Authorizations and the Appropriations Process May 16, 2023
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the “power of the purse” by prohibiting expenditures “but
in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” As a result, legislation to provide for
James V. Saturno
government expenditures must adhere to the same requirements and conditions imposed on the
Specialist on Congress and
lawmaking process as any other measure. There is no constitutional or general statutory
the Legislative Process
prescription, however, that determines how this legislative power is to be exercised. Instead, the

manner in which the House and Senate have chosen to exercise this authority is a construct of
congressional rules and practices, which have evolved pursuant to the constitutional authority of

each chamber to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”
For discretionary spending, the exercise of this authority has resulted in the formalization of a process in which funding
decisions are made in a two-step process, in which separate legislation to establish or continue federal agencies, programs,
policies, projects, or activities is presumed to be enacted first, and legislation that provides funding for these purposes is
presumed to follow. In order for this two-step process to work, congressional rules therefore distinguish between legislation
that addresses questions of policy and that which addresses questions of funding and encourage their separate consideration.
In common usage, the terms used to describe these types of measures are authorizations and appropriations, respectively.
• An authorization may generally be described as any statutory provision that defines the authority of the
government to act. It can establish or continue a federal agency, program, project, or activity. Further, it
may establish policies and restrictions and deal with organizational and administrative matters. It may also,
explicitly or implicitly, authorize subsequent congressional action to provide appropriations. By itself,
however, an authorization does not provide funding for government activities.
• An appropriation may generally be described as a statutory provision that provides budget authority, thus
permitting a federal agency to incur obligations and make payments from the Treasury for specified
purposes, usually during a specified period of time. Discretionary spending encompasses appropriations not
mandated by existing law and therefore may be made available in appropriation acts in such amounts as
Congress chooses.
This principle is framed in the standing rules of the House and Senate in terms of generally limiting appropriations to
purposes previously authorized by law. Although this principle was generally observed in the early practices of both
chambers, it did not become a formal part of House rules until 1837 and Senate rules until 1850. As a construct of chamber
rules, this distinction is subject to interpretation by the House and Senate based on various technical issues related to the
precedents of the respective chamber; the existence of legislation defining the legal authority for particular federal agencies,
programs, policies, projects, or activities; and the relationship of such authority to the applicable appropriation.
In general, an appropriation is said to be authorized when it follows language defining the legal authority for a federal
agency, program, policy, project, or activity that will be applicable in the same fiscal year for which the appropriation is to be
enacted. In contrast, an appropriation is often described as “unauthorized” when no such authority has been enacted or, if
previously enacted, has terminated or expired. Because this distinction is based on chamber rules, rather than a constitutional
or general statutory requirement, Congress may choose nevertheless to appropriate funds. In such cases, according to the
Government Accountability Office, “the enacted appropriation, in effect, carries its own authorization and is available to the
agency for obligation and expenditure.”
This report provides an analysis of the relation of authorizations and appropriations, the impact of this distinction on the
consideration of appropriations measures, and its significance for understanding how appropriations and other legislation
work in conjunction to determine how agencies may spend appropriated funds.
Congressional Research Service

Authorizations and the Appropriations Process

Introduction
Article I, Section 9, of the U.S. Constitution, known as the Appropriations Clause, grants
Congress the “power of the purse” by prohibiting expenditures “but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law.” As a result, legislation to provide for government expenditures
must adhere to the same requirements imposed on the lawmaking process as any other measure.
There is no constitutional prescription, however, that determines how this legislative power is to
be exercised. Instead, the manner in which the House and Senate have chosen to exercise this
authority is a construct of congressional rules and practices, which have evolved pursuant to the
constitutional authority in Article I, Section 5, for each chamber to “determine the Rules of its
Proceedings.”
For spending provided and controlled on an annual basis in appropriations acts—referred to as
discretionary spending—the exercise of this authority has resulted in the formalization of a
process in which funding decisions are made in a two-step process. First, legislation is enacted
that establishes or continues federal agencies, programs, policies, projects, or activities, and
legislation that provides funding for these purposes is presumed to follow. In order for this two-
step process to work, congressional rules therefore distinguish between legislation that addresses
questions of policy and that which addresses questions of funding and encourage their separate
consideration.1 In common usage, the terms used to describe these types of measures are
authorizations and appropriations:
• An authorization may generally be described as any statutory provision that defines the
authority of the government to act. It can establish or continue a federal agency, program,
project, or activity. Further, it may establish policies and restrictions and deal with
organizational and administrative matters. It may also, explicitly or implicitly, authorize
subsequent congressional action to provide appropriations. By itself, however, an
authorization does not provide spending authority.
• An appropriation may generally be described as a statutory provision that provides
budget authority, thus permitting a federal agency to incur obligations and make
payments from the Treasury for specified purposes, usually during a specified period of
time.2
Authorizations are not limited by congressional rules to a specific duration. They may be
permanent or they may have ‘‘sunset’’ provisions that require their periodic review.
Appropriations, however, are enacted in a characteristically annual cycle. Limiting appropriations
to purposes “previously authorized by law” imposes a general requirement for sequential action.
It is not understood, however, to entail a requirement that authorizing legislation also be enacted
on an annual (or periodic) cycle or in the same year as appropriations action.
The primary purpose of authorizations is to provide an agency with authority and direction that
allows it to administer a program or engage in an activity. Measures that provide such authority
are sometimes referred to as “organic” or “enabling” authorizations. Although authorizations do
not provide spending authority, they may shape agency authority to obligate funds because an
agency may perform only those functions for which it has received statutory authority in some
form. Authorizing legislation may also include language that provides for an “authorizations of

1 House Rule XXI, clause 2, and Senate Rule XVI, paragraph 1.
2 For more on appropriations, see CRS Report R47106, The Appropriations Process: A Brief Overview, by James V.
Saturno and Megan S. Lynch,and CRS Report R46417, Congress’s Power Over Appropriations: Constitutional and
Statutory Provisions, by Sean M. Stiff.
Congressional Research Service
1

Authorizations and the Appropriations Process

appropriations.” While the inclusion of language providing an authorization of appropriations is
common, it is not required under House or Senate rules.3 In addition, most federal agencies
operate under a patchwork of authorizing statutes that address various specific requirements and
duties rather than a single statute that encompasses all of them.
Understanding the application of the requirement to determine whether an appropriation is for a
purpose previously authorized by law can also be complicated because authorizations and
appropriations may address a given issue in different ways or with differing degrees of specificity.
Furthermore, there is no requirement in either chamber that the structure of either organic
authorizations or authorizations of appropriations mirror the account structure in appropriations
bills. As a consequence, it may be difficult to compare what is “authorized” with what is
appropriated.
The relationship between authorizations and appropriations then is not always straightforward. In
some cases, it may be difficult to determine whether the procedural requirement for something to
be authorized by law is satisfied. In others, the interaction between authorizations and
appropriations can potentially have an impact on the purposes for which an agency may obligate
funds.
The Development of Formal Rules
The principle of separate authorizations and appropriations is framed in the standing rules of the
House and Senate by language generally limiting appropriations to purposes authorized by law.
Although this principle was largely observed in the early practices of both chambers, it did not
become a formal part of House rules until 1837 and Senate rules until 1850.4
According to Hinds’ Precedents,5 the origin of a formal rule mandating the separate consideration
of policy legislation and appropriations can be traced to 1835, when the House discussed the
increasing problem of delays in enacting appropriations.6 A significant part of this delay was
attributed to the inclusion in such bills of “debatable matters of another character, new laws
which created long debates,” and a proposal was made to strip appropriation bills of “everything
but were legitimate matters of appropriation, and such as were not … made the subject of a

3 As expressed by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), “The existence of a statute (organic legislation)
imposing substantive functions upon an agency that require funding for their performance is itself sufficient legal
authorization for the necessary appropriations, regardless of whether the statute addresses the question of subsequent
appropriations.” GAO, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law (4th ed., 2016), GAO-16-464SP, ch. 2, (hereinafter
cited as GAO, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law), p. 2-55. The General Accounting Office was established in
Title III of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Public Law 13, 67th Cong., 42 Stat. 20. The name was changed in
2004 to the Government Accountability Office, P.L. 108-271, 118 Stat. 811. Under 31 U.S.C. §712(1) GAO
investigates on Congress’s behalf “all matters related to the receipt, disbursement, and use of public money.” Because it
is a legislative branch entity, however, neither the executive branch nor the federal judiciary considers GAO’s opinions
to be controlling, although GAO’s investigations and decisions create an extensive body of decisions discussing and
applying federal appropriations law.
4 For more on the development of historical practices, see Louis Fisher, “The Authorization-Appropriation Process in
Congress: Formal Rules and Informal Practices,” Catholic University Law Review, vol. 29 (1979-1980), pp. 51-105;
CRS Report 84-106, Legislation, Appropriations, and Budgets: The Development of Spending Decision-Making in
Congress, by Allen Schick (archived but available by request for congressional clients) (hereinafter cited as Schick,
Development of Spending Decision-Making in Congress); and Jessica Tollestrup, “Changes in the Purposes and
Frequency of Authorizations of Appropriations,” in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration,
The Evolving Congress, S.Prt. 113-30, 113th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014), pp. 259-279.
5 Asher C. Hinds, Hinds’ Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States, (Washington: GPO, 1907),
vol. 4, ch. XCV, §3578.
6 Congressional Globe, 24th Cong., 1st sess. (December 10, 1835), p. 20.
Congressional Research Service
2

Authorizations and the Appropriations Process

separate bill.” Although the proposal was not adopted at the time, at the beginning of the
following Congress (25th Congress, 1837-1839), language was added to the standing rules of the
House that stated:
No appropriation shall be reported in such general appropriation bill, or be in order as an
amendment thereto, for any expenditure not previously authorized by law.
A similar provision was added to the rules of the Senate on December 19, 1850 (31st Congress,
1849-1851).
The Evolving Form and Frequency of Authorizations
Although these rules established a formal requirement establishing a separation between what are
today termed authorizations and appropriations, they did not establish any requirement regarding
the form in which legislation establishes programs or activities. Practices concerning the language
and specificity of such provisions has varied greatly over time.
During the 19th century, authorizations were generally used for the initial establishment of
programs, while control over the details of particular activities and amounts was achieved through
language in annual appropriations acts. Authorization laws were typically enacted on a permanent
basis and provided broad grants of authority to government departments and agencies. In these
laws, the authorization of subsequent congressional action to provide appropriations was implied
and did not include language authorizing a specific amount to be appropriated. That is, the
general authorization in these laws included both the legal authority for the agency to act and the
authority under congressional rules to subsequently appropriate funds to carry out such activities.
Temporary authorizations were rare and were generally reserved for programs that were intended
to be of a limited duration. It was annually enacted appropriations laws that generally contained
the details directing how funds were to be expended.
As the size and scope of federal government activities increased during the 19th and early 20th
centuries, congressional practices related to the form of authorizations and appropriations also
changed. Authorization laws began to specify in greater detail the authority of agencies to
conduct or administer broad classes of federal government programs and activities. At the same
time, the form of appropriations also shifted to more general lump sums for purposes that were
often identified by reference to an agency’s statutory authority. In other words, appropriations
legislation increasingly assumed that authorizing statutes would guide agencies regarding the use
of funds.
Another significant change in the form of authorization laws began in the 1920s, when the phrase
“authorized to be appropriated” came into usage. This practice became common enough that in
1937 alone there were more than 100 measures enacted into law with explicit authorizations of
appropriations for definite amounts.7 At a minimum, such provisions served as a recommendation
by the legislative committees regarding the desired level of future appropriations. This practice,
however, had broader implications for the role of the legislative committees in budgetary
decisionmaking because of how the existing House and Senate rules prohibiting appropriations
not authorized by law were interpreted and applied. Such explicit authorization of appropriations
were interpreted as a procedural ceiling on the amount considered to be authorized by law,
effectively limiting appropriations for specific purposes. As a result, legislative committees
potentially could exert greater influence over subsequent funding decisions. In cases in which
provisions specifying the amount or duration of future appropriations was considered to be

7 Schick, Development of Spending Decision-Making in Congress, pp. 28-29.
Congressional Research Service
3

Authorizations and the Appropriations Process

impractical or inappropriate, legislative committees began to use indefinite language authorizing
“such sums as are necessary.”
Another change in congressional practices concerning authorizations during the 20th century was
the advent of periodic reauthorizations, particularly authorizations of appropriations for a limited
number of fiscal years. In 1965, George Schultz, director of the Bureau of the Budget, in
testimony before the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, expressed concern about
the impact of periodic reauthorizations on the budget process as a whole, especially their
contribution to delays in the appropriations process. He stated that at the end of World War II, an
estimated 95% of programs, excluding one-time projects, were authorized on a long-term or
indefinite basis, while 20 years later virtually one-third of the budget was dependent upon
renewal of authorizing legislation each year.8 The increased use of periodic reauthorizations by
legislative committees in the postwar period occurred for a variety of purposes, including to
better influence the actions of agencies, to influence appropriations outcomes, or to encourage
closer review and oversight by Congress.9
House Rules
Clause 2(a)(1) of House Rule XXI currently provides:
An appropriation may not be reported in a general appropriation bill, and may not be in
order as an amendment thereto, for an expenditure not previously authorized by law, except
to continue appropriations for public works and objects that are already in progress.
The rule generally requires that an authorization be enacted prior to House consideration of the
relevant general appropriations bill.10 It is not in order to simply make the availability of an
appropriation contingent on the relevant authorization being enacted in the future or to limit the
availability of funds to the amount authorized in future legislation as a means of meeting the
requirement that an authorization be previously enacted. Thus, delaying the availability of an
appropriation pending subsequent enactment of an authorization would not protect that
appropriation against a point of order.11
The House considers an appropriation for a project or activity to be authorized if the relevant
statute provides either broad or specific authority to engage in such projects or activities.12 That
is, it is not necessary that an authorizing statute provide the same level of detail or specificity as
an appropriation so long as it might be subsumed under some broader authority. General grants of
authority can constitute sufficient authorization to support appropriations depending on whether
the general laws applicable to the function or department in question require a further, specific

8 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, Hearings before the Joint Committee on the
Organization of Congress, Part 12, August 31 and September 9, 1965, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, DC: GPO,
1965), p. 1779.
9 Schick, Development of Spending Decision-Making in Congress, pp. 39; Louis Fisher, “Annual Authorizations:
Durable Roadblocks to Biennial Budgeting,” Public Budgeting and Finance (Spring 1983), p. 34.
10 Charles W. Johnson, John V. Sullivan, and Thomas J. Wickham Jr., House Practice: A Guide to the Rules,
Precedents and Procedures of the House, 115th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 2017), (hereinafter cited as House
Practice), ch. 4, §10. Clause 3 of Rule XVII requires that appropriations bills be considered in the Committee of the
Whole, which is where the House usually considers amendments to appropriations bills. For further information, see
CRS Report RL32200, Debate, Motions, and Other Actions in the Committee of the Whole, by Bill Heniff Jr. and
Elizabeth Rybicki.
11 House Practice, ch. 4, §10.
12 House Practice, ch. 4, §12. In addition to statutes, an authorization can also be provided by a treaty that has
previously been ratified by all parties. House Practice, ch. 4, §12.
Congressional Research Service
4

Authorizations and the Appropriations Process

authorization.13 For example, a statute defining the authority of an agency, but also providing that
the authorization of appropriations be only for such sums as subsequently authorized by law to
carry out those functions, would require such authorizations of appropriations to be enacted in
order for the appropriations to be considered authorized.14
Similarly, permanent authority in an enabling or organic statute is considered sufficient to meet
the requirement that appropriations be authorized by law unless a “periodic authorization
scheme” has been enacted or at some point in time “occupied the field.”15 A lapsed authorization
would not be sufficient for an appropriation to be considered ‘‘previously authorized’’ under the
language of the rule. Therefore, if an authorization is of limited duration and not reauthorized
prior to its expiration, subsequent appropriations would not be considered “authorized by law.”
In instances where the authorization limits the amount of budget authority that may be
appropriated, appropriations in excess of that amount are also considered to be unauthorized.16
That Congress has previously enacted appropriations for an unauthorized project or activity does
not constitute a sufficient authorization for future appropriations under House rules.17 An
executive order, by itself, is not considered a valid authorization of appropriations “absent proof
of its derivation from a statute enacted by Congress.”18
Rule XXI, clause 2(a)(1), contains a provision that excepts appropriations that would continue
“public works and objects already in progress” from the prohibition on unauthorized
appropriations. Historically, this has been narrowly construed.19 For example, this exception
applies only to something tangible, such as a building or road, and not projects that are either
more indefinite with respect to their completion (such as the gauging of streams) or intangible
(such as an investigation). Furthermore, the project must actually be “in progress” and not merely
in a preliminary stage such as selecting or purchasing a site for the construction of a building.20
Some examples of things allowed as a continuation have included a topographical survey, the
marking of a boundary line, and the recoinage of coins in the Treasury. Examples of projects
disallowed include scientific investigations, extensions of foreign markets for goods, and the
extension of an existing road.21
House rules related to unauthorized appropriations apply specifically to general appropriations
bills. In the House, “general appropriations bills” are the annual appropriations acts (or any
combination thereof) and any supplemental appropriations acts that cover more than one agency
but not continuing appropriations acts.22

13 House Practice.
14 House Practice.
15 Rules of the House of Representatives, in House Manual, One Hundred Seventeenth Congress, H.Doc. 116-177,
116th Cong., 2nd sess., [compiled by] Jason A. Smith, Parliamentarian (Washington: GPO, 2021) (hereinafter cited as
House Manual), §1045.
16 House Practice, ch. 4, §14.
17 House Practice, ch. 4, §14.
18 House Practice, ch. 4, §14.
19 House Practice, ch. 4, §§24-26.
20 House Practice, ch. 4, §26.
21 See House Manual, §§1049-1051 for further examples of projects that have and have not been previously determined
to fall under this exception.
22 Under House precedents, a measure providing continuing appropriations for government agencies pending enactment
of the regular appropriation bills is not considered a general appropriation bill because it does not provide
appropriations on an annual basis and is therefore not subject to the prohibitions of Rule XXI, clause 2. Lewis
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
5

Authorizations and the Appropriations Process

Enforcement
When an appropriations bill includes funding for a program or activity that is not considered to be
authorized by law, it is often termed an “unauthorized” appropriation. In such cases, the House
rule prohibiting such unauthorized appropriations is enforceable through points of order raised by
Members from the floor during consideration of the appropriations bill and ruled on by the chair.
A point of order against an appropriation as not being authorized may be raised against either an
entire paragraph or a portion of a paragraph in a general appropriations bill or amendment thereto.
If a point of order is raised against a provision of an appropriations bill as being unauthorized, the
burden of proof is on the manager (normally the chair or ranking member of the committee that
reported the measure) to demonstrate that the appropriation is authorized. If a point of order is
raised against a provision in an amendment, the burden of proof is on the Member who
introduced the amendment.23 If the point of order is sustained against a provision, the provision is
stricken from the bill, but consideration of the bill may continue. If the point of order is sustained
against an amendment, its further consideration is out of order.24
The prohibitions against unauthorized appropriations under House rules may be waived by
unanimous consent, pursuant to the bill’s consideration under suspension of the rules, or under the
terms of a special rule. Such special rules may waive points of order against the entire bill or
specific provisions contained in the bill that violate Rule XXI, clause 2(a). It is also possible for
points of order against potential floor amendments containing unauthorized appropriations to be
similarly waived by a special rule. A waiver of points of order against provisions in the bill does
not apply to amendments thereto unless the waiver is also made specifically applicable to
amendments.25
Senate Rules
The Senate has historically understood the meaning of authorized by law in broader terms than
the House and thus prohibited appropriations as unauthorized in a more narrow set of
circumstances.
Paragraph 1 of Senate Rule XVI currently provides:
On a point of order made by any Senator, no amendment shall be received to any general
appropriation bill the effect of which will be to increase an appropriation already contained
in the bill, or to add a new item of appropriation, unless it be made to carry out the
provisions of some existing law, or treaty stipulation, or act or resolution previously passed
by the Senate during that session; or unless the same be moved by direction of the
Committee on Appropriations or a committee of the Senate having legislative jurisdiction
of the subject matter, or proposed in pursuance of an estimate submitted in accordance with
law.
Because the House has historically originated appropriations measures, the Senate had developed
the custom of considering House-passed appropriations bills rather than Senate-originated bills,
and the rule was framed in terms of prohibiting amendments proposing additional

Deschler, Deschler’s Precedents of the United States House of Representatives (hereinafter cited as Deschler’s
Precedents) (Washington: GPO, 1977), vol. 8, ch. 26, §1.2.
23 House Practice, ch. 4, §13.
24 House Practice, ch. 4, §67.
25 House Practice, ch. 4, §68. See also CRS Report 98-433, Special Rules and Waivers of House Rules, by Megan S.
Lynch.
Congressional Research Service
6

Authorizations and the Appropriations Process

appropriations.26 There is no general prohibition in the standing rules of the Senate or the
precedents against making appropriations for a project or program in the absence of an
authorization.27
The prohibition on unauthorized appropriations found in Senate rules applies only in certain
circumstances.28 Provisions in the House-passed text of a general appropriations bill are not
subject to points of order in the Senate, nor are provisions in a general appropriations bill
originated by the Senate Committee on Appropriations or amendments to a House-passed bill
reported by the committee.29 Amendments containing unauthorized appropriations offered by
direction of the authorizing committee with relevant jurisdiction are also allowed so long as they
have been reported and referred to the Committee on Appropriations at least one day before
consideration.30 Effectively, then, the Senate’s prohibition on unauthorized appropriations applies
most significantly to amendments offered by individual Senators during floor consideration of a
general appropriations bill.31 While individual Senators may propose amendments increasing the
amount appropriated if the project or activity is authorized, in cases where a specific amount has
been authorized, the amendment must not cause appropriations to exceed that amount.32
In the Senate, an amendment to increase the amount of an appropriation to carry out an existing
law would be in order if no specific amount is authorized or if the amount provided is within the
amount authorized.33
To fulfill the requirements of this rule, an authorization must have been previously enacted or
have been passed by the Senate during the current session of Congress prior to consideration of
the relevant general appropriations bill. As in the House, provisions or stipulations of treaties
constitute a valid authorization for the purposes of the Senate.34 Amendments may be held in
order as carrying out the provisions of an act or resolution (construed to mean bills or joint
resolutions) passed by the Senate during that session but not a preceding session.35
Senate Rule XVI also allows appropriations “proposed in pursuance of an estimate submitted in
accordance with law.”36 Such estimates can be provided in the President’s annual budget request,
as required by 31 U.S.C. §§1105(a) and 1107, or through deficiency and supplemental
appropriations requests made after the President’s budget request has been submitted to
Congress.37 To permit an appropriation not otherwise authorized, estimates must be transmitted to
Congress officially from the President after having been prepared by the Office of Management

26 The House has traditionally taken the view that its prerogative under Article I, clause 7, of the U.S. Constitution,
known as the Origination Clause, encompasses the sole power to originate all general appropriation bills as well as all
revenue bills. Deschler’s Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 25 §13. Although the Senate does not concur with this interpretation,
in practice it has generally deferred to the House’s insistence on originating appropriations.
27 See Floyd M. Riddick and Alan S. Frumin, Riddick’s Senate Procedure: Precedents and Practices, 101st Cong., 2nd
sess., S.Doc. 101-28 (Washington: GPO, 1992) (hereinafter cited as Riddick’s Senate Procedure), p. 150.
28 Riddick’s Senate Procedure, p. 150.
29 Riddick’s Senate Procedure, p. 171.
30 Riddick’s Senate Procedure, p. 189.
31 Riddick’s Senate Procedure, p. 194.
32 Riddick’s Senate Procedure, p. 174.
33 Riddick’s Senate Procedure, p. 179.
34 Riddick’s Senate Procedure, p. 178.
35 Riddick’s Senate Procedure, p. 187.
36 Riddick’s Senate Procedure, p. 180.
37 Riddick’s Senate Procedure, p. 155.
Congressional Research Service
7

Authorizations and the Appropriations Process

and Budget.38 An amendment offered by an individual Member or reported by a committee
pursuant to this exception does not need to be printed and referred to the Committee on
Appropriations a day in advance of being offered as would otherwise be required under Rule
XVI, paragraph 3.39 In these instances, an amendment to the bill is in order if the amount of
appropriations comes within the limit estimated.40 In instances where a specific level of budget
authority has previously been authorized, however, a floor amendment that seeks to appropriate
funds in excess of that amount, even if it falls within the amount contained in the budget estimate,
is not in order.41
The application of Senate’s rule is also distinct from that in the House because the term general
appropriations bills means not only the annual appropriations acts (or any combination thereof)
and any supplemental appropriations acts that cover more than one agency or purpose but also
any continuing appropriations act that covers more than one agency or purpose.42
Enforcement
As is the case in the House, the rules against unauthorized appropriations in the Senate are
enforceable during floor consideration by points of order. In instances where an unauthorized
appropriation that does not fall under any of the exceptions outlined above is offered as an
amendment by a Senator, a point of order can be raised at any point prior to the amendment’s
disposition.43 If such a point of order is raised, in practice, the burden of proof is on the Senator to
demonstrate that the appropriation is authorized.
The Relationship of Appropriations to
Authorizations
As stated above, the distinction between authorizations and appropriations is a construct of
congressional rules, as there is no constitutional requirement that an appropriation must be
preceded by a specific act that authorizes the appropriation.44 Appropriations are enacted,
however, “against the backdrop of program legislation and, in many cases, specific authorization
acts.”45 Therefore, in addition to having an impact on their consideration, the distinctions between
authorizations and appropriations can have an impact in other ways. There are a number of
circumstances in which the interaction of these two types of legislation (or the absence of one
type) has the potential to have an impact on an agency, particularly the availability of funds with
respect to amount, purpose, or period of availability. The Government Accountability Office
outlines four general principles that guide their determinations regarding the availability of
appropriated funds based on the relationship of appropriations to other statutes:46

38 Riddick’s Senate Procedure, p. 155.
39 Riddick’s Senate Procedure, pp. 179-180.
40 Riddick’s Senate Procedure, p. 191.
41 Riddick’s Senate Procedure, p. 210.
42 Riddick’s Senate Procedure, p. 159.
43 Riddick’s Senate Procedure, pp. 992-993.
44 GAO, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, p. 2-55.
45 GAO, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, p. 2-57.
46 The principles used to resolve issues relating to appropriations and other statutes are described in GAO, Principles of
Federal Appropriations Law, pp. 2-57 to 2-60. GAO has the statutory authority to provide Congress with decisions and
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
8

Authorizations and the Appropriations Process

1. Congress intends to achieve a consistent body of law. Therefore multiple statutes should
be construed harmoniously wherever possible. In particular, unless otherwise specified in
the appropriation act, appropriations to carry out an authorization must be expended in
accordance with the authorization with respect to both the amount and the purpose.
Furthermore, while Congress is free to amend or repeal prior legislation, it should be
done directly and explicitly, and not by implication, so that statutes will be construed to
avoid this result whenever reasonably possible.
2. If it is not possible to reconcile the meaning of two statutes in conflict, the more recent
statute, as the latest expression of Congress, governs.
3. Although congressional rules are designed to limit it, Congress can and does “legislate”
in appropriation acts. Ultimately, appropriation acts are, like any other statute, passed by
both houses of Congress and either signed by the President or enacted over a presidential
veto. As such, they have the same legal force and effect as ordinary bills relating to a
particular subject.
4. Legislative history is not legislation, so congressional intent must be determined in the
language of the appropriation act.
Appropriations in the Absence of Authorizations
As the Comptroller General of the United States has explained:
Where authorizations are not required by law, Congress may, subject to a possible point of
order, appropriate funds for a program or object that has not been previously authorized or
which exceeds the scope of a prior authorization, in which event the enacted appropriation,
in effect, carries its own authorization and is available to the agency for obligation and
expenditure.47
Historically, as well as in recent years, Congress has on occasion appropriated money to fund
programs with expired authorizations of appropriations. Because the distinction between
authorizations and appropriations is a construct of congressional rules, it applies only to the
consideration of legislation. If Congress appropriates funds for a program whose funding
authorization has expired, that appropriation provides sufficient legal basis to continue the
program during that period of availability absent indication of congressional intent to terminate
the program.48
A few statutes, however, explicitly require that funds to carry out particular activities may not be
appropriated unless they have been specifically authorized. For example, the Department of
Energy Organization Act49 included a provision requiring that “Appropriations to carry out the
provisions of this Act shall be subject to annual authorization.” The Foreign Assistance Act of
197150 included language stating that “no money appropriated to the Department of State under
any law shall be available for obligation or expenditure with respect to any fiscal year
commencing on or after July 1, 1972 … unless the appropriation thereof has been authorized by
law enacted on or after February 7, 1972.” Such statutory requirements for prior authorization are

legal opinions regarding the availability and use of appropriated funds by federal agencies. GAO, Principles of Federal
Appropriations Law, ch. 1, p. 1-12.
47 GAO, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, p. 2-79.
48 GAO, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, p. 2-80.
49 P.L. 95-91, 91 Stat. 965 in §660.
50 P.L. 92-226, 86 Stat. 20 in §407(d).
Congressional Research Service
9

Authorizations and the Appropriations Process

effectively congressional directives to itself, which Congress is free to follow or alter in
subsequent legislation. Thus, if Congress were to appropriate funds to a department in the
absence of an explicit authorization, the appropriation would be just as valid, and just as available
for obligation, as if the requirement had been satisfied or did not exist.51
Authorizations in the Absence of Appropriations
Although an authorizing statute may authorize the subsequent enactment of appropriations to
provide funds for agencies and programs (and may establish a specific ceiling that may be
enforced at the time that the legislation providing the appropriation is considered), Congress may
choose to fund such program at a lesser amount or not at all.52 Furthermore, this is the case even
when language in a bill authorizes an appropriation of not less than a certain amount for a
specified purpose.53
The choice not to fund a program or activity may be for any reason. For example, Congress may
be interested in limiting or denying funding to a federal agency to prevent it from taking actions
that are required by law, such as to promulgate regulations, implement or enforce rules, initiate or
operate programs, or take other specified actions. Unless otherwise provided by law, an agency
that does not receive appropriations that can be used for a particular authorized program or
activity has no discretionary power to use funding provided for other purposes (such as operations
and maintenance) in order to carry out the unfunded activity (such as capital expenditures).54
Therefore, Congress can directly limit or prevent agencies from engaging in activities that are
otherwise permitted or required by statute by explicitly denying funds for such purposes.55
An authorizing statute that establishes a federal agency often creates statutory duties and
obligations for that federal agency, including the responsibility to conduct certain acts, such as
enforcement of particular laws that the agency is charged with administering. If an authorization
of appropriations expires, or if Congress fails to appropriate sufficient funds without explicitly
denying their use for a particular purpose, those statutory obligations still exist even though the
agency may lack sufficient funds to satisfy them. The mere failure to appropriate sufficient funds
is not enough to consider an agency’s statutory duties or obligations to be repealed by
implication.56

51 GAO, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, p. 2-56.
52 GAO, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, p. 2-61. This has been held in both the House and Senate.
Deschler’s Precedents, vol. 7, ch. 25, §2.1, states that the House has “the right to refuse to appropriate for any object
either in whole or in part, even though that object may be authorized by law.” Riddick’s Senate Procedure, p. 153.
53 The House has held that such language is not considered “a mandatory piece of legislation that must result in an
appropriation” but “simply an authorization.” Deschler’s Precednts, vol. 7, ch. 25, §4.34.
54 31 U.S.C. §1532 provides, “An amount available under law may be withdrawn from one appropriation account and
credited to another or to a working fund only when authorized by law.” See CRS Report R43098, Transfer and
Reprogramming of Appropriations: An Overview of Authorities, Limitations, and Procedures, by Michelle D.
Christensen; and GAO, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, pp. 2-38 to 2-43.
55 For more, see CRS Report R41634, Limitations in Appropriations Measures: An Overview of Procedural Issues, by
James V. Saturno.
56 GAO, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, p. 2-63, citing United States v. Langston, 118 U.S. 389, 394
(1886).
Congressional Research Service
10

Authorizations and the Appropriations Process

Author Information

James V. Saturno

Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process

Acknowledgments
This report incorporates information from a prior CRS Report coauthored by Jessica Tollestrup, former
Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process, and Brian Yeh, former Legislative Attorney.

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R46497 · VERSION 2 · UPDATED
11