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INSIGHTi
Previewing NATO’s 2023 Vilnius Summit
July 5, 2023
Leaders from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) 31 member states (see Figure 1) are
scheduled to meet in Vilnius, Lithuania, on July 11-12, 2023. The allies are expected to address a number
of issues of interest to Congress, including efforts to deter and respond to a possible Russian attack,
NATO’s relations with Ukraine, allied defense spending, security threats posed by China, and Sweden’s
pending accession to the alliance.
Enhanced Deterrence and Defense
Since Russia’s 2014 and 2022 invasions of Ukraine, NATO has bolstered its force posture in the eastern
part of the alliance, including by deploying eight multinational battlegroups in the region. Since early
2022, the number of allied soldiers deployed to Central and Eastern Europe more than tripled, bringing
approximately 40,000 allied troops in the region under direct NATO command. The United States has
been a leading proponent of the enhanced defense posture and has deployed about 20,000 additional
military personnel to Europe since February 2022, including some under NATO command; as of mid-
2022, U.S. forces in Europe totaled approximately 100,000 personnel.
In Vilnius, the allies are expected to adopt new regional defense plans and force structure requirements
that NATO leaders characterize as the most comprehensive since the end of the Cold War. NATO leaders
stress that implementation will require increased defense investments from NATO members. Some allies,
including Poland and the Baltic states, also have called for permanent stationing of more combat forces
on their territory.
NATO-Ukraine Relations
In Vilnius, NATO leaders are expected to reaffirm support for Ukraine to eventually join the alliance, call
on allies to continue providing Ukraine with robust security assistance, and announce enhanced
partnership programs with Ukraine. Underscoring its role as a defensive alliance, NATO has declared that
it would not deploy forces to Ukraine. NATO has, however, helped coordinate an estimated $26 billion in
security assistance provided to Ukraine by individual allied governments, and has provided about $82
million in nonlethal support to Ukraine, including medical supplies and fuel.
Since 2008, NATO has reiterated a broad pledge that Ukraine will one day become a member, but has not
outlined a timetable or specific benchmarks for a formal invitation. The Biden Administration and some
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other allied governments have said that Ukraine will not join the alliance while the war is ongoing. Other
allies, including Poland and the Baltic states, have called for a more defined pathway to membership and
have cautioned that postponing membership decisions could incentivize Russia to prolong the war.
Given a lack of progress in advancing Ukraine’s membership prospects, some allies argue that NATO
members should offer Ukraine explicit, long-term security guarantees. Most proposals under
consideration envision a coalition of individual members—primarily NATO’s most capable militaries,
including the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany—adopting binding commitments to
provide Ukraine with long-term security assistance.
Defense Spending
Russia’s war in Ukraine has added urgency to NATO efforts to increase allied defense spending and
investment. At the Vilnius Summit, allies are expected to adopt new defense spending targets, building on
NATO’s current guideline for member states to aim to spend at least 2% of GDP on annual defense
spending by 2024 (as agreed in 2014). NATO leaders expect 2% of GDP to be viewed as a minimal
spending requirement, rather than a ceiling, though allies continue to disagree on whether to specify a
higher level of GDP. NATO reports that defense spending within the alliance has increased for eight
consecutive years, and seven allies met the 2% of GDP benchmark in 2022. A total of 17 allies reportedly
have plans in place to meet or exceed the 2% target by 2024.
Addressing Security Threats from China
NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept is the first NATO strategic blueprint in which the allies identify security
challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). A key NATO response has been to enhance
cooperation with governments in the Indo-Pacific region, including Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and
South Korea, each of which are scheduled to attend the Vilnius Summit. At the same time, some European
governments remain reluctant to antagonize a major economic partner and concerned about the broader
implications of a more confrontational relationship with Beijing.
Finland and Sweden
The Vilnius Summit will be the first NATO summit attended by NATO’s newest member, Finland, which
formally joined the alliance on April 4, 2023. U.S. and NATO officials had been working toward
welcoming Sweden as NATO’s 32nd member at the summit, but accession remains delayed due to
concerns raised by Turkey and Hungary (see CRS Insight IN11949, NATO: Finland Joins as Sweden’s
Accession Faces Delay).
Considerations for Congress
In Vilnius, allied leaders plan to address a number of policy issues that have been of sustained interest to
Congress, including the following:
• NATO and U.S. Force Posture in Europe. NATO has reoriented its collective defense
posture in Europe to respond to the threat from Russia. Key questions remain, however,
about the longer-term sustainability of these efforts, whether the alliance’s current force
posture would be adequate to deter or defend against a possible Russian military attack,
and the U.S. role in such a response.
• NATO Support for Ukraine. While some in Congress have voiced support for Ukraine’s
NATO membership aspirations and a majority have voted in favor of U.S. bilateral
assistance to Ukraine, others have expressed opposition. The outcome of NATO
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deliberations over Ukraine’s membership prospects and possible security guarantees for
Ukraine could be a factor in congressional consideration of potential longer-term support
for Ukraine.
• Allied Defense Spending. Throughout NATO’s history, Congress has consistently urged
European allies and Canada to increase defense spending. Some Members have suggested
that allied defense spending levels could influence congressional deliberations over
potential future U.S. security commitments in Europe.
• Possible Accession of Sweden. Congressional majorities have voiced support for
pending NATO enlargement to Sweden. In 2022, the Senate passed a resolution of
ratification approving Sweden’s (and Finland’s) accession by a vote of 95-1; the House
passed legislation in support of accession by a vote of 394-18 (H.Res. 1130).
Figure 1.NATO Members and Aspirants
Source: CRS Graphics. Map updated April 2023.
Author Information
Paul Belkin
Analyst in European Affairs
Congressional Research Service
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