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Updated August 1, 2023
Iraq
The Republic of Iraq is strategically located in the central
Iraq’s government still struggles to meet the demands of its
Middle East region (Figure 1) and has large energy
citizens for more accountable, transparent, and responsive
resources and a growing, diverse population. Its potential
governance. During mass protests in 2019 and 2020,
and regional influence make it a venue for competition
security forces and politically aligned militias killed
between outside powers, including the United States and
hundreds of demonstrators, but protestors succeeded in
Iran. About 2,000 U.S. military forces are deployed in Iraq
bringing down the government formed after the 2018
at the invitation of the Iraqi government and provide advice
national election and prompted changes to Iraq’s electoral
and aid to Iraqi security forces, including the peshmerga
system that were then reversed in 2023. A caretaker
forces of the federally recognized Kurdistan Regional
government led the country through a severe economic and
Government (KRG). The Biden Administration supports
fiscal crisis in 2020 and 2021 but lacked a legislative
continued U.S.-Iraqi security cooperation and encourages
mandate for new initiatives.
Iraqi leaders to fight corruption and respect citizens’ rights.
Figure 1. Iraq
Neighboring Iran’s ties to some Iraqi parties and militias
complicate U.S.-Iraqi relations, and some Iraqis with ties to
the Iranian government call for the expulsion of U.S. and
other foreign forces from Iraq. In 2019, Iran-backed Iraqi
groups expanded attacks on U.S. targets, and in 2020, a
U.S. strike in Iraq killed Iranian Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani
and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) leader Abu
Mahdi al Muhandis. Iran retaliated with attacks on Iraqi
sites hosting U.S. forces. Intermittent attacks claimed by
Iran-backed Iraqi groups have followed, targeting U.S. and
Coalition forces—and their Iraqi hosts. The United States
has condemned a series of indirect fire and infrastructure
attacks in the Kurdistan region, including March and
September 2022 missile attacks from Iran.
The 118th Congress is considering developments in Iraq and
Iraq’s relationships with its neighbors as Members review
the Biden Administration’s requests for U.S. foreign aid
and defense assistance for Iraq. Members also may consider
steps to shape U.S.-Iraq economic ties, support positive
Sources: CRS, using ESRI and U.S. State Department data.
relations between Iraq’s national government and the KRG,
Iraq’s Government Seeks to Move
meet humanitarian needs, and promote human rights,
Beyond Stalemate, Improve Services
including those of religious and ethnic minorities.
Following an October 2021 early legislative election for
Background
Iraq’s unicameral Council of Representatives (COR),
Iraqis have persevered through intermittent wars, internal
competition among Iraqi factions devolved into stalemate
conflicts, sanctions, displacements, terrorism, and political
over government formation. After a year marked by
unrest since the 1980s. The legacies of the 2003 U.S.-led
contested judicial decisions, protests, high-profile
invasion of Iraq continue to shape U.S.-Iraq relations: the
resignations, and some armed confrontations, Iraqi parties
invasion ousted the dictatorial government of Saddam
in October 2022 formed a power-sharing government led by
Hussein and ended the decades-long rule of the Baath Party
Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani, the nominee of
but ushered in a period of chaos, violence, and political
the Shia political coalition known as the Coordination
transition from which the country struggled to emerge. U.S.
Framework (CF). The government is the first since 2003
forces withdrew in 2011, but conflict in neighboring Syria
that does not include all major political factions, following
and divisive sectarianism in Iraq enabled the insurgent
the resignation and withdrawal of followers of Shia
terrorist forces of the Islamic State organization (IS, aka
religious and social movement leader Muqtada Al Sadr,
ISIS/ISIL) to seize and exploit much of northwestern Iraq
who won the most seats in the 2021 election.
from 2014 to 2018. Iraqis leveraged new U.S. and coalition
military support to reclaim ground lost to the Islamic State,
Sudani, like his predecessors, faces challenges posed by
but as of 2023, some IS remnants retain an ability to operate
patterns of patronage and corruption in the Iraqi
in rural areas, especially in disputed territories between the
government, Iraq’s fiscal dependence on oil revenue, Iraq’s
Kurdistan region and areas to the south secured by national
assertive neighbors, and the activities of armed non-state
government forces.
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Iraq
actors, including militia groups associated with members of
Barzani is KRG prime minister. Nechirvan Barzani is KRG
the Coordination Framework. Iraq plans provincial elec
president and is the prime minister’s cousin. Historic KDP-
PUK tensions have resurged, and struggles within the
Sudani and his advisors describe the government as devoted
PUK’s leading Talibani family shape PUK relations with
to the interests of all Iraqis and focused on protecting Iraq’s
the KDP and parties in Baghdad. Convictions of journalists
sovereignty. The Prime Minister’s office has asserted direct
and crackdowns on activism in the Kurdistan region since
supervision over the awarding of some contracts and
2020 have increased foreign scrutiny of human rights there.
implementation of some programs in a bid to establish
clearer anti-corruption standards. The Prime Minister has
Iraq’s government opposes Turkey’s military’s presence
directed some actions against corrupt officials, and Iraqi
and operations in the Kurdistan region, where Turkish
authorities continue to investigate the theft of $2.5 billion in
forces target the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). KRG
tax revenue during 2020 and 2021, which may implicate
officials have called on the PKK to leave the region.
officials in the previous government. The Central Bank of
Partnership with the United States
Iraq is instituting international payment transparency
After a two-year bilateral strategic dialogue, U.S. and Iraqi
standards for certain transnational financial transactions and
leaders agreed in July 2021 on the transition of the U.S.
has altered Iraqi financial entities’ access to U.S. dollars in
military presence in Iraq to a noncombat advisory mission.
response to U.S.-Iraqi concerns about money laundering.
The Sudani government has supported the continuation of
President Biden reported to Congress in June 2023
Iraq’s cooperation with the U.S.-led counter-IS military
that U.S. forces remain in Iraq “to advise, assist, and
coalition, including the continued presence of U.S. and
enable select elements of the Iraqi security forces,
other foreign forces for advisory and training purposes. The
including Iraqi Kurdish security forces. United States
United States and Iraq continue to consult on the future of
Armed Forces also provide limited support to the
U.S.-Iraq security cooperation.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization mission in Iraq.”
The Sudani government proposed and the COR enacted an
Congress has authorized counter-IS train and equip
expansive three-year, $153 billion budget in June 2023
programs for Iraq through 2023, and has appropriated
which Iraqi leaders describe as enabling investment in
related funds available through September 2024, including
improved service provision and infrastructure, but which
aid to KRG forces subject to Baghdad’s approval. The State
some outside observers warn increases fiscal burdens
Department and the U.S. Agency for International
through new government hiring and may do little to reduce
Development (USAID) fund security, economic,
dependence on oil revenues. Reductions in state spending
stabilization, and democracy programs in parallel to
or public sector employment could prove politically
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Defense Department
sensitive, amid Iraq’s other challenges.
Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) and Global
Views from the Kurdistan Region
Train and Equip (10 U.S.C. 333) security assistance.
Iraqi Kurdish self-government developed after the 1991
Since 2014, Congress has appropriated more than $7.7
Gulf War. In 1992, Iraqi Kurds established a joint
billion for counter-IS train and equip programs for Iraqis.
administration between Iraqi Kurdistan’s two main political
Since 2015, the U.S. government has obligated more than
movements—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and
$405 million for stabilization of areas of Iraq liberated from
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—in areas under
their control. Iraq’s constitution formally recognizes the
the Islamic State, including funds for religious and ethnic
minority communities. The United States remains the top
authority of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in
humanitarian funding donor for Iraq and provided more
areas that were under Kurdish control as of March 19, 2003.
than $251 million in humanitarian aid for Iraq in FY2022.
The United States cooperates with the KRG and supports
The Biden Administration renewed a sanctions waiver on
the resolution of long-standing KRG-Baghdad disputes over
Iraqi electricity purchases from Iran in July 2023; Iraq has
oil production, the budget, territory, and security. Following
withheld related funds owed to Iran, but reports suggest the
a 2017 KRG-sponsored independence referendum, national
Administration has approved some Iraqi in-kind payments.
forces reasserted control over some disputed territories.
The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and U.S. Consulate in Erbil
Baghdad has maintained conditions on the transfer of funds
remain open. The U.S. Consulate in Basra has remained
to the KRG, contributing to the KRG’s fiscal strains. In
closed since 2018.
February 2022, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court (FSC) found
the KRG’s oil and gas sector law unconstitutional
Since 2021, U.S. forces have conducted strikes in the Iraq-
. KRG-
Syria border region and in Syria after attacks on U.S.
Baghdad negotiations continued amid government
personnel and facilities in Syria and Iraq. These U.S. strikes
formation talks during 2022, without agreement. In January
have targeted Iran-backed militia groups, including Iraqi
2023, the FSC ruled against new national fiscal transfers to
militia groups such as Kata’ib Hezbollah and Kata’ib
the KRG under the then-operative 2021 budget law. The
Sayyid al Shuhada. The executive branch reports to
Sudani government and KRG leaders reached new shared
Congress on U.S. military operations in Iraq consistent with
understandings and continue to consult on the
the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF,
implementation of the 2023 budget law.
P.L. 107-40), the 2002 Iraq AUMF (P.L. 107-243), and
The Erbil-based KDP and the Suleimaniyah-based PUK are
other laws.
the largest Kurdish parties in the COR and won the most
seats in the KRG’s 2018 regional election. KDP leader
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
Masoud Barzani remains influential; his son, Masrour
Affairs
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Iraq
IF10404
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