Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer
Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress
Updated March 27, 2023
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
RL32109

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Summary
The Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer program is one of the longest-running shipbuilding
programs in Navy history. The Navy began procuring DDG-51s, also known as Aegis destroyers,
in FY1985, and a total of 92 have been procured through FY2023, including three in FY2023.
From FY1989 through FY2005, DDG-51s were procured in annual quantities of two to five ships
per year. Since FY2010, they have been procured in annual quantities of one to three ships per
year. (The Navy did not procure any DDG-51s in FY2006-FY2009. Instead, the Navy in FY2007-
FY2009 procured three Zumwalt [DDG-1000] class destroyers. The Navy plans no further
procurement of DDG-1000s.)
The Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget requests the procurement of two more DDG-51s in
FY2024. The Navy’s FY2024 five-year (FY2024-FY2028) shipbuilding plan includes 10 DDG-
51s, to be procured at a rate of two ships per year.
As part of its FY2023 budget submission, the Navy requested authority for using a multiyear
procurement (MYP) contract for DDG-51s scheduled for procurement in FY2023-FY2027.
Congress, as part of its action on the Navy’s proposed FY2023 budget, approved this request.
Four previous MYP contracts for the DDG-51 program covered DDG-51s procured in FY1998-
FY2001, FY2002-FY2005, FY2013-FY2017, and FY2018-FY2022.
The first DDG-51 entered service in 1991, and a total of 72 have been delivered as of March
2023. The DDG-51 design has been updated multiple times over the years; the version currently
being procured, called the Flight III DDG-51 design, incorporates a new and more capable radar
called the SPY-6 radar.
DDG-51s currently cost about $2.2 billion each to procure. The budget estimates the combined
procurement cost of the two DDG-51s requested for procurement in FY2024 at $4,432.8 million
(i.e., about $4.4 billion). The two ships have received $233.6 million in prior-year Economic
Order Quantity (EOQ) funding, which is a kind of advance procurement (AP) funding that can
occur under an MYP contract. The Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget requests the remaining
$4,199.2 million needed to complete the two ships’ estimated combined procurement cost. The
Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget also requests $284.0 million in EOQ funding for DDG-51s to
be procured under the FY2023-FY2027 MYP contract, and $225.9 million in cost-to-complete
funding to cover cost growth on DDG-51s procured in prior fiscal years.

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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
This report presents background information and potential oversight issues for Congress on the
Navy’s Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) and Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyer programs. The Navy
began procuring DDG-51s, also known as Aegis destroyers, in FY1985, and a total of 92 have
been procured through FY2023, including three in FY2023. The Navy’s FY2024 budget requests
the procurement of two DDG-51s in FY2024.
Potential issues for Congress for the DDG-51 program in FY2024 include the Navy’s future
force-level goal for large surface combatants (or LSCs, meaning cruisers and destroyers), and
how the Navy proposes to transition several years from now from procurement of DDG-51s to
procurement of a successor destroyer design now in development called the DDG(X). Decisions
that Congress makes on these issues could substantially affect Navy capabilities and funding
requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.
For more on the DDG(X) program, see CRS In Focus IF11679, Navy DDG(X) Next-Generation
Destroyer Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Background
Navy’s Force of Large Surface Combatants (LSCs)
LSC Definition
Decades ago, the Navy’s cruisers were considerably larger and more capable than its destroyers.
In the years after World War II, however, the Navy’s cruiser designs in general became smaller
while its destroyer designs in general became larger. As a result, since the 1980s there has been
substantial overlap in size and capability of Navy cruisers and destroyers. (The Navy’s new
Zumwalt [DDG-1000] class destroyers, in fact, are considerably larger than the Navy’s cruisers.)
In part for this reason, the Navy now refers to its cruisers and destroyers collectively as large
surface combatants (LSCs), and distinguishes these ships from the Navy’s small surface
combatants (SSCs), the term the Navy now uses to refer collectively to its frigates, Littoral
Combat Ships (LCSs), mine warfare ships, and patrol craft. The Navy’s annual 30-year
shipbuilding plan, for example, groups the Navy’s surface combatants into LSCs and SSCs.1
LSC Force Level as of End of FY2022
As of the end of FY2022, the Navy’s LSC force included 90 ships, including 17 Ticonderoga
(CG-47) class cruisers,2 72 DDG-51s, and one Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyer.

1 The Navy sometimes also uses the term Cru-Des (an abbreviation of cruiser-destroyer, pronounced “crew-dez”) to
refer collectively to its cruisers and destroyers.
2 A total of 27 CG-47s (CGs 47 through 73) were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and FY1988; the ships
entered service between 1983 and 1994. The first five ships in the class (CGs 47 through 51), which were built to an
earlier technical standard in certain respects, were judged by the Navy to be too expensive to modernize and were
removed from service in 2004-2005, leaving 22 ships in operation (CGs 52 through 73). Of the remaining 22, five were
retired in FY2022, leaving 17 in service at the end of FY22.
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Current and Potential Future LSC Force-Level Goal
Current LSC Force-Level Goal Within 355-Ship Plan of December 2016
The Navy’s current force-level goal, released in December 2016, calls for achieving and
maintaining a fleet of 355 ships, including 104 LSCs.3
Successor Force-Level Goal to Replace 355-ship Goal of 2016
The Navy and the Department of Defense (DOD) have been working since 2019 to develop a
successor for the 355-ship force-level goal. The Navy’s FY2023 30-year (FY2023-FY2052)
shipbuilding plan, released on April 20, 2022, includes a table summarizing the results of studies
that have been conducted on the successor force-level goal. These studies outline potential future
fleets with 63 to 96 LCSs.4
DDG-51 Program
Overview
The DDG-51 program was initiated in the late 1970s.5 It is one of the longest-running
shipbuilding programs in Navy history, and the DDG-51 class is one of the Navy’s numerically
largest classes of ships since World War II. The first DDG-51 was procured FY1985, and a total
of 92 have been procured through FY2023, including three in FY2023. From FY1989 through
FY2005, DDG-51s were procured in annual quantities of two to five ships per year. Since
FY2010, they have been procured in annual quantities of one to three ships per year. The Navy
did not procure any DDG-51s in FY2006-FY2009. Instead, the Navy in FY2007-FY2009
procured three Zumwalt [DDG-1000] class destroyers, which are discussed later in this report.
The first DDG-51 entered service in 1991, and a total of 72 have been delivered as of March
2023. The remaining 20 DDG-51s are in various stages of construction. Earlier DDG-51s, known
as the Flight I/II DDG-51s, generally have an estimated service life (ESL) of 35 years, meaning
that retirement of these ships could begin in the late 2020s. An exception to the 35-year ESL for
the Flight I/II DDG-51s is the very first ship in the class—DDG-51 itself—which has been
certified for a 40-year life. Additional Flight I/II DDG-51s might eventually receive similar
certifications, depending on their condition and Navy mission needs. Later DDG-51s, known as
the Flight IIA and Flight III DDG-51s, have an estimated service life of 40 years.
DDG-51s (Figure 1 and Figure 2) are multi-mission destroyers with an emphasis on air defense
(which the Navy refers to as anti-air warfare, or AAW) and blue-water (mid-ocean) operations.
DDG-51s, like the Navy’s Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers, are equipped with the Aegis
combat system, an integrated ship combat system named for the mythological shield that
defended Zeus. CG-47s and DDG-51s consequently are often referred to as Aegis cruisers and

3 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
4 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
5 The program was initiated with the aim of developing a surface combatant to replace older destroyers and cruisers
that were projected to retire in the 1990s. The DDG-51 was conceived as an affordable complement to the Navy’s
Ticonderoga (CG-47) class Aegis cruisers. For an early discussion of the DDG-51 program, see Alva M. Bowen and
Ronald O’Rourke, “DDG-51 and the Future Surface Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1985: 176-189.
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Aegis destroyers, respectively, or collectively as Aegis ships. The Aegis system has been updated
several times over the years. Many DDG-51s (and also some CG-47s) have a capability for
conducting ballistic missile defense (BMD) operations.6
Figure 1. DDG-51 Class Destroyer

Source: Cropped version of photograph at Huntington Ingalls Industries, “Delbert Black (DDG 119) Completes
Builder’s Trials,” February 26, 2020, accessed November 17, 2021, at https://newsroom.huntingtoningalls.com/
file/delbert-black-ddg119-builders-trials.
Design Changes
The DDG-51 design has been modified and updated periodically over the years. The first 28
DDG-51s (DDGs 51 through 78) are called Flight I/II DDG-51s. In FY1994, the Navy shifted
DDG-51 procurement to the Flight IIA DDG-51 design, which incorporated certain changes,
including the addition of a helicopter hangar. A total of 47 Flight IIA DDG-51s (DDGs 79
through 124 and DDG-127) were procured in FY1994-FY2016. In FY2017, the Navy shifted
DDG-51 procurement to the current Flight III DDG-51 design, which incorporates a new and
more capable radar called the SPY-6 radar (previously known as the Air and Missile Defense
Radar, or AMDR), as well as associated changes to the ship’s electrical power and cooling
systems. DDGs 125 and higher, except for DDG-127 as noted above, are to be Flight III DDG-
51s.
Multiyear Procurement (MYP)
As part of its FY2023 budget submission, the Navy requested authority for using a multiyear
procurement (MYP) contract for DDG-51s scheduled for procurement in FY2023-FY2027.7

6 For more on Navy BMD programs, see CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
7 For more on MYP contracting, see CRS Report R41909, Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting
in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Congress, as part of its action on the Navy’s proposed FY2023 budget, approved this request.8
Four previous MYP contracts for the DDG-51 program covered DDG-51s procured in FY1998-
FY2001, FY2002-FY2005, FY2013-FY2017, and FY2018-FY2022.
Figure 2. DDG-51 Class Destroyer

Source: Cropped version of undated photograph of USS Jason Dunham (DDG-109) at “Bath Iron Works,”
accessed November 17, 2021, at https://www.gd.com/our-businesses/marine-systems/bath-iron-works.
Shipbuilders, Combat System Lead, and Radar Maker
DDG-51s are built by General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW) of Bath, ME, and
Huntington Ingalls Industries/Ingalls Shipbuilding (HII/Ingalls) of Pascagoula, MS. Lockheed is
the lead contractor for the Aegis system installed on all DDG-51s. The SPY-6—the primary radar
for the Aegis system on Flight III DDG-51s—is made by Raytheon.
Modernization of In-Service Ships
The Navy is modernizing existing DDG-51s (and some CG-47s) so as to maintain their mission
and cost-effectiveness out to the end of their projected service lives. Older CRS reports provide
additional historical and background information on the DDG-51 program.9

8 See Section 125 of the FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (H.R. 7776/P.L. 117-263 of December
23, 2022) and Section 8010 of the FY2023 DOD Appropriations Act, (Division C of H.R. 2617/P.L. 117-328 of
December 29, 2022).
9 See CRS Report 94-343, Navy DDG-51 Destroyer Procurement Rate: Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald
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FY2024 Procurement Funding Request
The Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget requests the procurement of two more DDG-51s in
FY2024. The budget estimates the combined procurement cost of the two ships at $4,432.8
million (i.e., about $4.4 billion). The two ships have received $233.6 million in prior-year
Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) funding, which is a kind of advance procurement (AP) funding
that can occur under an MYP contract. The Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget requests the
remaining $4,199.2 million needed to complete the two ships’ estimated combined procurement
cost. The Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget also requests $284.0 million in EOQ funding for
DDG-51s to be procured under the FY2023-FY2027 MYP contract, and $225.9 million in cost-
to-complete funding to cover cost growth on DDG-51s procured in prior fiscal years.
DDG-1000 Program
As noted earlier, in FY2007-FY2009, during the time when the Navy was not procuring DDG-
51s, the Navy instead procured three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers. The Navy plans no
further procurement of DDG-1000s.
DDG-1000s are multi-mission destroyers with an originally intended emphasis on naval surface
fire support (NSFS)10 and operations in littoral (i.e., near-shore) waters. Consistent with that
mission orientation, the ship was designed with two new-design 155mm guns called Advanced
Gun Systems (AGSs). The AGSs were to fire a new 155mm, gun-launched, rocket-assisted
guided projectile called the Long-Range Land-Attack Projectile (LRLAP, pronounced LUR-lap).
In November 2016, however, it was reported that the Navy had decided to stop procuring LRLAP
projectiles because the projected unit cost of each projectile had risen to at least $800,000.11
In December 2017, it was reported that, due to shifts in the international security environment and
resulting shifts in Navy mission needs, the mission orientation of the DDG-1000s would be
shifted from an emphasis on NSFS to an emphasis on surface strike, meaning the use of missiles
to attack surface ships and perhaps also land targets.12
As noted in the Appendix, the DDG-1000 program’s originally scheduled date for achieving
Initial Operating Capability (IOC) was FY2015. The date for achieving IOC, however, has been
repeatedly delayed. In February 2022, it was reported that the date had been delayed from
September 2021 to December 2021, but that the December 2021 date was not achieved, and that
the Navy was reevaluating the timeline for achieving IOC.13

O’Rourke (April 25, 1994; out of print and available to congressional clients directly from the author), and CRS Report
80-205, The Navy’s Proposed Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Guided Missile Destroyer Program: A Comparison With
An Equal-Cost Force Of Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Guided Missile Destroyers, by Ronald O’Rourke (November 21,
1984; out of print and available to congressional clients directly from the author).
10 NSFS is the use of naval guns to provide fire support for friendly forces operating ashore.
11 Christopher P. Cavas, “New Warship’s Big Guns Have No Bullets,” Defense News, November 6, 2016; Sam
LaGrone, “Navy Planning on Not Buying More LRLAP Rounds for Zumwalt Class,” USNI News, November 7, 2016;
Ben Guarino, “The Navy Called USS Zumwalt A Warship Batman Would Drive. But at $800,000 Per Round, Its
Ammo Is Too Pricey to Fire,” Washington Post, November 8, 2016.
12 Megan Eckstein, “New Requirements for DDG-1000 Focus on Surface Strike,” USNI News, December 4, 2017. See
also Richard Abott, “Navy Will Focus Zumwalt On Offensive Surface Strike,” Defense Daily, December 5, 2017;
David B. Larter, “The Navy’s Stealth Destroyers to Get New Weapons and a New Mission: Killing Ships,” Defense
News, February 15, 2018.
13 Audrey Decker, “Zumwalt’s Initial Operational Capability Delayed Again,” Inside Defense, February 25, 2022.
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To further optimize the three ships for conducting surface strike missions, the Navy reportedly
plans to remove their AGSs and associated below-deck equipment and replace them with large-
diameter vertical launch tubes capable of storing and firing the Navy’s new hypersonic
Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) missile, with a goal of having the first CPS-equipped DDG-
1000 class ship ready for testing by 2025. Each DDG-1000 class ship reportedly is to be equipped
with four of the large-diameter tubes, with each tube capable of holding three CPS missiles, for a
total of 12 CPS missiles per ship.14
The Navy reportedly also wants to replace some of the combat system equipment on the three
ships with equipment more similar to, and interoperable with, combat system equipment on other
U.S. Navy surface combatants. The Navy refers to this as the Zumwalt Enterprise Upgrade
Solution (ZEUS).15
For additional background information on the DDG-1000 program, see the Appendix.
Surface Combatant Construction Industrial Base
All cruisers and destroyers procured since FY1985 have been built at GD/BIW and HII/Ingalls.
Both of these shipyards have long histories of building larger surface combatants. Construction of
Navy surface combatants in recent years has accounted for virtually all of GD/BIW’s ship-
construction work and for a significant share of HII/Ingalls’ ship-construction work. (HII/Ingalls
also builds amphibious ships for the Navy and cutters for the Coast Guard.) Navy surface
combatants are overhauled, repaired, and modernized at GD/BIW, HII/Ingalls, and other U.S.
shipyards.
Lockheed Martin and Raytheon are generally considered the two leading Navy surface combatant
radar makers and combat system integrators. Lockheed is the lead contractor for the DDG-51
combat system (the Aegis system), while Raytheon is the lead contractor for the DDG-1000
combat system, the core of which is called the Total Ship Computing Environment Infrastructure
(TSCE-I). Lockheed has a share of the DDG-1000 combat system, and Raytheon has a share of
the DDG-51 combat system. Lockheed, Raytheon, and Northrop competed to be the maker of the

14 See, for example, Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy Planning for December 2025 Hypersonic Missile Test off USS
Zumwalt,” USNI News, February 1, 2023; Kyle Mizokami, “The Navy’s Stealth Destroyers Are Getting a Serious
Upgrade: 12 Hypersonic Missiles Each,” Popular Mechanics, December 1, 2022; Sam LaGrone, “Navy Details
Hypersonic Missile Plan for Zumwalt Destroyers, Virginia Submarines,” USNI News, November 3, 2022; Sam
LaGrone, “HII Set to Install First Hypersonic Missiles on USS Zumwalt, USS Michael Monsoor During Repair
Period,” USNI News, August 12, 2022; Sam LaGrone, “Latest Zumwalt Hypersonic Missile Installation Plan Calls For
Removing Gun Mounts,” USNI News, March 16, 2022; Joseph Trevithick, “The Navy’s Stealth Destroyers Will Have
Their Deck Guns Replaced With Hypersonic Missiles,” The Drive, November 2, 2021; Rich Abott, “Navy Plans to
Field 12 Hypersonic Missiles on Each Zumwalt Destroyer, Replacing Gun,” Defense Daily, June 8, 2021; Jason
Sherman, “Navy Plans to Pack Each DDG-1000 with 12 Long-Range Hypersonic Strike Missiles,” Inside Defense,
June 8, 2021; Jason Sherman, “Navy to Rip Out DDG-1000 Advanced Gun System Mounts to Make Room for
Hypersonic Weapons,” Inside Defense, May 26, 2021; Sam LaGrone, “CNO: Hypersonic Weapons at Sea to Premiere
on Zumwalt Destroyers in 2025,” USNI News, April 28, 2021; David B. Larter, “What Should Become of the Zumwalt
Class? The US Navy Has Some Big Ideas,” Defense News, March 25, 2021; Joseph Trevithick, “Navy Wants Triple-
Packed Hypersonic Missile Modules On Its Stealthy Zumwalt Destroyers,” The Drive, March 19, 2021; Paul McLeary,
“Exclusive[:] Eying China, CNO Plans Hypersonics & Lasers On Zumwalt Destroyers,” Breaking Defense, February
26, 2021. For more on the CPS program, see CRS Report R41464, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-
Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
15 See, for example, Kyle Mizokami, “The Navy’s Stealth Destroyers Are Getting a Serious Upgrade: 12 Hypersonic
Missiles Each,” Popular Mechanics, December 1, 2022; Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy Exploring ‘Surface Strike’
Upgrades for Zumwalt Destroyers,” USNI News, November 28, 2022; Justin Katz, “Navy Eyeing ‘ZEUS,’ an Upgrade
Program for the Zumwalt Destroyers,” Breaking Defense, November 22, 2022.

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SPY-6 radar to be carried by the Flight III DDG-51. On October 10, 2013, the Navy announced
that it had selected Raytheon to be the maker of the SPY-6.
The surface combatant construction industrial base also includes hundreds of additional firms that
supply materials and components. Several Navy-operated laboratories and other facilities support
the Aegis system and other aspects of the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 programs.
Issues for Congress
Future LSC Force-Level Goal
One issue for Congress for the DDG-51 concerns the future LSC force-level goal. As noted
above, studies conducted on the Navy’s next force-level goal outline potential future fleets with
63 to 96 LCSs. Reducing the LSC force-level goal from the current required figure of 104 ships
to a smaller number—particularly a number closer to 63 ships—could affect issues such as when
to retire older LSCs and how many new LSCs to procure each year. An August 1, 2022, press
report stated
In little more than five months, the shape of America’s future Navy fleet changed. Between
February and July, U.S. Navy leadership went from advocating for a modest fleet of 60
cruisers and destroyers to supporting a more robust vision of 96 large surface combatants
by 2045.
Nobody really knows what, exactly, pushed the Navy to favoring large combatants—a
rating traditionally comprised of high-value cruisers and destroyers. Neither the U.S.
Department of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, nor America’s Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral Mike Gilday, has offered taxpayers any real detail on what spurred
the Navy, after years of fretting over the relevance of large surface combatants, to redirect
at least $70 billion in future funding towards building bigger ships.
The shift was abrupt. In February, at the annual WEST 2022 conference in San Diego,
Gilday sketched out a future fleet of 60 large and 50 small combatants, breaking from the
traditional 355-ship fleet goal of maintaining a 2:1 ratio of large combatants (cruisers and
destroyers) to small vessels (frigates and Littoral Combat Ships). Last month, Gilday
changed his tune, releasing a “2022 Navigation Plan,” aiming for a fleet of 96 large
combatants by 2045.
Both targets are out of step with the 30-year shipbuilding plan detailed in April’s “Report
to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal
Year 2023,” which suggested to Congress that the Navy was intent upon fielding a fleet of
between 70 to 80 large surface combatants by 2045....
Given the public reporting to date, it is tough to tell what, exactly, is driving the Navy’s
sudden interest in large surface combatants. Industry press has been less than dogged in its
efforts to understand the dramatic—if not unprecedented—oscillation in the U.S. Navy’s
demand for large surface combatants.
That failure is unfortunate, as America’s public and policymaker communities need clarity
more than ever....
While the Navy’s growing appetite for large surface combatants—whatever they might
turn out to be—is welcome news for the large surface combatant industrial base, the Navy’s
inability to fix on a consistent plan is a public relations and strategic disaster....
With no viable strategic or tactical justification forthcoming from Navy leadership, the
Navy’s free-form approach to the future of the surface fleet does little more than bemuse
rivals and irk everybody else. The Navy has little room to make sudden whipsaw changes.
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After repeated operational fiascoes, the U.S. Navy has little credibility right now, and an
unexplained strategic change leaves pro-Navy advocates confused, and an already
impatient Congress frustrated....
The embrace of big ships in Gilday’s new force structure turns distributed lethality on its
head. Rather than working to grow the small-surface combatant fleet and using those
vessels to smear sensors and shooters all over the sea, the surface Navy is, with DDG(X),
re-inventing the battleship and, apparently, returning to the traditional World War II-era
battle group, leaving distributed lethality for crew-less things.
That’s fine. But, as originally articulated, the Distributed Maritime Operations concept was
set to push the fleet towards a 2:1 ratio of smaller crewed ships to bigger crewed surface
combatants. If the mechanics behind Distributed Maritime Operations are shifting to feed
the Navy’s craving for larger vessels, that shift—particularly if it is sacrificing smaller
crewed vessels for robots— is worth a bit of public discussion.16
Section 121 of the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6395/P.L. 116-283 of
January 1, 2021) states
SEC. 121. LIMITATION ON ALTERATION OF THE NAVY FLEET MIX.
(a) LIMITATION.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Navy may not deviate from the large surface
combatant requirements included in the 2016 Navy Force Structure Assessment until the
date on which the Secretary submits to the congressional defense committees the
certification under paragraph (2) and the report under subsection (b).
(2) CERTIFICATION.—The certification referred to in paragraph (1) is a certification, in
writing, that the Navy can mitigate the reduction in multi-mission large surface combatant
requirements, including anti-air and ballistic missile defense capabilities, due to having a
reduced number of DDG–51 Destroyers with the advanced AN/SPY–6 radar in the next
three decades.
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of the Navy shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that
includes—
(1) a description of likely detrimental impacts to the large surface combatant industrial
base, and a plan to mitigate such impacts, if the fiscal year 2021 future-years defense
program is implemented as proposed;
(2) a review of the benefits to the Navy fleet of the new AN/SPY–6 radar to be deployed
aboard Flight III variant DDG–51 Destroyers, which are currently under construction, as
well as an analysis of impacts to the warfighting capabilities of the fleet should the number
of such destroyers be reduced; and
(3) a plan to fully implement section 131 of the National Defense Authorization for Fiscal
Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 1237), including subsystem prototyping efforts
and funding by fiscal year.
Shipbuilding Industrial-Base Capacity and DDG-51 Procurement
Rate
Another issue for Congress concerns the shipbuilding industrial base’s capacity for building
DDG-51s, and the impact this could have on the DDG-51 procurement rate, specifically on the

16 Craig Hooper, “Battleships Are Back! Navy Abruptly Boosts DDG/CG Building Targets For 2045,” Forbes, August
1, 2022.
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question of whether to procure two or three DDG-51s per year. A March 21, 2023, press report
stated:
The Navy is keeping a two-ship-per-year cadence for its destroyer line because that’s a
realistic goal for industry to work toward, according to the Pentagon’s top budget officer.
Despite Congress’ push for the Navy to start buying three Arleigh Burke-class Flight III
destroyers per year, the Fiscal Year 2024 budget request unveiled last week showed the
service buying two destroyers. That’s because U.S. shipyards are not yet able to build two
destroyers per year, let alone three, Mike McCord said last week.
“I’m not hating on DDGs – my only point was that last year Congress added a third and
the reason we didn’t budget for three is, again, we don’t see the yards being able to produce
three a year. We don’t see them being able to produce two a year. And that’s just data. It’s
not what we wish to be true. But everybody’s struggling with skilled labor. Everybody’s
struggling with supply chain. So it’s not getting better very fast from the data that I’ve seen
– whether with submarines or DDGs. So two a year seems to be a reasonable place,”
McCord told USNI News at the McAleese Conference.
During the [FY2024] budget rollout last week, McCord said industry is currently building
1.5 destroyers per year, a number Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday has also
cited when arguing that the shipyards have limited capacity.
McCord also argued that asking for more destroyers than industry can build takes away
leverage from the Navy to negotiate with shipbuilders on price.
“If you keep sort of placing orders for things faster than they can be delivered, it’s good
for the books, the balance sheets of the companies. But are you really, as the buyer, are you
in the best place you’d like to be with any leverage or are you actually short of leverage
when, you produce on time or you don’t produce on time. It doesn’t matter to me – I’m
going to keep writing you checks,” McCord told USNI News.
The comptroller said both he and Susanna Blume, the director of the Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation (CAPE) Office of the Secretary of Defense, don’t think putting more
funding toward an extra destroyer is a wise use of resources that will help shipbuilders
deliver it to the Navy quicker.
“It’s just sort of piling up in the orders book and we’re still going to have the same problems
of the yards producing faster until we get through the supply chain and the workforce
issues,” McCord said. “It is not to say that we would not be interest[ed] in a more robust
production world where in having three DDGs or moving to three submarines, but it
doesn’t seem to be … realistic.”
General Dynamics Bath Iron Works, one of the yards that build the destroyers, has spent
the last several years digging through a backlog of work at its Maine yard that the COVID-
19 pandemic exacerbated. HII’s Ingalls Shipbuilding, the other yard that builds the Arleigh
Burke destroyers, has performed better. Ingalls is also winding down the Coast Guard’s
Legend-class National Security Cutter production line, which could open up more capacity
at its yard in Pascagoula, Miss.
A spokeswoman for Ingalls Shipbuilding told USNI New in a statement that the yard is
ready to support building three destroyers per year should the Navy go this route.
“Our shipbuilders will position to support whatever destroyer cadence the Navy needs and
we have started by building, testing and taking the first Flight III ship to sea, which will be
delivered later this year. We are a committed partner to not only our customers but to our
network of nearly 1,200 suppliers as well. Together, we can build three DDGs a year if that
is what the Navy and our country need,” Kimberly Aguillard said in a statement.
A spokesperson for Bath Iron Works told USNI News that it’s “working to aggressively
recover schedule” at the shipyard.
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“We support the call for a consistent demand signal that gives shipyards and suppliers the
predictability to make major investments in workforce and facilities, both to expand
destroyer production and to ensure that capability remains intact well into the future,”
David Hench said in a statement. “Those capital investments are currently underway in
Bath, and we are confident there will be significant schedule improvement so we can meet
the Navy’s expectations by the time construction begins on the anticipated multi-year
contract.”
Lawmakers have urged the Navy to work toward buying three destroyers per year and
added a third destroyer on top of the Navy’s request for two in FY 2023. Congress also
included a provision in the FY 2023 policy bill that would allow the Navy to ink a multi-
year procurement deal for as many as 15 Flight III destroyers. If the multi-year procurement
contracts are for fewer than 15 destroyers, the Navy must include at least one “pre-priced
option” so it has the opportunity to buy 15 ships, according to the bill language.17
Transition of Procurement from DDG-51s to DDG(X)s
Another issue for Congress concerns how the Navy proposes to transition several years from now
from procurement of DDG-51s to procurement of a successor destroyer design now in
development called the DDG(X). Navy plans for transitioning from procurement of DDG-51s to
procurement of DDG(X)s have been an oversight focus for the defense committees. DON’s
prepared statement for the April 26, 2022, hearing on DON investment programs before the
Seapower subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee states
The Navy is committed to a smooth and successful transition from DDG 51 to DDG(X)
starting around FY 2030.18 The transition will preserve the critical shipbuilding and
supplier industrial base by executing a collaborative design process with current DDG 51
shipyards and transitioning to a proven limited competition model between these shipyards
at the right point in ship construction.19
The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission states that “early DDG(X) production transition will
overlap DDG 51 FLT III production ensuring stability in the Large Surface Combatant industrial
base.”20
For more on the DDG(X) program, see CRS In Focus IF11679, Navy DDG(X) Next-Generation
Destroyer Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

17 Mallory Shelbourne, “OSD Comptroller Says U.S. Shipyards Can’t Build 3 Destroyers a Year,” USNI News, March
21 (updated March 22), 2023.
18 Under the Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget, procurement of the first DDG(X) has been deferred from FY2030 to
FY2032.
19 Statement of Frederick J. Stefany, Principal Civilian Deputy, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Development and Acquisition), Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development
and Acquisition), and Vice Admiral Scott Conn, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Warfighting Requirements and
Capabilities (OPNAV N9), and Lieutenant General Karsten S. Heckl, Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and
Integration, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, before the Subcommittee on
Seapower of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request for
Seapower, April 26, 2022, PDF page 10 of 37.
20 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book, Volume 2 of 5, Research,
Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, March 2023, p. 453.
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Cost, Technical, and Schedule Risk in Flight III DDG-51 Effort
Another issue for Congress concerns cost, technical, and schedule risk for the Flight III DDG-51.
A June 2022 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report assessing selected DOD
acquisition programs stated the following in its assessment of the Flight III DDG-51:
Current Status
Construction on the lead Flight III ship—DDG 125—is on schedule to deliver in April
2023, but the schedule leaves minimal time to address unexpected issues identified during
sea trials or operational testing to meet its August 2024 initial capability date, according to
program officials. Contractor performance reports show that the first two Flight III ships
saw cost growth since construction began. Both ships are above target costs due to first
time build challenges and ongoing impacts of COVID-19, per program officials. In October
2021, program officials said DDG 125 was 67 percent complete, and the second Flight III
ship—DDG 126—was 11 percent complete. Program officials report they plan to procure
14 Flight III ships through fiscal year 2022 with additional ships subject to future funding.
We previously reported the Navy planned to procure 18 Flight III ships through fiscal year
2025.
The program continues to make progress testing and integrating ship components with
AMDR components and Aegis software, but faced technical challenges over the last year.
Officials said these challenges resulted in rephasing AMDR testing 9 months later than
planned, but did not delay planned ship delivery and have since been resolved. The Navy
activated Aegis onboard DDG 125 in December 2021. The program is integrating and
testing ship power components with AN/SPY-6(V)1 and Aegis hardware and software at
land-based test sites. Flight III ships will also receive a new 400Hz power distribution
system after tests on Flight IIA ships showed the initial system did not meet requirements,
per program officials. The new system required design updates and retrofitting to areas on
Flight III ships, but has been tested on a Flight IIA ship and meets all requirements.
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The
program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
The program stated that it delivered 70 DDG 51 ships with an additional 19 under contract,
14 of which are Flight III ships. Officials said AN/SPY-6(V)1 and electrical plant
installations are complete on DDG 125, which is on track to be delivered in April 2023.
Land-based integration testing is ongoing and continues to reduce risk to the ship’s
production schedule, per officials. Program officials said the use of fixed-price incentive
contracts with cost ceilings have minimized cost overrun risks to the government.21
Regarding the AMDR specifically, the report stated the following:
Technology Maturity, Design Stability, and Production Readiness
AMDR fully matured its critical technologies when the Navy activated AMDR and the
Aegis combat system on DDG 125 in December 2021. Following combat system
activation, the Navy plans to conduct operational testing on AMDR and Aegis at sea on
DDG 125 starting in March 2024.
While AMDR’s overall design is stable, previous issues with a critical technology
component resulted in significant design changes over the past few years. Specifically, in
2020, the program redesigned the Digital Receiver Exciter (DREX) because it did not meet
vibration specifications, according to Navy officials. Program officials stated that the new
design met all qualification testing specifications. However, the fourth radar array, which

21 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] Challenges to Fielding Capabilities
Faster Persist GAO-22-105230, June 2022, p. 187.
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completed the AMDR unit for DDG 125, was delivered to the shipyard in October 2020, 2
months later than planned due in part to the redesign. In October 2021, program officials
stated that tests have shown that the new design is reliable, and they consider DREX issues
resolved. Any deficiencies the Navy discovers during testing could result in costly and
time-intensive revisions to existing design drawings or retrofitting to already-built radars.
By the end of 2021, the AMDR program delivered the radar arrays for DDG 128 and DDG
129—the third and fourth Flight III ships under construction, respectively. However,
program officials stated that they delayed delivery of an array to DDG 129 by a few weeks
due to a manufacturing issue. They explained that a microelectronic circuit within the
transmit/receive modules in the arrays was not functioning properly and the receiver could
become overloaded. Program officials stated that they had to replace some modules in the
array and the two arrays that followed it on the production line. While these manufacturing
issues delayed delivery of one of the arrays to the shipyard, they ultimately did not affect
the DDG Flight III program’s schedule because the shipbuilder was able to install the
AMDR shipsets as planned.
Also in 2021, the program addressed a manufacturing issue we reported on last year related
to the incorrect adhesive application on Transmit/Receive Integrated Microwave Module
components—another critical technology—that caused cost increases and rework.
Officials told us this year that Raytheon fixed the issue for future deliveries and offered a
warranty on the components.
We updated our Attainment of Production Knowledge table to reflect that we did not assess
whether critical manufacturing processes are in statistical control because the AMDR
program office stated that there are no critical processes.
Software and Cybersecurity
AMDR used an Agile development approach to complete nine software deliveries that
support core radar capabilities. Program officials stated that the 10th software delivery will
be the final one for DDG 51 Flight III.
Officials said that AMDR cybersecurity is addressed within the Aegis combat system and
cybersecurity testing will not occur until at least 2023.
Other Program Issues
The Navy continues to integrate and test AMDR and Aegis at land-based test sites and
these activities supported combat system activation. AMDR program officials stated that,
while they experienced some challenges integrating the radar and combat system, the
shipbuilder successfully activated the radar and combat system in December 2021, nearly
1 month ahead of its contracted schedule date.
In 2021, the Navy established the Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar (EASR) as a
subprogram within AMDR, which is expected to increase the program’s total cost estimate.
The Navy designed the AN/SPY-6(V)1 to be a family of radars that are scalable and
adaptable across multiple ship programs. Through the EASR subprogram, the Navy is
developing two variants of the AN/SPY-6 radar that are planned for installation on CVN
68, CVN 78, LHA 8, LPD 17 Flight II, and FFG 62 class ships. Program officials stated
that the updated acquisition program baseline reflecting this change is awaiting final
approval and, as of January 2022, a DOD official confirmed that the updated baseline had
not yet been approved.
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The
program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
The program office stated that it is on track to support DDG 125’s schedule. It noted that
it successfully completed two phases of testing at the land-based test site and plans to
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complete full-array power testing of the radar by the end of fiscal year 2022. The program
office also stated that the DDG 51 program successfully activated the Aegis combat system
on time on DDG 125. According to the program office, it is in the process of making the
two AN/SPY-6 EASR variants major subprograms of the AMDR program, and noted that
six EASR radars are in procurement and are on schedule to meet required ship dates. The
program office also stated that it began testing the EASR radar with air traffic control
systems in 2020 and the Ships Self-Defense System in 2021.22
Legislative Activity for FY2024
Summary of Congressional Action on FY2024 Funding Request
The Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget requests the procurement of two DDG-51s in FY2024. The
budget estimates the combined procurement cost of the two ships at $4,432.8 million (i.e., about
$4.4 billion). The two ships have received $233.6 million in prior-year Economic Order Quantity
(EOQ) funding, which is a kind of advance procurement (AP) funding that can occur under an
MYP contract. The Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget requests the remaining $4,199.2 million
needed to complete the two ships’ estimated combined procurement cost. The Navy’s proposed
FY2024 budget also requests $284.0 million in EOQ funding for DDG-51s to be procured under
the FY2023-FY2027 MYP contract, and $225.9 million in cost-to-complete funding to cover cost
growth on DDG-51s procured in prior fiscal years.
The Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget also requests $410.4 million in continued procurement
funding for the DDG-1000 program. The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission states that $234
million of the $410.4 million is for modifying the third ship in the program (DDG-1002) during
its construction to include large-diameter vertical launch tubes capable of storing and firing the
Navy’s new hypersonic Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) missile.23 (Costs to modify the first
two DDG-1000 class ships—DDG-1000 and DDG-1001—for the CPS are budgeted in the Other
Procurement, Navy [OPN] appropriation account.)
Table 1 summarizes congressional action on the Navy’s FY2024 procurement funding requests
for the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 programs.

22 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] Challenges to Fielding Capabilities
Faster Persist GAO-22-105230, June 2022, p. 160.
23 Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 1 of 1,
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, March 2023, pp. 178-179.
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Table 1. Congressional Action on FY2024 Funding Request
Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth
Authorization
Appropriation
HASC-
SASC
HAC-

Request
HASC
SASC Agreement
HAC
SAC
SAC
DDG-51 procurement
4,199.2

Quantity
(2)

DDG-51 advance procurement (EOQ AP)
284.0

DDG-51 cost to complete
225.9

DDG-1000 procurement
410.4

Sources: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2024 budget submission, committee and conference
reports, and explanatory statements on FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2024 DOD
Appropriations Act.
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee; HAC is
House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee.

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Appendix. Additional Background Information on
DDG-1000 Program
This appendix presents additional background information on the DDG-1000 program.
Overview
The DDG-1000 program was initiated in the early 1990s.24 DDG-1000s (Figure A-1) are multi-
mission destroyers with an originally intended emphasis on naval surface fire support (NSFS) and
operations in littoral (i.e., near-shore) waters. (NSFS is the use of naval guns to provide fire
support for friendly forces operating ashore.)
Figure A-1. DDG-1000 Class Destroyer

Source: U.S. Navy photo 151207-N-ZZ999-435, posted December 8, 2015, with a caption that reads in part:
“The future USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000) is underway for the first time conducting at-sea tests and trials in the
Atlantic Ocean Dec. 7, 2015.”
DDG-1000s were originally intended to replace, in a technologically more modern form, the
large-caliber naval gun fire capability that the Navy lost when it retired its Iowa-class battleships
in the early 1990s,25 to improve the Navy’s general capabilities for operating in defended littoral

24 The program was originally designated DD-21, which meant destroyer for the 21st century. In November 2001, the
program was restructured and renamed DD(X), meaning a destroyer whose design was in development. In April 2006,
the program’s name was changed again, to DDG-1000, meaning a guided missile destroyer with the hull number 1000.
25 The Navy in the 1980s reactivated and modernized four Iowa (BB-61) class battleships that were originally built
during World War II. The ships reentered service between 1982 and 1988 and were removed from service between
1990 and 1992.
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waters, and to introduce several new technologies that would be available for use on future Navy
ships. The DDG-1000 was also intended to serve as the basis for a planned cruiser called CG(X)
that was subsequently canceled.26
DDG-1000s are to have reduced-size crews of 175 sailors (147 to operate the ship, plus a 28-
person aviation detachment), compared to roughly 300 on the Navy’s Aegis destroyers and
cruisers, so as to reduce its operating and support (O&S) costs. The DDG-1000 design
incorporates a significant number of new technologies, including an integrated electric-drive
propulsion system27 and automation technologies enabling its reduced-sized crew.
With an estimated full load displacement of 15,656 tons, the DDG-1000 design is substantially
larger than the Navy’s Aegis cruisers and destroyers, which have displacements of up to about
9,700 tons, and are larger than any Navy destroyer or cruiser since the nuclear-powered cruiser
Long Beach (CGN-9), which was procured in FY1957.
The first two DDG-1000s were procured in FY2007 and split-funded (i.e., funded with two-year
incremental funding) in FY2007-FY2008; the Navy’s FY2024 budget submission estimates their
combined procurement cost at $9,450.8 million. The third DDG-1000 was procured in FY2009
and split-funded in FY2009-FY2010; the Navy’s FY2024 budget submission estimates its
procurement cost at $4,342.4 million.
The first DDG-1000 was commissioned into service on September 7, 2016. Its delivery date was
revised multiple times and reportedly was April 2020.28 This created an unusual situation in
which a ship was commissioned into service more than three years prior to its delivery date. The
delivery dates for the second and third ships have also been revised multiple times.29 In the
Navy’s FY2024 budget submission, the delivery dates for the two ships are listed as October
2023 and December 2026, respectively.
Program Origin
The program known today as the DDG-1000 program was announced on November 1, 2001,
when the Navy stated that it was replacing a destroyer-development effort called the DD-21
program, which the Navy had initiated in the mid-1990s, with a new Future Surface Combatant
Program aimed at developing and acquiring a family of three new classes of surface
combatants:30

26 For more on the CG(X) program, see CRS Report RL34179, Navy CG(X) Cruiser Program: Background for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
27 For more on integrated electric-drive technology, see CRS Report RL30622, Electric-Drive Propulsion for U.S. Navy
Ships: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
28 See Aidan Quigley, “Final Delivery of Zumwalt-class Destroyer Monsoor Delayed,” Inside Defense, January 21,
2021.
29 The revised delivery dates for the three ships reflect Section 121 of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act
(S. 2943/P.L. 114-328 of December 23, 2016), a provision that establishes standards for determining vessel delivery
dates and which also required the Secretary of the Navy to certify that the delivery dates for certain ships, including the
three DDG-1000s, had been adjusted in accordance with the provision. The Navy’s original plan for the DDG-1000
program was to install certain elements of each DDG-1000’s combat system after delivering the ship and
commissioning it into service. Section 121 of P.L. 114-328 in effect requires the Navy to defer the delivery date of a
DDG-1000 until those elements of the combat system are installed. By the time P.L. 114-328 was enacted, DDG-1000,
per the Navy’s original plan, had already been commissioned into service without those elements of its combat system.
30 The DD-21 program was part of a Navy surface combatant acquisition effort begun in the mid-1990s and called the
SC-21 (Surface Combatant for the 21st Century) program. The SC-21 program envisaged a new destroyer called DD-21
and a new cruiser called CG-21. When the Navy announced the Future Surface Combatant Program in 2001,
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 a destroyer called DD(X) for the precision long-range strike and naval gunfire
mission;
 a cruiser called CG(X) for the air defense and ballistic missile mission; and
 a smaller combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to counter
submarines, small surface attack craft (also called “swarm boats”), and mines in
heavily contested littoral (near-shore) areas.31
On April 7, 2006, the Navy announced that it had redesignated the DD(X) program as the DDG-
1000 program. The Navy also confirmed in that announcement that the first ship in the class,
DDG-1000, would be named Zumwalt, in honor of Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, the Chief of Naval
operations from 1970 to 1974. The decision to name the first ship after Zumwalt was made by the
Clinton Administration in July 2000, when the program was still called the DD-21 program.32
New Technologies
The DDG-1000 incorporates a significant number of new technologies, including a wave-
piercing, tumblehome hull design for reduced detectability,33 a superstructure on the first two
ships (but not the third) that is made partly of large sections of composite (i.e., fiberglass-like)
materials rather than steel or aluminum, an integrated electric-drive propulsion system,34 a total-
ship computing system for moving information about the ship, automation technologies enabling
its reduced-sized crew, a dual-band radar (that was later changed to a single-band radar), a new
kind of vertical launch system (VLS) for storing and firing missiles, and two copies of a new
155mm gun called the Advanced Gun System (AGS).
Shipbuilders and Combat System Prime Contractor
GD/BIW is the builder for all three DDG-1000s, with some portions of each ship being built by
HII/Ingalls for delivery to GD/BIW. Raytheon is the prime contractor for the DDG-1000’s
combat system (its collection of sensors, computers, related software, displays, and weapon
launchers).
Under a DDG-1000 acquisition strategy approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L) on February 24, 2004, the first DDG-1000
was to have been built by HII/Ingalls, the second ship was to have been built by GD/BIW, and

development work on the DD-21 had been underway for several years, while the start of development work on the CG-
21 was still years in the future. The current DDG-1000 destroyer CG(X) cruiser programs can be viewed as the
descendants, respectively, of the DD-21 and CG-21. The acronym SC-21 is still used in the Navy’s research and
development account to designate the line item (i.e., program element) that funds development work on both the DDG-
1000 and CG(X).
31 For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
32 For more on Navy ship names, see CRS Report RS22478, Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
33 A tumblehome hull slopes inward, toward the ship’s centerline, as it rises up from the waterline, in contrast to a
conventional flared hull, which slopes outward as it rises up from the waterline.
34 For more on integrated electric-drive technology, see CRS Report RL30622, Electric-Drive Propulsion for U.S. Navy
Ships: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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contracts for building the first six were to have been equally divided between HII/Ingalls35 and
GD/BIW.
In February 2005, Navy officials announced that they would seek approval from USD AT&L to
instead hold a one-time, winner-take-all competition between HII/Ingalls and GD/BIW to build
all DDG-1000s. On April 20, 2005, the USD AT&L issued a decision memorandum deferring this
proposal, stating in part, “at this time, I consider it premature to change the shipbuilder portion of
the acquisition strategy which I approved on February 24, 2004.”
Several Members of Congress also expressed opposition to the Navy’s proposal for a winner-
take-all competition. Congress included a provision (§1019) in the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for 2005 (H.R. 1268/P.L. 109-13 of May 11, 2005) prohibiting a winner-take-
all competition. The provision effectively required the participation of at least one additional
shipyard in the program but did not specify the share of the program that is to go to the additional
shipyard.
On May 25, 2005, the Navy announced that, in light of Section 1019 of P.L. 109-13, it wanted to
shift to a “dual-lead-ship” acquisition strategy, under which two DDG-1000s would be procured
in FY2007, with one to be designed and built by HII/Ingalls and the other by GD/BIW.
Section 125 of the FY2006 defense authorization act (H.R. 1815/P.L. 109-163) again prohibited
the Navy from using a winner-take-all acquisition strategy for procuring its next-generation
destroyer. The provision again effectively requires the participation of at least one additional
shipyard in the program but does not specify the share of the program that is to go to the
additional shipyard.
On November 23, 2005, the USD AT&L granted Milestone B approval for the DDG-1000,
permitting the program to enter the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase. As
part of this decision, the USD AT&L approved the Navy’s proposed dual-lead-ship acquisition
strategy and a low rate initial production quantity of eight ships (one more than the Navy
subsequently planned to procure).
On February 14, 2008, the Navy awarded contract modifications to GD/BIW and HII/Ingalls for
the construction of the two lead ships. The awards were modifications to existing contracts that
the Navy has with GD/BIW and HII/Ingalls for detailed design and construction of the two lead
ships. Under the modified contracts, the line item for the construction of the dual lead ships is
treated as a cost plus incentive fee (CPIF) item.
Until July 2007, it was expected that HII/Ingalls would be the final-assembly yard for the first
DDG-1000 and that GD/BIW would be the final-assembly yard for the second. On September 25,
2007, the Navy announced that it had decided to build the first DDG-1000 at GD/BIW, and the
second at HII/Ingalls.
On January 12, 2009, it was reported that the Navy, HII/Ingalls, and GD/BIW in the fall of 2008
began holding discussions on the idea of having GD/BIW build both the first and second DDG-
1000s, in exchange for HII/Ingalls receiving a greater share of the new DDG-51s that would be
procured under the Navy’s July 2008 proposal to stop DDG-1000 procurement and restart DDG-
51 procurement.36
On April 8, 2009, it was reported that the Navy had reached an agreement with HII/Ingalls and
GD/BIW to shift the second DDG-1000 to GD/BIW, and to have GD/BIW build all three ships.

35 At the time of the events described in this section, HII was owned by Northrop Grumman and was called Northrop
Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB).
36 Christopher P. Cavas, “Will Bath Build Second DDG 1000?” Defense News, January 12, 2009: 1, 6.
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HII/Iingalls will continue to make certain parts of the three ships, notably their composite
deckhouses. The agreement to have all three DDG-1000s built at GD/BIW was a condition that
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates set forth in an April 6, 2009, news conference on the FY2010
defense budget for his support for continuing with the construction of all three DDG-1000s
(rather than proposing the cancellation of the second and third).
Reduction in Procurement to Three Ships
Navy plans for many years called for ending DDG-51 procurement in FY2005, to be followed by
procurement of up to 32 DDG-1000s and some number of CG(X)s. In subsequent years, the
planned total number of DDG-1000s was reduced to 16 to 24, then to 7, and finally to 3.
At the end of July 2008, in a major reversal of its destroyer procurement plans, the Navy
announced that it wanted to end procurement of DDG-1000s and resume procurement of DDG-
51s. In explaining this reversal, which came after two DDG-1000s had been procured, the Navy
stated that it had reevaluated the future operating environment and determined that its destroyer
procurement now needed to emphasize three missions: open-ocean antisubmarine warfare
(ASW), countering anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and countering ballistic missiles. Although
the DDG-1000 could perform the first two of these missions and could be modified to perform
the third, the Navy concluded that the DDG-51 design could perform these three missions
adequately and would be less expensive to procure than the DDG-1000 design.
The Navy’s proposal to stop procuring DDG-1000s and resume procuring DDG-51s was
presented in the Navy’s proposed FY2010 budget, which was submitted to Congress in 2009.
Congress, in acting on the Navy’s FY2010 budget, approved the idea of ending DDG-1000
procurement and restarting DDG-51 procurement, and procured a third DDG-1000 as the final
ship in the class.
In retrospect, the Navy’s 2008 reversal in its destroyer procurement plans can be viewed as an
early indication of the ending of the post-Cold War era (during which the Navy focused its
planning on operating in littoral waters against the land- and sea-based forces of countries such as
Iran and North Korea) and the shift in the international security environment to renewed great
power competition (during which the Navy is now focusing its planning more on being able to
operate in mid-ocean waters against capable naval forces from near-peer competitors such as
China and Russia).37
Increase in Estimated Procurement Cost
As shown in Table A-1 below, the estimated combined procurement cost for all three DDG-
1000s, as reflected in the Navy’s annual budget submissions, has grown by $4,816.1 million (i.e.,
about $4.8 billion), or 53.6%, since the FY2009 budget (i.e., the budget for the fiscal year in
which the third DDG-1000 was procured). Within the increase from the FY2023 figure to the
FY2024 figure, the Navy’s FY2024 budget submission states $234 million is for modifying the
third ship in the program (DDG-1002) during its construction to include large-diameter vertical
launch tubes capable of storing and firing the Navy’s new hypersonic Conventional Prompt Strike

37 For additional discussion, see CRS Report R43838, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for
U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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(CPS) missile.38 (Costs to modify the first two DDG-1000 class ships—DDG-1000 and DDG-
1001—for the CPS are budgeted in the Other Procurement, Navy [OPN] appropriation account.)
Table A-1. Estimated Combined Procurement Cost of DDGs 1000, 1001, and 1002
In millions, rounded to nearest tenth, as shown in annual Navy budget submissions
Estimated combined
Change from prior
Cumulative change
Budget
procurement cost
year’s budget
from FY2009 budget
submission
(millions of dollars)
submission
submission
FY09
8,977.1
—
—
FY10
9,372.5
+395.4 (+4.4%)
+395.4 (+4.4%)
FY11
9,993.3
+620.8 (+6.6%)
+1,016.2 (+11.3%)
FY12
11,308.8
+1,315.5 (+13.2%)
+2,331.7 (+26.0%)
FY13
11,470.1
+161.3 (+1.4%)
+2,493.0 (+27.8%)
FY14
11,618.4
+148.3 (+1.3%)
+2,641.3 (+29.4%)
FY15
12,069.4
+451.0 (+3.9%)
+3,092.3 (+34.4%)
FY16
12,288.7
+219.3 (+1.8%)
+3,311.6 (+36.9%)
FY17
12,738.2
+449.5 (+3.7%)
+3,761.1 (+41.9%)
FY18
12,882.0
+143.8 (+1.1%)
+3,904.0 (+43.5%)
FY19
13,032.2
+150.2 (+1.2%)
+4,055.1 (+45.1%)
FY20
13,195.5
+163.3 (+1.3%)
+4,218.4 (+47.0%)
FY21
13,275.6
+80.1 (+ 0.6%)
+4,298.5 (+47.9%)
FY22
13,305.9
+30.3 (+0.2+%)
+4,328.8 (+48.2%)
FY23
13,378.7
+72.8 (+0.5%)
+4,401.6 (+49.0%)
FY24
13,793.2
+414.5 (+3.1%)
+4,816.1 (+53.6%)
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on data in annual Navy budget submissions.
Note: The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission states $234 mil ion of the increase shown for FY2024 is for
modifying the third ship in the program (DDG-1002) during its construction to include large-diameter vertical
launch tubes capable of storing and firing the Navy’s new hypersonic Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) missile.
(Costs to modify the first two DDG-1000 class ships—DDG-1000 and DDG-1001—for the CPS are budgeted in
the Other Procurement, Navy [OPN] appropriation account.)
Some of the cost growth in the earlier years in the table was caused by the truncation of the DDG-
1000 program from seven ships to three, which caused some class-wide procurement-rated costs
that had been allocated to the fourth through seventh ships in the program to be reallocated to the
three remaining ships.
The Navy stated in 2014 that the cost growth shown through FY2015 in the table reflects, among
other things, a series of incremental, year-by-year movements away from an earlier Navy cost
estimate for the program, and toward a higher estimate developed by the Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation (CAPE) office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). As one
consequence of a Nunn-McCurdy cost breach experienced by the DDG-1000 program in 2010
(see discussion below), the Navy was directed to fund the DDG-1000 program to CAPE’s higher
cost estimate for the period FY2011-FY2015, and to the Navy’s cost estimate for FY2016 and

38 Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 1 of 1,
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, March 2023, pp. 178-179.
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beyond. The Navy states that it implemented this directive in a year-by-year fashion with each
budget submission from FY2010 through FY2015, moving incrementally closer each year
through FY2015 to CAPE’s higher estimate. The Navy stated in 2014 that even with the cost
growth shown in the table, the DDG-1000 program as of the FY2015 budget submission was still
about 3% below the program’s rebaselined starting point for calculating any new Nunn-McCurdy
cost breach on the program.39
Technical Risk and Test and Evaluation Issues
January 2022 DOT&E Report
A January 2022 report from DOD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)—
DOT&E’s annual report for FY2021—stated the following regarding the DDG-1000 program:
Test Adequacy
In FY21, the Navy executed three missile exercises on the SDTS [Self-Defense Test Ship]
to evaluate the DDG 1000’s self-defense capability and validate the DDG 1000 combat
system M&S [modeling and simulation] test bed.
Due to shipyard delays and persistent combat systems integration faults affecting multiple
warfare areas, the test ship could not support the DDG 1000 IOT&E [Initial Operational
Test and Evaluation], initially planned for FY19. The Navy started IOT&E in October
2021, but the Navy must still develop a test strategy for the intended OaSUW [Offensive
Anti-Surface Warfare] capability.
The Navy has not planned or funded an adequate ship survivability assessment against
underwater threats, to include a demonstration of residual mission capability after such
engagements, through a full-ship shock trial. Given the current schedule, this assessment
will not be complete prior to initial deployment of a DDG 1000 ship.
The Navy has not yet modeled the ship as built to support an LFT&E [Live Fire Test and
Evaluation] assessment, and has yet to verify, validate, and accredit the intended
vulnerability M&S needed to evaluate ship survivability against air-delivered threats.
Planned shipboard testing will supplement some gaps in the capability of survivability
models and support the final survivability assessment.
The Navy plans to start Failure and Recoverability Mode testing on USS Michael Monsoor
[DDG-1001] in 1QFY22 [first quarter of FY2022] to evaluate the mission systems’
capability to recover from system failures and effectiveness of damage control response.
Development delays and required updates to the ship’s combat system and auxiliary
systems have limited the opportunity to conduct this evaluation. The Navy has scheduled
the cyber survivability assessment for 3QFY22 [third quarter of FY2022].
Performance
Effectiveness
Not enough data are yet available to provide a preliminary assessment of DDG 1000
operational effectiveness. The DDG 1000 live missile events using SDTS highlighted
performance limitations that may restrict operational effectiveness in the air warfare
mission. Final assessment of DDG offensive surface strike effectiveness will be published
in a classified report following the completion of the live missile events.
Suitability

39 Source: Navy briefing for CRS and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on the DDG-1000 program, April 30,
2014.
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Not enough data are yet available to provide a preliminary assessment of DDG 1000
operational suitability.
Survivability
Survivability assessments conducted thus far have not been validated and do not reflect the
ship as-built. Consequently, data are insufficient to adequately assess DDG survivability
in a contested environment, to include a cyber-contested environment.
Recommendations
The Navy should:
1. Complete IOT&E prior to the first deployment of a DDG 1000 ship.
2. Complete revision of the TEMP [Test and Evaluation master Plan] that includes an
adequate test strategy for the delivered OaSUW capability as soon as feasible.
3. Schedule, fund, and execute the four remaining DDG 1000 SDTS tests.
4. Complete development and validate the DDG 1000 combat system test bed, to include
debris, missile, radar, and electronic warfare models.
5. Document the risk to the warfighter associated with incomplete component shock
qualification and lack of full-ship shock trial.
6. Complete validation of LFT&E M&S for the ship as-built and determine required
mitigations to identified limitations.40
Regarding the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) weapon system—a conventionally armed,
boost-glide hypersonic weapon system that the Navy intends to deploy on DDG-1000s—the
DOT&E report stated
Test Adequacy
The Army and the Navy will start the Phase 1 flight tests as Joint Flight Campaign events
to determine Phase 1 flight performance and mission-relevant limitations of the common
components of the hypersonic weapon systems. Collection of joint test data is necessary to
identify and leverage common practices, test corridors and infrastructure, test data, and
modeling and simulation (M&S) capability across the family of hypersonic weapon
systems. The Navy intends to execute Phase 2 operational demonstrations, but limited
flight test opportunities pose a risk to demonstrating the required operational capability in
support of the fielding of the hypersonic missile system onboard a Zumwalt-class surface
combatant....
Performance
Effectiveness
Not enough data are yet available to evaluate the CPS effectiveness and lethality required
for the CPS program to transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2. Demonstrated capabilities and
limitations will be published in a classified Early Fielding Report after the completion of
Phase 2 testing.
Suitability
Not enough data are yet available to evaluate the CPS suitability capabilities required for
the CPS program to transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2. The program intends to complete

40 Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, FY2021 Annual Report, January 2022, p. 147.
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an initial Life Cycle Support Plan to address product support and fielding on a
Zumwalt‑class in FY22.41
June 2022 GAO Report
A June 2022 GAO report assessing selected major DOD weapon acquisition programs stated the
following of the DDG-1000 program:
Technology Maturity, Design Stability, Production Readiness
The DDG 1000 program has yet to mature three of its nine original critical technologies as
it nears completion of construction of the final ship in 2021. The program is also adding a
new weapon system with more immature technologies. According to the program, the
Navy intends to mature the three remaining original technologies—infrared signature,
volume search radar, and total ship computing environment—during operational testing,
conducted in realistic combat conditions. The Navy now plans to complete operational
testing for the DDG 1000 in December 2022—a 15-month delay compared to last year’s
date. This delay is a result of the Navy’s efforts to support industry workload balance, and
the Navy requiring the ship to be elsewhere to support other fleet activities.
Last year, we reported that three critical technologies had been added to the original nine
technologies to enable the new offensive surface strike mission. According to the Navy,
one of those three—a communication system—has since matured and will be installed in
2023. The second technology—a surface strike missile with a new seeker that was
approaching maturity—is no longer planned for this class. The Navy expects the third
technology—an intelligence system—to reach maturity by installation in 2024.
In addition to this strike mission, this year, the Navy announced plans to incorporate the
Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) hypersonic weapon system—a separate development
effort that we also assess in this report—on the class starting in 2024. CPS has four
immature technologies. The program currently has $15 million in funding to begin CPS
incorporation design efforts and finalize requirements, and requested over $100 million in
fiscal year 2022. The Navy plans to install CPS on the DDG 1000 in fiscal year 2024, and
on the other ships during their first planned dry docking maintenance periods.
DDG 1000 completed final delivery in April 2020 and is undergoing at-sea testing ahead
of planned initial operational capability. According to the Navy, initial operational
capability was delayed from December 2021 to December 2022 due to the rescheduling of
test events. The DDG 1000 also successfully completed rough-water testing of the ship
which, according to the program manager, validated the hull form design in harsh sea
states.
The other two ships of the class are facing delays. According to the program manager,
DDG 1001’s delivery was delayed until the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2022 due to
challenges with developing some needed range testing equipment. Delays also continue for
DDG 1002, as delivery of the ship was delayed until November 2021 to resolve
deficiencies and create a COVID-19 safe workplace, among other reasons. While the Navy
still plans for final delivery of DDG 1002 with its combat systems in 2024, further delays
are possible. For example, due to delays and crew habitability concerns, a different
contractor will install weapon systems on DDG 1002 than the contractor used on the other
two hulls, which could result in some loss of efficiencies gained by the contractor on the
other two ships.
Other Program Issues

41 Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, FY2021 Annual Report, January 2022, p. 141. See
also Justin Katz and Andrew Eversden, “Navy’s Problems with the Zumwalt May Be Hurting Its Hypersonic Weapon
Efforts,” Breaking Defense, January 27, 2022.
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According to the program manager, one of the primary engineering efforts to incorporate
CPS is to design a launching system that enables a cold launch missile, meaning that the
missile is ejected from the ship before its rocket motor ignites. The DDG 1000 class would
be the first surface ship that uses cold launch missile technology. Design efforts are also
required to remove the existing Advanced Gun System turrets and replace them with the
CPS payload launcher system that will house the CPS missiles. The program manager
further stated that the funding provided constitutes a fraction of the total expected funding
necessary for complete CPS integration. For example, integration of the CPS weapon
system across all three ships was estimated in June 2021 at approximately $900 million.
The first live demonstration of a hypersonic weapon from the DDG 1000 is currently
scheduled for fiscal year 2025.
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment for program office review and comment. The
program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
The program office stated that the DDG 1000 completed a key maintenance event and
several test events, and was transferred to in-service sustainment in 2021. It added that the
DDG 1001 participated in underway test events and fleet exercises, including an aviation
test, an integrated fleet exercise, and torpedo defense tests in 2021. Further, it noted that
the Navy accepted completion of DDG 1002 from Bath Iron Works in November 2021,
and that DDG 1002 departed in January 2022 and arrived at Huntington Ingalls Industries’
shipyard for completion of combat systems installation and activation. According to the
program office, the Navy commenced engineering design planning to allow for integration
of CPS in support of the Zumwalt class being the first platform to field these missiles.42
Procurement Cost Cap
Section 123 of the FY2006 defense authorization act (H.R. 1815/P.L. 109-163 of January 6, 2006)
limited the procurement cost of the fifth DDG-1000 to $2.3 billion, plus adjustments for inflation
and other factors. Given the truncation of the DDG-1000 program to three ships, this unit
procurement cost cap appears moot.
2010 Nunn-McCurdy Breach, Program Restructuring, and
Milestone Recertification
On February 1, 2010, the Navy notified Congress that the DDG-1000 program had experienced a
critical cost breach under the Nunn-McCurdy provision. The Nunn-McCurdy provision (10
U.S.C. 2433a) requires certain actions to be taken if a major defense acquisition program exceeds
(i.e., breaches) certain cost-growth thresholds and is not terminated. Among other things, a
program that experiences a cost breach large enough to qualify under the provision as a critical
cost breach has its previous acquisition system milestone certification revoked. (In the case of the
DDG-1000 program, this was Milestone B.) In addition, for the program to proceed rather than be
terminated, DOD must certify certain things, including that the program is essential to national
security and that there are no alternatives to the program that will provide acceptable capability to
meet the joint military requirement at less cost.43

42 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] Challenges to Fielding Capabilities
Faster Persist GAO-22-105230, June 2022, p. 166.
43 For more on the Nunn-McCurdy provision, see CRS Report R41293, The Nunn-McCurdy Act: Background,
Analysis, and Issues for Congress, by Moshe Schwartz and Charles V. O'Connor.
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The Navy stated in its February 1, 2010, notification letter that the DDG-1000 program’s critical
cost breach was a mathematical consequence of the program’s truncation to three ships.44 Since
the DDG-1000 program has roughly $9.3 billion in research and development costs, truncating
the program to three ships increased to roughly $3.1 billion the average amount of research and
development costs that are included in the average acquisition cost (i.e., average research and
development cost plus procurement cost) of each DDG-1000. The resulting increase in program
acquisition unit cost (PAUC)—one of two measures used under the Nunn-McCurdy provision for
measuring cost growth45—was enough to cause a Nunn-McCurdy critical cost breach.
In a June 1, 2010, letter (with attachment) to Congress, Ashton Carter, the DOD acquisition
executive (i.e., the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), stated
that he had restructured the DDG-1000 program and that he was issuing the certifications
required under the Nunn-McCurdy provision for the restructured DDG-1000 program to
proceed.46 The letter stated that the restructuring of the DDG-1000 program included the
following:
 A change to the DDG-1000’s design affecting its primary radar.
 A change in the program’s Initial Operational Capability (IOC) from FY2015 to
FY2016.
 A revision to the program’s testing and evaluation requirements.
Regarding the change to the ship’s design affecting its primary radar, the DDG-1000 originally
was to have been equipped with a dual-band radar (DBR) consisting of the Raytheon-built X-
band SPY-3 multifunction radar (MFR) and the Lockheed-built S-band SPY-4 Volume Search
Radar (VSR). (Raytheon is the prime contractor for the overall DBR.) Both parts of the DBR
have been in development for the past several years. An attachment to the June 1, 2010, letter
stated that, as a result of the program’s restructuring, the ship is now to be equipped with “an
upgraded multifunction radar [MFR] and no volume search radar [VSR].” The change eliminates
the Lockheed-built S-band SPY-4 VSR from the ship’s design. The ship might retain a space and
weight reservation that would permit the VSR to be backfitted to the ship at a later point. The
Navy states that
As part of the Nunn-McCurdy certification process, the Volume Search Radar (VSR)
hardware was identified as an acceptable opportunity to reduce cost in the program and
thus was removed from the current baseline design....
Modifications will be made to the SPY-3 Multi-Function Radar (MFR) with the focus of
meeting ship Key Performance Parameters. The MFR modifications will involve software
changes to perform a volume search functionality. Shipboard operators will be able to
optimize the SPY-3 MFR for either horizon search or volume search. While optimized for
volume search, the horizon search capability is limited. Without the VSR, DDG 1000 is
still expected to perform local area air defense....

44 Source: Letter to congressional offices dated February 1, 2010, from Robert O. Work, Acting Secretary of the Navy,
to Representative Ike Skelton, provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on February 24, 2010.
45 PAUC is the sum of the program’s research and development cost and procurement cost divided by the number of
units in the program. The other measure used under the Nunn-McCurdy provision to measure cost growth is average
program unit cost (APUC), which is the program’s total procurement cost divided by the number of units in the
program.
46 Letter dated June 1, 2010, from Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)
to the Honorable Ike Skelton, with attachment. The letter and attachment were posted on InsideDefense.com
(subscription required) on June 2, 2010.
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The removal of the VSR will result in an estimated $300 million net total cost savings for
the three-ship class. These savings will be used to offset the program cost increase as a
result of the truncation of the program to three ships. The estimated cost of the MFR
software modification to provide the volume search capability will be significantly less
than the estimated procurement costs for the VSR.47
Regarding the figure of $300 million net total cost savings in the above passage, the Navy during
2011 determined that eliminating the SPY-4 VSR from the DDG-1000 increased by $54 million
the cost to integrate the dual-band radar into the Navy’s new Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class
aircraft carriers.48 Subtracting this $54 million cost from the above $300 million savings figure
would bring the net total cost savings to about $246 million on a Navy-wide basis.
A July 26, 2010, press report quotes Captain James Syring, the DDG-1000 program manager, as
stating the following: “We don’t need the S-band radar to meet our requirements [for the DDG-
1000],” and “You can meet [the DDG-1000’s operational] requirements with [the] X-band [radar]
with software modifications.”49
An attachment to the June 1, 2010, letter stated that the PAUC for the DDG-1000 program had
increased 86%, triggering the Nunn-McCurdy critical cost breach, and that the truncation of the
program to three ships was responsible for 79 of the 86 percentage points of increase. (The
attachment stated that the other seven percentage points of increase are from increases in
development costs that are primarily due to increased research and development work content for
the program.)
Carter also stated in his June 1, 2010, letter that he had directed that the DDG-1000 program be
funded, for the period FY2011-FY2015, to the cost estimate for the program provided by the Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office (which is a part of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense [OSD]), and, for FY2016 and beyond, to the Navy’s cost estimate for the program.
The program was previously funded to the Navy’s cost estimate for all years. Since CAPE’s cost
estimate for the program is higher than the Navy’s cost estimate, funding the program to the
CAPE estimate for the period FY2011-FY2015 will increase the cost of the program as it appears
in the budget for those years. The letter states that DOD “intends to address the [resulting]
FY2011 [funding] shortfall [for the DDG-1000 program] through reprogramming actions.”
An attachment to the letter stated that the CAPE in May 2010 estimated the PAUC of the DDG-
1000 program (i.e., the sum of the program’s research and development costs and procurement
costs, divided by the three ships in the program) as $7.4 billion per ship in then-year dollars
($22.1 billion in then-year dollars for all three ships), and the program’s average procurement unit
cost (APUC), which is the program’s total procurement cost divided by the three ships in the
program, as $4.3 billion per ship in then-year dollars ($12.8 billion in then-year dollars for all
three ships). The attachment stated that these estimates are at a confidence level of about 50%,
meaning that the CAPE believes there is a roughly 50% chance that the program can be
completed at or under these cost estimates, and a roughly 50% chance that the program will
exceed these cost estimates.

47 Source: Undated Navy information paper on DDG-51 program restructuring provided to CRS and CBO by Navy
Office of Legislative Affairs on July 19, 2010.
48 Source: Undated Navy information paper on CVN-78 cost issues, provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to
CRS on March 19, 2012.
49 Cid Standifer, “Volume Radar Contracted For DDG-1000 Could Be Shifted To CVN-79,” Inside the Navy, July 26,
2010. See also Joseph Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway, “Navy’s Troubled Stealth Destroyers May Have Radars
Replaced Before Ever Sailing On A Mission,” The Drive, October 15, 2020.
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An attachment to the letter directed the Navy to “return for a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)
review in the fall 2010 timeframe when the program is ready to seek approval of the new
Milestone B and authorization for production of the DDG-1002 [i.e., the third ship in the
program].”
On October 8, 2010, DOD reinstated the DDG-1000 program’s Milestone B certification and
authorized the Navy to continue production of the first and second DDG-1000s and commence
production of the third DDG-1000.50

Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

50 Christopher J. Castelli, “Pentagon Approves Key Milestone For Multibillion-Dollar Destroyer,” Inside the Navy,
November 22, 2010.
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RL32109 · VERSION 267 · UPDATED
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