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INSIGHTi
Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. F-16 Sale
February 16, 2023
In January 2023, media sources—citing unnamed U.S. officials—reported that the Biden Administration
has provided informal notification to Congress about possible F-16 sales for Turkey (Türkiye), a member
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Issues potentially factoring into congressional review
of the sales include Turkey’s role regarding the Russia-Ukraine war, Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO
membership applications, regional rivalry with Greece, and Turkish domestic matters.
The January informal notification is reportedly for 40 new F-16s of the advanced Block 70/72 Viper
configuration and Block 70/72 upgrade packages for 79 existing fighters (see Figure 1), along with 900
air-to-air missiles and 800 bombs, at an estimated total value of $20 billion. The transaction could
modernize and extend the service life of much of Turkey’s fleet while Turkey tries to acquire or design a
more advanced fighter.
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Figure 1. F-16 Block 70/72 Viper Configuration
Source: Lockheed Martin
Some Members of Congress from both parties have expressed reservations. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee (SFRC) Chairman Bob Menendez was quoted in January as saying, “Until [Turkish President
Recep Tayyip] Erdogan ceases his threats [against neighboring NATO allies], improves his human rights
record at home ... and begins to act like a trusted ally should, I will not approve this sale.” Several other
Senators, including SFRC Ranking Member Jim Risch and the 29 who wrote a February letter to
President Biden, have indicated they might only consider supporting the F-16 sale to Turkey if its
parliament agrees to Sweden and Finland joining NATO.
In general, the State Department formally notifies SFRC and the House Foreign Affairs Committee of a
possible arms sale 20 to 40 days after an informal notification, giving the committees opportunity to raise
concerns in a confidential process. If a committee chair or ranking member places a “hold” on the
proposed transaction, formal notification usually does not proceed, though holds are not legally binding.
Under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA, P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320), the Administration can proceed
with a sale—if not blocked by legislation—15 days (for NATO allies like Turkey) after formal
notification.
Congress and U.S.-Turkey Arms Transactions
Congressional legislation and oversight has helped shape U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation for decades.
Congress placed an arms embargo on Turkey from 1975 to 1978, following the 1974 Cyprus conflict.
Since then, Turkey has focused more on developing its defense industry (see Figure 2), and as part of that
goal, one objective of Turkish arms purchases from the United States and other foreign suppliers has been
to acquire technology for future indigenous defense production.
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Figure 2. Arms Imports as a Share of Turkish Military Spending
Sources: Stratfor, based on information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Traders
Database, with some text modifications by CRS.
Since Erdogan became president in 2014, a number of proposed U.S. arms transfers to Turkey either have
stalled or faced reported congressional holds. After Turkey acquired an S-400 surface-to-air defense
system from Russia, the Trump Administration removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
program (citing concerns about possible Russian use of the S-400 to collect intelligence on F-35 stealth
capabilities), and imposed congressionally authorized sanctions on Turkey. Section 1245 of the FY2020
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92) prohibits funding the transfer of F-35s to
Turkey unless Turkey no longer possesses the S-400.
Considerations for Congress
Several issues could have implications for congressional approaches to the possible sale, and vice versa.
Shortly after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a State Department letter to some Members of
Congress reportedly said that there were “compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and capability
interests, as well as U.S. national security, economic and commercial interests that are supported by
appropriate U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.” While Turkey has acted more independently of the West
under Erdogan, it has NATO’s second-largest military, hosts allied military assets and personnel, and
partners in other ways with the United States and NATO—including using F-16s in occasional policing
missions.
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U.S. officials have voiced appreciation for Turkish actions that appear favorable to Ukraine. Turkey has
denounced Russia’s invasion, closed the Bosphorus (alt. Bosporus) and Dardanelles Straits to belligerent
warships, helped broker a Black Sea corridor for Ukrainian grain exports, and supplied Ukraine with
military equipment.
However, Turkey also has boosted various forms of economic and energy cooperation with Russia.
During early 2023, U.S. officials have warned counterparts in Turkey (and some non-NATO countries)
about possible penalties for businesses that continue trade potentially supplying Russia’s defense industry.
Within a context of strong congressional support for Swedish and Finnish NATO accession, some
Members argue that Turkish delay on the issue threatens alliance unity. Turkish officials appear
dissatisfied with steps Sweden has taken to date—per a June 2022 trilateral memorandum—against those
that Turkey considers terrorists. Turkey’s parliament reportedly might agree to Finland’s accession as
soon as March, but Finland apparently would rather join NATO together with Sweden, preferably before
NATO’s July summit.
Turkey-Greece regional disputes also are a
factor for Congress. U.S. arms transfers could
Figure 3. Turkish Public Opinion Polls
affect the balance of power between Turkey and
Greece. U.S.-Greece cooperation has expanded,
and reportedly the Administration informally
notified Congress of a possible sale of up to 40 F-
35s to Greece at the same time as the Turkey/F-16
informal notification. Additionally, the joint
explanatory statement accompanying the FY2023
NDAA (P.L. 117-263) cautioned NATO allies
against “unauthorized territorial overflights of
another NATO ally’s airspace.”
Domestic developments in Turkey are another
consideration. Many U.S. lawmakers have alleged
that “gross violation of human rights and
democratic backsliding” have occurred under the
rule of President Erdogan and his Justice and
Development Party (Turkish acronym AKP).
Closely contested Turkish presidential and
parliamentary elections could occur by June 2023
(see Figure 3), though they might be delayed due
to effects of the disastrous February 6 earthquakes
in southern Turkey. Observers speculate about the
earthquakes’ potential to affect election outcomes
and Turkey’s struggling economy, and how
leadership changes or getting past the elections
might influence Turkish policies relevant to the F-
16 issue.
Congressional action on a possible F-16 sale
could influence whether Turkey continues to use
major U.S. weapons platforms, and other aspects
of U.S.-Turkey political-military ties. Turkey is reportedly exploring Eurofighter Typhoons as a
potential alternative to F-16s, but it is unclear if consortium partner Germany would approve such a sale.
Moreover, Turkey’s air force could face difficulties adjusting to a non-F-16 platform, thus potentially
complicating alternatives.
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Author Information
Jim Zanotti
Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
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Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
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