Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy
June 21, 2023
In 2021, U.S. and international forces withdrew from Afghanistan after nearly two decades of
operations, and the Taliban, a Sunni Islamist extremist group that formerly ruled the country
Clayton Thomas
from 1996 to 2001, retook power. The United States does not recognize the Taliban or any other
Specialist in Middle
entity as the government of Afghanistan and reports there are no U.S. diplomatic or military
Eastern Affairs
personnel in the country. The Taliban’s rule appears to have had negative effects for many

Afghans, as well as a number of U.S. policy interests.

The Taliban government is dominated by officials from the Taliban’s prior rule or longtime
loyalists. Signs of dissension in the group’s ranks along various lines have emerged, though the Taliban have a history of
effectively managing internal disputes. Some Afghans have sought to advocate for their rights and express opposition to the
Taliban in nonviolent demonstrations, which the Taliban have sometimes violently dispersed, but the Taliban do not appear
to face effective political opposition. Other Afghans have taken up arms against the Taliban, claiming guerilla-style attacks
against Taliban forces and calling for international assistance. The regional Islamic State affiliate has conducted attacks
against Taliban forces, Afghan civilians, and international targets alike.
Some Members of Congress have focused on a number of impacts of the Taliban’s renewed rule on U.S. interests:
• Counterterrorism. The Taliban takeover has had different impacts on the Islamic State and Al Qaeda,
historic Taliban adversaries and partners, respectively. With no U.S. military forces based in Afghanistan
or neighboring states, the United States is pursuing an “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism approach.
• Women and Girls. Taliban actions have been detrimental for the status of women and girls in Afghanistan,
a longtime U.S. policy concern, with girls prohibited from attending school above the primary level and
women’s roles drastically curtailed, including an April 2023 decision to ban women from working for the
United Nations in Afghanistan.
• Relocating U.S. Partners. Some Members of Congress have closely followed ongoing U.S. efforts to
relocate remaining U.S. citizens, as well as the tens of thousands of Afghans who worked for U.S. efforts
and seek to leave the country.
Some Members have also expressed concern about dire humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan. Since the Taliban takeover,
Afghanistan has faced intersecting and overwhelming humanitarian and economic crises, a result of challenges both
preexisting (such as natural disasters and Afghanistan’s weak economic base) and new (such as the cut-off of international
development assistance, U.S. sanctions on the Taliban, and the U.S. hold on Afghan central bank assets). In response, the
United States has provided over $2 billion in humanitarian and development assistance since August 2021 and the Biden
Administration has issued general licenses authorizing various humanitarian and commercial transactions. The
Administration also established a Switzerland-based “Afghan Fund” to hold and potentially disburse some of Afghanistan’s
central bank assets to support the Afghan economy; the Fund has not, as of June 2023, made any disbursements.
Congressional oversight of U.S. Afghanistan policy has featured numerous hearings, past and ongoing investigations, and the
creation of the Afghanistan War Commission. Congress has also imposed a variety of reporting requirements to monitor
dynamics in Afghanistan and their implications for U.S. policy. Going forward, Congress may consider further reporting
requirements, resources, or investigative efforts related to various U.S. interests as it evaluates the Biden Administration’s
budget request and defense authorization measures and examines lessons learned in Afghanistan. Future reports from the
congressionally created Afghanistan War Commission and other bodies may offer lessons for legislators.
Congressional action could be influenced or constrained by a lack of reliable information about events in Afghanistan and the
historical legacy of U.S. conflict with the Taliban. Perhaps more challengingly, the Biden Administration and many in
Congress seek to ameliorate humanitarian and economic conditions in Afghanistan, but without taking any action that boosts
the Taliban’s position or that may be perceived as doing so. Pursuing these policies in tandem may prove complicated given
the Taliban’s evident aversion to make compromises in response to international pressure and its apparent willingness to
accept considerable humanitarian and economic suffering in Afghanistan as the price of that uncompromising stance.
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Introduction
This report provides background information and analysis on developments in Afghanistan and
implications for U.S. policy, including
• the Taliban’s government and the impact of their rule on terrorist groups, human
rights, and the ability of U.S. Afghan partners to leave the country;
• regional dynamics; and
• the intersecting humanitarian and economic crises facing the country.
The report also provides information on legislation and other congressional action related to
Afghanistan. The challenge at the heart of many U.S. policy debates over which Congress has
influence (including humanitarian assistance, U.S. sanctions, and the status of U.S.-based central
bank assets) is how to prioritize and, if possible, reconcile two U.S. interests: supporting the
Afghan people and refraining from bolstering the Taliban’s rule.
Background: Taliban Takeover
The chapter of Afghan history that ended in 2021 arguably began in 2001, when the United
States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military campaign against
Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban government that harbored it. In the subsequent 20 years, the
United States suffered thousands of military casualties in Afghanistan, mostly at the hands of the
rising Taliban insurgency, and Congress appropriated over $146 billion for reconstruction and
security forces there. During this same period, an elected Afghan government replaced the
Taliban and, with significant U.S. and international support, made modest but uneven
improvements in most measures of human development, though Afghanistan remained one of the
world’s poorest and most corrupt countries.
At the outset of 2021, the Afghan government was a partner in U.S. counterterrorism efforts, the
result of nearly 20 years of substantial U.S. and international support, including the deployment
of hundreds of thousands of troops and the provision of tens of billions of dollars in assistance.
President Donald Trump had withdrawn all but 2,500 U.S. troops, the lowest U.S. force level
since 2001, in advance of the full military withdrawal to which the United States agreed in the
February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement.1 U.S. officials committed to continue to provide financial
support to Afghan forces and expressed confidence about their capabilities vis-a-vis the Taliban,
while conceding that those forces remained reliant on U.S. support.2
At the same time, the Taliban were arguably at their strongest since 2001, when they were driven
from power by U.S., international, and U.S.-backed Afghan forces, having steadily gained
territory and improved their tactical capabilities over the course of their resilient two-decade

1 After more than a year of negotiations, U.S. and Taliban representatives signed a bilateral agreement on February 29,
2020, agreeing to two “interconnected” “guarantees”: the withdrawal of all U.S. and international forces by May 2021,
and unspecified Taliban action to prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the
United States and its allies. The text of the agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/
02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf. Nonpublic annexes accompanied the agreement.
2 See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, A Pathway for
Peace in Afghanistan: Examining the Findings and Recommendations of the Afghanistan Study Group, hearing, 117th
Cong., 1st sess., February 19, 2021, at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-117hhrg43713/pdf/CHRG-
117hhrg43713.pdf.
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insurgency. The Afghan government against which the Taliban fought was weakened by deep
internal divisions, factional infighting, and endemic corruption.
Several weeks after President Joseph Biden confirmed that international forces would depart
Afghanistan by the fall of 2021, Taliban forces began a sweeping advance that captured wide
swaths of the country. While the Taliban faced stiff, if ultimately unsuccessful, resistance from
government forces in some areas, others were taken with minimal fighting.3 The Taliban captured
their first provincial capital on August 6, after which the collapse of the Afghan government and
its security forces accelerated. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, whose seven-year tenure was
characterized by electoral crises, pervasive corruption, and the gradual deterioration of Afghan
military forces, fled the country on August 15. Taliban fighters began entering Kabul that same
day, taking effective control of the country.
Taliban Government
On September 7, 2021, the Taliban announced a “caretaker government” to rule Afghanistan. The
Taliban refer to their government, as they have for decades referred to themselves, as the Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan. The Taliban, who did not enact a formal constitution during their 1996-
2001 rule, have said they intend to govern according to Islamic law (sharia) but, according to one
group of experts, “remain remarkably ambiguous when it comes to the type of Islamic state they
want to form in Afghanistan.”4
Haibatullah Akhundzada, Taliban leader since the 2016 killing of his predecessor in a U.S. drone
strike, holds supreme power as the group’s emir. He has made few reported public appearances
and only one photograph of him is known to be publicly available.5 Despite Taliban promises to
form an inclusive government,6 nearly all members of the government are former officials from
the Taliban’s prior rule or longtime loyalists. All are male, the vast majority are ethnic Pashtuns
(Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, which represents a plurality of the population), and most are
from southern Afghanistan. Over half were, and remain, designated for terrorism-related U.S.
and/or U.N. sanctions, including the Acting Interior Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani. The U.S.
Department of State has for years offered a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to
the arrest of Haqqani, who is the head of the Haqqani Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO) that conducted numerous attacks against U.S. and other
international targets in Afghanistan.
Some reports since the Taliban takeover have indicated dissension in the group’s ranks along
various lines. While the Taliban have a history of effectively managing internal disputes,
governing Afghanistan presents new and unique challenges to the group’s consensus-based
decision-making.7 Points of tension reportedly have existed between members of the group’s

3 Susannah George, “Afghanistan’s military collapse: Illicit deals and mass desertions,” Washington Post, August 15,
2021; David Zucchino, “Collapse and Conquest: The Taliban Strategy That Seized Afghanistan,” New York Times,
August 18, 2021.
4 M. Bashir Mobasher et al., The Constitution and Laws of the Taliban, 1994-2001: Hints from the Past and Options
for the Future, Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, December 14, 2022.
5 “Taliban supreme leader addresses major gathering in Kabul,” Al Jazeera, July 1, 2022. In May 2023, Akhundzada
reportedly met with Qatar’s prime minister in Kandahar, the first known meeting between Akhundzada and a foreign
leader. Jonathan Landay, “Exclusive: Qatar prime minister, Taliban chief hold secret Afghan talks,” Reuters, May 31,
2023.
6 “Transcript of Taliban’s first news conference in Kabul,” Al Jazeera, August, 17, 2021, at
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/17/transcript-of-talibans-first-press-conference-in-kabul.
7 Andrew Watkins, “The Taliban one year on,” CTC Sentinel, August 2022.
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political wing and its military leaders (such as the Haqqanis) over who deserves the most credit
for the group’s victory;8 between a leadership that seeks stability and rank and file fighters who
are struggling to adjust to post-conflict life;9 and between those with different ideological
perspectives (including on education for girls; see below).10 In a February 2023 speech, Haqqani
criticized “power monopolization” within the Taliban, prompting other Taliban figures to state
that criticisms should be voiced privately.11 Some of these divisions are mirrored by an
increasingly significant geographic divide between the Taliban’s political leadership in Kabul and
the clerical establishment in Kandahar (where the emir is based and to which the Taliban have
reportedly relocated some senior officials).12
The Taliban and Drug Production
The Taliban have at times accommodated, actively facilitated, or efficiently repressed drug production and
trafficking in territory under their control, sometimes pursuing contradictory policies simultaneously in different
geographic areas or with respect to various aspects of the drug trade. In 2000, when they were previously in
power, the Taliban banned opium poppy cultivation, nearly eliminating cultivation in Taliban-control ed areas at a
time when Afghanistan was the world’s largest producer of opium.13 That ban came to an end with the Taliban’s
fall in 2001, and opium production reportedly rebounded immediately. The Taliban’s insurgency became entwined
with the booming opium economy, with the financial and political benefits of that trade evidently trumping the
group’s ideological opposition to opium production. In April 2022, after the Taliban had returned to power,
Akhundzada issued a decree again banning opium poppy cultivation. In June 2023, David Mansfield, a prominent
researcher, estimated that despite “widespread skepticism” the ban had been effectively implemented, with poppy
cultivation reduced by a “truly unprecedented” amount.14 A subsequent tweet from the U.S. Special
Representative for Afghanistan stated, “Reports that the Taliban have implemented policies to significantly
decrease opium poppy production this year are credible and important.”15 The economic impact is likely to be
uneven but considerable, with the potential for increased emigration for those least able to cope with the ban and
its effects.16
Current and Potential Opposition
While the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover was swift, its triumph, according to many analysts, did
not reflect massive popular support for the movement so much as a lack of support for the former
government.17 Many elements of Afghan society, particularly in urban areas, appear to view the
Taliban with skepticism, fear, or hostility, and small numbers of Afghans have demonstrated

8 “Cracks emerge within Taliban as Baradar-led group raises concern over Sirajuddin’s pro-Pashtun stance,” ANI,
February 15, 2022.
9 Sabawoon Samim, “New lives in the city: How Taleban have experienced life in Kabul,” Afghanistan Analysts
Network, February 2, 2023.
10 Andrew Watkins, “One year later: Taliban reprise repressive rule, but struggle to build a state,” United States
Institute of Peace, August 17, 2022.
11 Ayaz Gul, “Top Taliban official’s public criticism reignite internal rift speculation,” Voice of America, February 13,
2023.
12 Pamela Constable, “Taliban moving senior officials to Kandahar. Will it mean a harder line?” Washington Post, June
4, 2023.
13 Martin Jelsma, “Learning lessons from the Taliban opium ban,” International Journal of Drug Policy, March 1,
2005.
14 David Mansfield, “Truly unprecedented: the Taliban drugs ban v2.0,” Alcis, June 6, 2023.
15 U.S. Special Representative Thomas West (@US4AfghanPeace), Twitter post, June 7, 2023, 11:57 AM, at
https://twitter.com/US4AfghanPeace/status/1666474423040262145.
16 Mansfield, op. cit.; William Byrd, “The Taliban’s successful opium ban is bad for Afghans and the world,” United
States Institute of Peace, June 8, 2023.
17 “How the Taliban engineered ‘political collapse’ of Afghanistan,” Reuters, August 17, 2021; Shadi Hamid,
“Americans never understood Afghanistan like the Taliban did,” Brookings Institution, August 23, 2021.
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nonviolently to advocate for their rights and express opposition to the Taliban.18 The Taliban have
often violently dispersed these protests, and have sought to stifle dissenting voices, including with
the March 2023 arrest of prominent education activist Matiullah Wesa.19 In December 2022, the
U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan said, “There is no significant
visible political opposition to the Taliban inside Afghanistan,” and exiled officials associated with
the former government “are fragmented and their statements have decreasing resonance for the
population inside Afghanistan.”20
The Taliban face armed opposition from two very different quarters. The first is the National
Resistance Front (NRF), made up of figures aligned with the former Afghan state. NRF leaders
have appealed for U.S. and international support and have retained Washington, DC-based
representation.21 They have not won explicit public backing from any foreign countries, perhaps
due to the Taliban’s relatively stronger military position and closer Taliban ties with regional
powers, including some that formerly supported Taliban opponents in the 1990s, such as Russia
and Iran. The NRF has claimed numerous attacks against Taliban fighters, mostly in and around
the central province of Panjshir, but it is difficult to assess the veracity of such claims, which the
Taliban dismiss as “propaganda.”22 Still, the NRF does not appear to have either the military
capabilities or the broad-based public support that would likely be necessary to seriously threaten
the Taliban’s position.23
An arguably more potent armed threat to the Taliban is the local Islamic State affiliate (Islamic
State-Khorasan Province, ISKP, also known as ISIS-K), a longtime Taliban adversary. ISKP has
opposed the Taliban since its 2015 establishment, viewing the Taliban’s Afghanistan-focused
nationalist political project as counter to the Islamic State’s universalist vision of a global
caliphate. ISKP has launched multiple attacks against Taliban targets, killing several senior
officials (including provincial governors in March 2023 and June 2023). In addition, ISKP has
claimed attacks against Afghan civilians (mostly targeting Afghanistan’s Shia minority, the
Hazaras) and a number of externally-oriented operations, including cross border rocket attacks
against Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, attacks against the Russian and Pakistani embassies in Kabul,
and an assault on a Kabul hotel frequented by Chinese nationals.24 U.N. sanctions monitors assess

18 Barnett Rubin, “Afghanistan under the Taliban: findings on the current situation,” Stimson Center, October 20, 2022.
19 “Taliban disperses Afghan women’s march for ‘work and freedom,’” Al Jazeera, August 13, 2022; Ali Latifi, “Arrest
of leading education activist leaves Afghans confused and worried,” New Humanitarian, April 12, 2023.
20 UNAMA, “Briefing to the United Nations Security Council by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for
Afghanistan Roza Otunbayeva,” December 20, 2022.
21 Ali Maisam Nazary, “What the Taliban really fear,” Foreign Affairs, August 19, 2022.
22 Zia Ur Rehman, “Afghanistan’s resistance alliance aims to pry Taliban’s grip loose,” Nikkei Asia, June 13, 2022.
23 Rubin, op. cit.; Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan in 2023; Taliban internal power struggles and militancy,”
Brookings Institution, February 3, 2023; Jacob Zenn, “National Resistance Front (NRF) fails to foment unrest against
the Taliban,” Jamestown Foundation, March 31, 2023.
24 Hazaras comprise 10%-15% of Afghanistan’s population. Since their August 2021 takeover, the Taliban have
demonstrated a more accepting official stance toward the Hazaras than was the case during their former rule,
particularly in urban areas, despite some reports of killings and forced displacement in the Hazaras’ historic homelands
in central Afghanistan in fall 2021. While the Taliban government has not persecuted Hazaras, many Hazaras fault the
Taliban for not establishing an inclusive government and not stopping the ISKP attacks that have repeatedly targeted
Hazaras. Nilly Kohzad, “‘It doesn’t matter if we get killed,’ Afghanistan’s Hazaras speak out,” Diplomat, May 27,
2022.Sudha Ramachandran, “ISKP attacks in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, August 31,
2022.
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the group’s attacks are intended “to portray the Taliban as incapable of providing security” and
“to undermine the relationship between the Taliban and neighboring countries.”25
Regional Dynamics: Pakistan and Other Neighbors
Regional dynamics directly affect developments in Afghanistan, which is landlocked and has
throughout its history been the object of intervention by its neighbors and other foreign powers.
Events in Afghanistan also have consequences for those neighbors.
Pakistan.26 The neighboring state widely considered most important in this regard is Pakistan,
which has played an active, and by many accounts destabilizing, role in Afghan affairs for
decades, including by actively supporting the Taliban during its 1990s rule and much of its
subsequent insurgency. Many analysts regarded the Taliban takeover at least initially as a triumph
for Pakistan’s regional policy, pointing to statements of evident support for the takeover from
Pakistani leaders.27 Senior Pakistani officials have held numerous meetings with the new Taliban
government, both in Kabul and Islamabad, since August 2021.
However, there are some indications that the Taliban’s return to power may pose challenges for
Pakistan. The Taliban’s victory has arguably given a morale and perhaps material boost to
Pakistan-based Islamist terrorist groups, including the so-called Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-i
Taliban-i Pakistan, or TTP, a U.S.-designated FTO).28 TTP attacks against Pakistani security
forces increased after August 2021, reportedly prompting the Pakistani government to seek the
Afghan Taliban’s mediation of several ceasefires.29 The TTP has resumed attacks against
Pakistani targets, including a January 2023 attack (claimed by a TTP faction) that targeted police
officers and killed over 100. Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are further complicated by the
presence of over 1 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, as well as a long-running and ethnically
tinged dispute over their shared 1,600-mile border, at which Taliban and Pakistani government
forces intermittently clashed in 2022.30
Iran. Iran, with which Afghanistan shares its western border, opposed the Taliban’s 1990s rule
but has maintained relations with the group while emphasizing the need for representation for
Afghanistan’s ethnic and religious groups with which Iran has close ties (namely Tajiks, who
speak a variant of Persian, and Hazaras, who are mostly Shia Muslims). Disputes over water
rights and refugees persist, along with sporadic border clashes.31
Central Asia. Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan)
have responded in varying ways to the Taliban’s takeover. The Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
governments appear to be prioritizing stability and economic ties, including the planned

25 U.N. Security Council, Thirty-first report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals and entities,
S/2023/95, December 30, 2022.
26 For more, see CRS Report R47565, Pakistan and U.S.-Pakistan Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
27 Ishaan Tharoor, “Pakistan’s hand in the Taliban’s victory,” Washington Post, August 18, 2021; Husain Haqqani,
“Pakistan’s Pyrrhic Victory in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, July 22, 2021.
28 Abdul Sayed and Tore Hamming, “The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan after the Taliban’s Afghanistan takeover,” CTC
Sentinel, vol. 16, no. 5 (May 2023).
29 “Islamist militants present fresh challenge to Pakistan,” Reuters, January 31, 2023.
30 Rubin, op. cit. Pakistan, the United Nations, and others recognize the 1893 Durand Line as an international boundary,
but successive Afghan governments, including the Taliban, have not. See Vinay Kaura, “The Durand Line: A British
Legacy Plaguing Afghan-Pakistani Relations,” Middle East Institute, June 27, 2017.
31 Christian Hoj Hansen and Halimullah Kousary, “Can Iran get along with the Taliban?” War on the Rocks, June 7,
2022; “What caused deadly Afghan-Iran border clashes? What happens next?” Al Jazeera, May 30, 2023.
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Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline, and have had official
engagements with the Taliban. Tajikistan, on the other hand, has opposed the Taliban and offered
shelter to the anti-Taliban National Resistance Front, a consequence both of Tajikistan’s own
struggles with Islamist militancy as well as ties with Afghan Tajiks (the country’s second largest
ethnic group), some of whom oppose the Taliban’s rule.32
China. The prospect of greater Chinese influence and activity in Afghanistan has attracted some
congressional attention since the Taliban takeover. China, which played a relatively limited role in
Afghanistan under the former government, made some economic investments in Afghanistan
(particularly in the development of Afghan minerals and other resources) prior to the Taliban
takeover, but major projects have not come to fruition due to instability, lack of infrastructure, and
other limitations.33 Despite concerns about Afghanistan-based Islamist terrorist groups, China has
signaled tacit acceptance of the Taliban’s rule, with its foreign minister emphasizing in a May
2022 visit to Kabul that China “respects the independent choices made by the Afghan people.”34
In May 2023, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China agreed to extend China’s Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) to Afghanistan via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.35
U.S. Policy Impacts of the Taliban’s Return to Power
Renewed Taliban rule in Afghanistan has implications for a number of U.S. policy interests. It has
created opportunities and challenges for the various terrorist groups that have a presence in
Afghanistan, and has forced the United States to pursue an “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism
approach that lacks a local partner. Advancing protection of women’s and other human rights has
been another major U.S. policy goal in Afghanistan since 2001; the Taliban have taken numerous
actions to roll back those rights since retaking power. U.S. policymakers, including many
Members of Congress, have also focused on securing the relocation of remaining U.S. citizens
and Afghans who previously worked for the U.S. government, a halting effort that remains
ongoing as of June 2023.
Counterterrorism
Islamist extremist terrorist groups have for decades operated in Afghanistan, and the Taliban have
related to them in varying ways. ISKP and Al Qaeda (AQ) are two of the most significant of these
terrorist groups, and the Taliban’s takeover has affected them differently.
Long a significant U.S. counterterrorism concern, ISKP has clashed with the Taliban, as
mentioned above. Under the former U.S.-backed Afghan government, the United States launched
airstrikes in support of Taliban offensives against ISKP, a rare area of prior U.S.-Taliban
cooperation.36 In February 2022, the U.S. State Department announced rewards of up to $10
million each for information related to ISKP leader Sanaullah Ghafari as well as those responsible
for the August 26, 2021, ISKP attack at Kabul airport that killed and injured hundreds of people,
including over 30 U.S. servicemembers.37 In April 2023, the White House announced that the

32 Abubakar Siddique, “Hostilities grow between Taliban and Tajikistan amid border closure, truck seizures,”
Gandhara, May 19, 2022; Rubin, op. cit.
33 Jiayi Zhou et al., “Treading lightly: China’s footprint in a Taliban-led Afghanistan,” SIPRI, November 2022.
34 Shannon Tiezzi, “China signals it’s back to business as usual with Taliban government,” Diplomat, March 25, 2022.
35 Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Afghanistan joins China’s infrastructure plan as Beijing pushes interests,” Axios, May
9, 2023.
36 Wesley Morgan, “Our secret Taliban Air Force,” Washington Post, October 22, 2020.
37 U.S. Department of State, “New Initiatives in the Fight Against ISIS-K,” February 7, 2022.
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Taliban had killed the leader of the ISKP cell responsible for the airport attack.38 U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) commander General Eric Kurilla estimated in March 2023
congressional testimony that ISKP could be capable of conducting “an external operation against
U.S. or Western interests abroad in under six months.”39
While ISKP is seen as more operationally ambitious and capable in Afghanistan than Al Qaeda,
the July 2022 U.S. killing of Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri in Kabul attracted considerable
attention to the issue of AQ-Taliban ties.40 Despite (or perhaps because of) U.S. counterterrorism
pressure, those ties have persisted for decades. The circumstances of Zawahiri’s residence in
Kabul and what they might reveal about internal Taliban dynamics beyond continued AQ ties
remain unclear; neither the Taliban nor Al Qaeda officially acknowledged Zawahiri’s death.41
U.N. sanctions monitors reported in June 2023 that Al Qaeda “maintains a low profile” in
Afghanistan and that the importance of the group’s Afghanistan-based leadership had declined.42
From the outset of the U.S. withdrawal, U.S. officials said that the United States would maintain
the ability to combat terrorist threats in Afghanistan such as ISKP and Al Qaeda without a
military presence on the ground there by utilizing assets based outside of Afghanistan, in what
U.S. officials have described as an “over-the-horizon” approach.43 With the Taliban in control of
Afghanistan, the United States has had to alter any plans that had been predicated on the
continued existence of the former Afghan government and its security forces. In March 2023
testimony, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley said of U.S.
counterterrorism capabilities in Afghanistan:
It’s not what it was. Nothing’s going to replace having troops and Afghan security forces
and the amount of infrastructure we had. That’s not going to get replaced. We do have the
capability to see into Afghanistan with a variety of ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance] assets and to determine any threats to the homeland. If we pick those up,
we have the ability to strike at great distance.
The Biden Administration has cited the Zawahiri strike as a demonstration of U.S. over-the-
horizon capabilities.44 Some Members of Congress have criticized the approach, with one calling
it a “farce.”45

38 Karoun Demirjian and Eric Schmitt, “Taliban kill head of ISIS cell that bombed Kabul airport,” New York Times,
April 25, 2023.
39 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, To Receive Testimony on the Posture of United States Central
Command and United States Africa Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2024
and the Future Years Defense Program, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., transcript at
http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-7691155.
40 CRS Insight IN11976, Al Qaeda Leader Zawahiri Killed in U.S. Drone Strike in Afghanistan, by Clayton Thomas.
41 National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan suggested that some elements of the Taliban might not have supported or
even been aware of Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul, possibly leading to tensions within the Taliban. “The National
Security Advisor’s very busy week,” NPR, August 4, 2022.
42 U.N. Security Council, Fourteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution 2665 (2022) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a
threat to the peace, stability, and security of Afghanistan, S/2023/370, released June 2023.
43 See, for example, White House, Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan, April 14, 2021.
44 White House, National Security Strategy, October 2022.
45 U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in the
Greater Middle East and Africa, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st, sess., March, transcript at
http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-7697085.
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Afghan Women and Girls46
The Afghanistan in which the Taliban came to power in August 2021 was in many ways a
different country than the one they last ruled in 2001. After 2001, women became active
participants in many parts of Afghan society; protections for them were enshrined in the country’s
2004 constitution. Though the Taliban takeover reduced the high levels of violence that
characterized the conflict, a development particularly welcomed by women in rural areas, the
Taliban’s return to power has made Afghanistan “the most repressive country in the world
regarding women’s rights,” according to the head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan (UNAMA).47
Upon taking power, the Taliban closed the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, which had been a part of
the former Afghan government, and reinstated the Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and
Prevention of Vice, which enforced the Taliban’s highly oppressive rule in the 1990s. The
ministry monitors the implementation of Taliban edicts that seek to impose new restrictions on
Afghan women.48 Those edicts include a December 2021 prohibition on women driving long
distances or flying without a male guardian, a May 2022 decree mandating punishments for the
male relatives of women who do not wear a hijab that fully covers their bodies, and a November
2022 decision to ban women from public parks and bath houses.49 According to a report from
U.N. experts,
In their totality, the edicts significantly limit women’s and girls’ ability to engage in
society, have access to basic services, and to earn a living. Women have described the
continual announcement of restrictions as ‘day by day, the walls close in,’ feeling
‘suffocated,’ and the cumulative effect leaving them ‘without hope.’50
Additionally, media sources report that divorce is becoming more difficult to obtain, even in cases
of abuse, and that some Afghan women fear that their divorces from abusive husbands may be
nullified.51
Of particular concern to many U.S. policymakers are Taliban policies toward education for
Afghan girls; per the U.N., “Afghanistan is the only country in the world where women and girls’
access to education is suspended.”52 Taliban spokespersons said in early 2022 that girls’
secondary schools, effectively shuttered in most of the country since the August 2021 takeover,
would reopen with the start of the new school year in late March 2022.53 However, on March 23,
2022, with some girls already present in schools, the Taliban abruptly reversed course and
announced that secondary schools for girls would remain closed, shocking many observers.54 The
United States and many other countries condemned the decision, and in October 2022, the State
Department announced visa restrictions on several Taliban figures responsible for the repression

46 See CRS In Focus IF11646, Afghan Women and Girls: Status and Congressional Action, by Clayton Thomas.
47 Christina Goldbaum, “Loss piles on loss for Afghan women,” New York Times, March 8, 2023; UNAMA, “The UN
in Afghanistan calls for an immediate end to draconian restrictions on the rights of women and girls by the de facto
authorities,” March 8, 2023.
48 Situation of women and girls in Afghanistan: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Afghanistan and the Working Group on discrimination against women and girls, A/HRC/53/21, June 15, 2023.
49 Belquis Ahmadi, “Taliban escalate new abuses against Afghan women, girls,” USIP, October 27, 2022.
50 Situation of women and girls in Afghanistan, op. cit.
51 “Afghan women who were divorced under prior government fear for their status,” Washington Post, March 7, 2023.
52 UN, “Afghan girls and women made focus of International Education Day: UNESCO,” January 19, 2023.
53 Kathy Gannon, “The AP interview: Taliban pledge all girls in schools soon,” Associated Press, January 15, 2022.
54 Kathy Gannon, “Many baffled by Taliban reneging pledge on girls’ education,” Associated Press, March 24, 2022.
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of women and girls in Afghanistan.55 One analysis attributes the change to the advocacy of
hardline clerics within the group and Akhundzada.56 Other Taliban figures, including both
Baradar and the Haqqanis, reportedly support secondary education for girls (and some educate
their own daughters abroad).57 In December 2022, the Taliban also suspended women from
attending university.58 The evidently greater influence of the group’s traditionally conservative
leaders, and the unwillingness or inability of more pragmatic figures to assert themselves,
suggests that external actors may have limited leverage over Taliban decisions.
The impact of Taliban restrictions on girls’ education has been considerable: U.N. experts stated
in June 2023 that “reports of depression and suicide are widespread, especially among adolescent
girls prevented from pursuing education.”59 Some Afghan women have reportedly continued to
provide informal education to girls in private “secret schools,” and secondary schools for girls
have remained open in some areas (largely in the north, where less conservative views on girls’
education prevail).60 Some Afghan women and girls have also attempted to continue their studies
online, though those efforts are impeded by technological and infrastructure challenges.61 Some
girls’ schools have continued to face attacks under Taliban rule, notably a September 2022 suicide
bombing in Kabul and June 2023 reported poisoning in northern Afghanistan.62
Beyond education, the Taliban have also severely restricted women’s access to employment. In
December 2022, the Taliban banned women from working for national and international NGOs,
threatening to suspend the licenses of NGOs that do not comply. U.N. Security Council members
said the decision “would have a significant and immediate impact for humanitarian operations in
country, including those of the UN.”63 Many implementing partners halted their work after the
announcement of these restrictions, but some have since reportedly resumed some operations
after reaching “acceptable workarounds” with local authorities.64 While interruptions to
humanitarian operations have negative implications for many of the 28 million Afghans in need
of assistance, women and girls have been disproportionately affected. Afghan women face more
barriers to health care services, experience higher levels of unemployment, and adopt negative

55 U.S. Department of State, “Announcement of Visa Restriction in Response to the Repression of Women and Girls in
Afghanistan,” October 11, 2022.
56 Ashley Jackson, “The ban on older girls’ education: Taleban conservatives ascendant and a leadership in disarray,”
Afghanistan Analysts Network, March 29, 2022.
57 Stephanie Glinski and Ruchi Kumar, “Taliban u-turn over Afghan girls’ education reveals deep leadership
divisions,” Guardian, March 25, 2022; Sabawoon Samim, “Who gets to go to school? (3): Are Taleban attitudes
starting to change from within?” Afghanistan Analysts Network, February 7, 2022.
58 Diaa Hadid, “‘The Taliban took our last hope’: College education is banned for women in Afghanistan,” NPR,
December 20, 2022.
59 Situation of women and girls in Afghanistan, op. cit.
60 Allie Weintraub et al., “Afghan girls and women defy Taliban by continuing studies in secret schools,” ABC
News,March 8, 2023; “Afghanistan: Six provinces keep schools open for girls despite nationwide ban,” Amu TV,
January 1, 2023.
61; Ruchi Kumar, “The Taliban ended college for women. Here’s how Afghan women are defying the ban,” NPR,
February 24, 2023; Charlotte Greenfield and Muhammad Yunus Yawar, “Afghan girls struggle with poor internet as
they turn to online classes,” Reuters, March 27, 2023.
62 “Afghan women protest school attack as Taliban cracks down,” Al Jazeera, October 3, 2022; Ahmad Mukhtar,
“Afghanistan school girls ‘poisoned’ in 2 separate attacks, officials say, as Taliban vows to find perpetrators,” CBS
News, June 5, 2023.
63 U.N., “Security Council Press Statement on Afghanistan,” SC/15165, December 27, 2022.
64 Ali Latifi, “After the Taliban ban on women NGO work, local and foreign aid groups take different approaches,”
New Humanitarian, March 2, 2023; SIGAR, “Quarterly Report,” April 30, 2023.
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coping mechanisms (such as reducing food consumption and selling belongings for food) at
higher rates than men. Families may also be increasing the early and forced marriage of girls.65
In April 2023, the Taliban further banned women from working for the U.N.; the U.N. then
instructed all Afghan staff to not report to the office while it considered how to respond, an order
that the U.N. reportedly dropped in early May.66 Women are permitted to work in healthcare (for
other women and girls) but face Taliban monitoring and interference.67 Other women have
attempted to circumvent Taliban restrictions on working by operating online.68
Ongoing Relocations of U.S. Citizens and Certain Afghans
The Taliban’s entry into Kabul on August 15, 2021, triggered the mass evacuation of tens of
thousands of U.S. citizens (including all diplomatic personnel), partner country citizens, and
Afghans who worked for international efforts and/or the former Afghan government. U.S.
officials say that U.S. military forces facilitated the evacuation of 124,000 individuals, including
5,300 U.S. citizens, as part of Operation Allies Refuge, “the largest air evacuation in US
history.”69 Since that operation ended on August 30, 2021, the Biden Administration has said that
it has assisted in the departure of 13,000 Afghans from the country, in addition to 950 U.S.
citizens (as of April 2023) and 600 lawful permanent residents (as of August 2022).70
U.S. officials have characterized their efforts to secure the relocation of remaining U.S. citizens
and eligible Afghan partners who seek to leave the country as an “enduring mission.”71 According
to the State Department, the number of U.S. citizens it has identified in Afghanistan has
fluctuated amid continued relocations and because of cases in which additional U.S. citizens
come forward to ask for assistance to leave.72 On March 23, 2023, Secretary of State Antony
Blinken said there were “about 175” U.S. citizens in Afghanistan, of which 44 were “ready to
leave, and we are working to effectuate their departure.”73 Additionally, the State Department
reported that as of March 2023, over 150,000 Afghan SIV applicants whose applications were
undergoing processing remained in Afghanistan.74

65 “Afghanistan Inter-Agency Rapid Gender Analysis, November 2022,” Gender in Humanitarian Action Working
Group in Afghanistan, December 22, 2022.
66 Irwin Loy, “UN drops stay-home orders for Afghan staff over Taliban women ban,” New Humanitarian, May 10,
2023.
67 “Afghan women, banned from working, can’t provide for their children,” Wall Street Journal, March 3, 2023.
68 U.N. OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Afghanistan, A/HRC/52/84, February 9, 2023.
69 Statement of General Mark A. Milley, 20th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in U.S. Congress, Senate
Committee on Armed Services, To Receive Testimony on the Conclusion of Military Operations in Afghanistan and
Plans for Future Counterterrorism Operations, hearing, 117th Cong., 1st sess., at https://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Printed%2028%20Sep%20SASC%20CJCS%20Written%20Statement.pdf.
70 Some of those evacuated U.S. citizens reportedly traveled to Afghanistan after August 2021. U.S. Department of
State, “Department Press Briefing—August 15, 2022,” at https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-
august-15-2022/; White House, “U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” April 6, 2023; Andrew Desiderio et al., “800
Americans evacuated from Afghanistan since Taliban takeover,” Politico, August 14, 2022.
71 U.S. Department of State, Secretary Antony J. Blinken Remarks on Afghanistan, August 30, 2021.
72 U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing—April 12, 2022.”
73 U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, on The State of American Diplomacy in 2023: Growing Conflicts,
Budget Challenges, and Great Power Competition, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., March 23, 2023, at
https://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-7696303.
74 U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, “Relocation and resettlement outcomes of Afghan Special
Immigrant Visa holders,” June 2023.
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Some Afghans who seek to relocate reportedly remain in hiding, fearing Taliban retribution. The
Taliban issued a general amnesty after coming to power, but, according to various accounts, the
Taliban have carried out reprisals against figures aligned with the former government, including
hundreds of killings.75
The Taliban have at times reportedly interfered with relocation flights, including by demanding
seats for Taliban-selected individuals to work abroad and remit money, but in general appear to
have not significantly impeded the departure of Afghans.76 The United States has reportedly paid,
through Qatar, for tickets on some Afghan airlines that fly to Qatar for individuals to leave
Afghanistan.77 Impediments to relocations from Afghanistan include logistical issues at Kabul’s
international airport and issues with Afghans obtaining travel documentation.
Economic Contraction and Humanitarian Crisis
The Taliban’s return to power and resulting economic contraction have exacerbated one of the
worst humanitarian crises in the world in Afghanistan, long one of the world’s poorest and most
aid-dependent countries. A number of U.S. policy actions, including the cut-off of international
development assistance, longstanding U.S. and international sanctions on the Taliban, and the
U.S. hold on Afghanistan’s central bank assets, appear relevant to the economic breakdown that
underlies the humanitarian crisis.
The United States and other international donors provided billions of dollars a year to support the
former Afghan government, financing over half of its $6 billion annual budget and as much as
80% of total public expenditures.78 Much of that development assistance halted with the Taliban’s
August 2021 takeover, leading the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) to contract by over
20% in 2021.79 In 2022, however, the Afghan economy reached “a fragile low-level equilibrium,”
contracting by 3.6%, with “the Taliban’s economic management…more effective than expected,”
per the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan.80 The U.N.
Development Program (UNDP) projects slight GDP growth for 2023 (1.3%) and 2024 (0.4%).81
That growth is likely to be outstripped by population increase (around 2%), leading estimated per
capita GDP to decline from $359 in 2022 to $345 in 2024.
Those estimates assume a stable level of international support, including from the United Nations,
which requested $4.6 billion for Afghanistan for 2023, the largest ever annual appeal for a single
country.82 In May 2023, the appeal was revised to $3.2 billion for 2023 due to “the changing

75 Barbara Marcolini et al., “The Taliban promised them amnesty. Then they executed them,” New York Times, April
12, 2022; Abubakar Siddique, “‘Afghanistan is hell’: Supporters of late Afghan general claim Taliban killings,
persecution,” Gandhara, November 2, 2022.
76 Courtney Kube, Dan De Luce and Josh Lederman, “The Taliban have halted all evacuee flights out of Afghanistan
for the past two weeks,” NBC News, December 23, 2021; Akmal Dawi, “US continues relocating Afghans even under
Taliban rule,” VOA, April 4, 2023.
77 Dan De Luce and Cortney Kube, “Biden admin relies on Taliban-controlled airline to help Afghans flee
Afghanistan,” NBC News, June 8, 2022.
78 SIGAR, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” January 30, 2023, pp. 69-71.
79 U.N. Development Program, Afghanistan: Socio-economic Outlook 2023, April 2023.
80 Ibid.; UNAMA, “Briefing by Special Representative Roza Otunbayeva to the Security Council,” December 20, 2022,
at https://unama.unmissions.org/briefing-special-representative-roza-otunbayeva-security-council.
81 Afghanistan: Socio-economic Outlook 2023.
82 U.N. OCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan: Afghanistan, March 2023; “Taliban restrictions on women’s rights
deepen Afghanistan’s crisis,” International Crisis Group, February 23, 2023.
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operating environment,” including the bans on women working for NGOs and the U.N.83
International support includes cash payments; the U.N. delivered $1.85 billion in cash into
Afghanistan in 2022 for humanitarian operations.84
The economic contraction has exacerbated what was already a severe humanitarian crisis in
Afghanistan prior to August 2021, due primarily to conflict, drought, and the COVID-19
pandemic. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported in February
2023 that humanitarian partners provided 26.1 million Afghans with at least one form of
assistance in 2022, and that “the outlook remains grim” given projected droughts and higher
commodity prices.85 As of May 2023, the World Food Program projected that 15.3 million
Afghans would be food-insecure in mid-2023 and that 28 million people (two-thirds of
Afghanistan’s population) would require some form of assistance this year.86
U.S. Policy
The United States has provided over $2.1 billion in assistance for Afghanistan since the Taliban
takeover, making it the largest international donor.87 The Biden Administration’s FY2024 budget
request proposes $143 million for health, education, and other forms of bilateral assistance in
Afghanistan (on top of any emergency humanitarian assistance). The lack of a U.S. diplomatic
presence in Afghanistan may complicate or constrain the implementation and/or oversight of U.S.
funding. In March 2023, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Mike McCaul directed the
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) to assess, among other issues,
the extent to which U.S. foreign assistance funds have been diverted to the Taliban in the form of
taxes or fees.88
Beyond assistance, the two U.S. policy areas that appear to have the greatest relevance to the
economic and humanitarian situation are sanctions and the ongoing U.S. hold on Afghanistan’s
central bank reserves. U.S. sanctions on the Taliban (in place in various forms since 1999)
remain, but it is unclear to what extent they are affecting humanitarian conditions in
Afghanistan.89 Since the Taliban’s takeover, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has issued
several general licenses stating that U.S. sanctions on the Taliban do not prohibit the provision of
assistance to Afghanistan and authorizing various humanitarian and commercial transactions.90
Still, the continued existence of sanctions might lead financial institutions, private sector firms, or
other actors to “de-risk” Afghanistan by not engaging in the country rather than risk violation of
U.S. sanctions.91
The Biden Administration’s hold on the U.S.-based assets of the Afghan central bank (DAB) has
also drawn scrutiny. Imposed days after the Taliban entered Kabul to prevent the Taliban from

83 U.N. OCHA, “Afghanistan: Humanitarian response plan 2023 response overview (1 January – 30 April 2023),” June
18, 2023.
84 “Afghanistan: Overview,” World Bank, April 4, 2023.
85 U.N. OCHA, “Humanitarian Response Plan 2022,” February 6, 2023.
86 “WFP Afghanistan Situation Report,” World Food Program, May 24, 2023.
87 See SIGAR, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” April 30, 2023.
88 Letter from Rep. Michael T. McCaul, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, to John F. Sopko, Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, March 13, 2023, at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2023/03/HFAC-SIGAR-Afghanistan-Request3.pdf.
89 “Economic causes of Afghanistan’s humanitarian crisis,” Human Rights Watch, August 4, 2022.
90 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Issues Additional General Licenses and Guidance in Support of
Humanitarian Assistance and Other Support to Afghanistan,” press release, December 22, 2021.
91 David Ainsworth, “Sanctions and banks make it a struggle to get money into Afghanistan,” Devex, January 17, 2022.
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accessing the funds, the Taliban and some foreign leaders have urged the United States to release
the hold on those assets, which total around $7 billion.92 On February 11, 2022, the Biden
Administration announced that it would “seek to facilitate access of $3.5 billion [of the assets] ...
for the benefit of the Afghan people,” pending ongoing litigation related to the September 11,
2001, attacks.93 In September 2022, the Administration announced the establishment of an
“Afghan Fund” (based in Switzerland) to “make targeted disbursements of that $3.5 billion to
help provide greater stability to the Afghan economy.”94 The fund’s four member Board of
Trustees met for the first time in November 2022.95 It has not, as of June 2023, made any
disbursements. In early 2023, USAID reported to SIGAR that it had undertaken a third-party
assessment of the DAB and its anti-money laundering/countering terrorist financing controls but
that “the results were not finalized as of mid-April 2023.”96
Congressional Action and Outlook
The Taliban’s takeover attracted intense congressional and public scrutiny. U.S. public attention
appears to have since decreased, but Afghanistan remains the subject of congressional
engagement as some Members seek to account for the evident failure of U.S. efforts and grapple
with the reality of the Taliban’s renewed rule.97
Congressional oversight of Afghanistan has been robust. Congressional committees held at least
ten hearings specifically on Afghanistan in the weeks after the Taliban’s takeover.98 Senate
Foreign Relations minority staff released an assessment of the August 2021 evacuation in
February 2022, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee then-ranking member produced an
interim report on the withdrawal in August 2022.99 In addition, Congress established the
Afghanistan War Commission (AWC, Section 1094 of the FY2022 National Defense
Authorization Act, NDAA, P.L. 117-81) charged with examining the war and developing “a series
of lessons learned and recommendations for the way forward” in a final report to be issued within

92 CRS In Focus IF12052, Afghanistan Central Bank Reserves.
93 Executive Order 14064, “Protecting Certain Property of Da Afghanistan Bank for the Benefit of the People of
Afghanistan,” 87 Federal Register 8391, February 15, 2022, at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-02-
15/pdf/2022-03346.pdf .
94 U.S. Department of State, “The United States and Partners Announce Establishment of Fund for the People of
Afghanistan,” September 14, 2022. See also SIGAR Quarterly Report, October 30, 2022, pp. 112-115.
95 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Readout of Fund for the Afghan People Board Meeting,” November 21, 2022.
96 SIGAR, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” April 30, 2023.
97 Google Trends, “Afghanistan,” “8/31/2021–6/8/2023,” accessed June 8, 2023.
98 Hearings on Afghanistan include those held by House Foreign Affairs Committee (September 13, 2021, with
Secretary Blinken); Senate Foreign Relations Committee (September 14, 2021, with Secretary Blinken); Senate Armed
Services Committee (September 28, 2021, with Secretary Austin, General Milley, and General McKenzie); House
Armed Services Committee (September 29, 2021, with Secretary Austin, General Milley, and General McKenzie);
Senate Armed Services Committee (September 30, 2021, with outside witnesses); House Foreign Affairs Committee
(October 5, 2021, with former U.S. officials); Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee (October 5,
2021, with outside witnesses); House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Development, International
Organizations, and Global Corporate Impact (October 6, 2021, with SIGAR); Senate Armed Service Committee
(October 26, 2021, with DOD witnesses); and Senate Foreign Relations Committee (November 17, 2021, with former
U.S. officials).
99 Left Behind: A Brief Assessment of the Biden Administration’s Strategic Failures during the Afghanistan Evacuation,
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Minority Report, February 2022; House Republican Interim
Report: A “Strategic Failure:” Assessing the Administration’s Afghanistan Withdrawal, Congressman Michael
McCaul, August 14, 2022.
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three years. Per its website as of early June 2023, the Commission “plans to formally convene in
early 2023.”100
In the 118th Congress, two House committees have sought further information from the
Administration related to the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan and related contingency
plans.101 One of them, the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC), said in its February 2023
Authorization and Oversight Plan that it will “comprehensively review policy, decision-making,
planning, and execution related to the August 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan,” as well as
“examine U.S. policy toward Afghanistan.”102 Three House panels (HFAC, the House Committee
on Oversight and Accountability, and the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence) have held Afghanistan-focused hearings in
the 118th Congress.103
In shaping U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, Congress may consider a number of options.
• Congress may examine how U.S. assistance, and conditions thereon, may affect
Taliban actions, including with regard to women’s rights more broadly and the
ability of Afghan girls to attend school in particular, to inform congressional
consideration of the Administration’s budget request and action on FY2024
appropriations;
• Congress may request or mandate additional information from the Administration
about the number and status of U.S. citizens and Afghan partners who remain in
Afghanistan and about the status of U.S. efforts to secure their relocation,
including resources devoted to those efforts, obstacles to further relocations, and
Administration plans to overcome those obstacles;
• Congress may examine the impact of U.S. sanctions on the designated
entities/individuals, the Afghan economy, and Afghan society more broadly,
including by requiring reporting thereon from the Administration and/or the
Government Accountability Office, to assess whether they are achieving their
intended objectives; and
• Congress may examine the impact and efficacy of oversight of previous U.S.
efforts in Afghanistan to shape future U.S. policy efforts, congressional
authorizing and appropriations measures, and oversight mechanisms (including
those intended to oversee U.S. assistance to other foreign partners, such as
Ukraine). Relevant reports from the AWC and the Department of Defense (and
the federally funded research and development center with whom the Department
contracts, as directed by Section 1323 of P.L. 117-81) are due to be submitted
within approximately one and two years, respectively.

100 Afghanistan War Commission site, at https://www.afghanistanwarcommission.org/.
101 February 17, 2023 letters from Chairman James Comer et al. to White House National Security Affairs Director
Sullivan, Secretary of State Blinken, Secretary of Homeland Security Mayorkas, USAID Administrator Power,
Secretary of Defense Austin and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Milley; June 8, 2023 letter from Chairman Michael
McCaul to Secretary of State Blinken.
102 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Authorization and Oversight Plan, 118th Congress, adopted February 8, 2023.
103 U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, During and After the Fall of Kabul: Examining the
Administration’s Emergency Evacuation from Afghanistan, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., March 8, 2023; U.S.
Congress, House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence, on The
Homeland Security Cost of the Biden Administration’s Catastrophic Withdrawal from Afghanistan, hearing, 118th
Cong., 1st sess., April 18, 2023; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Accountability, on The Biden
Administration’s Disastrous Withdrawal from Afghanistan, Part I: Review by the Inspectors General, hearing, 118th
Cong., 1st sess., April 19, 2023.
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Going forward, U.S. policy, including congressional action, could be influenced or constrained by
a number of factors, including
• a dearth of information about dynamics in Afghanistan, given the lack of U.S.
diplomats and other on the ground observers and Taliban-imposed limitations on
journalists; and
• the historical legacy of U.S. conflict with the Taliban, which may make
cooperation with the group, even to advance U.S. policy priorities, politically
difficult.
Perhaps more fundamental is the challenge of how to pursue U.S. policy priorities that may be
difficult to reconcile: stabilizing Afghanistan and providing support to Afghans while avoiding
actions that might benefit the Taliban. While providing humanitarian aid may be sufficient to
stave off mass casualties, it is unlikely to sustainably improve economic conditions. Financial
assistance could improve the Afghan economy, ameliorating the humanitarian situation, but
comes with the risk of diversion of some funds or broader benefits to the Taliban. In considering
Administration budget requests, Members of Congress may weigh these and other options,
including conditions on U.S. assistance.
The Taliban have called for international recognition, assistance, and sanctions relief, but since
returning to power they have not shown a willingness to make compromises on important issues
to obtain them. Nearly every country, U.S. partners and adversaries alike, has urged the Taliban to
form a more inclusive government, and many countries have joined the United States in calling
for the group to lift restrictions on women and girls and break ties with terrorist groups. In
response, the Taliban have stalled, equivocated, and ultimately either ignored or rejected outright
these calls. Foreign policy tools that the United States has traditionally used as leverage may not
be as effective in Afghanistan as in some other contexts.104

Author Information

Clayton Thomas

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

104 See, for example, Marvin Weinbaum, “America can’t change the Taliban,” National Interest, August 15, 2022;
Madiha Afzal, “Afghanistan’s crises require a clear statement of U.S. policy,” Lawfare, March 26, 2023; Belquis
Ahmadi et al., “U.N. conference highlights global unity but limited leverage over the Taliban,” United states Institute
of Peace, May 4, 2023.
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Congressional Research Service
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