Energy and Water Development
Appropriations for Nuclear Weapons
Activities: In Brief
August 21, 2023
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R47657

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Energy and Water Development Appropriations for Nuclear Weapons Activities: In Brief

Introduction
Responsibility for U.S. nuclear weapons resides with both the U.S. Department of Defense
(DOD) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). DOD develops, deploys, and operates the
missiles and aircraft that can deliver nuclear warheads. It also generates the military requirements
for the warheads carried on those platforms, derived from presidential guidance. The National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency within the DOE, oversees
the research, development, test, and acquisition programs that produce, maintain, and sustain the
warheads.1
NNSA is also responsible for storing and securing the warheads that are not deployed and for
dismantling warheads that have been retired and removed from the stockpile. It manages and sets
policy for the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, consisting of eight sites in seven states. These sites
include three laboratories (Los Alamos National Laboratory, NM; Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, CA; and Sandia National Laboratories, NM and CA); four production sites (Kansas
City Plant, MO; Pantex Plant, TX; Savannah River Site, SC; and Y-12 National Security
Complex, TN); and the Nevada National Security Site (formerly Nevada Test Site).2
Congress authorizes funding for both DOD and NNSA nuclear weapons activities in the annual
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and provides funding for the NNSA through the
Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act. NNSA operates three programs, each of
which receives funding in a dedicated appropriation account: Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation,
Naval Reactors, and Weapons Activities. The last program is the subject of this report.
The Weapons Activities appropriation account supports U.S. nuclear warheads and associated
components, provides the materials and components for those weapons, and sustains and
modernizes the infrastructure that supports that mission. According to the NNSA, the Weapons
Activities account provides for “the maintenance and refurbishment of nuclear weapons to
continue sustained confidence in their safety, reliability, and performance; continued investment
in scientific, engineering, and manufacturing capabilities to enable production and certification of
the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile; and manufacture of nuclear weapon components.”
NNSA’s budget request for FY2024 seeks $18.83 billion for Weapons Activities, $1.72 billion
(10.0%) more than the enacted funding of $17.12 billion in FY2023, within a total budget of
$23.85 billion for NNSA.
Selected Major Activities
The FY2024 budget requested $18.83 billion for nuclear Weapons Activities—1.72 billion (10%)
more than the FY2023 enacted level.3 The FY2024 request contains funding to continue its five
nuclear warhead modernization programs and modernize NNSA production and research
facilities, as well as funding to support future plutonium pit production at the Savannah River Site
and Los Alamos National Laboratory. The Weapons Activities appropriation is organized into four

1 For a history of the nuclear weapons program and related topics, see U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear
Security Administration, “NNSA Timeline,” at https://www.energy.gov/articles/history-energy-departments-role-
nuclear-security.
2 For details on the sites in the Nuclear Weapons Complex,see CRS Report R45306, The U.S. Nuclear Weapons
Complex: Overview of Department of Energy Sites.
3 U.S. Department of Energy, Department of Energy FY 2024 Budget in Brief, FY 2024 Congressional Justification,
March 2023, p. 15, at https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-05/doe-fy2024-budget-in-brief-v4.pdf.
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Energy and Water Development Appropriations for Nuclear Weapons Activities: In Brief

main mission areas, after being reorganized and renamed in FY2021. These programs, each with
a request of over $2.5 billion for FY2024, include the following:
• Stockpile Management. The budget requested $250.80 million (5.1%) more
funding for FY2024 than was enacted in FY2023 to support work on nuclear
warhead life extension programs, warhead surveillance and quality assurance,
maintenance, and related activities.
• Production Modernization. The budget requested $439.20 million (8.6%) more
funding for FY2024 than was enacted in FY2023 for programs that focus on
maintaining and expanding the production capabilities for nuclear weapons
components critical to weapons performance.4
• Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering. The budget requested
$246.60 million (8.4%) more funding for FY2024 than was enacted in FY2023
for programs that provide the scientific foundation for the current and future
stockpile. This category replaces the Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation program area.
• Infrastructure and Operations (I&O). The budget requested $164.5 million
(6.3%) more funding for FY2024 than was enacted in FY2023 for programs to
maintain, operate, and modernize NNSA’s infrastructure. This category is
intended to support construction of new facilities and funds deferred maintenance
in older facilities.
In addition to these activities, NNSA also requested in the budget a total of $383.1 million
(21.4%) more funding for FY2024 than was enacted in FY2023 for several other programs, such
as the Secure Transportation Asset, Defense Nuclear Security, Information Technology and
Cybersecurity, and Legacy Contractor Pensions (see Table 1).
Table 1. Funding for Weapons Activities by Major Category, FY2021-FY2024 Request
(millions of current dollars)
$ Change
% Change
(FY2024
(FY2024
Request-
Request-
FY2021
FY2022
FY2023
FY2024
FY2023
FY2023
Program
Enacted
Enacted
Enacted
Request
Enacted)
Enacted)
Stockpile Management
4,290.2
4,637.7
4,954.1
5,204.9
250.79
5.1%
Production Modernization
3,903.5
4,156.9
5,116.7
5,555.9
439.22
8.6%
Stockpile RT&E*
3,003.5
2,866.1
2,950.0
3,196.6
246.65
8.4%
I&O
2,542.1
2,487.4
2,602.6
2,767.1
164.55
6.3%
Other**
1,605.7
1,663.6
1,787.0
2,170.1
383.10
21.4%
Total
15,345
15,920
17,116
18,833
1,716.83
10.0%
Source: NNSA Congressional Budget Requests, House and Senate Appropriations Committee reports.
Notes: Totals may not sum due to rounding. RDT&E: Research, Development, Test and Evaluation; I&O:
Infrastructure and Operations. *Stockpile RT&E: Beginning in FY2024, Academic Programs, which had previously
been within the Stockpile RT&E Program, wil be its own separate program. **Other: Secure Transportation

4 For example, according to NNSA, these include primaries, canned subassemblies, radiation cases, and non-nuclear
components.
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Energy and Water Development Appropriations for Nuclear Weapons Activities: In Brief

Asset, Defense Nuclear Security, Information Technology and Cybersecurity, and Legacy Contractor Pensions
and Settlement Payments, and Academic Programs beginning in FY2024.
Stockpile Management
According to NNSA’s FY2024 budget materials, the Stockpile Management requirements
“maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile.”5 The activities in this program
area include warhead life extension, modification, and design efforts; the annual assessment
process for the current active stockpile; stockpile sustainment activities; warhead dismantlement
activities; and sustainment of manufacturing capabilities and capacities. The Stockpile
Management program includes five subprograms:
• Stockpile Major Modernization: includes continuing activities for the B61-12
Life Extension Program (LEP), W88 Alteration (ALT) 370, W80-4 LEP, W87-1
Modification program, and a feasibility study for the W93 program. The FY2024
budget does not include funding for the W80-4 Sea-Launched Cruise Missile
Alteration.
• Stockpile Sustainment: includes activities to maintain and develop each Stockpile
System and Multi-Weapons System. According to NNSA, Stockpile Sustainment
executes “maintenance, surveillance, assessment, surety, and management
activities for all enduring weapons systems in the stockpile. The program
includes the B61, W76, W78, W80, B83, W87, and W88 Stockpile Systems, and
Multi-Weapon Systems.”6
• Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition: includes funding for the interim
storage of warheads awaiting dismantlement, funding for actual dismantlement,
and funding for the disposition of warhead components and materials.
• Production Operations: sustains manufacturing capabilities and capacities,
including weapons assembly and disassembly, component production,
surveillance, and weapon safety and reliability testing.
• Nuclear Enterprise Assurance (NEA): a program introduced in FY2023, NEA
“actively manages subversion risks to the nuclear weapons stockpile and
associated design, production, and testing capabilities.”7 See Table 2.8

5 U.S. Department of Energy, Department of Energy, FY 2024 Congressional Justification, National Nuclear Security
Administration, Federal Salaries and Expenses, Weapons Activities, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Naval
Reactors, March 2023, Office of the Chief Financial Officer, Volume I, p. 121 (of the PDF), at https://www.energy.gov/
sites/default/files/2023-03/doe-fy-2024-budget-vol-1-nnsa.pdf.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., p. 105.
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Energy and Water Development Appropriations for Nuclear Weapons Activities: In Brief

Table 2. Weapons Activities Funding by Warhead Program, FY2021-FY2024 Request
(dollars in millions)
$ Change % Change
(FY2024
(FY2024
Request-
Request-
Associated
FY2021
FY2022
FY2023
FY2024
FY2023
FY2023
Program
DOD System
Enacted
Enacted
Enacted
Request
Enacted)
Enacted)
B61-12 LEP
Nuclear-Capable
815.71
771.66
672.02
449.85
-222.17
-33.1%
Aircraft/Bomber
W88 Alt
Submarine-
256.92
207.16
162.06
178.82
16.76
10.3%
370
Launched Ballistic
Missile
W80-4 LEP
Air-Launched
1,000.31
1,080.40
1,122.45
1,009.93
-112.52
-10.0%
Cruise Missile
W87-1
Intercontinental
541.00
691.03
680.13
1,068.91
388.78
57.2%
Modification
Ballistic Missile
W93
Submarine-
53.00
72,00
240.51
389.66
149.15
62.0%
Launched Ballistic
Missile
Source: Department of Energy FY2023 Budget Request; Department of Energy FY2024 Budget Request.
Production Modernization
According to NNSA’s FY2024 budget materials, the Production Modernization program is tasked
with “production capabilities for nuclear weapons components critical to weapon performance,
including primaries, secondaries, radiation cases, and non-nuclear components.”9 The highest
spending category in NNSA’s FY2024 budget request, the Production Modernization program
includes five subprograms:
• Primary Capability Modernization: includes plutonium pit modernization and
high explosives modernization. In its FY2024 budget request, NNSA states that it
“remains committed to achieving the pit production capability goals on the path
to 80 [pits per year].”10
• Secondary Capability Modernization: includes uranium modernization, depleted
uranium modernization, and lithium modernization. This category’s budget
request reflected a 46.8% increase in funding, largely to support the Uranium
Production Facility at Y-12 National Security Complex.
• Tritium Modernization and Domestic Uranium Enrichment Program: the Tritium
Modernization portion of this program funds activities needed to produce,
recover, and recycle the tritium gas used in U.S. nuclear weapons, while the
Domestic Uranium Enrichment Program is designed to ensure a reliable supply
of enriched uranium to support U.S. national security and nonproliferation needs.

9 Ibid., p. 10.
10 Ibid., p. 167.
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Energy and Water Development Appropriations for Nuclear Weapons Activities: In Brief

• Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization: according to NNSA, this program area
funds capabilities necessary for the “design, qualification, production, and
surveillance of non-nuclear components for multiple weapon systems.”11
• Capability Based Investments Program: according to NNSA, this program
“executes projects for equipment, tools, supporting facilities, and infrastructure
directly related to enduring, multi-program weapon activity capabilities, mission
deliverables, and management of programmatic risk across the nuclear security
enterprise.”12
Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering
According to NNSA’s FY2024 budget materials, the Stockpile Research, Technology, and
Engineering program “provides the knowledge and expertise needed to maintain confidence in
the nuclear stockpile without the need for underground nuclear explosive testing.”13 It funds not
only science and engineering programs, but also large experimental facilities, such as the
Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments (ECSE) program, the Nevada National
Security Site (NNSS), and NNSA’s first Exascale high performance computing system at
Livermore Laboratory.14 The Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering program includes
six subprograms:
• Assessment Science: this program area performs experiments to obtain the
materials and nuclear data required to validate and understand the physics of
nuclear weapons performance, and pursues activities that develop, exercise, and
maintain the expertise of NNSA's nuclear weapon design, engineering, and
assessment community.
• Engineering and Integrated Assessments: this program area aims to ensure that
current and future nuclear weapons systems are survivable and adaptable. This
includes developing advanced weapons capabilities as well as certification and
qualification capabilities.
• Inertial Confinement Fusion: this program area focuses on High Energy Density
(HED) science capability development for nuclear weapons applications. This
includes funding for the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory.
• Advanced Simulation and Computing: this program area supports stockpile
stewardship with advanced modeling and computing capabilities to support
maintaining confidence in the nuclear stockpile without underground explosive
testing.
• Weapon Technology and Manufacturing Maturation: according to NNSA budget
documents, this program area provides “agile, assured, and affordable
technologies; partnership with stakeholders to meet stockpile and customer

11 Ibid., p. 159.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., p. 10.
14 For additional information on Exascale, see Exascale Computing Project at https://www.exascaleproject.org/
research-group/national-security/.
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requirements; qualification and certification; [and] developing a skilled technical
workforce and establishing enhanced capabilities.”15
Infrastructure and Operations
According to NNSA budget materials, the Infrastructure and Operations Program “maintains,
operates, and modernizes NNSA’s infrastructure,” which includes planning and constructing all
NNSA support facilities except for complex-construction projects (which are funded by that
specific capability sponsor).16 NNSA Administrator Jill Hruby noted in her 2022 testimony that
NNSA must invest in infrastructure to “rebuild capabilities lost in the 1990s.”17
Selected Legislative Activity
FY2023 Authorizations
The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (NDAA; P.L. 117-
263) authorized $17.360 billion for NNSA Weapons Activities—$873.5 million (5.3%) more than
the requested amount (see Table 3).
Table 3. Funding Authorized for NNSA Weapons Activities in FY2023 NDAA
(in billions of dollars of budget authority)
House-passed NDAA
SASC-Reported
Enacted NDAA (P.L.
Requested
(H.R. 7900)
NDAA (S. 4543)
117-263)
$16.486
$17.211
$17.090
$17.360
Source: H.Rept. 117-397 (Part 1) accompanying H.R. 7900, p. 408; S.Rept. 117-130 accompanying S. 4543, p.
382; and the explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 117-263, as published in U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Armed Services, James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 Legislative
Text and Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany H.R. 7776 P.L. 117-263 Book 2 of 2, committee print, 118th
Cong., 1st sess., 50-665, January 2023, p. 2171.
Notes: SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee.
FY2023 Appropriations
The Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2023 (Division D
of P.L. 117-328) provided $17.116 billion for NNSA Weapons Activities—$629.8 million (3.8%)
more than the requested amount (see Table 4).18

15 U.S. Department of Energy, Department of Energy, FY 2024 Congressional Justification, National Nuclear Security
Administration, Federal Salaries and Expenses, Weapons Activities, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Naval
Reactors, March 2023, Office of the Chief Financial Officer, Volume I, p. 96 (of the PDF), at https://www.energy.gov/
sites/default/files/2023-03/doe-fy-2024-budget-vol-1-nnsa.pdf.
16 Ibid.
17 Testimony of the NNSA Director Jill Hruby, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee
on Energy and Water Development, A Review of the Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Submission for National Nuclear
Security Administration, hearings, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., May 18, 2022, at https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/
download/hruby-testimony-2022.
18 For more background and analysis on this legislation, see CRS Report R47293, Energy and Water Development:
FY2023 Appropriations, by Mark Holt and Anna E. Normand.
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Energy and Water Development Appropriations for Nuclear Weapons Activities: In Brief

Table 4. Funding Appropriated for NNSA Weapons Activities in FY2023 Energy and
Water Appropriations Act
(in billions of dollars of budget authority)
HAC-reported act
SAC-released act
Enacted act (Division
Requested
(H.R. 8255)
(S. 4660)
D of P.L. 117-328)
$16.486
$16.333
$16.986
$17.116
Source: H.Rept. 117-394 accompanying H.R. 8255, p. 317; explanatory statement accompanying SAC-released
draft of S. 4660; and explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 117-328, as published in U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Appropriations, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 Committee Print of the Committee on
Appropriations U.S. House of Representatives on H.R. 2617/P.L. 117-328 [Legislative Text and Explanatory Statement]
Book 1 of 2, Divisions A-F, committee print, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., 50-347, 2023, p. 1052.
Notes: HAC is House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee.
Issues for Congress
Congressional oversight activities for these programs could include hearings, annual
appropriations and authorizations, reporting requirements, or site visits.
Program Schedules
During the 2010s, NNSA prioritized life extension programs and research and development at the
expense of deferred maintenance of production facilities. NNSA is currently modernizing many
of its capabilities and the infrastructure required to produce them, which Administrator Hruby
said was its “biggest challenge” in her 2022 testimony to Congress.19 Some analysts have
questioned NNSA’s ability to complete these projects on time. A 2022 RAND study on the
nuclear enterprise workforce found that one potential issue is the ability of the nuclear enterprise
to “handle the sheer number and scope of activities associated with nuclear modernization
programs.”20
Congress regularly reviews NNSA’s program schedules during the annual budget cycle and has
directed the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to give testimony, publish reports
documenting delays, and offer its recommendations. The GAO has published several reports that
express concern with specific NNSA program areas. During a March 3, 2020, House Armed
Services Committee hearing, Allison Bawden of the GAO raised concerns about the size and
scope of NNSA’s budget request for FY2021. She noted that “the nuclear security enterprise is
embarking on its most ambitious level of effort since the Cold War era, and NNSA is currently
managing four weapon modernization programs, proposing a fifth, and undertaking infrastructure
projects that affect every strategic material and component used in nuclear weapons.”21 She also

19 Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Nuclear Weapons Council, U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services, May 4, 2022. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/22-37_05-04-
2022.pdf.
20 Laura Werber et al., Is the National Nuclear Enterprise Workforce Postured to Modernize the Triad?, RAND
Corporation, 2022, at https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA1200/RRA1227-1/RAND_
RRA1227-1.pdf.
21 John M. Donnelly, "Undisclosed delays plague atomic programs, cost billions to fix," Congressional Quarterly,
March 19, 2020, https://plus.cq.com/doc/news-5863379?0&searchId=4tcMmrz2. See also Allison Bawden, “Nuclear
Weapons: NNSA’s Modernization Efforts Would Benefit from a Portfolio Management Approach,” GAO-20-443T,
Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, March 3, 2020.
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-443t.
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Energy and Water Development Appropriations for Nuclear Weapons Activities: In Brief

noted that “because NNSA uses the same production infrastructure for each weapon program and
capacity is limited, each program’s schedule can impact the next.”22
In FY2021, Congress expressed concerns about NNSA’s pit production plans. It mandated that
NNSA provide a plan outlining an integrated master schedule for “all pit production-related
project and program activities” going forward. Both the House and the Senate Energy and Water
Development Appropriations Subcommittees again stressed their concerns about these programs
in their FY2022 appropriations reports.23 Both noted that NNSA had not yet submitted the
required integrated master schedule. A January 2023 GAO report on plutonium pit production
stated that NNSA still lacks a “comprehensive schedule or cost estimate that meets GAO best
practices.”24 In response to Senator Kennedy’s question about how to get pit production “back on
track” at a May 2023 Senate Appropriations hearing, NNSA Administrator Hruby said, “The most
important thing we have to do to get pit production back on track is to finish our designs, get
craftworkers in the facilities, and that is happening. We have great confidence—between changes
we are making in our processes, getting people on board, doing equipment pre-buys, particularly
for glove boxes which are limited manufacturers in the United States—that we will be able to
make pits. We are going to be late, we are trying to catch up.” 25
The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), a DOD document on U.S. “nuclear strategy, policy,
posture, and forces,” calls for NNSA to develop a “Production Based Resilience Program” to
“complement the science-based stewardship program and ensure that the nuclear security
enterprise is capable of full-scope production.” 26 The NPR asserts that this program will address
“all elements of the enterprise,” and NNSA leadership has stated that its FY23 budget request is
informed by the NPR. In a 2023 speech, Administrator Hruby said that production-based
resilience entailed building an enterprise that is meant to “be flexible and scale more readily,” “be
more resilient to outages and failures” and “have modern capabilities to attract the best talent, to
be efficient, and to deliver the highest quality products.”27
Program Costs
NNSA’s Weapons Activities funding category has steadily increased in recent years, and the
FY2023 request continued this trend with a $1.4 billion increase. Congress has expressed

22 Ibid.
23 S.Rept. 117-36 - ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 2022, S.Rept. 117-
36, 117th Cong. (2023), https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/117th-congress/senate-report/36/1; H.Rept.
117-98 - ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS BILL,
2022, H.Rept. 117-98, 117th Cong. (2023), https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/117th-congress/house-
report/98/1.
24 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Does Not Have a Comprehensive Schedule or
Cost Estimate for Pit Production Capability, GAO-23-104661, January 12, 2023, at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-
23-104661.
25 Testimony of the NNSA Director Jill Hruby, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee
on Energy and Water Development, A Review of the Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Submission for National Nuclear
Security Administration, hearings, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., May 3, 2023,
athttps://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings/a-review-of-the-fiscal-year-2024-budget-request-for-the-us-
department-of-energy-including-the-national-nuclear-security-administration.
26 U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, October 27, 2022, at https://media.defense.gov/2022/
Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF. See also CRS In Focus
IF12357, 2022 Nuclear Posture Review: Selected Programmatic Issues, by Alexandra G. Neenan.
27 NNSA Administrator Jill Hruby’s Remarks for the 17th Annual Symposium on Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century
0 Nuclear Deterrence at the ‘Inflection Point,” April 27, 2023.
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concerns about cost growth and transparency in NNSA’s programs during its budget hearings.
These concerns have focused on both major construction projects and weapons refurbishment
programs.28
NNSA’s FY2021 budget requests asked for $19.6 billion, a $3.1 billion increase from the FY2020
budget, which press reports indicated was derived from internal NNSA documents stating these
increases were “devoted substantially to covering previously undisclosed cost overruns.”29
Several independent assessments of NNSA’s program of record have expressed concern with the
potential for cost overruns. In a 2019 report, the GAO noted that “missed milestones have the
potential to increase costs and further delay schedules,” and that NNSA has a “history of program
management challenges that have resulted in significant cost overruns.”30
Interdependencies with DOD Programs
While the DOD and NNSA work together to try to ensure that their schedules are aligned,
including mitigating schedule delays, many of DOD’s nuclear modernization programs are
dependent on NNSA to deliver its associated components in a timely manner. The 2022 Nuclear
Posture review notes that “there is little or no margin between the end of life of existing systems
and their replacements.”31
For example, the next-generation Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the LGM-35
Sentinel, is expected to field W87-0 and W87-1, the latter of which is expected to field its First
Production Unit (FPU) in FY2030, a year after the Sentinel is expected to come online.

28 See for example, “Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Department of Energy’s Atomic Energy Defense Activities
and Department of Defense Nuclear Weapons Programs in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal
Year 2024 and the Future Years Defense Program,” Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Senate Armed Services
Committee, April 18, 2023; and “Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Fiscal Year 2024 President’s Budget Request
for U.S. Nuclear Weapon and Warhead Modernization and Sustainment Plans, as well as the Administration’s Nuclear
Policy and Programmatic Priorities,” Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, House Armed Services Committee, March 28,
2023.
29 John M. Donnelly, “Undisclosed delays plague atomic programs, cost billions to fix,” CQ News, March 19, 2020, at
https://plus.cq.com/doc/news-5863379?0&searchId=4tcMmrz2.
30 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Security Enterprise: NNSA Should Use Portfolio Management
Leading Practices to Support Modernization Efforts, GAO-21-398, June 9, 2021, at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-
21-398.
31 U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, October 27, 2022, at https://media.defense.gov/2022/
Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.
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Energy and Water Development Appropriations for Nuclear Weapons Activities: In Brief

Should NNSA face unexpected delays for any of its major production capabilities, this may
impact DOD programmatic and operational requirements. Congressional committees have
questioned executive branch officials about the impact of the delays on DOD. GAO reported in a
June 2023 report that “[a]ccording to DOD officials, current nuclear weapons exceptions and
limitations do not constrain their ability to store, maintain, or operate nuclear weapons.”
However, the report noted that the officials also said “future flexibility may decline because of
stockpile aging.”32
Congress may continue to track progress on meeting program goals, particularly as part of the
annual budget cycle hearings.

Author Information

Alexandra G. Neenan
Mary Beth D. Nikitin
Analyst in U.S. Defense Infrastructure Policy
Specialist in Nonproliferation

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32 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Weapons: Technical Exceptions and Limitations Do Not Constratin
DOD’s Planning and Operations, GAO-23-105671, March 9, 2023, at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-105671.
Congressional Research Service
R47657 · VERSION 1 · NEW
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