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Updated February 8, 2023
Iraq
The Republic of Iraq is strategically located in the central
government forces. U.S. officials note that Iraq’s security
Middle East region (Figure 1) and has large energy
forces depend on coalition support for some operations.
resources and a growing, diverse population. Its potential
Iraq’s government still struggles to meet the demands of its
and regional influence make it a venue for competition
citizens for more accountable, transparent, and responsive
between outside powers, including the United States and
governance. During mass protests in 2019 and 2020,
Iran. About 2,000 U.S. military forces are deployed in Iraq
security forces and politically aligned militias killed
at the invitation of the Iraqi government and provide advice
hundreds of demonstrators, but protestors succeeded in
and assistance to Iraqi security forces, including the
bringing down the government formed after the 2018
peshmerga forces of the federally recognized Kurdistan
national election and prompted changes to Iraq’s electoral
Regional Government (KRG). The Biden Administration
system. A caretaker government led the country through a
supports continued U.S.-Iraqi security cooperation and
severe economic and fiscal crisis in 2020 and 2021 but
encourages Iraqi leaders to fight corruption and respect
lacked a legislative mandate for new initiatives.
citizens’ rights.
Figure 1. Iraq
Neighboring Iran’s ties to some Iraqi parties and militias
complicate U.S.-Iraqi relations, and some Iranian
government-linked Iraqis call for the expulsion of U.S. and
other foreign forces from Iraq. In 2019, Iran-backed Iraqi
groups expanded attacks on U.S. targets, and in 2020, a
U.S. strike in Iraq killed Iranian Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani
and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) leader Abu
Mahdi al Muhandis. Iran retaliated with attacks on Iraqi
sites hosting U.S. forces. Intermittent attacks claimed by
Iran-backed Iraqi groups have continued, targeting U.S. and
Coalition forces—and their Iraqi hosts. The United States
has condemned a series of indirect fire and infrastructure
attacks in the Kurdistan region, including March and
September 2022 missile attacks from Iran.
The 118th Congress may consider developments in Iraq and
Iraq’s relationships with its neighbors in the context of
requests for U.S. foreign aid and defense assistance for
FY2024. Members also may consider steps to shape U.S.-
Iraq economic ties, mend relations between Iraq’s national
Sources: CRS, using ESRI and U.S. State Department data.
government and the KRG, meet humanitarian needs, and
Political Stalemate Ends. Rivalry,
promote human rights, including those of religious and
Corruption, and Oil Dependence Endure
ethnic minorities.
Following an October 2021 early election for Iraq’s
Background
unicameral legislature, the Council of Representatives
Iraqis have persevered through intermittent wars, internal
(COR), competition among Iraqi factions devolved into
conflicts, sanctions, displacements, terrorism, and political
stalemate over government formation. At issue was whether
unrest since the 1980s. The legacies of the 2003 U.S.-led
the party that won the most seats in the election—
invasion of Iraq continue to shape U.S.-Iraq relations: the
supporters of Shia Arab religious, social, and political
invasion ousted the dictatorial government of Saddam
leader Muqtada Al Sadr—would form a majority-based
Hussein and ended the decades-long rule of the Baath Party
government with Sunni and Kurdish parties and exclude
but ushered in a period of chaos, violence, and political
Sadr’s rivals in the Coordination Framework (CF), a
transition from which the country struggled to emerge. U.S.
predominantly Shia Arab coalition whose members include
forces withdrew in 2011, but conflict in neighboring Syria
some pro-Iran parties. Sadr’s supporters resigned from the
and divisive sectarianism in Iraq enabled the insurgent
COR in June 2022 in response to a court ruling that blocked
terrorist forces of the Islamic State organization (IS, aka
Sadr’s government formation efforts. Related protests and
ISIS/ISIL) to seize and exploit much of northwestern Iraq
armed confrontations escalated in mid-2022 before the
from 2014 to 2018. Iraqis leveraged new U.S. and coalition
October 2022 formation of a power-sharing government led
military support to reclaim ground lost to the Islamic State,
by the CF’s nominee, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al
but IS remnants retain an ability to operate in rural areas,
Sudani. Sadr’s movement is not represented in Sudani’s
especially in disputed territories between the Kurdistan
cabinet, marking the first time since 2003 that Iraqis have
region and areas to the south secured by national
formed a government that does not include all major
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Iraq
political factions. Sudani, like his predecessors, faces
PUK’s leading Talibani family shape PUK relations with
challenges posed by patronage, corruption, oil dependence,
the KDP and parties in Baghdad. Convictions of journalists
assertive neighbors, and armed non-state actors. Sudani has
and crackdowns on activism in the Kurdistan region since
pledged to govern for all Iraqis, pursue anti-corruption
2020 have increased foreign scrutiny of human rights there.
measures, and protect Iraq’s sovereignty. He has said his
Iraq’s government opposes Turkey’s military’s presence
administration supports the continuation of Iraq’s
and operations in the northern Kurdistan region, where
cooperation with the U.S.-led counter-IS military coalition,
Turkish forces target the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
including the continued presence of U.S. and other foreign
KRG officials have called on the PKK to leave the region.
forces for advisory and training purposes. His government’s
program calls for revising Iraq’s electoral law and holding
Partnership with the United States
an early election within a year. Many Iraqi observers doubt
After a two-year bilateral strategic dialogue, U.S. and Iraqi
the government will arrange the early election but expect
leaders agreed in July 2021 on the transition of the U.S.
CF parties to seek to revisit electoral law reforms that
military presence in Iraq to a noncombat advisory mission.
benefitted Sadrists and independents in the 2021 election.
President Biden reported to Congress in December
In August 2022, then-Finance Minister Ali al Allawi
2022 that U.S. forces remain in Iraq “to advise, assist,
resigned, writing that “a vast octopus of corruption and
and enable select elements of the Iraqi security forces,
deceit” threatens Iraq’s future. Prime Minister Sudani has
including Iraqi Kurdish security forces. United States
directed some actions against corrupt officials, and Iraqi
Armed Forces also provide limited support to the
authorities continue to investigate the theft of $2.5 billion in
North Atlantic Treaty Organization mission in Iraq.”
tax revenue during 2020 and 2021, which may implicate
officials in the previous government. In 2022, the Central
Congress has authorized counter-IS train and equip
Bank of Iraq instituted international payment transparency
programs for Iraq through 2023, and has appropriated
standards for certain transnational financial transactions.
related funds available through September 2024, including
Continued dependence on oil revenues and expansive state
aid to KRG forces subject to Baghdad’s approval. The State
liabilities left Iraq vulnerable to financial collapse in 2020,
Department and the U.S. Agency for International
as the systemic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and oil
Development (USAID) fund security, economic,
price declines exacerbated underlying economic and fiscal
stabilization, and democracy programs in parallel to
problems. Oil prices in 2022 exceeded Iraqi budget
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Defense Department
assumptions, but the government faces demands to expand
Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) and Global
public sector employment and provide additional cost-of-
Train and Equip (10 U.S.C. 333) security assistance.
living support to citizens. Moves to reduce state spending or
Since 2014, Congress has appropriated more than $7.7
public sector employment could prove politically sensitive.
billion for counter-IS train and equip programs for Iraqis.
Views from the Kurdistan Region
Since 2015, the U.S. government has obligated more than
Iraqi Kurdish self-government developed after the 1991
$405 million for stabilization of areas of Iraq liberated from
Gulf War. In 1992, Iraqi Kurds established a joint
the Islamic State, including funds for religious and ethnic
administration between Iraqi Kurdistan’s two main political
minority communities. The United States remains the top
movements—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and
humanitarian funding donor for Iraq and provided more
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—in areas under
than $251 million in humanitarian aid for Iraq in FY2022.
their control. Iraq’s constitution formally recognizes the
The Biden Administration renewed a sanctions waiver on
authority of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in
specific Iraqi energy purchases from Iran in July 2022; Iraq
areas that were under Kurdish control as of March 19, 2003.
withholds related payments in accordance with the waiver.
The United States cooperates with the KRG and supports
The status of U.S. diplomatic facilities in Iraq is mixed: the
the resolution of long-standing KRG-Baghdad disputes over
U.S. Embassy in Baghdad has suspended consular
oil production, the budget, territory, and security. Following
operations but remains open, the U.S. Consulate in Erbil
a 2017 KRG-sponsored independence referendum, national
remains open, and the U.S. Consulate in Basra has
forces reasserted control over some disputed territories.
remained closed since 2018.
Baghdad has maintained conditions on the transfer of funds
Since 2021, U.S. forces have conducted strikes in the Iraq-
to the KRG, contributing to the KRG’s fiscal strains. In
February 2022, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court
Syria border region and in Syria after attacks on U.S.
(FSC) found
the KRG’s oil and gas sector law unconstitutional
personnel and facilities in Syria and Iraq. These U.S. strikes
. KRG-
have targeted Iran-backed militia groups, including Iraqi
Baghdad negotiations continued amid government
militia groups such as Kata’ib Hezbollah and Kata’ib
formation talks during 2022, without agreement. In January
Sayyid al Shuhada. The executive branch reports to
2023, the FSC ruled against new national fiscal transfers to
Congress on U.S. military operations in Iraq consistent with
the KRG under the still-operative 2021 budget law.
the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF,
The Erbil-based KDP and the Suleimaniyah-based PUK are
P.L. 107-40), the 2002 Iraq AUMF (P.L. 107-243), and
the largest Kurdish parties in the COR and won the most
other laws.
seats in the KRG’s 2018 regional election. KDP leader
Masrour Barzani is KRG prime minister. His cousin
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
Nechirvan Barzani is KRG president. Historic KDP-PUK
Affairs
tensions appear to have resurged, as struggles within the
IF10404
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Iraq
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10404 · VERSION 40 · UPDATED