Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023
May 17, 2023
Elections, and U.S. Relations
Jim Zanotti
U.S. relations with Turkey (Türkiye) take place within a complicated geopolitical environment
Specialist in Middle
and with Turkey in economic distress and facing challenges after disastrous earthquakes on
Eastern Affairs
February 6, 2023. U.S.-Turkey tensions that worsened after a failed 2016 coup in Turkey—

including ongoing disagreements over Syrian Kurds and Turkey’s 2019 procurement of a
Clayton Thomas
Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system—highlight uncertainties about the future of bilateral
Specialist in Middle
relations. Congressional actions have included sanctions legislation and holds on U.S. arms sales.
Eastern Affairs
Nevertheless, U.S. and Turkish officials emphasize the importance of continued cooperation and

Turkey’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Observers voice
concerns about the largely authoritarian rule of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Major

inflation and the February earthquakes’ aftermath led to speculation that Erdogan and his
electoral alliance might be vulnerable to a coalition of opposition parties in presidential and parliamentary elections that took
place on May 14, 2023. In the elections, pro-Erdogan parties retained a majority of seats in parliament, though with a smaller
margin than before. Erdogan led the presidential race but fell short of the 50% mark required for a first-round win. He will
therefore compete in a May 28 run-off against opposition candidate Kemal Kilicdaroglu, with the direction of some domestic
and foreign policies potentially at stake.
U.S. relations and F-16s. Under President Joe Biden, existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside cooperation
on other foreign policy matters. While deepening ties with Russia remain a cause for U.S. concern, Turkey’s emergence as a
mediator between Russia and Ukraine after Russia’s 2022 invasion has arguably increased Turkey’s importance for U.S.
policy. U.S.-Turkey relations have improved somewhat due to Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s defense; growing relationships
with and arms exports to other countries that seek to counter Russian regional power; and openness to rapprochement with
Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia. President Biden has voiced support for sales that would upgrade Turkey’s aging F-16
fleet, but some Members of Congress have expressed opposition. The Administration reportedly provided informal
notification to Congress in January 2023 of a possible sale of F-16s to Turkey, plus associated equipment and munitions.
Factors potentially influencing congressional consideration of the proposed sale include whether Turkey might agree to have
Sweden join NATO alongside Finland, and Turkey’s tense relations with Greece. Congressional and executive branch action
regarding Turkey and its neighboring countries could have implications for bilateral ties and U.S. political-military options in
the region, as well as Turkey’s strategic orientation. The following are key factors in the U.S.-Turkey relationship.
Turkey’s foreign policy approach. For decades, Turkey has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense
cooperation. Turkish leaders have indicated an interest in reducing their dependence on the West, and that may partly explain
their willingness to coordinate some actions with Russia. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia in
Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and Armenia-Azerbaijan. Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend partly on how willing
Turkey is to risk tensions or breaks in traditional relationships with Western powers while building other global relationships.
Major issues: Russia, Sweden-Finland-NATO, and Greece. In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey
faces challenges in balancing its relations with the two countries and managing Black Sea access, with implications for U.S.-
Turkey ties. To some extent, Erdogan has sought to reinforce Turkey’s embattled economy by deepening economic and
energy ties with Russia. Erdogan might assess that Western sanctions against Russia give Turkey increased leverage in these
dealings. At the same time, Turkey has expanded defense cooperation with Ukraine. Turkey has become an important
mediator between Russia and Ukraine on brokering a grain export corridor and other issues. Turkey approved Finland’s
NATO membership in March 2023, but has conditioned final approval for Sweden on it taking action against people that
Turkey considers to be terrorists. Long-standing disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean and
Eastern Mediterranean seas spiked in 2022 amid greater U.S. strategic cooperation with Greece, but tensions have somewhat
subsided in early 2023 after Greece provided some post-earthquake relief assistance to Turkey.
Syria: ongoing conflict near borders. Turkish concerns regarding its southern border with Syria have deepened further
during Syria’s civil war, due largely to (1) the flow of nearly four million refugees into Turkey, (2) U.S. efforts to counter the
Islamic State by working with Syrian Kurds linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-
designated terrorist organization), and (3) the presence of Russian, American, and Iranian forces in Syria that complicate and
somewhat constrain Turkish action. Turkey and allied Syrian armed opposition groups have occupied various areas of
northern Syria since 2016, and Turkey’s military continues to target Kurdish fighters in Syria and Iraq.
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Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 33

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Introduction and Key U.S.-Turkey Considerations
This report provides background information and analysis on key issues affecting U.S.-Turkey
(Türkiye)1 relations, including domestic Turkish developments and various foreign policy and
defense matters. Turkey has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
since 1952. U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that cooperation on regional security matters
remains mutually important,2 despite Turkey’s 2019 acquisition of an S-400 surface-to-air defense
system from Russia and a number of other U.S.-Turkey differences (such as in Syria and with
Greece and Cyprus).
Under President Joe Biden, some existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside
cooperation on other matters and opportunities to improve bilateral ties. While continued or
deepening ties with Russia in certain areas remain a cause for concern for the Biden
Administration and some Members of Congress, Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s defense and
openness to rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia have somewhat improved
U.S.-Turkey relations.3 President Biden has expressed support for selling F-16s to Turkey, and in
January 2023 the Administration reportedly informally notified Congress of a potential F-16 sale,
plus associated equipment and munitions (see “Possible F-16 Sale and Congressional Views”
below).
Members of Congress may consider legislative and oversight options regarding Turkey.
Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its rivals could have
implications for bilateral ties, U.S. political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s foreign
policy orientation and financial well-being.
For additional information, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S.
Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. See Figure A-1 for a map and key facts and
figures about Turkey.
Domestic Issues
Political Developments Under Erdogan’s Rule
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (pronounced air-doe-wan) has ruled Turkey since becoming
prime minister in 2003, and has steadily deepened his control over the country’s populace and
institutions. After Erdogan became president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular
presidential election, he claimed a mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a presidential

1 In late 2021, President Erdogan directed the use of “Türkiye” (the country’s name in Turkish) in place of “Turkey” or
other equivalents (e.g., the German “Türkei,” the French “Turquie”) in Turkish government documents and
communications. In June 2022, the United Nations accepted the Turkish request to change the country’s name at the
body to “Türkiye.” In January 2023, the State Department spokesperson said that the department would use the revised
spelling “in most formal diplomatic and bilateral contexts” where appropriate. The U.S. Board on Geographic Names
retained both “Turkey” and “Republic of Turkey” as conventional names, and the spokesperson said that the State
Department could use those names if it is in furtherance of broader public understanding. State Department Press
Briefing, January 5, 2023.
2 State Department, “Joint Statement on the U.S.-Türkiye Strategic Mechanism” and “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu Before Their Meeting,” January 18, 2023; State Department Press
Briefing, January 18, 2023.
3 Alper Coskun, “Making the New U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism Meaningful,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, May 12, 2022; Kali Robinson, “Turkey’s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions,” Council on Foreign
Relations, August 24, 2022.
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system of governance, which he cemented in a 2017 referendum and 2018 presidential and
parliamentary elections. Some allegations of voter fraud and manipulation surfaced after the
referendum and the elections.4 Since a failed July 2016 coup attempt by elements within the
military, Erdogan and his Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym
AKP) have adopted more nationalistic domestic and foreign policy approaches, perhaps partly
because of their reliance on parliamentary support from the Nationalist Action Party (Turkish
acronym MHP).
Many observers describe Erdogan as a polarizing figure, and elections have reflected roughly
equal portions of the country supporting and opposing his rule.5 The AKP won the largest share of
votes in 2019 local elections, but lost some key municipalities, including Istanbul, to candidates
from the secular-leaning Republican People’s Party (Turkish acronym CHP).
U.S. and European Union (EU) officials have expressed a number of concerns about authoritarian
governance and erosion of rule of law and civil liberties in Turkey.6 Some leading opposition
figures in Turkey have accused Erdogan of planning, controlling, and/or using the failed coup to
suppress dissent and consolidate power.7
Meanwhile, Turkish authorities have continued efforts to counter militants from the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization). These efforts
include Turkish military operations targeting PKK and PKK-aligned personnel in Iraq and Syria.8
February Earthquakes and Their Implications
Two major earthquakes (magnitude 7.8 and 7.5) hit southern Turkey on February 6, 2023. Quake
damage and its after-effects in areas of Turkey and Syria reportedly killed more than 50,000
people in Turkey and 8,000 in Syria, injured over 100,000 more, and directly affected the living
situations and daily lives of millions. As Turkish authorities coordinate a humanitarian response
involving significant international assistance, and facilitate access to Syrian border crossings,
observers have sought to assess (1) factors contributing to the damage and its scope, (2) efforts to
help victims and their families, and (3) present and future needs.9 U.S. officials have provided or
announced various means of assistance to Turkey, including $235 million in urgent humanitarian
assistance.10 With Turkey’s government estimating the economic toll from the earthquakes to be

4 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Limited Referendum Observation Mission Final
Report, Turkey, April 16, 2017 (published June 22, 2017); OSCE, International Election Observation Mission,
Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Turkey, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, June 24,
2018 (published June 25, 2018).
5 Kemal Kirisci and Berk Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two
Decades in Power?” Just Security, November 22, 2021.
6 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2022, Turkey; Turkey; European Commission,
Türkiye 2022 Report, October 6, 2022.
7 Gareth Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15: Erdogan’s New Turkey and the Myth of Its Immaculate Conception,”
Turkey Analyst, July 15, 2021; “Turkey coup: Top officers given life terms in mass trial,” BBC News, April 7, 2021.
8 Berkay Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux,” International Crisis Group, February
18, 2022.
9 See, for example, Nazlan Ertan, “EU raises $7.5 billion for Turkey, Syria earthquake victims,” Al-Monitor, March 20,
2023.
10 U.S. Agency for International Development, “The United States Provides Additional $50 Million to Support
Earthquake Affected Communities in Türkiye and Syria,” March 20, 2023.
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around $104 billion—roughly 9% of Turkey’s annual gross domestic product (GDP)—
international pledges of assistance to date total nearly $7.5 billion.11
The disaster has affected Turkey’s politics, society, and economy, particularly in the midst of the
country’s elections (discussed below). The 10 southern Turkish provinces most directly affected
account for about 10% of Turkey’s gross domestic product and 15% of its population, and host
thousands of refugees from Syria’s ongoing civil war.12
Analysts have speculated about how the crisis will affect support for President Erdogan and his
government.13 A major 1999 earthquake in northwestern Turkey killed approximately 18,000,
prompting legal and regulatory efforts to improve building safety.14 However, some media
accounts and opposition politicians allege that in the years before the 2023 earthquakes,
government officials and contractors prioritized economic benefits over adherence to construction
codes, at least partly contributing to the scope of damage and fatalities.15 Erdogan has denounced
criticism aimed at him or the government as fomenting disunity,16 and Turkey’s justice ministry
has ordered prosecutors to create “earthquake crimes investigation units” to consider criminal
violations for substandard work.17 Erdogan acknowledged some problems with the government’s
initial response,18 while mainly attributing the disaster to the quakes’ size.19 He has announced a
government-led recovery program, pledging to build 319,000 houses within a year, and 650,000
in total. Some local officials, engineers, and international donors have expressed concern that a
quick rebuilding effort without detailed planning or clearer accountability measures could leave
the new buildings vulnerable to future seismic activity.20
Major Economic Challenges
Ongoing economic problems in Turkey considerably worsened in 2022 as its currency, the lira,
depreciated in value around 28% against the U.S. dollar, after declining by nearly 45% in 2021.
After official annual inflation reached a 24-year peak of 86% in October 2022, it was around 44%
in April 2023,21 while some unofficial estimates have remained at over 100%.22 Many analysts

11 Türkiye Earthquakes Recovery and Reconstruction Assessment, March 2023, available at https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-
content/uploads/2023/03/Turkiye-Recovery-and-Reconstruction-Assessment.pdf; Ertan, “EU raises $7.5 billion for
Turkey, Syria earthquake victims.”
12 Nevzat Devranoglu, “Earthquake could cost Turkey up to $84 billion - business group,” Reuters, February 13, 2023;
Raja Abdulrahim and Emily Garthwaite, “For Syrian Refugees in Turkey, Quake Is a Disaster Within a Disaster,” New
York Times, February 13, 2023.
13 Adam Samson and Ayla Jean Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom,” Financial
Times, February 9, 2023; “Earthquake could shake up Turkish election,” Al-Monitor, February 10, 2023.
14 Zeynep Bilginsoy and Suzan Fraser, “Turkey’s lax policing of building codes known before quake,” Associated
Press, February 10, 2023.
15 Ibid.; Samson and Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom”; Ben Hubbard et al.,
“Turkish Builders Under Intense Scrutiny over Shoddy Work,” New York Times, February 24, 2023.
16 Samson and Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom.”
17 Ben Hubbard, “Quake Response Testing Erdogan as Survivors Express Frustration,” New York Times, February 12,
2023.
18 Ibid.
19 Ben Hubbard et al., “As Public Anger Mounts, Turkey Detains Builders,” New York Times, February 12, 2023.
20 Jared Malsin, “Concerns Mount as Erdogan Rebuilds,” Wall Street Journal, March 7, 2023; Ertan, “EU raises $7.5
billion for Turkey, Syria earthquake victims.”
21 “Turkish inflation slows to 44% ahead of landmark election,” Reuters, May 3, 2023.
22 Jared Malsin and Elvan Kivilcim, “Erdogan Faces Big Vote Test as Turkish Economy Suffers,” Wall Street Journal,
April 26, 2023.
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link the spike in inflation to the Turkish central bank’s repeated reductions of its key interest rate
since September 2021, with additional inflationary pressure possibly coming from external events
such as Russia’s war on Ukraine and interest rate hikes in the United States and other major
economies.23 The lira has been trending downward for more than a decade, with its decline
probably driven in part by broader concerns about Turkey’s rule of law and economy.24
Throughout this time, President Erdogan has assertively challenged the conventional economic
theory that higher interest rates stem inflation, attract foreign capital, and support the value of the
currency. In replacing Turkey’s central bank governor and finance minister in 2021, Erdogan
established greater control over Turkish fiscal and monetary policy. In public statements, Erdogan
has argued that lower interest rates boost production, employment, and exports.25 Erdogan also
has criticized high interest rates as contrary to Islamic teachings and as exacerbating the gap
between rich and poor.26
The currency and inflation crisis in Turkey has dramatically affected consumers’ cost of living
and the cost of international borrowing (mostly conducted in U.S. dollars) for banks and private
sector companies. The government has sought to lessen the impact of inflation by providing tax
cuts, minimum wage increases, greater access to early retirement benefits, and subsidies for basic
expenses, along with borrowing incentives for banks that hold liras.27 Turkey also has sought
currency swaps from some Arab Gulf states, and has benefitted from Russian-origin inflows that
contribute to U.S. warnings about potential sanctions evasion (see “Turkey-Russia Economic and
Energy Cooperation” below).28
Costs of ongoing humanitarian assistance and reconstruction from the earthquake crisis, along
with disruptions to agricultural, industrial, and commercial activity, will likely strain Turkey’s
economy further.29 With the overall cost estimated to approach $104 billion, the Economist
Intelligence Unit predicts some drag on economic growth.30 Turkey’s modest debt-to-GDP ratio
of around 37% (see Figure A-1) may permit it some space to boost fiscal spending in response to
the crisis. One analyst has said that financial assistance from international development banks
will be necessary but limited because of the Turkish government’s poor relations with the West.31

23 Baris Balci and Inci Ozbek, “Turkey Rewrites All Inflation Forecasts but Won’t Budge on Rates,” Bloomberg, April
28, 2022.
24 Mikolaj Rogalewicz, “Economic crisis in Turkey,” Warsaw Institute Review, April 25, 2022.
25 “EXPLAINER: Turkey’s Currency Is Crashing. What’s the Impact?” Associated Press, December 3, 2021; Carlotta
Gall, “Keeping His Own Counsel on Turkey’s Economy,” New York Times, December 11, 2021.
26 “Turkey will keep lowering interest rates: Erdogan,” Daily Sabah, June 6, 2022; Mustafa Akyol, “How Erdogan’s
Pseudoscience Is Ruining the Turkish Economy,” Cato Institute, December 3, 2021.
27 M. Murat Kubilay, “Already vulnerable, Turkey’s economy now faces massive earthquake recovery costs,” Middle
East Institute, February 13, 2023.
28 Laura Pitel, “Turkey finance minister defends economic links with Russia,” Financial Times, October 25, 2022; M.
Murat Kubilay, “As liquidity problems worsen, Turkey turns to capital controls and informal FX flows,” Middle East
Institute, November 7, 2022.
29 Mustafa Sonmez, “Massive earthquake cost to deepen Turkey’s economic woes,” Al-Monitor, February 11, 2023;
Devranoglu, “Earthquake could cost Turkey up to $84 billion.”
30 Economist Intelligence Unit, Turkey Country Report, generated May 3, 2023 (based on April 11, 2023 forecasts).
31 Kubilay, “Already vulnerable, Turkey’s economy now faces massive earthquake recovery costs.”
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May 2023 Elections
Background: Issues, Parties, Candidates, and Process
On May 14, 2023, Turkey held presidential and parliamentary elections. Largely in the context of
Turkey’s economic problems discussed above, public opinion polls before May 14 fueled
speculation that Erdogan and his allies might be vulnerable to a coalition of six opposition parties
led by the CHP and the Good (Iyi) Party (see Appendix B for profiles of selected party leaders).32
Despite Erdogan’s potential vulnerability, some observers questioned the opposition coalition’s
prospects. They cited opposition disunity, Erdogan’s political resilience, and the government’s
influence over judicial rulings, ability to provide economic subsidies, and effective control of
around 90% of the media.33
Questions that may persist as elections move to a May 28 presidential run-off (discussed further
below) include whether free and fair elections could take place or Erdogan might cede power in
the event of an electoral defeat.34 The Economist Intelligence Unit assessed that a close contest
could lead to “divisive court challenges” and “political instability.”35
The opposition coalition agreed on a joint platform focused on returning Turkey to the
parliamentary system that existed before the 2018 election, largely as a means of limiting
executive power.36 Opposition figures also have criticized the Erdogan government’s approach to
a range of foreign and domestic policy issues—including other subjects pertaining to democracy
and rule of law in Turkey—and promised to make changes (see also “Foreign Policy Changes
Under a Different President?”).37 In its platform, the opposition has hinted at more orthodox
economic policies, saying that it would reduce inflation and impose no responsibilities on the
Central Bank other than ensuring price and financial stability.38
This year’s parliamentary election took place under changes enacted in 2022 to Turkey’s electoral
law. As in the previous election in 2018, Turkey’s 600 parliamentary seats were assigned to party
lists under a proportional system for each of Turkey’s 87 electoral districts. However, the 2022
amendment lowered the threshold for entering parliament. Under the modified law, parties that
win seats can join parliament so long as they receive at least 7% of the national vote or belong to
a larger electoral alliance that does so.39 The previous threshold was 10%. Three main alliances
contested the election:

32 See, for example, “Erdogan’s rival boosted by withdrawal, poll lead ahead of Turkey vote,” Reuters, May 11, 2023..
33 Soner Cagaptay, “Turkey’s Resilient Autocrat,” Foreign Affairs, May 4, 2023; Jamie Dettmer, “It’s going to be hard
to get rid of Turkey’s Erdoğan,” Politico Europe, March 18, 2023.
34 “How free and fair will Turkey’s election be?” Economist, May 12, 2023; Soner Cagaptay (editor and co-author),
Turkey’s Pivotal 2023 Elections: Issues, Potential Outcomes, and What Comes After, Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, April 19, 2023; Andrew Wilks, “Would Turkey’s Erdogan accept an election loss after recent comments?”
Al-Monitor, May 3, 2023.
35 Economist Intelligence Unit, Turkey Country Report.
36 CHP, “Memorandum of Understanding on Common Policies (January 30, 2023)”; Text of Agreement for a
Strengthened Parliamentary System, February 28, 2022.
37 “A more democratic Turkey is within grasp, says Kemal Kilicdaroglu,” Economist, May 5, 2023; Nektaria Stamouli,
“Turkey’s anti-Erdoğan opposition vows a reset on EU and NATO,” Politico Europe, March 15, 2023.
38 CHP, “Memorandum of Understanding on Common Policies (January 30, 2023).”
39 Kayahan Cantekin, “Turkey: Parliament Passes Law Amending Election Laws and Lowering Electoral Threshold,”
Law Library of Congress, April 24, 2022.
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• People’s Alliance, which includes Erdogan’s AKP, the MHP, and a few smaller
parties.
• Nation Alliance (or “table of six”), which includes the CHP, the Good Party, and
four smaller parties, including two led by prominent former AKP figures.
• Labor and Freedom Alliance, which includes a few small parties alongside the
Kurdish-led Peoples’ Democratic Party (Turkish acronym HDP). The HDP
arranged to run under the aegis of the Green Left Party (Turkish acronym YSP)
to prevent against its exclusion, because a case pending before the Constitutional
Court could ban the HDP from future campaigns under its own name.
In March 2023, the Nation Alliance nominated CHP party leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu (kuhl-utch-
dahr-oh-loo) as its joint presidential candidate.40 Kilicdaroglu’s most important coalition partner,
Good Party leader Meral Aksener (awk-sheh-nar), eventually agreed to support Kilicdaroglu after
two other potential candidates who had polled more favorably against Erdogan—Istanbul mayor
Ekrem Imamoglu and Ankara mayor Mansur Yavas—backed Kilicdaroglu in response to
Aksener’s last-ditch appeal for one of them to run. Imamoglu’s prospects may have been
undermined by a criminal conviction (pending final resolution on appeal) that he and other
opposition figures charge is politically motivated.41 While Aksener’s Good Party rejected a formal
coalition between the Nation Alliance and the HDP, the HDP decided to support Kilicdaroglu in
the presidential race instead of fielding its own candidate.42
Two third-party presidential candidates appeared on the ballot alongside Erdogan and
Kilicdaroglu:
• Muharrem Ince, who was the CHP’s presidential candidate in the previous 2018
election. Early polls estimated that Ince might get 5% of the vote or more before
his prospects faded. He ultimately announced his withdrawal on May 11.43
• Sinan Ogan, an ultra-nationalist candidate who had previously served in
parliament for the MHP.
May 14 First Round: Erdogan’s Presidential Lead and Parliamentary Victory
In the May 14 elections, Erdogan fell a half-percentage point short of the 50% mark he needed to
surpass to claim outright victory in the presidential race, garnering 49.5% of the vote.
Kilicdaroglu received 44.9%, and Ogan appeared to outperform most pre-election polls by getting
5.2% (see Figure 1), with Ince receiving the remaining 0.4%. Erdogan’s People’s Alliance also
retained its parliamentary majority, even though it slipped from 344 seats to 323 seats (see Figure
2).

40 For profiles of Kilicdaroglu, see Appendix B and Suzan Fraser, “Challenger in Turkey presidential race offers sharp
contrast,” Associated Press, May 2, 2023; Amberin Zaman, “Meet Kemal Kilicdaroglu, Turkey’s long-derided
opposition head who could dethrone Erdogan,” Al-Monitor, March 23, 2023; “Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu: hope in the man
who’s never beaten Erdoğan,” James in Turkey, January 10, 2023.
41 Ben Hubbard and Safak Timur, “Conviction May Sideline Rival of Turkish Leader,” New York Times, December 15,
2022.
42 Nicolas Camut, “Pro-Kurdish party rallies behind main opposition candidate in Turkish election,” Politico Europe,
April 28, 2023.
43 “Turkish candidate Muharrem Ince drops out of presidential race,” Agence France Presse, May 11, 2023.
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Turkey now plans to conduct its first-ever presidential run-off election on May 28. Erdogan’s
presidential victories in both 2014 and 2018 came in the initial round.44 While Turkey’s economic
challenges and the February earthquakes may have increased voter dissatisfaction with Erdogan,
his first round electoral performance surpassed many observers’ expectations.45 Erdogan’s lead
over Kilicdaroglu and continued majority in parliament confounded aggregate pre-election
polling that anticipated a Kilicdaroglu lead or victory and a hung parliament.46 Despite some
contentious rhetoric on election night, with Erdogan and Kilicdaroglu supporters accusing each
other of announcing misleading information,47 both camps accepted the outcome in preparation
for the run-off.
Figure 1. Turkish 2023 First Round Presidential Election Preliminary Results
(comparison with past two elections)

Source: New York Times.
Note: A candidate is required to get more than 50% of the vote in the first round to prevent a run-off election.

44 Prior to the 2014 election, the president of Turkey was elected by parliamentary vote rather than popular election.
45 Peter Kenyon, “Takeaways from Turkey's election as it heads toward a runoff,” NPR, May 15, 2023; Amberin
Zaman, “Erdogan proves unbeatable as Turkey heads for runoff,” Al-Monitor, May 15, 2023.
46 600vekil.com, accessed on May 13, 2023.
47 Ben Hubbard and Gulsin Harman, “In Turkey Vote, Erdogan Fails to Get Majority,” New York Times, May 15, 2023.
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Figure 2. Turkish 2023 Parliamentary Election Preliminary Results

Source: Daily Sabah (based on underlying preliminary results from Anadolu Agency).
Notes: Figures include vote percentages and numbers for each alliance, as well as the number of seats won. The
various alliances and parties that received the remaining votes are unlisted because none of them won
parliamentary seats.
Observers for Turkey’s elections include representatives from domestic political parties and civil
society organizations, as well as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. These observers monitor polling
station operations, voting, ballot counting, and the tabulation of results.48 The OSCE international
election observation mission (IEOM) said the following in preliminary findings and conclusions
it released a day after the May 14 elections:
In the 14 May general elections, held in the wake of devastating earthquakes, voters had a
choice between genuine political alternatives and voter participation was high, but the
incumbent president and the ruling parties enjoyed an unjustified advantage, including
through biased media coverage. The continued restrictions on fundamental freedoms of
assembly, association and expression hindered the participation of some opposition
politicians and parties, civil society and independent media in the election process.
Nonetheless, the campaign itself was competitive and largely free for most contestants but
characterized by intense polarization, and marred by harsh rhetoric, instances of misuse of
administrative resources, and the pressure and intimidation faced by one opposition party.
The election administration technically managed elections efficiently, but there was a lack
of transparency and communication, as well as concerns over its independence. Measures
designed to facilitate registration and voting for earthquake-affected citizens were limited,
placing an additional burden on the voters to exercise their voting rights. Election day was
generally well-organized and assessed positively by IEOM observers, however, instances
of deficient implementation of certain procedures, particularly during voting and counting
were noted.49
One journalist added, “Fears of wide-scale fraud have proved empty so far, though there are
multiple complaints pending, and there was little if any violence at the polls where a record

48 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, “General Elections, 14 May 2023,” available at
https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkiye/537642; Hurcan Asli Aksoy and Salim Cevik, “Is extensive election fraud
possible in Turkey’s fiercest elections?” SWP (German Institute for International Politics and Security), May 10, 2023.
49 OSCE, International Election Observation Mission, Republic of Türkiye – General Elections, 14 May 2023:
Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions (published May 15, 2023).
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portion of voters—88%—cast their ballots.”50 On May 17, opposition officials said that they had
raised complaints over possible irregularities regarding 2,269 ballot boxes nationwide for the
presidential election and 4,825 for the parliamentary vote, but acknowledged that any corrections
would be unlikely to change election outcomes.51
May 28 Presidential Run-off and Key Issues
Many observers view Erdogan’s May 14 lead and parliamentary victory as signs that he may have
an advantage over Kilicdaroglu in a run-off.52 Major themes could carry over from the initial
campaign. As mentioned above, Kilicdaroglu has argued that problems in Turkey have arisen
under Erdogan on the economy, democracy, and human rights, and that the opposition has plans
to fix them. Erdogan has trumpeted various accomplishments at home and abroad during his 20-
year-rule—including with respect to Turkey’s defense and energy industries—and has criticized
the opposition by saying that it has sided with terrorists and LGBT causes.53
The following factors could affect the run-off outcome on May 28.
Nationalistic voters, particularly those who voted for Ogan in the first round. Some analysts
have argued that the Kurdish-led HDP’s support for Kilicdaroglu could hurt his chances with
some nationalistic voters.54 Ogan has suggested that any tilt he might make toward one of the two
run-off candidates could depend on how they address his support for maintaining constitutional
protection of Turkish identity, repatriating Syrian refugees, countering terrorism, and changing
Turkey’s economic policies.55
Economic issues and market swings, including how voters assess Turkey’s continuing inflation
and potential balance-of-payments problems alongside populist measures from Erdogan to help
households, like his May 9 announcement of a 45% wage increase for civil servants.56 With polls
before the May 14 elections predicting a strong opposition performance, Turkey’s stock market
and currency strengthened, and then fell in value after election results proved the predictions to be
largely inaccurate.57
Role of United States and Russia. In an run-off that may closely focus on the preferences of
nationalistic voters, Turkish public attitudes regarding U.S. and Russian influences—and their
importance—on Turkish policy and politics could play a role. While major changes in Turkey’s
foreign policy direction may be unlikely (see further discussion below), Kilicdaroglu’s statements
hint that he might favor moving in a more pro-Western direction than Erdogan has taken.58

50 Zaman, “Erdogan proves unbeatable as Turkey heads for runoff.”
51 “Turkey opposition contests thousands of ballots after election,” Reuters, May 17, 2023.
52 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey elections: Erdogan in a strong position ahead of presidential runoff,” Middle East Eye, May
15, 2023; Adam Samson and Ayla Jean Yackley, “Erdoğan poll lead prompts soul-searching for Turkey’s opposition,”
Financial Times, May 15, 2023.
53 Jared Malsin, “Turkish Vote Heightens Tensions,” Wall Street Journal, May 16, 2023; “In Turkey vote, Erdogan
defies forecasts of demise,” Reuters, May 15, 2023.
54 Halil Karaveli, “Turkey’s Opposition Can’t Win Without the Working Class,” Foreign Policy, April 17, 2023.
55 Yusuf Selman Inanc, “Sinan Ogan: The anti-refugee ultra-nationalist shaking up Turkey's election,” Middle East Eye,
May 15, 2023.
56 Elcin Poyrazlar, “Erdoğan gives public workers 45 percent pay rise in Turkey’s tight election race,” Politico Europe,
May 9, 2023.
57 “Turkey’s market rout deepens after Erdogan's strong election showing,” Reuters, May 16, 2023; Ayla Jean Yackley
and Adam Samson, “Erdoğan holds upper hand as Turkish election goes to run-off,” Financial Times, May 15, 2023.
58 “A more democratic Turkey is within grasp, says Kemal Kilicdaroglu,” Economist.
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In the days before the May 14 election, Kilicdaroglu pledged to re-emphasize Turkey’s NATO
membership and its efforts to join the European Union,59 and claimed to have “concrete
evidence” that Russian actors were responsible for “deep fake” online content criticizing the
opposition.60 Amid official Russian denials of involvement in Turkish elections, Erdogan
criticized Kilicdaroglu for attacks against Russia, and said, “Our relations with Russia are no less
important than those with the United States.”61 An unnamed Turkish opposition figure was cited
on May 12 as complaining that Russia has helped Erdogan maintain financial stability amid
Turkey’s economic crisis, pointing to media reports suggesting that Russia may have given
Erdogan access to billions of dollars via some funds transfers and by deferring Turkey’s
obligation to pay for Russian energy imports to 2024.62
On May 13, Erdogan was cited as saying that President Biden had given an order to topple him,63
apparently referring to statements Candidate Biden made in a New York Times interview during
the 2020 U.S. presidential campaign in support of efforts to defeat Erdogan via the electoral
process.64 That same day, a State Department spokesperson said that the United States does not
take sides in elections, and is only interested “in the democratic process, which should be both
free and fair.”65 After the first round of voting, the State Department principal deputy
spokesperson said that U.S. officials are continuing to monitor Turkey’s ongoing electoral
process, adding:
But broadly we congratulate the people of Türkiye for peacefully expressing their will at
the ballot box, and also congratulate the newly elected parliament. We’ll continue to work
together with whatever government is chosen by the Turkish people to deepen our
cooperation and ... shared priorities.66
Divided government? Since popular elections for president began in 2014, Turkey has not
experienced divided rule. If the president’s party coalition does not control parliament after the
elections, parliament could check the president in various ways if a majority of members seeks to
do so. The president has broad powers to appoint cabinet ministers and act in the absence of
parliamentary initiative, but relies on parliament’s approval in certain matters such as budgeting,
international treaty ratification, and foreign military deployments.67
It is unclear how voters might view the prospect of a Kilicdaroglu presidency alongside a pro-
Erdogan parliamentary majority. Erdogan and his supporters warn that stalemate between the two
branches of government could resemble past periods in Turkish history (such as during the 1990s)
in which fractious parliamentary coalitions may have contributed to socioeconomic challenges
and ideological tensions.68

59 Jared Malsin and Elvan Kivilcim, “Turkey’s Top Election Challenger Pledges Closer Ties to NATO and EU,” Wall
Street Journal, May 9, 2023
60 “Erdogan rival says has evidence of Russia's online campaign ahead of Turkey election,” Reuters, May 12, 2023.
61 “Relations with Russia are no less important than those with US: Erdoğan,” Hurriyet Daily News, May 13, 2023.
62 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey elections: Why Kilicdaroglu suspects Russian interference,” Middle East Eye, May 12, 2023.
63 “On final day of campaign, Erdogan accuses Turkish opposition of working with Biden,” Reuters, May 13, 2023.
64 New York Times editorial board interview of Joe Biden, December 16, 2019, published on January 17, 2020 at
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/17/opinion/joe-biden-nytimes-interview.html.
65 “On final day of campaign, Erdogan accuses Turkish opposition of working with Biden,” Reuters.
66 State Department Press Briefing, May 15, 2023.
67 Unofficial English translation of Turkish constitution available at https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/
Turkey_2017.pdf?lang=en. See also Alan Makovsky, Erdoğan’s Proposal for an Empowered Presidency, Center for
American Progress, March 22, 2017.
68 Andrew England, “Enduring pulling power of Erdoğan deflates opposition hopes,” Financial Times, May 15, 2023.
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Procedural questions or disputes. Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Council (Turkish acronym YSK)
administers elections. It also investigates and rules on all irregularities, complaints, and
objections.69 Past YSK decisions favoring Erdogan’s position that attracted controversy were (1)
its 2017 ruling not to enforce the normal requirement that only sealed ballots could be counted in
that year’s constitutional referendum, and (2) its 2019 ruling to repeat that year’s Istanbul
mayoral election (the AKP candidate lost the second election by a larger margin than the first).70
Additionally, the 2022 amendment to Turkey’s electoral law changed the selection process for
judges who will preside over the provincial and district-level electoral boards that supervise
voting, replacing a seniority system with a lottery. Critics have charged that the change may
increase the chances of greater politicization of these boards.71
Turkish Foreign Policy
General Assessment
Turkey’s strategic orientation, or how it relates to and balances between the West and other global
and regional powers, is a major consideration for the United States. Trends in Turkey’s relations
with the United States and other countries reflect changes to this orientation, as Turkey has sought
greater independence of action as a regional power within a more multipolar global system.
Turkish leaders’ interest in reducing their dependence on the West for defense and discouraging
Western influence over their domestic politics may partly explain their willingness to coordinate
some actions with Russia, such as in Syria and with Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400
surface-to-air defense system. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia—
with which it has a long history of discord—including in political and military crises involving
Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and Armenia-Azerbaijan.
Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other influential
countries as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkey’s dependence on these
actors and maintain its leverage with them.72 Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend
partly on the degree to which Turkish leaders feel constrained by their traditional security and
economic relationships with Western powers, and how willing they are to risk tensions or breaks
in those relationships while building other global relationships.
Foreign Policy Changes Under a Different President?
In anticipation of 2023 elections, observers have speculated about how a new president’s foreign
policy (including domestic policy with clear foreign policy ramifications) might differ from
Erdogan’s if an opposition candidate wins.73 Because of widespread nationalistic sentiment
among Turkey’s population and most of its political parties, a different president may have

69 YSK website available at https://www.ysk.gov.tr/en/supreme-election-council/1841.
70 “Five new members and new chair to be elected to Supreme Electoral Council,” Bianet, January 5, 2023.
71 Kayahan Cantekin, “Turkey: Parliament Passes Law Amending Election Laws and Lowering Electoral Threshold,”
Law Library of Congress, April 24, 2022; Suzan Fraser, “Turkish parliament approves contentious election law
changes,” Associated Press, March 31, 2022.
72 Nur Ozcan Erbay, “Ankara to use compartmentalization in managing relations,” Daily Sabah, June 24, 2021;
Stephen J. Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and the
U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, 2020.
73 Alan Makovsky, “Turkey’s Hinge Election,” Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, November 2022; Coskun and Ulgen,
“Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy.”
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difficulty changing Turkish policies on some of the following matters of core security concern:
Syria and Iraq (Kurdish militancy, refugee issues, and other countries’ influence), Greece and
Cyprus (Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean disputes), and Russia and Ukraine (conflict and its
regional and global consequences).
However, a different president may be more likely to alter certain ongoing policies that may be
more reflective of Erdogan’s or the AKP’s preferences than of broad national consensus. Such
changes may include (1) providing more flexibility to central bankers and other officials on
monetary policy decisions and other measures to address Turkey’s economic problems, (2) giving
greater consideration to European Court of Human Rights rulings, and (3) reducing Turkish
support for Sunni Islamist groups like Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and Syrian armed opposition factions.
Some Turkish opposition parties’ foreign policy statements suggest that a different president
might be less willing than Erdogan to say and do things that risk harming relationships with the
United States and European countries.74 Thus, despite the difficulties that may surround changing
some policies (as mentioned above), a different Turkish president could conceivably be less
inclined toward implementing those policies in a way that might worsen relations with Western
states, such as by pursuing additional arms purchases from Russia or new military operations in
northern Syria or the Aegean/Eastern Mediterranean area. However, if a new, untested Turkish
government feels pressure to signal its strength to various international actors or to placate
multiple domestic constituencies within a coalition, that president may strive to match Erdogan’s
reputation for assertiveness. Conversely, a president facing lack of consensus within a coalition
might become more passive on foreign policy.
U.S./NATO Strategic Relationship and Military Presence
The United States has valued Turkey’s geopolitical importance to and military strength within the
NATO alliance, while viewing Turkey’s NATO membership as helping anchor Turkey to the
West. The State Department’s Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) for Turkey says that its sizable
military (the second-largest in NATO) and its geographic location at the southeastern flank of the
alliance gives it a critical role in regional security.75 Turkey’s proximity to several conflict areas
in the Middle East and elsewhere has made the continuing availability of its territory for the
stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and NATO.
In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key U.S./NATO
sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO ground forces
command in Izmir (see Figure A-2). Turkey also controls access to and from the Black Sea
through the Bosphorus (alt. Bosporus) and Dardanelles Straits (the Straits—see Figure A-3).
For Turkey, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns about
encroachment by neighbors, such as the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World War II posturing
leading up to the Cold War. Additionally, NATO security guarantees compensate Turkey for a
general lack of nationally owned strategic defense and deterrence capabilities.76 In more recent or

74 Alper Coskun and Sinan Ulgen, “Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, November 14, 2022.
75 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey, May 13, 2022.
76 Can Kasapoglu, “Turkey,” The Nations of NATO: Shaping the Alliance’s Relevance and Cohesion, Thierry Tardy,
ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022, p. 97.
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ongoing arenas of conflict like Ukraine and Syria, Turkey’s possible interest in countering
Russian objectives may be partly motivating its military operations and arms exports.77
Tensions between Turkey and other NATO members have fueled internal U.S./NATO discussions
about the continued use of Turkish bases. Some reports suggest that expanded or potentially
expanded U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, and Jordan might be
connected with concerns about Turkey.78 In March 2022 congressional hearing testimony, Turkey
expert and former congressional committee staff member Alan Makovsky said that while the
United States should make efforts to keep Turkey in the “Western camp,” Turkish “equivocation
in recent years” justifies the United States building and expanding military facilities in Bulgaria,
Romania, and Greece to “hedge its bets.”79
Russia
Turkey’s relations with Russia feature elements of cooperation and competition. Turkey has made
a number of foreign policy moves since 2016 toward closer ties with Russia. These moves could
be motivated by a combination of factors, including Turkey’s effort to reduce dependence on the
West, economic opportunism, and chances to increase its regional influence at Russia’s expense.
Turkey also has moved closer to a number of countries surrounding Russia—including Ukraine
and Poland—likely in part as a counterweight to Russian regional power.80
Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine and Turkish Mediation Efforts
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has heightened challenges Turkey faces in balancing its
relations with the two countries, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. Turkey’s links with
Russia—especially its 2019 acquisition of a Russian S-400 system—have fueled major U.S.-
Turkey tensions, triggering sanctions and reported congressional holds on arms sales (discussed
below). However, following the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine, U.S. and Turkish interests
in countering Russian revisionist aims—including along the Black Sea coast—appear to have
converged in some ways as Turkey has helped strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities in
parallel with other NATO countries.81 In addition to denouncing Russia’s invasion, closing the
Straits to belligerent warships, opposing Russian claims to Ukrainian territory (including
Crimea), and serving as a transit hub for natural gas to Europe,82 Turkey has supplied Ukraine
with various types of military equipment—including armed drone aircraft and mine-resistant

77 Dimitar Bechev, “Russia, Turkey and the Spectre of Regional Instability,” Al Sharq Strategic Research, April 13,
2022; Mitch Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year,” Business Insider, October 22, 2020.
78 “Pentagon pushes back on claim that US to leave Turkey’s Incirlik base,” Al-Monitor, September 16, 2020; Joseph
Trevithick, “Docs Show US to Massively Expand Footprint at Jordanian Air Base amid Spats with Turkey, Iraq,” The
Drive, January 14, 2019.
79 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, “Opportunities and
Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation,” House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa and Global Counterterrorism; and Subcommittee on Europe, Energy,
the Environment and Cyber, March 31, 2022, available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/opportunities-and-
challenges-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-examining-u-s-interests-and-regional-cooperation/.
80 Can Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond,” Jamestown Foundation, October 12,
2022; Jeffrey Mankoff, “As Russia Reels, Eurasia Roils,” War on the Rocks, October 11, 2022.
81 Saban Kardas, “The War in Ukraine and Turkey’s Cautious Counter-Balancing Against Russia,” German Marshall
Fund of the United States, March 3, 2022.
82 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press
Availability,” February 20, 2023.
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ambush-resistant (MRAP) vehicles83—as well as humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, Turkey’s
leaders likely hope to minimize spillover effects to Turkey’s national security and economy, and
this might partly explain Turkey’s continued engagement with Russia and desires to help mediate
the conflict (discussed below).
In January 2023, a media outlet reported that Turkey began transferring some dual-purpose
improved conventional munitions (or DPICMs, which are artillery-fired cluster munitions) to
Ukraine in November 2022. The report cited various observers debating the potential battlefield
impact and humanitarian implications of the weapon’s use.84 Turkish and Ukrainian officials have
denied that any such transfers have occurred.85
Turkey-Ukraine Defense Cooperation
Turkey and Ukraine have strengthened their relations since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014.86 In 2017, a
Turkish security analyst attributed these closer ties to growing mutual interests in countering Russian influence in
the Black Sea region and in sharing military technology to expand and increase the self-sufficiency of their
respective defense industries.87 Since 2020, the two countries have signed multiple agreements signifying closer
cooperation, and also signed a broader free trade agreement (pending ratification) in February 2022.88
In line with these agreements, Turkish and Ukrainian companies have engaged in or planned a significant expansion
of defense transactions, including a number of joint development or co-production initiatives.89 Turkish expertise
with drone and other aircraft and naval platforms complements Ukrainian skil s in designing and constructing
aerospace engines and missiles.90 As part of the deepening bilateral defense cooperation, Turkey has sold several
Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine since 2019,91 and some reports have suggested that the
manufacturer has delivered additional TB2s to Ukraine at various times since Russia’s 2022 invasion.92 Additionally,
Turkey is helping establish Ukraine’s naval capabilities by producing corvettes (small warships) for export.93
Turkey’s maintenance of close relations with both Russia and Ukraine, and its ability to regulate
access to the Straits has put it in a position to mediate between the parties on various issues of
contention. In July 2022, Turkey and the United Nations entered into parallel agreements with
Russia and Ukraine to provide a Black Sea corridor for Ukrainian grain exports that could partly

83 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey sends 50 mine-resistant vehicles to Ukraine, with more expected,” Defense News, August
22, 2022; Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, “The Stalwart Ally: Türkiye’s Arms Deliveries to Ukraine,” Oryx,
November 21, 2022.
84 Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer, “Turkey Is Sending Cold War-Era Cluster Bombs to Ukraine,” Foreign Policy,
January 10, 2023.
85 Ragip Soylu, “Russia-Ukraine war: Turkey denies supplying Kyiv with cluster munitions,” Middle East Eye, January
14, 2023.
86 For information on the Crimea invasion, see CRS Report R45008, Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and
U.S. Policy, by Cory Welt.
87 Metin Gurcan, “Turkey-Ukraine defense industry ties are booming,” Al-Monitor, May 1, 2017.
88 “Turkey, Ukraine Sign Military Cooperation Agreements,” Associated Press, October 16, 2020; Christopher Isajiw,
“Free trade and drones: Turkey and Ukraine strengthen strategic ties,” Atlantic Council, February 11, 2022.
89 Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond.”
90 Ibid.
91 Dorian Jones, “Turkey Strengthens Defense Industry with Its Ukraine Partnership,” Voice of America, February 4,
2022.
92 David Hambling, “New Bayraktar Drones Still Seem to Be Reaching Ukraine,” Forbes, May 10, 2022. The TB2’s
main producer, Baykar Technology, is planning to build a $100 million factory in Ukraine that could be in position
within about three years to manufacture the full range of the company’s drones—doubling Baykar’s overall production
capacity. Jared Malsin, “Erdogan Seizes Chance to Give Turkey a Global Role,” Wall Street Journal, November 7,
2022.
93 Kate Tringham, “Update: Turkey launches first Ada-class corvette for Ukraine and cuts steel for second,” Janes
Navy International, October 3, 2022.
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alleviate global supply concerns.94 Under the deal, which currently runs until May 2023, Turkey,
Russia, Ukraine, and the U.N. have representatives at a joint coordination center in Istanbul to
oversee implementation and inspect ships to prevent weapons smuggling.95 President Biden has
expressed appreciation for Turkey’s efforts.96
Turkey-Russia Economic and Energy Cooperation
Turkish officials have sought to minimize any negative economic impact Turkey might face from
the Russia-Ukraine war, partly through boosting various forms of economic and energy
cooperation with Russia. These efforts may stem from Turkish leaders’ concerns about improving
the country’s economic profile in advance of 2023 elections.97 The Turkish government has not
joined economic sanctions against Russia or closed its airspace to Russian civilian flights.
In August 2022, Presidents Erdogan and Putin publicly agreed to bolster Turkey-Russia
cooperation across economic sectors.98 Turkey’s Russia-related dealings could potentially lead to
Western secondary sanctions against Turkey for facilitating Russian sanctions evasion. During a
February 2023 trip to Turkey and the United Arab Emirates to emphasize U.S. concerns about the
dangers of “dark money flowing through their financial systems,” Brian Nelson, Under Secretary
of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, delivered the following remarks to
leaders of Turkish financial institutions:
We of course recognize Türkiye’s reliance on Russian energy imports and trade in
agricultural goods, and continue to work to mitigate adverse impacts to these economic
activities.
However, the marked rise over the past year in non-essential Turkish exports or re-exports
to Russia makes the Turkish private sector particularly vulnerable to reputational and
sanctions risks. This is being driven by Moscow....
In engaging with sanctioned Russian entities, Turkish businesses and banks could put
themselves at risk of sanctions and a potential loss of access to G7 markets and
correspondent relationships.
Turkish businesses and banks should also take extra precaution to avoid transactions
related to potential dual-use technology transfers that could be used by the Russian
military-industrial complex.99
Some Turkish banks and companies appear to be limiting or considering limits on certain types of
transactions and services with Russian businesses.100 Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu
has denied that Turkish businesses are exporting electronic or technological products with

94 “Ukraine, Russia agree to export grain, ending a standoff that threatened food supply,” Associated Press, July 22,
2022.
95 See https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/background.
96 White House, “Readout of President Biden’s Meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkiye,” November
15, 2022.
97 Patricia Cohen, “Turkey Tightens Energy Ties with Russia as Other Nations Step Back,” New York Times, December
10, 2022.
98 “Russia’s Putin, Turkey’s Erdogan agree to boost economic, energy cooperation,” Agence France Presse, August 5,
2022.
99 Department of the Treasury, “Remarks by U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson in Türkiye,” February 3, 2023. See also Jared Malsin, “Turkish Exports Aid
Moscow’s War Effort,” Wall Street Journal, February 4, 2023; Ben Hubbard, “U.S. Presses Its Partners to Weed Out
Illicit Trade With Moscow,” New York Times, February 5, 2023.
100 Jonathan Spicer, “U.S. warns Turkey on exports seen to boost Russia’s war effort,” Reuters, February 4, 2023.
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potential defense applications to Russia, but has publicly welcomed information sharing with
U.S. and EU counterparts to ensure that businesses do not use Turkey to bypass Western
sanctions.101 Reportedly, Turkey began in March 2023 to enforce curbs on sanctioned goods
transiting its territory to Russia.102 In April 2023, the Department of the Treasury placed sanctions
on two Turkey-based companies and associated persons for assisting Russia or Russian entities.103
NATO Accession Process for Sweden and Finland
Sweden and Finland formally applied to join NATO in May 2022, following Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine. Turkey objected to the formal start of the two countries’ accession process, delaying it
for more than a month. Under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the admission of new allies
requires the unanimous agreement of existing members.
The Turkish objections centered around claims that Sweden and Finland have supported or
harbored sympathies for groups that Turkey’s government deems to be terrorist organizations,
namely the Fethullah Gulen movement104 (which the government has blamed for involvement in
the 2016 failed coup) and the PKK.105 (The United States and EU also classify the PKK as a
terrorist group, but not the Gulen movement.) Turkey demanded that Sweden and Finland lift the
suspension of arms sales they had maintained against Turkey since its 2019 incursion into Syria
against the PKK-linked Kurdish group (the People’s Protection Units—Kurdish acronym YPG)
that has partnered with the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition.106 Turkey removed its objections
to starting the accession process after NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg mediated a June
2022 memorandum between Turkey, Sweden, and Finland. In the trilateral memorandum, the
three countries confirmed that no arms embargoes remain in place between them. Further,
Sweden and Finland agreed not to support the YPG or Gulen movement, and pledged to work
against the PKK.107
Since then, Turkey has continued to press Sweden and Finland to extradite people that Turkey
considers to be terrorists. Under the June 2022 trilateral memorandum, Sweden and Finland
agreed to address Turkey’s pending deportation or extradition requests in various ways, but did
not commit to specific outcomes in those cases.108 Sweden’s prime minister and other sources
have indicated that neither Sweden nor Finland are inclined to make political decisions on
extradition that contravene domestic judicial findings conducted under due process and the rule of
law.109 In January 2023, Turkish presidential adviser Ibrahim Kalin said that Turkey would only

101 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press
Availability.”
102 “Turkey Blocks Transit of Goods Sanctioned by EU, US to Russia,” Bloomberg, March 10, 2023.
103 Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Russian Financial Facilitators and Sanctions Evaders Around the
World,” April 12, 2023.
104 For more information on Gulen and the movement, see archived CRS In Focus IF10444, Fethullah Gulen, Turkey,
and the United States: A Reference, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
105 Semih Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?” Al-Monitor, May 17,
2022.
106 Sources citing links between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include State Department, Country
Reports on Terrorism 2020, Syria; Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux”; Barak
Barfi, Ascent of the PYD and the SDF, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2016.
107 Memorandum text available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220628-trilat-
memo.pdf.
108 Ibid.
109 Steven Erlanger, “Sweden Says Turkey Terms on NATO Bid Go Too Far,” New York Times, January 10, 2023; Ben
(continued...)
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be in a position to agree to Sweden’s accession after it passed new anti-terror laws, a process he
estimated would take about six months.110 Erdogan then called on Sweden and Finland to
extradite “around 130” people.111
In January 2023, the Wall Street Journal cited unnamed U.S. officials predicting that
congressional approval of a possible F-16 sale to Turkey (see “Congressional Notification
Process” below) would be tied to Turkish approval of Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO
accession.112 Several Senators from both parties, including Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(SFRC) Ranking Member Jim Risch and the 29 who wrote a February 2023 letter to President
Biden, have indicated that they may only consider supporting an F-16 sale to Turkey if accession
moves forward for both Sweden and Finland.113 In March, Erdogan hosted Finnish President
Sauli Niinisto in Turkey and expressed his support for Finland’s accession, and then Turkey’s
parliament approved it later in the month,114 paving the way for Finland’s formal accession in
April.
Although Turkey’s parliament has ratified accession protocols for Finland, it has not done so for
Sweden as of mid-May. (To date, Hungary also has not approved Swedish accession.) Sweden’s
parliament passed new anti-terrorism legislation in May 2023, which will take effect in early
June.115 Anticipating the legislation’s likely passage, Turkish presidential spokesperson Ibrahim
Kalin said that when it comes into effect, Sweden could start taking “more decisive, concrete, and
fruitful steps to address our security concerns,” adding, “we’ll see how fast they can move.”116 It
is unclear (1) whether and when Turkish ratification might proceed after that, (2) if Turkey’s
leadership after its elections might demand further Swedish actions, and (3) whether a potential
future Turkish parliament would act in line with the Turkish president’s wishes.117 Secretary of
Defense Lloyd Austin and NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg have both stated hopes for
Turkey to approve Sweden’s NATO membership—thus placing both Sweden and Finland within
NATO—by the time of the alliance’s July 11-12 summit in Lithuania.118

Keith, “Turkey’s Erdoğan Deploys Sweden and Finland’s NATO Membership Bids to Further His Repression,” Just
Security, October 28, 2022.
110 “Turkey ‘Not in a Position’ to Ratify Swedish NATO Bid,” Agence France Presse, January 14, 2023.
111 “Sweden, Finland must send up to 130 ‘terrorists’ to Turkey for NATO bid, Erdogan says,” Reuters, January 16,
2023.
112 Jared Malsin and Vivian Salama, “Biden Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey,” Wall
Street Journal, January 13, 2023.
113 Marc Rod, “Turkey risks ‘serious consequences’ if it blocks Sweden, Finland NATO accession, Risch warns,”
Jewish Insider, February 6, 2023; Text of February 2, 2023 letter from 29 Senators to President Biden available at
https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf. In August 2022, Senate Treaty Document 117-3
approved ratification by a 95-1 vote.
114 Ezgi Akin, “Turkey ratifies Finland’s NATO membership,” Al-Monitor, March 30, 2023.
115 “Swedes tighten terror laws, likely to help NATO membership,” Associated Press, May 3, 2023.
116 Filiz Kinik Oz, “Türkiye leaves door open to Sweden’s NATO bid: Turkish presidential spokesperson,” Anadolu
Agency, March 26, 2023.
117 Article 87 of Turkey’s constitution gives the Turkish parliament (or Grand National Assembly) the authority to
ratify international treaties. Unofficial English translation available at https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/
Turkey_2017.pdf?lang=en.
118 Department of Defense, “Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Joint Press Conference with Swedish Defense
Minister Pal Jonson in Stockholm, Sweden,” April 19, 2023; “Stoltenberg sees progress in Sweden’s NATO bid, talks
to resume in March,” Reuters, February 23, 2023.
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Syria119
Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s conflict since it started in 2011 has been complicated and costly
and has severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties.120 Turkey’s priorities in Syria’s civil war have evolved
during the course of the conflict. While Turkey still opposes Syrian President Bashar al Asad, it
has engaged in a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (which support Asad)
since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Turkey and the United States have
engaged in similarly inconsistent interactions in northern Syria east of the Euphrates River, where
U.S. forces have been based.
Since at least 2014, Turkey has actively sought to thwart the Syrian Kurdish YPG from
establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern border with Turkey. Turkey’s government
considers the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), to be a major
threat to Turkish security, based on Turkish concerns that YPG/PYD gains have emboldened the
PKK (which has links to the YPG/PYD) in its domestic conflict with Turkish authorities.121 The
YPG/PYD has a leading role within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an umbrella group
including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements that became the main U.S. ground force partner
against the Islamic State in 2015. Turkish-led military operations in October 2019 to seize areas
of northeastern Syria from the SDF—after U.S. Special Forces pulled back from the border
area—led to major criticism of and proposed action against Turkey in Congress.122 Turkey has set
up local councils in areas of northern Syria that Turkey and Turkish-supported Syrian armed
opposition groups—generally referred to under the moniker of the Syrian National Army
(SNA)—have occupied since 2016 (see Figure A-4).
Erdogan has hinted at the possibility of repairing relations with Asad, after more than a decade in
which Turkey has sought an end to Asad’s rule. Since late 2022, senior Turkish officials have held
a number of meetings with Syrian government counterparts in Russia.123 Turkey is seeking
Syria’s help to push YPG fighters farther from the border and facilitate the return of Syrian
refugees living in Turkey. Asad reportedly wants full Turkish withdrawal in return.124 It is unclear
whether the two leaders can compromise and how that would affect Turkey’s relationship with the
SNA and the overall dynamic with other stakeholders in northern Syria. In response to a question
about potential Turkey-Syria rapprochement, the State Department spokesperson has said that
U.S. officials have told allies that now is not the time to normalize or upgrade relations with the
Asad regime.125
U.S.-Turkey Arms Sales Issues
How Turkey procures key weapons systems is relevant to U.S. policy in part because it affects
Turkey’s partnerships with major powers and the country’s role within NATO. For decades,

119 See CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Carla E. Humud.
120 For background, see Burak Kadercan, “Making Sense of Turkey’s Syria Strategy: A ‘Turkish Tragedy’ in the
Making,” War on the Rocks, August 4, 2017.
121 See, for example, Soner Cagaptay, “U.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and
YPG,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 7, 2019. For sources linking the PKK to the YPG (or PKK
affiliates in Syria), see footnote 106.
122 Rachel Oswald, “Sanctions on Turkey go front and center as Congress returns,” Roll Call, October 15, 2019.
123 “Moscow hosts more Turkey-Syria rapprochement talks,” Associated Press, April 25, 2023.
124 “Syria resisting Russia’s efforts to broker Turkey summit, sources say,” Reuters, December 5, 2022.
125 State Department Press Briefing, January 3, 2023.
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Turkey has relied on certain U.S.-origin equipment such as aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and
other munitions to maintain military strength.126
Russian S-400 Acquisition: Removal from F-35 Program,
U.S. Sanctions, and Congressional Holds
Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 system, which Turkey ordered in 2017 and Russia
delivered in 2019,127 has significant implications for Turkey’s relations with Russia, the United
States, and other NATO countries. As a direct result of the transaction, the Trump Administration
removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in July 2019, and imposed sanctions
under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) on
Turkey’s defense procurement agency in December 2020.128 In explaining the U.S. decision to
remove Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019, the Defense Department rejected the idea of
Turkey fielding a Russian intelligence collection platform (housed within the S-400) that could
detect the stealth capabilities of F-35s in Turkey.129 Additionally, Section 1245 of the FY2020
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92) prohibits the transfer of F-35s to
Turkey unless the Secretaries of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer possesses the S-
400. Turkey has conducted some testing of the S-400 but does not appear to have made the
system generally operational. Turkey may need to forgo possession or use of the S-400 in order to
have CAATSA sanctions removed.
An August 2020 article reported that some congressional committee leaders placed holds on
major new U.S.-origin arms sales to Turkey in connection with the S-400 transaction. The
executive branch customarily defers to such holds, though they are not legally binding.130 Such a
disruption to U.S. defense transactions with Turkey had not occurred since the 1975-1978
embargo over Cyprus.131
Possible F-16 Sale and Congressional Views
Background (Including Turkey-Greece Issues)
In the fall of 2021, Turkish officials stated that they had requested to purchase 40 new F-16
fighter aircraft from the United States and to upgrade 80 F-16s from Turkey’s aging fleet.132

126 Turkey also has procurement and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany
(submarines), Italy (helicopters and reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype).
127 “Turkey, Russia sign deal on supply of S-400 missiles,” Reuters, December 29, 2017. According to this source,
Turkey and Russia reached agreement on the sale of at least one S-400 system for $2.5 billion, with the possibility of a
second system to come later.
128 Archived CRS Insight IN11557, Turkey: U.S. Sanctions Under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA), by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas; State Department, “CAATSA Section 231 ‘Imposition
of Sanctions on Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries,’” December 14, 2020. Sanctions were not imposed on other
Turkish ministries or agencies that might independently conduct defense-related transactions.
129 Department of Defense, “Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey Accepting
Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System,” July 17, 2019.
130 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.
131 Valerie Insinna et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,” Defense News,
August 12, 2020.
132 For information on Turkey’s F-16s, see “Turkey – Air Force,” Janes World Air Forces, June 23, 2021 (posted
November 7, 2022); “Turkey” at https://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article21.html.
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President Biden reportedly discussed the F-16 request with Erdogan during an October 2021 G20
meeting in Rome, indicating that the request would go through the regular arms sales consultation
and notification process with Congress.133 Upgrades of Turkey’s F-16 aircraft to the Block 70/72
Viper configuration could include a new radar, other software and hardware enhancements, and
structural improvements that significantly extend each aircraft’s service life.134
After Russia’s early 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s potential to boost NATO’s strategic and
military strengths amid an evolving European security crisis may have increased the
Administration’s interest in moving forward with an F-16 transaction with Turkey. While Turkey
has acted more independently of the West under Erdogan, its sizable military and geographic
location remains important for the alliance.135 Turkey partners in a number of ways with the
United States and its other allies—including by using F-16s in NATO missions based in the Baltic
and Mediterranean Sea regions.136
Responding to criticism of a possible F-16 sale from 53 Members of Congress in a February 2022
letter,137 a State Department official wrote in March that Turkey’s support for Ukraine was “an
important deterrent to malign influence in the region.”138 While acknowledging that any sale
would require congressional notification, the official added, “The Administration believes that
there are nonetheless compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and capability interests, as well
as U.S. national security, economic and commercial interests that are supported by appropriate
U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.”139
The modernization of much of Turkey’s F-16 fleet could give Turkey time to acquire or design a
more advanced fighter,140 though delivery of new F-16s could face a production backlog.141
According to Lockheed Martin, the F-16 production rate at the Greenville, South Carolina plant is
four aircraft per month, though it plans to increase this rate with a growing list of buyers.142 Other
countries receiving or possibly receiving new or upgraded F-16Vs include Greece, Taiwan,

133 “Biden talks F-16s, raises human rights in meeting with Turkey’s Erdogan,” Reuters, October 31, 2021; Diego
Cupolo, “In troubled US-Turkey relations, F-16 deal seen as path for dialogue,” Al-Monitor, November 1, 2021. For
background information, see CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.
134 See description at https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/aero/documents/F-16/22-
06570_F-16-Viper-6Panel_Digital.pdf.
135 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey.
136 Ibid.; “U.S. Relations with Turkey (Türkiye),” Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, January 9, 2023; Kasapoglu,
“Turkey,” The Nations of NATO, pp. 103-105; Gareth Jennings, “Turkey joins NATO Baltic Air Policing for first time
since 2006,” Janes Defence Weekly, July 7, 2021; NATO Allied Air Command, “Turkish E-7T Provides Airborne
Command and Control for Exercise Ramstein Alloy,” April 14, 2022.
137 Text of letter available at https://pallone.house.gov/sites/pallone.house.gov/files/
20220123%20Letter%20on%20Turkey%20F-16%20Request.pdf.
138 Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Naz Durakoglu, quoted in Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. says
potential F-16 sale to Turkey would serve U.S. interests, NATO – letter,” Reuters, April 6, 2022.
139 Ibid.
140 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts,” Defense News, March 9,
2022. Turkey does have a limited ability to make modifications to some of its F-16s. It has reportedly been working
with various Turkish domestic contractors to upgrade the avionics in the country’s 36 Block 30 aircraft. It cannot
domestically upgrade the avionics of its other F-16s—thus explaining its interest in a purchase from the United
States—because it only has source codes for Block 30 versions. Burak Ege Bekdil, “Locally made AESA radar to
extend life of Turkish F-16 jets,” Defense News, November 17, 2022; Gastón Dubois, “Project ÖZGÜR: Turkey starts
modernizing its F-16 with indigenous technology,” Aviacionline, June 3, 2022.
141 Bryant Harris and Stephen Losey, “Turkey F-16 sale in congressional limbo amid Lockheed backlog,” Defense
News, January 18, 2023.
142 Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A, provided to CRS on February 23, 2023.
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Singapore, South Korea, Morocco, Bahrain, Jordan, Bulgaria, the Philippines, and Slovakia.143
Assuming the parties finalize contracts for Jordan and Bulgaria, Lockheed will have a backlog of
148 aircraft.144 Based on current production rates, it could take three years or more for Turkey to
start accepting delivery of new F-16Vs.
If unable to upgrade their F-16 fleet, Turkish officials have hinted that they might consider
purchasing Western European alternatives.145 Turkey is reportedly exploring Eurofighter
Typhoons as a potential alternative to F-16s,146 but it is unclear if consortium partner Germany
would approve such a sale.147 Additionally, Turkey’s air force could face difficulties adjusting to a
non-F-16 platform.148 Moreover, European weapons transfers to Turkey could be subject to the
congressional review process described below if such weapons were to include U.S.-origin
defense articles meeting the specified notification threshold.149 Previously, Congress received
notification in connection with some non-NATO countries’ (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar)
proposed purchases of U.S. equipment for Typhoons.150 If Turkey cannot procure F-16s and
encounters obstacles to European alternatives, its next steps toward preserving its military
aviation capabilities and NATO interoperability would be unclear. The State Department’s ICS for
Turkey states
If NATO and the West continue to not support Turkey’s pursuit of defense modernization,
Turkey may be forced to turn to Russia or China to fulfil those defense capability gaps in
areas where its indigenous defense industry cannot produce the required capability.151
At the end of the June 2022 NATO summit in Spain, where Turkey agreed to allow the Sweden-
Finland accession process to move forward (pending final Turkish ratification) and President
Biden met with President Erdogan, Biden expressed support for selling new F-16s to Turkey as
well as for upgrades. He also voiced confidence in obtaining congressional support.152 However,
SFRC Chairman Bob Menendez has consistently expressed disapproval due to what he has
termed Erdogan’s “abuses across the region.”153
In addition to ongoing U.S.-Turkey tensions regarding Syrian Kurdish groups in northern Syria,
Turkey-Greece disputes regarding overflights of contested areas and other long-standing Aegean
Sea issues (referenced in the text box below) spiked in 2022 and attracted close congressional

143 Ibid.; Arda Mevlutoglu, “F-16Vs Instead of F-35s: What’s behind Turkey’s Request?” Politics Today, November
22, 2021.
144 Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A.
145 Paul Iddon, “Turkey Questions the Wisdom of Having an All-American Air Force,” Forbes, February 6, 2023.
146 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines,” Middle East Eye,
January 20, 2023.
147 Tanmay Kadam, “Can Russian Su-35 Fighters Triumph Eurofighter Typhoons as Turkey Explores Alternative to
‘Backlog-Ridden’ F-16 Jets?” EurAsian Times, January 29, 2023.
148 Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines.”
149 See footnote 171.
150 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Transmittal 08-101, September 26, 2008 (73 Federal Register
61399, October 16, 2008); State Department Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) Transmittal 17-079, May
24, 2019 (84 Federal Register 65608, November 27, 2019); DSCA Transmittal 20-11, November 4, 2021; DDTC
Transmittal 18-014, November 2, 2018 (84 Federal Register 65608, November 27, 2019); DDTC Transmittal 20-074,
September 2, 2021 (86 Federal Register 73075, December 23, 2021).
151 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey.
152 “Biden supports F-16 sale to Turkey, is confident about congressional approval,” Reuters, June 30, 2022.
153 Twitter, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 7, 2022 – 10:57 AM, at https://twitter.com/SFRCdems/
status/1600519759493304321.
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attention.154 Erdogan suspended dialogue with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis after
Mitsotakis appeared to raise concern about U.S.-Turkey arms transactions while addressing a
May 2022 joint session of Congress.155 In December, the final version of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L.
117-263) excluded a House-passed condition on F-16 sales to Turkey (Section 1271 of H.R.
7900) related to potential overflights of Greek territory. However, the joint explanatory statement
accompanying the NDAA included a provision stating, “We believe that North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) allies should not conduct unauthorized territorial overflights of another
NATO ally’s airspace.”156 While Turkey-Greece disputes persist, tensions have somewhat
subsided in early 2023. Erdogan and Mitsotakis have renewed contacts in the context of positive
diplomatic momentum from Greek post-earthquake relief assistance to Turkey.157
With U.S. officials already having notified a possible upgrade of F-16s for Greece to Congress in
2017,158 U.S. decisions on bolstering Turkey’s F-16 fleet could have significant implications for
the security balance between Turkey and Greece, and for relations involving the three
countries.159 In the past three years, Greece has strengthened its defense cooperation and relations
with the United States and a number of regional countries such as France, Israel, and Egypt.160
Enhanced U.S.-Greece defense cooperation has included an expanded U.S. military presence and
increased U.S.-Greece and NATO military activities at Greek installations (see also text box
below).161
Turkey-Greece-Cyprus Tensions: Background and Some Ongoing Issues162
Since the 1970s, disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea and broader
Eastern Mediterranean have been a major point of contention, bringing the sides close to military conflict on
several occasions. The disputes, which have their roots in territorial changes after World War I, revolve around
contested borders involving the two countries’ territorial waters, national airspace, exclusive economic zones
(including energy claims), islands (and their use for military purposes), and continental shelves (see Figure A-5
and Figure A-6 for maps of some of the areas in dispute).
These tensions are related to and further complicated by one of the region’s major unresolved conflicts, the de
facto political division of Cyprus along ethnic lines that dates from the 1974 military clash in which Turkish forces
invaded parts of the island to prevent the ethnic Greek leadership from unifying Cyprus with Greece. The
internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus (sometimes referred to as Cyprus), which has close ties to Greece,
claims jurisdiction over the entire island, but its effective administrative control is limited to the southern two-
thirds, where Greek Cypriots comprise a majority. Turkish Cypriots administer the northern one-third and are
backed by Turkey, including a Turkish military contingent there since the 1974 clash.163 In 1983, Turkish Cypriot

154 Alexis Heraclides, “The unresolved Aegean dispute: Problems and prospects,” Greece and Turkey in Conflict and
Cooperation, New York: Routledge, 2019, pp. 89-108; Ryan Gingeras, “Dogfight over the Aegean: Turkish-Greek
Relations in Light of Ukraine,” War on the Rocks, June 8, 2022.
155 Greek Prime Minister’s website, “Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ address to the Joint Session of the U.S.
Congress,” May 17, 2022. Erdogan and Mitsotakis have spoken in the wake of the February 2023 earthquakes, in the
context of Greek assistance in relief and recovery efforts.
156 Joint explanatory statement available at https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20221205/BILLS-117HR7776EAS-
RCP117-70-JES.pdf.
157 “Turkey, Greece take strides in Ankara meeting as aid diplomacy continues,” Al-Monitor, March 22, 2023.
158 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Government of Greece – Upgrade of F-16 Aircraft to F-16 Block V
Configuration,” Transmittal No. 17-54, October 17, 2017.
159 Aaron Stein, “You Go to War with the Turkey You Have, Not the Turkey You Want,” War on the Rocks, May 30,
2022.
160 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
161 State Department, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Greece,” October 31, 2022.
162 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
163 Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by several thousand Turkish Cypriot
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leaders proclaimed this part of the island the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” although no country other
than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot claim
to be legally invalid.
Turkish officials have complained about a significant new U.S. military presence at the Greek port of
Alexandroupoli (alt. Alexandroupolis), located around 10-15 miles from the Turkish border.164 U.S. officials have
explained that they are using the port as a transit hub to send equipment to allies and partners in the region as
part of a broader NATO response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.165 In the March 2022 congressional hearing
testimony mentioned above, Alan Makovsky said that having facilities at Alexandroupoli allows NATO to bypass
logjams or closures of the Straits to transport troops and materiel overland to allies and partners.166 After Turkish
Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said in October 2022 that the United States no longer maintains a balanced
approach in the Aegean,167 U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake released a statement saying that there has been
no shift in U.S. security posture to favor Turkey or Greece, and that the NATO allies’ col ective efforts are
focused on ending Russia’s war in Ukraine.168
Congressional Notification Process
In February 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly confirmed the Biden
Administration’s support for and engagement with Congress on a possible sale of F-16 fighter
aircraft to Turkey.169 One month earlier, media sources—citing unnamed U.S. officials—reported
that the Administration had provided informal notifications to Congress about possible F-16 sales
for Turkey and possible sales of up to 40 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to Greece. According to these
reports, the January informal notification on Turkey was for 40 new F-16 Vipers and 79 F-16
Viper upgrade packages, along with 900 air-to-air missiles and 800 bombs, at an estimated total
value of $20 billion.170
After the State Department informally notifies the SFRC and House Foreign Affairs Committee
(HFAC) of a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) or Direct Commercial Sale (DCS) of major
defense equipment, articles, and/or services meeting certain value thresholds, the proposed FMS
or DCS requires formal notification to Congress before it can proceed. In most cases, the State
Department submits the formal notification 20 to 40 days after informal notification.171 This time

soldiers). This presence is countered by a Greek Cypriot force of approximately 12,000 with reported access to between
50,000 and 75,000 reserves. “Cyprus - Army,” Janes Sentinel Security Assessment - Eastern Mediterranean, February
3, 2021. The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission (UNFICYP) of approximately 900 personnel within a
buffer zone headquartered in Cyprus’s divided capital of Nicosia. The United Kingdom maintains approximately 3,000
personnel at two sovereign base areas on the southern portion of the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
164 Niki Kitsantonis and Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Sleepy Greek Port Turns into Pivotal Transit Point for American
Military,” New York Times, August 19, 2022.
165 Ibid.; Department of Defense News, “Strategic Port Access Aids Support to Ukraine, Austin Tells Greek Defense
Minister,” July 18, 2022.
166 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, “Opportunities and Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining
U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation.”
167 “Cavusoglu says US siding against Turkey in the Aegean, East Med,” Kathimerini, October 21, 2022.
168 Twitter, U.S. Embassy Türkiye, October 18, 2022 – 3:32 AM, at https://twitter.com/USEmbassyTurkey/status/
1582273449145212928.
169 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press
Availability.”
170 “US working with Congress towards Turkey F-16 sale,” Al-Monitor, January 13, 2023; Malsin and Salama, “Biden
Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey”; Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, “U.S. Plan to
Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition,” New York Times, January 14, 2023.
171 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. The thresholds for NATO
allies (and Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, and New Zealand) are $25 million for the sale, enhancement, or
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period gives the committees opportunity to raise concerns in a confidential “tiered review”
process. If a Member of Congress places a hold (as mentioned earlier, not legally binding) on the
proposed transaction, formal notification usually does not proceed.172 Under provisions of the
Arms Export Control Act (AECA, P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320), the executive branch can proceed
with a sale—if not blocked by legislation—15 days (for NATO allies like Turkey and Greece)
after formal notification.173
As mentioned above, congressional consideration of the potential F-16 sale to Turkey may
depend on Turkey’s approval of NATO accession for both Sweden and Finland.174 With Turkey
already having approved Finland’s NATO membership, the U.S. focus has turned to Turkey’s
approach to Sweden’s situation. Shortly after the reported informal notifications of possible
aircraft sales to Greece and Turkey, the New York Times cited Chairman Menendez as welcoming
the F-35 sale to Greece while strongly opposing the F-16 sale to Turkey. Regarding the F-16 sale,
he said
President Erdogan continues to undermine international law, disregard human rights and
democratic norms, and engage in alarming and destabilizing behavior in Turkey and
against neighboring NATO allies. Until Erdogan ceases his threats, improves his human
rights record at home—including by releasing journalists and political opposition—and
begins to act like a trusted ally should, I will not approve this sale.175
In a March SFRC hearing featuring Secretary Blinken, Chairman Menendez elaborated on
objections he has against various Turkish foreign and domestic policies, and opined that Turkey
does not deserve to receive F-16s unless it addresses some of the issues he mentioned.176
The Administration’s reported informal notifications of potential sales to Turkey and Greece
come amid ongoing tensions between the two countries over maritime boundaries and U.S.
regional involvement (as mentioned above).177 By harmonizing the informal notification on F-35s
for Greece with the one on F-16s for Turkey, the Administration may be seeking to reassure
Greek leaders and popular opinion that the United States is not favoring Turkey over Greece.178
One journalist has argued
A Greek acquisition of F-35s—coupled with the ongoing procurement of two dozen 4.5-
generation Dassault Rafale F3R fighters from France and the upgrade of the bulk of its F-
16 fleet to the most advanced Block 72 configuration—will give the Hellenic Air Force a
technological edge over its much larger Turkish counterpart. That will remain the case even
if Turkey secures this F-16 deal.179

upgrading of major defense equipment; $100 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of defense articles and
defense services; and $300 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of design and construction services. For all
other countries, the thresholds are $14 million, $50 million, and $200 million, respectively.
172 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.
173 Ibid.; CRS In Focus IF11533, Modifying or Ending Sales of U.S.-Origin Defense Articles, by Paul K. Kerr and
Liana W. Rosen.
174 See footnote 112 and footnote 113.
175 Crowley and Wong, “U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.” Alexander Ward et al.,
“Menendez vows to block plan to sell fighter jets to Turkey,” Politico, January 13, 2023.
176 SFRC Hearing, March 22, 2023, transcript available at https://plus.cq.com/alertmatch/558656174?0&deliveryId=
105309916&uid=congressionaltranscripts-7694906.
177 CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
178 Malsin and Salama, “Biden Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey”; Crowley and Wong,
“U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.”
179 Paul Iddon, “Balance of Power: Why the Biden Administration Wants to Sell Turkey F-16s and Greece F-35s,”
Forbes, January 16, 2023.
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In response to the news of a possible F-35 sale to Greece, Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu
called on the United States to “pay attention” to the balance of power in the region.180
As Turkey approaches its May 28 presidential run-off election, congressional committee leaders’
concerns regarding a possible F-16 sale appear to endure. At some point, the Administration may
consider whether, when, and how to address congressional concerns, and/or move forward with a
formal notification of the sale. In April 2023, the Administration formally notified a possible sale
of avionics that Turkey had requested in 2019 to increase the NATO interoperability of its F-16s
on certain information sharing and flight safety issues.181 Despite apparent congressional
acquiescence to the avionics sale, SFRC Chairman Menendez said afterward that he continues to
oppose the sale of F-16s to Turkey.182

180 Andrew Wilks, “Turkish FM travels to Washington seeking to seal deal for F-16 fighter jets,” Al-Monitor, January
17, 2023.
181 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Türkiye – F-16 Avionics Upgrade,” Transmittal No. 21-34, April 17, 2023;
CRS correspondence with Turkish official, April 17, 2023.
182 “Menendez reiterates opposition to sale of F-16 fighters to Turkey,” Kathimerini, April 22, 2023.
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Appendix A. Maps, Facts, and Figures
Figure A-1. Turkey at a Glance

Geography
Area: 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas
People
Population: 83,593,483. Most populous cities: Istanbul 15.8 mil, Ankara 5.4 mil, Izmir 3.1 mil,
Bursa 2.1 mil, Adana 1.8 mil, Gaziantep 1.8 mil.
% of population 14 or younger: 22.1% (2022)
Ethnic groups: Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 6%-11% (2016)
Religion: Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2%
Literacy: 96.7% (male 99.1%, female 94.4%) (2019)
Economy
GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity): $36,176
Real GDP growth: 2.8%
Inflation: 43.7% (as of April 2023)
Unemployment: 10.4%
Budget deficit as % of GDP: 3.8%
Public debt as % of GDP: 37.0%
Current account deficit as % of GDP: 4.4%
International currency reserves: $128.3 bil ion
Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using
Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2023
projections unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database;
Economist Intelligence Unit; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook; and Turkish Statistical
Institute.

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Figure A-2. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey

Sources: Created by CRS using data gathered from the Department of Defense, NATO, and various media
outlets since 2011.
Note: All locations are approximate.

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Figure A-3. Map of Black Sea Region and Turkish Straits

Source: Nikkei Asia, March 2022.

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Figure A-4. Syria Conflict Map

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Figure A-5. Some Areas of Aegean Dispute

Source: Greek Reporter, June 2022, at https://greekreporter.com/2022/06/09/turkey-challenge-greece-
sovereignty-16-maps/.

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Figure A-6. Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean

Source: Main map created by The Economist, with slight modifications by CRS.
Note: As stated elsewhere in this report, in 1983, Turkish Cypriots administering a portion of the island of
Cyprus proclaimed that portion to be the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” though no country other
than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot
claim to be legally invalid.
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Appendix B. Profiles of Selected Turkish Party
Leaders
Recep Tayyip Erdogan—President of Turkey and Leader/Co-Founder of
the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
(pronounced air-doe-wan)
Born in 1954, Erdogan was raised in Istanbul and in his familial hometown of Rize on
the Black Sea coast. He attended a religious imam hatip secondary school in Istanbul.
In the 1970s, Erdogan studied business at what is today Marmara University, became a
business consultant and executive, and became politically active with the different
Turkish Islamist parties led by eventual prime minister Necmettin Erbakan.
Erdogan was elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994 but was removed from office,
imprisoned for six months, and banned from parliamentary politics for religious
incitement after publicly reciting a poem drawing from Islamic imagery. After
Erbakan’s government resigned under military pressure in 1997 and his Welfare Party
was disbanded, Erdogan became the founding chairman of the AKP in 2001. The AKP

won a decisive electoral victory in 2002, and has led the government ever since. After
the election, a legal change allowed Erdogan to run for parliament in a 2003 special
election. After he won, Erdogan replaced Abdul ah Gul as prime minister.
Erdogan and his personal popularity and charisma have been at the center of much of
the domestic and foreign policy change that has occurred in Turkey since he came to
power. Erdogan became Turkey’s first popularly elected president in August 2014 and
won reelection to a newly empowered presidency in June 2018. Many observers
assess that he seeks to consolidate power and to avoid the reopening of corruption
cases that could implicate him and close family members or associates.
Kemal Kilicdaroglu—Leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP)
(kuhl-utch-dahr-oh-loo)
Born in 1948 in Tunceli province in eastern Turkey to an Alevi (religious minority
with some relation to Shia Islam) background. Kilicdaroglu is the leader of the CHP,
which is the main opposition party and traditional political outlet of the Turkish
nationalist secular elite. In recent years, the party has also attracted various liberal and
social democratic constituencies.
After receiving an economics degree from what is now Gazi University in Ankara,
Kilicdaroglu had a civil service career—first with the Finance Ministry, then as the
director-general of the Social Security Organization. After retiring from the civil
service, Kilicdaroglu became politically active with the CHP and was elected to
parliament from Istanbul in 2002. He gained national prominence for his efforts to
root out corruption among AKP officials and the AKP-affiliated mayor of Ankara.
Kilicdaroglu was elected as party leader in 2010 but has since faced criticism for the
CHP’s failure to make electoral gains at the national level. The CHP made notable
gains—particularly in Istanbul and Ankara mayoral races—in 2019 local elections.
Devlet Bahceli—Leader of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP)
(bah-cheh-lee)
Born in 1948 in Osmaniye province in southern Turkey, Bahceli is the leader of the
MHP, which is the traditional Turkish nationalist party of Turkey that is known for
opposing political accommodation with the Kurds.
Bahceli moved to Istanbul for his secondary education, and received his higher
education, including a doctorate, from what is now Gazi University in Ankara. After a
career as an economics lecturer at Gazi University, he entered a political career as a
leader in what would become the MHP. He became the chairman of the MHP in 1997
and served as a deputy prime minister during a 1999-2002 coalition government. He
was initially elected to parliament in 2007.
Bahceli and the MHP have allied with Erdogan, providing support for the 2017
constitutional referendum and joining a parliamentary coalition with the AKP in 2018.
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Meral Aksener—Founder and Leader of the Good (Iyi) Party
(awk-sheh-nar)
Born in 1956 in Izmit in western Turkey to Muslims who had resettled in Turkey from
Greece, Aksener is the founder and leader of the Good Party. She founded the party
in 2017 as an alternative for nationalists and other Turks who oppose the MHP’s
alliance with Erdogan.
Aksener studied at Istanbul University and received a doctorate in history from
Marmara University, becoming a university lecturer before entering politics. She was
first elected to parliament in 1995 with the True Path Party, and served as interior
minister in the coalition government that was ultimately forced from office in 1997 by
a memorandum from Turkey’s military. She served in parliament with the MHP from

2007 to 2015 and served for most of that time as deputy speaker.
Aksener became a forceful opponent of Erdogan after the MHP agreed in 2016 to
provide him the necessary parliamentary support for a constitutional referendum
establishing a presidential system of government. She left the party and campaigned
vigorously against the proposed changes, which won adoption in 2017 despite the
controversy that attended the vote. After founding the Good Party, she ran as its
presidential candidate in the 2018 elections.

Author Information

Jim Zanotti
Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
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Congressional Research Service
R44000 · VERSION 104 · UPDATED
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