Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy
March 2, 2023
Since the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in the early 1970s, Oman has relied on the
United States as a key defense partner, and successive U.S. presidential administrations have
Jeremy M. Sharp
considered Oman important to the promotion of regional stability and peace in the Middle East.
Specialist in Middle
Over the past decade, Oman has played the role of discreet mediator having served an
Eastern Affairs
intermediary in seeking to resolve the ongoing civil conflict in Yemen. Oman also has helped

facilitate negotiations that led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to limit Iran’s
nuclear program, from which the Trump Administration withdrew in 2018. Oman’s strategic

location at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world's most important oil
chokepoints, provides it with regional and global influence.
In January 2020, Oman’s long-time leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id Al Said, passed away and was succeeded by his cousin
Haythim bin Tariq Al Said. Sultan Haythim leads a stable, high-income nation, though Oman faces challenges in maintaining
its decades-long social contract, in which oil has brought prosperity to its citizens in exchange for their acceptance of the
Sultan’s absolute rule. Like the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Kuwait—Oman derives most of its state income from hydrocarbon production and export;
however, Oman’s hydrocarbon-focused economy is smaller than those of its wealthier neighbors. In order to curb
government spending, attract foreign investment, and diversify the economy, Sultan Haythim has launched “Vision 2040,” a
strategic plan similar to those of other GCC states.
The U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement was signed on January 19, 2006, and ratified by Congress (P.L. 109-283, signed
September 26, 2006). Today, the United States is one of Oman’s largest trading partners and foreign investors. In 2021, the
United States exported $1.4 billion in goods to Oman and imported $1.86 billion in goods.
Since the 1990s, Oman has consistently sought an end to the Arab-Israeli dispute as a means of calming regional tensions.
During the height of Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking in the 1990s, Oman became the first Gulf state to officially host a visit
by an Israeli prime minister (Yitzhak Rabin in 1994), and it hosted then-Prime Minister Shimon Peres in April 1996. At
times, there has been speculation among experts that Oman would follow the UAE and Bahrain in normalizing relations with
Israel (the Abraham Accords), but Omani officials have not given any indication that doing so is currently under
consideration. In 2023, Oman did announce that it was opening up its airspace for all civil carriers, including Israeli
commercial aircraft; the Israeli government responded with expressions of gratitude.
Oman and the United States maintain strong defense ties, whereby Oman permits the U.S. military to use its military
facilities. Oman also allows other nations to use some of its maritime facilities, including China. In November 2022, the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Oman of 48 Raytheon Joint
Stand Off Weapons (JSOW) for $385 million. The JSOW is an unpowered glide bomb that uses Global Positioning System
navigation for guidance in order to strike hardened targets.
From 1946 to 2020, the United States provided Oman with $853 million in total economic and military assistance. Currently,
Oman receives around $5 million of annual foreign assistance to support specific U.S. programs. The United States provides
Oman with annual International Military Education and Training (IMET) grants to support Omani officer participation in the
IMET program, which provides professional military education and training to foreign military students and seeks to
establish lasting relationships with future leaders. The United States also provides small funding grants, through
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related programs, to help Oman counter terrorist and related threats. In
previous years, the United States also has provided Oman with Foreign Military Financing grants to procure U.S. defense
equipment.

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Overview
Oman is located along the Arabian Sea (see Figure 1), on the southern approaches to the Strait of
Hormuz, across from Iran. Since the mid-eighteenth century, the Al Said (or Busaid) dynasty has
ruled Oman. The Sultanate of Oman is a hereditary monarchy, and the sultan has sole authority to
enact laws through royal decree.2 In January 2020, Oman’s long-time leader, Sultan Qaboos bin
Sa’id Al Said, passed away and was succeeded by Haythim bin Tariq Al Said, a cousin selected
by Oman’s royal family immediately upon
Qaboos’s death.
Sultan Haythim bin Tariq al Said
Sultan Haythim leads a stable, high-income
Sultan Haythim bin Tariq, an Oxford-educated cousin
of the late sultan Qaboos, is 68 years old (born
nation (as categorized by the World Bank),
October 13, 1954). He had served since 2002 as
though Oman faces challenges in maintaining
Minister of Heritage and Culture and previously served
its decades-long social contract, in which oil
in senior positions in Oman’s foreign ministry.
has brought prosperity to Omani citizens in
Haythim’s selection bypassed his two older brothers—
exchange for their apparent acceptance of the
Asad bin Tariq and Shihab bin Tariq—whom many
experts considered more likely successors than
Sultan’s absolute rule. Like the other Gulf
Haythim. Upon assuming the leadership, Sultan
Cooperation Council (GCC) states—Saudi
Haythim indicated a commitment to continue Qaboos’s
Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates
policies.1 In late January 2021, the new Sultan appointed
(UAE), Bahrain, and Kuwait—Oman derives
his son, Theyazin bin Haythim, who was born in August
most of its state income through hydrocarbon
1990, as Crown Prince. The appointment represented
a contrast with the Qaboos era in which the succession
production and export. In 2022, oil and gas
was unclear. Theyazin serves in government as Minister
accounted for 78% of government revenues.3
of Culture, Youth, and Sports. Crown Prince Theyazin
With proven reserves at 5.2 billion barrels
completed officer training at the Royal Military
(ranked 23rd globally as of June 2022) and
Academy Sandhurst in the United Kingdom.
current production at 1.05 million barrels per
day (mbd), however, Oman’s hydrocarbon-
focused economy is smaller than those of its
wealthier neighbors. Oman is not a member of
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), but coordinates with other
oil producers through the wider, 23-member
OPEC+ arrangement. Oman’s sovereign
wealth fund, the Oman Investment Authority,
has total assets of $41.5 billion (as of late

2022), a figure far less than some other GCC
Source: Foreign Ministry of Oman
state funds, which have hundreds of billions of
dollars under management.4
Though the Sultanate has used its limited oil-generated wealth to provide citizens with subsidized
goods, low taxes, and public sector salaries, the rising costs of oil-fueled state spending coupled
with global inflation has put government finances under strain. Oman’s debt to Gross Domestic

1 “Meet Oman’s New Sultan. How Will He Navigate the Region’s Turmoil?” Washington Post, January 15, 2020.
2 U.S. Department of State, Overseas Security Advisory Council, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Oman Country
Security Report, March 31, 2022.
3 Kate Dourian, “Oman Has Cause To Celebrate Record High Oil Production And New Partners,” Middle East
Economic Survey, February 1, 2023.
4 See Global SWF Data Platform, available at: https://globalswf.com/.
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Product ratio is already the second highest in the GCC after Bahrain's (total debt is $104 billion).5
In 2021, unemployed or underemployed youth protested in several Omani cities demanding
access to stable jobs; Sultan Haythim had enacted austerity measures to rein in public spending.6
In 2022, pressure on the treasury has somewhat eased due to higher oil prices and government
repayment of sovereign debt, though the fundamental challenge of how Oman transitions to a
post-oil, private-sector led economy remains.7
Figure 1. Oman

People
 Population: 3.8 mil ion, of which about 46% are expatriates (2023 est.)
 Religions: Muslim 85.9% (of which Ibadhis and Sunnis are over 90%, and 5% are Shia); Christian
6.4%; Hindu 5.7%; other 2% (2020 est.)
Economy  GDP: $103 bil ion (2022)
 GDP per capita: $41,572 (2022)
 GDP real growth rate: 4.7% (2022)
 Unemployment Rate: 3% Youth Unemployment: 14.6% (2021)
Energy
 Oil Exports: $28 bil ion (2022)
and

Trade
Oil Reserves: 5.2 bil ion barrels (2022)
 Major Trade Partners: China (mostly oil), UAE, South Korea, Japan, India, United States, Saudi
Arabia
Source: Graphic created by CRS with information from CIA, The World Factbook, World Bank, and Economist
Intelligence Unit.

5 Economist Intelligence Unit, Oman (country report), January 21, 2023, available at: http://country.eiu.com/oman.
6 “Protests in Oman over economy, jobs continue for third day,” Al Jazeera, May 25, 2021.
7 Hassan Jivraj, “Oman’s economy surges with higher oil prices, fiscal reform,” Al Monitor, September 1, 2022.
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Domestic Politics
Oman has a bicameral parliament with limited legislative powers; members may question
ministers, select their own leadership, and review government-drafted legislation, but law-making
powers rest firmly in the hands of the Sultan. Members of the 86-seat Consultative Council
(Majlis As Shura) are directly elected by Omani citizens, male and female, over 21 years of age.
The sultan appoints all 85 members of the upper house or State Council (Majlis Ad Dawla).
Appointees are usually former high-ranking government officials, military officials, tribal leaders,
and other notables. The next election for the Consultative Council is scheduled for October 2023
although, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, “with political parties banned and
candidates heavily vetted, we expect that voter apathy will again result in a low turnout in 2023.”8
Female candidates have been competing in elections for the Consultative Council since 2000.
Two women were elected to the council in 2019 and, that same year, the late Sultan Qaboos
appointed 15 women to the State Council.
Economic Reforms and Diversification
In order to curb government spending, attract foreign investment, and diversify the economy,
Sultan Haythim has launched “Oman Vision 2040,” a strategic plan similar to those of other GCC
states.9
Figure 2. Oman GDP Growth
annual percent change

Source: IMF Data Mapper, World Economic Outlook, October 2022
Over the past two years, the government has consolidated state-owned enterprises and merged
duplicative investment authorities, while appointing younger technocrats and ministers to lead
government agencies.10 To attract foreign investors, Oman is offering tax incentives, lower
government fees, expanded land use, and increased access to capital for qualifying companies in

8 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, Oman, January 31, 2023.
9 See Oman Vision 2040, available at: https://www.oman2040.om/index-en.html.
10 Jonathan Campbell-James, “Oman’s Economic Success Is Driven by Accountability as Much as Oil,” Policy Watch
#3639, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 11, 2022.
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sectors, such as manufacturing, logistics, tourism, mining, and fishing. However, according to the
U.S. Department of Commerce’s Country Commercial Guide for Oman:
Oman’s success in growing its economy will depend in part on revising labor policies,
which some U.S. companies tell us can be challenging to navigate. Smaller companies with
limited or no local or regional experience report bureaucratic difficulties, including
requirements to hire a certain percentage of Omanis for their workforce and problems
letting go of non-performing or redundant employees. The government recognizes these
challenges and is working to address them as part of efforts to improve the investment
climate and achieve its economic development goals under Oman’s Vision 2040
development plan.11
Human Rights
Oman is an absolute monarchy in which, according to international human rights groups, state
authorities target individuals and entities that are critical of the government.12 Freedom House’s
annual survey of political rights and civil liberties globally ranks Oman as “not free”; it also notes
that “Political parties are not permitted, and the authorities do not tolerate other forms of
organized political opposition.”13 According to the most recent State Department report on human
rights, the principal human rights issues in Oman are:
arbitrary arrest or detention; serious restrictions on free expression and media, including
censorship and criminal libel laws; serious restrictions on the internet, including site
blocking; substantial interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of
association; serious restrictions on political participation; criminalization of consensual
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex conduct; and labor exploitation of
foreign migrants.14
The law provides for an independent judiciary, but the Sultan chairs the country’s highest legal
body, the Supreme Judicial Council, which can review judicial decisions. The Oman Human
Rights Commission (OHRC), a quasi-independent but government-sanctioned body, investigates
and monitors prison and detention center conditions through site visits. According to the U.S.
State Department, “OHRC functions semi-independently with moderate effectiveness in
protecting human rights in the country, based on limited public information.”15
The government has been credited with expanding its efforts to protect the rights of expatriate
laborers, who are about 80% of the workforce. Some measures to reform the kafala or visa-
sponsorship employment system have been implemented, such as the June 2020 removal of a
requirement for migrant workers to obtain a “no-objection” certificate from their current
employer before changing jobs. However, the State Department reports that some expatriate
laborers have faced working conditions indicative of forced labor, including withholding of
passports, restrictions on movement, usurious recruitment fees, nonpayment of wages, long
working hours without food or rest, threats, and physical or sexual abuse.16

11 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Oman Country Commercial Guide, September
14, 2022.
12 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2021, Oman.
13 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022, Oman.
14 U.S. Department of State, 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Oman.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
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Advancement of Women
During his reign, Sultan Qaboos emphasized that Omani women are vital to national development
and sought to promote their advancement. In 2000, he began appointing women to the State
Council and, in 2004, Sultan Qaboos appointed the first female cabinet minister.17 Since then,
there have consistently been several female ministers in each cabinet.
For the 2021-2022 Omani academic year, Omani women comprised 62% of all enrolled students
at higher education institutions in the sultanate compared to just 39% a decade ago.18 In the labor
market, as of 2021, women (citizens and expatriates) constitute nearly 30% of the workforce.19
The 2022 Global Gender Gap Report – which benchmarks progress in gender parity across four
areas (economic opportunities, education, health, and political leadership) – notes that Oman
ranks 139th of 146 countries.20 UN Women notes that researchers require more data to properly
assess the state of development goals for Omani women in key sectors, such as “gender and
poverty, physical and sexual harassment, women’s access to assets (including land), and gender
and the environment.”21
Foreign Policy
Oman is sometimes colloquially referred to as the “Switzerland of the Middle East,” though it
does not formally espouse neutrality as a principle of its foreign policy.22 Accordingly, Oman’s
foreign policy sometimes diverges from that of some of its fellow GCC members, particularly
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Oman has generally sought to mediate regional conflicts and
refrained from direct military involvement in them. In 2014, Oman joined the U.S.-led coalition
against the Islamic State, but did not participate in the coalition’s airstrikes or ground operations
against the group. Oman opposed the Saudi-led move in June 2017 to isolate Qatar over a number
of policy disagreements.
China
Beyond its close ties to fellow GCC states and the West, Oman also is cultivating ties to the
People’s Republic of China (PRC). Oman’s exports 85% of its oil to the PRC. The PRC
government also has financed an industrial park in the port of Duqm and lent Oman $3.6 billion
in 2017 for Duqm’s development.23 According to the U.S. State Department, as of 2020, China
was the fifth largest foreign investor Oman, with one Chinese company taking a 49% stake in the
Oman Electricity Transmission Company.24

17 “Omanis Welcome Appointment of Woman Minister,” Arab News, March 10, 2004.
18 “Oman women demand ‘equal partnership’ as divorce rates rise,” Al Jazeera, January 27, 2022.
19 World Bank, Labor force participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+) (modeled International Labor
Organization estimate) – Oman.
20 World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report 2022, available at: https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-
gender-gap-report-2022/in-full/1-benchmarking-gender-gaps-2022#1-6-in-focus-country-performances.
21 UN Women, The Women Count Data Hub, Oman.
22 Giulia Daga, “Is Oman the Switzerland of the Middle East,” Arab Gulf States Institute, January 20, 2023.
23 Economist Intelligence Unit, Middle East and Africa economy: Middle East weekly brief: China's expanding role,
August 26, 2020.
24 U.S. Department of State, 2022 Investment Climate Statements: Oman.
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Iran
Omani leaders, including Sultan Haythim, have consistently asserted that engagement with Iran
better mitigates the potential threat from that country than confrontation—a stance that has
positioned Oman as a mediator in regional conflicts in which Iran or its proxies are involved. In
explaining Oman’s positive relations with Iran, Omani leaders often cite the late former Shah of
Iran’s support for the late Sultan Qaboos’s seizure of power from his father in 1970 and Iran’s
deployment of troops to help Oman end the leftist revolt in Oman’s Dhofar Province during
1962-1975, a conflict in which 700 Iranian soldiers died.25
At the same time, Oman has supported U.S. efforts to deter Iran strategically. As noted below, it
has hosted U.S. forces since the 1980s, it has supported U.S. operations to deter Iran, and it
regularly participates in U.S.-led exercises in and around the Gulf. Iran’s President Ibrahim Raisi
visited Oman in late May 2022 to discuss regional issues and sign a series of agreements to
expand bilateral trade and move forward on long delayed joint energy development projects,
including to develop the Hengham oil field in the Persian Gulf.26
Iran and Oman civilian trade volumes are marginal (see Figure 2), and Oman has sought to
ensure that its projects with Iran not violate any of the wide array of U.S. sanctions in effect on
transactions with Iran. In 2014, the two countries signed a deal to build a $1 billion undersea
pipeline to bring Iranian natural gas from Iran’s Hormuzegan Province to Sohar in Oman, from
where it would be exported, but the reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran in 2018 derailed the
concept.27

25 Faramarz Davar, “Why is Oman So Loyal to Iran?” Iranwire, August 9, 2018.
26 Iran, Oman to jointly develop oil field, Al Monitor, May 23, 2022.
27 Dana El Baltaji, “Oman Fights Saudi Bid for Gulf Hegemony with Iran Pipeline Plan,” Bloomberg, April 21, 2014;
“Oman to Invite Bids to Build Gas Pipeline,” Financial Tribune, April 23, 2018.
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Figure 3. Oman’s Trade with Iran and the GCC

Source: IMF and Economist Intelligence Unit
Oman’s relations with Iran reportedly often have helped U.S. officials negotiate with Iranian
officials. U.S. officials’ meetings with Iranian officials in Oman, which began in early 2013, set
the stage for negotiations that culminated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
Iran nuclear agreement that was finalized in July 2015.28 Omani banks, including Bank Muscat,
held about $5.7 billion in Iranian funds, and implemented some of the pact’s financial
arrangements.29 During 2016-2019, Iran exported heavy water to Oman in order to maintain its
stockpile of that material at levels that comport with its commitments under the JCPOA.
However, in May 2019, the United States ended waivers that enabled countries to buy Iranian
heavy water without U.S. penalty, a decision that caused Oman to stop importing Iranian heavy
water. 30
Oman has supported now-moribund indirect negotiations between the Biden Administration and
Tehran to restore full compliance with the JCPOA, and Omani officials, including during the visit
to Oman of Iranian President Raisi in May 2022, have reportedly encouraged Iran to compromise
in those talks in the interests of achieving an accord. In February 2023, Sultan Haythim
reportedly traveled to Iran, drawing praise from the U.S. State Department which noted that same
month that “Oman's played a constructive role across the Middle East in helping to solve

28 David Ignatius, “Opinions: The Omani ‘back channel’ to Iran and the secrecy surrounding the nuclear deal,”
Washington Post, June 7, 2016.
29 Omani banks had a waiver from U.S. sanctions laws to permit transferring those funds to Iran’s Central Bank, in
accordance with Section 1245(d)(5) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (P.L. 112-81). For
text of the waiver, see a June 17, 2015, letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Julia Frifield to
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker, containing text of the “determination of waiver.” See also
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the U.S. Senate. Majority Report, “Review of U.S. Treasury
Department’s License to Convert Iranian Assets Using the U.S. Financial System,” May 2018.
30 “A conversation with H.E. Sayyid Badr Albusaidi, Foreign Minister of Oman,” The Atlantic Council, February 11,
2021.
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challenges and to bridge divide -- divides between countries that don't see eye to eye, and that's
putting it mildly. We're consulting closely with Iran on challenges near and far.”31
Oman also has helped facilitate the release and transfer of Western hostages held in Iran. In
October 2022, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken thanked Oman for working with Iranian
authorities to arrange for the flight out of Iran of detained 85-year-old Iranian-American Baquer
Namazi. Several months earlier, the Secretary had thanked Oman for securing the release of
Morad Tabhaz, a trilateral U.S.-British-Iranian citizen who had been unjustly detained in Iran.32
Yemen33
In neighboring Yemen, Oman’s and Iran’s interests conflict, insofar as U.N. investigators have
cited Iran as arming and advising the Zaidi Shia Ansarallah (aka Houthi) movement that drove the
Republic of Yemen government (ROYG) out of the capital, Sana’a, in 2014. In an effort to help
mediate a resolution of the conflict, the Omani government has hosted talks between U.S.
diplomats and Houthi representatives. Oman has been facilitating talks aimed at extending a U.N-
mediated ROYG-Houthi cease-fire that lapsed in October 2022 but has been observed since. In
January 2023, United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg visited the Omani
capital Muscat, where he met with Omani senior officials; a month earlier, Oman had sent a
delegation to Sana’a to meet with Houthi leaders.34 In a briefing to the U.N. Security Council,
Grundberg expressed appreciation for Omani diplomatic efforts.35
Israel and the Abraham Accords
Since the 1990s, Oman has consistently sought an end to the Arab-Israeli dispute as a means of
calming regional tensions. During the height of Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking in the 1990s,
Oman became the first Gulf state to officially host a visit by an Israeli prime minister (Yitzhak
Rabin in 1994), and it hosted then-Prime Minister Shimon Peres in April 1996. Since 1997, Oman
has hosted the Middle East Desalination Research Center (MEDRC), which brings together
scientists from Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, and Qatar to discuss desalination and
water treatment cooperation in the region. The U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs at times obligates grants (around $400,000 in Economic Support Funds or ESF) to support
MEDRC operations. Other donors include Oman, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Japan, and
the Republic of Korea.36
At times, there has been speculation among experts that Oman would follow the UAE and
Bahrain in normalizing relations with Israel (the Abraham Accords), but Omani officials have not
given any indication that doing so is currently under consideration. On October 25, 2018, Israel’s
then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Oman and met with Sultan Qaboos to discuss
regional issues. Israel has sought to convince the Omani government to open Oman’s airspace to

31 U.S. Department of State, Press Briefing, February 22, 2023.
32 U.S. Department of State, Secretary Blinken’s Call with Omani Foreign Minister Al-Busaidi, July 31, 2022.
33 The current instability adds to a long record of difficulty in Oman-Yemen relations. The former People’s Democratic
Republic of Yemen (PDRY), considered Marxist and pro-Soviet, supported Oman’s Dhofar rebellion. Oman-PDRY
relations were normalized in 1983, but the two engaged in border clashes later in that decade. Relations improved after
1990, when PDRY merged with North Yemen to form the Republic of Yemen.
34 “Yemen: Briefing and Consultations,” What’s in Blue, Security Council Report, January 13, 2023.
35 Samy Magdy, “Yemen rebels, Saudis in back-channel talks to maintain truce,” Associated Press, January 17, 2023.
36 See https://www.medrc.org/about-us/.
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Israeli commercial flights to Asia. In November 2022, during the U.S.-Omani strategic dialogue,
U.S. officials met with Omani Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr al Busaidi to discuss the potential
opening of Omani airspace to Israeli airlines. Reportedly, the late Sultan Qaboos had been in
favor of doing so, but Sultan Haythim has held back; one commentator argued this was because
“the Omanis had several bilateral issues and requests from the U.S. that they wanted to get in
return.”37
Then, in February 2023, the Sultanate’s Civil Aviation Authority announced that “As part of the
Sultanate of Oman’s continuous efforts to fulfill its obligations under the Chicago Convention of
1944, the Civil Aviation Authority affirms that the Sultanate’s airspace is open for all carriers that
meet the requirements of the Authority for overflying.”38 In response, Israeli Foreign Minister Eli
Cohen thanked the government of Oman, remarking that it’s a “historic decision that will shorten
the journey to Asia, lower costs for Israelis, and help Israeli companies be more competitive.”39
U.S. Relations, Defense, and Trade
Since the United States and Oman opened embassies in their respective capitals in the early
1970s, both countries have conducted cordial relations. According to the U.S. State Department,
“Oman’s longstanding partnership with the United States is critical to our mutual objectives,
including increasing economic diversification and development opportunities, promoting regional
stability, and countering terrorism.”40 Secretary Blinken has highlighted the key role Oman plays
as a U.S. partner, specifically on “Iran, as well as on Yemen and a commitment to try to bring the
war in Yemen to an end.”41
Oman was the first Persian Gulf state to sign a formal accord permitting the U.S. military to use
its facilities (1980) as part of this long-standing strategic partnership. On March 24, 2019, Oman
and the United States signed a “Strategic Framework Agreement” that expands the U.S.-Oman
facilities access agreements by allowing U.S. forces to use the ports of Al Duqm, which is large
enough to handle U.S. aircraft carriers, and Salalah.42 In April 2021, the Eisenhower Carrier
Strike Group visited Duqm port for logistics and maintenance support. Oman is trying to expand
and modernize its arsenal primarily with purchases from the United States. As of June 2021, the
United States has 72 active cases valued at $2.7 billion with Oman under the government-to-
government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system.43

37 Barak Ravid, “U.S. and Oman talk potential opening of Omani airspace to Israeli planes,” Axios, November 16,
2022.
38 Twitter, @CAAOMN, February 23, 2023.
39 “Israel thanks Oman for opening its airspace,” Reuters, February 23. 2023.
40 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations With Oman, Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, May 12, 2022.
41 U.S. Department of State, Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Omani Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr al Busaidi,
November 8, 2022.
42 U.S. Embassy in Oman, “U.S. Statement on the Signing of the Strategic Framework Agreement” March 24, 2019.
43 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Oman,” fact sheet, June 15, 2021. Section 564 of Title V,
Part C of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1994 and FY1995 (P.L. 103-236) banned U.S. arms transfers
to countries that maintain the Arab boycott of Israel during those fiscal years. As applied to the GCC states, this
provision was waived on the grounds that doing so was in the national interest.
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U.S.-led Maritime Interdiction in the Gulf of Oman
In order to counter weapons and drug trafficking in the Gulf of Oman, U.S. Naval forces, in conjunction with
regional partners in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, patrol coastal waters and
routinely interdict suspected smuggling operations. While Oman is not a member of the U.S.-led, 34-member
nation Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), which operates task forces to counter piracy and smuggling, the Royal
Omani Navy has at times participated in CMF-led joint exercises.44 In 2022 and 2023, CMF reported several large
drug (heroin, hashish) and weapon (rifles, explosives, and ammunition rounds) seizures in the Gulf of Oman.45
The signature bilateral forum for discussing the entirety of U.S.-Omani defense ties is the U.S.-
Oman Joint Military Commission (JMC), last held in March 2022. According to the Defense
Department readout of the JMC, both sides discussed maritime and border security threats, Iran’s
destabilizing activities in the region, the conflict in Yemen, and how to strengthen the Sultanate’s
air and missile defense.46 Through the U.S. Department of Defense’s National Guard Bureau
State Partnership Program, the Arizona National Guard has partnered with the Sultan of Oman’s
Armed Forces, beginning in 2022.
In November 2022, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of a
possible FMS to Oman of 48 Raytheon AGM-154C Joint Stand Off Weapons (JSOW) for $385
million. The JSOW is an unpowered glide bomb that uses Global Positioning System navigation
for guidance in order to strike hardened targets. The United States has sold the JSOW to Saudi
Arabia and approved its sale to other GCC states, such as Qatar, the UAE, and Bahrain.
According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, the Royal Air Force of Oman may be seeking to purchase
the JSOW in order to use against hardened targets, “including Iranian coastal anti-ship missile
storage sites, from a relatively long range to minimize its F-16 fighters’ exposure to air
defenses.”47 In November 2022, an Israeli-owned oil tanker was struck by an armed drone off the
coast of Oman, in a suspected Iranian attack; a similar attack in 2021 on another Israeli-owned
tanker killed two people onboard.48
Oman receives a small amount of annual foreign assistance to support specific U.S. programs.
The United States provides Oman with annual International Military Education and Training
(IMET) grants to support Omani officer participation in the IMET program, which provides
professional military education and training to foreign military students and seeks to establish
lasting relationships with future leaders. The United States also provides small funding grants
(est. $1 million)—much of it through the NADR—to help Oman counter terrorist and related
threats. NADR funding Export Control and Related Border Security, Anti-Terrorism Assistance,
and Terrorism Interdiction Program enhance the capabilities of the Royal Oman Police (ROP), the
ROP Coast Guard, the Directorate General of Customs, the Ministry of Defense, and several
civilian agencies to interdict weapons of mass destruction, advanced conventional weapons, or

44 Combined Maritime Task Forces, Combined Task Force Visits Senior Oman Armed Forces Leadership, April 22,
2021.
45 For example, see: U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs, U.S. Coast Guard Seizes Heroin Shipment in
Gulf of Oman, June 2, 2022; U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs, U.S. Ship Seizes Illegal Narcotics in
Gulf of Oman, August 31, 2022; U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs, U.S. Coast Guard Ship
Seizes$48 Million in Drugs in Middle East, October 11, 2022; U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs,
U.S. Naval Forces Intercept Explosive Material Bound for Yemen, November 15, 2022; U.S. Naval Forces Central
Command Public Affairs, U.S. Seizes 1.1 Million Rounds of Ammunition, Other Illegal Weapons in Gulf Of Oman,
December 4, 2022; and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs, U.S., International Forces Seize Illegal
Drugs in Gulf of Oman, January 31, 2023.
46 U.S. Department of Defense, Readout of U.S.-Oman Joint Military Commission, March 24, 2022.
47 Jeremy Binnie, “U.S. Approves JSOW Sale to Oman, Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 10, 2022.
48 “Oil tanker hit by armed drone off coast of Oman: Official,” Al Jazeera, November 16, 2022.
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Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

illegal drugs at land and sea borders. The funding is also used to train Omani law enforcement
agencies on investigative techniques and border security.
The U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement was signed on January 19, 2006, and ratified by Congress
(P.L. 109-283, signed September 26, 2006). It was intended to facilitate Oman’s access to the
U.S. economy and accelerate Oman’s efforts to diversify. Today, the United States is one of
Oman’s largest trading partners and foreign investors. In 2021, the United States exported $1.4
billion in goods to Oman and imported $1.86 billion in goods. The largest U.S. export categories
to Oman are automobiles, aircraft (including military) and related parts, drilling and other oilfield
equipment, and other machinery. Of the imports, the largest product categories are fertilizers,
industrial supplies, and oil by-products such as plastics. The United States imports a relatively
small amounts of Omani oil.

Author Information

Jeremy M. Sharp

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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Congressional Research Service
RS21534 · VERSION 117 · UPDATED
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