Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious
Ship Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress

Updated May 22, 2023
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R43543




Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

Summary
The Navy is currently building two types of amphibious ships: LPD-17 Flight II class amphibious
ships, and LHA-type amphibious assault ships. Both types are built by Huntington Ingalls
Industries/Ingalls Shipbuilding (HII/Ingalls) of Pascagoula, MS. Required numbers and types of
amphibious ships are reportedly ongoing matters of discussion and debate between the Navy, the
Marine Corps, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Projected numbers of
amphibious ships, procurement of LPD-17 Flight II class ships, and proposed retirements of older
amphibious ships have emerged as prominent items in Congress’ review of the Navy’s proposed
FY2024 budget.
The Navy’s 355-ship force-level goal, released in December 2016, calls for achieving and
maintaining a 355-ship fleet with 38 larger amphibious ships, including 13 LPD-17 Flight II class
ships. The Navy and OSD have been working since 2019 to develop a new force-level goal to
replace the 355-ship force-level goal, but have not been able to come to closure on a successor
goal. Required numbers of amphibious ships are reportedly a major issue in the ongoing
discussion. The Marine Corps supports a revised Navy ship force-level goal with 31 larger
amphibious ships, including 10 LHA/LHD-type ships and 21 LPD-17s. Section 1023 of the
FY2023 NDAA amends 10 U.S.C. 8062 to require the Navy to include not less than 31
operational larger amphibious ships, including 10 LHA/LHD-type ships and 21 LPD- or LSD-
type amphibious ships.
The Navy’s FY2024 30-year (FY2024-FY2053) shipbuilding plan shows the projected number of
amphibious ships remaining below 31 ships throughout the 30-year period, with the figure
decreasing to 26 ships in FY2035 and to 19 to 23 ships in FY2053. Marine Corps officials have
stated that a force with fewer than 31 larger amphibious ships would increase operational risks in
meeting demands from U.S. regional combatant commanders for forward-deployed amphibious
ships and for responding to contingencies
The Navy’s FY2023 budget submission proposed truncating the LPD-17 Flight II program to
three ships by making the third LPD-17 Flight II class ship—LPD-32—the final ship in the
program. The Navy’s proposed FY2023 budget submission requested funding for the
procurement of LPD-32 in FY2023, but programmed no additional LPD-17 Flight II class ships
or LPD-type ships of a follow-on design through FY2027. Congress, in acting on the Navy’s
proposed FY2023 budget, funded the procurement of LPD-32 in FY2023 and provided $250.0
million in advance procurement (AP) funding for the procurement in a future fiscal year of LPD-
33, which would be a fourth LPD-17 Flight II class ship.
The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission, like its FY2023 budget submission, proposes truncating
the LPD-17 Flight II program to three ships by making LPD-32 the final ship in the program. The
Navy’s FY2024 budget submission does not request any funding for the procurement of LPD-33
and programs no additional LPD-17 Flight II class ships or LPD-type ships of a follow-on design
through FY2028. The Marine Corps’ FY2024 unfunded priorities list (UPL) includes, as its top
unfunded priority, $1,712.5 million in procurement funding for procuring LPD-33 in FY2024.
The most recently procured LHA-type ship is LHA-9. The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission
estimates its procurement cost at $3,834.3 million (i.e., about $3.8 billion). The ship has received
a total of $2,004.1 million in prior year advance procurement (AP) and procurement funding. The
Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget requests the remaining $1,830.1 million needed to complete the
ship’s procurement cost.
Section 129 of the FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (H.R. 7776/P.L. 117-
263 of December 23, 2022) permits the Navy to enter into a block buy contract for procuring up
to five LPD-17 and LHA-type amphibious ships.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1

U.S. Navy Amphibious Ships .................................................................................................... 1
Roles and Missions ............................................................................................................. 1
Current Types of Amphibious Ships ................................................................................... 2
Amphibious Ship Force-Level Requirement in 10 U.S.C. 8062(b) .................................... 2
Amphibious Ship Force Level at End of FY2022 and Projected Through FY2053 ........... 2
Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goal ................................................................................... 3
FY2023 NDAA Provisions Regarding Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goal ...................... 5
Existing LSD-41/49 Class Ships ......................................................................................... 5
Amphibious Warship Industrial Base .................................................................................. 5

LPD-17 Flight II Program ......................................................................................................... 6
Program Origin and Name .................................................................................................. 6
Design ................................................................................................................................. 7
Procurement Cost ................................................................................................................ 8
Procurement Quantity and FY2024 Funding Request ........................................................ 8

LHA-9 Amphibious Assault Ship .............................................................................................. 8
Overview and FY2024 Funding Request ............................................................................ 8
LHA-9 Procurement Date ................................................................................................... 8

FY2021-FY2023 NDAA Provisions Regarding Block Buys and Ship Procurement
Dates .................................................................................................................................... 10
Block Buy Authority in FY2021 and FY2022 NDAAs .................................................... 10
Block Buy Authority in FY2023 NDAA .......................................................................... 10
Ship Procurement Date Provision in FY2021 NDAA ...................................................... 10

Issues for Congress ......................................................................................................................... 11
Future Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goal ............................................................................. 11
LPD-17 Fight II Procurement and Amphibious Ship Force Level .......................................... 12
FY2024 Procurement Funding for LPD-33 ............................................................................ 22
Use of Block Buy Contract Authority ..................................................................................... 22
FY2024 Advance Procurement Funding for LHA-10 ............................................................. 23
Technical and Cost Risk in LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Programs .......................................... 23

LPD-17 Flight II Program ................................................................................................. 24
LHA Program .................................................................................................................... 24

Legislative Activity for FY2024 .................................................................................................... 26
Summary of Congressional Action on FY2024 Funding Request .......................................... 26

Figures
Figure 1. LSD-41/49 Class Ship ...................................................................................................... 6
Figure 2. LPD-17 Flight II Design .................................................................................................. 7
Figure 3. LHA-8 Amphibious Assault Ship..................................................................................... 9
Figure 4. LHA-7 Amphibious Assault Ship..................................................................................... 9

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Tables
Table 1. Summary of Congressional Action on FY2024 Procurement Funding Request ............. 26

Appendixes
Appendix. Procurement Dates of LPD-31 and LHA-9 ................................................................. 27

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 30
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Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on two types of amphibious
ships being built for the Navy: LPD-17 Flight II class amphibious ships and LHA-type
amphibious assault ships. Both types are built by Huntington Ingalls Industries/Ingalls
Shipbuilding (HII/Ingalls) of Pascagoula, MS.
The Navy’s LPD-17 Flight II and LHA shipbuilding programs pose multiple oversight issues for
Congress. Congress’s decisions on the LPD-17 Flight II and LHA programs could affect Navy
capabilities and funding requirements and the shipbuilding industrial base.
A separate CRS report discusses the Navy’s Medium Landing Ship (LSM) program, previously
known as the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) program.1
Background
U.S. Navy Amphibious Ships
Roles and Missions
Navy amphibious ships are operated by the Navy, with crews consisting of Navy personnel. They
are battle force ships, meaning ships that count toward the quoted size of the Navy and toward the
Navy’s force-level goal. The primary function of Navy amphibious ships is to lift (i.e., transport)
embarked U.S. Marines and their weapons, equipment, and supplies to distant operating areas,
and enable Marines to conduct expeditionary operations ashore in those areas. Although
amphibious ships can be used to support Marine landings against opposing military forces, they
are also used for operations in permissive or benign situations where there are no opposing forces.
Due to their large storage spaces and their ability to use helicopters and landing craft to transfer
people, equipment, and supplies from ship to shore without need for port facilities,2 amphibious
ships are potentially useful for a range of combat and noncombat operations.3
On any given day, some of the Navy’s amphibious ships, like some of the Navy’s other ships, are
forward-deployed to various overseas operating areas in multiship formations called amphibious
groups (ARGs). Amphibious ships are also sometimes forward-deployed on an individual basis,
particularly for conducting peacetime engagement activities with foreign countries or for
responding to smaller-scale or noncombat contingencies.

1 CRS Report R46374, Navy Medium Landing Ship (LSM) (Previously Light Amphibious Warship [LAW]) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
2 Amphibious ships have berthing spaces for Marines; storage space for their wheeled vehicles, their other combat
equipment, and their supplies; flight decks and hangar decks for their helicopters and vertical take-off and landing
(VTOL) fixed-wing aircraft; and in many cases well decks for storing and launching their landing craft. (A well deck is
a large, garage-like space in the stern of the ship. It can be flooded with water so that landing craft can leave or return
to the ship. Access to the well deck is protected by a large stern gate that is somewhat like a garage door.)
3 Amphibious ships and their embarked Marine forces can be used for launching and conducting humanitarian-
assistance and disaster-response (HA/DR) operations; peacetime engagement and partnership-building activities, such
as exercises; other nation-building operations, such as reconstruction operations; operations to train, advise, and assist
foreign military forces; peace-enforcement operations; noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs); maritime-security
operations, such as anti-piracy operations; smaller-scale strike and counterterrorism operations; and larger-scale ground
combat operations. Amphibious ships and their embarked Marine forces can also be used for maintaining forward-
deployed naval presence for purposes of deterrence, reassurance, and maintaining regional stability.
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Current Types of Amphibious Ships
The Navy’s current amphibious ship force consists entirely of larger amphibious ships, including
the so-called “big-deck” amphibious assault ships, designated LHA and LHD, which look like
medium-sized aircraft carriers, and the smaller (but still quite sizeable) amphibious ships,
designated LPD or LSD, which are sometimes called “small-deck” amphibious ships.4 As
mentioned earlier, a separate CRS report discusses the Navy’s Medium Landing Ship (LSM)
program, previously known as the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) program, which is a
program to build a new type of amphibious ship that would be much smaller than the Navy’s
current LHA/LHD- and LPD/LSD-type amphibious ships.5
Amphibious Ship Force-Level Requirement in 10 U.S.C. 8062(b)
10 U.S.C. 8062(b) requires the Navy to include not less than 31 operational amphibious warfare
ships. The 31 amphibious ships are to include not less than 10 LHA/LHD-type “big deck”
amphibious assault ships, with the remaining amphibious ships within the total of not less than 31
amphibious ships being LPD/LSD-type amphibious ships. The requirement for the Navy to
include these numbers and types of amphibious ships was added to 10 U.S.C. 8062 by Section
1023 of the FY2023 (NDAA) (H.R. 7776/P.L. 117-263 of December 23, 2022).
Amphibious Ship Force Level at End of FY2022 and Projected Through FY2053
The Navy’s force of amphibious ships at the end of FY2022 included 31 larger ships, including 9
amphibious assault ships (2 LHAs and 7 LHDs), 12 LPD-17 Flight I class ships, and 10 older
LSD-41/49 class ships. The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission projects that the Navy at the end
of FY2024 will include 29 larger amphibious ships, including 9 LHA/LHD-type ships, 13 LPD
Flight I class ships, and 7 LSD-41/49 class ships.
The Navy’s FY2024 30-year (FY2024-FY2053) shipbuilding plan, released on April 18, 2023,6
includes three 30-year shipbuilding profiles and three resulting 30-year force-level projections.
The three alternatives are called PB2024 (meaning the President’s budget for FY2024),
Alternative 2, and Alternative 3. The document shows the projected number of amphibious ships
remaining below 31 ships throughout the 30-year period, with the figure decreasing to 26 ships in
FY2035 and decreasing further, to 19 ships (PB2024), 20 ships (Alternative 2), or 23 ships
(Alternative 3), in FY2053.

4 U.S. Navy amphibious ships have designations starting with the letter L, as in amphibious landing. LHA can be
translated as landing ship, helicopter-capable, assault; LHD can be translated as landing ship, helicopter-capable, well
deck; LPD can be translated as landing ship, helicopter platform, well deck; and LSD can be translated as landing ship,
well deck. Whether noted in the designation or not, almost all these ships have well decks. The exceptions are LHAs 6
and 7, which do not have well decks and instead have expanded aviation support capabilities. For an explanation of
well decks, see footnote 2. The terms “large-deck” and “small-deck” refer to the size of the ship’s flight deck.
5 CRS Report R46374, Navy Medium Landing Ship (LSM) (Previously Light Amphibious Warship [LAW]) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke
6 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2024
, March 2023, with cover letters dated March 30, 2023, released April 18, 2023, 31 pp.
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Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goal
Force-Level Goal under 355-Ship Plan of 2016
The Navy’s current force-level goal, released in December 2016, calls for achieving and
maintaining a 355-ship fleet that includes 38 larger amphibious ships—12 LHA/LHD-type ships,
13 LPD-17 Flight I class ships, and 13 LPD-17 Flight II class ships (12+13+13).7 This 38-ship
force-level goal predates the LSM program and consequently includes no LSMs.
Successor Force-Level Goal
The Navy and OSD have been working since 2019 to develop a new force-level goal to replace
the Navy’s 355-ship force-level goal, but have not been able to come to closure on a successor
goal. Required numbers of amphibious ships are reportedly a major issue in the ongoing
discussion. The Navy’s FY2023 30-year (FY2023-FY2052) shipbuilding plan, released on April
20, 2022, includes a table summarizing the results of studies that have been conducted on the
successor force-level goal. These studies outline potential future fleets with 6 to 10 LHAs/LHDs
and 30 to 54 other amphibious ships, including but not necessarily limited to LPDs and LSMs.8
Marine Corps officials state that, from their perspective, a minimum of 66 larger and smaller
amphibious ships will be required in coming years, including a minimum of 31 larger amphibious
ships (10 LHAs/LHDs and 21 LPD-17s) plus 35 LSMs (aka “31+35”).9 Marine Corps officials
have stated that a force with fewer than 31 larger amphibious ships would increase operational
risks in meeting demands from U.S. regional combatant commanders for forward-deployed
amphibious ships and for responding to contingencies.10
At an April 26, 2022, hearing on Department of the Navy (DON) investment programs before the
Seapower subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Department of the Navy
testified that
In order to ensure the future naval expeditionary force is maximized for effective combat
power, while reflecting and supporting the force structure changes addressed in USMC’s
Force Design, the Secretary of the Navy directed an amphibious requirement study that
will inform refinement of amphibious ship procurement plans and shipbuilding profiles, as
well as inform the ongoing overall Naval Force Structure Assessment.11

7 For more on the Navy’s 355-ship force-level goal, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding
Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke. For a more detailed review of the 38-ship force
structure requirements, see Appendix A of archived CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship
Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
8 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and
Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
9 See, for example, Todd South, “Back to Ship: Marines Need Ships to Fight. Will They Get Them?” Military Times,
March 24, 2022; Megan Eckstein, “Some Lawmakers Back Marines in Disagreement over Navy Amphib Force,”
Defense News, April 5, 2022; Caitlin M. Kenney, “Marines Push Light Amphib Warship While Navy Secretary Awaits
Study,” Defense One, April 5, 2022; Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy and Marines Divided Over the Amphibious Fleet’s
Future as Delays and Cancellations Mount in FY 2023 Budget Request,” USNI News, April 3, 2022.
10 See, for example, Caitlin M. Kenney, “‘We Didn’t Have the Ships’ to Send ‘Best Option’ to Help Earthquake
Victims, Commandant Says,” Defense One, February 15, 2023; Caitlin M. Kenney, “Marines Issue Warning on
Amphib Fleet, The Assistant Commandant Says 31 Large Amphibious Warfare Ships Are Needed to Avoid Risk,”
Defense One, February 14, 2023.
11 Statement of Frederick J. Stefany, Principal Civilian Deputy, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Development and Acquisition), Performing The Duties Of The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Development and Acquisition), and Vice Admiral Scott Conn, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Warfighting
(continued...)
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In January 2022, Navy officials reportedly anticipated that the above-mentioned study would be
completed by the end of March 2022.12 At the end of March 2022, the study reportedly was
expected to be completed shortly.13 At the beginning of April 2022, the study reportedly was in its
final stages.14 A January 20, 2023, press report states
The long-awaited Navy study to determine the future makeup of the U.S. amphibious
warship fleet has finally made it to Congress, but don’t hold your breath for the results:
they’re classified.
The Navy sent the Amphibious Force Requirements Study to the Congressional defense
committees on Dec. 28, Lt. Gabrielle Dimaapi, a spokeswoman for the Navy secretary,
said in an email statement Friday to Defense One.
The study was “closely coordinated with the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost
Analysis and Program Evaluation and Office of Management and Budget prior to providing
it to Congress,” Dimaapi said. It “assessed the risk associated with the size and composition
of the future amphibious warship fleet. It focused on both traditional and planned
amphibious warships and platforms.”
Though the service “is not planning to release an unclassified summary of the report,” the
results “will be incorporated into an ongoing battle force ship assessment that will be
published later this year,” she said.
But it’s unclear how much of the amphibious ship study results will be revealed in the
battle force ship assessment. Last year’s assessment was also classified, and only the top-
level number of 373 ships was released, U.S. Naval Institute News reported.
Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro has been promising for months that the amphibious ship
study would be ready in a matter of weeks, even testifying to that during a May Senate
Armed Services Committee hearing. When no study materialized, Sens. Tim Kaine, D-Va.,
and Roger Wicker, R-Miss., sent a letter in November to Del Toro asking for the study. In
early December, the secretary told reporters the document was almost ready, but was still
“being briefed to senior leadership.”15
The Navy’s FY2024 30-year shipbuilding plan states
The Department [of the Navy] is conducting an LPD 17 Flt II amphibious ship
cost/capability study... to inform PB2025’s way ahead [the Navy’s proposed FY2025
defense budget, to be submitted to Congress in early 2024] with respect to this platform....
The Navy has started an Amphibious Ship Study to assess cost/capability tradeoffs to LPD
Flt II, with study completion expected in June 2023....

Requirements And Capabilities (OPNAV N9), and Lieutenant General Karsten S. Heckl, Deputy Commandant,
Combat Development and Integration, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, before
the Subcommittee on Seapower of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2023
Budget Request for Seapower, April 26, 2022, PDF page 12 of 37.
12 See Megan Eckstein, “Amphib Ship Requirements Study Could Spell Bad News for Marines, Industry,” Defense
News
, January 18, 2022.
13 Megan Eckstgein, “US Navy Seeks to End San Antonio-Class Ship Production, Reducing Fleet by 8 Amphibious
Hulls,” Defense News, March 28, 2022.
14 Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy and Marines Divided Over the Amphibious Fleet’s Future as Delays and Cancellations
Mount in FY 2023 Budget Request,” USNI News, April 3, 2022; Caitlin M. Kenney, “Marines Push Light Amphib
Warship While Navy Secretary Awaits Study,” Defense One, April 5, 2022.
15 Caitlin M. Kenney, “Navy Won’t Publicly Release Results of Amphibious Ship Study, The Study, Which Had Been
Delayed for Months, Has Been Sent to Lawmakers,” Defense One, January 20, 2023.
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[Projected] Amphibious ship inventories reflect a pause in the current LPD [procurement]
line. The analytic results of the medium deck amphibious ship study and the BFSAR will
be reflected in future shipbuilding plans.16
FY2023 NDAA Provisions Regarding Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goal
The FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (H.R. 7776/P.L. 117-263 of December
23, 2022) included the following provisions relating to the amphibious ship force-level goal:
• Section 1022 amended 10 U.S.C. 8026 to require the Secretary of the Navy to
ensure that the views of the Commandant of the Marine Corps are given
appropriate consideration before a major decision is made by an element of the
Department of the Navy outside the Marine Corps on a matter that directly
concerns amphibious force structure and capability.
• Section 1023, as noted earlier, amended 10 U.S.C. 8062 to require the Navy to
include not less than 31 operational larger amphibious ships, including 10
LHA/LHD-type ships and 21 LPD or LSD type ships.
• Section 1025 amended 10 U.S.C. 8695 to state that, in preparing a periodic battle
force ship assessment and requirement, the Commandant of the Marine Corps
shall be specifically responsible for developing the requirements relating to
amphibious warfare ships.
Existing LSD-41/49 Class Ships
The Navy procured a total of 12 Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry (LSD-41/49) class ships (Figure
1
)
procured between FY1981 and FY1993. The ships entered service between 1985 and 1998.17
The LSD-41/49 class included 12 ships because the class was built at a time when the Navy was
planning a 36-ship (12+12+12) amphibious force. LD-41/49 class ships have an expected service
life of 40 years. Two of the ships were retired in 2021 and 2022. The Navy’s proposed FY2024
budget proposes retiring three more in FY2024 at ages of 34, 35, and 38 years, which would leave
seven in service at the end of FY2024.
Amphibious Warship Industrial Base
Huntington Ingalls Industries/Ingalls Shipbuilding (HII/Ingalls) of Pascagoula, MS, is the Navy’s
current builder of both LPDs and LHA-type ships, although other U.S. shipyards could also build
amphibious ships.18 The amphibious warship industrial base also includes many supplier firms in
numerous U.S. states that provide materials and components for Navy amphibious ships. HII

16 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2024
, March 2023, with cover letters dated March 30, 2023, released April 18, 2023, pp. 5, 14, 15 (note).
17 The class was initially known as the Whidbey Island (LSD-41) class. The final four ships in the class, beginning with
Harpers Ferry (LSD-49), were built to a modified version of the original LSD-41 design, prompting the name of the
class to be changed to the Harpers Ferry/Whidbey Island (LSD-41/49) class. Some sources refer to these 12 ships as
two separate classes.
18 Amphibious ships could also be built by U.S. shipyards such as HII/Newport News Shipbuilding (HII/NNS) of
Newport News, VA; General Dynamics/National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (GD/NASSCO) of San Diego, CA;
and (for LPDs at least) General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW) of Bath, ME. The Navy over the years has from
time to time conducted competitions among shipyards for contracts to build amphibious ships.
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states that the supplier base for its LHA production line, for example, includes 457 companies in
39 states.19
Figure 1. LSD-41/49 Class Ship

Source: Cropped version of U.S. Navy photo dated July 13, 2013, showing the Pearl Harbor (LSD-52).
LPD-17 Flight II Program
Program Origin and Name
The Navy decided in 2014 that the LSD-41/49 replacement ships would be built to a variant of
the design of the Navy’s San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships. (A total of 13 LPD-17
class ships [LPDs 17 through 29] were procured between FY1996 and FY2017.) Reflecting that
decision, the Navy announced on April 10, 2018, that the replacement ships would be known as
the LPD-17 Flight II class ships.20 By implication, the Navy’s original LPD-17 design became the
LPD-17 Flight I design. The first LPD-17 Flight II class ship is designated LPD-30. Subsequent
LPD-17 Flight II class ships are to be designated LPD-31, LPD-32, and so on.
Whether the LPD-17 Flight II class ships constitute their own shipbuilding program or an
extension of the original LPD-17 shipbuilding program might be a matter of perspective. As a
matter of convenience, this CRS report refers to the Flight II class shipbuilding effort as a
separate program. Years from now, LPD-17 Flight I and Flight II class ships might come to be
known collectively as either the LPD-17 class, the LPD-17/30 class, or the LPD-17 and LPD-30
classes.

19 Source: HII statement as quoted in Frank Wolfe, “Navy Budget Plan Delays Buy of Amphibious Ships,” Defense
Daily
, March 15, 2019.
20 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Designates Upcoming LX(R) Amphibs as San Antonio-Class LPD Flight II,” USNI News,
April 11, 2018. Within a program to build a class of Navy ships, the term flight refers to a group of ships within the
class that are built to a particular version of the class design. The LPD-17 Fight II program was previously known as
the LX(R) program and before that as the LSD(X) program.
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On October 10, 2019, the Navy announced that LPD-30, the first LPD-17 Flight II class ship, will
be named Harrisburg, for the city of Harrisburg, PA.21 As a consequence, LPD-17 Flight II, if
treated as a separate class, would be referred to as Harrisburg (LPD-30) class ships.
Design
Compared to the LPD-17 Flight I design, the LPD-17 Flight II design (Figure 2) is somewhat
less expensive to procure, and in some ways less capable—a reflection of how the Flight II design
was developed to meet Navy and Marine Corps operational requirements while staying within a
unit procurement cost target that had been established for the program.22 In many other respects,
however, the LPD-17 Flight II design is similar in appearance and capabilities to the LPD-17
Flight I design. Of the 13 LPD-17 Flight I class ships, the final two (LPDs 28 and 29) incorporate
some design changes that make them transitional ships between the Flight I design and the Flight
II design.
Figure 2. LPD-17 Flight II Design
Artist’s rendering

Source: Cropped version of Huntington Ingalls Industries rendering accessed March 2, 2021, at
https://newsroom.huntingtoningalls.com/file?fid=5c9a85ca2cfac22774673031.

21 Secretary of the Navy Public Affairs, “SECNAV Names Future Amphibious Transport Dock Ship in Honor of the
city of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,” Navy News Service, October 10, 2019.
22 The Navy’s unit procurement cost targets for the LPD-17 Flight II program were $1,643 million in constant FY2014
dollars for the lead ship, and an average of $1,400 million in constant FY2014 dollars for ships 2 through 11. (Source:
Navy briefing on LX(R) program to CRS and CBO, March 23, 2015.) The cost target for the lead ship was greater than
the cost target for the subsequent ships primarily because the procurement cost of the lead ship incorporates much or all
of the detail design and nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) costs for the program. Incorporating much or all of the
DD/NRE costs of for a shipbuilding program into the procurement cost of the lead ship in the program is a traditional
Navy shipbuilding budgeting practice.
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link to page 13 link to page 13 link to page 31 Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

Procurement Cost
LPD-17 Flight II class ships have a current unit procurement cost of about $1.9 billion.
Procurement Quantity and FY2024 Funding Request
Although the Navy’s 355-ship force-level goal, released in December 2016, calls for achieving
and maintaining a 355-ship fleet with 38 larger amphibious ships, including 13 LPD-17 Flight II
class ships, the Navy’s FY2023 budget submission proposed truncating the LPD-17 Flight II
program to three ships by making the third LPD-17 Flight II class ship—LPD-32—the final ship
in the program. The Navy’s proposed FY2023 budget submission requested funding for the
procurement of LPD-32 in FY2023, but programmed no additional LPD-17 Flight II class ships
or LPD-type ships of a follow-on design through FY2027. Congress, in acting on the Navy’s
proposed FY2023 budget, funded the procurement of LPD-32 in FY2023 and provided $250.0
million in advance procurement (AP) funding for the procurement in a future fiscal year of LPD-
33, which would be a fourth LPD-17 Flight II class ship.
The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission, like its FY2023 budget submission, proposes truncating
the LPD-17 Flight II program to three ships by making LPD-32 the final ship in the program. The
Navy’s FY2024 budget submission does not request any funding for the procurement of LPD-33
and programs no additional LPD-17 Flight II class ships or LPD-type ships of a follow-on design
through FY2028. The Marine Corps’ FY2024 unfunded priorities list (UPL) includes, as its top
unfunded priority, $1,712.5 million in procurement funding for procuring LPD-33 in FY2024.
LHA-9 Amphibious Assault Ship
Overview and FY2024 Funding Request
LHA-type amphibious assault ships (Figure 3 and Figure 4) are procured once every few years.
LHA-8 was procured in FY2017. The most recently procured LHA-type ship is LHA-9. The
Navy’s FY2024 budget submission estimates its procurement cost at $3,834.3 million (i.e., about
$3.8 billion). The ship has received a total of $2,004.1 million in prior year advance procurement
(AP) and procurement funding. The Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget requests the remaining
$1,830.1 million needed to complete the ship’s procurement cost.
LHA-9 Procurement Date
The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission, similar to its FY2023, FY2022, and FY2021 budget
submissions, presents LHA-9 as a ship procured or projected for procurement in FY2023.23
Consistent with congressional action on the Navy’s FY2020 and FY2021 budgets, this CRS
report treats LHA-9 as a ship that Congress procured (i.e., authorized and provided
procurement—not advance procurement—funding for) in FY2021. Navy officials described the
listing of LHA-9 in the Navy’s FY2023 budget submission as a ship being requested for
procurement in FY2023 as an oversight.24 (For additional discussion, see the Appendix.)

23 The Navy’s FY2022 budget submission did not show an LHA as having been procured in FY2020 or FY2021, and
referred to LHA-9 as an “FY23 ship.” (Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Navy,
Justification Book Volume 1 of 1, Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy
, May 2021, p. 271 [PDF page 291 of 390].)
24 Source: Navy briefing on Navy’s proposed FY2023 budget for Congressional Budget Office and CRS, March 30,
2023.
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Figure 3. LHA-8 Amphibious Assault Ship
Artist’s rendering

Source: Rendering accompanying Tyler Rogoway, “The Next America Class Amphibious Assault Ship Wil
Almost Be In a Class of its Own,” The Drive, April 17, 2018. A note on the photo credits the photo to HII.
Figure 4. LHA-7 Amphibious Assault Ship
Shown with 20 F-35B Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs) on Flight Deck

Source: Photograph accompanying Stavros Atlamazoglou, “The US’s Experimental ‘Lightning Carriers’ Are
‘Much More Capable’ than China’s Current Carriers, US Admiral Says,” Business Insider, December 6, 2022. The
article credits the photograph to U.S. Marine Corps/Sgt. Samuel Ruiz.
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FY2021-FY2023 NDAA Provisions Regarding Block Buys and Ship
Procurement Dates

Block Buy Authority in FY2021 and FY2022 NDAAs
Section 124 of the FY2021 NDAA (H.R. 6395/P.L. 116-283 of January 1, 2021), as amended by
Section 121 of the FY2022 NDAA (S. 1605/P.L. 117-821 of December 27, 2021), permitted the
Navy to enter into a block buy contract in FY2021 or FY2022 for the procurement of three LPD-
17 class ships and one LHA-type amphibious assault ship. Such a contract would have been the
first block buy contract to cover the procurement of ships from two separate ship classes. Using
block buy contracting could reduce the unit procurement costs of LPD-17 Flight II and LHA-type
ships and affect Congress’s flexibility for making changes to Navy shipbuilding programs in
response to potential changes in strategic or budgetary circumstances during the period covered
by the block buy contract.25 The Navy did not use this authority.
Block Buy Authority in FY2023 NDAA
Section 129 of the FY2023 NDAA (H.R. 7776/P.L. 117-263 of December 23, 2022) permits the
Navy to enter into a block buy contract for procuring up to five LPD-17 and LHA-type
amphibious ships. Similar to the point made in the previous paragraph, such a contract would be
the first block buy contract to cover the procurement of ships from two separate ship classes.
Using block buy contracting could reduce the unit procurement costs of LPD-17 Flight II and
LHA-type ships and affect Congress’s flexibility for making changes to Navy shipbuilding
programs in response to potential changes in strategic or budgetary circumstances during the
period covered by the block buy contract.
Ship Procurement Date Provision in FY2021 NDAA
The Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) decision to present LPD-31 and LHA-9 in its FY2021
budget submission as ships requested for procurement in FY2021 and FY2023, respectively, even
though Congress procured the two ships in FY2020 and FY2021, respectively, posed an
institutional issue for Congress regarding the preservation and use of Congress’s power of the
purse under Article 1 of the Constitution, and for maintaining Congress as a coequal branch of
government relative to the executive branch. Section 126 of the FY2021 NDAA (H.R. 6395/P.L.
116-283 of January 1, 2021) states
SEC. 126. TREATMENT IN FUTURE BUDGETS OF THE PRESIDENT OF SYSTEMS
ADDED BY CONGRESS.
In the event the procurement quantity for a system authorized by Congress in a National
Defense Authorization Act for a fiscal year, and for which funds for such procurement
quantity are appropriated by Congress in the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy account
for such fiscal year, exceeds the procurement quantity specified in the budget of the
President, as submitted to Congress under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, for
such fiscal year, such excess procurement quantity shall not be specified as a new
procurement quantity in any budget of the President, as so submitted, for any fiscal year
after such fiscal year.

25 For more on block buy contracting, see CRS Report R41909, Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy
Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke. See also Megan
Eckstein, “Ingalls Eyeing LPD Cost Reductions, Capability Increases As Future Fleet Design Evolves,” USNI News,
January 21, 2021.
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Regarding the original Senate version of this provision, the Senate Armed Services Committee’s
report (S.Rept. 116-236 of June 24, 2020) on the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (S.
4049) states
Treatment of weapon systems added by Congress in future President’s budget
requests (sec. 126)

The committee recommends a provision that would preclude the inclusion in future annual
budget requests of a procurement quantity of a system previously authorized and
appropriated by the Congress that was greater than the quantity of such system requested
in the President’s budget request.
The committee is concerned that by presenting CVN–81 as a ship that was procured in
fiscal year 2020 (instead of as a ship that was procured in fiscal year 2019), LPD–31 as a
ship requested for procurement in fiscal year 2021 (instead of as a ship that was procured
in fiscal year 2020), and LHA–9 as a ship projected for procurement in fiscal year 2023
(instead of as a ship that was procured in fiscal year 2020), the Department of Defense, in
its fiscal year 2021 budget submission, is disregarding or mischaracterizing the actions of
Congress regarding the procurement dates of these three ships. (Page 11)
Issues for Congress
Future Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goal
One issue for Congress concerns the future amphibious ship force-level goal, which could affect
future procurement quantities for LPD- and LHA-type amphibious ships. As noted earlier
• The Navy’s FY2023 30-year (FY2023-FY2052) shipbuilding plan, released on
April 20, 2022, includes a table summarizing the results of studies that have been
conducted on the successor force-level goal. These studies outline potential
future fleets with 6 to 10 LHAs/LHDs and 30 to 54 other amphibious ships,
including but not necessarily limited to LPDs and LSMs.
• Marine Corps officials state that, from their perspective, a minimum of 66
amphibious ships will be required in coming years, including a minimum of 31
larger amphibious ships (10 LHAs/LHDs and 21 LPD-17s) plus 35 LSMs (aka
“31+35”).
Required numbers and types of amphibious ships are reportedly ongoing matters of discussion
and debate between the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD).26 Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:

26 Megan Eckstein, “Marines Want 31 Amphibious Ships. The Pentagon Disagrees. Now What?” Defense News, May
2, 2023; Laura Heckmann, “Navy, Marine Corps at Odds Over Fleet Requirements,” National Defense, March 29,
2023; Brent D. Sadler, “This Ugly Dispute Over Amphibious Warships Didn’t Have to Happen,” Defense One, March
23, 2023; Paul McLeary, “Marines Furious over the Navy’s Plan for Troop-Carrying Ships,” Politico Pro, March 17,
2023; Caitlin M. Kenney, “Is the LPD-17 Flight II Amphib Worth It? Depends Who You Ask,” Defense One, March
16, 2023; Rich Abott, “Pause in Procurement of LPDs is Mostly Due To Price, CNO Says,” Defense Daily, March 15,
2023; Megan Eckstein, “Naval Chief Says Rising Cost Spurred Amphib Production Pause,” Defense News, March 15,
2023; Justin Katz, “ Both Citing Cost, Leaders of Navy, Marines Dig In on Amphib Ship Fight,” Breaking Defense,
March 15, 2023; Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy and Marine Corps Debate Amphibious Ship Costs as Clash Over LPD-17
Flight II Line Continues,” USNI News, March 15 (updated March 16), 2023; Nick Wilson, “Berger: LSD
Decommissioning Would Violate Amphib Requirement; Unfunded Priorities Coming Soon,” Inside Defense, March
15, 2023; Nick Wilson, “CNO: LPD Pause Is Cost-Driven, Budget Growth Will Not Last,” Inside Defense, March 15,
(continued...)
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• What are the comparative potential costs and operational risks associated with an
amphibious force that includes
• 6 LHAs/LHDs and 30 LPDs and LSMs?
• 10 LHAs/LHDs and 54 LPDs and LSMs?
• 10 LHAs/LHDs, 21 LPDs, and 35 LSMs?
• To what extent, if any, do the Navy and Marine Corps disagree regarding future
required levels of LHA- and LPD-type amphibious ships?
LPD-17 Fight II Procurement and Amphibious Ship Force Level
A related issue for Congress—one that has emerged as a prominent item in Congress’s review of
the Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget—concerns the Navy’s plans for procuring LPD-17 Flight II
class ships, the Navy’s proposals for retiring older amphibious ships, and projected numbers of
amphibious ships.
As noted earlier, 10 U.S.C. 8062(b) requires the Navy to include not less than 31 operational
amphibious warfare ships. The 31 amphibious ships are to include not less than 10 LHA/LHD-
type “big deck” amphibious assault ships, with the remaining amphibious ships within the total of
not less than 31 amphibious ships being LPD/LSD-type amphibious ships. The requirement for
the Navy to include these numbers and types of amphibious ships was added to 10 U.S.C. 8062
by Section 1023 of the FY2023 (NDAA) (H.R. 7776/P.L. 117-263 of December 23, 2022).
As also noted earlier, the Navy’s FY2024 30-year (FY2024-FY2053) shipbuilding plan shows the
projected number of amphibious ships remaining below 31 ships throughout the 30-year period,
with the figure decreasing to 26 ships in FY2035 and decreasing further, to 19 ships (PB2024
profile), 20 ships (Alternative 2 profile), or 23 ships (Alternative 3 profile), in FY2053.
Under the 38-ship amphibious force-level goal that is included in the Navy’s current 355-ship
force-level objective, the Navy had planned to procure a total of 13 LPD-17 Flight II class ships.
Under the Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget, as under its proposed FY2023 budget, the LPD-17
Flight II ship proposed for procurement (and funded by Congress)—the third LPD-17 Flight II
ship—would be the final one to be procured. The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission, like its
FY2023 budget submission, would thus truncate the LPD-17 Flight II program from a previously
envisaged total of 13 ships to 3 ships. Ending LPD-17 Flight II procurement with the ship
procured in FY2023 would make for a total of 16 LPD-17 Flight I and Flight II ships (13 LPD-17
Flight I ships procured in earlier years, and 3 LPD-17 Flight II ships).
The Navy’s FY2024 30-year shipbuilding plan states

2023; Justin Katz, “‘Unacceptable’: Marines Are Ready to Fight Tonight—About the Amphib Budget,” Breaking
Defense
, March 13, 2023; Caitlin M. Kenney, “Navy On Path To Violate 31-Amphibious-Ship Requirement in 2024,”
Defense One, March 13, 2023; Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy: OSD Directed Amphib Procurement Pause, Joint Staff
Says Current Amphib Force ‘Sufficient,’” USNI News, March 13 (updated March 20), 2023; Megan Eckstein,
“Commandant pushes amphibious warship funding as next budget emerges,” Defense News, March 9, 2023; Mallory
Shelbourne, “FY2024 Budget: Navy Won’t Buy Any More San Antonio Amphibs in the Next Five Years,” USNI
News
, March 9 (updated March 15), 2023; Megan Eckstein, “US Navy Reviews Cost-Saving Design Changes Before
Resuming Amphib Buys,” Defense News, February 28, 2023; Rich Abott, “Rivers: Navy Not Talking About ‘Walking
Away’ From LPD Flight II,” Defense Daily, February 27, 2023; Megan Eckstein, “White House Steps in as Navy,
Pentagon Feud over Amphibious Ship Study,” Defense News, December 8, 2022; Justin Katz, “Del Toro: Navy-Marine
Corps Amphib Study in ‘Final Stages’, Being Briefed to Leadership,” Breaking Defense, December 6, 2022; Lee
Hudson, “Senators Press Del Toro for Update on Amphib Study,” Politico Pro, November 14, 2022; Megan Eckstein,
“US Marines Warn Against Navy’s FY24 Decommission Plans,” Defense News, October 4, 2022.
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The Department [of the Navy] is conducting an LPD 17 Flt II amphibious ship
cost/capability study... to inform PB2025’s way ahead [the Navy’s proposed FY2025
defense budget, to be submitted to Congress in early 2024] with respect to this platform....
The Navy has started an Amphibious Ship Study to assess cost/capability tradeoffs to LPD
Flt II, with study completion expected in June 2023....
[Projected] Amphibious ship inventories reflect a pause in the current LPD [procurement]
line. The analytic results of the medium deck amphibious ship study and the BFSAR will
be reflected in future shipbuilding plans.27
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
• Are the Navy’s plans for procuring amphibious ships and the Navy’s projected
numbers of amphibious ships consistent with the requirement in 10 U.S.C.
8062(b) for the Navy to include not less than 31 amphibious ships? If not, why
not?
• 10 U.S.C. 8062(b) requires the Navy to include not less than 11 operational
aircraft carriers. When the Navy projected that for a period of several years, it
would have 10 rather than 11 operational aircraft carriers, the Navy requested,
and Congress approved, a legislative waiver permitting the Navy to include 10
rather than 11 operational carriers during that period.28 As noted above, the
Navy’s FY2024 30-year (FY2024-FY2053) shipbuilding plan shows the
projected number of amphibious ships remaining below 31 ships throughout the
30-year period. Has the Navy requested a legislative waiver of the requirement
under 10 U.S.C. 8062(b) for the Navy to include not less than 31 operational
amphibious warfare ships? If the Navy has not requested such a waiver, why not?
• What changes to the Navy’s FY2024 budget submission would be needed to
better align Navy plans with the amphibious ship force-level required by 10
U.S.C. 8062? How much additional funding for procuring amphibious ships and
for operating and supporting amphibious ships would be needed to achieve and
maintain a force of not less than 31 amphibious ships, including not less than 10
LHA/LHD-type “big deck” amphibious assault ships, as required by 10 U.S.C.
8062(b)? In a situation of finite defense funding, what impact might providing
this additional funding have on funding available for other Navy or DOD
priorities?
• What are the potential operational consequences of the projected numbers of
amphibious shown in the Navy’s FY2024 30-year shipbuilding plan?
• Is the Navy’s proposal to truncate the LPD-17 Flight II program to three ships,
and not procure any more such ships during the five-year period FY2024-
FY2028, consistent with the requirement under 10 U.S.C. 8062(b)?

27 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2024
, March 2023, with cover letters dated March 30, 2023, released April 18, 2023, pp. 5, 14, 15 (note).
28 As discussed in in the CRS report on the Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier program (CRS Report
RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke), the aircraft carrier force dropped from 11 ships to 10 ships between December 1, 2012, when the aircraft
carrier Enterprise (CVN-65) was inactivated, and July 22, 2017, when the aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78)
was commissioned into service. Anticipating the gap between the inactivation of CVN-65 and the commissioning of
CVN-78, the Navy asked Congress for a temporary waiver of 10 U.S.C. 8062(b) to accommodate the period between
the two events. Section 1023 of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October
28, 2009) authorized the waiver, permitting the Navy to have 10 rather than 11 operational carriers between the
inactivation of CVN-65 and the commissioning of CVN-78.
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• If the Navy has not yet released a definitive new force-level goal to replace the
355-ship goal, how can the Navy know that the requirement for LPD-17s will be
no more than 16 ships?
• What impact would the truncation of LPD-17 Flight II procurement to a total of
three ships have on the shipyard that builds LPD-17 Flight IIs (HII/Ingalls—the
Ingalls shipyard of Pascagoula, MS, which is part of Huntington Ingalls
Industries) in terms of workloads, employment levels, and costs for building
other Navy warships (including DDG-51 destroyers and LHA-type amphibious
assault ships) that are built at that yard? What impact would the truncation of
LPD-17 Flight II procurement have on supplier firms associated with
construction of LPD-17 Flight II ships?
A May 1, 2023, press report stated
In the aftermath of a powerful February earthquake in Turkey, Marine Corps’ leadership
was publicly lamenting its response to aid an ally. The service’s “best option,” a Marine
Expeditionary Unit hauling shelter, medical supplies and other humanitarian assistance
aboard a big deck amphibious ship, was not available.
“When the earthquake happened in Turkey, a NATO ally, the MEU was not on station and
it should have been,” Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl, one of the commandant’s deputies, told
lawmakers in March.
The commandant himself, Gen. David Berger, in a separate interview with Defense One
said as a service chief, he owes the president and the defense secretary “options…all the
time. Here, I felt like the best option, we couldn’t offer them because we have the Marines
and the equipment and they’re trained, [but] we didn’t have the ships.”
Now, in the wake of the dramatic evacuation of American diplomats and citizens from
Sudan, an African nation with two opposing generals threatening war, the Marines again
were unable to provide the combatant commander with its premiere capability for
evacuations, a senior official told Breaking Defense.
It’s a perceived failure about which top Marine officials have been unusually and publicly
blunt. That bluntness, analysts and former military officials say, has been driven by a
cultural ethos that demands they be the nation’s “crisis response force” as well as a genuine
need to shore up the embattled amphibious fleet.
“I feel like I let down the combatant commander cause Gen. [Michael] Langley needs
options,” Berger said during an April 28 congressional hearing of the four-star Marine
Corps general leading US Africa Command. “He didn’t have a sea-based option [from the
Marine Corps]. That’s how we reinforce embassies. That’s how we evacuate them. That’s
how we deter.”29
An April 21, 2023, press report stated
The Pentagon is wrapping up a study on how it can slash costs on a key shipbuilding
program central to an ambitious retooling of the Marine Corps, as the Navy enters a cash
crunch in the coming years.

29 Justin Katz, “Short on Amphibs for Turkey, Sudan, the Marines Grapple with Crisis Response Ethos,” Breaking
Defense
, May 1, 2023. See also James G. Foggo, “Evacuating Sudan: An Amphibious Gap and Missed Opportunity,”
Defense News, May 3, 2023; Nancy A. Youssef, “Grounding of U.S. Marine Unit Spotlights Lack of Ships in Asia-
Pacific,” Wall Street Journal, April 30, 2023.Richard R. Burgess, “Berger: Lack of Amphibs Left AFRICOM with No
Sea-Based Option for Sudan Evacuation,” Seapower, April 28, 2023; Konstantin Toropin, “'I Let Down the Combatant
Commander’: Marine Leader Regrets His Forces Weren't Available for Recent Crises,” Military.com, April 28, 2023.
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The study, launched in January, has caused plenty of angst on Capitol Hill and within the
Marine Corps, both of which charge that the relook is wasting time in growing the fleet
and imperiling shipyards’ ability to plan for the future.
But the Pentagon says the review is focused solely on how to drive down costs on the San
Antonio-class of amphibious ships, whose price tag has emerged as a point of contention
between the Navy and the Corps.30
An April 18, 2023, press report stated
Like its predecessor, the U.S. Navy’s 2024 long-range shipbuilding plan is a tardy,
multiple-choice document that appears to fall short of the legal requirement for amphibious
warships. And some lawmakers are not happy.
“Why are you violating the law? And why does your shipbuilding plan have no remote
interest for the next 30 years, as far as I can tell, of hitting the statutory mandate that we
told you to hit?” [Senator Dan Sullivan] asked Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro at a
Tuesday [April 18] hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
“It is my responsibility to follow the law. It's also my responsibility to ensure that we just
don't waste taxpayer money on vessels, for example, that will never see the light of day,”
Del Toro replied....
Sullivan was complaining about the Navy’s stated plan to allow its amphibious fleet to
drop to 29 ships in 2024, below the 31-ship floor that Congress mandated in the 2023
National Defense Authorization Act.
He was not alone. Several senators remarked on the amphibious-ship plan during the
hearing or in later emailed statements....
[Senator Tim Kaine, who leads the committee’s Seapower subcommittee, said in his
statement:] ““Lastly, on the issue of amphibious ships: the Marine Corps has made it clear
that they need 31, and Congress shares that view. I’m frustrated that neither this plan nor
the President’s budget gets us there.”...
The top request in the Marine Corps’ 2024 unfunded priorities list is to fully fund LPD 33
to try to get the fleet back to the minimum requirement, Marine Corps Commandant Gen.
David Berger told senators at Tuesday’s hearing.
“In the shipbuilding plan and the budget submitted, there is no plan to get to that number.
And that's why I put it as the top of the unfunded list,” Berger said. “I know it to be the
operational requirement and the law. And I saw no plan to get there.”31
A March 30, 2023, press report stated
The U.S. Navy’s plan to decommission three amphibious warships ahead of schedule has
drawn ire from some legislators, who last year put into law a requirement for the service to
maintain a fleet of at least 31 ships for the Marine Corps to use.
The Navy in its fiscal 2024 budget request asked to decommission three Whidbey Island-
class amphibious dock landing ships — the Germantown, Gunston Hall and Tortuga —
which it tried to decommission last year and Congress voted to save.
Vice Adm. Scott Conn, the deputy chief of naval operations for warfighting requirements
and capabilities, explained during a Tuesday [March 28] hearing before the Senate Armed

30 Paul McLeary, “Pentagon Defends Amphib Review amid Angst from Marine Corps, Lawmakers,” Politico Pro,
April 21, 2023.
31 Caitlin M. Kenney, “Navy Shipbuilding Plan Draws Lawmakers’ Ire Anew,” Defense One, April 18, 2023. See also
Doug G. Ware, “‘You’re Ignoring the Law’: Navy Secretary Grilled in Senate over Lack of Amphibious Ships,” Stars
and Stripes
, April 18, 2023.
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Services Committee’s sea power panel that these ships are not viable options for overseas
operations given their poor condition. The vessels have not reached the end of their planned
40-year life span.
Conn said the ships’ original service life was meant to be 35 years, but in the 1990s the
Navy changed that to 40 based on the assumptions the ships would operate in six-month
deployments and be properly maintained along the way.
Throughout the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, “we operated those ships much longer than
six-month deployments,” Conn said. “We know we didn’t put the resources [toward] those
ships to be able to sustain them. So now we’re in a position where we have some hard
choices to make.”
As the Navy watches their performance in ongoing maintenance availabilities, “we don’t
have the confidence, as we’re seeing growth work and new work, that those ships will get
out of the maintenance phase, be able to get through a work-up cycle … which is a year
long, and then go on deployment.”
Why keep them if “we can’t get them away from the pier,” Conn wondered.
It would cost about $3 billion to keep the Whidbey Island amphibious ships and cruisers
the Navy wants to decommission, but Conn argues that money would be better spent on
other ships. Additionally, decommissioning the ships rather than continuing their
unsuccessful maintenance availabilities would free up sailors for other ship assignments at
sea and would free up repair yards to work on ships that are more badly needed by the fleet.
Sen. Dan Sullivan, R-Alaska, who serves in the Marine Corps Reserve, told Conn the
Navy’s plan to decommission these ships brings the fleet lower than the now-statutory
requirement for 31 ships.
“This is not a suggestion, it’s a law,” he said. “You have a law, we passed it … and the
Navy comes out and says: ‘Eh, we’ll just blow off those silly U.S. senators.’ ”
Conn told him that “having 31 ships, of which three of them may be tied to a pier for the
next five years, is not really 31.”32
Another March 30, 2023, press report stated:
The Pentagon team leading the charge to reduce the cost of amphibious warships has shown
the Marine Corps drawings of scaled-down, less expensive ship designs—but a service
general told Defense News he won’t accept them.
During a Tuesday [March 28] hearing with the Senate Armed Services Committee’s sea
power panel, Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl, the deputy commandant for combat development and
integration, told lawmakers he will not change his current requirements.
“The trade space will be my requirements. And I’m the requirements officer for the Marine
Corps: I am not coming off the requirement any further,” Hekcl said, amid an effort by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense to reduce the cost of building San Antonio-class
amphibious transport docks, or LPD....
The general told Defense News after the hearing he has two major concerns with the
Pentagon’s suggested designs.
First is that amphibious ready groups — a collection of one amphibious assault ship and
two smaller San Antonio or Whidbey Island amphibious ships — hauling Marine
expeditionary units typically disaggregate as soon as they deploy to a theater. The Whidbey
Island LSDs cannot operate alone, but the LPD Flight II replacements can, making this

32 Megan Eckstein, “Lawmakers Decry US Navy’s Plan to Decommission Aging Amphibious Ships,” Defense News,
March 30, 2023.
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design a boon for the Corps and the combatant commanders who want flexibility in how
they operate ships in theater.
Heckl said the proposed designs take away the ability of this revised LPD to operate
independently.
Additionally, he said the flight deck and vehicle cargo storage spaces would be “reduced
dramatically.”
He said the Office of the Secretary of Defense offered up “very rough ideas, and I’ve seen,
like, three of them not flushed out at all. And none of them are acceptable. The Marine
Corps will not accept them.”33
A March 15, 2023, press report stated
The Navy halted its pursuit of the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock line
because of the program’s growing costs and delays in the shipyard, the service’s top officer
said Wednesday.
The pause to reassess the LPD-17 Flight II line started a year ago at the direction of the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday said at
the annual McAleese Conference....
The pause on buying amphibious ships is so the Navy can perform a Battle Force Ship
Assessment and Requirements Study, which will help inform amphibious ship buys and
likely wrap up in the third quarter of FY 2023, and evaluate both possible cost savings and
capabilities, officials have said....
The Navy wanted [LPD-32] to be the last LPD-17 Flight II purchase, as the service last
year tried to end the line early after only buying three ships instead of the originally planned
13.
After appeals from the Marine Corps for advanced procurement funding for LPD-33,
lawmakers opted to continue the line and allotted $250 million in advanced procurement
dollars for that ship in the FY 2023 funding and policy bills.
But the service did not include the ship in its five-year budget outlook released Monday
[March 13]. The Navy could buy LPD-33 in FY 2025 if it followed industry’s
recommendation to order the ships every two years to keep a stable work force and
maintain the supply chain. Because of the two-year centers, Gilday said the Navy has time
to evaluate the LPD-17 Flight II line.
“Congress has given us the authorities in the latest [National Defense Authorization Act]
to do a bundle buy and we all agree that that’s the way that we ought to go after these ships.
But to go after a single ship in ‘25, and put that in the budget now – based on where we are
with all this churn on cost and so forth and this concern about the cost of those ships – it’s
like telling a car dealer, ‘hey I really want to buy that minivan. I’m going to buy that
minivan. Now let’s roll up our sleeves and talk about price,’” Gilday said.
“It’s not going to drive down the price of that ship. It needs to be competitive. Actually,
with that production line and that ship, it’s not competitive. One company builds it,” the
CNO added.
But the Marine Corps has a different take. At the same conference, Marine Corps
Commandant Gen. David Berger made the case for the LPD-17 Flight II line and said a
block buy acquisition strategy is the way to pursue the ships to save money. The
commandant argued that HII’s Ingalls Shipbuilding is approaching the point in the line

33 Megan Eckstein, “Marine Corps Rejects Pentagon’s Pitch for New Amphibious Ship Designs,” Defense News,
March 30, 2023.
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where they can see cost savings and that increased costs to buy new LPDs are because of
inflation....
Berger was part of the team in 2014 that assessed the LPD-17 line and chose to pursue an
altered design – Flight II – instead of starting from scratch on a new amphibious ship
program. He expressed doubt that the Navy could find more cost savings by doing another
assessment and said halting the line would affect the workforce and drive the price up....
Naval Sea Systems Command chief Vice Adm. Bill Galinis could not provide details when
asked if NAVSEA is formally assessing the LPD design or looking at a potential Flight
III....
Both Berger and Gilday argued for block buys to achieve cost savings, a point Navy
Secretary Carlos Del Toro echoed in advocating for potential multi-year procurement
strategies.
“I think it’s necessary to try to get to why is the cost of the LPD going up as significantly
as it has. It’s now approaching pretty much the cost of a DDG Flight III destroyer,” Del
Toro said.
“So there are some concerns to that. So we’re going to actually take a look at that over the
next few months actually, hopefully by either June or September we’ll have the final
answer to are there ways that we could perhaps bring that cost down a bit.”...
Berger cited his minimum requirement of 31 amphibious ships, which Congress signed
into law in FY 2023, as the reason why he cannot support the pause in purchasing LPDs.
“They’re right at the point in the curve that’s the most efficient and we’re going to take a
time out. From my perspective, I can’t accept that when the inventory – the capacity has to
be no less than 31,” the commandant said.34
A March 13, 2023, press report stated
The Navy is proposing to drop its amphibious fleet below 31 ships, despite an agreement
with the Marine Corps and a potential violation of last year’s defense policy law.
Sent to Congress on Monday [March 13], the Navy’s proposed $255.8 billion 2024 budget
aims to retire eight warships before the end of their intended service life, including three
Whidbey Island-class dock landing ships, or LSDs, that it proposed to scrap last year but
which were saved by the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act....
“We've gone through, not only on LSDs but the other divestments proposed in this budget,
did a ship-by-ship review, to understand the material state of each of the ships. What we
found on the LSDs is that they are challenged in terms of readiness. We want to make sure
that the capabilities that we field are the right capabilities, and are able to perform the
mission to the standards that we expect,” Navy Undersecretary Erik Raven told reporters
ahead of the proposed budget’s release.
“And so we're proposing those divestments because we think the return on investment, on
further investments on those particular ships, as judged hull by hull, that return on
investment is not there,” Raven said. “Additionally, say that we have sailors and Marines
who are serving on these ships, we think that getting them matched up to the right platforms
is the way to go.”
Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger last week rejected any plans that would cut
these aging LSDs before their replacements were delivered.

34 Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy and Marine Corps Debate Amphibious Ship Costs as Clash Over LPD-17 Flight II Line
Continues,” USNI News, March 15 (updated March 16), 2023.
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Despite the delivery of one LPD in 2024, the early retirement of the three LSDs would
mean the total number of amphibs that year would drop below the legally required 31 ships
minimum laid out in the 2023 NDAA, according to the budget documents. Raven told
reporters that the Navy is not seeking a waiver at this time....
Berger on Monday reiterated the reasoning behind the 31-ship requirement for amphibs.
“Anything less incurs risk to national defense by limiting the options for our combatant
commanders,” he said in a statement to Defense One. “Per strategic guidance, the Marine
Corps must be able to provide the nation with crisis response capabilities and build
partnerships with allies and partners in support of integrated deterrence—difficult to
achieve without the requisite number of amphibious warships.”...
Last month, Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro said the service is taking a “strategic pause”
on buying more LPDs until additional studies are completed, Defense News reported.
Afterward, the Navy would “probably” start buying them again, according to the report.
On Monday, Raven told reporters at the Pentagon that the office of the Secretary of Defense
had directed the pause and a capabilities-based assessment, and that there is an “integrated
team” to assess the ships.
“What we are making sure that we are doing as we move forward with our budget plans,
is making sure that we have the right capabilities at the right price aligned to not only
meeting military requirements, but working with industry,” Raven said. “And for LPD,
we're taking a look at the acquisition strategy moving forward, again, to make sure that we
would have the right capabilities at the right price and working with industry partners to
put together that plan moving forward.”
The Navy has “time to get this right” with the LPD, and that the Navy and Marine Corps
are “fundamentally aligned” on the 31-ship requirement, Rear Adm. John Gumbleton, the
deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for budget, said Monday.
“Both service chiefs like 31 [ships] as a requirement. Both service chiefs like multiyear
procurements. Both service chiefs want to buy in a predictable future. And so if we can do
a study and actually lower the costs of this, that's all to the good of the Department of the
Navy and Marine Corps,” Gumbleton said.35
Another March 13, 2023, press report stated
The future amphibious warship fleet — and its productions line — are in peril of being
sunk by budget politics. And the Marine Corps is ready to fight about it.
“Without a programmed replacement for [dock landing ships] being decommissioned,
substantial risk falls on the combatant commander as the requirement for 31 ships will not
be met,” Maj. Joshua Benson, a spokesman for the service’s three-star general in charge of
combat development and integration, told Breaking Defense today. “This is unacceptable.”
The Navy’s new fiscal 2024 budget request follows up on previous comments from Navy
Secretary Carlos Del Toro, who has said the service will take a “strategic pause” in
purchasing new amphibious warships, which are designed to ferry Marines and their
equipment into strategic locations where they can deploy from ship to shore. At the time,
Del Toro said the pause was so the Navy can consider both how many ships it needs as
well as the capabilities onboard those vessels.
Speaking to reporters ahead of the budget rollout, Navy Undersecretary Erik Raven
declined to answer several questions about the pause, instead thanking for Congress for its

35 Caitlin M. Kenney, “Navy On Path To Violate 31-Amphibious-Ship Requirement in 2024,” Defense One, March 13,
2023.
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support in the previous budget and promising to work with industry and the Hill moving
forward.
During an event on the Hill last week, Commandant Gen. David Berger also declined to
explain the logic behind the “strategic pause,” saying it was Del Toro’s place to articulate
the administration’s position. But he was blunt about the risk in not meeting what the
Marines say is a minimum of 31 amphibious ship fleet, a figure backed up by a recent joint
Navy-Marine Corps assessment delivered to lawmakers.
“The inventory is going to go down, the risk is going to go up,” he said then. “The risk
meaning our ability as a nation to respond when needed, and sometimes you can’t predict
that the risk goes up — that a combatant commander doesn’t have the right tool for the job.
That’s the risk.”
But the new comments from the Marine Corps’ three-star command in charge of
developing warfighting technologies represent major, public push-back against the
Pentagon’s formal request.
In follow up comments today to Breaking Defense, Benson emphasized that risk, citing the
ongoing humanitarian crises in Turkey prompted by multiple earthquakes.
“The ongoing humanitarian disaster in Turkey is the most recent example of a situation
that would benefit from the capabilities organic to an [amphibious ready group/ Marine
expeditionary unit]. Unfortunately, no operationally deployable amphibious warfare ships
were available,” said Benson.
In terms of the industrial base, the Marine Corps views the “strategic pause” as putting its
ship production lines at risk of completely shutting down. “Depending on the length of the
pause,” Benson said shipyards may be forced to cut their workforce, losing “years of
experience that have been carried forward from keel to keel.”
“If a shipbuilder is forced to make these decisions due to forecasted gaps in production, re-
starting a line becomes much more expensive,” he added.36
Another March 13, 2023, press report stated
A new study directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense led to the halt in amphibious
ship procurement so the Navy can evaluate requirements and cost efficiencies, a Navy
official said Monday [March 13].
“We received direction from OSD, but this will be an integrated team moving forward for
that assessment,” Navy Under Secretary Erik Raven told USNI News when asked who
directed the pause and reassessment.
Rear Adm. Gumbleton, the Navy deputy assistant secretary for budget, said the Department
of the Navy will work with both OSD and its Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
office on the evaluation....
When questioned by USNI News, Gumbleton disputed the notion that the Navy chose to
invest in the Landing Ship Medium over the LPD platform. He acknowledged the service
would ideally buy the San Antonio-class ships on two-year centers, a procurement plan
industry advocates for to keep the shipyard workforce and supply chain stable.
“The intent here is not an either-or between an LPD or a Medium Landing Ship. It’s a
both,” Gumbleton said.
“I believe the services are fundamentally aligned on this requirement. Both service chiefs
like 31 as the requirement. Both service chiefs like multi-year procurements. Both service

36 Justin Katz, “‘Unacceptable’: Marines Are Ready to Fight Tonight—About the Amphib Budget,” Breaking Defense,
March 13, 2023.
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chiefs want to buy in a predictable future. And so if we can do a study and actually lower
the cost of this, that’s all to the good of the Department of the Navy and the Marine Corps,”
he added, referring to the 31-amphibious ship floor that Congress signed into law in FY
2023.
Since Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro said last month that there was a “strategic pause”
on buying amphibious ships, the Navy opted not to include LPD-33 in today’s budget
proposal. In FY 2023 legislation, Congress appropriated and authorized $250 million in
advanced procurement money for that ship, but a Navy official told USNI News the service
plans to hold that contract for the duration of the pause.
The halt is so the Navy can perform a Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirements
Study, a new evaluation that will inform its amphibious ship procurement, according to
Del Toro. Speaking at the Pentagon’s budget rollout, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Adm. Christopher Grady said that study will wrap in the third quarter of FY 2023....
The current amphibious force can meet the military’s missions for the immediate future,
Vice Adm. Sara Joyner, the director of Force Structure, Resources and Assessment on the
Joint Staff (J8), told reporters Monday.
“As far as amphib studies, with the new [National Defense Strategy] that came out in ‘22,
the thought is that what we have right now is sufficient for what we need in order for near-
term requirements for amphibs,” Joyner said. “But the chance to redirect and take another
look was something that was valued and that so the Department of the Navy is moving
forward with that study. And it will be their study that they will bring forward is to my
knowledge how that will occur.”
Since Del Toro announced the pause, the Marine Corps has voiced concern over the
amphibious force structure and investment plans, particularly as the Navy seeks to retire
the older Whidbey Island-class dock landing ships. The Navy’s FY 2024 proposal asks to
retire three LSDs: USS Germantown (LSD-42), USS Gunston Hall (LSD-44) and USS
Tortuga (LSD-46).
“We have to have the inventory not less than 31 [ships]. To me, that’s a combination of old
and new. We cannot decommission a critical element without having a replacement in our
hand,” Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger said at an event last week.
“We can’t do that, or else, back to risk … we’re not going to have the tools or it’s not going
to be available. So the decommissioning of the LSDs to me is directly tied to the inventory
as fast as we can procure and field.”
Both Defense Department and Navy officials during the budget rollout emphasized that the
ongoing evaluations are meant to assess both cost and capabilities to ensure the service is
making the right investments.
“We remain committed to Landing Ship Medium, and for LPD we’re taking a look at the
acquisition strategy moving forward again to make sure that we will have the right
capabilities at the right price and working with industry partners to put together that plan
moving forward,” Raven said.
Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks emphasized that amphibious ships are crucial to
the Indo-Pacific, the Pentagon’s priority theater.
“We believe that’s vital to the Indo-Pacific region in particular, and as we look at all the
investments we’re making, for example, in the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030, of course
it includes the ability to move around our Marine forces,” Hicks said.
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“The question really is what is the right mix of capabilities for today and for tomorrow,
and that’s where we’re taking time to look at what that right mix of capabilities looks like,
including, of course … in the case you’re pointing out on the amphibious forces.”37
FY2024 Procurement Funding for LPD-33
Another related issue for Congress is whether to provide FY2024 procurement or advance
procurement (AP) funding for LPD-33, and if so, how much. As noted earlier, the Navy’s
proposed FY2024 budget requests no procurement funding for LPD-33, and the Marine Corps’
FY2024 unfunded priorities list (UPL) includes, as its top unfunded priority, $1,712.5 million in
procurement funding for procuring LPD-33 in FY2024.
Use of Block Buy Contract Authority
Another issue for Congress is whether the Navy intends to use the LPD-LHA block buy
contracting authority provided by Congress in Section 129 of the FY2023 NDAA, and if not, then
what, if anything, Congress should do in response. As noted earlier, the Navy previously did not
use the LPD-LHA block buy contracting authority provided in the FY2021 and FY2022 NDAAs.
An April 3, 2023, press report stated:
The Chief of Naval Operations wants the Navy to pursue a multi-year procurement strategy
for the amphibious warship program the service indicated it would end in the latest budget
submission.
“Most recently, on Friday, we put LPD-32 on contract at a good price and we hope to
leverage the multi-year authorities that we have to keep that great line of ships going,”
Adm. Mike Gilday said Monday [April 3] at the annual Navy League’s Sea Air Space
symposium.
A March 9, 2023, press report stated that Marine Corps Commandant General David Berger
today doubled down on the need for 31 traditional amphibious warships and endorsed block
buys and other contracting strategies to signal consistent demand to industry....
“We have bought these one at a time. That's not the way you do it,” Berger said at a
Thursday [March 9] forum hosted by the Amphibious Warship Industrial Base Coalition.
“We do block buys for other platforms—destroyers, submarines aircraft carriers—for all
the right reasons. We need to do it also for amphibious ships.”38
At a June 22, 2021, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Department of
the Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget, General David Berger, the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, stated that using the block buy authority in the FY2021 and FY2022 NDAAs would
reduce the combined cost of the four ships by $722 million.39 At a June 17, 2021, hearing before
the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on

37 Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy: OSD Directed Amphib Procurement Pause, Joint Staff Says Current Amphib Force
‘Sufficient,’” USNI News, March 13 (updated March 20), 2023. See also Mallory Shelbourne, “FY2024 Budget: Navy
Won’t Buy Any More San Antonio Amphibs in the Next Five Years,” USNI News, March 9 (updated March 15), 2023;
Caitlin M. Kenney, “Marines Issue Warning on Amphib Fleet, The Assistant Commandant Says 31 Large Amphibious
Warfare Ships Are Needed to Avoid Risk,” Defense One, February 14, 2023.
38 Nick Wilson, “Commandant Endorses Block Buys for Amphibious Warships,” Inside Defense, March 9, 2023. See
also Mallory Shelbourne, “FY2024 Budget: Navy Won’t Buy Any More San Antonio Amphibs in the Next Five
Years,” USNI News, March 9 (updated March 15), 2023.
39 Richard R. Burgess, “Senators Hammer $1 Billion Loss, Industrial Instability with Navy’s Planned 2022
Shipbuilding,” Seapower, June 22, 2021.
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seapower programs in the Department of the Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget, Frederick J.
Stefany, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition
(ASN RDA) (i.e., the Navy’s acting acquisition executive), stated that this would equate to a
reduction of 7.1%.40 At a June 8, 2021, hearing before the Seapower subcommittee of the Senate
Armed Services Committee on Navy and Marine Corps investment programs, the Department of
Navy witnesses were asked about the Navy’s intentions regarding the block buy contracting
authority granted by Section 124. Stefany replied that
to update you on that authority that your—your committee provided last year, the Section
124 Authority, we have finished negotiating with HII Ingalls to document a … contract
structure that could be put in place to implement the four-ship procurement that you’re
referring to, that—that we just finished that up about a week ago.
And, so we had a—a handshake agreement [with HII Ingalls] on what that would look like
if we were to actually enact it into a contract and we packaged that up and we’re sending
it to the department41 leadership for—for a decision. But what—and—and get that in place
before the authority that expires at the end of this year, that you provided us.
But—in—I’ll just let you know the initial indications we’re getting from the department is
that they would like to defer this decision so that they can make an overall, as they do their
overall [FY]'23 budget review this summer and fall, of the overall force structure, work
with Admiral Kilby and General Smith on the right mix of ships of the future, the
commitment of four ships at once, they would like to make—defer that commitment until
they are able to make that force-structure assessment.
So, right now, indicators are that we are not gonna be able to execute that, but it’s not a
done deal. It’s going through the process within the department for a final decision sir.42
FY2024 Advance Procurement Funding for LHA-10
Another potential issue for Congress is whether to provide FY2024 advance procurement (AP)
funding for the next LHA-type ship, LHA-10. The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission programs
the procurement of LHA-10 for FY2027. Congress, as part of its action on the Navy’s proposed
FY2023 budget, provided $289.0 million in advance procurement (AP) funding for LHA-10. The
Navy’s FY2024 budget submission does not request additional AP funding for the ship in
FY2024; it does program additional AP funding for the ship in FY2025 and FY2026.
Technical and Cost Risk in LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Programs
Another potential issue for Congress is technical and cost risk in the LPD-17 Flight II and LHA
programs.

40 Megan Eckstein, “Marines Explain Vision for Fewer Traditional Amphibious Warships,” Defense News, June 21,
2021.
41 This is a reference to the Department of the Navy or the Department of Defense.
42 Transcript of hearing as posted by CQ.com. The passage as printed here includes some minor typographical
corrections done by CRS for readability. See also Megan Eckstein, “Deal to Buy Four Amphibious Warships Losing
Steam, as Navy Takes Another Look at Future Force Needs,” Defense News, June 8, 2021; Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy
Reaches ‘Handshake’ Deal on Four-Ship Amphib Buy, Pentagon Wants New Navy Force Structure Assessment,” USNI
News
, June 8, 2021.
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LPD-17 Flight II Program
Regarding technical and cost risk in the LPD-17 Flight II program, a June 2022 Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report—the 2022 edition of GAO’s annual report surveying DOD
major acquisition programs—states the following about the LPD-17 Flight II program:
Current Status
The LPD 17 Flight II designs are complete and include roughly 200 changes from the prior
flight, according to the program. As we reported last year, the Navy is adding some planned
Flight II enhancements to the last Flight I ships, LPD 28 and 29, to lower risk for Flight II
ships. Navy officials told us that one key enhancement for LPD 29 and Flight II ships, the
Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar, is on track to deliver as planned by summer 2022.
Program officials said that work on LPD 30 and 31 is underway, with keel-laying for LPD
30 in October 2020 and construction scheduled to begin on LPD 31 in April 2022. COVID-
19 led the shipbuilder to draw workers from LPD 30 to mitigate shortages on LPD 28. As
a result, construction of LPD 30 is delayed and the schedule is currently being reassessed.
The LPD 30 workforce—which was about half of planned levels in mid-2020—is now
approaching 70 percent of planned levels. Program officials told us they intend to assess
COVID-19-related cost and schedule changes for LPD 30 in spring 2022.
The program plans to begin operational testing for LPD 30 in fiscal year 2024. Program
officials told us that over the past year, the program’s testing approach changed. They
originally planned for some testing conducted on LPD 28 to count toward Flight II testing
because this ship will have some Flight II equipment. However, the testing authority
clarified that LPD 28 testing could not replace testing on Flight II. Revisions to the test and
evaluation master plan are underway, and several decisions regarding testing remain, such
as a requirement for a Full Ship Shock Trial.
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The
program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
The program office stated that Flight II will provide increased capability, including
improved command and control capabilities, and ensure the Navy meets evolving missions
using the new technologies. It added that the shipbuilder and Navy continue to identify and
manage risks for all LPD 17 class ships currently under construction.43
LHA Program
Regarding technical risk in the LHA program, a January 2023 report from DOD’s Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)—DOT&E’s annual report for FY2022—stated the
following:
TEST ADEQUACY
Between March and April 2022, the Navy and Marine Corps tested the USS Tripoli (LHA
7) in the F-35B-heavy configuration consisting of 20 F-35B Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, 3
SH-60S Seahawk helicopters, a Marine Aviation Combat Element, and a Marine Command
Element. Testing evaluated the ability to embark, operate, support and maintain the fixed
and rotary wing aircraft in this configuration. The Navy conducted this FOT&E [follow-
on operational test and evaluation] period of the LHA 6 Flight 0 in accordance with a
DOT&E-approved test plan, and tests were observed by DOT&E. Testing was adequate

43 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] Challenges to Fielding Capabilities
Faster Persist
, GAO-22-105230, June 2022, p. 189.
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for demonstration of capability. Additionally, the test will inform future F-35B-heavy
operational concepts and tactics, techniques, and procedures.
In FY22, the Navy conducted no LFT&E [live fire test and evaluation] of LHA 6 Flight 0
or operational test of LHA 6 Flight 1. DOT&E and the Navy have yet to agree on a LFT&E
strategy to evaluate the survivability of the LHA 6 Flight 1 to air delivered or underwater
kinetic threats.
PERFORMANCE
Effectiveness
Under the operational conditions imposed during FOT&E, the LHA 6 Flight 0
demonstrated capability to operate in the F-35B-heavy configuration consisting of 20 F-
35B Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, 3 SH-60S Seahawk helicopters, a Marine Aviation
Combat Element, and a Marine Command Element. However, no preliminary assessment
of mission performance attributes can be made from this FOT&E event as analysis remains
in progress. DOT&E expects to deliver an LHA 6 Flight 0 FOT&E report in 2QFY23.
Suitability
Insufficient data are available to determine operational suitability from the FOT&E,
however LHA 6 Flight 0 suitability was evaluated as satisfactory during IOT&E. FOT&E
suitability evaluation is limited to reliability, maintainability, logistics supportability, and
availability of ship’s systems that directly supported F-35B operations. DOT&E observed
no significant issues related to suitability, but analysis remains in progress. DOT&E
expects to deliver an LHA 6 Flight 0 FOT&E report in 2QFY23.
Survivability
No data are available to change the lethality assessment of LHA 6 Flight 0 from IOT&E
or assess survivability of LHA 6 Flight 1.
RECOMMENDATION
The Navy should:
1. Collaborate with DOT&E to deliver an LFT&E strategy that adequately evaluates the
survivability of the LHA 6 Flight 1 with the update to the TEMP [test and evaluation
mastger plan] in FY23.44
The June 2022 GAO report stated the following about the LHA program:
Current Status
LHA 8 construction progress is 37 percent complete as of September 2021 and the ship is
expected to be delivered in February 2025—about a year later than originally planned—
per program officials. They said one of the main reasons for the delay was due to a 14- to
18-month delay in receiving the ship’s main reduction gears after manufacturing defects
required correction. They added that the shipbuilder continues to prioritize completing
ships with earlier delivery dates, leaving LHA 8 construction understaffed. Program
officials said they can do little to address the issue beyond delaying LHA 8’s delivery by
about a year. According to the program, changes to the ship to accommodate integration of
the Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar (EASR)—a new radar system based on the
preexisting Air and Missile Defense Radar assessed separately in this report—is another
contributor to LHA 8’s schedule delay. Officials told us they expect LHA 8’s final price to
exceed the original target cost by $68 million due to the delays. Costs above the target cost
but below the contract’s price ceiling will be shared by the shipbuilder and the Navy.

44 Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, January 2023, pp. 190-191.
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The planned timing of LHA 9’s detailed design and construction contract was accelerated
from fiscal year 2024 to late fiscal year 2021 after Congress provided fiscal year 2019
advanced procurement funding. However, program officials said the contract was not
awarded in late fiscal year 2021 as planned. They do not expect to delay construction start,
currently planned for fiscal year 2023.
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The
program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
The program office stated that, as of mid-December 2021, LHA 8 is roughly 42 percent
complete. The program office added that the shipbuilder and the Navy continue to identify
and manage risks where appropriate and that LHA 8 is on track for delivery in 2025.45
Legislative Activity for FY2024
Summary of Congressional Action on FY2024 Funding Request
Table 1
summarizes congressional action on the Navy’s FY2024 procurement and advance
procurement (AP) funding request for the LPD-17 Flight II and LHA-9 programs.
Table 1. Summary of Congressional Action on FY2024 Procurement
Funding Request
Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth
Authorization
Appropriation

Request
HASC
SASC
Final
HAC
SAC
Final
LPD-33 advance procurement (AP) funding
0






LPD-33 procurement funding
0






LHA-9 procurement funding
1,830.1






LHA-10 advance procurement (AP) funding
0






Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2024 budget submission, committee and conference
reports, and explanatory statements on FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2024 DOD
Appropriations Act.
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee; HAC is
House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee.


45 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] Challenges to Fielding Capabilities
Faster Persist
, GAO-22-105230, June 2022, p. 188.
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Appendix. Procurement Dates of LPD-31 and LHA-9
This appendix presents background information regarding the procurement dates of LPD-31 and
LHA-9. In reviewing the bullet points presented below, it can be noted that procurement funding
is funding for a ship that is either being procured in that fiscal year or has been procured in a prior
fiscal year, while advance procurement (AP) funding is funding for a ship that is to be procured in
a future fiscal year.46
An institutional issue for Congress in FY2021 concerned the treatment in the Navy’s proposed
FY2021 budget of the procurement dates of LPD-31 and LHA-9. The Navy’s FY2021 budget
submission presented LPD-31 as a ship requested for procurement in FY2021 and LHA-9 as a
ship projected for procurement in FY2023. Consistent with congressional action on the Navy’s
FY2020 and FY2021 budgets regarding the procurement of LPD-31 and LHA-9, this CRS report
treats LPD-31 and LHA-9 as ships that Congress procured (i.e., authorized and provided
procurement funding for) in FY2020 and FY2021, respectively. Potential oversight issues for
Congress included the following:
• By presenting LPD-31 as a ship requested for procurement in FY2021 (instead of
a ship that was procured in FY2020) and LHA-9 as a ship projected for
procurement in FY2023 (instead of a ship that was procured in FY2021), was
DOD, in its FY2021 budget submission, disregarding or mischaracterizing the
actions of Congress regarding the procurement dates of these three ships? If so
• Was DOD doing this to inflate the apparent number of ships requested
for procurement in FY2021 and the apparent number of ships included in
the five-year (FY2021-FY2025) shipbuilding plan?
• Could this establish a precedent for DOD or other parts of the executive
branch in the future to disregard or mischaracterize the actions of
Congress regarding the procurement or program-initiation dates for other
Navy ships, other Navy programs, other DOD programs, or other federal
programs? If so, what implications might that have for the preservation
and use of Congress’s power of the purse under Article 1 of the
Constitution, and for maintaining Congress as a coequal branch of
government relative to the executive branch?
The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission, similar to its FY2023, FY2022, and FY2021 budget
submissions, presents LHA-9 as a ship procured or projected for procurement in FY2023. Navy
officials have described the listing of LHA-9 in the Navy’s FY2023 budget submission as a ship
being requested for procurement in FY2023 as an oversight.
LPD-31—an LPD-17 Flight II Class Amphibious Ship
The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission presented LPD-31, an LPD-17 Flight II class amphibious
ship, as a ship requested for procurement in FY2021. This CRS report treats LPD-31 as a ship
that Congress procured (i.e., authorized and provided procurement funding for) in FY2020,
consistent with the following congressional action on the Navy’s FY2020 budget regarding the
procurement of LPD-31:

46 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL31404, Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy—Background,
Issues, and Options for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke and Stephen Daggett.
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• The House Armed Services Committee’s report (H.Rept. 116-120 of June 19,
2019) on H.R. 2500, the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act,
recommended authorizing the procurement of an LPD-17 Flight II class ship in
FY2020, showing a quantity increase of one ship above the Navy’s request and
recommending procurement (not just AP) funding for the program.47
• The Senate Armed Services Committee’s report (S.Rept. 116-48 of June 11,
2019) on S. 1790, the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act,
recommended authorizing the procurement of an LPD-17 Flight II class ship in
FY2020, showing a quantity increase of one ship above the Navy’s request and
recommending procurement (rather than AP) funding for the program.48
• The conference report (H.Rept. 116-333 of December 9, 2019) on S. 1790/P.L.
116-92 of December 20, 2019, the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act,
authorized the procurement of an LPD-17 Flight II class ship in FY2020,
showing a quantity increase of one ship above the Navy’s request and
recommending procurement (rather than AP) funding for the program.49 Section
129 of S. 1790/P.L. 116-92 authorizes the Navy to enter into a contract,
beginning in FY2020, for the procurement of LPD-31, and to use incremental
funding to fund the contract.
• The Senate Appropriations Committee’s report (S.Rept. 116-103 of September
12, 2019) on S. 2474, the FY2020 DOD Appropriations Act, recommended
funding for the procurement of an LPD-17 Flight II class ship in FY2020,
showing a quantity increase of one ship above the Navy’s request and
recommending procurement (rather than AP) funding for the program.50
• The final version of the FY2020 DOD Appropriations Act (Division A of H.R.
1158/P.L. 116-93 of December 20, 2019) provided procurement (not AP) funding
for an LPD-17 Flight II class ship. The paragraph in this act that appropriated
funding for the Navy’s shipbuilding account, including this ship, includes a
provision stating “Provided further, That an appropriation made under the
heading ‘Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy’ provided for the purpose of
‘Program increase—advance procurement for fiscal year 2020 LPD Flight II
and/or multiyear procurement economic order quantity’ shall be considered to be
for the purpose of ‘Program increase—advance procurement of LPD–31’.” This
provision relates to funding appropriated in the FY2019 DOD Appropriations Act
(Division A of H.R. 6157/P.L. 115-245 of September 28, 2018) for the
procurement of an LPD-17 Flight II class ship in FY2020, as originally
characterized in the explanatory statement accompanying that act.51
LHA-9 Amphibious Assault Ship
The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission, similar to its FY2023, FY2022, and FY2021 budget
submissions, presents LHA-9 as a ship procured or projected for procurement in FY2023. This
CRS report treats LHA-9 as a ship that Congress procured (i.e., authorized and provided

47 H.Rept. 116-120, p. 379, line 012.
48 S.Rept. 116-48, p. 433, line 12. See also pp. 23-24 for associated report language.
49 H.Rept. 116-333, p. 1566, line 012. See also p. 1144 for associated report language.
50 S.Rept. 116-103, p. 118, line 12. See also p. 122 for associated report language.
51 See PDF page 176 of 559, line 12, of the explanatory statement for H.R. 6157/P.L. 115-245.
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procurement funding for) in FY2021, consistent with the following congressional action on the
Navy’s FY2020 and FY2021 budgets regarding the procurement of LHA-9:
• The Senate Armed Services Committee’s report (S.Rept. 116-48 of June 11,
2019) on S. 1790, the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act,
recommended authorizing the procurement of LHA-9 in FY2020, showing a
quantity increase of one ship above the Navy’s request and recommending
procurement (rather than AP) funding for the program.52
• The conference report (H.Rept. 116-333 of December 9, 2019) on S. 1790/P.L.
116-92 of December 20, 2019, the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act,
authorized the procurement of LHA-9 in FY2020, showing a quantity increase of
one ship above the Navy’s request and recommending procurement (rather than
AP) funding for the program.53 Section 127 of S. 1790/P.L. 116-92 authorizes the
Navy to enter into a contract for the procurement of LHA-9 and to use
incremental funding provided during the period FY2019-FY2025 to fund the
contract.
• The Senate Appropriations Committee’s report (S.Rept. 116-103 of September
12, 2019) on S. 2474, the FY2020 DOD Appropriations Act, recommended
funding for the procurement of an LHA amphibious assault ship in FY2020,
showing a quantity increase of one ship above the Navy’s request and
recommending procurement (rather than AP) funding for the program.54
• The final version of the FY2020 DOD Appropriations Act (Division A of H.R.
1158/P.L. 116-93 of December 20, 2019) provided procurement (not AP) funding
for an LHA amphibious assault ship. The explanatory statement for Division A of
H.R. 1158/P.L. 116-93 stated that the funding was for LHA-9.55
• The procurement (not AP) funding provided for LHA-9 in the FY2020 DOD
Appropriations Act (see previous bullet point) was subsequently reprogrammed
to provide support for counter-drug activities of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) along the U.S. southern border.56 The final version of the
FY2021 DOD Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R. 133/P.L. 116-260 of
December 27, 2020, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021), however, once
again provided procurement (not AP) funding for an LHA amphibious assault
ship. The explanatory statement for Division C of H.R. 133/P.L. 116-260 stated
that the funding is for “Program increase—LHA 9.”57 As a result of the FY2021
procurement (not AP) funding for LHA-9, the ship once again has an
authorization (provided in the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act),
authority for using incremental funding in procuring it (provided by Section 127
of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act), and procurement (not AP)
funding (provided in the FY2021 DOD Appropriations Act).

52 S.Rept. 116-48, p. 433, line 15.
53 H.Rept. 116-333, p. 1566, line 015.
54 S.Rept. 116-103, p. 118, line 15.
55 Explanatory statement for Division A of H.R. 1158, PDF page 175 of 414, line 15.
56 Reprograming action (Form DD 1415) FY 20-01 RA, February 13, 2020, page 3 of 5.
57 Explanatory statement for Division C of H.R. 133/P.L. 116-260, PDF page 204 of 469, line 17.
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Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs



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Congressional Research Service
R43543 · VERSION 126 · UPDATED
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