Turkey (TÃ¼rkiye): Background and U.S.
February 15, 2023
Relations In Brief
Jim Zanotti
U.S. relations with Turkey (TÃ¼rkiye) take place within a complicated geopolitical environment
Specialist in Middle
and with Turkey in economic distress. U.S.-Turkey tensions that worsened after a failed 2016
Eastern Affairs
coup in Turkeyâ€”including ongoing disagreements over Syrian Kurds and Turkeyâ€™s 2019

procurement of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense systemâ€”highlight uncertainties about the
Clayton Thomas
future of bilateral relations. Congressional actions have included sanctions legislation and holds
Specialist in Middle
on U.S. arms sales. Nevertheless, U.S. and Turkish officials emphasize the importance of
Eastern Affairs
continued cooperation and Turkeyâ€™s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO). Observers voice concerns about the largely authoritarian rule of Turkish President
Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Major inflation and a sharp decline in Turkeyâ€™s currency have led to

speculation that Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym AKP) might
be vulnerable to a coalition of opposition parties in presidential and parliamentary elections required by June 2023, if
competitive elections occur. The aftermath of the disastrous February 6, 2023 earthquakes in southern Turkey is affecting
Turkeyâ€™s politics, society, and economy, and could influence the timing and nature of elections. If a different Turkish
president were to win 2023 elections and take power, or if the presidentâ€™s party coalition does not control parliament, some
domestic and foreign policy changes could be possible.
U.S. relations and F-16s. Under President Joe Biden, existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside cooperation
on other foreign policy matters. While deepening ties with Russia remain a cause for U.S. concern, Turkeyâ€™s emergence as a
mediator between Russia and Ukraine after Russiaâ€™s 2022 invasion has arguably increased Turkeyâ€™s importance for U.S.
policy. U.S.-Turkey relations have improved somewhat due to Turkeyâ€™s cautious support for Ukraineâ€™s defense; growing
relationships with other countries that seek to counter Russian regional power (including via the export of drone aircraft); and
openness to rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia. President Biden has voiced support for sales that
would upgrade Turkeyâ€™s aging F-16 fleet, but some Members of Congress have expressed opposition. According to media
accounts, the Administration reportedly provided informal notification to Congress in January 2023 of possible sales of F-16s
to Turkey, plus associated equipment and munitions. Factors potentially influencing congressional deliberations include
Turkeyâ€™s stance on Swedenâ€™s and Finlandâ€™s NATO accession and Turkeyâ€™s tense relations with Greece. Congressional and
executive branch action regarding Turkey and its rivals could have implications for bilateral ties and U.S. political-military
options in the region, as well as Turkeyâ€™s strategic orientation. The following are key factors in the U.S.-Turkey relationship.
Turkeyâ€™s foreign policy approach. For decades, Turkey has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense
cooperation. Turkish leaders have indicated an interest in reducing their dependence on the West, and that may partly explain
their willingness to coordinate some actions with Russia. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia in
Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and Armenia-Azerbaijan. Turkeyâ€™s future foreign policy course could depend partly on how willing
Turkey is to risk tensions or breaks in traditional relationships with Western powers while building other global relationships.
Major issues: Russia, Sweden-Finland-NATO, and Greece. In the wake of Russiaâ€™s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey
faces challenges in balancing its relations with the two countries and managing Black Sea access, with implications for U.S.-
Turkey ties. To some extent, Erdogan has sought to reinforce Turkeyâ€™s embattled economy by deepening economic and
energy ties with Russia. Erdogan might assess that Western sanctions against Russia give Turkey increased leverage in these
dealings. At the same time, Turkey has expanded defense cooperation with Ukraine. Turkey has become an important
mediator between Russia and Ukraine on brokering a grain export corridor and other issues. In June, Turkey agreed on a
framework deal for Sweden and Finland to join NATO, but Turkey has delayed final approval while demanding that the two
countries help Turkey act against people it considers to be terrorists. Long-standing disputes between Greece and Turkey
over territorial rights in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean seas spiked in 2022 amid greater U.S. strategic cooperation
with Greece.
Syria: ongoing conflict near borders. Turkish concerns regarding its southern border with Syria has deepened further
during Syriaâ€™s civil war, due largely to (1) the flow of nearly four million refugees into Turkey, (2) U.S. efforts to counter the
Islamic State by working with Syrian Kurds linked to the Kurdistan Workersâ€™ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-
designated terrorist organization), and (3) the presence of Russian, American, and Iranian forces in Syria that complicate and
somewhat constrain Turkish action. Turkey and allied Syrian armed opposition groups have occupied various areas of
northern Syria since 2016, and Turkeyâ€™s military continues to target Kurdish fighters in Syria and Iraq.
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Introduction and Key U.S.-Turkey Considerations
This report provides background information and analysis on key issues affecting U.S.-Turkey
(TÃ¼rkiye)1 relations, including domestic Turkish developments and various foreign policy and
defense matters. U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that bilateral cooperation on regional security
matters remains mutually important,2 despite Turkeyâ€™s purchase of an S-400 surface-to-air
defense system from Russia and a number of other U.S.-Turkey differences (such as in Syria and
with Greece and Cyprus).
Under President Joe Biden, some existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside
cooperation on other matters and opportunities to improve bilateral ties. While continued or
deepening ties with Russia in certain areas remain a cause for concern for the Biden
Administration and some Members of Congress, Turkeyâ€™s cautious support for Ukraineâ€™s defense
and openness to rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia have somewhat
improved U.S.-Turkey relations.3 President Biden has expressed support for selling F-16s to
Turkey, and in January 2023 the Administration reportedly informally notified Congress of a
potential F-16 sale, plus associated equipment and munitions (see â€œPossible F-16 Sales and
Congressional Viewsâ€ below). Turkey has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) since 1952.
Members of Congress may consider legislative and oversight options regarding Turkey.
Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its rivals could have
implications for bilateral ties, U.S. political-military options in the region, and Turkeyâ€™s foreign
policy orientation and financial well-being.
For additional information, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey (TÃ¼rkiye): Background and U.S.
Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. See Figure A-1 for a map and key facts and
figures about Turkey.
Domestic Issues
Political Developments Under Erdoganâ€™s Rule
President Erdogan has ruled Turkey since becoming prime minister in 2003, and has steadily
deepened his control over the countryâ€™s populace and institutions. After Erdogan became
president in August 2014 via Turkeyâ€™s first-ever popular presidential election, he claimed a

1 In late 2021, President Erdogan directed the use of â€œTÃ¼rkiyeâ€ (the countryâ€™s name in Turkish) in place of â€œTurkeyâ€ or
other equivalents (e.g., the German â€œTÃ¼rkei,â€ the French â€œTurquieâ€) in Turkish government documents and
communications. In June 2022, the United Nations accepted the Turkish request to change the countryâ€™s name at the
body to â€œTÃ¼rkiye.â€ In January 2023, the State Department spokesperson said that the department would use the revised
spelling â€œin most formal diplomatic and bilateral contextsâ€ where appropriate. The U.S. Board on Geographic Names
retained both â€œTurkeyâ€ and â€œRepublic of Turkeyâ€ as conventional names, and the spokesperson said that the State
Department could use those names if it is in furtherance of broader public understanding. State Department Press
Briefing, January 5, 2023.
2 State Department, â€œJoint Statement on the U.S.-TÃ¼rkiye Strategic Mechanismâ€ and â€œSecretary Antony J. Blinken and
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu Before Their Meeting,â€ January 18, 2023; State Department Press
Briefing, January 18, 2023.
3 Alper Coskun, â€œMaking the New U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism Meaningful,â€ Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, May 12, 2022; Kali Robinson, â€œTurkeyâ€™s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions,â€ Council on Foreign
Relations, August 24, 2022.
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mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a presidential system of governance, which he
cemented in a 2017 referendum and 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections. Some
allegations of voter fraud and manipulation surfaced after the referendum and the elections.4
Since a failed July 2016 coup attempt by elements within the military, Erdogan and his Islamist-
leaning Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym AKP) have adopted more nationalistic
domestic and foreign policy approaches, perhaps partly because of their reliance on parliamentary
support from the Nationalist Action Party (Turkish acronym MHP).
Many observers describe Erdogan as a polarizing figure, and elections have reflected roughly
equal portions of the country supporting and opposing his rule.5 The AKP won the largest share of
votes in 2019 local elections, but lost some key municipalities, including Istanbul, to candidates
from the secular-leaning Republican Peopleâ€™s Party (Turkish acronym CHP).
U.S. and European Union (EU) officials have expressed a number of concerns about authoritarian
governance and erosion of rule of law and civil liberties in Turkey.6 Some leading opposition
figures in Turkey have accused Erdogan of planning, controlling, and/or using the failed coup to
suppress dissent and consolidate power.7
Meanwhile, Turkish authorities have continued their on-and-off efforts to counter militants from
the Kurdistan Workersâ€™ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization).
These efforts include Turkish military operations targeting PKK and PKK-aligned personnel in
Iraq and Syria.8
February Earthquakes and Their Implications
Two major earthquakes (magnitude 7.8 and 7.5) hit southern Turkey on February 6, 2023. Quake
damage in areas of Turkey and Syria, and the after-effects in cold winter weather, have reportedly
killed more than 35,000 people in Turkey and 5,000 in Syria, injured over 100,000 more, and
have directly affected the living situations and daily lives of millions. As Turkish authorities
coordinate a humanitarian response involving significant international assistance, and facilitate
access to Syrian border crossings,9 observers have sought to assess (1) factors contributing to the
damage and its scope, (2) efforts to help victims and their families, and (3) present and future
needs.10 U.S. officials have provided or announced various means of assistance to Turkey,

4 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Limited Referendum Observation Mission Final
Report, Turkey, April 16, 2017 (published June 22, 2017); OSCE, International Election Observation Mission,
Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Turkey, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, June 24,
2018 (published June 25, 2018).
5 Kemal Kirisci and Berk Esen, â€œMight the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to ErdoÄŸan After Two
Decades in Power?â€ Just Security, November 22, 2021.
6 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021, Turkey; Turkey; European Commission,
TÃ¼rkiye 2022 Report, October 6, 2022.
7 Gareth Jenkins, â€œFive Years After July 15: Erdoganâ€™s New Turkey and the Myth of Its Immaculate Conception,â€
Turkey Analyst, July 15, 2021; â€œTurkey coup: Top officers given life terms in mass trial,â€ BBC News, April 7, 2021.
8 Berkay Mandiraci, â€œTurkeyâ€™s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux,â€ International Crisis Group, February
18, 2022.
9 Fulya Ozerkan and Omar Haj Kadour, â€œMiracle rescues as Turkey-Syria quake toll passes 25,000,â€ Agence France
Presse, February 10, 2023.
10 See, for example, Ben Hubbard, â€œQuake Response Testing Erdogan as Survivors Express Frustration,â€ New York
Times, February 12, 2023.
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including $85 million in urgent humanitarian assistance and the deployment of transport
helicopters to Turkeyâ€™s Incirlik Air Base.11
The crisis is affecting Turkeyâ€™s politics, society, and economy, particularly as the country
prepares for presidential and parliamentary elections (discussed below). Parliament has approved
a three-month state of emergency in the ten southern Turkish provinces most directly affected.
These provinces account for about 10% of Turkeyâ€™s gross domestic product and 15% of its
population, and host thousands of refugees from Syriaâ€™s ongoing civil war.12
Analysts speculate about how the crisis will affect support for President Erdogan and his
government.13 A major 1999 earthquake in northwestern Turkey killed approximately 18,000,
prompting legal and regulatory efforts to improve building safety.14 However, some media
accounts and opposition politicians allege that in the years before the 2023 earthquakes,
government officials and contractors prioritized economic benefits over adherence to construction
codes, at least partly contributing to the scope of damage and fatalities.15 Erdogan has denounced
criticism aimed at him or the government as fomenting disunity,16 and Turkeyâ€™s justice ministry
has ordered prosecutors to create â€œearthquake crimes investigation unitsâ€ to consider criminal
violations for substandard work.17 Erdogan has acknowledged some problems with the
governmentâ€™s initial response,18 while mainly attributing the disaster to the quakesâ€™ size.19 He has
announced that the government will prepare a recovery program and complete housing
reconstruction within a year.20
Major Economic Challenges
Ongoing economic problems in Turkey considerably worsened in 2022 as its currency, the lira,
depreciated in value around 28% against the U.S. dollar, after declining by nearly 45% in 2021.
Annual inflation was at 58% in January 2023,21 with an unofficial estimate suggesting that actual
inflation may be well over 100%.22 Many analysts link the spike in inflation to the Turkish central
bankâ€™s repeated reductions of its key interest rate since September 2021, with additional
inflationary pressure possibly coming from external events such as Russiaâ€™s war on Ukraine and
interest rate hikes in the United States and other major economies.23 The lira has been trending

11 White House, â€œFACT SHEET: The Biden-â Harris Administrationâ€™s Response to the Earthquakes in TÃ¼rkiye and
Syria,â€ February 10, 2023; U.S. Navy, â€œUnified DoD Efforts Supporting TÃ¼rkiye,â€ February 11, 2023.
12 Nevzat Devranoglu, â€œEarthquake could cost Turkey up to $84 billion - business group,â€ Reuters, February 13, 2023;
Raja Abdulrahim and Emily Garthwaite, â€œFor Syrian Refugees in Turkey, Quake Is a Disaster Within a Disaster,â€ New
York Times, February 13, 2023.
13 Adam Samson and Ayla Jean Yackley, â€œEarthquake tests ErdoÄŸanâ€™s leadership as Turkish elections loom,â€ Financial
Times, February 9, 2023; â€œEarthquake could shake up Turkish election,â€ Al-Monitor, February 10, 2023.
14 Zeynep Bilginsoy and Suzan Fraser, â€œTurkeyâ€™s lax policing of building codes known before quake,â€ Associated
Press, February 10, 2023.
15 Ibid.; Samson and Yackley, â€œEarthquake tests ErdoÄŸanâ€™s leadership as Turkish elections loom.â€
16 Samson and Yackley, â€œEarthquake tests ErdoÄŸanâ€™s leadership as Turkish elections loom.â€
17 Hubbard, â€œQuake Response Testing Erdogan as Survivors Express Frustration.â€
18 Ibid.
19 Ben Hubbard et al., â€œAs Public Anger Mounts, Turkey Detains Builders,â€ New York Times, February 12, 2023.
20 Devranoglu, â€œEarthquake could cost Turkey up to $84 billion - business group.â€
21 â€œTurkey inflation higher than expected at nearly 58%,â€ Reuters, February 3, 2023.
22 â€œTurkeyâ€™s independent academics announce annual inflation rate as 121 percent,â€ Duvar English, February 3, 2023.
23 Baris Balci and Inci Ozbek, â€œTurkey Rewrites All Inflation Forecasts but Wonâ€™t Budge on Rates,â€ Bloomberg, April
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downward for more than a decade, with its decline probably driven in part by broader concerns
about Turkeyâ€™s rule of law and economy.24
Throughout this time, President Erdogan has assertively challenged the conventional economic
theory that higher interest rates stem inflation, attract foreign capital, and support the value of the
currency. In replacing Turkeyâ€™s central bank governor and finance minister in 2021, Erdogan
established greater control over Turkish fiscal and monetary policy. In public statements, Erdogan
has argued that lower interest rates boost production, employment, and exports.25 Erdogan also
has criticized high interest rates as contrary to Islamic teachings and as exacerbating the gap
between rich and poor.26
The currency and inflation crisis in Turkey has dramatically affected consumersâ€™ cost of living
and the cost of international borrowing (mostly conducted in U.S. dollars) for banks and private
sector companies. The government has sought to stop or reverse inflation by providing tax cuts,
minimum wage increases, greater access to early retirement benefits, and subsidies for basic
expenses, along with borrowing incentives for banks that hold liras.27 Turkey also has sought
currency swaps from some Arab Gulf states, and has benefitted from Russian-origin inflows that
contribute to U.S. warnings about potential sanctions evasion (see â€œTurkey-Russia Economic and
Energy Cooperationâ€ below).28 To date, Erdogan has publicly rejected calls to turn to the
International Monetary Fund for a financial assistance package.
Costs of ongoing humanitarian assistance and reconstruction from the earthquake crisis, along
with disruptions to agricultural, industrial, and commercial activity (estimated to reduce Turkeyâ€™s
2023 economic growth forecasts by up to 2%), will likely strain Turkeyâ€™s economy further.29 An
early estimate of rebuilding costs and damage is around $84 billion.30 With a modest debt-to-GDP
ratio of around 37.5% (see Figure A-1), Turkey may have some space to boost fiscal spending in
response to the crisis. One analyst has said that financial assistance from international
development banks will be necessary but limited because of the Turkish governmentâ€™s poor
relations with the West.31 The World Bank has said it will provide $1.78 billion in relief and
recovery assistance, and assess priority areas for support.32

28, 2022.
24 Mikolaj Rogalewicz, â€œEconomic crisis in Turkey,â€ Warsaw Institute Review, April 25, 2022.
25 â€œEXPLAINER: Turkeyâ€™s Currency Is Crashing. Whatâ€™s the Impact?â€ Associated Press, December 3, 2021; Carlotta
Gall, â€œKeeping His Own Counsel on Turkeyâ€™s Economy,â€ New York Times, December 11, 2021.
26 â€œTurkey will keep lowering interest rates: Erdogan,â€ Daily Sabah, June 6, 2022; Mustafa Akyol, â€œHow Erdoganâ€™s
Pseudoscience Is Ruining the Turkish Economy,â€ Cato Institute, December 3, 2021.
27 M. Murat Kubilay, â€œAlready vulnerable, Turkeyâ€™s economy now faces massive earthquake recovery costs,â€ Middle
East Institute, February 13, 2023.
28 Laura Pitel â€œTurkey finance minister defends economic links with Russia,â€ Financial Times, October 25, 2022;
Murat Kubilay, â€œAs liquidity problems worsen, Turkey turns to capital controls and informal FX flows,â€ Middle East
Institute, November 7, 2022.
29 Mustafa Sonmez, â€œMassive earthquake cost to deepen Turkeyâ€™s economic woes,â€ Al-Monitor, February 11, 2023;
Devranoglu, â€œEarthquake could cost Turkey up to $84 billion.â€
30 Devranoglu, â€œEarthquake could cost Turkey up to $84 billion.â€
31 Kubilay, â€œAlready vulnerable, Turkeyâ€™s economy now faces massive earthquake recovery costs.â€
32 World Bank, â€œWorld Bank Announces Initial $1.78 Billion for TÃ¼rkiyeâ€™s Recovery & Reconstruction Efforts After
Earthquake Disaster,â€ February 9, 2023.
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2023 Elections
Turkeyâ€™s next presidential and parliamentary elections are required under Turkeyâ€™s constitution to
take place by June 18, 2023. In January, President Erdogan signaled that elections would likely
occur on May 14, 2023,33 but the February 6 earthquakes have led some Erdogan allies to
publicly consider a delay.34 A delay beyond June 18 could prompt debate over its legal basis.35
Measures taken under the state of emergencyâ€”especially if Erdogan moves to extend or
geographically expand itâ€”could influence the campaignâ€™s trajectory.36
Largely in the context of Turkeyâ€™s economic problems discussed above, public opinion polls have
fueled speculation that Erdogan and the AKP-MHP parliamentary coalition might be vulnerable
to a coalition of six opposition parties including the CHP, the Iyi (Good) Party, and the
Democracy and Progress Party (Turkish acronym DEVA) (see Figure A-2).37 Some observers
have debated whether (1) free and fair elections could take place under Erdogan,38 (2) opposition
parties can convince potential swing voters to side with them despite their personal or ideological
affinity for Erdogan,39 or (3) Erdogan would cede power after an electoral defeat.40 If no
presidential candidate receives more than 50% of the vote, a presidential run-off election between
the top two vote-getting candidates would take place two weeks later.
If the presidentâ€™s party coalition does not control parliament after the elections, parliament could
check the president in various ways if a majority of members seeks to do so. The president has
broad powers to act in the absence of parliamentary initiative, but relies on parliamentâ€™s approval
in certain matters such as budgeting, international treaty ratification, and foreign military
deployments.41
The opposition coalition has agreed on a joint platform focused on returning Turkey to the
parliamentary system that existed before the 2018 election, largely as a means of limiting

33 â€œPresident ErdoÄŸan hints at May 14 for general elections,â€ Hurriyet Daily News, January 18, 2023. Turkeyâ€™s
constitution requires that a president can only seek a third term if parliament (rather than the president) moves up the
election date, which it can do via a three-fifths vote. Some Erdogan supporters argue that Erdoganâ€™s next term would be
his second under Turkeyâ€™s constitution because his first term (which was not a full five years) came before the current
constitutional amendments regarding the presidency became effective in 2018. â€œCan Recep Tayyip ErdoÄŸan run for a
third term as president?â€ James in Turkey, last updated December 19, 2022.
34 â€œExplainer: How the earthquake threw Turkey's election plan into turmoil,â€ Reuters, February 14, 2023.
35 Ibid.; Soner Cagaptay, â€œHow Will Turkeyâ€™s Earthquake Affect the Current Election Cycle?â€ Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, February 14, 2023.
36 Cagaptay, â€œHow Will Turkeyâ€™s Earthquake Affect the Current Election Cycle?â€
37 Hubbard, â€œSkyrocketing Prices in Turkey Hurt Families and Tarnish Erdoganâ€; â€œPolls indicate close race between
rival blocs, yet people increasingly think ErdoÄŸan will win,â€ BIA News, October 12, 2022; Berk Esen, â€œThe opposition
alliance in Turkey: A viable alternative to Erdogan?â€ SWP Comment, August 2022.
38 Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, â€œIt Is Not Too Early to Think About Political Change in Turkey,â€ German Marshall Fund of
the United States, January 10, 2022; Kirisci and Esen, â€œMight the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to
ErdoÄŸan After Two Decades in Power?â€
39 Ozer Sencar of Metropoll, in Laura Pitel, â€œWill the ailing Turkish economy bring Erdogan down?â€ Financial Times,
November 1, 2021.
40 Unnamed Western diplomat quoted in Laura Pitel, â€œDefeating Erdogan: Turkeyâ€™s opposition searches for a
champion,â€ Financial Times, May 5, 2022.
41 Unofficial English translation of Turkish constitution available at
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Turkey_2017.pdf?lang=en. See also Alan Makovsky, ErdoÄŸanâ€™s
Proposal for an Empowered Presidency, Center for American Progress, March 22, 2017.
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executive power.42 However, it remains unclear which opposition candidate will challenge
Erdogan for president: CHP party leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu (from the Alevi religious minority),
or either of the two mayors who won control of Istanbul and Ankara for the party in 2019 (Ekrem
Imamoglu and Mansur Yavas, respectively) and generally poll higher than Kilicdaroglu.43
Opposition figures have criticized the Erdogan governmentâ€™s approach to a range of foreign and
domestic policy issues and promised to make changes (see also â€œForeign Policy Changes Under a
Different President?â€).44 Imamogluâ€™s candidacy may be jeopardized by a criminal conviction that
he and other opposition figures charge is politically motivated.45 As he awaits a final decision on
appeal, Imamoglu continues to serve as mayor and engage politically.46 Despite Erdoganâ€™s
potential vulnerability, some observers have questioned the opposition coalitionâ€™s prospects,
citing obstacles posed by disunity, Erdoganâ€™s political resilience, and the governmentâ€™s influence
over the media, economic developments, and judicial rulings.47 It is unclear how voters will
respond to the earthquake crisis.
How Kurdish citizens of Turkey (numbering nearly 20% of the population) vote could impact the
outcome.48 The Kurdish-led Peoplesâ€™ Democratic Party (Turkish acronym HDP), which could
face a legal ban,49 announced in January 2023 that it would run its own presidential candidate in
the elections.50 Pending resolution of the potential legal ban, Turkeyâ€™s Constitutional Court has
frozen the HDP bank accounts that hold the partyâ€™s state-provided funds.51
Turkish Foreign Policy
General Assessment
Turkeyâ€™s strategic orientation, or how it relates to and balances between the West and other global
and regional powers, is a major consideration for the United States. Trends in Turkeyâ€™s relations
with the United States and other countries reflect changes to this orientation, as Turkey has sought
greater independence of action as a regional power within a more multipolar global system.
Turkish leadersâ€™ interest in reducing their dependence on the West for defense and discouraging

42 CHP, â€œMemorandum of Understanding on Common Policies (January 30, 2023).â€
43 Ibid.; Pitel, â€œDefeating Erdogan.â€
44 â€œTÃ¼rkiyeâ€™s CHP forms technocratic committee to advise the govt,â€ Yetkin Report, December 4, 2022; Berk Esen,
â€œPost-2023 election scenarios in Turkey,â€ SWP Comment, September 2022; Alper Coskun and Sinan Ulgen, â€œPolitical
Change and Turkeyâ€™s Foreign Policy,â€ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2022.
45 Ben Hubbard and Safak Timur, â€œConviction May Sideline Rival of Turkish Leader,â€ New York Times, December 15,
2022. In a separate case, Turkish prosecutors charged Imamoglu (and six co-workers) in January 2023 with improperly
awarding a public tender to a company during his time as mayor of an Istanbul district (before he was elected mayor of
the entire city). Amberin Zaman, â€œIstanbul mayor charged with corruption as Turkish opposition weighs Erdogan
challenger,â€ Al-Monitor, January 11, 2023. Imamoglu has called the charges â€œan attempt to fabricate a bogus criminal
offence,â€ saying that authorities had not detected anything problematic at the time of the tender. â€œIstanbul mayor,
Erdogan critic faces fraud case â€“ Haberturk,â€ Reuters, January 11, 2023.
46 Hubbard and Safak Timur, â€œConviction May Sideline Rival of Turkish Leader.â€
47 â€œThe opposition should win, but it has obstacles in its way,â€ Economist, January 16, 2023; James Ryan, â€œThe path
ahead in Turkeyâ€™s upcoming electoral campaign,â€ War on the Rocks, November 10, 2022.
48 Mesut Yegen, â€œErdogan and the Turkish Opposition Revisit the Kurdish Question,â€ SWP Comment, April 2022.
49 Diego Cupolo, â€œTop Turkish court accepts revised indictment to ban pro-Kurdish party,â€ Al-Monitor, June 21, 2021.
50 Amberin Zaman, â€œWill Kurdsâ€™ choice to field own candidate benefit Erdogan or Turkeyâ€™s opposition?â€ Al-Monitor,
January 9, 2023.
51 Andrew Wilks, â€œTurkeyâ€™s historic election could move up as Erdogan calculates,â€ Al-Monitor, January 5, 2023.
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Western influence over their domestic politics may partly explain their willingness to coordinate
some actions with Russia, such as in Syria and with Turkeyâ€™s purchase of a Russian S-400
surface-to-air defense system. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russiaâ€”
with which it has a long history of discordâ€”including in political and military crises involving
Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and Armenia-Azerbaijan. U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that bilateral
cooperation on regional security matters remains mutually important.52
Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other influential
countries as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkeyâ€™s dependence on these
actors and maintain its leverage with them.53 Turkeyâ€™s future foreign policy course could depend
partly on the degree to which Turkish leaders feel constrained by their traditional security and
economic relationships with Western powers, and how willing they are to risk tensions or breaks
in those relationships while building other global relationships.
Foreign Policy Changes Under a Different President?
In anticipation of 2023 elections, observers have speculated about how a new presidentâ€™s foreign
policy (including domestic policy with clear foreign policy ramifications) might differ from
Erdoganâ€™s if an opposition candidate wins.54 Because of widespread nationalistic sentiment
among Turkeyâ€™s population and most of its political parties, a different president may have
difficulty changing Turkish policies on some of the following matters of core security concern:
Syria and Iraq (Kurdish militancy, refugee issues, and other countriesâ€™ influence), Greece and
Cyprus (Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean disputes), and Russia and Ukraine (conflict and its
regional and global consequences).
However, a different president may be more likely to alter certain ongoing policies that may be
more reflective of Erdoganâ€™s or the AKPâ€™s preferences than of broad national consensus. Such
changes may include (1) providing more flexibility to central bankers and other officials on
monetary policy decisions and other measures to address Turkeyâ€™s economic problems, (2) giving
greater consideration to European Court of Human Rights rulings, and (3) reducing Turkish
support for Sunni Islamist groups like Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and Syrian armed opposition factions.
Some Turkish opposition partiesâ€™ foreign policy statements suggest that a different president
might be less willing than Erdogan to say and do things that risk harming relationships with the
United States and European countries.55 Thus, despite the difficulties that may surround changing
some policies (as mentioned above), a different Turkish president could conceivably be less
inclined toward implementing those policies in a way that might worsen relations with Western
states, such as by pursuing additional arms purchases from Russia or new military operations in
northern Syria or the Aegean/Eastern Mediterranean area. However, if a new, untested Turkish
government feels pressure to signal its strength to various international actors or to placate
multiple domestic constituencies within a coalition, that president may strive to match Erdoganâ€™s

52 State Department, â€œJoint Statement on the U.S.-TÃ¼rkiye Strategic Mechanism,â€ January 18, 2023.
53 Nur Ozcan Erbay, â€œAnkara to use compartmentalization in managing relations,â€ Daily Sabah, June 24, 2021;
Stephen J. Flanagan et al., Turkeyâ€™s Nationalist Course: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and the
U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, 2020.
54 Alan Makovsky, â€œTurkeyâ€™s Hinge Election,â€ Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, November 2022; Coskun and Ulgen,
â€œPolitical Change and Turkeyâ€™s Foreign Policy.â€
55 Coskun and Ulgen, â€œPolitical Change and Turkeyâ€™s Foreign Policy.â€
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reputation for assertiveness. Conversely, a president facing lack of consensus within a coalition
might become more passive on foreign policy.
U.S./NATO Strategic Relationship and Military Presence
The United States has valued Turkeyâ€™s geopolitical importance to and military strength within the
NATO alliance, while viewing Turkeyâ€™s NATO membership as helping anchor Turkey to the
West. For Turkey, NATOâ€™s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns about
encroachment by neighbors, such as the Soviet Unionâ€™s aggressive post-World War II posturing
leading up to the Cold War. In more recent or ongoing arenas of conflict like Ukraine and Syria,
Turkeyâ€™s possible interest in countering Russian objectives may be partly motivating its military
operations and arms exports.56
Turkeyâ€™s location near several conflict areas has made the continuing availability of its territory
for the stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and
NATO. In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key
U.S./NATO sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO
ground forces command in Izmir (see Figure A-3). Turkey also controls access to and from the
Black Sea through the Bosphorus (alt. Bosporus) and Dardanelles Straits (the Straitsâ€”see Figure
A-4).
Tensions between Turkey and other NATO members have fueled internal U.S./NATO discussions
about the continued use of Turkish bases. Some reports suggest that expanded or potentially
expanded U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, and Jordan might be
connected with concerns about Turkey.57 In March 2022 congressional hearing testimony, Turkey
expert and former congressional committee staff member Alan Makovsky said that while the
United States should make efforts to keep Turkey in the â€œWestern camp,â€ Turkish â€œequivocation
in recent yearsâ€ justifies the United States building and expanding military facilities in Bulgaria,
Romania, and Greece to â€œhedge its bets.â€58
Russia
Turkeyâ€™s relations with Russia feature elements of cooperation and competition. Turkey has made
a number of foreign policy moves since 2016 toward closer ties with Russia. These moves could
be motivated by a combination of factors, including Turkeyâ€™s effort to reduce dependence on the
West, economic opportunism, and chances to increase its regional influence at Russiaâ€™s expense.
Turkey also has moved closer to a number of countries surrounding Russiaâ€”including Ukraine
and Polandâ€”likely in part as a counterweight to Russian regional power.59

56 Dimitar Bechev, â€œRussia, Turkey and the Spectre of Regional Instability,â€ Al Sharq Strategic Research, April 13,
2022; Mitch Prothero, â€œTurkeyâ€™s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year,â€ Business Insider, October 22, 2020.
57 â€œPentagon pushes back on claim that US to leave Turkeyâ€™s Incirlik base,â€ Al-Monitor, September 16, 2020; Joseph
Trevithick, â€œDocs Show US to Massively Expand Footprint at Jordanian Air Base amid Spats with Turkey, Iraq,â€ The
Drive, January 14, 2019.
58 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, â€œOpportunities and
Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation,â€ House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa and Global Counterterrorism; and Subcommittee on Europe, Energy,
the Environment and Cyber, March 31, 2022, available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/opportunities-and-
challenges-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-examining-u-s-interests-and-regional-cooperation/.
59 Can Kasapoglu, â€œTurkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond,â€ Jamestown Foundation, October 12,
2022; Jeffrey Mankoff, â€œAs Russia Reels, Eurasia Roils,â€ War on the Rocks, October 11, 2022.
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Russiaâ€™s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine and Turkish Mediation Efforts
Russiaâ€™s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has heightened challenges Turkey faces in balancing its
relations with the two countries, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. Turkeyâ€™s links with
Russiaâ€”especially its 2019 acquisition of a Russian S-400 systemâ€”have fueled major U.S.-
Turkey tensions, triggering sanctions and reported congressional holds on arms sales (discussed
below). However, following the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine, U.S. and Turkish interests
in countering Russian revisionist aimsâ€”including along the Black Sea coastâ€”may have
converged in some ways as Turkey has helped strengthen Ukraineâ€™s defense capabilities in
parallel with other NATO countries.60 In addition to denouncing Russiaâ€™s invasion, closing the
Straits to belligerent warships, and opposing Russian claims to Ukrainian territory (including
Crimea),61 Turkey has supplied Ukraine with various types of military equipmentâ€”including
armed drone aircraft and mine-resistant ambush-resistant (MRAP) vehicles62â€”as well as
humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, Turkeyâ€™s leaders likely hope to minimize spillover effects
to Turkeyâ€™s national security and economy, and this might partly explain Turkeyâ€™s continued
engagement with Russia and desires to help mediate the conflict (discussed below).
In January 2023, a media outlet reported that Turkey began transferring some dual-purpose
improved conventional munitions (or DPICMs, which are artillery-fired cluster munitions) to
Ukraine in November 2022. The report cited various observers debating the potential battlefield
impact and humanitarian implications of the weaponâ€™s use.63 Turkish and Ukrainian officials have
denied that any such transfers have occurred.64
Turkey-Ukraine Defense Cooperation
Turkey and Ukraine have strengthened their relations since Russiaâ€™s invasion of Crimea in 2014.65 In 2017, a
Turkish security analyst attributed these closer ties to growing mutual interests in countering Russian influence in
the Black Sea region and in sharing military technology to expand and increase the self-sufficiency of their
respective defense industries.66 Since 2020, the two countries have signed multiple agreements signifying closer
cooperation, and also signed a broader free trade agreement (pending ratification) in February 2022.67
In line with these agreements, Turkish and Ukrainian companies have engaged in or planned a significant expansion
of defense transactions, including a number of joint development or co-production initiatives.68 Turkish expertise
with drone and other aircraft and naval platforms complements Ukrainian skil s in designing and constructing

60 Saban Kardas, â€œThe War in Ukraine and Turkeyâ€™s Cautious Counter-Balancing Against Russia,â€ German Marshall
Fund of the United States, March 3, 2022.
61 â€œTurkey President ErdoÄŸan on Russiaâ€™s invasion of Ukraine and the future of NATO,â€ PBS Newshour, September
19, 2022; â€œTurkey recognises Russia-Ukraine â€˜warâ€™, may block warships,â€ Agence France Presse, February 27, 2022.
62 Burak Ege Bekdil, â€œTurkey sends 50 mine-resistant vehicles to Ukraine, with more expected,â€ Defense News, August
22, 2022; Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, â€œThe Stalwart Ally: TÃ¼rkiyeâ€™s Arms Deliveries to Ukraine,â€ Oryx,
November 21, 2022.
63 Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer, â€œTurkey Is Sending Cold War-Era Cluster Bombs to Ukraine,â€ Foreign Policy,
January 10, 2023.
64 Ragip Soylu, â€œRussia-Ukraine war: Turkey denies supplying Kyiv with cluster munitions,â€ Middle East Eye, January
14, 2023.
65 For information on the Crimea invasion, see CRS Report R45008, Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and
U.S. Policy, by Cory Welt.
66 Metin Gurcan, â€œTurkey-Ukraine defense industry ties are booming,â€ Al-Monitor, May 1, 2017.
67 â€œTurkey, Ukraine Sign Military Cooperation Agreements,â€ Associated Press, October 16, 2020; Christopher Isajiw,
â€œFree trade and drones: Turkey and Ukraine strengthen strategic ties,â€ Atlantic Council, February 11, 2022.
68 Kasapoglu, â€œTurkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond.â€
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aerospace engines and missiles.69 As part of the deepening bilateral defense cooperation, Turkey has sold several
Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine since 2019,70 and some reports have suggested that the
manufacturer has delivered additional TB2s to Ukraine at various times since Russiaâ€™s 2022 invasion.71 Additionally,
Turkey is helping establish Ukraineâ€™s naval capabilities by producing corvettes (small warships) for export.72
Turkeyâ€™s maintenance of close relations with both Russia and Ukraine, and its ability to regulate
access to the Straits has put it in a position to mediate between the parties on various issues of
contention. In July 2022, Turkey and the United Nations entered into parallel agreements with
Russia and Ukraine to provide a Black Sea corridor for Ukrainian grain exports that could partly
alleviate global supply concerns.73 Under the deal, which currently runs until March 2023,
Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, and the U.N. have representatives at a joint coordination center in
Istanbul to oversee implementation and inspect ships to prevent weapons smuggling.74 President
Biden has expressed appreciation for Turkeyâ€™s efforts.75
Turkey-Russia Economic and Energy Cooperation
Turkish officials have sought to minimize any negative economic impact Turkey might face from
the Russia-Ukraine war, partly through boosting various forms of economic and energy
cooperation with Russia. These efforts may stem from Turkish leadersâ€™ concerns about improving
the countryâ€™s economic profile in advance of 2023 elections.76 The Turkish government has not
joined economic sanctions against Russia or closed its airspace to Russian civilian flights.
In August 2022, Presidents Erdogan and Putin publicly agreed to bolster Turkey-Russia
cooperation across economic sectors.77 Turkeyâ€™s Russia-related dealings could potentially lead to
Western secondary sanctions against Turkey for facilitating Russian sanctions evasion. During a
February 2023 trip to Turkey and the United Arab Emirates to emphasize U.S. concerns about the
dangers of â€œdark money flowing through their financial systems,â€ Brian Nelson, Under Secretary
of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, delivered the following remarks to
leaders of Turkish financial institutions:

69 Ibid.
70 Dorian Jones, â€œTurkey Strengthens Defense Industry with Its Ukraine Partnership,â€ Voice of America, February 4,
2022.
71 David Hambling, â€œNew Bayraktar Drones Still Seem to Be Reaching Ukraine,â€ Forbes, May 10, 2022. The TB2â€™s
main producer, Baykar Technology, is planning to build a $100 million factory in Ukraine that could be in position
within about three years to manufacture the full range of the companyâ€™s dronesâ€”doubling Baykarâ€™s overall production
capacity. Jared Malsin, â€œErdogan Seizes Chance to Give Turkey a Global Role,â€ Wall Street Journal, November 7,
2022.
72 Kate Tringham, â€œUpdate: Turkey launches first Ada-class corvette for Ukraine and cuts steel for second,â€ Janes
Navy International, October 3, 2022.
73 â€œUkraine, Russia agree to export grain, ending a standoff that threatened food supplyâ€ Associated Press, July 22,
2022.
74 See https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/background.
75 White House, â€œReadout of President Bidenâ€™s Meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkiye,â€ November
15, 2022.
76 Patricia Cohen, â€œTurkey Tightens Energy Ties with Russia as Other Nations Step Back,â€ New York Times, December
10, 2022.
77 â€œRussiaâ€™s Putin, Turkeyâ€™s Erdogan agree to boost economic, energy cooperation,â€ Agence France Presse, August 5,
2022.
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We of course recognize TÃ¼rkiyeâ€™s reliance on Russian energy imports and trade in
agricultural goods, and continue to work to mitigate adverse impacts to these economic
activities.
However, the marked rise over the past year in non-essential Turkish exports or re-exports
to Russia makes the Turkish private sector particularly vulnerable to reputational and
sanctions risks. This is being driven by Moscow....
In engaging with sanctioned Russian entities, Turkish businesses and banks could put
themselves at risk of sanctions and a potential loss of access to G7 markets and
correspondent relationships.
Turkish businesses and banks should also take extra precaution to avoid transactions
related to potential dual-use technology transfers that could be used by the Russian
military-industrial complex.78
Some Turkish banks and companies appear to be limiting or considering limits on certain types of
transactions and services with Russian businesses.79
NATO Accession Process for Sweden and Finland
Sweden and Finland formally applied to join NATO in May 2022, following Russiaâ€™s invasion of
Ukraine. Turkey objected to the formal start of the two countriesâ€™ accession process, delaying it
for more than a month. Under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the admission of new allies
requires the unanimous agreement of existing members (Figure A-5).
The Turkish objections centered around claims that Sweden and Finland have supported or
harbored sympathies for groups that Turkeyâ€™s government deems to be terrorist organizations,
namely the Fethullah Gulen movement80 (which the government has blamed for involvement in
the 2016 failed coup) and the PKK.81 (The United States and EU also classify the PKK as a
terrorist group, but not the Gulen movement.) Turkey demanded that Sweden and Finland lift the
suspension of arms sales they had maintained against Turkey since its 2019 incursion into Syria
against the PKK-linked Kurdish group (the Peopleâ€™s Protection Unitsâ€”Kurdish acronym YPG)
that has partnered with the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition.82 Turkey removed its objections
to starting the accession process after NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg mediated a June
2022 memorandum between Turkey, Sweden, and Finland. In the trilateral memorandum, the
three countries confirmed that no arms embargoes remain in place between them. Further,
Sweden and Finland agreed not to support the YPG or Gulen movement, and pledged to work
against the PKK.83

78 Treasury Department, â€œRemarks by U.S. Department of the Treasury's Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial
Intelligence Brian Nelson in TÃ¼rkiye,â€ February 3, 2023. See also Jared Malsin, â€œTurkish Exports Aid Moscowâ€™s War
Effort,â€ Wall Street Journal, February 4, 2023; Ben Hubbard, â€œU.S. Presses Its Partners to Weed Out Illicit Trade With
Moscow,â€ New York Times, February 5, 2023.
79 Jonathan Spicer, â€œU.S. warns Turkey on exports seen to boost Russiaâ€™s war effort,â€ Reuters, February 4, 2023.
80 For more information on Gulen and the movement, see archived CRS In Focus IF10444, Fethullah Gulen, Turkey,
and the United States: A Reference, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
81 Semih Idiz, â€œHow long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?â€ Al-Monitor, May 17,
2022.
82 Sources citing links between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include State Department, Country
Reports on Terrorism 2020, Syria; Mandiraci, â€œTurkeyâ€™s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Fluxâ€; Barak
Barfi, Ascent of the PYD and the SDF, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2016.
83 Memorandum text available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220628-trilat-
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Since then, President Erdogan has sought to have Sweden and Finland take additional steps
before Turkeyâ€™s parliament considers approving the two countriesâ€™ accession.84 With Hungaryâ€™s
parliament likely to agree to accession by early 2023, Turkey could remain the only country
delaying the process.85
For example, Turkey continues to press Sweden and Finland to extradite people that Turkey
considers to be terrorists. Under the June 2022 trilateral memorandum, Sweden and Finland
agreed to address Turkeyâ€™s pending deportation or extradition requests in various ways, but did
not commit to specific outcomes in those cases.86 In December, Sweden reportedly deported a
man who had been convicted in Turkey in 2015 of being a PKK member,87 but Swedenâ€™s supreme
court blocked the extradition of a journalist with alleged links to the Gulen movement.88
Swedenâ€™s prime minister and other sources have indicated that neither Sweden nor Finland are
inclined to make political decisions on extradition that contravene domestic judicial findings
conducted under due process and the rule of law.89 In January 2023, Turkish presidential adviser
Ibrahim Kalin said that Turkey would only be in a position to agree to Swedenâ€™s accession after it
passed new anti-terror laws, a process he estimated would take about six months.90 Erdogan then
said publicly that he expects the extradition of â€œaround 130â€ people before approving Turkish
ratification.91
In January 2023, the Wall Street Journal cited unnamed U.S. officials predicting that
congressional approval of a possible F-16 sale to Turkey (see â€œCongressional Notification
Processâ€ below) would be tied to Turkish approval of Swedenâ€™s and Finlandâ€™s NATO accession.92
Several Senators from both parties, including Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking
Member Jim Risch and 29 others who wrote a February 2023 letter to President Biden, have
indicated that they may only consider supporting an F-16 sale to Turkey if Swedish and Finnish
accession moves forward.93 A media source has suggested that Turkeyâ€™s parliament could agree to
Finlandâ€™s accession as soon as March.94 Finland reportedly prefers to join NATO together with

memo.pdf.
84 Amberin Zaman, â€œErdogan says Swedenâ€™s, Finlandâ€™s NATO memberships not done deal,â€ Al-Monitor, June 30,
2022.
85 William Mauldin and Michael R. Gordon, â€œSweden and Finland on Track for NATO Membership,â€ Wall Street
Journal, December 9, 2022.
86 See footnote 83.
87 â€œSweden deports man with alleged ties to Kurdish militant group,â€ Reuters, December 3, 2022.
88 â€œSwedish court blocks extradition of journalist sought by Turkey in Nato deal,â€ Agence France Presse, December
19, 2022.
89 Steven Erlanger, â€œSweden Says Turkey Terms on NATO Bid Go Too Far,â€ New York Times, January 10, 2023; Ben
Keith, â€œTurkeyâ€™s ErdoÄŸan Deploys Sweden and Finlandâ€™s NATO Membership Bids to Further His Repression,â€ Just
Security, October 28, 2022.
90 â€œTurkey â€˜Not in a Positionâ€™ to Ratify Swedish NATO Bid,â€ Agence France Presse, January 14, 2023.
91 â€œSweden, Finland must send up to 130 â€˜terroristsâ€™ to Turkey for NATO bid, Erdogan says,â€ Reuters, January 16,
2023.
92 Jared Malsin and Vivian Salama, â€œBiden Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey,â€ Wall
Street Journal, January 13, 2023.
93 Marc Rod, â€œTurkey risks â€˜serious consequencesâ€™ if it blocks Sweden, Finland NATO accession, Risch warns,â€
Jewish Insider, February 6, 2023; Text of February 2, 2023 letter from 29 Senators to President Biden available at
https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf. In August 2022, Senate Treaty Document 117-3
approved ratification by a 95-1 vote.
94 Selcan Hacaoglu and Firat Kozok, â€œTurkey Could Approve Finlandâ€™s NATO Bid Before May Elections,â€
Bloomberg, February 3, 2023.
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Sweden,95 but if Swedenâ€™s status remains unresolved over the coming months, popular support in
Finland for NATO membership could lead to pressure on Finnish officials to join before
Sweden.96
Syria97
Turkeyâ€™s involvement in Syriaâ€™s conflict since it started in 2011 has been complicated and costly
and has severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties.98 Turkeyâ€™s priorities in Syriaâ€™s civil war have evolved
during the course of the conflict. While Turkey still opposes Syrian President Bashar al Asad, it
has engaged in a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (which support Asad)
since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Turkey and the United States have
engaged in similarly inconsistent interactions in northern Syria east of the Euphrates River, where
U.S. forces have been based.
Since at least 2014, Turkey has actively sought to thwart the Syrian Kurdish YPG from
establishing an autonomous area along Syriaâ€™s northern border with Turkey. Turkeyâ€™s government
considers the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), to be a major
threat to Turkish security, based on Turkish concerns that YPG/PYD gains have emboldened the
PKK (which has links to the YPG/PYD) in its domestic conflict with Turkish authorities.99 The
YPG/PYD has a leading role within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an umbrella group
including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements that became the main U.S. ground force partner
against the Islamic State in 2015. Turkish-led military operations in October 2019 to seize areas
of northeastern Syria from the SDFâ€”after U.S. Special Forces pulled back from the border
areaâ€”led to major criticism of and proposed action against Turkey in Congress.100 Turkey has set
up local councils in areas of northern Syria that Turkey and Turkish-supported Syrian armed
opposition groupsâ€”generally referred to under the moniker of the Syrian National Army
(SNA)â€”have occupied since 2016 (see Figure A-6).
Erdogan has hinted at the possibility of repairing relations with Asad, after more than a decade in
which Turkey has sought an end to Asadâ€™s rule. As of early 2023, Russia is reportedly trying to
broker better ties.101 Turkey is seeking Syriaâ€™s help to push YPG fighters farther from the border
and facilitate the return of Syrian refugees living in Turkey. Asad reportedly wants full Turkish
withdrawal in return.102 It is unclear whether the two leaders can compromise and how that would
affect Turkeyâ€™s relationship with the SNA and the overall dynamic with other stakeholders in
northern Syria. In response to a question about potential Turkey-Syria rapprochement, the State
Department spokesperson has said that U.S. officials have told allies that now is not the time to
normalize or upgrade relations with the Asad regime.103

95 Essi Lehto, â€œFinland to stick with Sweden in NATO bid, hopes for green light by July,â€ Reuters, January 30, 2023.
96 â€œFinland Debates NATO Ratification That May Leave Sweden Behind,â€ Reuters, February 9, 2023.
97 See CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Carla E. Humud.
98 For background, see Burak Kadercan, â€œMaking Sense of Turkeyâ€™s Syria Strategy: A â€˜Turkish Tragedyâ€™ in the
Making,â€ War on the Rocks, August 4, 2017.
99 See, for example, Soner Cagaptay, â€œU.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and YPG,â€
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 7, 2019. For sources linking the PKK to the YPG (or PKK affiliates
in Syria), see footnote 82.
100 Rachel Oswald, â€œSanctions on Turkey go front and center as Congress returns,â€ Roll Call, October 15, 2019.
101 Fehim Tastekin, â€œFledgling Turkish-Syrian dialogue faces bumpy road ahead,â€ Al-Monitor, January 14, 2023.
102 â€œSyria resisting Russiaâ€™s efforts to broker Turkey summit, sources say,â€ Reuters, December 5, 2022.
103 State Department Press Briefing, January 3, 2023.
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U.S.-Turkey Arms Sales Issues
How Turkey procures key weapons systems is relevant to U.S. policy in part because it affects
Turkeyâ€™s partnerships with major powers and the countryâ€™s role within NATO. For decades,
Turkey has relied on certain U.S.-origin equipment such as aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and
other munitions to maintain military strength.104
Russian S-400 Acquisition: Removal from F-35 Program,
U.S. Sanctions, and Congressional Holds
Turkeyâ€™s acquisition of the Russian S-400 system, which Turkey ordered in 2017 and Russia
delivered in 2019,105 has significant implications for Turkeyâ€™s relations with Russia, the United
States, and other NATO countries. As a direct result of the transaction, the Trump Administration
removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in July 2019, and imposed sanctions
under the Countering Americaâ€™s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) on
Turkeyâ€™s defense procurement agency in December 2020.106 In explaining the U.S. decision to
remove Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019, the Defense Department rejected the idea of
Turkey fielding a Russian intelligence collection platform (housed within the S-400) that could
detect the stealth capabilities of F-35s in Turkey.107 Additionally, Section 1245 of the FY2020
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92) prohibits the use of U.S. funds to
transfer F-35s to Turkey unless the Secretaries of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer
possesses the S-400. Turkey has conducted some testing of the S-400 but does not appear to have
made the system generally operational. Turkey may need to forgo possession or use of the S-400
in order to have CAATSA sanctions removed.
An August 2020 article reported that some congressional committee leaders placed holds on
major new U.S.-origin arms sales to Turkey in connection with the S-400 transaction. The
executive branch customarily defers to such holds, though they are not legally binding.108 Such a
disruption to U.S. defense transactions with Turkey had not occurred since the 1975-1978
embargo over Cyprus.109

104 Turkey also has procurement and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany
(submarines), Italy (helicopters and reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype).
105 â€œTurkey, Russia sign deal on supply of S-400 missiles,â€ Reuters, December 29, 2017. According to this source,
Turkey and Russia reached agreement on the sale of at least one S-400 system for $2.5 billion, with the possibility of a
second system to come later.
106 Archived CRS Insight IN11557, Turkey: U.S. Sanctions Under the Countering Americaâ€™s Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA), by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
107 Defense Department, â€œUnder Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DODâ€™s Response to Turkey Accepting
Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System,â€ July 17, 2019.
108 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.
109 Valerie Insinna et al., â€œCongress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,â€ Defense News,
August 12, 2020.
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Possible F-16 Sales and Congressional Views
Background (Including Turkey-Greece Issues)
In the fall of 2021, Turkish officials stated that they had requested to purchase 40 new F-16
fighter aircraft from the United States and to upgrade 80 F-16s from Turkeyâ€™s aging fleet.110
President Biden reportedly discussed the F-16 request with Erdogan during an October 2021 G20
meeting in Rome, indicating that the request would go through the regular arms sales consultation
and notification process with Congress.111 Upgrades of Turkeyâ€™s F-16 aircraft to the Block 70/72
Viper configuration would include a new radar, other software and hardware enhancements, and
structural improvements that significantly extend each aircraftâ€™s service life.112 Other countries
receiving or possibly receiving new or upgraded F-16 Block 70/72 Vipers include Greece,
Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Morocco, Bahrain, Bulgaria, the Philippines, and Slovakia.113
After Russiaâ€™s early 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkeyâ€™s value as a NATO ally amid a crisis
implicating European security may have subsequently boosted the Administrationâ€™s interest in
moving forward with an F-16 transaction with Turkey in early 2022. While Turkey has acted
more independently of the West under Erdogan, it has NATOâ€™s second-largest military, hosts
allied military assets and personnel (see Figure A-3), and partners in other ways with the United
States and NATO114â€”including using F-16s in occasional policing missions in the Baltics,
Poland, and elsewhere.115
Responding to criticism of a possible F-16 sale from 53 Members of Congress in a February 2022
letter,116 a State Department official wrote in March that Turkeyâ€™s support for Ukraine was â€œan
important deterrent to malign influence in the region.â€117 While acknowledging that any sale
would require congressional notification, the official added, â€œThe Administration believes that
there are nonetheless compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and capability interests, as well
as U.S. national security, economic and commercial interests that are supported by appropriate
U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.â€118

110 For information on Turkeyâ€™s F-16s, see https://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article21.html.
111 â€œBiden talks F-16s, raises human rights in meeting with Turkeyâ€™s Erdogan,â€ Reuters, October 31, 2021; Diego
Cupolo, â€œIn troubled US-Turkey relations, F-16 deal seen as path for dialogue,â€ Al-Monitor, November 1, 2021. For
background information, see CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.
112 See description at https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/aero/documents/F-16/22-
06570_F-16-Viper-6Panel_Digital.pdf.
113 Arda Mevlutoglu, â€œF-16Vs Instead of F-35s: Whatâ€™s behind Turkeyâ€™s Request?â€ Politics Today, November 22,
2021.
114 State Department, â€œU.S. Relations With Turkey (TÃ¼rkiye),â€ Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, January 9, 2023; Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, â€œTÃ¼rkiyeâ€™s International Security Initiatives and Contributions to NATO and EU
Operations.â€
115 NATO, â€œTurkey, United States take up NATO air patrols,â€ July 7, 2021.
116 Text of letter available at https://pallone.house.gov/sites/pallone.house.gov/files/
20220123%20Letter%20on%20Turkey%20F-16%20Request.pdf.
117 Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Naz Durakoglu, quoted in Humeyra Pamuk, â€œU.S. says
potential F-16 sale to Turkey would serve U.S. interests, NATO â€“ letter,â€ Reuters, April 6, 2022.
118 Ibid.
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The modernization of much of Turkeyâ€™s F-16 fleet could give Turkey time to acquire or design a
more advanced fighter,119 though delivery of new F-16s could face a production backlog.120 If
unable to upgrade their F-16 fleet, Turkish officials have hinted that they might consider
purchasing Western European alternatives. Turkey is reportedly exploring Eurofighter Typhoons
as a potential alternative to F-16s,121 but it is unclear if consortium partner Germany would
approve such a sale.122 Additionally, Turkeyâ€™s air force could face difficulties adjusting to a non-
F-16 platform.123
At the end of the June 2022 NATO summit in Spain, where Turkey agreed to allow the Sweden-
Finland accession process to move forward (pending final Turkish ratification) and President
Biden met with President Erdogan, Biden expressed support for selling new F-16s to Turkey as
well as for upgrades. He also voiced confidence in obtaining congressional support.124 However,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez has consistently expressed
disapproval due to what he has termed Erdoganâ€™s â€œabuses across the region.â€125
In addition to ongoing U.S.-Turkey tensions regarding Syrian Kurdish groups in northern Syria,
Turkey-Greece disputes regarding overflights of contested areas and other long-standing Aegean
Sea issues (referenced in the text box below) spiked in 2022 and attracted close congressional
attention.126 Erdogan suspended dialogue with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis after
Mitsotakis appeared to raise concern about U.S.-Turkey arms transactions while addressing a
May 2022 joint session of Congress.127 In December, the final version of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L.
117-263) excluded a House-passed condition on F-16 sales to Turkey (Section 1271 of H.R.
7900) related to potential overflights of Greek territory. However, the joint explanatory statement
accompanying the NDAA included a provision stating, â€œWe believe that North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) allies should not conduct unauthorized territorial overflights of another
NATO allyâ€™s airspace.â€128

119 Burak Ege Bekdil, â€œRussian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts,â€ Defense News, March 9,
2022. Turkey also plans to work with domestic contractors to upgrade the countryâ€™s 36 F-16 Block 30 aircraft. It cannot
domestically upgrade its other F-16s because it only has source codes for Block 30 versions. Burak Ege Bekdil,
â€œLocally made AESA radar to extend life of Turkish F-16 jets,â€ Defense News, November 17, 2022.
120 Bryant Harris and Stephen Losey, â€œTurkey F-16 sale in congressional limbo amid Lockheed backlog,â€ Defense
News, January 18, 2023.
121 Ragip Soylu, â€œTurkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines,â€ Middle East Eye,
January 20, 2023.
122 Tanmay Kadam, â€œCan Russian Su-35 Fighters Triumph Eurofighter Typhoons as Turkey Explores Alternative to
â€˜Backlog-Riddenâ€™ F-16 Jets?â€ EurAsian Times, January 29, 2023.
123 Soylu, â€œTurkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines.â€
124 â€œBiden supports F-16 sale to Turkey, is confident about congressional approval,â€ Reuters, June 30, 2022.
125 Twitter, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 7, 2022 â€“ 10:57 AM, at https://twitter.com/SFRCdems/
status/1600519759493304321.
126 Alexis Heraclides, â€œThe unresolved Aegean dispute: Problems and prospects,â€ Greece and Turkey in Conflict and
Cooperation, New York: Routledge, 2019, pp. 89-108; Ryan Gingeras, â€œDogfight over the Aegean: Turkish-Greek
Relations in Light of Ukraine,â€ War on the Rocks, June 8, 2022.
127 Greek Prime Ministerâ€™s website, â€œPrime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakisâ€™ address to the Joint Session of the U.S.
Congress,â€ May 17, 2022. Erdogan and Mitsotakis have spoken in the wake of the February 2023 earthquakes, in the
context of Greek assistance in relief and recovery efforts.
128 Joint explanatory statement available at https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20221205/BILLS-117HR7776EAS-
RCP117-70-JES.pdf.
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With U.S. officials already having notified a possible upgrade of F-16s for Greece to Congress in
2017,129 U.S. decisions on bolstering Turkeyâ€™s F-16 fleet could have significant implications for
the security balance between Turkey and Greece, and for relations involving the three
countries.130 In the past three years, Greece has strengthened its defense cooperation and relations
with the United States and a number of regional countries such as France, Israel, and Egypt.131
Enhanced U.S.-Greece defense cooperation has included an expanded U.S. military presence and
increased U.S.-Greece and NATO military activities at Greek installations (see also text box
below).132
Turkey-Greece-Cyprus Tensions: Background and Some Ongoing Issues133
Since the 1970s, disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea and broader
Eastern Mediterranean have been a major point of contention, bringing the sides close to military conflict on
several occasions. The disputes, which have their roots in territorial changes after World War I, revolve around
contested borders involving the two countriesâ€™ territorial waters, national airspace, exclusive economic zones
(including energy claims), islands (and their use for military purposes), and continental shelves (see Figure A-7
and Figure A-8 for maps of some of the areas in dispute).
These tensions are related to and further complicated by one of the regionâ€™s major unresolved conflicts, the de
facto political division of Cyprus along ethnic lines that dates from the 1974 military clash in which Turkish forces
invaded parts of the island to prevent the ethnic Greek leadership from unifying Cyprus with Greece. The
internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus (sometimes referred to as Cyprus), which has close ties to Greece,
claims jurisdiction over the entire island, but its effective administrative control is limited to the southern two-
thirds, where Greek Cypriots comprise a majority. Turkish Cypriots administer the northern one-third and are
backed by Turkey, including a Turkish military contingent there since the 1974 clash.134 In 1983, Turkish Cypriot
leaders proclaimed this part of the island the â€œTurkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,â€ although no country other
than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot claim
to be legally invalid.
Turkish officials have complained about a significant new U.S. military presence at the Greek port of
Alexandroupoli (alt. Alexandroupolis), located around 10-15 miles from the Turkish border.135 U.S. officials have
explained that they are using the port as a transit hub to send equipment to allies and partners in the region as
part of a broader NATO response to Russiaâ€™s invasion of Ukraine.136 In the March 2022 congressional hearing
testimony mentioned above, Alan Makovsky said that having facilities at Alexandroupoli allows NATO to bypass
logjams or closures of the Straits to transport troops and materiel overland to allies and partners.137 After Turkish
Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said in October 2022 that the United States no longer maintains a balanced

129 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, â€œGovernment of Greece â€“ Upgrade of F-16 Aircraft to F-16 Block V
Configuration,â€ Transmittal No. 17-54, October 17, 2017.
130 Aaron Stein, â€œYou Go to War with the Turkey You Have, Not the Turkey You Want,â€ War on the Rocks, May 30,
2022.
131 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (TÃ¼rkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
132 State Department, â€œU.S. Security Cooperation with Greece,â€ October 31, 2022.
133 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (TÃ¼rkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
134 Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by several thousand Turkish Cypriot
soldiers). This presence is countered by a Greek Cypriot force of approximately 12,000 with reported access to between
50,000 and 75,000 reserves. â€œCyprus - Army,â€ Janes Sentinel Security Assessment - Eastern Mediterranean, February
3, 2021. The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission (UNFICYP) of approximately 900 personnel within a
buffer zone headquartered in Cyprusâ€™s divided capital of Nicosia. The United Kingdom maintains approximately 3,000
personnel at two sovereign base areas on the southern portion of the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
135 Niki Kitsantonis and Anatoly Kurmanaev, â€œSleepy Greek Port Turns into Pivotal Transit Point for American
Military,â€ New York Times, August 19, 2022.
136 Ibid.; Department of Defense News, â€œStrategic Port Access Aids Support to Ukraine, Austin Tells Greek Defense
Minister,â€ July 18, 2022.
137 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, â€œOpportunities and Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining
U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation.â€
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approach in the Aegean,138 U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake released a statement saying that there has been
no shift in U.S. security posture to favor Turkey or Greece, and that the NATO alliesâ€™ col ective efforts are
focused on ending Russiaâ€™s war in Ukraine.139
Congressional Notification Process
In January 2023, media sourcesâ€”citing unnamed U.S. officialsâ€”reported that the Administration
has provided informal notifications to Congress about possible F-16 sales for Turkey and possible
sales of up to 40 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to Greece. According to these reports, the January
informal notification on Turkey is for 40 new F-16s and 79 F-16 upgrade packages, along with
900 air-to-air missiles and 800 bombs, at an estimated total value of $20 billion.140 The State
Department says it does not comment on possible arms sales until the executive branch formally
notifies the sale to Congress.141
In general, the State Department formally notifies SFRC and the House Foreign Affairs
Committee of a possible arms sale 20 to 40 days after an informal notification, giving the
committees the opportunity to address concerns with the Administration in a confidential process.
However, formal notification usually does not proceed if a committee chair or ranking member
places a hold (as mentioned earlier, not legally binding) on the proposed transaction.142 Under
provisions of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA, P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320), the
Administration can proceed with a saleâ€”if not blocked by legislationâ€”15 days (for NATO allies
like Turkey and Greece) after formal notification.143
As mentioned above, congressional consideration of the potential F-16 sale to Turkey may
depend on Turkeyâ€™s approval of Swedish-Finnish NATO accession.144 Shortly after the reported
informal notifications, the New York Times cited Chairman Menendez as welcoming the F-35 sale
to Greece while strongly opposing the F-16 sale to Turkey, saying:
President Erdogan continues to undermine international law, disregard human rights and
democratic norms, and engage in alarming and destabilizing behavior in Turkey and
against neighboring NATO allies. Until Erdogan ceases his threats, improves his human
rights record at homeâ€”including by releasing journalists and political oppositionâ€”and
begins to act like a trusted ally should, I will not approve this sale.145
The Administrationâ€™s reported informal notifications of potential sales to Turkey and Greece
come amid ongoing tensions between the two countries over maritime boundaries and U.S.

138 â€œCavusoglu says US siding against Turkey in the Aegean, East Med,â€ Kathimerini, October 21, 2022.
139 Twitter, U.S. Embassy TÃ¼rkiye, October 18, 2022 â€“ 3:32 AM, at https://twitter.com/USEmbassyTurkey/status/
1582273449145212928.
140 â€œUS working with Congress towards Turkey F-16 sale,â€ Al-Monitor, January 13, 2023; Malsin and Salama, â€œBiden
Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkeyâ€; Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, â€œU.S. Plan to
Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition,â€ New York Times, January 14, 2023.
141 State Department Press Briefing, January 13, 2023.
142 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.
143 Ibid.; CRS In Focus IF11533, Modifying or Ending Sales of U.S.-Origin Defense Articles, by Paul K. Kerr and
Liana W. Rosen.
144 See footnote 92 and footnote 93.
145 Crowley and Wong, â€œU.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.â€ Alexander Ward et al.,
â€œMenendez vows to block plan to sell fighter jets to Turkey,â€ Politico, January 13, 2023.
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regional involvement (as mentioned above).146 By harmonizing the informal notification on F-35s
for Greece with the one on F-16s for Turkey, the Administration may be seeking to reassure
Greek leaders and popular opinion that the United States is not favoring Turkey over Greece.147
One journalist has argued:
A Greek acquisition of F-35sâ€”coupled with the ongoing procurement of two dozen 4.5-
generation Dassault Rafale F3R fighters from France and the upgrade of the bulk of its F-
16 fleet to the most advanced Block 72 configurationâ€”will give the Hellenic Air Force a
technological edge over its much larger Turkish counterpart. That will remain the case even
if Turkey secures this F-16 deal.148
In response to the news of a possible F-35 sale to Greece, Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu
called on the United States to â€œpay attentionâ€ to the balance of power in the region.149

146 CRS Report R41368, Turkey (TÃ¼rkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
147 Malsin and Salama, â€œBiden Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkeyâ€; Crowley and Wong,
â€œU.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.â€
148 Paul Iddon, â€œBalance of Power: Why the Biden Administration Wants to Sell Turkey F-16s and Greece F-35s,â€
Forbes, January 16, 2023.
149 Andrew Wilks, â€œTurkish FM travels to Washington seeking to seal deal for F-16 fighter jets,â€ Al-Monitor, January
17, 2023.
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Appendix. Maps, Facts, and Figures
Figure A-1. Turkey at a Glance

Geography
Area: 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas
People
Population: 83,047,706. Most populous cities: Istanbul 15.6 mil, Ankara 5.3 mil, Izmir 3.1 mil,
Bursa 2.1 mil, Adana 1.8 mil, Gaziantep 1.8 mil.
% of Population 14 or Younger: 23.4% (2020)
Ethnic Groups: Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 6%-11% (2016)
Religion: Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2% (2017)
Literacy: 96.7% (male 99.1%, female 94.4%) (2019)
Economy
GDP Per Capita (at purchasing power parity): $38,759
Real GDP Growth: 5.0%
Inflation: 73%
Unemployment: 10.8%
Budget Deficit as % of GDP: 4.5%
Public Debt as % of GDP: 37.5%
Current Account Deficit as % of GDP: 5.7%
International currency reserves: $67.1 bil ion
Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using
Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2022
end-of-year estimates or projections unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World
Economic Outlook Database; Economist Intelligence Unit; and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World
Factbook.

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Figure A-2. Turkish Public Opinion Polls

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Figure A-3. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey

Sources: Created by CRS using data gathered from the Department of Defense, NATO, and various media
outlets since 2011.
Note: All locations are approximate.

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Figure A-4. Map of Black Sea Region and Turkish Straits

Source: Nikkei Asia, March 2022

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Figure A-5. NATO Countries and Aspirants

Source: CRS Graphics. Map updated June 2022.
Notes: As indicated, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine are also formal aspirants for NATO
membership.

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Figure A-6. Syria Conflict Map

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Figure A-7. Some Areas of Aegean Dispute

Source: Greek Reporter, June 2022, at https://greekreporter.com/2022/06/09/turkey-challenge-greece-
sovereignty-16-maps/.

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Figure A-8. Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean

Source: Main map created by The Economist, with slight modifications by CRS.
Note: As stated elsewhere in this report, in 1983, Turkish Cypriots administering a portion of the island of
Cyprus proclaimed that portion to be the â€œTurkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,â€ though no country other
than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot
claim to be legally invalid.

Author Information

Jim Zanotti
Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRSâ€™s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
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copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R44000 Â· VERSION 93 Â· UPDATED
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