DECOMMISSIONINGS
The Committee is concerned the Services are reducing personnel, operations, and
sustainment for aircraft and ships prior to the congressional approval of corresponding
divestment and decommissioning proposals. The Committee notes that over the past
several fiscal years, Congress has rejected many of these proposals and has provided
increased funding for the costs of keeping these assets in service. The Committee is
specifically concerned by these actions as they relate to the Navy Littoral Combat Ships,
Air National Guard aircraft, and Air Force Reserve Command aircraft. In the case of the
Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command, the divestment of aircraft without
identified replacement missions increases uncertainty for personnel and local communities.
While the Committee understands the phasing required for a divestment or
decommissioning action, the Committee expects the Services to not initiate these actions
until formally approved by the congressional defense committees. (Page 12)
H.Rept. 118-121 also states:
EXPEDITIONARY MEDICAL SHIP
The Committee remains supportive of the Expeditionary Medical Ship (EMS) class and
recognizes the operational utility of these ships, especially in the Indo-Pacific Command
area of operations. The Committee notes the Navy awarded contracts for the three ships
funded in fiscal years 2022 and 2023, with an option to add EMS 4 to the contract.
Therefore, the Committee supports the expeditionary capabilities of the EMS ship class
and recognizes the need for additional ships to be funded in future fiscal years. (Page 147)
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 118-81 of July 27, 2023) on S. 2587,
recommended the funding levels shown in the SAC column of Table 4. Compared with the
Navy’s proposed FY2024 shipbuilding program, the committee recommended
• no procurement funding for the AS(X) submarine tender program;
• one additional service craft—a yard, repair, berthing, and messing barge
(YRBM) barge; and
• one additional auxiliary personnel lighter (APL).
The report recommends reducing by $3.3 million cost-to-complete funding for the TATS towing,
salvage, rescue ship program. (Page 35, line 32)
Congressional Research Service

33

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Section 8076 of S. 2587 would permit the Secretary of Defense, with certain limitations, to
transfer funds from any available Department of the Navy appropriation to any available Navy
ship construction appropriation for the purpose of liquidating necessary changes resulting from
inflation, market fluctuations, or rate adjustments for any ship construction program appropriated
in law.
Section 8090 states that of the amounts appropriated in the act for the Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy (SCN) account, $142.008 million may, with certain conditions, be used for the
purchase of two used sealift vessels for the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF).
Section 8096 would prohibit the use of funds made available in the act to award new contracts for
acquisition activities for TARC(X) cable laying and repair ships and TAGOS-25 oceanographic
surveillance ships unless the contracts include specifications that all auxiliary equipment,
including pumps and propulsion shafts, are manufactured in the United States.
S.Rept. 118-81 states:
Managing Navy Shipbuilding Programs.—The fiscal year 2024 President’s budget request
includes $1,648,559,000 to address fiscal year 2024 cost overruns on 17 previously fully
funded ships, and the Committee understands that additional funds will be required in
future years to pay for additional cost overruns. The Committee notes that increased prices
of certain commodities, such as steel, as well as the growing cost of labor contribute
substantially to these increased construction costs. The Committee further notes, however,
that additional factors contribute to these liabilities, including changes to requirements,
subsystem immaturity, and the failure to accurately estimate the full costs of shipbuilding
programs. The Committee is concerned that failure to properly understand and budget for
the costs of ships impacts the Navy’s ability to procure and sustain the force structure it
requires, and negatively impacts the stability of the shipbuilding industrial base, its
suppliers and workforce.
For instance, the Committee notes that in fiscal year 2022, the Navy requested and received
appropriations to procure the first of seven new T–AGOS Class ocean surveillance ships.
However, the Navy significantly underestimated the requirements and costs of those ships,
resulting in the cost for the lead ship to increase by more than 80 percent. Given the
criticality of this platform, the Committee recommends fully funding the lead ship and
encourages the Navy and the industrial base to better manage costs for additional ships of
this class planned to be procured. Similarly, in this year’s budget request, the Navy
included funds for Auxiliary Personnel Lighter [APL] berthing ships, but did not fully
budget for the costs of these ships in the future years. The Committee recommends
procurement of an additional APL to stabilize the industrial base and reduce costs of future
ships. Further, the Committee notes that the Navy removed two T–AO Fleet Replenishment
Oilers from its shipbuilding program despite congressional authority to award these ships
en bloc and reduce costs. Finally, the Navy proposes to accelerate a new program for a
submarine tender, yet it has failed to fully budget for the costs of these two ships, thereby
creating future budget shortfalls.
The Committee is well aware of the many factors that affect the acquisition and budgeting
of ships, and points to those past Navy budgeting and acquisition best practices that have
resulted in reducing costs and stabilizing the industrial base. The Committee believes the
Navy would be well-served to rededicate itself to implementing and enforcing these
practices. Further, the Committee believes such actions are necessary to re-introduce
stability and predictability to Navy shipbuilding programs and budgets, and that the
Secretary of Navy, through the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development
and Acquisition) should manage the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ shipbuilding programs
based on their identified force structure needs. (Pages 135-136)
S.Rept. 118-81 also states:
Congressional Research Service

34

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Stability in Navy Shipbuilding.—The Committee notes that the fiscal year 2024 Navy
shipbuilding plan projects a decline in fleet size from 299 ships in July 2023 to 290 ships
in fiscal year 2030. However, the Chief of Naval Operations recently increased the Navy’s
fleet size requirement from 373 ships to 381 ships. The Committee believes that Navy
leaders must make a concerted effort to manage existing Navy shipbuilding production
lines to ensure they are sustained, modified, or expanded to meet evolving Navy
requirements in a manner that promotes shipbuilder, supplier, and workforce stability, and
reverses the growing gap between the Navy’s fleet requirements and the size of the fleet.
Accordingly, the Committee recommends adding advance procurement funding for an
amphibious ship, LPD–33, to continue SAN ANTONIO class production and advance
procurement funding for a third fiscal year 2025 DDG–51 pursuant to the multi-year
procurement authority for up to 15 DDG–51s provided in section 8010 of the Defense
Appropriations Act, 2023. Additionally, the Committee supports initiatives to improve the
quality-of-life for Navy sailors serving in shipyards through recommendations to fund one
additional Auxiliary Personnel Lighter and one additional Repair, Berthing and Messing
Barge [YRBM], as well as supporting the request for multi-use and parking facilities at
two shipbuilders. (Pages 136-137)
S.Rept. 118-81 also states:
Domestic Source Content for Navy Shipbuilding Critical Components.—The Committee
remains concerned with the fragility of the domestic shipbuilding supply base and notes
the report on ‘‘Domestic Source Content for Navy Shipbuilding’’ submitted to the
congressional defense committees in accordance with direction accompanying the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2023. Given the long-term impact of
shipbuilding programs, the Committee believes that understanding and managing the
domestic supply base is critical. Therefore, the Committee directs the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) to submit to the congressional
defense committees, concurrent with submission of the fiscal year 2025 President’s budget
request, a plan to incorporate upfront domestic sourcing requirements for key materials,
components and subsystems into current and future acquisition strategies for shipbuilding
programs. Further, the report shall identify a supply chain strategy that identifies existing
horizontal and vertical gaps and redundancies in the domestic industrial base to support
such acquisition strategies, and efforts by the Navy to ensure the domestic industrial base
and supply chain can address domestic source content of Navy shipbuilding requirements.
Finally, to the extent the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and
Acquisition) plans to prioritize foreign content over domestic content, the Assistant
Secretary is directed to provide the statutory basis for doing so, include a detailed risk
assessment of such a strategy, as well as to provide the cost estimate of growing a
commensurate domestic capability. Such report shall be delivered in unclassified format
and may contain a classified annex. (Pages 137-138)
S.Rept. 118-81 also states:
Hiring and retention of Navy shipbuilding trades workforce.—The Committee recognizes
that the Navy shipbuilding industrial base is comprised of no fewer than three elements:
facilities, suppliers, and workforce. Each of these elements is critical to building ships on
cost and schedule and increasing the size of the Navy’s fleet. With respect to workforce,
the Committee notes the significant challenges in hiring and retaining the needed trades
workforce [e.g. welders, electricians, pipefitters, and other] to meet Navy shipbuilding
demands, and further notes an overall workforce participation decline over the last two
decades. Therefore, the Committee directs the Comptroller General to submit a report to
the congressional defense committees not later than 120 days after the enactment of this
act on key factors affecting hiring and retention of the Navy shipbuilding trades workforce.
This report shall include an identification of such key factors, an assessment of the relative
significance of such key factors, the extent to which a wage gap is impacting hiring and
Congressional Research Service

35

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

retention of such workforce, and recommendations for Navy and congressional action to
improve the hiring and retention of such workforce. (Page 138)

Congressional Research Service

36

link to page 41 link to page 41 link to page 41 link to page 41 link to page 41 link to page 41 link to page 41 link to page 41 link to page 41 link to page 41 link to page 41 link to page 41 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 link to page 42 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Appendix A. Earlier Navy Force-Structure Goals
Dating Back to 2001
The table below shows earlier Navy force-structure goals dating back to 2001. The 308-ship
force-level goal of March 2015, shown in the first column of the table, is the goal that was
replaced by the 355-ship force-level goal released in December 2016.
Table A-1. Earlier Navy Force-Structure Goals Dating Back to 2001
Changes
Early-2005
2002-
to
Navy goal
2004
2001
~310-
Revised
February
February
for fleet of
Navy QDR
308-
306-
316
313-ship
2006 313-
2006
260-325
goal
goal
ship
ship
ship
goal of
ship goal
Navy
ships
for
for
goal of goal of
goal of
Septem-
announced
goal for
375-
310-
March January
March
ber
through
313-ship
260-
325-
ship
ship
Ship type
2015
2013
2012
2011
mid-2011
fleet
ships ships Navya Navy
Ballistic missile submarines
12b
12b
12-14b
12b
12b
14
14
14
14
14
(SSBNs)
Cruise missile submarines
0c
0c
0-4c
4c
0c
4
4
4
4
2 or
(SSGNs)
4d
Attack submarines (SSNs)
48
48
~48
48
48
48
37
41
55
55
Aircraft carriers
11e
11e
11e
11e
11e
11f
10
11
12
12
Cruisers and destroyers
88
88
~90
94
94g
88
67
92
104
116
Frigates
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs)
52
52
~55
55
55
55
63
82
56
0
Amphibious ships
34
33
~32
33
33h
31
17
24
37
36
MPF(F) shipsi
0j
0j
0j
0j
0j
12i
14i
20i
0i
0i
Combat logistics (resupply) ships
29
29
~29
30
30
30
24
26
42
34
Dedicated mine warfare ships
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
26k
16
Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs)
10l
10l
10l
10l
21l
3
0
0
0
0
Otherm
24
23
~23
16
24n
17
10
11
25
25
Total battle force ships
308
306
~310-
313
328
313
260
325
375
310
316
or
312
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on U.S. Navy data.
Notes: QDR = Quadrennial Defense Review. The “~” symbol means approximately.
a. Initial composition. Composition was subsequently modified.
b. The Navy plans to replace the 14 current Ohio-class SSBNs with a new class of 12 next-generation SSBNs.
For further discussion, see CRS Report R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
c. Although the Navy plans to continue operating its four SSGNs until they reach retirement age in the late
2020s, the Navy does not plan to replace these ships when they retire. This situation can be expressed in a
table like this one with either a 4 or a 0.
d. The report on the 2001 QDR did not mention a specific figure for SSGNs. The Administration’s proposed
FY2001 DOD budget requested funding to support the conversion of two available Trident SSBNs into
Congressional Research Service

37

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

SSGNs, and the retirement of two other Trident SSBNs. Congress, in marking up this request, supported a
plan to convert all four available SSBNs into SSGNs.
e. With congressional approval, the goal has been temporarily be reduced to 10 carriers for the period
between the retirement of the carrier Enterprise (CVN-65) in December 2012 and entry into service of the
carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), currently scheduled for September 2015.
f.
For a time, the Navy characterized the goal as 11 carriers in the nearer term, and eventually 12 carriers.
g. The 94-ship goal was announced by the Navy in an April 2011 report to Congress on naval force structure
and missile defense.
h. The Navy acknowledged that meeting a requirement for being able to lift the assault echelons of 2.0 Marine
Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) would require a minimum of 33 amphibious ships rather than the 31 ships
shown in the February 2006 plan. For further discussion, see CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious
Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
i.
Today’s Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships are intended primarily to support Marine Corps
operations ashore, rather than Navy combat operations, and thus are not counted as Navy battle force
ships. The planned MPF (Future) ships, however, would have contributed to Navy combat capabilities (for
example, by supporting Navy aircraft operations). For this reason, the ships in the planned MPF(F) squadron
were counted by the Navy as battle force ships. The planned MPF(F) squadron was subsequently
restructured into a different set of initiatives for enhancing the existing MPF squadrons; the Navy no longer
plans to acquire an MPF(F) squadron.
j.
The Navy no longer plans to acquire an MPF(F) squadron. The Navy, however, has procured or plans to
procure some of the ships that were previously planned for the squadron—specifically, TAKE-1 class cargo
ships, and Mobile Landing Platform (MLP)/Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) ships. These ships are
included in the total shown for “Other” ships. AFSBs are now called Expeditionary Sea Base ships (ESBs).
k. The figure of 26 dedicated mine warfare ships included 10 ships maintained in a reduced mobilization status
called Mobilization Category B. Ships in this status are not readily deployable and thus do not count as
battle force ships. The 375-ship proposal thus implied transferring these 10 ships to a higher readiness
status.
l.
Totals shown include 5 ships transferred from the Army to the Navy and operated by the Navy primarily
for the performance of Army missions.
m. This category includes, among other things, command ships and support ships.
n. The increase in this category from 17 ships under the February 2006 313-ship goal to 24 ships under the
apparent 328-ship goal included the addition of one TAGOS ocean surveillance ship and the transfer into
this category of six ships—three modified TAKE-1 class cargo ships, and three Mobile Landing Platform
(MLP) ships—that were previously intended for the planned (but now canceled) MPF(F) squadron.
Congressional Research Service

38

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Appendix B. Comparing Past Ship Force Levels to
Current or Potential Future Levels
In assessing the appropriateness of the current or potential future number of ships in the Navy,
observers sometimes compare that number to historical figures for total Navy fleet size. Historical
figures for total fleet size, however, can be a problematic yardstick for assessing the
appropriateness of the current or potential future number of ships in the Navy, particularly if the
historical figures are more than a few years old, because
• the missions to be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the
Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing
missions all change over time; and
• the number of ships in the fleet in an earlier year might itself have been
inappropriate (i.e., not enough or more than enough) for meeting the Navy’s
mission requirements in that year.
Regarding the first bullet point above, the Navy, for example, reached a late-Cold War peak of
568 battle force ships at the end of FY1987,44 and as of August 28, 2023, included a total of 297
battle force ships. The FY1987 fleet, however, was intended to meet a set of mission requirements
that focused on countering Soviet naval forces at sea during a potential multitheater NATO-
Warsaw Pact conflict, while the August 2023 fleet is intended to meet a considerably different set
of mission requirements centered on countering China’s improving naval capabilities and,
secondarily, Russia’s naval capabilities. In addition, the Navy of FY1987 differed substantially
from the August 2023 fleet in areas such as profusion of precision-guided weapons and the
sophistication of C4ISR systems and networking capabilities.45
In coming years, Navy missions may shift again, and the capabilities of Navy ships will likely
have changed further by that time due to developments such as more comprehensive
implementation of networking technology, increased use of ship-based unmanned vehicles, and
the potential fielding of new types of weapons such as lasers.46
The 568-ship fleet of FY1987 may or may not have been capable of performing its stated
missions; the 296-ship fleet of August 2023 may or may not be capable of performing its stated
missions; and a fleet years from now with a certain number of ships may or may not be capable of
performing its stated missions. Given changes over time in mission requirements, ship mixes, and
technologies, however, these past, present, and future relationships of Navy ship totals to stated
Navy missions are to a substantial degree independent of one another.

44 Some publications have stated that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however,
is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle
force ships figure is the number used in government discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total
number of active ships has been larger than the total number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval History and
Heritage Command (formerly the Naval Historical Center) states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy included a
total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle
force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships in another
year is thus an apples-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of
ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the
Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.
45 C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
46 For more on Navy programs for developing high-energy shipboard lasers, see CRS Report R44175, Navy Shipboard
Lasers: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service

39

link to page 53 link to page 41 link to page 41 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a
reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An
increasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to
perform its stated missions is increasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be
increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing
number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated
missions is decreasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly
than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships
are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in
total ship numbers.
Regarding the second of the two bullet points above, it can be noted that comparisons of the size
of the fleet today with the size of the fleet in earlier years rarely appear to consider whether the
fleet was appropriately sized in those earlier years (and therefore potentially suitable as a
yardstick of comparison), even though it is quite possible that the fleet in those earlier years
might not have been appropriately sized, and even though there might have been differences of
opinion among observers at that time regarding that question. Just as it might not be prudent for
observers years from now to tacitly assume that the 294-ship Navy of September 2021 was
appropriately sized for meeting the mission requirements of 2021, even though there were
differences of opinion among observers on that question, simply because a figure of 294 ships
appears in the historical records for 2021, so, too, might it not be prudent for observers today to
tacitly assume that the number of ships of the Navy in an earlier year was appropriate for meeting
the Navy’s mission requirements that year, even though there might have been differences of
opinion among observers at that time regarding that question, simply because the size of the Navy
in that year appears in a table like Table G-1.
Previous Navy force structure plans, such as those shown in Table A-1, might provide some
insight into the potential adequacy of a proposed new force-structure plan, but changes over time
in mission requirements, technologies available to ships for performing missions, and other force-
planning factors, as well as the possibility that earlier force-structure plans might not have been
appropriate for meeting the mission demands of their times, suggest that some caution should be
applied in using past force structure plans for this purpose, particularly if those past force
structure plans are more than a few years old. The Reagan-era goal for a 600-ship Navy, for
example, was designed for a Cold War set of missions focusing on countering Soviet naval forces
at sea, which is not an appropriate basis for planning the Navy today, and there was considerable
debate during those years as to the appropriateness of the 600-ship goal.47

47 Navy force structure plans that predate those shown in Table A-1 include the Reagan-era 600-ship goal of the 1980s,
the Base Force fleet of more than 400 ships planned during the final two years of the George H. W. Bush
Administration, the 346-ship fleet from the Clinton Administration’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review (or BUR, sometimes
also called Base Force II), and the 310-ship fleet of the Clinton Administration’s 1997 QDR. The table below
summarizes some key features of these plans.
Features of Recent Navy Force Structure Plans
Plan
600-ship
Base Force
1993 BUR
1997 QDR
Total ships
~600
~450/416a
346
~305/310b
Attack submarines
100
80/~55c
45-55
50/55d
Aircraft carriers
15e
12
11+1f
11+1f
Surface combatants
242/228g
~150
~124
116
Amphibious ships
~75h
51i
41i
36i
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service

40

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD and U.S. Navy data.
a. Commonly referred to as 450-ship goal, but called for decreasing to 416 ships by end of FY1999.
b. Original total of about 305 ships was increased to about 310 due to increase in number of attack submarines to 55
from 50.
c. Plan originally included 80 attack submarines, but this was later reduced to about 55.
d. Plan originally included 50 attack submarines but this was later increased to 55.
e. Plus one additional aircraft carrier in the service life extension program (SLEP).
f. Eleven active carriers plus one operational reserve carrier.
g. Plan originally included 242 surface combatants but this was later reduced to 228.
h. Number needed to lift assault echelons of one Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) plus one Marine Expeditionary
Brigade (MEB).
i. Number needed to lift assault echelons of 2.5 MEBs. Changing numbers needed to meet this goal reflect in part
changes in the design and capabilities of amphibious ships.
Congressional Research Service

41

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Appendix C. Employment Impact of Additional
Shipbuilding Work
This appendix presents background information on the employment impact of additional
shipbuilding work.
Building the additional ships that would be needed to achieve and maintain the 355-ship fleet
could create many additional manufacturing and other jobs at shipyards, associated supplier
firms, and elsewhere in the U.S. economy. A 2021 Maritime Administration (MARAD) report on
the economic importance of the U.S. private-sector shipbuilding and repair industry states
In 2019, the U.S. private shipbuilding and repairing industry directly provided 107,180
jobs…, $9.9 billion in labor income, and $12.2 billion in gross domestic product, or GDP,
to the national economy…. Including direct, indirect, and induced impacts, on a nationwide
basis, total economic activity associated with the industry reached 393,390 jobs, $28.1
billion of labor income, and $42.4 billion in GDP in 2019….
Considering the indirect and induced impacts, each direct job in the U.S. private
shipbuilding and repairing industry is associated with another 2.67 jobs in other parts of
the U.S. economy; each dollar of direct labor income and GDP in the U.S. private
shipbuilding and repairing industry is associated with another $1.82 in labor income and
$2.48 in GDP, respectively, in other parts of the U.S. economy….
The importance of the industry is not limited to the direct output and employment it
generates (i.e., “direct impact”). Companies in the shipbuilding and repairing industry
purchase inputs from other domestic industries, contributing to economic activity in those
sectors (i.e., “indirect” impact). Employees spend their incomes, helping to support the
local and national economies (i.e., “induced” impact). Thus, the economic importance of
the U.S. private shipbuilding and repairing industry includes direct, indirect, and induced
effects….
Average labor income per job [in the U.S. private-sector shipbuilding and repair industry,
including wages and salaries and benefits as well as proprietors’ income] was
approximately $92,770 in 2019, 49 percent higher than the national average for the private
sector economy ($62,090)….
Total revenues for the U.S. shipbuilding and repairing industry are estimated to be $27.9
billion in 2019, up from $26.9 billion in 2018.10 In 2019, 78.7 percent of these revenues
came from military shipbuilding and repairs, and 21.3 percent from commercial
shipbuilding and repairs….48

48 Maritime Administration (MARAD), The Economic Importance of the U.S. Private Shipbuilding and Repairing
Industry, March 30, 2021, pp. 1, 2, 3, 9.
Congressional Research Service

42

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Appendix D. A Summary of Some Acquisition
Lessons Learned for Navy Shipbuilding
This appendix presents a general summary of lessons learned in Navy shipbuilding, reflecting
comments made repeatedly by various sources over the years. These lessons learned include the
following:
• At the outset, get the operational requirements for the program right.
Properly identify the program’s operational requirements at the outset. Manage
risk by not trying to do too much in terms of the program’s operational
requirements, and perhaps seek a so-called 70%-to-80% solution (i.e., a design
that is intended to provide 70%-80% of desired or ideal capabilities). Achieve a
realistic balance up front between operational requirements, risks, and estimated
costs.
• Use mature technologies. Use land-based prototyping and testing to bring new
technologies to a high state of maturity before incorporating them into ship
designs, and limit the number of major new technologies to be incorporated into
a new ship design.
• Impose cost discipline up front. Use realistic price estimates, and consider not
only development and procurement costs, but life-cycle operation and support
(O&S) costs.
• Employ competition where possible in the awarding of design and construction
contracts.
• Use a contract type that is appropriate for the amount of risk involved, and
structure its terms to align incentives with desired outcomes.
• Minimize design/construction concurrency by developing the design to a high
level of completion before starting construction and by resisting changes in
requirements (and consequent design changes) during construction.
• Properly supervise construction work. Maintain an adequate number of
properly trained Supervisor of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP) personnel.
• Provide stability for industry, in part by using, where possible, multiyear
procurement (MYP) or block buy contracting.
• Maintain a capable government acquisition workforce that understands what
it is buying, as well as the above points.
Identifying these lessons is arguably not the hard part—most if not all these points have been
cited for years. The hard part, arguably, is living up to them without letting circumstances lead
program-execution efforts away from these guidelines.
Congressional Research Service

43

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Appendix E. Some Considerations Relating to
Warranties in Shipbuilding Contracts
This appendix presents some considerations relating to warranties in shipbuilding contracts and
other defense acquisition.
In discussions of Navy (and also Coast Guard) shipbuilding, one question that sometimes arises is
whether including a warranty in a shipbuilding contract is preferable to not including one. The
question can arise, for example, in connection with a GAO finding that “the Navy structures
shipbuilding contracts so that it pays shipbuilders to build ships as part of the construction
process and then pays the same shipbuilders a second time to repair the ship when construction
defects are discovered.”49
Including a warranty in a shipbuilding contract (or a contract for building some other kind of
defense end item), while potentially valuable, might not always be preferable to not including
one—it depends on the circumstances of the acquisition, and it is not necessarily a valid criticism
of an acquisition program to state that it is using a contract that does not include a warranty (or a
weaker form of a warranty rather than a stronger one).
Including a warranty generally shifts to the contractor the risk of having to pay for fixing
problems with earlier work. Although that in itself could be deemed desirable from the
government’s standpoint, a contractor negotiating a contract that will have a warranty will
incorporate that risk into its price, and depending on how much the contractor might charge for
doing that, it is possible that the government could wind up paying more in total for acquiring the
item (including fixing problems with earlier work on that item) than it would have under a
contract without a warranty.
When a warranty is not included in the contract and the government pays later on to fix problems
with earlier work, those payments can be very visible, which can invite critical comments from
observers. But that does not mean that including a warranty in the contract somehow frees the
government from paying to fix problems with earlier work. In a contract that includes a warranty,
the government will indeed pay something to fix problems with earlier work—but it will make
the payment in the less-visible (but still very real) form of the up-front charge for including the
warranty, and that charge might be more than what it would have cost the government, under a
contract without a warranty, to pay later on for fixing those problems.
From a cost standpoint, including a warranty in the contract might or might not be preferable,
depending on the risk that there will be problems with earlier work that need fixing, the potential
cost of fixing such problems, and the cost of including the warranty in the contract. The point is
that the goal of avoiding highly visible payments for fixing problems with earlier work and the
goal of minimizing the cost to the government of fixing problems with earlier work are separate
and different goals, and that pursuing the first goal can sometimes work against achieving the
second goal.50

49 See Government Accountability Office, Navy Shipbuilding[:] Past Performance Provides Valuable Lessons for
Future Investments, GAO-18-238SP, June 2018, p. 21. A graphic on page 21 shows a GAO finding that the
government was financially responsible for shipbuilder deficiencies in 96% of the cases examined by GAO, and that
the shipbuilder was financially responsible for shipbuilder deficiencies in 4% of the cases.
50 It can also be noted that the country’s two largest builders of Navy ships—General Dynamics (GD) and Huntington
Ingalls Industries (HII)—derive much of their revenues from U.S. government work. These two shipbuilders operate
the only U.S. shipyards currently capable of building several major types of Navy ships, including submarines, aircraft
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service

44

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

The Department of Defense’s guide on the use of warranties states the following:
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 46.7 states that “the use of warranties is not
mandatory.” However, if the benefits to be derived from the warranty are commensurate
with the cost of the warranty, the CO [contracting officer] should consider placing it in the
contract. In determining whether a warranty is appropriate for a specific acquisition, FAR
Subpart 46.703 requires the CO to consider the nature and use of the supplies and services,
the cost, the administration and enforcement, trade practices, and reduced requirements.
The rationale for using a warranty should be documented in the contract file....
In determining the value of a warranty, a CBA [cost-benefit analysis] is used to measure
the life cycle costs of the system with and without the warranty. A CBA is required to
determine if the warranty will be cost beneficial. CBA is an economic analysis, which
basically compares the Life Cycle Costs (LCC) of the system with and without the warranty
to determine if warranty coverage will improve the LCCs. In general, five key factors will
drive the results of the CBA: cost of the warranty + cost of warranty administration +
compatibility with total program efforts + cost of overlap with Contractor support +
intangible
savings.
Effective
warranties
integrate
reliability,
maintainability,
supportability, availability, and life-cycle costs. Decision factors that must be evaluated
include the state of the weapon system technology, the size of the warranted population,
the likelihood that field performance requirements can be achieved, and the warranty
period of performance.51

carriers, large surface combatants, and amphibious ships. Thus, even if a warranty in a shipbuilding contract with one
of these firms were to somehow mean that the government did not have pay under the terms of that contract—either up
front or later on—for fixing problems with earlier work done under that contract, there would still be a question as to
whether the government would nevertheless wind up eventually paying much of that cost as part of the price of one or
more future contracts the government may have that firm.
51 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Warranty Guide, Version 1.0, September 2009, accessed July 13,
2017, at https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pdi/uid/docs/departmentofdefensewarrantyguide[1].doc.
Congressional Research Service

45

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Appendix F. Avoiding Procurement Cost Growth vs.
Minimizing Procurement Costs
This appendix presents some considerations relating to avoiding procurement cost growth vs.
minimizing procurement costs in shipbuilding and other defense acquisition.
The affordability challenge posed by the Navy’s shipbuilding plans can reinforce the strong
oversight focus on preventing or minimizing procurement cost growth in Navy shipbuilding
programs, which is one expression of a strong oversight focus on preventing or minimizing cost
growth in DOD acquisition programs in general. This oversight focus may reflect in part an
assumption that avoiding or minimizing procurement cost growth is always synonymous with
minimizing procurement cost. It is important to note, however, that as paradoxical as it may seem,
avoiding or minimizing procurement cost growth is not always synonymous with minimizing
procurement cost, and that a sustained, singular focus on avoiding or minimizing procurement
cost growth might sometimes lead to higher procurement costs for the government.
How could this be? Consider the example of a design for the lead ship of a new class of Navy
ships. The construction cost of this new design is uncertain, but is estimated to be likely
somewhere between Point A (a minimum possible figure) and Point D (a maximum possible
figure). (Point D, in other words, would represent a cost estimate with a 100% confidence factor,
meaning there is a 100% chance that the cost would come in at or below that level.) If the Navy
wanted to avoid cost growth on this ship, it could simply set the ship’s procurement cost at Point
D. Industry would likely be happy with this arrangement, and there likely would be no cost
growth on the ship.
The alternative strategy open to the Navy is to set the ship’s target procurement cost at some
figure between Points A and D—call it Point B—and then use that more challenging target cost to
place pressure on industry to sharpen its pencils so as to find ways to produce the ship at that
lower cost. (Navy officials sometimes refer to this as “pressurizing” industry.) In this example, it
might turn out that industry efforts to reduce production costs are not successful enough to build
the ship at the Point B cost. As a result, the ship experiences one or more rounds of procurement
cost growth, and the ship’s procurement cost rises over time from Point B to some higher
figure—call it Point C.
Here is the rub: Point C, in spite of incorporating one or more rounds of cost growth, might
nevertheless turn out to be lower than Point D, because Point C reflected efforts by the
shipbuilder to find ways to reduce production costs that the shipbuilder might have put less
energy into pursuing if the Navy had simply set the ship’s procurement cost initially at Point D.
Setting the ship’s cost at Point D, in other words, may eliminate the risk of cost growth on the
ship, but does so at the expense of creating a risk of the government paying more for the ship than
was actually necessary. DOD could avoid cost growth on new procurement programs starting
tomorrow by simply setting costs for those programs at each program’s equivalent of Point D. But
as a result of this strategy, DOD could well wind up leaving money on the table in some
instances—of not, in other words, minimizing procurement costs.
DOD does not have to set a cost precisely at Point D to create a potential risk in this regard. A risk
of leaving money on the table, for example, is a possible downside of requiring DOD to budget
for its acquisition programs at something like an 80% confidence factor—an approach that some
observers have recommended—because a cost at the 80% confidence factor is a cost that is likely
fairly close to Point D.
Congressional Research Service

46

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Procurement cost growth is often embarrassing for DOD and industry, and can damage their
credibility in connection with future procurement efforts. Procurement cost growth can also
disrupt congressional budgeting by requiring additional appropriations to pay for something
Congress thought it had fully funded in a prior year. For this reason, there is a legitimate public
policy value to pursuing a goal of having less rather than more procurement cost growth.
Procurement cost growth, however, can sometimes be in part the result of DOD efforts to use
lower initial cost targets as a means of pressuring industry to reduce production costs—efforts
that, notwithstanding the cost growth, might be partially successful. A sustained, singular focus
on avoiding or minimizing cost growth, and of punishing DOD for all instances of cost growth,
could discourage DOD from using lower initial cost targets as a means of pressurizing industry,
which could deprive DOD of a tool for controlling procurement costs.
The point here is not to excuse away cost growth, because cost growth can occur in a program for
reasons other than DOD’s attempt to pressurize industry. Nor is the point to abandon the goal of
seeking lower rather than higher procurement cost growth, because, as noted above, there is a
legitimate public policy value in pursuing this goal. The point, rather, is to recognize that this goal
is not always synonymous with minimizing procurement cost, and that a possibility of some
amount of cost growth might be expected as part of an optimal government strategy for
minimizing procurement cost. Recognizing that the goals of seeking lower rather than higher cost
growth and of minimizing procurement cost can sometimes be in tension with one another can
lead to an approach that takes both goals into consideration. In contrast, an approach that is
instead characterized by a sustained, singular focus on avoiding and minimizing cost growth may
appear virtuous, but in the end may wind up costing the government more.
Congressional Research Service

47

link to page 53 link to page 43 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Appendix G. Size of the Navy and Navy
Shipbuilding Rate
Size of the Navy
Table G-1 shows the size of the Navy in terms of total number of ships since FY1948; the
numbers shown in the table reflect changes over time in the rules specifying which ships count
toward the total. Differing counting rules result in differing totals, and for certain years, figures
reflecting more than one set of counting rules are available. Figures in the table for FY1978 and
subsequent years reflect the battle force ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules
established in the early 1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy.
As shown in the table, the total number of battle force ships in the Navy reached a late-Cold War
peak of 568 at the end of FY1987 and began declining thereafter.52 The Navy fell below 300
battle force ships in August 2003 and remained below 300 ships for the next 16 years. The Navy
briefly returned to a level of 300 ships in early July 2020, for the first time in almost 17 years,
subsequently fell back below 300 ships, reached 300 ships again briefly during periods in August
and September 2022, and as of August 28, 2023, included 297 battle force ships.
As discussed in Appendix B, historical figures for total fleet size might not be a reliable yardstick
for assessing the appropriateness of proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy,
particularly if the historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be
performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are
available to Navy ships for performing missions all change over time, and because the number of
ships in the fleet in an earlier year might itself have been inappropriate (i.e., not enough or more
than enough) for meeting the Navy’s mission requirements in that year.
For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a
reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An
increasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to
perform its stated missions is increasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be
increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing
number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated
missions is decreasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly
than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships
are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in
total ship numbers.

52 Some publications have stated that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however,
is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle
force ships figure is the number used in government discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total
number of active ships has been larger than the total number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval History and
Heritage Command (formerly the Naval Historical Center) states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy included a
total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle
force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships in another
year is thus an apples-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of
ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the
Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.
Congressional Research Service

48

link to page 53 link to page 53 link to page 53 link to page 53 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Table G-1. Total Number of Ships in Navy Since FY1948
FYa
Number
FYa
Number
FYa
Number
FYa
Number
1948
737
1970
769
1992
466
2014
289
1949
690
1971
702
1993
435
2015
271
1950
634
1972
654
1994
391
2016
275
1951
980
1973
584
1995
372
2017
279
1952
1,097
1974
512
1996
356
2018
286
1953
1,122
1975
496
1997
354
2019
290
1954
1,113
1976
476
1998
333
2020
296
1955
1,030
1977
464
1999
317
2021
294
1956
973
1978
468
2000
318
2022
289
1957
967
1979
471
2001
316

1958
890
1980
477
2002
313

1959
860
1981
490
2003
297

1960
812
1982
513
2004
292

1961
897
1983
514
2005
281

1962
959
1984
524
2006
281

1963
916
1985
541
2007
279

1964
917
1986
556
2008
282

1965
936
1987
568
2009
285

1966
947
1988
565
2010
288

1967
973
1989
566
2011
284

1968
976
1990
546
2012
287

1969
926
1991
526
2013
285

Source: Compiled by CRS using U.S. Navy data. Numbers shown reflect changes over time in the rules
specifying which ships count toward the total. Figures for FY1978 and subsequent years reflect the battle force
ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules established in the early 1980s for public policy
discussions of the size of the Navy.
a. Data for earlier years in the table may be for the end of the calendar year (or for some other point during
the year), rather than for the end of the fiscal year.
Congressional Research Service

49

link to page 54 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Shipbuilding Rate
Table G-2 shows past (FY1982-FY2023) and programmed (FY2024-FY2028) rates of Navy ship
procurement.
Table G-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982-FY2028
Procured in FY1982-FY2023 and programmed for FY2024-FY2028
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93
94 95 96 97 98 99 00
17 14 16 19 20 17 15 19 15 11 11
7
4
4
5
4
5
5
6
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
13 14 15 16 17 18 19
6
6
5
7
8
4
5
3
8
7
10
11
11
8
8
9
9
9
13
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

13 11 13 11
9
7
13 12 14

Source: CRS compilation based on Navy budget data and examination of defense authorization and
appropriation committee and conference reports for each fiscal year. The table excludes nonbattle force ships
that do not count toward the 355-ship goal, such as certain sealift and prepositioning ships operated by the
Military Sealift Command and oceanographic ships operated by agencies such as the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
Notes: (1) The totals shown for FY2006, FY2007, and FY2008, reflect the cancellation two LCSs funded
in FY2006, another two LCSs funded in FY2007, and an LCS funded in FY2008.
(2) The total shown for FY2012 includes two JHSVs—one that was included in the Navy’s FY2012 budget
submission, and one that was included in the Army’s FY2012 budget submission. Until FY2012, JHSVs were being
procured by both the Navy and the Army. The Army was to procure its fifth and final JHSV in FY2012, and this
ship was included in the Army’s FY2012 budget submission. In May 2011, the Navy and Army signed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) transferring the Army’s JHSVs to the Navy. In the FY2012 DOD
Appropriations Act (Division A of H.R. 2055/P.L. 112-74 of December 23, 2011), the JHSV that was in the
Army’s FY2012 budget submission was funded through the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN)
appropriation account, along with the JHSV that the Navy had included in its FY0212 budget submission. The
four JHSVs that were procured through the Army’s budget prior to FY2012, however, are not included in the
annual totals shown in this table.
(3) The figures shown for FY2019 and FY2020 reflect a Navy decision to show the aircraft carrier CVN-81
as a ship to be procured in FY2020 rather than a ship that was procured in FY2019. Congress, as part of its
action on the Navy’s proposed FY2019 budget, authorized the procurement of CVN-81 in FY2019.
(4) The figures shown for FY2021 and FY2023 include LHA-9 as a ship procured in FY2021, consistent with
congressional authorization and appropriation action for FY2021 and prior fiscal years.

Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs

Congressional Research Service

50

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
RL32665 · VERSION 388 · UPDATED
51