Iran: Background and U.S. Policy
March 23, 2023
Congress has played a key role in shaping U.S. policy toward Iran, providing for extensive U.S.
sanctions, providing aid and authorizing arms sales to partners threatened by Iran, seeking to
Carla E. Humud
influence negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, and enacting legislation that allows Congress
Analyst in Middle Eastern
to review related agreements. In addition to Iran’s nuclear program, its government’s support for
Affairs
armed proxies and terrorist groups, its human rights violations, and its increasingly close

relationships with Russia and China have all posed challenges for the United States.
Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle
2022 Political Protests. The September 2022 death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who was
Eastern Affairs
arrested by Iran’s Morality Police for allegedly violating Iran’s mandatory hijab (or head

covering) law and died after reportedly having been beaten in custody, sparked nationwide
unrest. The regime has cracked down violently against protesters, killing hundreds. The protests

appear to have subsided in 2023 but could resurge as the grievances underlying them remain
unresolved. The Biden Administration sanctioned a number of Iranian officials in response to the protests and issued a
general license aimed at expanding secure internet access for Iranians.
Iran’s Military. U.S. officials have expressed long-standing concern with the activities of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC), which provides arms, training, and support to a network of regional proxies and armed groups. In
addition to IRGC support to U.S. adversaries in the Middle East, Iran maintains what U.S. officials describe as “the largest
inventory of ballistic missiles in the region.” Iran also maintains an arsenal of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones).
Iran’s Foreign Policy. According to the 2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Iran’s
government seeks to erode U.S. influence in the Middle East while projecting power in neighboring states. Iran-backed
militia forces in Iraq and Syria have carried out rocket, drone, and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against U.S.
and allied forces. Iran has provided thousands of rockets and short-range missiles to Lebanese Hezbollah, which the group
has used in armed conflicts with Israel. Iran has provided Houthi militants in Yemen with ballistic and cruise missiles, as well
as UAVs, that have enabled the Houthis to target Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Iran also has sought to
strengthen its economic and military ties with China and Russia—for example, by exporting drones to bolster Russian
military operations in Ukraine. Iran’s March 2023 agreement to reestablish ties with Saudi Arabia, which was brokered by
China, also has implications for U.S. interests.
Iran’s Nuclear Program. U.S. policymakers have long signaled concern that Tehran might seek to develop nuclear
weapons, though Iranian leaders deny such ambitions. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) imposed
restraints on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for relief from most U.S. and UN Security Council economic sanctions. In
2018, the Trump Administration withdrew the United States from the JCPOA. Since the reimposition of U.S. sanctions in
2018 and resulting economic pressure, Iran has decreased its compliance with the nuclear commitments of the JCPOA. As of
March 2023, indirect talks with Iran’s government to revive the JCPOA appear to be stalled.
Issues for Congress. In recent years, congressional action on Iran has focused on sanctions and the JCPOA.
 Sanctions. Since 1979, successive U.S. Administrations have imposed economic sanctions in an effort to
change Iran’s behavior, often at the direction of Congress. The United States has imposed sanctions on
Iran’s energy sector, arms and weapons-related technology transfers, financial sector, and various non-oil
industries and sectors. Sanctions appear to have had a mixed impact on Iranian behavior.
 Oversight of Nuclear Talks. In 2015, Congress enacted the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA,
P.L. 114-17), which mandates congressional review of related agreements and provides for consideration of
legislation to potentially block their implementation. Some in Congress who have opposed Biden
Administration efforts to revive the JCPOA have indicated that they might use INARA to block or at least
complicate a potential future agreement.
Outlook. Successive U.S. Administrations have used varying policy tools, including comprehensive sanctions, limited
military action, and diplomatic engagement with leaders in Iran and other countries to counter perceived Iranian threats to
U.S. interests. As of 2023, the Iranian government retains considerable influence in the Middle East region, is developing
new ties to Russia and China, and remains able to challenge U.S. interests in the region and beyond. In this context, Members
of Congress may consider questions related to U.S. and Iranian policy goals, the stability of Iran’s government, and efforts to
counter Iran’s regional influence and deter its nuclear development activities.
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Iran: Background and U.S. Policy

Overview and Issues for Congress
The Islamic Republic of Iran, the second-largest country in the Middle East by size (after Saudi
Arabia) and population (after Egypt), has for decades played an assertive, and by many accounts
destabilizing, role in the region and beyond. Iran’s influence stems from its oil reserves (the
world’s fourth largest), its status as the world’s most populous Shia Muslim country, and its
active support for political and armed groups (including several U.S.-designated terrorist
organizations) throughout the Middle East.
Since the Iranian Revolution that ushered in the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has presented a
major foreign policy challenge for the United States. Successive U.S. Administrations have
identified Iran and its activities as a threat to the United States and its interests. Of particular
concern are the Iranian government’s nuclear program, its military capabilities, its partnerships
with Russia and China, and its support for armed factions and terrorist groups. The United States
has also condemned the Iranian government’s human rights violations and detention of U.S.
citizens and others, though it has wrestled with how to support protest movements in Iran. The
U.S. government has used a range of policy tools intended to reduce the threat posed by Iran,
including sanctions, limited military action, and diplomatic engagement; however, Iran’s regional
influence and strategic capabilities remain considerable and have arguably increased.
Congress has played a key role in shaping U.S. policy toward Iran, providing for extensive U.S.
sanctions, providing aid and authorizing arms sales for partners threatened by Iran, seeking to
influence negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, and enacting legislation that allows Congress
to review related agreements. In 2021-2022, as the Biden Administration engaged in negotiations
intended to reestablish mutual compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), numerous Members expressed a range of views, some in support of and others opposed
to renewing the agreement. The prominence of the JCPOA in U.S. policy towards Iran waned in
late 2022 because of developments such as nationwide unrest in Iran.
Figure 1. Iran at a Glance

Geography
Total Area: 1,648,195 sq km (636,372 sq. miles), 2.5 times the size of Texas
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People
Population: 86,758,304 (17th in the world)
% of Population 14 or Younger: 24.1%
Religion: Muslim 99.6% (90-95% Shia, 5-10% Sunni), other (Zoroastrian, Christian, and Jewish)
0.3% (2016)
Literacy: 85.5% (male 90.4%, female 80.8%) (2016)
Economy
GDP Per Capita (at purchasing power parity): $17,159 (2021)
Real GDP Growth: 4.7% (2021); 3.2% (2022 projection)
Year-on-year Inflation: 54% (July 2022)
Unemployment: 8.9% (2021); 8.7% (2022 projection)
Source: Graphic created by CRS. Fact information (2022 estimates unless otherwise specified) from Economist
Intelligence Unit and Central Intel igence Agency, The World Factbook.
Iran’s Political System1
Iran’s Islamic Republic was established in 1979, ending the autocratic monarchy of the Shah, and
is a hybrid political system that defies simple characterization. Iran has a parliament, regular
elections, and some other features of representative democracy. In practice, though, the
government is authoritarian, ranking 154th out of 167 countries in the Economist Intelligence
Unit’s 2022 Democracy Index.2 Shia Islam is the state religion and the basis for all legislation and
jurisprudence, and political contestation is tightly controlled, with ultimate decisionmaking power
held by the Supreme Leader. That title has been held by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei since 1989,
when he succeeded the Islamic Republic’s founding leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. In
September 2022, Khamenei appeared to have suffered a bout of significant illness; prospects for
leadership succession are unclear.
Iran’s top directly elected position is the presidency, which, like the directly elected unicameral
parliament (the Islamic Consultative Assembly, also known as the Majles) and every other organ
of Iran’s government, is subordinate to the Supreme Leader. Incumbent president Ebrahim Raisi,
a hardliner close to Khamenei, won the June 2021 election to succeed Hassan Rouhani, who won
elections in 2013 and 2017. Rouhani, who oversaw Iran’s negotiations with the United States and
its entry into the JCPOA, was seen as relatively moderate. The 2018 U.S. exit from the JCPOA
and reimposition of sanctions, as well as the January 2020 U.S. killing of Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC)-Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani, appeared to shift public support
away from moderates like Rouhani.3 Hardliners prevailed in February 2020 Majles elections.
The June 2021 presidential election appears to have cemented this shift toward a more hardline
approach to the United States. Rouhani was term-limited and ineligible to run; the government
also banned several moderate candidates from running. These circumstances might have
contributed to this election having the lowest turnout in the Islamic Republic’s history; slightly
less than half (49%) of eligible Iranians voted. Raisi, who reportedly played a role in a judicial
decision to approve the execution of thousands of political prisoners in 1988, had lost the 2017

1 For additional background, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options, by
Kenneth Katzman; congressional offices may also contact the authors of this report.
2 Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2022: Frontline democracy and the battle for Ukraine, February 2023.
3 Garrett Nada, “Iran’s Parliamentary Polls: Hardliners on the Rise, Reformists Ruled Out,” United States Institute of
Peace, February 12, 2021. In Iran’s political system, hardliners are also known as “principlists,” moderates as
“reformists.”
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presidential election to Rouhani. In 2019 Khamenei appointed Raisi to head Iran’s judiciary.
Raisi’s presidential victory may boost his chances of succeeding Khamenei as Supreme Leader.4
Mass demonstrations shook Iran in 2009 and 2010, when hundreds of thousands of demonstrators
took to the streets of Iran’s urban centers to protest alleged fraud in the 2009 presidential election.
Iran has experienced significant unrest intermittently since then, including in December 2017,
summer 2018, and late 2019, based most frequently on economic conditions but also reflecting
other opposition to Iran’s leadership. The government has often used violence to disperse
protests, in which hundreds have been killed by security forces. U.S. and UN assessments have
long cited Iran’s government for a wide range of human rights abuses in addition to its repression
of political dissent and use of force against protesters, including severe violations of religious
freedom and women’s rights, human trafficking, and corporal punishment.
2022-2023 Political Protests
The September 2022 death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who was arrested by Iran’s Morality
Police for allegedly violating Iran’s mandatory hijab (or head covering) law and died after
reportedly having been beaten in custody, sparked nationwide unrest in late 2022. In protests
throughout the country, demonstrators voiced a broad range of grievances, with some calling for
an end to the Islamic Republic and chanting “death to the dictator.” Women played a particularly
prominent role in the protests.5 In response, the Iranian government deployed security forces who
killed hundreds of protesters and arrested thousands. Iranian officials, who blamed the United
States and other foreign countries for fomenting what they called “riots,” also shut down internet
access.
Throughout fall 2022, observers debated whether the protests, information about which remains
opaque, fluid, and highly contested, represented the “turning point” that some activists claimed:
one observer compared 2022 unrest to the circumstances that preceded the 1979 Islamic
Revolution, while another discounted the revolutionary potential of the protests.6 The
demonstrations of 2022 were smaller and more geographically dispersed than those of 2009, and
reportedly included protestors from a diverse range of social groups. In December 2022, as the
protests appeared to wane, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines stated, “this is not
something that we see right now as being … an imminent threat to the regime.”7
As of March 2023, the protest movement seems to have receded. The fundamental grievances that
motivated the outbreak of unrest in September 2022 (and in previous years) remain unresolved,
so further rounds of popular protests appear possible in the short term. However, the continued
absence to date of an organized opposition, a popular leader, or a shared alternative vision for
Iran’s future may limit the existential risk protests pose to the Islamic Republic. The question of
who might succeed 83-year old Supreme Leader Khamenei may be a more acutely destabilizing
issue, though it is unclear how (if at all) Iranian foreign and domestic policy might change after
Khamenei leaves office and whether such changes would be advantageous for the United States.8

4 Parisa Hafezi, “Winner of Iran presidency is hardline judge who is under U.S. sanctions,” Reuters, June 20, 2021.
5 Suzanne Kianpour, “The women of Iran are not backing down,” Politico, January 22, 2023.
6 Ray Takeyh, “A second Iranian revolution?” Commentary, November 2022; Sajjed Safael, “Iran’s protests are
nowhere near revolutionary,” Foreign Policy, January 17, 2023.
7 “DNI Avril Haines: Protests in Iran not an ‘imminent threat to the regime’” MSNBC, December 5, 2022.
8 Murtaza Hussain, “The other giant crisis hanging over the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Intercept, December 9, 2022.
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U.S. Policy Responses to the Protests
New sanctions designations. Since September 2022, the Biden Administration has announced
sanctions designations targeting Iran’s Morality Police and dozens of other government entities
and officials for their role in the crackdown. Legislation introduced in the 118th Congress (H.R.
589) would direct the Administration to review whether additional specified Iranian officials meet
the criteria for designation under certain existing sanctions authorities.
General license and Internet service. In September 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s
Office of Foreign Assets Control issued Iran General License D-2, designed to counter what
officials described as Tehran’s move to “cut off access to the Internet for most of its 80 million
citizens to prevent the world from watching its violent crackdown on peaceful protestors.”9
Treasury officials stated that the new license expands access to cloud-based services, Virtual
Private Networks (VPNs), and anti-surveillance tools critical to secure communication. In March
2023, a State Department spokesperson said “several U.S. companies have in turn taken
advantage of the expanded authorization that we’ve provided.”10
Action at international bodies. In late November, the U.N. Human Rights Council authorized a
fact-finding mission to investigate allegations of human rights abuses committed by the Iranian
government.11 The United States also led a successful effort to remove Iran from U.N.
Commission on the Status of Women in December 2022.
Nuclear negotiations. In the context of the protests, some Members of Congress have renewed
calls on the Biden Administration to formally terminate stalled indirect talks with Iran over the
2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement. As outlined below, Biden
Administration officials are reportedly reluctant to do so, though they assert that negotiations are
moribund and no longer a focus of U.S. efforts.12 Secretary Blinken in December 2022 stated that
the regime’s actions in response to the protests “have only deepened our conviction that Iran must
never be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon. We continue to believe that the best way to ensure
this is through diplomacy.”13
Congressional Action. In the 118th Congress, some Members have introduced several resolutions
and bills related to the protests that have received consideration. In January 2023, the House
voted 420-1 to agree to H.Con.Res. 7 which condemns Amini’s death and the violent suppression
of protests and “encourages continued efforts” by the Biden Administration to respond to the
protests via sanctions and the expansion of unrestricted internet access in Iran. Another
introduced bill, H.R. 589, would direct the President to, within 90 days, review whether certain
existing sanctions authorities apply to specified persons (including the Supreme Leader and
associated persons and entities).

9 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “U.S. Treasury issues Iran General License D-2 to increase support for internet
freedom,” September 23, 2022.
10 U.S. Department of State Press Briefing, March 1, 2023.
11 Office of the High Commissioner, “Human Rights Council establishes fact-finding mission to investigate alleged
human rights violations in Iran related to the protests that began on 16 September 2022,” November 24, 2022.
12 Nahal Toosi, “‘Everyone thinks we have magic powers’: Biden seeks a balance on Iran,” Politico, October 25, 2022.
13 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the J Street National Conference,” December 4, 2022.
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Iran’s Military: Structure and Capabilities14
Given the adversarial nature of U.S.-Iran relations and the centrality of various military-related
entities in Iranian domestic and foreign policy, Iran’s military has been a subject of sustained
engagement by Congress and other U.S. policymakers. In 2023 testimony, U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Erik Kurilla said, “The advancement of Iranian
military capabilities over the past 40 years is unparalleled in the region.”15 The elements of Iran’s
military that arguably threaten U.S. interests most directly are Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) and the country’s missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV, or drone) programs.
Iran’s traditional military force, the Artesh, is a legacy of Iran’s Shah-era military force. The
Artesh exists alongside the IRGC, which Khomeini established in 1979 as a force loyal to the new
regime. Rivalries between the two parallel forces (each have their own land, air, and naval force
components) stem from their “uneven access to resources, varying levels of influence with the
regime, and inherent overlap in missions and responsibilities.”16 While both serve to defend Iran
against external threats, the government deploys the Artesh primarily along Iran’s borders to
counter any invading force, while the IRGC has a more ideological character and the more
expansive mission of combating internal threats and expanding Iran’s influence abroad. Elements
of the IRGC include
 The Basij, a “volunteer paramilitary reserve force,” which plays a key role in
suppressing protests and other forms of internal dissent.17
 The IRGC Qods Force (IRGC-QF), which coordinates Iran’s regional activities,
providing arms, training, and other forms of support to the network of proxies
and armed groups that share Iran’s objectives (see “Regional Activities and
Strategy” below).
Ballistic Missiles
According to the U.S. intelligence community, Iran has “the largest inventory of ballistic missiles
in the region,” and, as of 2022, has steadily improved the range and accuracy of its more than
3,000 ballistic missiles over “the last five to seven years.”18 Per CENTCOM Commander Kurilla,
Iran has aggressively developed its missile capabilities to achieve “an asymmetric advantage
against regional militaries.”19 Iran has used its ballistic missiles to target U.S. regional assets
directly, including a January 2020 attack (shortly following the U.S. killing of IRGC-QF
Commander Soleimani) against Iraqi sites where U.S. military forces were stationed that left
scores of U.S. service members injured, and missile and drone attacks against Iraq’s Kurdistan
region in March and September 2022.20

14 For additional background, see CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman;
congressional offices may also contact the authors of this report.
15 Statement for the Record before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture of U.S. Central Command,
March 13, 2023.
16 Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance,
2019.
17 Ibid.
18 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, March 8, 2023; Senate Armed Services Committee
Hearing, March 15, 2022, available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6484358.
19 Statement for the Record before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 13, 2023.
20 “Who would live and who would die: The inside story of the Iranian attack on Al Asad Airbase,” CBS News, August
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Iran’s medium-range ballistic missiles were assessed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
in 2019 to have a maximum range of around 2,000 kilometers from Iran’s borders, reportedly
capable of reaching targets as far as Israel or southeastern Europe.21 U.S. officials and others have
expressed concern that Iran’s government could use its nascent space program to develop longer-
range missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).22 In March 2022, the Biden
Administration designated for sanctions five Iranian individuals and entities for their involvement
in ballistic missile activities.23
UAVs
According to CENTCOM, Iran has also developed “the largest and most capable Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle force in the region,” with which it has attacked numerous foreign targets.24 While
Iranian drones are not as technologically complex or advanced as the U.S. UAVs on which the
Iranian versions are often modeled, they are a cost-effective way of projecting power, especially
given Iran’s underdeveloped air force. Traditional air defense systems have difficulty intercepting
UAVs, in part because such systems were designed to detect manned aircraft with larger radar
and/or heat signatures.25 Iran’s drone operations include attacks in September 2019 against Saudi
oil production facilities in Abqaiq, a complex assault that featured 18 drones and several land-
attack cruise missiles; in July 2021 against an oil tanker off the coast of Oman; and in October
2021 against a U.S. military base in At Tanf, Syria. The Biden Administration has designated for
sanctions individuals and entities that have “provided critical support” to the IRGC’s UAV
programs,26 and in the 117th Congress the House passed, and the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee reported, a bill (H.R. 6089) that would have required the President to impose
sanctions on persons that engage in activities related to Iranian UAVs.27 In August 2022, Iran
began transferring armed drones to Russia, which has used them against Ukrainian forces and
civilian infrastructure.28

8, 2021; “Iran attacks Iraq’s Erbil with missiles in warning to U.S., allies,” Reuters, March 13, 2022; White House
press release, “Statement by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on Iran’s Missile and Drone Attacks in Northern
Iraq,” September 28, 2022.
21 Iran Military Power, op. cit. 43.
22 Annual Threat Assessment, op. cit.; Farzin Nadimi, “Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal is still growing in size, reach, and
accuracy,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 13, 2021.
23 U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, “Treasury Sanctions Key Actors in Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program,”
March 30, 2022.
24 Statement for the Record, op. cit.
25 Golnaz Esfandiari, “Iran deploys drones to target internal threats, protect external interests,” RFE/RL, January 18,
2022.
26 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury sanctions network and individuals in connection with Iran’s unmanned
aerial vehicle program,” October 29, 2021.
27 The bill would amend Section 107 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA. P.L.
115-44) to include unmanned combat aerial vehicles.
28 Ellen Nakashima and Joby Warrick, “Iran sends first shipment of drones to Russia for use in Ukraine,” Washington
Post, August 29, 2022; Yaroslav Trofimov and Dion Nissenbaum, “Russia’s use of Iranian kamikaze drones creates
new dangers for Ukrainian troops,” Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2022.
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Foreign Policy and Regional Activities29
Iran’s foreign policy appears to reflect overlapping and at times contradictory motivations. These
include
Threat Perception. Iran’s leaders argue that the United States and its allies seek to overturn
Iran’s regime, claiming, for example, that the U.S. military presence in and around the Persian
Gulf reflects an intent to intimidate or attack Iran. Per the 2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the
U.S. Intelligence Community, “The Iranian regime sees itself as locked in an existential struggle
with the United States and its regional allies.”30 Iranian officials describes the country’s missile
program and other military programs as “defensive,” arguing that they serve as a deterrent to
attacks by hostile powers.31 Iranian leaders have witnessed U.S. military intervention in two of
Iran’s neighboring states (Iraq and Afghanistan), and continue to reference what former Secretary
of State Albright described as the “significant role” played by the United States in “orchestrating
the overthrow of Iran’s popular Prime Minister, Mohammed Massadegh” in 1953.32 Iranian
leaders describe U.S. sanctions as economic warfare against Iran.33
Ideology. Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution replaced a secular, U.S.-backed authoritarian leader
with a Shia cleric-dominated regime, and that change infuses Iran’s foreign policy. Another
ideological element of the Islamic Revolution is the regime’s steadfast rhetorical opposition to the
existence of Israel. Since the revolution, that enmity has fed Iran-Israel tensions, with broad
implications for the region and U.S. policy.34
Pragmatism. Iranian leaders have expressed a commitment to aiding other Shia Muslims, but at
times have tempered that approach to preserve Iran’s geopolitical interests. For example, Iran has
supported Christian-inhabited Armenia, rather than Shi’a-inhabited Azerbaijan, possibly in part to
thwart cross-border Azeri nationalism among Iran’s large Azeri minority.35 President Raisi has
also tried to improve relations with neighboring Gulf states, an effort that appears to place
domestic economic concerns ahead of traditional regional rivalries.36 Iran’s March 2023
agreement to reestablish ties with rival Saudi Arabia (see textbox below) may also reflect this
approach.
Factional Interests and Competition. Iran’s foreign policy has reflected differing approaches
among key internal actors and groups. Supreme Leader Khamenei sits at the apex of several
decisionmaking and advisory councils dominated by hardliners that seek to shield Iran from

29 For additional background, see CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman;
congressional offices may also contact the authors of this report.
30 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,
February 6, 2023.
31 Omer Carmi, “Khamenei’s First Speech of 2021: Reemphasizing U.S. Weakness, Iranian Self-Reliance,”
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 8, 2021; “Iran’s defensive power must increase daily and it does:
Imam Khamenei,” Khamenei.Ir, February 27, 2018.
32 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Remarks before the American-Iranian Council, March 17, 2000; “Conflicts
between Iran and US goes back to 1953 coup,” Khamenei.Ir, November 2, 2022.
33 “Sanctions are ‘US way of war’, Iranian President at UN,” UN News, September 21, 2021.
34 For more information on Israel’s approach to threats it perceives from Iran, as relevant to U.S. foreign policy, see
CRS Report R44245, Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
35 Borzou Daraghi, “Nagorno-Karaback: An unexpected conflict that tests and perplexes Iran,” Atlantic Council,
November 9, 2020; Vali Kaleji, “Iran increasingly uneasy about threats to common border with Armenia,” Eurasia
Daily Monitor, October 14, 2022.
36 “Iran’s regional agenda and the call for détente with the Gulf states,” Middle East Institute, March 17, 2022.
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Western political and cultural influence. More moderate Iranian leaders, such as former President
Hassan Rouhani, have at times sought to use engagement with the West as a way to attract greater
foreign investment and boost Iran’s economy.37
Regional Proxies and Allies
U.S. officials characterize the Iranian government’s support for regional proxies and allies as a
threat to U.S. interests and forces in the region. The 2023 intelligence community threat
assessment predicted that, “Iran will continue to threaten U.S. interests as it tries to erode U.S.
influence in the Middle East, entrench its influence and project power in neighboring states [...]
Iranian-supported proxies will seek to launch attacks against U.S. forces and persons in Iraq and
Syria, and perhaps in other countries and regions.”38
Iraq. Iran-backed militia forces in Iraq continue to carry out intermittent rocket, drone, and
improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against U.S. and Iraqi facilities and support systems.
These groups seek to revise or rescind Iraq’s invitation to the U.S. military to retain an advisory
presence in Iraq beyond the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from the country in December
2021. They also seek to retaliate for the January 2020 U.S. strike in Baghdad that killed IRGC-
Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani and the head of the Iran-backed Iraqi militia Kata’ib
Hezbollah.39 Iran also has carried out strikes in Iraq’s Kurdistan region, targeting what Iran
alleges are support networks for Israel and Iraq-based Iranian Kurdish opposition groups.
Syria. Iran-backed militias have used Syria as a base from which to target U.S. armed forces and
facilities in Iraq. They also have targeted U.S. forces in Syria in what U.S. officials have
sometimes described as retaliation for Israeli airstrikes on Iranian forces in Syria.40 U.S. officials
assess that Iran’s government seeks a permanent military presence in Syria to bolster its regional
influence, support Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and threaten Israel.41
Lebanon. Iran’s support for Hezbollah, including providing thousands of rockets and short-range
missiles, helps Iran acquire leverage against Israel, a key regional adversary.42 Israel has stated
that Iran may be supplying Hezbollah with advanced weapons systems and technologies, and
assisting Hezbollah in creating an indigenous production capability for rockets, missiles, and
drones that could threaten Israel from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, or Yemen.43
Yemen. Iran’s support to the Houthi movement in Yemen—including supplying ballistic and
cruise missiles, as well as unmanned systems—has enabled the group to target U.S. partners,
including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.44 Iran reportedly agreed to halt arms

37 “Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in Paris to court investors,” Los Angeles Times, January 27, 2016.
38 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,
February 6, 2023.
39 For additional background see, CRS Report R46148, U.S. Killing of Qasem Soleimani: Frequently Asked Questions,
coordinated by Clayton Thomas.
40 “Strike on U.S. Base Was Iranian Response to Israeli Attack, Officials Say,” New York Times, November 18, 2021.
41 See, for example, Posture statement of General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, March 15, 2022.
42 For more, see CRS Report R44245, Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
43 Missile Multinational: Iran’s New Approach to Missile Proliferation, International Institute for Strategic Studies,
April 2021; “Israeli minister says Iran using Syria facilities for weapons production,” Reuters, September 12, 2022.
44 Seth Jones et al., “The Iranian and Houthi war against Saudi Arabia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
December 21, 2021; Bruce Reidel, “Yemen war spreads to the UAE,” Brookings, February 10, 2022.
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shipments to the Houthis as part of its March 2023 agreement with Saudi Arabia (see textbox
below).
Gaza Strip. Iran continues to support the Palestinian Sunni Islamist militant groups Hamas and
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), whose Gaza-based operations threaten parts of Israel with rockets,
missiles, and drones. Both groups also seek to make inroads into the West Bank to undermine
Israeli and Palestinian Authority control there.
Iran’s Relations with China and Russia
Iran has sought to maintain and expand economic and military ties with Beijing and Moscow,
reflecting what analysts describe as a “look East” strategy favored by hardline leaders including
President Raisi and Supreme Leader Khamenei.45
For the past several decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has taken steps to
deepen its financial presence in numerous sectors of the Iranian economy, as well as to expand
military cooperation. China is Iran’s largest trade partner and the largest importer of Iran’s crude
oil and condensates.46 Over the years, the PRC has become a source of capital for Iran, in line
with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which includes a series of energy and transportation
corridors extending throughout Eurasia. On March 27, 2021, Iran and the PRC signed a 25-year
China-Iran Comprehensive Cooperation Plan “to tap the potential for cooperation in areas such as
economy and culture and map out prospects for cooperation in the long run.”47 Before doing so
was banned by the UN Security Council, the PRC openly supplied Iran with advanced
conventional arms, including cruise missile-armed fast patrol boats that the IRGC Navy operates
in the Persian Gulf; anti-ship missiles; ballistic missile guidance systems; and other technology
related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).48 U.S. officials also report
that PRC-based entities have supplied Iran-backed armed groups with UAV technology.49 The
United States has imposed sanctions on a number of PRC-based entities for allegedly supplying
Iran’s missile, nuclear, and conventional weapons programs. Tehran has reportedly viewed with
apprehension closer Chinese relations with Saudi Arabia (Iran’s primary regional rival) and the
UAE (with which Iran has strong economic ties but also some territorial disputes).50
March 2023 China-Iran-Saudi Arabia Agreement
In March 2023, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China announced that Iran and Saudi Arabia would reestablish diplomatic
relations (suspended since 2016), reopen embassies in each other’s capitals, and reinitiate exchanges pursuant to
bilateral accords signed during a previous period of Saudi-Iranian rapprochement (in 1998 and 2001).51 In the

45 Pierre Pahlavi, “The origins and foundations of Iran’s “Look East” policy,” Australian Institute of International
Affairs, October 4, 2022.
46 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Executive Summary: Iran,” November 17, 2022.
47 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Wang Yi Holds Talks with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad
Zarif,” March 28, 2021.
48 Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance,
2019.
49 Testimony of Department of State Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf before the
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and Counterterrorism, August 4, 2022.
50 Jacopo Scita, “When it comes to Iran, China is shifting the balance,” Bourse and Bazaar, December 13, 2022; Tala
Taslimi, “China’s embrace of Saudi Arabia leaves Iran out in the cold,” Nikkei Asia, December 13, 2022.
51 See Joint Trilateral Statement at https://twitter.com/KSAmofaEN/status/1634180277764276227. For more on past
agreements, see Faris Almaari, “Clarifying the status of previous Iran-Saudi agreements,” Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, March 16, 2023.
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China-brokered agreement, Iran and Saudi Arabia affirmed their respect for “non-interference in internal affairs of
states.” One media source indicates that specific elements include a Saudi pledge to “tone down critical coverage
of Iran” by a Saudi-linked media outlet and an Iranian pledge to halt arms shipments to the Houthis in Yemen.52 It
is unclear what commitments, if any, China may have made as part of the agreement.
The Biden Administration indicated that it conditionally welcomed the agreement, while highlighting uncertainty
over “whether the Iranians are going to honor their side of the deal” given the legacy of Iran’s support to the
Houthis in Yemen.53 CENTCOM Commander General Kuril a cautioned, “an agreement is not implementation”
and “They have had diplomatic relations in the past while they were stil shooting at each other in the past.”54
Some Administration officials have characterized the agreement as “a good thing” that advances the U.S. goal of
“de-escalation in the Middle East,” while downplaying the significance of the deal and of China’s role in brokering
it.55 Observers have expressed a range of views. Some view the PRC initiative as a sea change in regional
diplomacy and as an indication of China’s increased influence, while others see it as a modest win for China.56 The
implications of the deal for U.S. policy also elicited a range of views. Some experts perceive the deal as a major
blow to U.S. credibility, while others argue that, despite China’s foray into Middle Eastern diplomacy, the United
States remains the essential partner to Gulf Arab states.57
Russia has traditionally been Iran’s main supplier of conventional weaponry and a significant
supplier of nuclear- and missile-related technology (for their role in the latter, Russian companies
have been subject to U.S. sanctions). U.S. officials have expressed concern with Iran-Russia
military cooperation, particularly in Syria. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022,
Russia and Iran—both under U.S. sanctions—have deepened their relationship. Since August
2022, Iran has transferred armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones) to Russia, which
has used them against a range of targets in Ukraine. These transfers (and potential transfers of
ballistic missiles) have implications for the trajectory of the conflict in Ukraine as well as for U.S.
efforts to support Ukraine’s defense against Russia's invasion. In late 2022, Administration
officials warned that the relationship between Iran and Russia was advancing beyond the sale of
drones; a National Security Council spokesperson stated, “Russia is offering Iran an
unprecedented level of military and technical support that is transforming their relationship to a
full-fledged defense partnership.”58 In February 2023, media reports suggested that Iran and
Russia were advancing plans to construct a factory in Russia to produce Iranian-designed drones
for Russia’s war in Ukraine.59

52 Summer Said et al., “China plans new Middle East summit as diplomatic role takes shape,” Wall Street Journal,
March 12, 2023; Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Iran agrees to stop arming Houthis in Yemen as part of pact with Saudi
Arabia,” Wall Street Journal, March 16, 2023.
53 Patsy Widakuswara, “White House welcomes Chinese-brokered Saudi-Iran deal,” VOA, March 10, 2023.
54 “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Fiscal Year 2024 Defense Authorization Request for Central
Command and Africa Command,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, March 16, 2023.
55 Nahal Toosi and Phelim Kine, “U.S. officials project calm as China stuns world with Iran-Saudi deal,” Politico,
March 13, 2023.
56 “Experts react: Iran and Saudi Arabia just agreed to restore relations, with help from China. Here’s what that means
for the Middle East and the world,” Atlantic Council, March 10, 2023.
57 Michael McFaul and Abbas Milani, “How China’s Saudi-Iran deal can serve U.S. interests,” Foreign Policy, March
14, 2023; Adam Gallagher et al, “What you need to know about China’s Saudi-Iran deal,” United States Institute of
Peace, March 16, 2023.
58 “Russia and Iran Military Ties Deepening Into Partnership, Biden Administration Warns,” Wall Street Journal,
December 9, 2022.
59 “Moscow, Tehran Advance Plans for Iranian-Designed Drone Facility in Russia,” Wall Street Journal, February 5,
2023.
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Iran’s Nuclear Program60
U.S. policymakers have signaled concern for decades that Tehran might attempt to develop
nuclear weapons. Iran’s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently
the main source of concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons. Gas centrifuges can produce
both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-
grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in
nuclear weapons. Iranian leaders claim that the country’s LEU production is only for Tehran’s
current and future civil nuclear reactors.
U.S. policy has focused on using various means of coercive diplomacy to pressure Iran to agree to
limits on its nuclear program. The Obama Administration pursued a “dual track” strategy of
stronger economic pressure through increased sanctions coupled with offers of sanctions relief if
Iran accepted constraints on the nuclear program. Many observers assess that U.S. and
multilateral sanctions contributed to Iran’s 2013 decision to enter into negotiations that concluded
in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).61 For more on Trump and Biden
Administration approaches, see below.
2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
The JCPOA imposed restraints on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for relief from most U.S.
and UN Security Council economic sanctions. The agreement restricted Iran’s enrichment and
heavy water reactor programs and provided for enhanced International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) monitoring to detect Iranian efforts to produce nuclear weapons using either declared or
covert facilities. The nuclear-related provisions of the agreement, according to U.S. officials,
extended the nuclear breakout time—the amount of time that Iran would need to produce enough
weapons-grade HEU for one nuclear weapon—to a minimum of one year, for a duration of at
least 10 years.62 In addition to the restrictions on activities related to fissile material production,
the JCPOA indefinitely prohibited Iranian “activities which could contribute to the design and
development of a nuclear explosive device,” including research and diagnostic activities. The
IAEA continues to monitor Iranian compliance with the JCPOA provisions but since 2019 has
reported diminishing Iranian cooperation with JCPOA-mandated monitoring.63
Sanctions relief.64 In accordance with the JCPOA, the United States waived its secondary
sanctions—restrictions on any third country engaging in some types of trade with Iran, primarily
in the energy sector—in 2016. The secondary sanctions eased during JCPOA implementation
included (1) sanctions that limited Iran’s exportation of oil and foreign sales to Iran of gasoline

60 Material in this section is drawn from CRS Report R43333, by Paul K. Kerr, Clayton Thomas, and Carla E. Humud,
which contains additional information on Iran’s nuclear program and the JCPOA.
61 Uri Berliner, “Crippled by sanctions, Iran’s economy key in nuclear deal,” NPR, November 25, 2013; Amir Toumaj,
“Iran’s economy of resistance: implications for future sanctions,” AEI, November 17, 2014; “Inside the Iran nuclear
deal,” Harvard Gazette, October 6, 2015.
62 “Background Conference Call by Senior Administration Officials on Iran,” July 14, 2015. U.S. Secretary of Energy
Ernest Moniz described this timeline as “very, very conservative” in an April 2015 interview (Michael Crowley,
“Ernest Moniz: Iran Deal Closes Enrichment Loophole,” Politico, April 7, 2015). See also CRS In Focus IF12106, Iran
and Nuclear Weapons Production, by Paul K. Kerr.
63 CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, by Paul K.
Kerr.
64 For additional details on sanctions waived under the JCPOA, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth
Katzman; congressional offices may also contact the authors of this report.
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and energy sector equipment, and which limited foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector; (2)
financial sector sanctions, including trading in Iran’s currency, the rial; and (3) sanctions on
Iran’s auto sector. The European Union (EU) lifted its ban on purchases of oil and gas from Iran;
and Iranian banks were readmitted to the SWIFT financial messaging services system.65 The UN
Security Council revoked its resolutions that required member states to impose restrictions. The
JCPOA did not require the lifting of U.S. sanctions on direct U.S.-Iran trade or sanctions levied
for Iran’s support for regional armed factions and terrorist groups, its human rights abuses, or its
efforts to acquire missile and advanced conventional weapons technology. The United States
reimposed sanctions waived pursuant to JCPOA implementation in 2018 (see below).
Post-JCPOA developments. The International Atomic Energy Administration (IAEA) has
reported that some of Iran’s nuclear activities exceed JCPOA-mandated limits, including Iran’s
LEU stockpile and number of enrichment locations. In March 2023, after the detection of
uranium particles enriched to 83.7 percent at Iran’s Fordow enrichment site sparked U.S. and
international concern,66 IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated that the agency and Iran
“have initiated technical discussions to fully clarify this issue.”67 Following a January IAEA
inspection of the Fordow facility, during which inspectors observed that Iran was operating
centrifuges in a manner inconsistent with Tehran’s declaration to the agency, Iran agreed to
“facilitate the further increase in the frequency and intensity of Agency verification activities” at
the Fordow site, Grossi added.68 The U.S. Representative to the IAEA welcomed the
announcement but stated, “too many times in the past, Iran has issued similarly vague promises
for cooperation in order to avoid international censure, only to never follow through.”69
U.S.-Iran Relations: History and Recent Approaches
Under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, an authoritarian monarch who ruled from 1941 until 1979,
Iran was a close U.S. security partner, receiving a total of nearly $15 billion in U.S. foreign
assistance to buttress its position against the neighboring Soviet Union.70 Domestically, the
Shah’s social policies achieved some results but also alienated many Iranians; the government
jailed tens of thousands as political prisoners and tortured many. Many other Iranians went into
exile abroad, including prominent Shia cleric Ayatollah Ali Khomeini. Mass public protests by
both religious and secular Iranians against the Shah’s rule escalated throughout 1978, culminating
in the Shah’s January 1979 flight into exile, Khomeini’s return the following month, and the
March 1979 replacement of the monarchy with a new Islamic Republic that quickly moved to
suppress domestic opposition.
The 1979 Islamic Revolution marked a turning point for U.S. policy toward Iran, and the two
countries have not had diplomatic relations since 1980, a result of the U.S. Embassy hostage
crisis.71 U.S.-Iran tensions continued in the following decade, punctuated by armed confrontations

65 The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), based in Belgium, provides a financial
messaging service to facilitate cross-border transactions, including payments involving multiple currencies.
International energy-sector trade heavily depends on SWIFT services.
66 Karen DeYoung and Joby Warrick, “Iran nuclear advance challenges U.S. as time to make potential bomb shortens,”
Washington Post, March 2, 2023.
67 IAEA Director General’s introductory statement to the Board of Governors, IAEA, March 6, 2023.
68 Ibid.
69 U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna, IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, U.S. Statement as
Delivered by Ambassador Laura S.H. Holgate, March 8, 2023.
70 Figure is in constant dollars (retrieved September 2022) from foreignassistance.gov.
71 For an account of the crisis, see Mark Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006).
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in the Gulf and Iran-backed terrorist attacks (including the 1983 bombings of the U.S. Embassy
and Marine barracks in Beirut). U.S. sanctions, first imposed in 1979, continued apace with the
government of Iran’s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism in 1984, the
imposition of an embargo on U.S. trade with and investment in Iran in 1995, and the first
imposition of secondary sanctions (U.S. penalties against firms that invest in Iran’s energy sector)
in 1996.
Approaches under the Trump and Biden Administrations
In comparing recent Administrations’ approaches to Iran, various points of continuity and change
emerge, with Biden Administration policy apparently continuing elements of both the Obama and
Trump Administrations. The Trump Administration reimposed sanctions that the Obama
Administration had imposed prior to the JCPOA but lifted as part of that deal, and sanctions
newly imposed by the Trump Administration remain in place under the Biden Administration. At
the same time, the Biden Administration has sought to resuscitate the JCPOA, but the United
States and Iran have not engaged directly as happened under the Obama Administration. The
September 2022 outbreak of nationwide unrest in Iran appears to have shifted the Biden
Administration’s focus away from reviving the JCPOA, prospects for the revival of which were
reportedly already dimming.
Trump Administration Policy
U.S. policy toward Iran shifted significantly under the Trump Administration. As a candidate,
Donald Trump said “my number one priority is to dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran.”72
Though then-President Trump initially certified to Congress in April and July 2017 that Iran was
in compliance with the agreement (under an INARA requirement to submit such a report every 90
days),73 in October 2017 President Trump announced he would not submit another certification of
Iranian compliance, saying, “Iran is not living up to the spirit of the deal.”74 In January 2018,
President Trump announced that he would again waive the application of certain energy-sector
sanctions as a “last chance” to “secure our European allies’ agreement to fix” the JCPOA.75 No
such deal was reached, and President Trump announced on May 8, 2018, that the United States
would cease participating in the JCPOA, reinstating all sanctions that the United States had
waived or terminated in meeting in meeting its JCPOA obligations. All sanctions went back into
effect as of November 2018.
In articulating a new Iran strategy in May 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that due to
“unprecedented financial pressure” through reimposed U.S. sanctions, U.S. military deterrence,
and U.S. advocacy, “we hope, and indeed we expect, that the Iranian regime will come to its
senses.”76 He also laid out 12 demands for any future agreement with Iran, including the
withdrawal of Iranian support for armed groups and proxies throughout the region. Iran’s leaders
rejected U.S. demands and insisted the United States return to compliance with the JCPOA before

72 “Full transcript: First 2016 presidential debate,” Politico, September 27, 2016; “Read Donald Trump’s Speech to
AIPAC,” Time, March 21, 2016.
73 Sections 135(d)(6) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as added by INARA (P.L. 114-17).
74 “Transcript: Trump’s Remarks on Iran nuclear deal,” NPR, October 13, 2017. The October 2017 decertification
triggered a 60-day window for Congress to consider, under expedited procedures per INARA, legislation to re-impose
sanctions lifted as part of the U.S. implementation of the JCPOA. Congress did not do so.
75 Statement by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal, White House, January 12, 2018.
76 “After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy,” Heritage Foundation, May 21, 2018.
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engaging on a new or revised accord. The Trump Administration policy of applying “maximum
pressure” on Iran after late 2018 took two forms: additional sanctions and limited military action.
After U.S. sanctions were reinstated in November 2018, the Administration designated for
sanctions a number of additional entities under existing authorities (e.g., designating Iran’s
Central Bank under Executive Order [E.O.] 13224, adding to the Central Bank’s designation as a
proliferation entity under E.O. 13382); issued new authorities (e.g., E.O. 13876, sanctioning the
office of the Supreme Leader); and designated the entirety of Iran as a “jurisdiction of primary
money laundering concern.”77
From mid-2019 on, Iran escalated its regional military activities, at times coming into direct
military conflict with the United States (such when Iran shot down an unmanned U.S.
surveillance drone over the Persian Gulf in June 2019). Iranian attacks against oil tankers in the
Persian Gulf and a complex September 2019 drone attack against Saudi Arabian oil production
facilities further increased tensions. Those tensions peaked in the Trump Administration’s January
3, 2020, killing of IRGC-Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani in Baghdad, and Iran’s
retaliatory strikes against U.S. forces in Iraq.78 Iran responded with ballistic missile attacks
against U.S. forces based in Iraq that left over one hundred U.S. military personnel injured, and
attacks by Iran-backed forces in Iraq against U.S. targets continued over the following year. Iran
also began exceeding JCPOA-mandated limits on its nuclear activities according to the IAEA.
Biden Administration Policy
As a presidential candidate, Joe Biden described the Trump Administration’s Iran policy as a
“dangerous failure” that had isolated the United States from its international partners, allowed
Iran to increase its stockpiles of enriched uranium, and raised tensions throughout the region.79
He pledged to “offer Tehran a credible path back to diplomacy” by promising to have the United
States rejoin the JCPOA as long as “Iran returns to strict compliance” with it.
Less than a month after taking office, the Biden Administration offered to restart talks with Iran to
revive the JCPOA and appointed Robert Malley as Special Envoy for Iran. However, Iran refused
to engage directly with the United States until the United States decreased sanctions pressure,
necessitating indirect negotiations facilitated by the EU and other JCPOA partners. During
multiple subsequent rounds of talks, negotiators reported slow and uneven progress, with talks
sometimes paused for weeks or months at a time. In August 2022, reports indicated that all sides
were close to achieving agreement before again stalling over Iran’s reported revival of some
demands that the other parties had considered closed issues.80 Since then, U.S. officials have
stated that JCPOA talks are not a U.S. policy priority.81
President Biden has said, “Iran will never get a nuclear weapon on my watch,” and
Administration officials have told Congress that a negotiated settlement akin to the JCPOA is the
best way to achieve that goal.82 Administration officials also argue that it is not possible to resolve

77 Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), 31 Code Federal Regulations Part
1010, 84 Federal Register 59302.
78 For more, see CRS Report R46148, U.S. Killing of Qasem Soleimani: Frequently Asked Questions.
79 Joe Biden, “There’s a smarter way to be tough on Iran,” CNN, September 13, 2020.
80 Ishaan Tharoor, “Is the Iran deal worth salvaging?” Washington Post, August 26, 2022; “Iran nuclear talks in
‘stalemate,’ says EU foreign policy chief,” Arab News, September 15, 2022.
81 U.S. Department of State, Briefing with Senior Administration Officials on the Administration’s efforts to advance
the free flow of information for the Iranian people, September 23, 2022.
82 White House, Remarks by President Biden and President Rivlin of the State of Israel Before Bilateral Meeting, Jun
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the challenge of Iran’s nuclear program militarily, while maintaining that all U.S. options remain
available.83 In March 2023, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said, “President Biden’s
preference is to explore all diplomatic avenues to ensure that we constrain Iran’s progress in this
field...And my job as secretary of defense...is to provide the president options if he so desires.”84
Other Biden Administration courses of action related to Iran include:
 New sanctions. The Biden Administration has not exerted any new sanctions
authorities but has continued to designate for sanctions Iranian and third-country-
based entities pursuant to existing U.S. laws and executive orders. Newly
designated entities include individuals involved in oil smuggling networks; IRGC
financial facilitators; individuals involved in Iran’s UAV programs; an air
transportation service provider for its role in shipping Iranian UAVs to Russia for
use in Ukraine; and Iran’s Morality Police.
 Military activities. U.S. armed forces have reportedly struck Iran-related targets
in Iraq (June 2021) and Syria (February 2021, June 2021, January 2022, and
August 2022) in response to attacks by Iran-backed entities on U.S. forces.85 U.S.
naval forces have interdicted or supported the interdiction of weapons shipments
originating from Iran, including in February 2023.86
 Security cooperation with other regional partners. The Biden Administration
has continued the long-standing U.S. policy of bolstering the defense capabilities
of U.S. partners in the Gulf through arms sales, including an August 2022
proposed sale of 300 Patriot missiles to Saudi Arabia ($3 billion) and 96 Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles to the United Arab Emirates
($2.2 billion).87 The U.S. military and its partners have also continued to conduct
joint military exercises, including some seen as intended to counter Iran.88
In its October 2022 National Security Strategy, the Administration laid out its policy toward Iran,
stating the United States would “pursue diplomacy to ensure that Iran can never acquire a nuclear
weapon, while remaining postured and prepared to use other means should diplomacy fail,” and
that “we will respond when our people and interests are attacked.”89 The Strategy also states, “we
will always stand with the Iranian people striving for the basic rights and dignity long denied
them by the regime in Tehran.”

28, 2021; Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on US-Iran Policy, CQ Congressional Transcripts, May
25, 2022.
83 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on US-Iran Policy, CQ Congressional Transcripts, May 25,
2022.
84 Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Holds a Joint Press Conference with Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant,
U.S. Department of Defense, March 9, 2023.
85 See for example, U.S. Central Command, “Statement regarding precision strikes in Syria,” August 23, 2022.
86 U.S. Central Command Public Affairs, “U.S. Central Command supports partner forces in major Iranian weapons
seizure,” February 2, 2023.
87 Defense Security Cooperation Agency Transmittals 22-32 and 22-26, August 2, 2022.
88 Dion Nissenbaum, “U.S.. Israel send message to Iran with biggest-ever military exercises,” Wall Street Journal,
January 26, 2023.
89 White House, National Security Strategy, October 12, 2022.
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Issues for Congress
Sanctions
Since 1979, successive U.S. Administrations have imposed economic sanctions in an effort to
change Iran’s behavior, often at the direction of Congress.90 U.S. sanctions on Iran are
multifaceted and complex, a result of over four decades of legislative, administrative, and law
enforcement actions by successive presidential administrations and Congresses.
U.S. sanctions on Iran were first imposed during the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis of 1979-1981, when
President Jimmy Carter issued executive orders blocking nearly all Iranian assets held in the
United States. In 1984, Secretary of State George Schultz designated the government of Iran a
state sponsor of acts of international terrorism (SSOT) following the October 1983 bombing of
the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon by elements that later established Lebanese Hezbollah.
Iran’s status as an SSOT triggers several sanctions including restrictions on licenses for U.S.
dual-use exports; a ban on U.S. foreign assistance, arms sales, and support in the international
financial institutions; and the withholding of U.S. foreign assistance to countries that assist or sell
arms to the designee.91
Later in the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, other U.S. sanctions sought to limit Iran’s
conventional arsenal and its ability to project power throughout the Middle East. In the 2000s, as
Iran’s nuclear program progressed, U.S. sanctions focused largely on trying to pressure Iran to
limit its nuclear activities (see Table 1). Most of the U.S. sanctions enacted after 2010 were
secondary sanctions—essentially denying U.S. market access to foreign firms that transact with
major sectors of the Iranian economy, including banking, energy, and shipping. Successive
Administrations issued Executive Orders under which they designated specific individuals and
entities to implement and supplement the provisions of these laws. United States has also,
pursuant to various authorities, imposed sanctions on a number of individuals and entities held
responsible for human rights violations.
Table 1. Select Sanctions Legislation Pertaining to Iran
Public Law
Legislation Name
Number
Final Votes
Target of Sanctions
The Comprehensive
P.L. 111-195,
Conference Report
Codifies the U.S. ban on trade with and
Iran Sanctions,
22 U.S.C.
agreed to in the
investment in Iran, first imposed by Executive
Accountability, and
§§8501 et seq.
House 408-8 and in
Order 12959 of May 1995; imposes sanctions
Divestment Act of
the Senate 99-0.
on foreign banks that facilitate transactions
2010 (CISADA)
for Iranian entities.
FY2012 National
Section
Conference Report
Imposes sanctions on banks of countries that
Defense Authorization 1245(d), P.L.
agreed to in the
do not reduce Iran oil imports.
Act (NDAA)
112-81, 22
House 283-136 and
U.S.C. 8513a
in the Senate 86-13.

90 For details on the legislative bases for sanctions imposed on Iran, see CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic
Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions, by Dianne E. Rennack.
91 CRS Report R43835, State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism—Legislative Parameters: In Brief, by Dianne
E. Rennack.
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Public Law
Legislation Name
Number
Final Votes
Target of Sanctions
Iran Threat Reduction
P.L. 112-158,
Passed in the House
Expands sanctions relating to Iran’s energy
and Syria Human
22 U.S.C.
410-11; passed in the sector; prohibits foreign banks from allowing
Rights Act of 2012
§§8701 et seq.
Senate with an
Iran to withdraw its funds; imposes sanctions
(ITRSHRA)
amendment by voice
relating to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps
vote.
(IRGC) and to human rights violations.
Iran Freedom and
Sections 1244-
Conference Report
Imposes sanctions on transactions with Iran’s
Counter-Proliferation
1247, P.L. 112-
agreed to in the
energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors, and
Act (IFCA)
239, 22 U.S.C.
House 315-107 and
banks that conduct transactions with
§§8801 et seq.
in the Senate 81-14.
sanctioned Iranian entities.
Notes: Congress grants to the President the authority to terminate most of the sanctions imposed on Iran in
CISADA, ITRSHRA, and IFCA. Before terminating these sanctions, however, the President must certify that the
government of Iran has ceased its engagement in the two critical areas of terrorism and weapons, as set forth in
Section 401 of CISADA, as amended.
Impact of sanctions. U.S. sanctions imposed during 2011-2015, and since 2018, have taken a
substantial toll on Iran’s economy. A UN official, in a May 2022 visit to Iran, said that economic
sanctions had increased inflation and poverty, exacerbating overall humanitarian conditions.92
Some analysts, while agreeing that sanctions have an impact, also have argued that Iran suffers
from “decades of failed economic policies.”93 The CIA World Factbook states, “Distortions—
including corruption, price controls, subsidies, and a banking system holding billions of dollars of
non-performing loans—weigh down the economy.”94
Sanctions appear to have had a mixed impact on the range of Iranian behaviors their imposition
has been intended to curb. As mentioned above, many experts attribute Iran’s decision to enter
into multilateral negotiations and agree to limits on its nuclear program under the JCPOA at least
in part to sanctions pressure. Many other aspects of Iranian policy seen as threatening to U.S.
interests, including its regional influence and military capabilities, appear to remain considerable
and have arguably increased in the last decade.95
Since the reimposition of U.S. sanctions in 2018 and resulting economic pressure, Iran has
decreased its compliance with the nuclear commitments of the JCPOA and conducted
provocations in the Persian Gulf and in Iraq. Those nuclear advances and regional provocations
continued as Iran and the United States engaged with other JCPOA signatories in indirect
negotiations around reviving the JCPOA. The reimposition of U.S. sanctions after 2018 may also
have contributed to Iran’s growing closeness to China (with which Iran signed a March 2021
agreement to deepen economic and security ties) 96 and Russia. Following Russia’s invasion of

92 Golnaz Esfandiari, “Visit to Iran by controversial UN rapporteur provokes concerns,” RFE/RL, May 13, 2022; Amir
Vahdat, “UN envoy: US sanctions on Iran worsen humanitarian situation,” ABC News, May 18, 2022.
93 Anthony Cordesman, “The Crisis in Iran: What Now?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 11,
2018.
94 CIA World Factbook, “Iran,” updated September 28, 2022.
95 See, for example, “New report reveals extent of Iran’s growing Middle East influence,” Al Jazeera, November 7,
2019; Ariane Tabatabai et al., “Iran’s Military Interventions: Patterns, Drivers, and Signposts,” RAND Corporation,
2021; David Gardner, “Curbing Iran’s regional ambitions remains a distant hope for the west,” Financial Times, June
10, 2021; Philip Loft, “Iran’s influence in the Middle East,” House of Commons Library (UK Parliament), March 23,
2022.
96 “China, With $400 Billion Iran Deal, Could Deepen Influence in Mideast,” New York Times, March 27, 2021.
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Ukraine in early 2022, Russia and Iran—both under U.S. sanctions—have explored expanding
bilateral and energy cooperation.97
As part of its oversight responsibilities and to better inform legislative action, Congress has
directed successive Administrations to provide numerous reports on a wide array of Iran-related
topics, including U.S. sanctions. In FY2022 legislation, they include reports on the “status of
United States bilateral sanctions on Iran” (§7041(b)(2)(B) of FY2022 Consolidated
Appropriations Act, P.L. 117-103) and the impact of sanctions on various Iranian entities and
Iran-backed groups (§1227 of the FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 117-81).
Congress has also held numerous hearings focused primarily or in part on U.S. sanctions on Iran.
Oversight of Nuclear Talks/Agreement
Congress has sought to influence the outcome and implementation of international negotiations
over Iran’s nuclear program. In 2015, Congress enacted the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act
(INARA, P.L. 114-17), which mandates congressional review of related agreements and provides
for consideration of legislation to potentially block their implementation.98
Among other provisions, INARA directs the President to submit to Congress within five calendar
days of reaching “an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran” that agreement
and a certification that it meets certain conditions, such as that the agreement ensures that Iran
will not be permitted to use its nuclear program for military purposes. It also provides Congress
with a 30-day period following transmittal to review the agreement, during which the President
may not waive or otherwise limit sanctions; if Congress enacts a resolution of disapproval during
that period, the executive branch may not take any “action involving any measure of statutory
sanctions relief.”
Indirect negotiations over potentially reviving the JCPOA (see above) have implications for
INARA. The Biden Administration would likely be required to report any JCPOA amendments to
Congress, triggering the congressional review process described above, but it remains unclear
whether reentering the JCPOA would do so.99 For their part, Biden Administration officials have
stated publicly that they are “committed to ensuring the requirements of INARA are fully
satisfied” without engaging on the question of whether they would submit a hypothetical
agreement for congressional review.100 Many observers consider it likely that deal opponents
would be able to muster majorities against a potential agreement but would again fall short of
veto-proof majorities to block its implementation, as they did in 2015.101
Some in Congress who oppose Biden Administration efforts to revive the JCPOA have indicated
that they might use INARA to block or at least complicate a potential future agreement. Several
dozen senators wrote to President Biden in March 2022 urging him to submit any agreement for
congressional review expressing opposition to any agreement that does not constrain Iran’s

97 “Russia's Lavrov in Iran to Discuss Nuclear Deal, Cooperation,” Reuters, June 22, 2022.
98 For a legislative history of INARA, and the several votes taken in Congress that demonstrated opposition to the
JCPOA but failed to block its implementation, see CRS Report R46796, Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020:
Selected Case Studies, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard.
99 CRS Report R46663, Possible U.S. Return to Iran Nuclear Agreement: Frequently Asked Questions, by Kenneth
Katzman et al.
100 State Department Press Briefing, March 16, 2022.
101 See, for example, Dan De Luce, “Biden is betting Republican senators lack votes to derail revival of Iran nuclear
deal,” NBC News, March 2, 2022; Patricia Zengerle and Arshad Mohammed, “Analysis: U.S. Congress may squawk
over a new Iran deal but is unlikely to block it,” Reuters, February 17, 2022.
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nuclear program, its ballistic missile activities, and its support for international terrorism.102 In the
117th Congress, some Members also introduced legislation related to Iran’s nuclear program.103
Other Members issued public statements or introduced legislation in support of the Biden
Administration’s diplomatic efforts to revive the JCPOA.104 In the 118th Congress, legislation
directly relating to Iran’s nuclear program has been relatively limited to date.
Outlook
A vigorous protest movement shook the Islamic Republic in fall 2022. Although visible unrest
diminished in early 2023, protests could resurge in the near future, and Iran remains beset by
economic challenges that are at least partly a result of wide-ranging U.S. sanctions. At the same
time, Iran’s regional influence remains considerable, and its growing ties with China and Russia
could benefit Iran’s economy, military capabilities, and regional relationships. Looming over all
of these domestic and foreign policy developments are Iran’s nuclear activities, which have
advanced in recent years.
Together, these dynamics pose a complex challenge for U.S. policymakers and Congress, which
has long played an active role in overseeing U.S. policy toward Iran. The Biden Administration
and many in Congress express support for demonstrators, but the United States’ ability to support
the right of Iranians to protest, or to aid the protesters in achieving their various objectives,
appears limited. To counter Iran’s strategic clout, the United States has sought to marshal regional
opposition to Iran and isolate Iran on the world stage. Despite some successes on both fronts, Iran
remains diplomatically engaged with many of its neighbors, including some U.S. partners, and
the lack of U.S. relations with Tehran precludes direct U.S. involvement in those diplomatic
engagements.
It is unclear how the 2023 agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia may affect the likelihood of
a revival of JCPOA negotiations. On the one hand, Iranian leaders may calculate that, given
deeper ties with countries like China and Russia, they may not need the U.S. sanctions relief that
an agreement to limit their nuclear program would secure. On the other hand, the re-establishment
of relations with Saudi Arabia could possibly signal the beginning of a shift towards a policy of
greater re-engagement. Following the agreement, an IRGC-affiliated media outlet reportedly
stated, “The agreement with Saudi Arabia might pave the way for resolving the deadlock over the
revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).”105
Beyond the limitations of existing U.S. policy tools, a number of other factors may influence
congressional views of, and action toward, U.S. policies regarding Iran, including:

102 “49 Senate Republicans tell President Biden: An agreement without broad congressional support will not survive,”
Senator James M. Inhofe, March 14, 2022.
103 Such measures include legislation to condition potential U.S. entry into an agreement on IAEA inspectors having
full access to Iranian nuclear facilities (H.R. 1203); on the Administration’s commitment to submit the agreement for
approval by the Senate as a treaty (S. 1205/H.R. 1479); or on the President’s submission of the agreement as a treaty
(S. 2030). Other proposed measures would have created congressional review and disapproval procedures similar to
those of INARA for the lifting of any sanctions on Iran (S. 488/H.R. 1699).
104 See, for example, S. 434 and Senator Chris Murphy, “Murphy: After four years of failed maximum pressure in Iran,
we know we’re better off with a nuclear agreement,” September 22, 2022.
105 “Deal With KSA May Facilitate Return To Nuclear Deal, Iran Media Say,” Iran International, March 14, 2023.
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 A lack of detailed, current information about dynamics within Iran, at least
partially a result of the absence of U.S.-Iran diplomatic relations. No Members of
Congress or congressional staff appear to have visited Iran since 1979.106
 The historical legacy of animosity between the United States and Iran,
particularly the U.S. embassy hostage crisis of 1979-1981 and subsequent Iranian
government support for terrorism and attacks on U.S. military personnel in the
Middle East.
 The large, diverse, and politically active Iranian diaspora community.
In seeking to understand Iran and to shape U.S. policy, potential questions that Members of
Congress may consider include:
 What are the ultimate goals of U.S. policy toward Iran? What U.S. policy
approaches have been most and least successful in moving toward those goals?
 How secure is the position of Supreme Leader Khamenei? Who might succeed
him? What other factions or power centers exist within the Iranian political
system and how might they influence leadership succession and future regime
policy?
 To what extent did protests in fall 2022 and early 2023 represent a threat to
regime stability? How did they compare with similar periods of unrest in Iranian
history? What are the goals of the current protest movement and how likely are
they to achieve those goals? What, if anything, can the United States do to
support them?
 What are Iran’s regional aims, and what do they need to achieve them? What
additional assets/capabilities do U.S. partners need to counter Iran? What are the
implications of diplomatic engagement and economic ties between Iran and U.S.
regional partners for U.S. interests?
 Why has Iran provided Russia with weaponry for use in Ukraine and how has
their partnership impacted Iran and its other bilateral relationships? What drives
the deepening Iran-Russia relationship and should the United States and its
partners seek to impede it?
 Why has Iran increased its nuclear activities and what is the ultimate purpose of
the program? What additional steps would Iran need to obtain a nuclear weapon
and how can the United States and partners prevent that? What might be the
implications of Iran’s obtaining a nuclear weapon for Iran’s broader foreign
policy, regional stability, and other U.S. interests?
 What was the impact of the JCPOA on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s regional
activities, domestic politics in Iran, and U.S.-Iran relations overall? What was the
impact of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA?
 What are the arguments for and against attempting to rejoin the JCPOA? Given
changes on both sides since 2015, is reviving the accord feasible? What
alternative arrangements, if any, might meet the U.S. goal of securing limits on
Iran’s nuclear activities?

106 Some Members of Congress have visited other countries without a U.S. embassy such as Syria (in 2017), Cuba (in
2009), and North Korea (in 2003).
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Author Information

Carla E. Humud
Clayton Thomas
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Acknowledgments
Ken Katzman provided knowledge, advice, and wisdom in the production of this report—and has been
indispensable in the authors’ careers.

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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Congressional Research Service
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